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## Voice, Time, and Dialectics: Critique of the political economy of memory and imagination, Part V<sup>1)</sup>

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### Abstract

This article is the fifth (Part V) of a series of six parts. Alloying philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural studies, this series seeks to articulate a relationship between the essential nature of Western philosophy's metaphysical method of dialectics and the structure of memory in human beings. Covering Western philosophers from ancient to modern, such as Plato, Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, Lacan, Derrida, and Jakobson, and quoting social, cultural, and psychopathological materials such as *Sarashina Diary* (the daughter of Sugawara no Takasue in 11c Japan), *Funes the Memorious* (Jorge Luis Borges), *Norwegian Wood* (Haruki Murakami), *1984* (Apple Computer television commercial), autism spectrum disorder, late capitalism, and even the Quest Atlantis boom, this series endeavors to elucidate the nature of memory in the neurotypical (NT), the so-called normal, most human beings. The so-called normal can be defined only by comparing it with the so-called abnormal. In conclusion, the author elucidates that it is the being of 'the otherness' that always and already permeates the normal and stable working of memory. It is that which frames the structure and content of the ego. In particular, the heteronomous nature of memory and imagination capabilities of typically developed individuals is depicted.

Part I traces the position of imagination from Augustine to Descartes and, Part II, its position in Kant and Heidegger. Part III examines Hegel's theory of imagination with precision. Hegel transforms the Kantian productive imagination into one that makes "sign." Part IV closely examines what "sign" and "mechanical memory" are in Hegel and discusses the enigma of the synchronized function of "sign-making fantasy." In this Part V, I work on the riddle of "sign-making fantasy" and discuss the theoretical possibility of a "pseudo-synchronic circuit" that synchronizes our fantasies, using contemporary linguistics and psychology.

Compared with Kant's visual imagination, Hegel's imagination is phonetic. Hegel

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considered voice to be the medium that connects intuition and language. Voice is a physical existence, but it also has the property of disappearing. The voice of another person enters one's inner self. One's voice can be superimposed on others' voices. Voices can be superimposed on letters and images. Due to its nature as a transparent medium, voice produces a "sign." However, Hegel also states that the negativity of voice, which denies the directness of intuition, is still "abstract negativity." The "concrete negativity" of truth, which transforms linguistic symbols into something internal, is the intellect. However, Hegel does not explain concrete negativity. This "concrete negativity" transforms recollection into memory. It is a component that accompanies speech and a force that enables us to overwrite the voices of others on our own, internalize others' language, and simultaneously retain it within ourselves as an external object. It is the light that could rescue "Funes the Memorious" from the darkness of recollection's fullness and drag him out to the dialogue with others. In Part VI, we will examine the nature of this "concrete negativity" mentioned by Hegel, based on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy in Jakobson's famous paper on two types of aphasia.

Key words: imagination; memory; Hegel; Derrida; sign; voice; concrete negativity

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Kant also thought of imagination not merely as the capacity to recollect (reproductive imagination), but as the ability to generate transcendental schemata that link intuition and understanding in cognition, or the ability to produce aesthetic subjects in artistic endeavors (productive imagination). When Kant discusses the imagination, the examples he cites are often pictorial and visual—lines, triangles, circles, and the like. One might say they are spatial. For this spatial cognition to be synthesized as recognition, a negation is required to grasp space as space. This is precisely why time as the other to space becomes necessary—as a “place” where spatial awareness overlaps and forms a single cognition. This explains why Kant (and Heidegger) considered imagination as temporality. However, as discussed previously, concluding that imagination is temporality prevents any investigation of the establishment of temporality itself. In that case, visual images are inserted into temporality as a pre-provided sequential framework. On the other hand, Hegel seemingly linked the operation of imagination to what would today be called “speech-acts”: “[I]ntelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking” [Hegel (Enz-III) 277 (§459)]. Hegel considers the movement from the pictorial cognition of the world to linguistic cognition to be the movement of intelligence. This is why he conceives of an imagination that created “signs.” The understanding of phenomena by intelligence using “signs” indicates a move away from sensation toward abstractness as a concept. Earlier I quoted Hegel’s statement that that living in the memory is being spirit, but memory here can be considered a reproduction that is integrated using language, and not a coincidental reproduction of immediate experiences. Hegel believes that living in speech-acts, rather than in pictorial recollections, and verbalizing spatial and visual cognition, is living as general intelligence. (This is reflected in Hegel’s high regard for abstract linguistic arts, rather than concrete visual arts, in his theory of art.)

