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Chapter 2 The Leibnizian Principle and the Kantian Principle

Section 1 Let’s Learn about Leibniz

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and God’s Will

In this section, we will learn about Leibniz. Leibniz sorted truths into two classes: truths of reason and truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary and it is impossible for them to be otherwise, whereas truths of fact are contingent and, though they in fact are the way they are, it is possible for them to be otherwise.

Truths of reason can be known to be true only by analyzing a concept. Any husband of a widow is necessarily dead. This can be known without researching the facts of the world. By contrast, truths of fact cannot be known whether or not to be true until the facts of the world are researched one by one. Whether or not Yukio Mishima committed hara-kiri can be known only from the facts of the world. The possibility that Yukio Mishima did not commit hara-kiri is perfectly conceivable.

However, there is what is called the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz’s thought; Leibniz claims that every fact has a reason to be the way it is. Accordingly, just as the concept ‘widow’, a general concept, contains ‘the husband is dead’, so the concept ‘Yukio Mishima’, an individual concept, contains ‘committing hara-kiri’. If so, it follows that there exists someone who can know, only by analyzing the concept ‘Yukio Mishima’, whether or not he did commit hara-kiri. Who is it?

It is God. That is, Yukio Mishima’s committing hara-kiri was, from the very beginning, prepared in God’s intelligence. But if that was so from the beginning, when and at what point could God exercise his free will? To such a question posed by Arnauld, Leibniz replies as follows:

‘The connection between Yukio Mishima and his committing hara-kiri is necessary, but that is not in the sense that it does not rely on God’s will. For though a free decision of God conceived as something possible was contained in the concept of a possible Yukio Mishima, it is when this decision comes to be actual, that is, when God wills it so, that it becomes the cause of the actual Yukio Mishima. An individual
like Yukio Mishima contains in his individual concept the fact that he bears God’s free will as his cause. Individual concepts or truths of fact are, in that respect, different from general concepts or truths of reason which do not presuppose the free will of God and rely solely on God’s intelligence.¹

Unless we ask a petty question why Leibniz, who is not God but only a seventeenth-century European philosopher, knows Yukio Mishima, we can see that something very important is pointed out here. Truths of concepts or reason rely solely on God’s intelligence, and do not need God’s will. They equally exist in all possible worlds in God’s intelligence, so they need not be actually created. (If the regular icosahedron is proven to be possible, that alone makes it exist.) By contrast, as to truths of individuals or fact, it is contained in their concept that they occur in the actual world, so God’s will as well as God’s intelligence needs to be exercised; that is to say, they need to be actually created by God. (Even if Yukio Mishima is proven to be possible as an individual concept, that alone does not mean that he exists.) And that is why it is possible for that thing not to be created.

Let me say a word on this connection: it can be said that, on the basis of the classification under consideration, it is the philosophy of Descartes that assimilates God’s intelligence into God’s will, and conversely, it is the philosophy of Spinoza that assimilates God’s will into God’s intelligence.

Now, however, if the individual concept of Yukio Mishima contains in advance everything that obtains involving him, why is it possible that he did not commit hara-kiri? That is another interesting problem though it is a little digression from our main subject.

That it is possible that Yukio Mishima did not commit hara-kiri means, in fact, that there is a possible world in which there exists a person who resembles Yukio Mishima in all respects except that the person does not commit hara-kiri. Nevertheless, we who live in the actual world must grasp what happens in the possible world as a possibility concerning Yukio Mishima using our stock concepts—saying, “If Yukio Mishima did not commit hara-kiri . . .”, for example—although, strictly (or in God’s language), there cannot be a possibility that Yukio Mishima did not commit hara-kiri.

**To Exist Actually**

Then, why is it that Yukio Mishima who committed hara-kiri is the only one that exists actually? The principle of sufficient reason would give the reason. It is at this point that the notorious optimism, according to which God chose and created the best possible world,

emerges. But whatever reason God had to select and create the actual world, what did God do then? Whatever sort of criteria God had for selection, what are the selecting criteria for? ‘What’ is of great import is this matter.

The question cannot be answered other than in terms of the existence of something whose concept itself can be understood only in terms of its actual existence. For Leibniz, it is certainly God. God chose something from his intelligence and endowed it with a property that he has.

What would happen if we suppose that the existence of something whose concept can only be understood in terms of its actual existence, is the existence of me, instead of supposing that it is the existence of God? In order to understand the meaning of the concept ‘I’, I myself must exist in a way that other things do not. It is true that, from a certain point of view, I am merely one example of a number of people who call themselves ‘I’, but it is what should be merely one example that gives the concept the real meaning. Therefore, in this case, to ‘exist actually’ is not a property that the concept can sometimes have. The way I exist is utterly different from the way either the regular icosahedron or Yukio Mishima does. I exist, unlike the regular icosahedron, in the actual world, and, unlike Yukio Mishima, necessarily.

If this analogy holds, it would be that, in creating the world, God created another instance whose concept itself can be understood only in terms of their actual existence: that is, he created the problem of other minds (for God). (Of course, there is no guarantee that things were in this order.)

The discussion has gone too far. The problem started with the idea that to exist actually is a sort of fact utterly different from all other facts. So even if this actual world is deprived of the property that it exists actually, it can exist in God’s intelligence with its content perfectly preserved. If God is capable, by his will, of converting possibility into actuality, it should be that, conversely, he is also capable of depriving the actual world of its actuality alone. That possible world, which has been deprived of actuality, and this actual world do not differ at all in their content.

If it is thought possible that Hitoshi Nagai ceases to be me, and that October the twentieth, 2004 ceases to be now, these must be thought to be matters of the same sort as that above. Just as this actual world is deprived of actuality alone without changing its content at all, Mr. Nagai ceases to be me and becomes a mere person without changing his content at all, and 3:20 PM, 20 October 2004 ceases to be now and becomes a mere point in time without changing its content at all. All of those are, from a certain viewpoint, the most fundamental changes from existence to non-existence. However, from another viewpoint, there is no change at all.
Of course, this is not what Leibniz thought. His thought is different. Since an individual concept like Yukio Mishima, unlike a general concept, must contain infinite predicates, it cannot be defined. If all the predicates are the same, we have the same thing. This is what is called Leibniz’s ‘principle of the identity of indiscernibles’, which claims that indiscernible things are the same thing. Adding perspectivity to this individuality forms Leibniz’s famous concept ‘monad’. Each of all monads represents the world from its own viewpoint, so there cannot exist two identical monads which only differ in their spatial locations. (To be a different monad requires a monad to be in a different spatial location.) Thus, the ground for the difference between I and another who is exactly like me is to be found in the point that the two must be at least slightly different in their perspectives, which represent the world.

