The Rise of China and US-Japan and US-ROK Alliances Developments Compared

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Introduction

Entering the alliance relationships with the superpower like the United States imposed on the junior partners the perennial dilemmas and problems such as varying degrees of restraints on their external behaviors, risks of entrapment and abandonment, and undue burden-sharing, in exchange for U.S. security guarantee.

Within the outer limits placed by the imperatives of U.S. strategy, however, Japan as well as South Korea resorted to hedging tactics in order to alleviate these alliance dilemmas and risks. Both Tokyo and Seoul, by employing various hedging tactics, tried to gain as much as possible from the U.S. strategy.

Both of them faced the twin risks of abandonment and entrapment during the Cold War years. Compared with the Japanese situation, however, South Korea was in a much more difficult position in devising and exercising hedging options not only because Seoul faced a more immediate and serious threat from the North but also because she was the outpost of the Cold War confrontation between Moscow/ Beijing and Washington.

Tokyo and Seoul also had to struggle with another dilemma: how to maintain or restore autonomy in foreign and security policies. In 1993 Bruce Cumings, professor of history at the University of Chicago made the following observation about US-

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Japan relations. The American architects of the postwar order "wished to situate Japan structurally in a world system shaped by the United States so that Japan would do what it should without having to be told". "In so doing," he added, "they placed distinct outer limits on Japan's behavior, and these limits persist today." In this sense, according to Cumings, "Japan has not entered a 'post-postwar' era."[1]

The key mechanism that set "distinct outer limits on Japan's behavior" throughout the postwar years was the system that had been created by the US-Japan security treaty of 1951. With the establishment of the system, Japan was placed under US hegemony. Since then Japan has struggled with the perennial dilemma of pursuing a more independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States while depending on the latter for security protection.

Like Japan, South Korea also had to struggle with the "distinct outer limits" set by the U.S. on her foreign and security policies. South Korea entered the alliance with the U.S. in 1953 in the aftermath of the Korean War that had broken out in June 1950. Since then, Seoul has depended on the U.S. for security protection against the threat from North Korea. The bitter memory of the Korean War among South Koreans and the continuing threat from the North left little choice for them but to endure the costs and risks involved in the alliance with the U.S. superpower during the Cold War years.

However, Seoul became more flexible in foreign and security policies when Kim Dae-jung, coming into office in 1988, adopted a 'sunshine policy' toward North Korea. This trend has gained momentum ever since the June 2000 summit between President Kim Dae-jung and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.

The post-Cold War years have witnessed the growing convergence of interests and threat perceptions between Tokyo and Washington, while there has emerged during these years the growing divergence of interests and threat perceptions between Washington and Seoul. The convergence and divergence of interests and perceptions among Japanese and Koreans have given rise to the contrasting approaches and orientations in their foreign and security fields vis-à-vis the United States. Why

has Korea become more assertive and why has Japan been unable to exercise a greater degree of autonomy, in foreign and security policies vis-à-vis Washington?

The paper will first address the two interrelated questions concerning the alliance. Chapter one will review the historical developments of alliance dilemmas and risks Japan and South Korea faced during the Cold War years. In chapter two, the paper will examine how they managed to alleviate such dilemmas and risks by exercising hedging options. In chapters three and four, the paper will address the question as to why Japan has not been able to move out of the outer limits set by the United States, whilst South Korea has made progress in its effort to gain more autonomy in foreign and defense policy in recent years. These two chapters will analyze a new constellation of forces that have emerged since the ending of the Cold War in order to explain why Japan and Korea have moved in different directions in their relations with the United States. And finally, the paper will end by offering some concluding observations.

1. Risks of Abandonment and Entrapment

Japan's alliance anxieties during the Cold War period revolved around entrapment rather than abandonment. Japanese fears of entrapment had existed even before the signing of the 1951 security treaty because the Korean War had been going on for more than a year by that time. The war lasted for three years, during which the US troops stationed in Japan were deployed to the theater on the Korean peninsula. A Japanese fear of entrapment was especially heightened when the Chinese leadership in Beijing made the decision to intervene in the war, further increasing the likelihood of the conflict escalating into the full-scale war between the U.S. and Communist China.[2]

There were two important reasons behind Japan's alliance anxieties at the time. One was more structural: as long as Japan was allied with the US, the bipolar nature of the Cold War confrontation inevitably increased the risk that Japan could

become a proxy target in conventional or nuclear conflict between the US and the USSR. Another had to do with the conflicting priorities that each party attached to the treaty. While Washington's priority was on Article 6 of the treaty focusing on regional conflicts in the "Far East", Japan's priority was on Article 5 that stipulated a possible deployment of US troops stationed on Japanese soil for protection of Japan at times of contingency. Given the US priority difference, Washington policy-makers often pressed Japan to play a larger security role beyond its territorial boundary in areas such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, or Southeast Asia where conflicts were considered more likely to occur.

Three crises over the Taiwan Strait also raised fears of entrapment among Japanese. The 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, the first of the three was initiated by Communist China's shelling of Quemoy, an island group lying just off the Fukien coast in September 1954. The Communist Chinese renewed bombardment of the islands in 1958, and the third and final Quemoy-Matsu crisis in 1962 was instigated by Taipei's troop deployments and rhetoric of liberating China from the Communist rule.[3] Since then potential sources of crisis over Taiwan between Washington and Beijing continued to be a serious concern among Japanese. Such concern persists in Japan even after the post-Cold War period because the Beijing leadership never abandoned the right to use force against Taiwan in case the latter should formally declare independence.

A Japanese fear of entrapment surfaced again when the Johnson administration began escalating the war in Vietnam by sending US marines to Da Nang in the spring of 1965. Throughout the conflict, Japanese facilities were employed for logistic support of U.S. forces in Vietnam. The US bases on Okinawa were especially sensitive because the island was under the US administration before its reversion to Japan in 1972. The US, without consultation with the Japanese government, could freely use the fuel and ammunition depots in Okinawa for B-52 bombing runs originating in Guam. Not only the North Vietnamese but also Moscow and Beijing strongly criticized Japan's involvement in the Vietnam War through the

US bases in Japan.[4]

A Japanese fear of entrapment was heightened again when the US-Japan joint communiqué was announced in November 1969 after the Sato-Nixon summit talks in Washington. In the communiqué both Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon acknowledged that South Korea and Taiwan were respectively essential and important factors for the security of Japan. The opposition parties severely criticized the Sato government for the security commitments to these Asian countries that had been made in exchange for the US promise to return the administration of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Their criticism was largely based on fears of entrapment.[5]

For those Koreans who had experienced the Korean War, a sense of entrapment was much more acute throughout the Cold War years. But they also faced fears of abandonment. In the 1960s, South Korea, along with Australia and New Zealand, made the decision to send its troops to Vietnam in response to the desire of the Johnson administration that wanted to make the war appear the joint efforts of the U.S. allies in order to avoid criticism of U.S. imperialist ambitions. President Park Chung-hee's decision was motivated by several factors. But the most important factor was his fear of abandonment. Park wanted to make sure that the U.S. economic and military assistance would not be scaled down or discontinued. As equally important were the U.S. considerations of reductions of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula.

In the minds of many Koreans, such fears were confirmed by Washington's attitude revealed during the three incidents provoked by North Korea. In each case, the U.S.'s reserved and lukewarm responses alarmed South Koreans, given the implications of the evolving U.S. policy of retrenchment that had been initiated by the Nixon Doctrine. On January 21, 1968, North Korean commandos attempted a raid on the South Korean presidential residence, the Blue House. These commandos' mission was to assassinate President Park and US Ambassador William Porter (1967-71). Park seriously contemplated retaliation against the North but the U.S. government not only announced that the U.S. would not retaliate but also explicitly cautioned that Washington would oppose any South Korean retribution.[6] Two days later North

Korea seized a U.S. naval intelligence ship the USS *Pueblo*, near the port of Wonsan. The action was not only a clear violation of freedom of maritime conventions and the eighty-three crewmen were captured as hostages. Nevertheless, Washington declined all requests from Park for retaliatory air strikes against Pyongyang. On April 1969 North Korea's Mig fighters shot down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane ninety miles off the North Korean coast. The U.S. again reacted mildly and took no punitive actions. Neither did Washington make any demands for compensation. The U.S. lukewarm responses to these North Korean provocations in 1968 and 1969 seriously undermined South Korean confidence in Washington's alliance commitments to defend the South from the North.[7]

South Koreans' fears of abandonment were further reinforced when Nixon approved the March 1970 NSDM 48 that called for the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from Korea.[8] The decision was communicated to Ambassador Porter by cable during the last days of March 1970, along with the instructions to begin conversations on the matter with President Park. Park was infuriated by this decision. According to Porter, the president even demanded that the U.S. "would not be allowed to take our troops out," and that she "had no right to do that."[9] The final terms stipulated in the joint communiqué issued in February 1971 included the deactivation of the American Seventh Infantry Division from reserve positions, removal of three Air Force squadrons, and pullback of the Second Infantry Division front-line positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Porter testified later that Koreans' concern about the American commitment "was voiced on many occasions" around this time. It was "not a matter connected only with the withdrawal of troops." A July 16 1970 cable to Washington from a USIA official who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul also confirmed it. It read as follows:

"When the Korean officials began to realize that the Nixon Doctrine would be applied to them, irrespective of the 'special relationship' they feel exists between them and the United States, their professions of support for that doctrine ceased and were replaced by expressions of deep anxiety."[10]

This first major reduction of forces from South Korea since the Korean War shocked not only the Korean leadership but also the public on the whole. For, there were general feelings among South Koreans that the ROK would be exempt from the Nixon Doctrine because of its troop commitment in Vietnam. The South Korean troops in Vietnam numbered fifty-thousand at their height, making an important contribution to the allied effort to the Vietnam War. The unilateral and abrupt U.S. decision not only infuriated President Park but the National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution expressing that the Korean loyalty, proven in Vietnam, had been betrayed by Washington.