According to Hegel, living in a linguistic space is truly living as the spirit. Moreover, what is notable about Hegel’s theory of imagination is his linkage of the verbalization of life with temporality when considering the following: “The intuition—in its natural phase a something given and given in space—acquires, [however,] when employed as a sign, the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. Such is the negativity of intelligence; and thus the truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in *time* (but its existence vanishes in the moment of being [Ibid. 271 (§459)].” Speech-acts have an element that encourages the occurrence of temporality. What could that element be? Derrida sought it out in “voice.” Hegel continues: “...if we consider the rest of its external psychical quality, its *institution* by intelligence, but an institution growing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. This institution of the natural is the *vocal note* (*Ton*), where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas—*speech* (*Rede*) and, its system, *language* (*Sprache*)—gives to sensations, intuitions, conceptions, a second and higher existence than they naturally possess—invests them with the right of existence in the *ideational realm* [Ibid. 271 (§459)].”

Having stated this, Hegel draws on the findings about languages of the world while arguing about the relationship between phonetic language (spoken language) and transcription language (written language). European languages use alphabetic writing, which creates signs from the phonetic language, as a written language, while China uses hieroglyphic writing for its written language. Alphabetic writing is, in short, a language in which the sounds that are read match the symbols that are written. In European languages, denotations in letters approximately represent sounds pronounced as shown. Because this denotation is faithful to the sounds, it is an expression with a higher level of abstraction that is further separated from the sensory phenomena that are the sources of the meanings of the words in the first place and images associated with them. By contrast, the cultural sphere centered on China mainly uses hieroglyphic writing, which is a writing method that retains more remnants that represented the original sensory meaning with pictorial symbols. Here, the characters directly represent the concrete sensory meaning. If these two are compared, alphabetic writing has a higher level of encoding with signs and is thus more intelligent, according to Hegel: “In particular, *hieroglyphics* uses spatial figures to designate *ideas*; *alphabetic writing*, on the other hand, uses them to designate *vocal notes* which are already signs. Alphabetic writing thus consists of signs of signs” [Ibid. 273 (§459)]. “Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent” [Ibid. 274 (§459)].

In Japan, which exists in the *kanji* (Chinese characters) cultural sphere and moreover imported from China a writing method to denote its phonetic language, the situation is somewhat complicated, and it seems that we can communicate in a “language” (*Sprache*) of more advanced intelligence, in Hegel’s words, through deliberate phonetic readings that differ from the meanings that the denotations themselves had and overlapping meanings, and by severing denotations and readings. However, leaving aside the question of how correct Hegel’s argument about comparisons between alphabetic and hieroglyphic writing methods is from today’s linguistic perspectives, it is important to examine what he is actually trying to say. According to Hegel, Leibnitz was previously stimulated by the hieroglyphic writing method in China and sought to create a universal language by developing a perfect written language. This means a language in which each sign is a unit that perfectly expresses a single phenomenon. His models were numbers, chemical symbols, etc. Leibnitz believed that creating such a language would significantly affect the efficiency and development of exchange between different peoples, particularly in the realm of academia. However, Hegel determined that this line of thinking was mistaken: in fact, communication between peoples brought about the necessity and development of alphabetic writing methods. That is what had happened in Phoenicia. In Europe, interactions between peoples, including sometimes fierce conflicts, had occurred frequently since ancient times, and cultural and intellectual exchange had been plentiful, which was exactly why the more abstract alphabetical writing method had developed. The development of the alphabetic writing method promoted the evolution of phonetic languages in Europe. By contrast, in China, which uses a hieroglyphic writing method, phonetic language is underdeveloped: “The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing, by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious ...

Perfection here consists in the opposite of that *parler sans accent* which in Europe is justly required of an educated speaker. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphabetic writing [Ibid. 274 (§459)].” The objective precision that Hegel is concerned with here appears to be the level at which the meaning that the user seeks to convey is expressed by the structural nature of the linguistic expressions themselves without relying on non-linguistic communication expressions (accent, intonation, etc.) at that point. In other words, Hegel considers as ideal those languages that have developed such that the context is woven into the linguistic expressions themselves and expresses “meaning” through the very structure of the linguistic expressions: “At any rate a comprehensive hieroglyphic language *for ever completed* is impracticable. Sensible objects no doubt admit of permanent signs; but, as regards signs for mental objects, the progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views (*Ansichten*) of their internal relations and thus also of their nature [Ibid. 273 (§459)].” In his work “The Philosophy of Spirit,” Hegel later directed his attention toward the “objective spirit” and entered the domain of the so-called social sciences, discussing law and morality, civil society, and nations. Hegel considered the abstract social system that developed in this way to an advanced level and discussed language with communication between subjects engaged in intercourse within this relationship. This intercourse or traffic between modern subjects, to use the current terminology, is a form of communication based on the exchange of concepts abstracted at an advanced level that are grounded in social relationships, such as law, politics, and economics. The domain of the intellectually advanced spirit, in Hegel’s words, can be imagined as the lifestyle of this modernized society. In this highly abstract communication form, a single word can have various meanings according to context. What is required of speakers here is speech that is capable of brushing off the diversity created by the attraction of concreteness ancillary to words and conveying “meaning” to the listener by accurately weaving context in through the appropriate *selection* and *combination* of words. To actualize this speaker space, Hegel elevates Kant’s visual productive imagination to a vocal productive imagination and relies on the abstract nature of the “vocal tone” to link it to the production of “signs,” which are the medium of general intelligence. The uniqueness of Hegel’s imagination consists in the fact that it is vocal imagination, an imagination that generates speech-acts. Moreover, the sounds in this case exclude the addition of any intonation by the individual speaker and are conveyed only with a tone that has been generalized and standardized to the extent possible.