But I do not agree with that. If there were only such a distinction, the difference between I and another would be the same as the difference between another person X and another person Y. Of course, another person X and another person Y are two different persons. That can be explained with Leibniz’s device, which has just been discussed. The difference between I and another, however, is not a difference of that sort. That cannot be explained with Leibniz’s device, which has just been discussed.

Using Leibniz’s own concept, I would express that difference as follows: just as it is conceivable that one of two different worlds that are exactly alike is an actual world and the other is a possible world, so it is conceivable that one of two different persons who are exactly alike is me and the other is another person. That is to say that the contrast that emerges when God chooses one world and exercises his will beyond his intelligence is repeated here.

Section 2  When Anything Is Seen, It Is Always I Who See

What Lies at the Bottom of Solipsism

I have said that it is conceivable that one of two different worlds that are exactly alike is an actual world and the other is a possible world. But that does not imply that the two worlds exist simultaneously (while one of them exists in God’s intelligence). So instead of saying ‘two different worlds that are exactly alike’, it would have been better to say ‘one and the same world being actualised in one case and not being actualised in another case’.

Similarly, when I said that it is conceivable that one of two different persons who are exactly alike is me and the other is another person, I did not mean to say that the two exist simultaneously. So instead of saying ‘two different persons who are exactly alike’, it would have been better to say ‘one and the same person being me in one case and not being me (and
merely being a person as he is) in another case’. Hence, the other person should not have been called ‘another person’; he should have been called a ‘mere person’.

What is important is that, in both cases, what makes something actual or me—or now—is God’s will, but not God’s intelligence. What is of import is this difference. Leibniz’s idea is that God has to exercise something special - his will - in order to make one possible world the actual world, or to actualise a possibility. What I wanted to do is apply that idea to I and now.

If I were asked why that was what I want to do, I would be bewildered, since there could not be any reason publicly acceptable. But I would say, as an official statement, that the reason is this: in trying to find the truth of the world, we must (as we did in the case of the actual world) grasp what it is to be me and what it is to be now independently of their contents.

The contents here are, in the case of me, such things as being Hitoshi Nagai, being a professor at Chiba University, etc. They are, in the case of now, such things as being October the twentieth, 2004, being the time when a person named Hitoshi Nagai is listening to Ryoko Hirosue’s ‘In Love for Real in 5 Seconds’, etc. And they are, in the case of actuality, such things as that an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August the sixth, 1945, that the earth orbits the sun, etc.

To grasp actuality, now, and I independently of their contents is to grasp them in such a way as this: in the case of actuality, that an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August the sixth, 1945 is not what makes it actual; even if Tokyo had been bombed, that would be actual if it were; that the earth orbits the sun is not what makes it actual—even if the earth did not exist at all, that would be actual if it were; in the case of now, that a person named Hitoshi Nagai is listening to Ryoko Hirosue’s ‘In Love For Real in 5 Seconds’ is not what makes the time now—even if it were July the eighth, 1853, and Commodore Perry were visiting Uraga, that time would be now if it were; and in the case of me, being Hitoshi Nagai, a professor at Chiba University, is not what makes the person I— if I were George W. Bush, the president of the United States, that person would be me.

Here I am considering a group of problems such as whether a person is me if that person has the same contents as I do, and whether a time is now if the contents of what is happening at that time are the same as what is happening now. I am trying to solve this group of problems by referring to Leibniz’s solution to the problem of whether a world is an actual world if its contents are the same as that of the actuality. For it seems to me impossible for other (ordinary) strategies to confront the problem.

Just as it is possible that what is happening is not actual, even though the same thing is happening in this actual world, so it is possible that a person whose contents are the same as
mine is not me but a mere person, and that a time is not now but a mere time even though what is happening at that time has the same contents as what is happening now. On the contrary, whatever contents something has, it is possible for it to be actual, whatever contents a person has, it is possible for that person to be me, and whatever is happening at some time, it is possible for that time to be now.

Wittgenstein devised such an expression as ‘When anything is seen, it is always I who see’ as a way to profess ‘solipsism’. What it says is not—as it is often misunderstood—such a tedious thing as that others do not have a mental phenomenon of ‘seeing’. Indeed, it should be understood by analogy with a statement ‘When anything happens, it is always in the actual world that it happens,’ which is in fact self-evident. It is the same with the statement, ‘When anything happens, it is always now that it happens’. There would be no one who would ask back, concerning these statements, ‘Then, is there nothing happening in worlds other than the actual world?’ or, ‘Then, is there nothing happening at times other than now?’

Conceptualisation and Entitativation

The problem here is again of the conflict between the ‘opening itself’ and the conditions that obtain inside the world opened by it. From the viewpoint of the ‘opening itself’, the principle of sufficient reason - or even the optimism based on that principle - is merely a condition that obtains inside the world. Any such things can be dealt solely with God’s intelligence. Whereas intelligence is based on reason, will is beyond it.

One who dislikes the idea of God can think of it as a mere contingency instead. And here is the place where the problem diverges in two directions.

If a ‘solipsist’ says, ‘When anything is seen, it is always I who see,’ the only valid way of asking back is, ‘But who’s “I”?’ That is just like the following cases: if a ‘solacualist’ says, ‘When anything happens, it is always in the actual world that it happens,’ an inhabitant of a different world can ask back, ‘But which world is the “actual world”?’ and if a ‘solnuncist’ says, ‘When anything happens, it is always now that it happens,’ an inhabitant of a different time can ask back, ‘But which time is “now”?’

All of these ways of asking back are perfectly valid. Nevertheless, they are wrong in another sense. None of ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘actuality’ can ever be pluralised, since any of them is not a mere example of the concept, and for each of them there is the genuine one—the only real I, the only real now, or the only real actuality—which excludes others.