Though Japanese fears of entrapment were stronger, fears of abandonment, it should be born in mind, were latent among many Japanese because the 1951 treaty legally absolved the U.S. of the obligation to defend Japan. Nishimura Kumano, then Director of the Treaty Bureau who had negotiated the treaty later admitted that it was the most serious deficiency inherent in the treaty.[11] According to the treaty provision, it was up to US decision-makers to decide whether they would risk a global nuclear war with the USSR over the defense of the Japanese homeland.

Such fears of abandonment surfaced intermittently. At an informal news conference in Guam in July 1969, President Nixon formulated what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. According to this doctrine, the US would continue to provide for the nuclear umbrella for any allies threatened by a nuclear power. However, in conventional military conflicts the US would furnish some military and economic assistance but would expect the ally to assume the primary burden of defense.

U.S. policies of retrenchment during 1969-71 that had ensued in line with the doctrine instilled concerns among Asian countries including Japan about a U.S. resolve. Japanese political leaders feared that the U.S was going to disengage not only from the war in Vietnam but also from Asia as a whole. Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi's article contributed for *Foreign Affairs* in 1969 reveals it. "A simple transfer of peacekeeping responsibilities in Asia from the United States to Japan," wrote Aichi, "is out of the question because of Japan's constitutional limitation and the great

disparity in both actual and potential military power between our two countries. Japanese public opinion is simply not prepared for such an undertaking." "It is reasonable to assume," he thus concluded, "that for some time to come there will be no substitute for the continuing presence of American deterrent power to counter effectively any designs for large-scale military adventures in the area."[12]

During the early 1970s, Japan's entrapment fears abated as the Nixon administration began to pursue both détente with the USSR and rapprochement with China. The relaxation of tensions between Washington and Moscow also had a positive impact on Japanese-Soviet relations, which in turn contributed to the amelioration of Japanese perception of the Soviet threat.

Nixon's July 1971 announcement to visit China, however, badly shook the Sato government because Sato had been a loyal ally in the US containment of China ever since Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, under a strong pressure from Washington in 1951, was eventually forced to recognize Taiwan as the legitimate government of China instead of the Beijing regime. Though Nixon's China shock per se did not necessarily result in Japan's fear of U.S. abandonment as such, it certainly undermined Japanese confidence in the United States as a trusted ally. Japanese government circles often lamented that "Asakai's nightmare" had finally come true.[13] Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan (1961-66) testified in 1972 that "the most serious damage done by the style of the new (China) policy has been in our relations with Japan." Then he went on to say that "it is a tragedy that it has been carried out in such a way that it has very greatly strengthened the Japanese doubts about our reliability and also about the possibility of an equal relationship with us."[14]

Japan's fear of U.S. abandonment was mollified by two factors at the time. The first of these factors had to do with the changed security and political environment in East Asia that had been caused by the Nixon shock. The Japanese did not necessarily view Nixon's announcement as incompatible with the traditional Japanese interest in China. Reischauer accurately observed that "the détente between the two

countries is not itself the problem." Washington was moving on China policy "in the right direction they have always wanted us to."[15] Consequently, the new Japanese government led by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka who had replaced Sato, decided to capitalize on Nixon's China opening as an opportunity for Japan to restore diplomatic relations with Beijing.[16] Secondly, Washington also made extensive efforts to restore Japanese confidence by apologizing for the secrecy of the entire process of U.S.-China talks and subsequently briefed Japan on the contents of bilateral negotiations. U.S. government officials assured that there were no "secret deals" undermining Japanese security interests. At the January 1972 summit in Washington, and at the Honolulu meeting of August 31 and September 1, Nixon gave assurance respectively to Sato and Tanaka about U.S. security commitment to defend Japan.[17]

South Koreans' reaction to the détente was different from that of Japan. In contrast to Japan's reduced threat perceptions, Seoul continued to regard North Korea's threat as basically undiminished. They feared Soviet-American détente would result in a downgrading of alliance ties with the United States. Moreover, in their perceptions, US-China rapprochement was motivated by the erosion of U.S. hegemony under the impact of the war in Vietnam, which meant for Seoul a rise of Communist China's influence. President Park felt increasingly isolated and Korea's fear of abandonment intensified. A U.S. fact-finding group, after interviewing top South Korean foreign officials, defense ministry, Blue House, and intelligence officials reported in November, 1972 as follows:

"In particular, President Park was said to have felt increasingly, beginning with the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, that Korea would not be able to rely on the United States in the future as it had in the past. Many believe that this feeling intensified as U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam, as the new US policy toward China was revealed, and as President Park concluded that US interest in Asia in particular, and in foreign affairs generally, was decreasing."[18]

What the South Korean president did in response was to start a dialogue with North Korea to reduce tensions on the peninsula. Moreover, he began pulling out

ROK forces from Vietnam to shore up defense at home and the pullout was completed in fifteen months.

During the Carter years, both South Korea and, to a lesser degree, Japan felt increasing anxieties about the administration's disengagement from Asia.

Jimmy Carter, even before he decided to run for the 1976 presidential campaign, had been flirting with an idea of withdrawing all U.S. troops from Korea. When he came into office, Carter approved Presidential Review Memorandum 13 in January, 1977, ordering a broad review of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, including "reductions in U.S. conventional force level." In early May, he signed a document which called for a pullout of 6,000 combat troops of the Second Infantry Division by 1978, eventually withdrawing all remaining troops by 1982. His decision reflected the general neo-isolationist mood among the American people to avoid entanglements in regional conflicts in Asia after the debacle in Vietnam. At the same time, Carter, in his letter of February 15, 1977 to President Park, specifically linked the pullout decision with US objections to his regime's human rights violations.[19]

Due to strong criticism from Asian allies as well as high-ranking Administration officials' advice against the pullout, Carter eventually reversed his policy. On July 20, 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to the President, announced the president's decision to suspend withdrawals of U.S. ground combat units. However, the pullout plan had already raised fears of abandonment among ROK officials.[20] Park decided to resort to a tactics of not openly opposing the proposed withdrawal but instead asking for compensation to maintain the North-South military balance. At the time, Seoul's ability to influence Carter was substantially limited by the Koreagate scandals and human rights controversies. So South Koreans relied on the assistance of pro-Seoul forces in Japan as well as a growing domestic opposition to the pullout among Congressional critics and government circles in the United States.[21]

ROK's fears of abandonment abated considerably during the Reagan years. Unlike Carter, President Ronald Reagan regarded South Korea as an important ally that

had stood up as a front-line defense citadel against the Soviet threat. The common anti-communist and capitalist ideologies, rather than the Park administration's human rights record, took priority as the rationale for U.S. support. When Chun Doo-hwan grabbed power after the assassination of Park in October, 1979, Reagan invited Chun to Washington. The U.S. president publicly assured Chun that Washington had no plans to withdraw troops from the Korean peninsula. He also informed that the U.S. was prepared to sell Korea F-16s, the most modern fighters in the U.S. inventory.[22]

In September, 1983 the Soviet Union shot down a civilian airliner that had strayed into Soviet air-space, killing all passengers, which was followed a month later by a North Korean assassination attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan during his state visit to Rangoon, Burma, killing fifteen top-level officials, including Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk. Reagan responded to these incidents by going through with the planned visit to Seoul in November 1983. During his visit, Reagan inspected forces at the DMZ, demonstrating the firm US commitments to the defense of the ROK. In the meantime, Washington resumed the previously suspended security consultative conferences between defense departments. Following the approval in 1981 of the sale of advanced F16 Falcon Fighters that had been denied by Carter, the Reagan administration in 1986 deployed Lance missile systems and supported the ROK's five-year Force Improvement Plan (1982-87), boosting the morale of the Korean people.[23] Through these and other efforts to consolidate the U.S.-ROK alliance, Reagan "was successful in greatly reducing South Korean fears of U.S. abandonment, prevalent during the preceding 1975-79 period."[24]

The Reagan administration also embarked upon the consolidation and expansion of the U.S.-Japan alliance to counter the Soviet military build-up in East Asia. The Japanese government took some measures to meet Washington's desire for larger burden-sharing. Thus Japan's risks of entrapment increased in the 1980s, especially during the Reagan-Nakasone years.