Why is the medium of sound so important? Because it negates or abstracts the concreteness of intuition. This negation destroys the particular concreteness that intuition has and grants it the uniqueness of intelligence itself. Hegel regards the essence of the medium of the voice as consisting in its temporality and highly evaluated it. The voice issues forth as a concrete/corporeal representation, but it nevertheless disappears. Hegel perceives this as good, as he locates the true nature of signs in scenes where they are expressed by voice. In other words, it can be said that the true sign only comes into being within the time of this superimposition—where intelligence layers another meaning onto the image of the sign itself as a symbol, providing a voice-over. It is precisely in this connection between sign, voice, and

temporality that the essence of Hegel's semiotics lies.

Hegel points to the relationship between speech-acts using signs created by vocal imagination and temporality: "Language as *something that produces sound* disappears in *time*. Thus, time clearly demonstrates itself as *abstract* negativity, i.e., mere *negative* negativity in language as something that produces sound" [Ibid. 279–280 (§462)]. Derrida also notes this point: "Hegel also recognizes an essential link between the imagination productive of signs and time" [Derrida (1972) 91 (Engl. 79)]. Hegel holds vocality in higher regard than visuality due to its advanced level of abstraction and recognizes its spiritual and ideational superiority. In both the artistic sciences and the natural sciences, Hegel emphasizes the negativity of the aural sense—of vocal tone. The advanced ideality of the aural sense enables their internalized existence as an existence that disappears despite being an exterior existence. The temporal interiority that arises here has an essential link with dialectical movement: "Sound as the movement of idealization, the *Aufhebung* of natural exteriority, the *relève* of the visible into the audible" [Ibid. 109 (Engl. 93)]. However, the argument that sound enables temporality by being constant but having the constancy of disappearing brings to mind Husserl's argument about temporal consciousness, but that alone does not lead to the creation of dialectics. Derrida's use of the word "phonocentrism" points to the establishment of "metaphysical space" as a "phenomenon" in Western Europe. "Metaphysics," in this case, can also be considered to be Hegel's "dialectics." However, it is necessary to supplement the argument connecting the temporality of "voice" and the establishment of "dialectics." It must be noted that immediately after mentioning the relationship between language and time, Hegel contrasts the operation of intelligence as concrete negativity with the abstract negativity of time. Sound = time is still merely abstract negativity: "However, the *true, concrete* negativity of the linguistic sign is *intelligence*, because through it, the sign is transformed from something *external* into something *internal* and *preserved* in this transformed form. In this way, words become an existence animated by thought. This existence is absolutely necessary for our thoughts. We only know our thoughts, only have definite, real thoughts, when we give them the form of *objectivity*, of *difference* from our *inner self*, that is, the form of *externality*, and indeed an externality that at the same time bears the stamp of the highest *inner self*. Such an inner externality is solely the *articulated sound*, the *word*. [Hegel (Enz-III) 280 (§462)]." Here, it is important to emphasize the intersection between internality and externality, or the overlap between the interior and the exterior, is produced by "words." The spoken words—the sounds uttered by others—enters and is internalized by me while retaining its externality. Even internalized, it is external. By internalizing others' words, I externalize my interior. Hegel's subsequent argument appears to consider social entities as so-called "general thought machines." By accumulating others' words within myself, or in other words, by accumulating words that have lost meaning that is private and arbitrary, concrete and sensory, I connect the self to the public, socially symbolic order.<sup>2)</sup>



However, to reiterate, the “voice” as a purely physical medium is probably not the issue here.