In that sense, there cannot be more than one actuality, more than one now (or present), or

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more than one I. In the same sense in which it is impossible to count the number of transcendent God, it is impossible to count the number of actuality, present, or I. For there cannot, in principle, be a viewpoint for viewing more than one of them equally. The reason for this is that, to put it in terms of the inside of the objective world, a viewpoint has to be inherent in one of them, and other viewpoints are seen only from that viewpoint. Or, more fundamentally, to put it from the standpoint of the ‘opening itself’, one viewpoint is actually prominent; other viewpoints are not the actual one—namely the actual actuality, the actual present, or the actual I.

It could be true that for the inhabitants of another world, that world is the ‘actual world’, or that for someone living in another time, that time is ‘now’. Similarly, for someone who is inherent in another bodily-psychological continuum, that person is ‘I’. However, in reality, only here is the actual I, the actual now, or the actually actual world. If this way of talking applies to every ‘actual world’, ‘now’, or ‘I’, it is indeed language that is to blame for that.

There is always the crucial gap, which is—to borrow Leibniz’s notions—the gap between God’s intelligence and God’s will, and is—to borrow Heidegger’s notion—the gap called ‘ontological difference’. Whether we can see the gap or not is crucial, and this is the first direction of the problem. (The essential function of language is, in my view, to deny this gap. Isn’t it the case that such devices as mode, tense, and person have resulted from that denial?)

The problem has another direction. This direction in turn relates to persistence. That an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August the sixth, 1945 is not what makes it actual, but it does not follow that it is possible for the actual world to become one in which an atomic bomb was dropped on Tokyo on August the sixth, 1945. That it is October the twentieth, 2004 is not what makes the time now, but it does not follow that it is possible for now to become July the eighth, 1853. Being Hitoshi Nagai is not what makes the person I, but it does not follow that it is possible for me to become President Bush. Even God—apart from our ‘higher God’—could not bring about those things. For it is impossible for us to understand the meaning of their becoming so.

It is the case that the opening itself is located inside the world opened by it, and is provided with the criteria of its existence and persistence by the conditions that govern inside the world. Once that occurs, we can no longer say, ‘When anything happens, it is always in the actual world that it happens’. For what happens provides us with the conditions for determining whether it is actual or not. If something very extraordinary, something that could never happen, occurred, it would be that it is not actual—that is, it would be that it in fact has not happened. That is Kant’s fundamental insight.

Indeed, suppose that the contents of this world suddenly at a certain time became quite
different from and utterly unrelated to what they had been before, could we then say that this world had become so? If the criteria or bases for saying that one and the same thing ‘changes’ have themselves changed, that would not be change anymore, but would be extinction and birth (of something new). Or, perhaps, we cannot even say that there has been extinction and birth. It is in that sense that we cannot count the number of God.

It should be the same in the case of me. Suppose that I suddenly at a certain time became something quite different and my contents became utterly unrelated to what they had been before, could it then be said that I had become so? Once the opening itself is located inside the world opened by it, and is provided with the criteria of its existence and persistence by the conditions that govern inside the world, I can no longer say, ‘When anything is seen, it is always I who see’. For what is seen—or, more generally, what is in the consciousness—provides us with the condition for determining whether it is I or not. If something very extraordinary, something I could never be conscious of, is in the consciousness, it cannot thereby be I anymore.

But again there exists, in this direction of the problem, the ‘gap’ that was found in the first direction. That is the subject proper of this chapter and, therefore, this book.

Section 3 The Actual World Is the World in Which I Exist Now

How Solipsism Is Turned into Monadology

To begin with, let us briefly review and reinforce what we saw in the previous section. I would like to start with solipsism, which I discussed in the first half.

Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus writes ‘The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of the language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world (5.62)’. He suggests that it is therefore impossible to say ‘the world is my world’ in the language. For, once spoken, what is said will be something different from solipsism, of which it should be impossible to speak. It will be something that can be spoken of in the language (e.g. something such as differences among perspectives of persons).

That, I think, is a most clear line of thought, but for some reason there are many who do not understand it. There are many who, despite the correct translation, ‘of that language which alone I understand’, in fact take it as meaning ‘of that language which I alone understand’ as if there could be a comparison between that language and others’ language. Since this is a matter of the language which alone I understand (i.e. the only language that I understand), it is not important whether others understand it, or whether it is the same as
I think that those who take it so, although they in fact tacitly presuppose without explanation the sort of ‘solipsism’ that is in question, are under an illusion that ‘solipsism’ can be explained in terms of differences among perspectives of persons. In a word, that is monadology. Here, too, we can see the effect of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. While differences between the contents of worlds give the sufficient reason for making one of them an actual world, differences between perspectives of persons give the sufficient reason for making one of them I.

But there is no way we can believe such a description. Reason could never be sufficient to yield existence by itself, or to make itself exist.

To briefly ‘learn’ something here again, those who insisted strongly and clearly on this ‘gap’—the independence of existence from essence—in the earliest time in history were the philosophers of medieval Islam, notably Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (whose Latin name was Avicenna). However clear it becomes ‘what’ something is, it will not follow that it ‘actually exists’. To put it in medieval terminology, haecceitas will not follow from quidditas. Existence of something is not an element that internally constitutes its essence. Rather, existence is only an external constitutional element that is attached from the outside, that is, an element attached externally in virtue of the mere will of a transcendent God.

Wittgenstein says of ‘what the solipsist means’ that it ‘cannot be said’, for the existence of me is the very existence—haecceitas—of this language (and therefore that of this world), and its existence will not follow from the way—quidditas—its structure is.

Then the next problem is this: I think that I see what Wittgenstein is saying, but why is it? Is it because something taken as what cannot be said has been said? No. What cannot be said is still not said. Nevertheless, independently of that very thing that cannot be said, the structure to locate it has been separately learned. That is the reason. And what is learned is transformed into this impossibility to say. How is that possible? What is it that makes it possible?