Washington and Tokyo moved toward increased military cooperation in the late

1970s and throughout the 1980s. Following the adoption of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976, the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation was approved by the Japanese cabinet in November 1978. The Guidelines marked a turning point in this direction, paving the way for further bilateral defense cooperation, such as joint military studies between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), as well as joint exercises between the two militaries. It also marked the beginning of a growing voice of the military vis-à-vis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance in Japanese defense decision-making.[25] Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki during his visit to Washington surprised many Japanese by referring to the relationship as an "alliance" (a taboo word in Japanese politics at the time) in May 1981. He also made a speech at a national press club to the effect that Japan would assume responsibility for the defense of sea-lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.[26]

When Yasuhiro Nakasone succeeded Suzuki as prime minister in November 1982, he accelerated U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. Nakasone, just before his visit to Washington in January 1983, made two important decisions to demonstrate his seriousness for defense cooperation between the two countries. He subdued the reluctant Ministry of Finance officials and pushed through a 5.6% increase in the 1983 defense budget. He also decided to allow the transfer of Japanese military technology to the United States by amending the 'three principles' prohibiting exports of arms including military technology transfer. At a Reagan-Nakasone summit in January 1983, both leaders confirmed the vital importance of the alliance. Moreover, Nakasone even referred Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Pacific during his breakfast meeting with a *Washington Post* owner. The Nakasone administration also expanded capabilities to defend sea lanes of communication up to one thousand nautical miles in the north western Pacific region.

Nakasone's willingness to share greater responsibilities within the alliance matched the Reagan administration's strategy of dealing with the Soviets from strength. The defense guidance for the 1984-88 fiscal years approved in March 1982 by Secretary

of Defense Casper Weinbeger assumed that the NATO area and the Middle East oil region were considered strategically inseparable and defense forces were to be interchangeable between the two areas. To block the concentration of Soviet forces in the above areas in times of contingencies, according to the Pentagon planners, "forces may be shifted from the western Pacific to other regions if needed."[27] In other words, the primary purpose of the planners was to enlist Japanese air and submarine support to deter a potential Soviet advance in Northeast Asia while the U.S. Seventh Fleet met contingencies in the Persian Gulf. According to the scenario, Japan was expected to complement the U.S. strategy by containing the bombers and battleships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and to protect the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the sea-lanes.

This war scenario suggests that, should a war break out in the Middle East, Japan would most likely be drawn into a war involving the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus Japan's risks of entrapment increased during the Nakasone-Reagan years.

2. Hedging Tactics

Christopher W. Hughes, professor of international relations at the University of Warwick who examined Japan's postwar security relations with the United States, pointed out that Japanese policymakers fashioned various responses to the alliance dilemmas and risks. The hedging options, according to him, included "evading and temporizing", "acquiescing and standing aside", "emphasizing domestic political and constitutional restraints", "obfuscating and delimiting", "adding or withholding military capability", "seeking a like-minded regional partner or partners", "committing and partially retracting", and "intimating non-cooperation."[28] His analysis and observation on U.S.-Japan security relations can be applied to U.S.-South Korean security relations. South Korea also resorted to various hedging tactics to deal with the security dilemmas and risks. This chapter will examine some of these hedging tactics

both Tokyo and Seoul employed to manage their alliance relationships with the superpower.

(1) U.S.-Japan security relations

This section will focus on the factors rather than the hedging tactics per se that enabled Japan to maintain a degree of autonomy or gain as much as possible within the outer limits set by the U.S. upon Japanese security and foreign policies.

A U.S. briefing paper dated November 8, 1967 highlights what Washington policymakers regarded as obstacles in pushing Tokyo for increasing Japan's defense capability as well as burden-sharing. The document listed six factors as the obstacles "that have inhibited an accelerated Japanese defense build-up in the postwar period." These obstacles contained (1) a lack of a sense of attack from the Soviet Union or Communist China, (2) constitutional restrictions, (3) widespread pacifism, (4) concern about an adverse reaction from formerly Japanese-occupied countries, (5) the Japanese public's continuing "nuclear allergy", and (6) a continuing reluctance to divert resources from economic goals to defense.[29] From a Japanese perspective, these factors prevalent among the Japanese public provided for various useful tactics for negotiating with the U.S.

It is well-known that Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida during his meeting in early 1951 with John Foster Dulles, chief of the U.S. delegation, resisted his demands for rearmament of Japan mainly on two grounds. Given the tottering economy, argued Yoshida, Japan should concentrate on postwar reconstruction and economic development rather than spending for rearmament. In addition, he brought out the constitutional restraints as the rationale against the rearmament.

The results were mixed. Yoshida's tactics of resistance may have slowed down Japan's pace for rearmament. However, Yoshida, at the same time, conceded to Dulles' demands by submitting a Japanese plan for limited rearmament. The Japanese plan, "initial steps for rearmament" dated February 3, 1951, called for establishment of Japanese security forces composed of the army and the navy as well as establishment

of a Ministry of Security.

The Japanese reluctance to divert resources from economic goals to defense continued to be an important rationale for hedging tactics until the late 1970s and the constitutional restraints prohibiting major rearmament remain a powerful bulwark even today against dispatching JSDFs for participating in combats overseas.

Different conceptions of national security and divergent threat perceptions between Japan and the U.S. also provided for a persistent rationale for Japanese policymakers to evade or obfuscate its security obligations. While the U.S. conception of national security stressed the military component, the Japanese counterpart regarded the non-military aspects as more important in advancing Japan's national security.

Typical of such thinking was Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (July, 1960 to October, 1964) whose security conception was colored by his perception that the world was becoming increasingly interdependent and economics was the major driving force in the current and future trend of international relations. Ikeda's belief was further reinforced by his encounter with the burgeoning European Economic Community in Western Europe. After his tour to European countries in November 1963, Ikeda delivered a speech at the Hibiya Hall, Tokyo on the 29th to the effect that the EEC would become stronger economically, and would have the power to deter war. He also emphasized in the speech that the world was becoming interdependent and no country would be prosperous in isolation or without mutual cooperation.[30]

Such a conception of national security among many Japanese precluded a major regional military role for Japan. For example, in February 1961, a Japanese Ambassador to the Unite Nations stated publicly that JSDFs should participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations in the future. His statement stirred controversy in the Japanese Diet and the opposition parties demanded his resignation. Not only did the Ambassador have to retract his statement but Prime Minister Ikeda admitted that the existing law prohibited JSDF units from being deployed overseas.

The escalation of the Vietnam War roughly corresponded to the administration of Eisaku Sato (November, 1964 to June, 1972). The escalation of the conflict

severely strained bilateral relations. However, Sato steadfastly supported the U.S. policy in Vietnam. He clearly understood that Japan's support for the U.S. effort in Vietnam was essential to achieving the reversion of Okinawa that he regarded as the administration's top priority. During these years, the Japanese government emphasized Japan's contribution "in the non-military aspects of organizing peace." When the Asian Development Bank was established in November, 1966, Japan pledged $200 million for the fund, equal to the U.S. capital contribution.[31] His tactics of cooperation eventually paid off. Sato's steadfast support for the U.S. war efforts in Vietnam as well as his administration's cooperative efforts in political and economic fields contributed to Washington's decision to return the administration of Okinawa to Japan.

At the end of the Johnson presidency, the State Department Policy Planning Council made the following observation about Japan's role in the 1970s and beyond in the U.S. strategy.

"Japan's primary efforts over the next decade will most likely be directed towards the expansion of her economic and political influence in East Asia (and in the world more generally). She will probably not devote substantially greater resources to the development of her military power, certainly not to the extent of creating forces capable of playing a significant role in regional security beyond her own immediate territory."[32]

The same document pointed out that "a major regional military role for Japan" was precluded by the domestic political forces in Japan that opposed such a role. It also noted "the sensibilities of other Asian countries to the resurgence of Japanese nationalism and power." Thus State Department experts concluded that these factors would present "insuperable obstacles to a regional military role for Japan for a long time to come." Given such constraining factors, what Washington could envision as a future scenario was to encourage Japan to have a capability to deploy forces abroad in peace-keeping operations under U.N. or other international auspices in the next decade and beyond.

