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How to Tackle Nuclear Disarmament*

Mitsuru KUROSAWA**

Abstract

Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was adopted in 1968, the international environment surrounding the NPT has constantly changed. However, the changes since the year 2000 seem to be more far-reaching, mainly because of the emergence of the Bush Administration in the United States with its new nuclear doctrine and security strategy and the occurrence of the terrorists' attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

The NPT Review Conference in 2000 adopted a final document by consensus that included thirteen concrete steps for nuclear disarmament. This paper will examine the process of the implementation of these nuclear disarmament measures through the discussion in the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. While criticizing the lack of the progress in nuclear disarmament due primarily to U.S. nuclear policy, I will propose how to tackle this thorny issue.

Keywords: NPT, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, Review Conference, CTBT, FMCT

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How to interpret the Obligations under Article VI?

It is clear that the main and principal objective of the NPT is to prevent any state other than the five nuclear-weapon states from acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons as provided for in Articles I and II. However, Article VI was inserted at a late stage of the negotiation in order to soften its discriminatory nature and get support from non-nuclear-weapon states. Review Conferences taking place every five years have reviewed the operations of this Treaty in general, and the progress in nuclear disarmament in particular.

In 1995, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the states parties agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely as a package with two other documents. One of them is “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” which includes future courses of nuclear disarmament. It urged i) the completion of negotiations on a CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) no later than 1996, ii) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty), and iii) the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, a final document including thirteen concrete steps for nuclear disarmament was adopted by consensus. Enumeration of the 13 steps is a translation of the 1995 agreement on nuclear disarmament into more concrete measures.

From a historical and developmental perspective, these movements in 1995 and 2000 could be understood as a progressive interpretation of Article VI, that was originally very general and abstract but is now agreed to have concrete objectives. The decision of 1995 was adopted without vote, and the decision of 2000 was adopted by a consensus of the states parties. Strictly speaking they are not legally binding, but they are an expression of the general will of the states parties accompanied by a strong political and moral power.

For example, Japanese delegation stated that “As for nuclear disarmament, the

NPT obliges nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of their nuclear weapons should be achieved through the full implementation of Article VI. The 1995 decision on Principles and Objectives and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference reaffirm this objective. It should be recalled that decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with Principles and Objectives, with includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament. 3

At the three Preparatory Committees (PrepCom) of the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in 2002, 2003 and 2004, different perceptions and understandings on the agreements of 1995 and 2000 have clearly appeared among the states parties.

The first one is the selective application of and later the total neglect of the 13 steps by the U.S. In 2002 and 2003, the U.S. stated: "We no longer support all 13 steps, but we unambiguously support Article VI and the goal of nuclear disarmament. We think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to the 13 steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill their Article VI obligations." 4

However, in 2004, the U.S. avoided any reference to the 13 steps, totally neglecting their existence. Almost all parts of the statement by John Bolton, made on April 27, 2004, at the third PrepCom, dealt with non-compliance and enforcement of non-proliferation obligations. He said, "We cannot divert attention from the violations we face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist. If a party cares about the NPT, then there is a corresponding requirement to care about violation and enforcement." 5

Only one paragraph in the statement referred to nuclear disarmament, stating "The U.S. remains strongly committed to its article VI obligations, and President Bush has made major contributions to the goals of Article VI." As concrete measures, he mentioned the Moscow Treaty and the Global Partnership against

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4) Information Paper from the United States Concerning Article VI of the NPT, May 1, 2003.

the spread of WMD.

The new interpretation of the Article VI by the United States is clearly expressed by Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, that is exclusively based on the letters of Article VI and completely ignores the Principles and Objectives in 1995 and the Final Document in 2000. He argues that 1) the provision nowhere refers specifically to the nuclear-weapon states; 2) Article VI does not literally require the conclusion of “agreements” relating to disarmament; 3) Article VI calls for negotiations aimed at three separate but related objectives, and 4) the language of Article VI establishes no timetable and sets no deadline for accomplishing there objectives.6

The U.S. refers the following measures as the evidence of their fulfilling the obligations under Article VI over the past 15 years.7

--Reduced from over 10,000 deployed strategic warheads to less than 6,000 by December 5, 2001 as required by the START Treaty.

--Eliminated nearly 90% of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and reduced the number of types of nuclear systems in Europe from nine in 1991 to just one today.

--Dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1998.

--Not produced highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988.

--Not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992.

--Removed more than 200 tons of fissile material from the military stockpile; enough material for at least 8,000 nuclear weapons.