This problem corresponds to the first of the ‘two directions of the problem’ discussed in the second half of the last section. To put it in Heidegger’s terms that I used there, it is that, although the ontological difference is not to be grasped by language, that very fact can be said in language. To put it in Leibniz’s terms: although the distinction between God’s will and God’s intelligence is essentially different from distinctions made within intelligence, it can be understood by intelligence, and when it is understood, it is assimilated into distinctions made within intelligence.

Therefore, it can be argued that there is originally no such distinction, and that every distinction is originally a distinction within intelligence in so far as it is intelligible. In so far
as we exist *simpliciter* (and if we are not infected with linguistic philosophy), we all can
‘have sensitivity’ to that difference, and moreover, we can talk of it in language and can
sometimes even agree with one another. Therefore . . . . (The argument continues.)

This problem is, in various senses, undoubtedly extremely important, but I have written
about it many times, and there is in an essential respect no argument to be added. So in this
book I will mainly talk about the second of the ‘two directions of the problem’. (I suppose
that the exception will be the part where I talk about ‘now’.)

**The Leibnizian Principle and the Kantian Principle**

Now, let us turn to the second direction.

Whatever happens, it is in the actual world that it happens. In a sense, that is self-evident,
and there is no room for doubt.

Then how about the following case? Let us suppose that the contents of this actual world
suddenly, at a certain time, become utterly unrelated to what they were before. Human
beings are suddenly extinguished. There cease to be laws of nature, the world, all at once,
falls in sheer disorder, and so on. We may think of any fantasy. Anything that can be thought
of is what can be thought of. Whatever the contents, if something has happened, we must
acknowledge that it has happened. Whatever happens, it is in the actual world that it happens.
Therefore, what has happened is actual.

If you think, ‘That’s right,’ reading the above paragraph, consider the consequence of
adding the following supposition to the situation that has just been described. The
supposition is that precisely at the time when the tremendous change breaks out in the actual
world, contents that are perfectly continuous with the past course of history in the actual
world begin to occur in a different world (a world that is not actual). A world that is not
actual might be a possible world in God’s intelligence, a world that someone is dreaming
about, or a world of some other sort. So, naturally, this book will continue in that world.
Please keep reading!

Is it not that even a reader who has just thought: ‘That’s right’, is now inclined to say
that that world which is not actual has become an actual world in virtue of the continuity of
the contents? For in that world the same laws of nature govern, and there are indeed the same
human beings. However, if that is true, what will the world that has fallen into sheer disorder
be? Although it is only that the world has actually become so, will it have to be non-actual?

There are two principles in conflict. There is, on the one hand, the principle that
whatever happens, it is in the actual world that it happens, and, on the other hand, the
principle that the connection between the contents of what happens determines what is actual.
This conflict is parallel to that between the principle that whatever is experienced, it is I who experience it, and the principle that the connection between what can be experienced with respect to the contents determines which person is I. For both cases of actuality and I, let us call the former the Leibnizian Principle, and the latter the Kantian Principle—though these names are my own invention.

In a sense, the Leibnizian Principle is undoubtedly true. We cannot possibly say that actuality consists in there happening what is most likely to happen. Even if what is most unlikely to happen has happened, it is actual once it happens. Then, we will have to say that a possible world in which what is most likely to happen is happening is not actual.

The same can be said of me. I am the sole origin from which the world actually opens. So whatever is experienced, if it is experienced, it must be I who experience it. The contents of what is experienced are irrelevant. It cannot be the way contents of experiences are connected with those of the past that determines which person is I and which person is not I. If what is experienced becomes no longer connected at all, it just means that my experiences are no longer connected. Since there is only one subject from which the world actually opens simpliciter, and there can, in principle, be only one such subject, it is simply impossible to compare the ways experiences are connected. It is impossible that a person whose experiences are connected in the best way becomes I.

In the case of a familiar thought experiment in which I split into two, since the two that have come apart are persons whose contents are almost the same, contingency alone—or God’s will alone—determines which is I. The problem is the case where the one who properly inherits the memory I have had is somehow not I, but the one who does not inherit it is somehow I. According to the Leibnizian Principle, it is possible for that to happen. The person who is the most ideal successor of the person who was me can nevertheless be another.

Needless to say, it is utterly irrelevant to discuss this thought experiment by paralleling it with a split of a physical object. It is equally wrong to bring in a physical object that has a mental property, e.g. a human being or an animal. An analogy between the ‘actual’ course of history and ‘my’ memory is the essence of the matter. The thought experiment does not lose its philosophical implication only when it is made parallel with a split of the world, a split of now, or a split of God.

In spite of that, is it not that the matter differs between the case of me and the case of the world? In the case of the world, we said: if the course of history that is connected to the past history of the actual world begins to occur in a different world, that world (which is not actual) becomes an actual world in virtue of the connection between its contents. Is it, in the case of me, possible to think of what corresponds to that?
If there is a difference between the case of me and the case of the world, is the reason for it not that—in conceiving that the course of history connected to the history of the actual world begins to occur in a different world—it is felt that I, who have continuity from the original world, continue to exist in that different world? This arguably shows that which world is actual is determined by whether or not I exist there (and now).

If it is, God, in choosing one among human beings and creating me by will, did not then repeat the contrast between will and intelligence that was seen when choosing one world among many and creating the actual world by will. For, on that supposition, those two actions are, in fact, not two different actions but must be one and the same action.

Section 4 And Now, Kant

Kant’s Circularity
In Section 2, I said as follows: ‘The “opening itself” is located inside the world opened by it, and is provided with the criteria of its existence and persistence by the conditions that govern inside the world. Once that occurs, we can no longer say, “When anything happens, it is always in the actual world that it happens.”’ That was Kant’s insight. Here, ‘opening’ is the opening of that very condition setting.

Now, let’s learn about Kant. The conditions are conditions for saying that the same world exists continuously. Connections of the world have certain forms, including causality, and unless they are followed, it cannot be said that the same world exists continuously. These conditions are combined with conditions for saying that the same I exists continuously. That is Kant’s crucial insight.

Since they are combined together, the existence of the objective world can be proven solely on the basis of the principle, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Manifold things given to the consciousness are assembled according to the conditions that I give. This means that the objective world is constituted—that is, that the objective world obtains. So a certain assembly in the consciousness is all that is required for (and is the only thing that is capable of) making the objective world obtain. Therefore, all phenomena, even external things, are in a sense internal after all.