Japanese policymakers during the Cold War period were able to take advantage of these factors that allowed them to employ various tactics to hold down further militarization, resist a larger security role beyond the defense of the homeland, or to hedge against risks of entrapment and abandonment.

As we shall see, however, these conditions, to use the words of the above-mentioned 1968 State Department briefing paper, "diminished in importance," particularly in the post-Cold War years.

(2) U.S.-ROK security relations

U.S.-ROK security relations were severely tested when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. President Rhee Syng-man was not an easy collaborator for the United States. Throughout the war, he openly insisted on unifying two Koreas by military means, severely straining relations with the Republican administration which desired to contain the conflict as much as possible. Not only did Rhee refuse acceding to an armistice but also tried to hinder the armistice negotiations by unilaterally releasing communist POWs in June 1953 or threatening to leave the United Nations command. He eventually agreed to an armistice agreement but only after he gained a billion-dollar economic reconstruction program, the training and equipping of a 700,000- man army, and the signing of the US-ROK mutual security treaty in October 1953 that committed the U.S. to the ROK defense. Lee's recalcitrant tactics paid off.

When the Vietnam War escalated in the spring of 1964, as already discussed, a fear of entrapment increased in Japan. However, South Koreans found themselves in a risk of abandonment. The ROK governments had been under U.S. pressures for possible reductions of Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds as well as decreasing U.S. forces in Korea since the early 1960s. By 1964 MAP funds for Korea were actually reduced to $153 million, putting the ROK military modernization program in jeopardy.

Under the circumstance South Koreans saw an opportunity in the escalation of

the Vietnam War to reverse the U.S. Congressional mood to cut military and economic aid for Korea. In September 1965 the Park Chung-hee government ventured into an entrapment tactics by deploying ROK combat troops to Vietnam. This tactics of entrapment in reverse allowed Seoul to renew requests for various forms of military and economic assistance. Moreover, the tactics "effectively suspended U.S. efforts at reducing both American and Korean military force levels".[33]

After the 1968 Blue House raid and a series of Pyongyang's provocations in June, a ROK sense of vulnerability increased markedly. Then, came the Nixon administration's announcement to withdraw the U.S. Seventh Division from Korea, despite President Park's vehement protests. The decision made on the heels of the Nixon Doctrine shocked South Koreans. Seoul's fears of abandonment reached a peak at this point, which compelled Park to resort to a secret nuclear weapons development program in 1972. By the fall of 1975 the ROK had negotiated an agreement by which France would provide the reprocessing plant. A secret cable to the embassy in Seoul sent by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Washington shows that U.S. officials were alarmed at its impact on "its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan." "This impact," they feared, "will be complicated by the fact that ROK nuclear weapon's effort has been in part reflection of lessened ROKG confidence in U.S. security commitment, and consequent desire on Park's part to reduce his military dependence on U.S."[34]

Nixon administration officials including Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and his successor Donald Rumsfeld who visited Seoul in August 1975 and May 1976 respectively, put strong pressures upon Park to give up the plan. Park begrudgingly canceled the French contract under veiled U.S. threats to "review the entire spectrum of its relations with the ROK."

But this tactics of bold action paid off because the US side felt it necessary to address their security concern. "Given U.S. attitudes," observed Richard Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, "one had to admit that South Korea had some reason for their concern over their future security."[35] Consequently, in return for cancellation

of the contract, Washington offered a number of incentives, including guaranteed access to reprocessing when needed by the ROK and access to additional technology under a science and technology agreement.

As already discussed, the Carter years gave rise to fears of abandonment both in Tokyo and Seoul. These shared concerns led both governments to cooperate with each other in security and political fields. According to Victor Cha, the period from 1975 to 1976 witnessed the emergence of bilateral cooperation in response to the events in Indochina, and the period from 1977 to 1979, in response to the Carter plan calling for U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula.[36]

Convergent perceptions of U.S. disengagement from Asia compelled both Tokyo and Seoul to seek greater bilateral security cooperation. Both countries resorted to a tactics, to use Professor Hughe's expression, of "seeking a like-minded regional partner or partners." For example, in meetings with officials of the Gerald Ford administration in August 1975, Park stated that Japan should be included in any security dialogue on Korea. When Ford met Prime Minsiter Takeo Miki at a Washington summit in August 1976, the joint communiqué directly linked the ROK security with that of Japan, which was welcomed by Seoul. During Vice President Walter Mondale's visit to Japan in February 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, in response to Carter's pullout plan, urged the U.S. president to provide a compensatory military-aid package for the ROK. During the March 1977 Carter-Fukuda summit, Fukuda asked the president to implement a gradual reduction of troops over the long-term period rather than the complete withdrawal by 1982. Michael Armacost, then a National Security Council staff member, said "it will have extraordinary adverse consequences in Japan" to withdraw troops without providing compensating aid as promised. The Japanese government's insistence, combined with Park's tactics of collaboration with Tokyo, paid off, contributing to Carter's reappraisal of the pullout plan.[37]

3. The Rise of China and the Redefinition of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the post-Cold War Years

When the Cold War ended, it was presumed that Japanese diplomacy would gain more room for maneuverability and autonomy vis-à-vis Washington as the concomitant disappearance of the 'Soviet threat' has made Japan less dependent on US security protection than it had been in the Cold War years. Such an expectation proved to be false. On the contrary, the post-Cold War records of US-Japan relations seem to show that Washington policymakers have succeeded in integrating Japan further into the US global strategy. In his 1997 book, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, remarked that Japan was America's 'protectorate.'[38]

The previous chapter analyzed Washington's strenuous efforts to remove obstacles to U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and Japan's larger security role. The U.S. success in this clearing effort partly explains why Japan is still in the grip of U.S. hegemony.[39] But there are more important reasons behind Japan's continuing subordination to Washington. This chapter explores how and why Japan has not been able to restore more autonomy in foreign and defense affairs in the new post-Cold War environment.

The process of redefining the US-Japan security treaty after the end of the Cold War presented opportunities for both Japan and the US. For Japan, it was an opportunity to restore more flexibility and autonomy in foreign and security policy whereas, for the US, it was a chance to make the bilateral alliance more effective for the US global strategy. One of the most important objectives for the US government to initiate this process was to integrate Japan more firmly into the US's post-Cold War East Asian security strategy at a time when the Japan-US relationship seemed to be drifting under the impact of the ending of the Cold War.

The pattern of behavior that had characterized the postwar US-Japan relations was more or less repeated here. Washington initiated this process, successfully integrating Japan into its Asian strategy.

The sequence of events illustrates this. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* of February 1995 outlined the US global strategy. It was followed in the same month by the completion of another report, *US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (the Nye report) which delineated US goals and a strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. In tandem with Washington's preparations, Tokyo also set out to produce the new 'Outline of National Defense Programme', which was approved by the Ryutaro Hashimoto cabinet in November 1995. The new Outline made it clear that it would place more emphasis on 'regional contingencies' rather than the defense of Japan proper. In April 1996, the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security was issued during President Bill Clinton's visit to Japan. In the Joint Declaration, both Hashimoto and Clinton agreed to conduct a review of the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in order to update the alliance and enhance bilateral cooperation.[40]

The public release of the revised Defense Guidelines in September 1997 marked a new era in US-Japan security relations because it provided the basis for more effective bilateral defense cooperation in time of a regional crisis. Japan decided on a more definitive role (rear area support for US forces in regional contingencies) in responding to 'situations in areas surrounding Japan' that affects Japan's peace and security. The expression 'situations in areas surrounding Japan' embodied in the revised Guidelines was explained as 'not geographical but situational' so that the Japanese government could avoid the complications arising from answering the question of whether or not the concept included the Taiwan Strait.

It is clear that at the heart of this redefinition process were two challenges that both Tokyo and Washington faced at that time: the 1993-94 crisis triggered by North Korea's nuclear weapons development program and the rising power of China, including the Taiwan question. Policymakers both in Washington and Tokyo deliberately focused on the crisis on the Korean peninsula, which helped the Japanese government to capitalize on North Korea's threat to contain the critics.[41]

Far more crucial throughout the redefinition process, however, was the rising

power of China. Given the growing influence of China, the US-Japan security treaty system was still viewed as the linchpin for US hegemony in East Asia, and Japan would have to play a larger security role within the outer limits set by the US.[42]

Policymakers in Japan shared the perception concerning China with Washington. One of the new trends between Japan and China in the mid-1990s was the emergence of the simmering rivalry between the two countries. Since then, Chinese and Japanese competitive impulses have loomed again as a key factor in their relationships.[43] Later during the Junichiro Koizumi government, such impulses found their expression in Beijin's refusal to support Tokyo's membership to the UN Security Council.