It is true that the voice is a medium suited to overlapping. In cases of visual recollection, images spatially exclude each other and cannot be overlapped. However, overlapping is possible with sounds. Video can be overlaid with sound, and sound can also be overlaid with sound. The negativity of the voice as a medium derives from its transparency, like watercolors that permit overlapping. This transparency helps convert recollections into intelligent memories. However, even Hegel asserts that the negativity of the voice is still *abstract negativity*. In comparison, he claims that the negativity of intelligence is *concrete negativity*. The negativity of intelligence is negativity in a deeper sense than the negativity that arises when visual is converted to sound. Hegel does not directly explain in concrete detail what form of concrete negativity intelligence is provided with, but it could conceivably be the negativity that creates signs and over-writes phenomena with meaning. Hegel often uses the adjective “abstract” pejoratively. He uses it in the sense of merely capturing the surface-level, simple physical characteristics of a thing. By contrast, he uses the adjective “concrete” when capturing the deep, essential spiritual characteristics of a thing. Therefore, concrete things, as Hegel describes them, are not things that can be directly seen with the eyes, contrary to the general meaning. This must actually be understood in reverse. The negativity of sound is temporal in the sense that it is a medium whose nature is to physically fade away, and by being temporal, it became a negativity toward the mental image of spatial intuition. However, a further negativity that is not simply this physical quality is the issue here. This could be a power that makes it possible to unerringly assign general meaning to “signs” when uttering them, by weaving the context into the “speech” and “language” discussed above when distinguishing between hieroglyphic and alphabetic writing methods. This is a negativity even more transparent than the voice, in that it is a spiritual negativity.



The developmental psychologist Yoko Yamada emphasizes the existence of resonant, empathic relationships in the process of human language acquisition [Yamada (2010)]. Here, the key is to make language one’s own through the process by which a parent points to a thing for a child, recites its name, and has the child repeat it. According to Yamada, language arises not from the subject standing in opposition to the object, but from a parallel relationship—a relationship in which the subject desires to show others what they have seen, standing side by side, resonating, empathizing, and coexisting. Here, the state of identity of identity and difference through the overlap of sound is highlighted as a process in developmental theory. As Yamada emphasizes, what happens in this process should be recognized as not merely overlaying of voices. An invisible medium is actually required for voice to become and function as a medium. This transparent medium is the so-called resonance of desire. Without that, others’ voices remain others’ voices, even if they are repeated. This is what Yamada seeks to explain

with the term “language before language”: “For language to be born, it is necessary to have a powerful desire to tell and share with others the things one has seen and experienced and the interpersonal relationships to support that” [Ibid. 191]. It is precisely for this reason that the echoes of others’ voices are converted to one’s own voice and internalized—at least, in a typically developmental way.

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One suggestive anecdote on the negativity of intelligence, and the formation of memory, as described by Hegel, was expressed by Borges in his work “Funes the Memorious” written in 1944, which is part of the collection *Ficciones* (Fictions). This short story, which is only a few pages long, is concise but leaves a strong impression. It depicts an encounter with a person who developed an abnormal memory capacity because of an accident. Naturally, this is a “creation” by Borges, but Borges’s depiction contains brilliant insights into the subject of memory, and like the other works contained in *Ficciones*, it invites the reader to ponder human existence. This could be considered a type of philosophical novel. Funes, the person depicted in this story, exhibits several typical characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) from today’s perspective, suggesting that Borges may have had contact with a person with ASD on some occasion. If that is not the case and Funes is entirely a figment of Borges’s imagination, his observations about the characteristics of human memory capacity are nothing short of astonishing.

As a young man, Funes was thrown from a wild horse at a farm one day and became paralyzed, leaving him bedridden. When he recovered from the shock of the fall, he had acquired a *perfect* memory. A perfect memory, in this case, meant that he could recall the entirety of what he had seen previously and what he now saw in every detail: “When he fell, he’d been knocked unconscious; when he came to again, the present was so rich, so clear, that it was almost unbearable, as were his oldest and even his most trivial memories. ... Now his perception and his memory were perfect [Borges (1998) 135].” In this way, he had become a storehouse that stored, perfectly and without limit, every intuition he experienced when he was awake, every dream he saw when he was asleep, and the peerlessly accurate images from both. For example, he could precisely remember the shape of the clouds in the sky that he saw at one moment at such-and-such a time on such-and-such a date: “The truth was, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree in every patch of forest, but every time he had perceived or imagined that leaf” [Ibid. 136]. If we compare our memories with Funes’s, we can see that they have a rough, abstracted format. However, to use Hegel’s term, Funes is a *recollecting person*, not a memorizing person. One day, Funes thought of an original numbering system and began assigning words to every number as signs. Conversely, he sought to assign numbers to all memories of the past to fix them in place. The “infinite vocabulary for the natural series of numbers, [or] a pointless mental catalog of all the images of his memory” [Ibid. 136]—either of these would have been possible for the all-remembering Funes, but he noticed that the task would be interminable and decided against carrying it out. Funes could not hold a “concept,” as we use the term in the normal sense. Being able to remember and recollect the details of every intuition, Funes had no need for concepts and could not even have them in