Then, it follows that the word ‘internal’ has two meanings. One is the ‘internal’ world in the sense that it contains the external world that is objective, and the other is the ‘internal’ world that does not contain the external world. That is what is called the ‘inside of mind’.

But the ‘inside of mind’ should also have two meanings. One is the ‘inside of mind’ that itself is the very activity which makes the objective world obtain, and the other is the ‘inside
of mind’ that is located within the objective world that has obtained. In Kantian terms, the
former corresponds to the ‘self-consciousness’ of the ‘existence of undetermined (or
unlocated) I’, and the latter corresponds to the ‘self-knowledge’ of the ‘existence of
determined (or located) I’. That is, I am, only being I, the subject that makes the entire
objective world obtain for the first time, and, at the same time, am a human being who exists
inside that world, a human being who exists persistently having a body. Here we can again
see the structure of locating the ‘opening itself’ within the world that has been opened.

However, why is it that that which is only I can possess such a grave responsibility as to
make the objective world obtain for the first time? It is because forming an integration of
being I as such is already indivisibly related to forming an integration of making the
objective world obtain. That is why the existence of the objective world can be, or is even
forced to be, proven solely on the basis of the principle, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Behind the
word ‘therefore’ that derives ‘I am’ from ‘I think’, there must be hidden the great event,
where the objective world obtains. That is Kant’s crucial insight.

However, does it not have some circular structure? If forming an integration of being I is
already indivisibly related to forming an integration of making the objective world obtain, is
it not that that indivisible I is already an objective human being who is located inside the
objective world that has obtained?

The same can be said even if the relationship with others is taken into consideration. In
so far as I can construct the objective world, I can inhabit the world that others also construct
in the same way as I do. But since others are at the same time objects that appear in the
objective world, those others themselves, who should also be making the objective world
obtain, can obtain only if I make them obtain. That is to say, the operation needed is that of
assembling my own representations such that I inhabit the same world as others do and share
the objective knowledge others have, and of locating myself as a member of it inside the
common world which obtained thus.

Are others subjects or objects of construction? They are objects that are made up as
being subjects. Am I a subject or an object of construction? I am a subject that is made up as
being an object. Therefore, I and others are thoroughly of entirely different sorts, and, at the
same time, are thoroughly of entirely the same sort.

To apply this to what is called ‘the problem of other minds’, it is in a sense utterly self-
evident that others are subjects that have the same sort of mind as I do, and it is in a different
sense utterly self-evident that they are not. (Moreover, what is said regarding ‘others’ here,
with ‘a sense’ and ‘a different sense’ reversed, holds of me.)
Looking into It in More Detail

In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant insists as follows: I am conscious of my representations, therefore the representations and I myself who have them exist—that is, I think, therefore I am. However, external objects are also a part of my internal representation. Therefore, for the same reason that I exist, external objects exist, too.

Taken as it stands, this argument, which is grounded only on the point that they are the same ‘representations’, is a bit poor. But this is just the outward route of Kant’s argument. The argument has to have the homeward route, which is shown in the revised edition (i.e. the second edition) in order for it to form a complete circularity.

Kant thinks in the following way in the revised edition: I feel my existence to be persisting existence in objective time. However, any temporal location presupposes the persisting existence of something in perception. For only in relation to it, can change or motion be perceived as change or motion. Since my existence can be located in time only in relation to that persisting thing, that persisting thing cannot be inside me. Thus, since it is the condition of temporal location that things do exist outside me, the consciousness of my existing in time is necessarily bound up with the existence of such things in the external world. In other words, the consciousness of my own actual existence as such is immediately the consciousness of the actual existence of things outside me.

Whereas in the first edition the world is located inside me, in the revised edition I am located inside the world. Each of the two editions seems to be saying the opposite of what the other says. The two arguments, however, must be understood as saying the same thing from different points of view.

Just as the ‘inside of mind’ has two meanings, so the ‘external world’ has two. But the two must be understood as the same thing viewed from different standpoints. The external world that obtains through the mind’s activity of assembling representations and the external world that locates that mind inside it are one and the same. Inside the external world, which I have constructed and is inside my mind, there is the very I, and as I, being inside the external world, construct that external world, inside me there is the very external world. (This is not a joke or anything, but is indeed the way the structure of the world is.)

If representations that are ‘inside of mind’ are interrelated through causality or other conditions, the external world that is ‘outside of mind’ thereby obtains. When they have been thus interrelated and have made the external world obtain, each of them is taken as objective judgement (such as perception and memory) and when it is not so, it is thereby taken as subjective experience (such as hallucination and delusion). In so far as I locate myself in the objective world as a human being, even if my objective judgement is corrected by others, subjective experience of a human being who is I—which is something objective thus
named—is still considered to be real.

I have said that representations are interrelated by causality or other conditions; these conditions are what are called the categories. However imaginative we are in conceiving of a world, in so far as the world can be experienced at all, it must follow the categories. When we can say that we could not use a certain concept if the world differed in a certain respect, that concept is a mere empirical concept, but not a category. When it is impossible even to conceive of such a case, a concept becomes a category.

Then, should not it be impossible even to speak of (or to itemise) the categories? One would naturally ask that (Wittgensteinian) question, but let us shelve it for the time being. And let us shelve the following question, too: if the objective world obtains through the application of the categories, is not a dream also an objective world? Before addressing those questions, we should take note of Kant’s criticism of Cartesianism.

Kant says that the existence of the objective world can be proven solely on the basis of the principle, ‘I think, therefore I am’. But that does not mean that there exists a single, immaterial subject that experiences the entire world, i.e. the soul or the self that is separated from the body. Because of our tendency of equally locating inside the world the very activity that makes the world obtain, we are inclined to mistake this unifying activity of apperception for the single, immaterial subject inside the world. However, since the unifying activity that makes experience possible is the very activity of making the world obtain, the unifying activity cannot appear as an object inside the world. The understanding of this coincidence of the objective world and the activity of mind that makes it obtain is the incomparable insight of Kant’s philosophy.