The second differing perception is the linkage of nuclear disarmament with general and complete disarmament made by France. In 2002, France declared that “a pro-active stance must be based on a principle of reality. The objective of general and complete disarmament illustrates this principle and it is inseparable from nuclear disarmament.”8 In 2003 and 2004, France emphasized that “nuclear

8) Statement by Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, Head of France Delegation, 8 April 2002.
disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament."

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) expressed its concern at the level of implementation and fulfillment of the NPT, and said that we needed comprehensive implementation of the 13 steps.\(^9\) The Swedish delegation stated, "The final document of the Review Conference in 2000 including the 13 practical steps to nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the NPT regime. It is therefore a risk to the regime if states parties state that they no longer support some of the steps."\(^10\)

The Chairman’s factual summary of the first PrepCom in 2002 described that disappointment was expressed in the progress in implementing the practical steps for nuclear disarmament,\(^11\) and the Chairman’s factual summary of 2003 summarized the discussion and stated that "disappointment continued to be expressed in the progress made in implementing these steps, notwithstanding the recognition of the incremental nature of the process involved."\(^12\)

The Chairman’s factual summary of the third PrepCom in 2004, which has no formal status, declares, "State parties expressed continued disappointment over the lack of progress made in the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI."\(^13\)

Generally speaking, while the five nuclear-weapon states have emphasized their commitment to and implementation of nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon states have expressed their disappointment in this regard. Almost all measures that are listed as evidence for the implementation of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states were taken before 2000, and they had been previously reviewed at the prior conferences. The main focus of the review at the 2005 conference should be on the measures taken after 2000. The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation in 2002 is the only fruit since 2000, the value of which will be examined later.

\(^9\) New Agenda Statement made on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and New Zealand by the Honorable Marian Hobbs, Minister of Disarmament of New Zealand, 29, April 2003.
\(^10\) Statement by H.E. Ambassador Henrik Salander, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament, 2 May 2003.
\(^11\) 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee, Chairman’s Factual Summary, 18 April 2002.
\(^12\) Annex II Chairman’s Factual Summary, in Report of the Preparatory Committee on its Second Session, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/50, 13 May 2003.
\(^13\) NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP. 27.
What Progress has been made so far in the Nuclear Disarmament?

I will check the progress in the 13 concrete nuclear disarmament measures that were included in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

1. The importance and urgency of signature and ratification to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT

Since 2000, the number of signatories of the CTBT increased from 155 to 174, and ratifiers from 61 to 120. Among the 44 states whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, 33 states by adding two since 2000 have ratified it. The remaining 11 states include the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and others.

In particular, the refusal of its ratification and no support to the Treaty by the United States is the biggest stumbling block for its entry into force. The United States is the only country that voted against the UN General Assembly resolution 59/109 which stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification of the CTBT.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions

As no nuclear-weapon-test explosion has conducted, we can say that the step 2 has been well observed by all states. However, the United States in its nuclear policy review plans to make the preparation time for the resumption of nuclear test shorter and in fact budget was approved, although the United States repeats that there is no plan to conduct nuclear test.

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) criticizes the U.S. action by stating that “Any move by the nuclear-weapon states towards the resumption of nuclear testing would be a retrograde step for international peace and security. We call for the upholding and maintenance of moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.”

3. The necessity of negotiations in the CD of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

The negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty has not started since 2000, although this step was included in the Principles and Objectives of 1995. The main

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reason was the demand by China to link the negotiations of an FMCT with ones of PAROS (prevention of arms race in outer space), but China and Russia agreed to de-link an FMCT negotiations from negotiations on PAROS in August 2003.

Then in the summer of 2004, progress on the FMCT hit another obstacle when U.S. Ambassador announced that, "The U.S. policy review raised serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMCT is not achievable."15

4. The necessity to establish in the CD an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament

The subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament has not been established in the CD because it has not been able to agree on a program of work. The Five Ambassadors’ proposal (the A5)16, which incorporates an Ad Hoc Committees to negotiate on negative security assurances, to deal with nuclear disarmament, to negotiate an FMCT, and to deal with PAROS, remains the best basis for agreement on a program of work.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament

The United States referred to the CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) and down-blending of Russia’s HEU to LEU as examples of irreversible nuclear disarmament. However, the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is criticized because it is virtually a blueprint to ensure that any nuclear and related arms control and reduction measures undertaken by the United States are fully reversible. In particular, the Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) is criticized because it does not obligate to destroy delivery systems or warheads.

6. An unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals

It seems that all the nuclear-weapon states have failed to treat the unequivocal undertaking seriously. In particular, the Bush Administration continues to press for mini-nukes and robust nuclear earth penetrators (bunker busters).