the first place: “Funes, we must not forget, was virtually incapable of general, platonic ideas. Not only was it difficult for him to see that the generic symbol “dog” took in all the dissimilar individuals of all shapes and sizes, it irritated him that the “dog” of three-fourteen in the afternoon, seen in profile, should be indicated by the same noun as the dog of three-fifteen, seen frontally [Ibid. 136].” He was able to master many foreign languages without difficulty. He learned Latin in a few days by merely borrowing a Latin dictionary and Pliny’s *Naturalis historia* and recited from the *Naturalis historia*, astonishing the first-person narrator. However, despite these abilities, the narrator did not sense any intelligence in Funes, who sat in a darkened room all day and floated in a sea of recollections: “I suspect, nevertheless, that he was not very good at thinking. To think is to ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract. In the teeming world of Ireneo Funes there was nothing but particulars—and they were virtually immediate particulars [Ibid. 137].”


We can find surprising coincidences with Hegel’s thoughts on “intelligence” in Borges’s intuition that “thinking is forgetting.” According to Hegel, recollecting is not memory. Memory is established by burying direct images. Memory itself is thus intelligence, and so to think is to forget. The paradox that “memory is forgetting” is established here, which is what Hegel said. Sadly, we cannot remember everything. However, forgetting allows us to think about it and to talk about it as well. Then, by being completely unaware of this, we think and talk in forgetfulness.

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At the beginning of Haruki Murakami’s novel *Norwegian Wood*, the first-person main character laments that he is losing the ability to recall the details of events that occurred between him and his former lover “Naoko” over time. In this narrative, which begins in a Proustian style, the flow of memory is triggered by the melody of The Beatles’ song “Norwegian Wood,” which the narrator hears on an airplane 17 years after his lover’s death. The dead lover had asked him to never forget her. However, now that he is amid imperfect memories that gradually fade from one moment to the next, the narrator feels that he can at last write down everything about Naoko and understand her more deeply: “Once, long ago, when I was still young, when the memories were far more vivid than they are now, I often tried to write about Naoko. But I was never able to produce a line. I knew that if that first line would come, the rest would pour itself onto the page, but I could never make it happen. Everything was too sharp and clear, so that I could never tell where to start—the way a map that shows too much can sometimes be useless [Murakami (2004) vol. 1: 22 (Engl. 10)].” Forgetting saved the narrator from his 17-year-long aphasia and spurred him to begin the tale about Naoko.

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Only through Borges’s unrealistic portrayal of a fictional person who “could remember *everything*” can we reach the forgetful character of our “memory.” Funes, who could only sit in the dark and



Le schéma L  
(Lacan (1966), 47).

constantly talk about his rich, minutely detailed recollections, hardly sought to understand the narrator's words. Conversely, he wrote an extremely polite letter and sent it to the narrator requesting to borrow a Latin dictionary and some books. He was capable of acquiring language and writing well. He could also speak. However, the *dialogs* between the narrator and Funes were always fraught with difficulty. The fullness of Funes's recollections has no room for the narrator to insert any words. The narrator's *voice* does not penetrate Funes's mutterings. Thinking and engaging in dialog are both, in a certain sense, the same thing. Each requires discarding some of the details and generalizing and abstracting them. The light that rescues Funes from the darkness that is filled with recollections is the power of transparent negativity that enables this abstraction. What Funes requires is the negativity to change recollection into memory. This is also the imagination to create signs. When the negativity of imagination intervenes, Funes will be able to think and engage in dialog with others. Funes is certainly speaking, but he is not saying words addressed to the narrator, nor are the narrator's words being taken in by Funes. Funes is a being who has lost his *language* in the sense of dialog.