Through this insight, the condition for my continuing to be the same I is literally combined with the condition for the world’s continuing to be the same world. Only through this insight can we understand the necessity that the thought experiment where I split into two should be one where the world itself splits into two, and the necessity that if ‘my now’ suddenly goes back thirty years, President Nixon, though unrelated to me, would have to declare the end of the Vietnam War.

Nevertheless, that incomparable insight of Kant has a fatal drawback. Although Kant did present the conditions of the possibility of a unified objective world, the unified objective world is not yet the sole actual world. Which of the worlds that satisfy the conditions of the unified objective world becomes the sole actual world? The problem of the condition for the sole actual world to exist, which was found in Leibniz, is not found in Kant. Here, there still must be a remaining route to vindicate Descartes from Kant’s seemingly crucial criticism.
Section 5 The Split of the World—From Kant to Descartes

Kant’s Philosophy of Possibility

When I have a dream, I do not locate my existence in objective time. However, it is only afterwards that I become aware of that. I, even in a dream, share with others in the dream world that objective world, and have come to have objective knowledge in common with them; that is the way I assemble my representations. I, even in a dream, can experience the distinction between perception and hallucination. Even if I now have a dream, I am successful in constructing such an objective world.

It might be said that the distinction between perception and hallucination in a dream is merely a relative distinction in a dream. But, even in actuality, the distinction between perception and hallucination is relative; we have seen that fundamental insight of Kant. Therefore, the structure ‘it is only afterwards that I become aware of that’ itself obtains both in a dream and in actuality. The world that locates inside itself other worlds as non-actual ones, and exists now, is the actual world.

A dream world is, in so far as it appears such that it is so for others too, a unified objective world in the Kantian sense. If actuality obtains in virtue of interrelations through causality or other conditions, a dream is actuality. (In this respect, we must draw a distinction between the functions of a dream and the evil spirit in Descartes’ doubt.) Then, how would Kant distinguish between a dream and actuality?

We could say that he does not. Or we could say that, by not speaking of the distinction between a dream and actuality, he simply does not distinguish between actuality and non-actuality. Kant would not distinguish between the obtaining of a unified objective world and the obtaining of the sole actual world. The conditions of what can happen and the locating (in the objective time) that follows the conditions determine whether or not something is actual. If a scenario goes against the conditions that make a unified objective world obtain, it is no longer actual.

For Kant, there is no possibility of a unified objective world somehow not being the sole actual world and no possibility of the sole actual world somehow not being a unified objective world. That should be fine in normal cases. It is because that is alright in normal cases that the problem hidden there is overlooked. The problem becomes manifest in the case where there exists more than one authentic successor to the unified objective world. These are the cases where the world splits!

The world in the future will also have to be, as it has been, a world in which external physical objects move following causality (and thereby time is measured), according to Kant. That is the condition for that world to be the actual future, in which the time of the actual
world continues. We can no longer say that whatever happens, it is in the actual world that it happens. It cannot be that anything can happen in the future. It is impossible for the contents of the world to become utterly unrelated to what they were before. If they do, they already lack the conditions to be the future of the actual world, so they are no longer the actual future. In the sense that we do not have the capacity to understand such a state of affairs, it is literally something impossible, and our not having it is exactly what makes us what we are.

Now, we saw that what makes the very actuality obtain is the activity of my assembling my representations. Therefore, it is also impossible for that activity itself to jump out of the world that it makes obtain, or to cease to continue the activity as it has been doing, or to cease to locate itself as a person who continuously exists in the world, or to suddenly change the way it locates itself.

Therefore, we cannot say this either: whatever is experienced, it is I who experience it. For the ways the contents of experience are connected constitute the conditions for the same I to continue to exist. Moreover, the conditions are conjoined with the conditions for the world to continue to exist as the same world. If I jumped out of the world, or started to act differently, or ceased to locate myself as a person who persists in the world, or changed the way I locate myself, I would already lack the conditions to be me, and therefore it is not I who changed in that way. (Strictly speaking, these four are different states of affairs. Although I think that the difference is important, I shall not discuss it here.)

However, if it is true that the ways contents of experience are connected constitute the conditions for the same I to continue to exist, is it also true that, conversely, I can continue to be me in so far as there are connections? We have seen that the unified objective world is not yet the sole actual world. Then, similarly, can it be that my continuator cannot yet be regarded as the sole actual I in the new present? Here, again, the Leibnizian Principle is needed.

**The Split of Me**

Let us start with the split of me. It is possible to suppose that one of the twins is a precise duplicate created by a mad scientist, but we should avoid any unnecessary complication by imagining a case where both the twins result from a split under quite equal conditions.

The twins become separate subjects ruled by separate apperceptions. If one is me, the other must be another. Each twin constructs an objective world through its own representations and locates itself inside its world. Therefore, the fundamental difference between them as subjects that each construct a world and locate themselves there does not appear in that world, but the difference is assimilated with the difference of a located object,
and appears as an objective difference; the world and the self are constructed thus. In other words, each of the two becomes ‘another’ for the other within one objective world. The argument up to this point is sufficiently philosophical but only in a Kantian sense.

What is important is the meaning of: if one is me, then the other must be another. Whatever state of affairs we consider, if we *suppose* that one is me, the other is another. That is, the other is always ‘an object that is made up as being a subject’ who is constructed by the activities of the ‘I’. Since the way the world is is such that it obtains from a sole mental origin, the above argument is only a common general truth. However, let us suppose that after I split into Nagai R and Nagai L, I somehow find myself to be Nagai L. This does not mean that if I *suppose* that I have the viewpoint of L, R is another. What I really mean is: I have been, somehow, *actually* made to have L’s viewpoint, so R is *actually* another. I am actually L, so it is only R’s viewpoint that I can *suppose* that I have. It is this kind of actuality that transcends a Kantian problematic.

Again, let me give a short lecture. Existential philosophy, which became very prevalent in the mid-twentieth century, has a keen sensitivity to this difference. ‘Existence’ means actual being that does not follow from essence, i.e. what it is.

Now, ‘God’s will’ is exercised in relation to this difference between ‘actually’ and ‘if I suppose that’, and thereby a common general truth turns into an uncommon existential truth. (In fact, the understanding of an uncommon existential truth is already tacitly functioning in the understanding of a common general truth. Without it, even a common general truth would not be understood, and vice versa. However, I can only expect what is involved in that matter to be made clear by the whole of this book.)