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the

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conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty

The U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001 and the START process was abandoned by the U.S. for its unilateral reduction of strategic nuclear warheads. Eventually the U.S. plan to reduce unilaterally was transformed into the Moscow Treaty with Russia. The Treaty stipulates the reduction of each operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 by the end of 2012, but it lacks transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., Russia and the IAEA

In 2002, a Model Verification Agreement was completed, but the final agreement has not been concluded.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament

The phrase of “based on the principle of undiminished security for all” has been used by the NWSs to justify their reluctance to negotiate new measures of nuclear disarmament.

--Further steps by the NWSs to reduce the nuclear arsenals unilaterally
There has been no unilateral reduction of nuclear arsenals since 2000.
--Increased transparency
Transparency as distinct from public relations is virtually nil.
--The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons
There has been no progress in the regulation or reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, although the vulnerability of those weapons to possible seizure by terrorists is widely recognized.
--Measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems
The five NWSs agreed to de-target their nuclear weapons but there have been no measures taken for de-alerting or de-mating thereafter.
--A diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policy
The U.S. always emphasizes that they diminished the role of nuclear weapons in their military policy. Although it may be true in the field of strategic nuclear weapons, the U.S. has increased the role of tactical nuclear weapons, such as bunker buster and new small nuclear weapons, in their nuclear policy and made
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efforts to shorten the preparation time for the resumption of nuclear testing.

- The engagement of all the NWSs in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

China asks the two biggest nuclear powers to further reduce their nuclear weapons for other NWSs to join the nuclear disarmament process. The U.K. and France have argue that they have already reduced their nuclear arsenals.

10. Arrangement by all NWSs to place excess fissile material under IAEA or other international verification

The efforts have been made to safely control nuclear weapons and nuclear material in the former Soviet Union states through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and G8 Global Partnership.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament

There has not been progress in the CWC, the BWC, and the Land-Mine Treaty. Any new international treaty on disarmament has not been negotiated or concluded in the last five years.

12. Regular report on the implementation of Article VI

Many states submitted reports to the Preparatory Committee and this is a significant step toward transparency and accountability. However, as there is no agreed formula for reporting, the content, quality and regularity are not good enough.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities

There has been some progress in verification through Additional Protocol and the international monitoring system under the CTBT, but an FMCT with effective verification is opposed by the U.S.

What are the Issues that need to be addressed for further progress and How to proceed?

At the previous review conferences, several states or state-groups submitted their own working papers, which included many kinds of measures in nuclear disarmament. For example, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Japan and
Australia, the European Union, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), China, Canada, the NATO-5 and others submitted working papers that included a number of nuclear disarmament measures.

At the coming Review Conference, we cannot afford to permit any state or state-group to submit papers that include arbitrary measures on nuclear disarmament. The situation now does not allow us to be optimistic on the progress in nuclear disarmament, because of the extremely negative attitude to nuclear disarmament by one or a few nuclear-weapon states.

The most effective way to send a clear message to the nuclear-weapon states--and indeed to the world as a whole--is a focused approach supported by as many states as possible. We should focus on a limited number of issues where we can find the widest level of support by the greatest number of states. We should focus on the following four items: CTBT, FMCT, strategic nuclear weapons, and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

There are two possible ways in which we can address these four issues. The first option is to formulate a coalition of as many non-nuclear-weapon states as possible. Japan, Australia, Canada, NATO-5 and other NATO states which are under the nuclear umbrella of the United States but eager to promote nuclear disarmament should get together to form a coalition and submit the same working paper, thus avoiding the situation where each state or state-group competitively submits its own working paper.

Furthermore, the possibility of including the NAC in this coalition should be explored. General Assembly resolution 59/75 submitted by the NAC gained the support of Japan and eight NATO states, including Germany, Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands. Additionally, it would be nice if we could make a coalition that includes the NAM. If we try to make a working paper that is fundamentally based on the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, it will not necessarily be impossible to make such a coalition. Minor differences of opinion between states must be ironed out for our common interests to be realized.

The second option is to form coalitions issue by issue. In the case of the CTBT, we can form a much wider coalition to stress the importance and urgency of signature and ratification to achieve the earliest entry into force of the CTBT, and
to maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapons test explosions. In December 2004, the UN General Assembly resolution 59/109 on the CTBT was adopted with a vote of 177 in favor, 2 (Palau, the U.S.) against and 4 (Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syria) abstaining. The coalition for the CTBT can include not only many non-nuclear-weapon states, but also China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom, states which voted in favor of the resolution.