In the course of the complicated interaction of events affecting Sino-Japanese relations in the mid-1990s and after, the prospect that China would become a real power was registered in the minds of Japanese government officials and the public. This growing concern in Japan, that China would become more competitive and intractable in the bilateral relationship, prompted Japanese policymakers to ask for US reassurance regarding the reliability of the security treaty. It is in this context that we should understand the Nye initiative and the redefinition of the security treaty that finally led to the new Guidelines. In essence, Japanese policymakers were willing to go along with the redefinition of the security treaty as a result of their growing anxiety about China's intentions and her role in the East Asian security environment.

This perception of the rising China explains why Japan chose to reintegrate herself more deeply in the US global and regional strategy. The same factor also explains why Japan has not been able to capitalize on the ending of the Cold War (or the disappearance of the Soviet threat) to restore more autonomy in foreign and defense policies in the post-Cold War era.

Such an image of China as an emerging rival tends to reverberate with a Chinese view of Japan, and vice-versa. One of the important consequences of the redefinition process was the change in Chinese perception of the US-Japan security treaty. From Sino-Japanese normalization in the early 1970s until the end of the Cold War,

China had valued its role as a counter to Soviet hegemonic ambitions in East Asia. She had also appreciated the alliance's role in capping Japanese military options and ambitions. Faced with the stronger, more effective alliance as well as Japan's larger security role envisioned in the 1997 Defense Guidelines, China began to feel more suspicious of the bilateral alliance, making it clear that Taiwan should be explicitly excluded from the definition of the expression 'situations in areas surrounding Japan.' Washington and Tokyo, however, were deliberately ambiguous regarding Taiwan coverage in this definition.[44]

The issue of Japan's role in the U.S. Missile Defense system further complicated the situation. It increased Chinese fears that their joint role in MD would further strengthen bilateral collaborative efforts against China. From the Chinese point of view, the US-Japan alliance increasingly appears an important leverage to manage the rising power of China so that she will respect and follow the international rules of the game laid down by the US. In their view, a growing number of Japanese government officials have come to embrace such a view.

As the above analysis shows, the triangular relationship involving Tokyo, Washington and Beijing is inherently unstable. This raises the potential question of abandonment for Japan. Two points should be noted in this context.

Firstly, one factor that tends to further complicate the trilateral relations to Japan's disadvantage is the history question. The mutual suspicions of the other's motives and goals between China and Japan have been compounded by China's wartime experience with Japan, namely, Japan's nineteenth-and-twentieth century invasions of China, its war crimes and its inability to offer what the Chinese consider a clear apology and a 'correct' view of history. The growing gap in mutual perceptions of histoty held by both Chinese and Japanese is likely to drive Japan into closer defense cooperation with the US.

Conversely, what is more worrisome for Japan is that a growing number of foreign and defense experts in the Washington community began to point out that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine had not only

adversely affected Japan's relations with Asian countries but also were going to bring about the consequences inimical to US interests. Kent Calder, a specialist on US-Japan relations and East Asia made the following observation at the time.

"Seasoned U.S. diplomats suggest privately that the Yasukuni issue is more damaging to Japanese regional influence now than it was even two or three years ago, because China is emerging as a skilled diplomatic player that can use the history card more effectively to marginalize Japan than previously due to its growing political and economic clout."[45]

If this kind of situation is allowed to continue, there is a potential danger that Japan could be isolated diplomatically from other Asian countries. An isolated Japan unable to influence Asian countries is not welcome from the U.S. point of view because the credibility and effectiveness of the US-Japan alliance would diminish in the region. A decline in the strategic and political value of Japan to the US would enhance the likelihood of abandonment, a consideration to be born in mind from a long-term perspective.

The history question is not the only worrisome factor for Japan that may increase her risk of abandonment. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the US has attempted to lead the world in order to organize international relations along the lines of liberal norms and principles. A postwar Japan has been firmly integrated into this liberal world order through the occupation reforms led by the U.S. The U.S., however, failed to incorporate the Soviet Union into liberal international relations in the immediate postwar years when Moscow eventually rejected the offer of loans as well as the Marshall Plan aid. Washington then decided to keep the Soviet Union out of the orbit of liberal relations. This signaled the beginning of the Cold War. In this context, Washington's China policy in the post-Cold War years can be seen as part of the continuing liberal project, an attempt at a second postwar reconstruction after the first experiment with the Soviet Union resulted in failure.[46]

More recently, the Clinton administration's policy of integrating China into the network of liberal economic exchange illustrates the US effort to redefine the

boundaries of liberal international relations. This project points to a possibility that the American-organized liberal international order may be able to accommodate even the authoritarian system of China through the liberal domain of international economic exchange. Such a strategy is based upon the assumption that the integration of China into liberal economic relations would help the US make more viable other domains of liberalism, especially individual and group rights, self-determination, and liberal governance.

We should not lose sight of the fact that this U.S. liberal project to integrate China into liberal international relations continued even under the Bush (junior) administration which described U.S.-China relations as "complex.". In July 2001, both Washington and Beijing agreed on the terms of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has been the most rapidly growing market for US export for the last two decades. During 2000-2005, US exports to China grew by 160%, while its exports to the rest of the world rose by only 10%.[47] In 2002, China overtook the US as the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment.[48] In 2008, bilateral trade hit $409 billion dollars, making China the second largest U.S. trading partner after Canada, the third largest U.S. export market, and the largest source of U.S. imports. From June 2002 to June 2008, China's holdings of U.S. securities as a share of total foreign holdings of U.S. securities rose from 3.9% to 11.7% and its ranking increased from fifth to second after Japan. Moreover, total U.S. FDI in China in 2007 was $28.3 billion, making China the 21st largest destination for FDI.[49]

Not only does the US have large economic interests in China but the two countries have expanded other avenues of cooperation: a semi-annual vice-ministerial Senior Dialogue on strategic issues which aims to facilitate candid communication, build understanding, prevent miscalculation, and exchange perspectives at a senior level; growing government, military, and people-to-people exchanges in the fields of counterterrorism, nonproliferation, UN reform, health, energy, environmental protection, and culture; multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC;

coordinating the organization and conduct of Six Party talks to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

What happened to the UN Security Council resolution initiated by the Japanese government to sanction North Korea for having launched seven missiles in July 2006 indicates the degree to which interests between Washington and Beijing converged. The Japanese government wanted a resolution which included coercive measures based on chapter 7 of the UN charter, but when China threatened to veto it, Washington chose to compromise, agreeing to the non-coercive resolution without reference to chapter 7. The final outcome was all the more revealing when we recall that Washington had publicly praised and supported the Japanese government's initiative throughout the negotiations at the U.N.

A possibility of abandonment and entrapment has potentially increased in the post-9.11 years, given the poor handling of the war on terror waged by the Bush administration and its blatantly unilateral foreign and defense policies. Because of the growing gap in military capability between the US and other countries, Bush administration officials were tempted to use military power unilaterally. The American unilateralism in this context meant that the more tightly Japan was integrated in the US global and regional strategy, the more likely Japan was to be trapped in a situation where she had no alternative but to support or get involved in a conflict initiated by Washington. Hence, a risk of entrapment would increase on the part of Japan. The US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a case in point.

On the other hand, the Bush administration's 'coalition of the willing' approach suggested that Washington, depending on the mission, would decide which country to team up with. This kind of approach made the alliance partner felt quite uneasy as it tended to increase a risk of abandonment. A defense policy expert at the Japan Defense Agency confided in June 2003 that "We can no longer take the Japan-US alliance for granted." "We feel as though the alliance is no longer a given," he mused, "and that we are constantly being tested by the United States. It's very stressful."[50] Given the changing nature of the US-Japan alliance as illustrated by

the Bush administration's "coalition of the willing" approach, a risk of abandonment increased. What is more, should this approach continue, it might eventually risk shaking up the foundation of the alliance.

In this connection, it is also important to recall the main features of the Bush administration's China policy. The Bush administration officials pursued a hedging strategy toward China. They wanted to maintain extensive and mutually beneficial economic ties with China but at the same time needed to address uncertainty and growing security concern with China's current and future intentions.