‘Transcendental apperception’ - the activity that assembles representations and makes up an objective world - is retained for both of the twins. Both twins, by that activity, locate themselves inside the world as a person of certain characteristics, with a certain history. Since the two have the same characteristics and the same history, they are, in a sense, the same human being. Yet it is impossible for me to be two persons at the same time. (It is possible for two bodies to be ruled by the same apperception—that is, it is possible for me to have two bodies. But that is not what I take to be impossible here.)

The question why there can exist only one person that is me can be answered in a Kantian way. The answer would be that there can exist only one world. The answer goes on as follows: there only exists one world, because it is that which ultimately includes everything, and I am the ultimate origin of such a world. (In this connection, the singularity of God has the same form.)

Nevertheless, the actuality where, *somehow*, L is *actually* I at a time after the split—i.e. in the ‘present’ at that time—cannot be captured in a Kantian way. ‘God’s will’, which is
Leibnizian, must choose one among more than one possible candidates for actuality.

Conversely, it can be said that this choice is the starting point for everything, and that the entire Kantian circularity argument is merely a matter within actuality. That is to say, this circularity does not concern an objective world in general and a general subject that constructs it, but is a matter concerning the actual world that has already been ‘chosen’ and I myself who make it obtain. (Here begins the Leibnizian ontological circularity, which is different from the Kantian epistemological circularity: actuality is one among possibilities and possibilities are inside the actuality.)

According to the above idea, the split of me is not the split of a thing in the world, but is the split of the world itself. Therefore, we could consider the case where the world splits instead of the case where I split.

Let us suppose that this world, at a certain time, splits into a world R and a world L. Which world the actual world is is determined by which world I am actually in after the split. If a world that splits is one in which I do not exist—e.g. a future world—which world is actual is not determined. That is analogous to the fact that there cannot be a problem about which person is the genuine ‘I’ (for the person) if another person splits. (In virtue of the criteria internal to a world that has obtained, actuality where I do not exist or non-actuality where I exist becomes intelligible. However, since they are basically only Kantian criteria, we cannot apply them to the present matter of the split of the world.)

Kant denies the possibility of the existence of a single, immaterial subject in the world. He thinks that it transcends the conditions of the possibility of experience and the world. That criticism, however, underestimates the real worth of its opposing argument and misses its point. The genuine problem lies in the point that, among those that satisfy the conditions of the possibility that construct a unified objective world, somehow, someone is the actual I. The problem is that this point, which is the starting point of everything, cannot be drawn out of the Kantian conditions alone—it needs to transcend the Kantian conditions in order for it to be drawn out. Conditions do not yield actuality, for they are merely conditions of possible actuality.

Kant’s criticism of Descartes still casts its spell over philosophy. Today, ‘Cartesian’ can even be a scornful word, and people are unaware that they have degenerated enormously from the loftiness of Descartes.
Identity of a Physical Object

In spite of everything, it does not mean that Descartes or Leibniz is superior to Kant. Kant seemed to overlook something, only because we have tentatively conceived of a state of affairs where fundamental apperception splits, which is impossible on a Kantian view. If a something that should be the sole fundamental splits, it can no longer be the sole actuality in virtue of the sole activity.

Conversely, we can also conceive of a case where the sole actuality can be secured only by the continuity of its contents. One example is the case we discussed earlier, where the actual world suddenly changes all its contents including causal relations in a drastic way, so that the way it becomes unrelated to its history and, at the same time, a non-actual world starts to inherit its contents. (We can conceive of a case where I am in a ‘dreaming machine’ and start to have a dream that is continuous with actuality, whereas, at the same time, the actual world loses continuity.) Or an example could be the case where I suddenly change all my mental and personal contents including memory (as, from a standpoint of the Leibnizian Principle, the person continues to be me), whereas, exactly at the same time, a person who is not me (from a standpoint of the Leibnizian Principle) suddenly starts to inherit my contents.

If a subject that is unknown to me suddenly inherits the memory of my past experience (more accurately than I), that has nothing to do with me. It is indeed true from one viewpoint. However, from another viewpoint, we can think that connection between contents will always override the principle that ‘whatever happens, it is always . . . ’. The principle that functions here is the principle that a world whose contents are continuous with actuality could not cease to be an actual world, and is the principle that a person whose contents are continuous with me could not cease to be me. This is the Kantian Principle, according to which even God cannot exercise his free will here.

Here there is a conflict between principles. What is important is that the Leibnizian Principle and the Kantian Principle cannot be reduced to each other.

Nevertheless, the Kantian Principle can be sufficiently recognised as the Kantian Principle even when it functions only within Leibnizian actuality. Similarly, the Leibnizian Principle can be sufficiently recognised as the Leibnizian Principle, even when it functions only within Kantian possibility, i.e. only as a selection from what are possible in the Kantian Principle. It might be that if the Leibnizian Principle is strong enough to create a space of possibility, it should be called the Cartesian Principle.

It could be said that Kant has made another contribution to this argument. Leibniz thought that God has the capacity to choose one world among countless possible worlds and
give it actuality. But I have mentioned earlier that this capacity corresponds to the capacity to choose one among countless human beings and turn that person into me. If we assume that this is true, Kant has proved that, if God has the former capacity, it must be identical with the latter.

Incidentally, in supposing that a person who is not me suddenly starts to inherit my content, I cannot help thinking of the difference between the person who is not me and I in terms of that of our bodies. As a body is a physical object, let us briefly consider the identity of physical objects—though I am barely interested in it—in order to confirm that, which we should regard as significant, the spatio-temporal connection of the body or the connection of the contents of memory, is merely a conflict internal to the Kantian Principle.

We have seen that, if there is more than one candidate for I, it is not automatically the most appropriate person who will become I. Even if he/she is not at all appropriate, a person who somehow actually is I, is I. Even if there is a person who is more appropriate than I am (the way I in the past would have been in the future), that person does not thereby become I. And we have seen that, if there is more than one candidate, it is not that the most likely world will be the future actual world. Even if it is not at all likely, a world that somehow actually is actual, is actual. Even if there is a world which is more appropriate than actuality (actuality as the way actuality in the past would have been in the future), that world does not thereby become actual. These are pictures of the conflict between the Leibnizian Principle and the Kantian Principle, in other words the conflict between the ‘principle of the opening’ and the ‘principle internal to the world that has been opened’, drawn in favour of the former.