Perhaps Funes's problem could be that he *takes in other people's voices too directly*. As he cannot voice-over others' *voices* with his own *voice*, Funes is trapped by teeming recollections that leave no gaps for negativity to enter. Therefore, what is important is the *overlap* or *intersection* of *voices* or of transparent negativity that intrudes, carried by voices. In other words, we are actually not hearing others' voices when we seem to be listening to them. We are voicing-over others' voices and listening to our own voices. Perhaps we are listening to the voices of the Other—of "People." Let us think of the "schema L" from early Lacan. When the line for listening to the voice from the *Other* that blocks the line for the *ego* responding to the voice of the *other* in front is established, our *subject* is formed. The

most masterful part of this schema is that its structure is formed by the intersection of two lines and is not a mere intersection of lines, but a closed circuit that can be traced the whole way around, as a twisted quadrangle. The diagram is a flat drawing, so it becomes an intersection, but if it were converted into a solid, it would have a structure like a Klein bottle and could represent the circulating cycle of dialectics. Lacan believes that a person develops a psychosis (schizophrenia) when *the symbolic* line that listens to the voice from the *Other* is interrupted and disturbed by *the imaginary* line from ego to other. It is a malfunction of the dialectic circuit. However, in Funes's case, the two lines probably do not intersect. This is not a malfunction that occurs after a circuit has formed, but a failure to form a circuit in the first place.

On reaching this point, it is possible that Funes is not delayed, but a more advanced being than us. Borges has already suggested that Funes himself is the pioneering being that Nietzsche refers to as the "Übermensch."

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In the second half of the twentieth century, the current of thought known as "contemporary thought" (post-structuralism/postmodern thought) in the 1970s and in subsequent decades extracted the two patterns of human spirit called "paranoia" and "schizophrenia" [see Asada (1983), etc.] from attempts at differential diagnosis of neurosis and schizophrenia, which Lacan's psychopathology studies had contributed to (see Matsumoto (2015)). It positioned paranoia as a pattern of the *modern spirit* and as the labor force that drives the capitalist economy, and schizophrenia as a pattern of the *postmodern spirit* that overcomes the conversion of the human spirit into labor force through the capitalist economy by disjointing it. This is our summary. From the perspective of this discussion, paranoia can be mapped to the formation of the dialectic circuit of "identity of difference and identity," and schizophrenia can be mapped to overcoming the dialectic circuit by dismantling the circuit. Deleuze and Guattari's problématique, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, is positioned as a work in which the schizophrenic mental pattern thus *overcomes* the capitalist neurotic mental pattern. However, what has become clear today, now that we have entered the twenty-first century, having experienced the transformation of late-stage capitalist economies into hyper-consumerist economies in developed countries, periodic development of bubble economies, conversion to a monetary economy, and globalization, is that the schizophrenia-like mental model considered post-modern was merely how the ego behaves in response to the overabundance of products in a highly developed capitalist society. In a capitalist mode of production, constant capital accumulates as the economy cycles. This increases the proportion of constant capital (equipment, technology, knowledge and raw materials) relative to variable capital (human labour). This is so-called a rise of organic composition of capital. Direct, simple human labor becomes essentially unnecessary to an increasing degree in the site of production. At the risk of oversimplification and omission of such factors as the export of products and production sites themselves, a society that has accumulated sufficient production capital increasingly requires only a small amount

of advanced labor while also requiring the consumption of the goods that are produced, so the goods become steadily more advanced. Capital is invested in technical innovation, and daily life is filled with advanced goods that make use of technology. In societies such as Japan that have accumulated at least a certain level of capital, even social strata engaged in comparatively simple labor become able to lead lives in which every day is enhanced with products that make use of previously inconceivable advanced technology. People seeking incomes greater than the norm must either advance their own labor itself in terms of knowledge or technology and enter the labor market to become advanced workers or become capitalists. Thus, lifestyles tend toward polarization. Yet regardless of which lifestyle is chosen, the intensifying process of generating surplus value—by overwriting constant capital with variable capital, concrete labor with abstract labor, and use value with exchange value—persists uninterrupted. This process drives technological advancement, ultimately preventing our lives from achieving liberation from labor, that is, temporal abundance. The production of surplus value demands unceasing technological innovation and resource consumption, which threatens the environment. Sacrificing that, developed countries move their accumulated capital to foreign locations as production systems and reset and recompile the organic composition of the capital in combination with the cheap labor on site, and so, a life that *appears to be* released from direct production is possible for urban populations with advanced capital accumulation and others in certain strata. However, this does not mean that they have successfully overcome the cycle of abstracting human labor with exchange value. The mechanism that forces people to commodify their own labor to a high level in order to obtain a lifestyle filled with advanced goods remains amazingly unchanged since the era of Marx. It will ultimately never happen that the accumulated capital is used for releasing us from labor [see Nojiri (2014)].