The U.S. hedging strategy was and is based on two basic assumptions. On the one hand, China today has a continued stake in maintaining the current status quo. On the other, many Chinese leaders are dissatisfied with certain aspects of the current international system such as Taiwan's status and the US position of dominance in the international structure of power. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick remarked to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York in September 2005, that the United States desired China to be "a responsible stakeholder" in the international system and that such a China was welcome. On the other hand, many Americans worried, he cautioned, that China might become "a fire-breather." In other words, many countries hoped that China would pursue "a peaceful rise" but "none will bet their future on it."[51] That is why Washington had to pursue a strategy of hedging against China.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, the Ministers of both countries reached an understanding on "common strategic objectives." Included in the common strategic objectives was the phrase, "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue." The joint statement also urged China "to improve transparency of its military affairs."[52] As expected, China reacted strongly to its reference to the Taiwan Strait but Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura in May 29, 2005 countered by saying that Taiwan had been covered all along by the US-Japan alliance. The strategic ambiguity that had been built in the new Defense Guidelines and the law

on emergencies in situations surrounding Japan of May 1999 appeared almost written off by this remark. The interim report of October 2005 on the military transformation and realignment of US forces in Japan again noted "the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty" and underscored "the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region."[53]

It is clear that these phrases were written into the documents with China in mind. The shared perception in Tokyo and Washington that not only Pyongyang but also Beijing was a source of the "unpredictability and uncertainty" aroused China's suspicion and fear of America and Japan's intentions. Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing University and Director of the Institute of the Communist Party of China pointed out at the time that "many Chinese still view the United tates as a major threat to their nation's security and domestic stability." As a result, "Beijing fears," noted Wang, "that the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan alliance is coming at the expense of China and that the growing closeness is motivated by the allies' common concern about the increase of China's power."[54]

What makes the matter more complicated for Japanese diplomacy is China's own strategic calculations. Chinese policymakers seem to think that China can gain strategically by pitting the US and Japan against each other whenever such opportunities arise. The Chinese understanding of "strategic partnership" with the US can be seen in this light. According to this logic, the more independent foreign policy Japan pursues vis-à-vis the US, the better. Japan is required to steer between Scylla and Charybdis in the delicate situation created by the trilateral relationship. Japan has to pursue a more independent policy without being trapped into China's strategic manipulations of benefiting from any divisions between Japan and the US.

In the changing strategic landscape in East Asia, Tokyo's fear of abandonment at the Six-Party Talks by Washington increased when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who had succeeded to Koizumi in September 2006, took the position that it would not provide any aid under the agreement until its dispute with Pyongyang over the abductions of Japanese citizens was resolved.

President Bush apparently supported Japan on the question of Japanese abductees but the administration's attitude toward the issue became more ambivalent as US-DPRK bilateral talks advanced on the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility as well as a declaration of all its nuclear program, the key components of the October 3, 2007 agreement on "Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" at the Six Party Talks.

The pressing question for Japan was whether she would be able to make substantial progress on the abduction issue in parallel with the U.S decision to rescind the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism. To prevent the worst case scenario, that is, Washington's abandonment of Japan on the question of abductees, the Japanese governments found it necessary to continue their support for the Bush administration's war on terrorism. Accordingly, with the special measure law for the reconstruction and assistance for Iraq going to expire in July, 2007, Prime Minister Abe announced the decision to extend it for another two years. The law allowed the JSDFs operating from Kuwait to transport U.S. troops and equipment to Iraq. When the anti-terrorist special measure law of October 2001 expired in November 2007, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who had come into office after Abe's resignation in September 2007, passed a new law in January 2008 after four months of political bickering at the Diet, finally allowing the MSDF unit to resume its refueling mission for the US-led coalition forces in the Indian Ocean. As this political process shows, Japan's fears of abandonment have not gone out of sight.

On the contrary, the poor handling of his campaign pledge to move U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa our of Japan or at least out of Okinawa Prefecture again raised the question of abandonment as Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama began to pursue a policy of moving the base out of Japan to Guam. Due to rising tensions between North and South Korea in recent weeks and an increasingly assertive China, coupled with the uncompromising attitude of Obama administration officials on the issue, Hatoyama found it increasingly difficult to move the base to Guam. Abandonment of this plan resulted in a sharp decline of

his popularity, forcing him to resign in May 2010 as prime minister after eight months in office.

Hatoyama's abortive Futenma relocation plan reflected his desire to reduce Tokyo's security dependence upon Washington while attempting to forge warmer and closer links with Asian neighbors. It also reflected sentiments of a growing number of Japanese for more independence in foreign and defense policy that will not easily go away. As long as such school of thought will not disappear with the fall of Hatoyama, Japan will continue to face fears of abandonment.

4. Rising Korean Nationalism and US-ROK Security Relations in the post-Cold War Years

China's dynamic economic growth and the simultaneous military build-ups have changed the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific. China's influence has grown steadily for the past two decades both politically and strategically. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has further added to the instability and uncertainty in the strategic landscape in the region.

The U.S. government responded to these changes by initiating the major military reform and transformation to meet the new threats, which in turn affected the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances in a significant way. As a result, both Japan and Korea have been forced to adjust respectively to the U.S. military realignments.

The major security challenges in Northeast Asia that affect the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance today are the rising power of China, North Korea's nuclear weapons development program, and the 'war on terrorism.' When we examine the changes in U.S.-Japan security relations that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, it is clear that these three security challenges, coupled with the dynamics of domestic politics, have been the main driving forces for the changes as already described in chapter 3. When policymakers both in Tokyo and Washington began to redefine the Japan-U.S. security treaty in November 1994, they did so

with the rising power of China and the crisis on the Korean peninsula in mind.

The U.S.-ROK alliance faced more or less the same security challenges. However, South Koreans have accommodated more readily to China and North Korea than Japanese. For example, Korea and China have increasingly found their interests and perceptions converging. Both have expanded their areas of cooperation, notably in economics. In 2004, South Korea's trade surplus with China was $25.7 billion. South Korea invested more in China in 2003 than it did in the United States.[55] China is now Seoul's largest export market and foreign investment destination.

Both Beijing and Seoul share the view that sanctioning North Korea would prove dangerous and counterproductive as they would not only lose any leverage to exercise influence on Pyongyang but also drive the regime into a corner. Both are concerned that they are the most to suffer from turmoil in North Korea because of their geographical proximity.

Japan-China relations, on the other hand, are more complicated. Economic relations have been steadily expanding between the two. Conversely, the bilateral political relations have fluctuated considerably in recent years. As already discussed, the strained relations are due to the factors that are specific to the bilateral relationship: bitterness in China toward Japan rooted in Japan's colonization of Taiwan and brutal occupation of China during the first half of the twentieth century; the Chinese perception of the lack of true remorse in Japan concerning its historical legacy; Japan's resentment toward China because of her perception that Beijing uses history as a political weapon to keep Japan disgraced and subjugated as China rises; increasing competition between Beijing and Tokyo for leadership and influence in the region in the midst of rising nationalism in both countries; the expanding role of Japan in the U.S.-Japan alliance targeting the Taiwan Strait and China; disputes over the Senkaku Islands and China's offshore oil and gas fields under the East China Sea such as the Chunxiao gas fields.

These issues are absent between Beijing and Seoul. On the other hand, the same or similar issues are causes of tensions between Tokyo and Seoul; the history

question, the dispute over Takeshima (Tokuto) Islands; South Korea's perception of the expanding U.S.-Japan alliance to the disadvantage of Seoul.

For these reasons, those same challenges that have emerged in the security environment in East Asia led to divergence in threat perception and approach between Seoul and Washington as well as that between Beijing and Tokyo.

Disparate perceptions of the threat posed by North Korea have created fissures between Washington and Seoul. South Korea's fear of the North has relatively diminished, while U.S. policymakers continue to regard North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons as unacceptable and threatening to the peace and stability in the region. Officials in Washington are also worried that Pyongyang might provide nuclear materials to international terrorists. South Koreans, on the other hand, see as great risk to themselves coming from the US, depending on what the US might do to deal with North Korea's nuclear threat. Such perceptions among the South Koreans tended to be reinforced as influential figures in the Bush (junior) administration and outside argued that the only way to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state was through a change in the regime in Pyongyang. At that time, Seoul was even willing to play the role of mediator between Washington and Pyongyang.

On the China question, as already pointed out, Washington's attitude toward Beijing is ambivalent, collaborating with each other in the war against terrorism and proliferation, while they remain potential strategic rivals. President Bush himself once publicly described the bilateral relations as "complex."

South Korea, on the other hand, has steadily expanded economic relations with China. Moreover, China is an important player in security matters in the region. As far as North Korea's nuclear weapons program goes, China's role weighs more heavily in Seoul's consideration of security matters than in Tokyo or Washington. In this vein, South Korea's position in the Six-Party Talks often appears closer to China's. Both of them emphasize the peaceful solution to the problem and do not want the collapse of the North Korean regime, while 'neo-conservatives' in Washington would welcome such an eventuality. Neither do they want to see the U.S. government

taking drastic action such as surgical air strikes at North Korea's nuclear reactors facilities.

Given the increasing convergence of interests between Beijing and Seoul, the latter is very cautious about the concept of "strategic flexibility" of the USFK proposed by Washington as part of the US military transformation and realignment on the Korean peninsula. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, testified in June 2003 that "US regional defense postures need to be based on global considerations, not just regional." In other words, the US regional approach to military readiness should conform to global priorities of mobility, increased capability of US forward forces, combined and joint operations, forward infrastructure to support long-range attack capabilities, and promotion of greater allied contribution.[56] The US looked to broaden the role of the US-ROK alliance to extend beyond the peninsula. The concept of "strategic flexibility" aims just that. Washington plans to integrate the USFK more fully into the US global military posture. The USFK's primary role since its deployment in Seoul has been to deter North Korea's attack on the South as well as to repel any possible invasion from the North should such a contingency occur. This should remain the primary role of the USFK from Seoul's point of view. However, the Pentagon now plans to expand the responsibilities of the USFK to encompass off-peninsula contingencies.