Similarly, it is not the object which is most appropriate that will automatically become that certain physical object in the future. Even if it is not at all likely, an object which is spatio-temporally continuous is the same object. It is a possible case that, as the physical object changes its shape to become an object of a different sort, another physical object becomes exactly like what the physical object in question originally was. But the physical object exactly alike is not the original object.

We can think conversely. A sumo wrestler Takahanada succeeded to the name of Takanohana, changing only little. In this case, we need not think that the same thing has changed its name. For we can think in this way: at the time of his succession to the name, an entity called Takanohana, being identical with the previous Takanohana, comes to be filled with different material. Thinking in that way, we could assert that there is little of what is identical, continuous from Takahanada to Takanohana. If we suppose that, when Takahanada succeeds to the name of Takanohana, he somehow changes his personality and loses the characteristics of Takahanada to acquire the characteristics of Takanohana, that assertion all at once becomes plausible. (Recall the case of Dalai Lama.) If one, in spite of that, adheres
to the assertion that physical (or material) continuity is more essential, this adherence seems to look somewhat like the adherence to the Leibnizian actuality. In fact, however, it is not at all alike. The conflict here is not in the least Leibnizian, but is merely one inside a Kantian world. For the problem here is merely of the competition for priority concerning identity, in the case where a body (as an object in the world) and a characteristic (as an object in the world) break their ordinary link. Although there are varieties of ‘philosophical’ argument about such a problem which are somewhat interesting, they do not strike a chord in my heart. For they are only arguments resting on the contingent fact that many of the things in this world happen to be in such a way that they do not go through such an irregular change. They do not split or fuse but, in most cases, persist maintaining their shape (although we could deepen this line of thought by taking into consideration the point that this very fact is, from a Kantian standpoint, necessary in the sense that it is the condition for measuring time).

Thinking in that way, I have come up with an idea. Let us conceive of a world in which everything, including human beings, changes indiscriminately (or anomalously). Even in such a world, there would be time (though it is not measurable). Now, let us suppose that regularities such as ‘painful when pinched’ and ‘tickling when tickled’ also frequently change, yet that there nevertheless is memory as usual. Here is the first question: on this supposition, can memory function as memory? The second question is this: can there be language in this world? The discussion, in reaching this point, has suddenly struck a chord in my heart, since I have realised that those two questions are linked to each other. I shall discuss this later, relating it to the problem of private language.

**Tense, the Special Form**

Let us return to what originally struck a chord in my heart. It is, except for the world and I: Now (and God).

In a sense, of course, it is true that whatever happens, it is now that it happens. Each of all times except from now is either a time remembered now or a time expected now. However, when is ‘now’? Once this question is posed, we can see that ‘now’ here is possible only through being located within the objective world. For ‘now’ can only mean the ‘very time for any time’ in general. Not only is the now that is simply now, now, but there was also now five minutes ago, and there will be now five minutes hence. They are already determined to be that way, even if the now five minutes earlier is no longer now, and the now five minutes later is not yet now. A person who does not know this is a person who does not know the meaning of the word ‘now’. However, we cannot deny that, among these instances of now, there exists the ‘special now’, i.e. the now that is simply now.
We can find a conflict in these two sorts of ‘now’, a conflict of the kind we saw in the case of ‘I’ and ‘actuality’. The special now is 3:20 PM, 18 October 2003. Five minutes after, now will be 3:25 PM, 18 October 2003. However, let us suppose that, five minutes after, the ‘special now’ then somehow turns out to be 11:12 AM, 3 June 1853. Even if there exists a state of affairs in which it is 3:25 PM, 18 October 2003, and in which what is most appropriate for that time is happening, if, somehow, that state of affairs is not now and turns out to be the future, it could no longer be now. For if we accept the idea of the Leibnizian Principle, it is possible that, among many candidates, a time being the most appropriate as now does not become now.

This is, in short, a conflict between the now from where everything opens and the now located in it. If we think in a Kantian way, the former now is the very activity of the transcendental apperception that makes the objective world obtain, and therefore it is not located internally to the objective world that has obtained.

However, now locates itself as the objective now within objective time. That is, it becomes just one example of the same kind of many nows, in the sense that there was now for the time five minutes earlier and there will be now for the time five minutes later. In order to locate itself in objective time, it has to be relativizable in such a way.

From here, we can go further than Kant. Though so-called tenses such as the past, present, and future are not events but forms, they are special forms, differing from ordinary forms of time, e.g. the before/after relation or simultaneity. We can illustrate the forms as follows:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>past</th>
<th>present</th>
<th>future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>past</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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And this goes on endlessly.

Although the past, present, and future in the top row are also forms, they are to be always filled with actuality, and they actually are. The same is endlessly true of the pasts, presents, and futures perpendicularly below the present in the top row. However, whichever time in the past or in the future we take, there will be a past, present, and future for that particular time. The time concept of that sort is portrayed as the pasts, presents, and futures below the past and the future in the top row. They are mere forms that are not being actually filled with actuality.
Again, what is crucial here is whether or not we observe this gap (or ontological difference). If we do not, the ‘present’, which was expressed as ‘being actually filled with actuality’, will be assimilated to the mere form of ‘present’ that repeatedly appears below the past and the future in the top row. Even the actual now is taken into the presents as a mere form, and becomes just one example of many. (That is Kant’s thought in the revised edition.) Thus, there no longer exists the special, actual present.

However, do we not clearly distinguish between a formal (or relative or possible) present and the actual present? We do indeed. Still, it is necessary for this very conflict between the formal and the actual to be formalised. This is because tense, the form of the past, present and future, is a special form, which includes this movement.

Of course, things that hold of tense (the past, present and future) are true of person (he/she, I and you) and modality (necessity, actuality and possibility). Nevertheless, tense is special because the shift from a possible present to the actual present (not the horizontal shift but the oblique shift) is incorporated internally in the concept of tense.