Those who create the spell locking us into the *commodity space* are ourselves. We cannot quit the pleasure cycle of producing *commodities* and consuming them. This is because *commodities* are *signs*. During the earlier boom period of postmodern thought, people said that *signs* were a play of *difference*, and so on. However, that is not what *signs* are. Plays of *difference* and other surface-level conceptual manipulations have no such spellbinding pleasure. That is a misunderstanding by the intelligentsia. Through *signs*, we convert others' voices into our own voice to hear them. What cannot be abandoned is the pleasure of being a *subject*, born from that *intersection* of negativity. Marx once said that reification is the transformation of human relationships into things, but this must also imply that relationships between things become relationships between people. When we hear others' voices in *commodities*, we hear them as our own voice. Through this, we then cast a spell on our own being and transform ourselves into voices heard by others. We thereby convert ourselves into *commodities*. If a being who could be called an "Übermensch" were possible, it would be a person who could shake off the voice-over effect at the *intersection* of hearing one's own voice in this other voice or who could ignore the effect right from the beginning. The schizophrenia-like mental model can be regarded as no more than a modeling of partial reactions arising at the stage when the pressure of subsuming direct human labor into production settings is stronger. However, the idea that one can escape the commodity space that exchange value rules if one leaves the production setting was clearly mistaken. In the consumption

space, the *voice* of exchange value continues to have control. Even if the peril of schizophrenia can be avoided, the paranoia named production neurosis = dialectics continues, reforming itself into the paranoia named consumption neurosis = dialectics. Schizophrenia has been reportedly trending toward milder symptoms in developed countries since the 1970s. It is no coincidence that relative attention has concentrated on ASD (autism) at this stage of the capitalist economy. The present-day phenomenon of ASD suggests that ASD, rather than schizophrenia, was the opposite of neurosis. The concept of autism entails not listening to the voices filling the commodity space. In other words, the problématique of “capitalism and autism.”

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We still have not answered questions regarding the intersection between internality and externality and why it creates dialectics and temporality. However, Hegel’s theory of signs offers some key hints: Hegel regarded imagination as the faculty that generates “signs,” and through this mechanism, linked the operation of imagination to language (speech). Its detailed operations have yet to be revealed, but the relationship between the negativity and temporality of voice and language (speech) has been suggested. At the same time, the genesis of dialectics and the mechanism of the formation of Western metaphysical space are involved there. Imagination and language and temporality and dialectics, and also metaphysics—Derrida once suggested these mutual relationships as a thesis, though he did not complete the argument. Yet he left behind a significant suggestion.

In *Marges de la philosophie* (1972), Derrida submits two important problématique: Hegel’s sign theory and the metaphysics that creates empty mythology. The former is discussed in the paper “The Pit and the Pyramid,” and the latter in “White Mythology.” In the former, Derrida describes how the imagination to create signs in Hegel is precisely what generates both dialectics and time. In the case of the latter, he explains that all concepts are said to be similes, and that Western metaphysics is a meta-myth beyond the myths that are basically metaphors—a myth about myths—and generating empty mythology is its essence. However, Derrida does not elaborate on these two important questions in a way that connects neatly. One reason seems to be that Derrida did not clearly distinguish between metaphor and metonymy in his theory of metaphors. Here and there in the predication and in the notes, Derrida briefly touched upon the problem of metonymy, but he did not go as far as to shine a spotlight on the point of discussion.<sup>3)</sup> What Derrida discussed was metaphors as a general figure of speech in the broad sense and how that issue related to the essence of Western metaphysics. In “White Mythology,” Derrida asserts that all “concepts” used in philosophy are no more than metaphors. This is because they originally had sensory meanings, but these wore off as they were used up and they have become tokens that have come to circulate with a meaning different from their original source: “Abstract notions always hide a sensory figure. And the history of metaphysical language is said to be confused with the erasure of the efficacy of the sensory figure and the *usure* of its effigy” [Derrida (1972) 250 (Engl. 210)]. Therefore, philosophy as metaphysics is the attitude that ultimately sought to take back the

erasure and forgetting of the sensory imprint of the origin, resulting in the invention of a unique truth beyond the expression: “[Quoting from Anatole France, *The Garden of Epicurus*] ‘[A]ny expression of an abstract idea can only be an analogy. By an odd fate, the very metaphysicians who think to escape the world of appearances are constrained to live perpetually in allegory. A sorry lot of poets, they dim the colors of the ancient fables, and are themselves but gatherers of fables. They produce white mythology.’... Metaphysics—the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own *logos*, that is, the *mythos* of his idiom, for the universal form of that which he must still wish to call Reason. ...White mythology—metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest [Ibid. 253–54 (Engl. 213)].”