The ROK government is willing to cooperate with the US for the stability and peace in the region, including the fight against the war on terrorism. In fact, in August 2004, 3,600 US troops stationed in S. Korea were allowed to be deployed in Iraq. South Korea also deployed its own troops to Iraq. However, the Pentagon's concept of "strategic flexibility" poses serious implications for South Korea. It is a fear of entrapment. Park Kun-young, Professor of International Relations at the Catholic University in Korea, explains a possible scenario as follows: If a conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, the US is likely to ask for the deployment of the USFK (and USFJ) to the theater. China may launch missiles at USFK bases in Korea in an attempt to hamper or delay US reinforcement efforts. Korea would then

be forced to take action for self-defense against China.[57]

Unlike Japan's attempt to maintain "strategic ambiguity" on the Taiwan question in US-Japan defense cooperation, South Korea is more explicit about what would be Seoul's response in the event of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. President Roh Moo-hyun said in his address at the Korean Air Force Academy in March 2005 that the U.S. forces in Korea were very important for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and that they would continue to play such a role in the future. At the same time, he made it clear how South Korea would react to a contingency in Northeast Asia.

"There have been some voices worrying about possible expansion of the role of U.S. Forces in Korea. This has to do with what is called strategic flexibility. However, it should be clarified that we will not be embroiled in any conflict in Northeast Asia against our will. This is an absolutely firm principle we cannot yield under any circumstance."[58]

It is understood that this statement was made with a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait in mind. China wants to avoid a situation that could jeopardize the economic relationship with South Korea. South Koreans share the view. China is an important player in the Six-Party Talks with important implications for South Korea's security. Given the increasing convergence of interests and perceptions between the two, Seoul is very reluctant to get involved in what is construed as US moves to contain or pressure China.

An overall effect of diverging threat perceptions and differing approaches vis-à-vis North Korea and China reflect the resurgence of Korean nationalism in recent years. With a growing confidence in Korea's achievements in prosperity, democratization and defense capability, North Korea is now seen less as a threat than as a burden. President Roh once declared that South Korea would raise her eyes beyond the Korean peninsula and play a balancing role in Northeast Asia. For this purpose, he said, Korea would "take the lead in building a cooperative security structure in the region."[59]

The resurgence of nationalism also reflects significant realignments of domestic politics in Korea in the past decade or so. Since the election of Kim Dae Jung to the presidency in 1998, "progressive forces" had been on the rise and Roh Moo-hyun's narrow victory in the 2002 presidential election became a major step in the reshaping of domestic politics. The April 2004 electoral success of the left-of-center Uri Party after legislative supporters of Roh had split from the Millennium Democratic Party signaled the decline of the long dominance of the conservatives mainly represented by the Grand National Party. In the 2002 presidential election, twice as many voters in the 20s and 30s chose Roh of the Millennium Democratic Party. Those over age 50 overwhelmingly voted for Lee Hoi-chang of the Grand National Party. Given the fact that South Koreans in their 20s and 30s accounted for 45% of the voting age population, their political preferences and voting behavior have important implications for Seoul's foreign and defense policies.[60]

Surveys since 9.11 show the declining support for the status quo of the US-ROK alliance and a trend of declining pro-American sentiment. North Korea is seen no longer as serious a threat. South Koreans are as equally concerned with the potential U.S. provocations as with an attack from the North. In 2004 more than half of young South Koreans thought that the US benefited more from the alliance than did the ROK.[61]

Given the generational shift that reflects a different world view from that of the previous generation as well as the resurgence of nationalism among the younger generation, recent trends toward more independent and more assertive South Korean foreign and defense policies are likely to grow in the future.

The Roh administration's decision to develop "self-reliant defense capabilities" reflected such nationalist aspirations. According to President Roh, "self-reliant national defense is the essence of sovereignty" and operational control was "the basis of self-reliant national defense."[62] Then it was natural that the president decided to put the issue of regaining wartime operational control on the table for negotiation with Washington. The US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established

in 1978. Since then the CFC had been commanded by a four-star US Army general, who currently heads the USFK and reports to the National Command and Military Authorities of both countries. The CFC deputy commander is a four-star ROK Army general. In December 1994, the peacetime operational control was handed over to the ROK side but the American CFC commander has continued to exercise operational control in time of war. In the eyes of critics, this state of affairs has been considered a symbol of the loss of Korea's sovereignty and an epitome of Seoul's subservient diplomacy toward Washington.[63]

"Within ten years," said President Roh during his address at the Korea Air Force Academy in March 8, 2005, "we should be able to develop our military into one with full command of operations."[64] Korea wanted to set 2012 as the target date for recovering wartime operational control. In response, the US side indicated its willingness to advance the target date by two years to 2009 at the 9th ROK-U.S. Strategic Policy Initiative (SPI) meeting in Seoul in July 2006.

The issue was intensely debated in Korea. The critics opposed the transfer for the following reasons: (1) a likelihood of a weakening US defense commitment and a loss of certain combined military capabilities; (2) an increasing likelihood of reduction and withdrawal of US troops from South Korea; (3) a large increase in ROK defense expenditures; (4) a possibility of Pyongyang's misjudgment and miscalculation; (5) managing contingencies in the North.[65]

The 38th Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that took place in Washington DC in October 2006 could not reach an agreement on a roadmap on the transfer of wartime operational control. Finally, at a meeting held in Washington on February 23, 2007, the defense secretaries of both countries agreed on the target date as April 2012 as desired by Seoul.[66]

The sudden revelations in June 2003 of U.S. plans to reduce troops by one-third totaling 12,500 men by the end of 2005 shocked many Koreans. They were thrown into consternation, for one thing, because the decision was made as part of the long-term global military reform and transformation led by the Pentagon, and, for another,

because the announcement came only two months after the Roh government had made the decision to dispatch ROK troops to Iraq, despite the fact that half of the ruling Uri party members had opposed it.

South Koreans' anxieties of abandonment were further reinforced by the repositioning issue. As part of the military transformation, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld informed Seoul of his decision to move the 2nd Infantry Division away from the DMZ to south of the Han river and relocate 7,000 troops of the 8th Army at Yongsan out of Seoul and further south by 2006. This repositioning made the notion of tripwire deterrence questionable, raising a fear of abandonment in case of emergencies on the Korean peninsula. From Korea's standpoint, it cast the United States as less committed to the defense of South Korea.

The repositioning issue caused not only a fear of abandonment but also that of entrapment. The Koreans perceived the move to be lowering the threshold of U.S. pre-emptive attack on North Korea since the USFK troops are no longer "hostage" to North Korea's retaliation in the event of a U.S. first-strike scenario.

President Bush's rather inflexible handling of the negotiations on North Korea's nuclear issue also fueled their dissatisfactions.[67] The Bush administration, at least during the first term, not only raised the threshold for negotiation by adding new agenda on the table such as human rights issue and reduction of North Korea's troops concentrated near the DMZ but also took the position of "not rewarding bad behavior". President Bush's inclusion of North Korea in the "axis of evil" message to Congress in January 2002 reflected the administration's strong antipathy to the Kim Jong Il regime. Many Koreans at the time suspected that the Bush administration aimed at a regime change. A collapse of the regime was the worst case scenario of entrapment for South Koreans as they would suffer most from such an eventuality. Washington's treatment of North Korea contrasted with the growing sentiment among South Koreans who viewed the North as the object for reconciliation and accommodation with the final reunification in mind.

In the latter half of Bush's second term in office, administration officials changed

their tactics from no bilateral talks and no rewards for "bad behavior". The change of tactics led to a Berlin meeting in mid-January 2007 between Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. They apparently made a deal to "advance the process" of ending financial sanctions that had been imposed on the North for counterfeiting U.S. dollars and money laundering at Macao's Banco Delta Asia. The Six-Party meeting in mid-February reached an accord which required North Korea to stop and seal its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days and allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors of nuclear facilities in the initial stage of the agreement. In exchange, North Korea would receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. In the meantime, the United States would also initiate a process to remove North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism.

South Korea which had been pursuing North-South dialogue under the "sunshine policy" toward Pyongyang welcomed these developments at the Six-Party Talks. Accordingly, Seoul's sense of entrapment was somewhat mollified. But the trend toward drifting in the alliance continued. Victor Cha called the alliance situation in 2003 a "close call."[68]

From another perspective, the trend toward drifting not only indicates the continuing sense of abandonment among South Koreans. It also suggests that Seoul's effort to gain more autonomy in foreign policy and security affairs will continue unabated.

Conclusions

The above analysis shows that the alliances with the United States posed common dilemmas and problems for Japan and South Korea. It also reveals that the two countries often responded differently to risks of abandonment and entrapment, reflecting their own perceptions of interests and threats.

One of the common dilemmas and problems was that both Tokyo and Seoul had to struggle with the "outer limits" imposed on their external behaviors by the U.S. The dilemma for Japan was that the closer the bilateral defense cooperation became,

the more firmly Japan tended to be integrated into the U.S. global strategy. In the post-Cold War years, the major factor that has pushed Japan further into the hands of the United States is the rising power of China and the looming competitive impulses for leadership and influence in East Asia between Tokyo and Beijing. Under the circumstance, Japanese policymakers feel it necessary to make sure Japan will not be abandoned by the United States.

Policymakers in Washington currently pursue a strategy of hedging toward China. They also find the U.S.-Japan alliance in U.S. interest as it will help make China's external behavior more restrained and attentive to U.S. power and interest. To that end, the United States must make sure that Japan will not step out of the "outer limits" that she managed to place on Japan's external behavior during and immediately after the occupation period. Since then, Washington has been generally successful in maintaining Japan as a U.S. collaborator.

This does not mean that Japan did not attempt to restore more autonomy in security affairs from the U.S. In April 1954, a Korean Ambassador said to Dulles that the Koreans wanted a mutual defense treaty like the one between the U.S. and Japan. Dulles replied that Washington would be perfectly willing to give the ROK a treaty like the Japanese treaty. "The Japanese Treaty," explained Dulles "imposes no obligations upon the United States. We have no obligation under the treaty to come to the defense of Japan if it is attacked. On the other hand, it gives us perpetual rights to station our forces in Japan." The ROK "can have that kind of treaty, if it wants, but it would be crazy to take it."[69] Therefore, the successive Japanese governments made efforts to amend the unequal provisions of the security treaty of 1951, first initiated by Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo during the Ichiro Hatoyama administration and subsequently taken over by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who finally managed to sign the new treaty in 1960.

Japanese policymakers also resisted with some success the U.S. pressures for increasing Japan's defense capability under the U.S. Cold War strategy of containing the Soviet Union and Communist China. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and

the prevailing mood of the public who had supported it offered a powerful rationale for policymakers in Japan to argue against U.S. demands for larger burden-sharing.

However, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, coming into office in September 2006, publicly vowed that his cabinet would make the constitutional amendment its top priority agenda. Abe's challenge to Article 9 of the constitution was the most recent expression of the so-called neo-nationalists' attempts to gain more independence in Japan's foreign and defense policies vis-à-vis Washington. The LDP draft amendment announced in October 2005 aimed at legitimating the JSDFs and allowing for Japan's right to exercise collective self-defense. These "neo-nationalists" believe that to gain the right to exercise collective defense currently prohibited by Article 9 is the first step toward more equality vis-à-vis the United States in defense as well as foreign policy.

The movement toward the constitutional amendment reflects the long-term structural changes taking place in Japanese politics since the end of the Cold War. The combined Socialist and Communist representation in the Diet has declined from 14% to 3% over the past decade. Before the advent of the Hatoyama government, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, the Komei Party had occupied two-thirds majority in the lower house needed to begin amendment of the constitution. The recent ascendancy of "defense hawks" of the younger generation in the Democratic Party of Japan further underscores the left's collapse.

Unlike Japan, South Korea during the early Cold War period faced a more immediate, direct threat from North Korea. Consequently, she had less room for flexibility and maneuverability in the fields of defense and diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States. As long as the threat from the North remained serious, South Koreans had to pay more costs than Tokyo to maintain the alliance with the U.S. for fear of abandonment. They did so by venturing themselves into situations of voluntary entrapment by deploying ROK troops to America's war in Vietnam and, in the post-Cold War years, to Bush's war in Iraq.

When South Koreans' fears of abandonment markedly increased during the détente in the 1970s, the Park government countered the US move by embarking upon a nuclear development program. When they saw fears of abandonment shared by Japanese, Seoul took an initiative in getting support from Tokyo. Despite the historical antagonism between the two countries, they cooperated with each other to keep the U.S. engaged in Asia or reaffirm its commitment to the alliances.

In the post-Cold War security environment in East Asia, the perceptions of threat and interest between Tokyo and Washington converged as Japan began to play a larger security role. As a result, Japan now faces higher risks of entrapment and larger burden-sharing. A loose and expansive interpretation of Article 9 that had been made by the successive LDP governments culminated in the Koizumi cabinet's decision to deploy ground JSDFs to areas such as the Indian Ocean and Samawah, southwest of Basra, Iraq. With the special measure law for the assistance and reconstruction for Iraq extended in July 2007 for another two years, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) C-130 cargo planes operating from Kuwait continued to transport soldiers of the multinational forces in Iraq, U.N. workers and cargo to Baghdad and Arbil in northern Iraq, even though the Nagoya High Court ruled in April 2008 that the ASDF's mission in Iraq included activities that violated the war-renouncing constitution. With the alliance cooperation extending beyond the defense of Japan proper, Japan's risk of entrapment and larger burden-sharing is likely to increase.

At the same time, Japan's risk of abandonment has not necessarily disappeared because areas of cooperation between Washington and Beijing are likely to increase in the future. In this context, it should be noted that the February 2007 report prepared by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye mentioned the existence of those elements in the US who advocates a US-China condominium as the logical structure for East Asia. The same report also pointed out that some warn against too much reliance on the US-Japan alliance for fear that Washington, along with Japan, should be isolated in Asia due to the tensions between Japan and China and between Japan

and Korea over historical issues. They urge a shift in US long-term strategy to China. The report rejected such an alternative suggesting instead, that Washington "should encourage good relations among all three." The significance of this bipartisan report is that their idea of "getting Asia right" is not longer the US-Japan alliance vs China but trilateral cooperation in the region. Hence, from a long-term perspective, a risk of abandonment will remain a nagging problem for Japanese policymakers.[70]

South Korea faces risks of abandonment and entrapment as well. As we have seen, Seoul, for fear of abandonment, even had to get the country directly involved in the past wars initiated by the United States. In the Bush administration's war against Iraq, about 2,300 ROK troops were committed to assisting U.S. forces in Iraq.

U.S.-ROK security relations since the end of the Cold War witnessed the disparate perceptions of North Korea's threat, the resultant difficulties in aligning respective policies toward Pyongyang, U.S. troop reductions stationed in South Korea as part of the Pentagon's global military transformation initiatives, fears of U.S. abandonment or U.S. preemptive strike against the North, and growing anti-Americanism particularly among a younger generation in South Korea. The combined effect of all these factors was that South Koreans became more assertive in their security and foreign policies. During the Bush administration years, ROK officials even appeared to play the role of mediator between Washington and Pyongyang, reflecting their perception at the time that the main problem on the Korean peninsula lay in the dispute between Washington and Pyongyang, not necessarily between Seoul and Pyongyang.

With President Lee Myung-bak coming into office in February 2008 who pledged to strengthen US-ROK relations, together with the shift in the Bush administration's policy from non-negotiation to negotiation with North Korea beginning in January 2007, the differences between Washington and Seoul over North Korea's nuclear issue seem to have narrowed. However, North Korea continues to test the U.S.-Korean alliance. In April 5, 2009, Pyongyang launched a long-range ballistic missile. Three weeks later, Pyongyang went ahead with the second nuclear testing. To counter these moves, the Lee government decided to participate in the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI) led by the US. During President Lee's visit to Washington in mid-June, the joint statement specifically mentioned for the first time that the US would provide South Korea with the 'nuclear umbrella'.

The Obama administration's assurance, however, has not necessarily lessened Seoul's fear of abandonment. Washington explored a possibility of redesignating North Korea as the 'terrorist state'. However, in early February 2010, President Obama sent a report to the Congress to the effect that they could not find enough evidence to do so. In March, a South Korean warship was sunk by a North Korean torpedo, killing 46 South Korean sailors. The incident triggered sharp exchanges between Seoul and Pyongyang, heightening tensions on the Korean peninsula. President Lee decided to ask the Obama administration to postpone the agreed date of April 2012 for the transfer of the wartime operational control from the US commander to the ROK commander, to which Washington subsequently agreed.[71]

The question of the transfer of the wartime operational control has raised an anxiety among the conservative elements in Korea that it would weaken the alliance. On the other hand, a fear of entrapment continues to worry Seoul, given the Pentagon's plan to deploy the USFK in contingencies off the peninsula. In December 14, 2009, Walter Sharp, the commander of the USFK remarked in Washington that the USFK should be deployed globally outside of the peninsula, which suggests that South Korea may be drawn into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait in cases of emergency.

notes

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