Here, Derrida quotes Nietzsche: “What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths *are* illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions: worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses (*die abgenützt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind*), coins which have their obverse (*Bild*) *effaced* and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal [Ibid. 258 (Engl. 217)].” Here, Derrida is clearly quoting Nietzsche’s account of the loss of power to affect the senses and the effacement of *Bild*, while being conscious of Hegel’s theory of imagination and theory of signs. Moreover, Derrida suggests an overlap between Nietzsche’s observations and the theory of value (Marx): in other words, the overwriting of use value by exchange value. Metaphysics is the attitude that forgets that mythology is a figure of speech and seeks to reach the only mythology, the ultimate mythology, mythology itself. When mythology itself forgets that it is one figure of speech and objectifies mythological effects themselves, the mythology has become a white mythology (*mythologie blanche*), that is, an objectified mythology. Here, a mythology/self is born that questions its own meaning while being visited by an amnesia about its own origins. Derrida draws attention to Du Marsais’s use of “light” in the definition of metaphor: “When one speaks of the *light of the spirit*, the word *light* is taken metaphorically; for, just as light in the literal, proper sense makes us see corporal objects, so the faculty of knowing and perceiving enlightens the spirit, and puts it in a condition to bear sound judgments. Metaphor is therefore a species of Trope; the word which one uses in the metaphor is taken in another than the literal, proper sense: it is, so to speak, *in a borrowed dwelling*, as one of the ancients says; which is common to and essential for all Tropes [Ibid. 302 (Engl. 253). Quotation by Derrida from Du Marsais].” Here, it is clear that Du Marsais is using metaphors to define metaphors, but the use of the “light” and the “borrowed dwelling” figures of speech are important to Derrida. This light is of a different type to the natural light that shines on things when we see them with our senses: the light of the spirit. This is the light of reason (*nous*). When we actually look at a thing, we are looking at the natural light overwritten with the light of reason. Hegel also said that, in the case of recollection, the light of the senses recalls images from the darkness. However, when recollections become memories,

the light that recalls the memories would be the light of *nous*. In other words, that is the very light that converts recollections into imagination. What could the light of *nous* be? Derrida's discussion on this is not that clear. Derrida also focused on Du Marsais's figure of the "borrowed dwelling" regarding metaphors: "[The figure of the borrowed dwelling] is there in order to signify metaphor *itself*; it is a metaphor of metaphor; an expropriation [= removal of its proper nature], a being-outside-one's-own-residence, but still in a dwelling, outside its own residence but still in a residence in which one comes back to oneself, recognizes oneself, reassembles oneself or resembles oneself, outside oneself in oneself. This is the philosophical metaphor as a detour within (or in sight of) reappropriation, *parousia*, the self-presence of the idea in its own light. The metaphorical trajectory from the Platonic *eidos* to the Hegelian Idea [Ibid. 302 (Engl. 253)]."

In the figure of a borrowed dwelling, the overlapping of being outside oneself in oneself is expressed. What enables this is the overwriting light of reason. Where does this *light* come from? This is probably the light that brings Funes out of the fullness of recollection into the world of memory and dialog, whether he wants it or not. In order to discern the true form of this light, let us refer to the theory of aphasia based on the contrast between metaphor and metonymy in Jakobson, which constituted one of the foundations of twentieth-century language theory, while reintroducing Derrida. What will be revealed as a result is that this light is the ability to generate metonymies.

(Continues in *Part VI*)

### Notes

- 1) This article is based on "Memories of the Future: An Essay on the Origin of Philosophy and Hegel's Imagination" from the general book *The Battlefield of Philosophy (Tetsugaku no senjou)*, edited by Seigen Nasu and Eiichi Nojiri, Kojinsha, 2018), with additions, revisions, and restructuring into a series for publication in this bulletin.
- 2) This theory by Hegel on mechanical intelligence brings to mind the Edo-era educational practice of *kanbun sodoku* provided in samurai households and private elementary schools in Japan. In *kanbun sodoku*, the fundamental principle is to first recite *kanbun* mechanically without thinking about its meaning. In this same way, in early modern Japan, converting others' language, such as Confucius' *Analects*, which were originally in Chinese, into Japanese sounds and internalizing it by recitation was the way to achieve cultivation (*Bildung*).
- 3) See original note (21) in "White Mythology" [Derrida (1972) 271 (Engl. 227: note32)]. In the main text where this note is placed, Derrida mentions that Nietzsche even said that every phonic enunciation is a metaphor and states that the overwriting of something different from speech-language (*parole*) with speech-language is the essence of metaphor. In the note, he suggests that what Nietzsche seeks to convey with the word "metaphor" is to extend to every element of discourse the "metonymy of the sign." In other words, what Derrida means is that the essence of metaphysics is metaphor, which is essentially all metonymy, and the signs formed by overwriting

sensory ideas with meaning.

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- \* The original sources were referred to, if they were important to the discussion, and were listed in the order of source information, followed by information on the Japanese translation. Books where only the Japanese translation was referred to have been cited with information on the translated version first. Wherever the author has revised a translation, it is indicated.

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