In the case of an FMCT, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 59/81 in December 2004. This resolution urged the CD to immediately commence the negotiations of a treaty based on the Shannon report and was adopted with 179 in favor, 2 (Palau, the U.S.) against and 2 (Israel, the U.K.) abstaining. The coalition for an FMCT can also include China, France and Russia in addition to many non-nuclear-weapon states.

In the cases of strategic nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons, a common position could be found among many non-nuclear-weapon states.

**What efforts should we make to realize the early entry into force of the CTBT?**

So far, 174 states have signed and 120 states have ratified the CTBT. Among the 44 states whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, 33 states have ratified it. The remaining 11 states are as follows: China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the U.S. and Vietnam (which have signed but not yet ratified it), and the DPRK, India and Pakistan (which have not yet signed it).

Among these eleven states, seven states (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Vietnam and Pakistan) cast affirmative votes for the UN General Assembly resolution 59/109 mentioned above. Only the U.S. voted against. Colombia and India abstained, and the DPRK did not participate.

The first thing we should do is to exert all possible effort for the peaceful resolution or settlement of regional disputes or conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia in order to get ratification from Israel, Egypt and Iran in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, and the DPRK in Northeast Asia.
Secondly, we should persuade Colombia, Indonesia and Vietnam, using all possible leverages available, to proceed in support of its ratification.

Thirdly, as has been stated many times, China claims to be ready for its ratification and is simply waiting for the resolution to progress through its legislature. If that is truly the only reason for China’s delay, we should urge China to speed up its ratification process. China may be waiting to assess the U.S. attitude toward ratification.

Finally, the most serious and fatal obstacle to the CTBT’s entry into force is the negative attitude of the United States. This negative attitude has a decisive impact on the future of the CTBT. Every effort has to be exerted to persuade the United States to change its position on this issue. The coming review conference will be one of the most effective opportunities to send a clear message to the United States on this issue.

If the U.S. ratifies the treaty, China will follow suit, and the states in the second category will be easily persuaded to ratify. As to the states in the first category, pressure from a majority of the states in the world—including the U.S.—will be so strong that they may start rethinking their positions. Thus, U.S. ratification of the treaty is the key to solving this issue.

Pending its entry into force, we should work hard in the following two areas:

- strengthening International Monitoring Systems under the Treaty, and
- keeping the moratorium as strict as possible.

**How can we start negotiations on an FMCT?**

A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons is an essential measure for nuclear disarmament. The U.S., Russia, the U.K. and France formally declared an end to their production of such materials, but China’s position is not clear. While Israel’s position is not clear whether it has stopped production, India and Pakistan are believed to continue their production.

An FMCT will cap the production of nuclear material by the three holdout states, that is, India, Israel and Pakistan. It is a useful measure to involve these states into the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In addition, an
FMCT will serve to prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists when accompanied by the measure of tightening nuclear security.

On July 29, 2004, the U.S. stated, "the United States reaffirms our commitment to the negotiation in the CD of a legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives...The U.S. policy review, however, raised serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMCT is not achievable...We believe an FMCT is ripe for negotiations and must have a clean mandate that is not linked to other unrelated proposals for CD Ad Hoc Committees."

The first problem to be addressed is whether the negotiation of an FMCT should commence in the CD without any linkage to other issues as the U.S. claims, or a stream-lined version of the Five Ambassadors proposal consisting of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and security assurances, coupled with the establishment of Ad Hoc Committees to discuss nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) should be pursued.

In order to complete an FMCT as soon as possible, it would be convenient to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate it without any linkage. However, it would be difficult to do so, when all members of the CD have their own priorities on items that should be taken up in the CD.

The second problem is the U.S. new position that a realistic, effective verification process for an FMCT is not achievable. The U.S. implies that the CD should commence the negotiation on an FMCT with no verification clause. Traditionally, the content of an FMCT has been written as "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," that is known as the Shannon mandate. As is shown in the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution 59/109 (with 177 in favor, 2 against and 4 abstaining), the vast majority of states support an FMCT with effective verification.

U.S. officials argue that it would be difficult to assess whether a specific quantity of fissile material was produced before or after the treaty took effect. They also argue that HEU and plutonium could be produced for weapons under the cover of permitted activities, such as making fuel for naval propulsion.
reactors. Given these potential loopholes, U.S. officials insist that negotiating a verification regime would simply instill a false sense of security and needlessly delay an agreement.

As the U.S. does not seem to oppose the negotiation of an FMCT itself, its opposition to verification seems to come from a conceived negative impact on national security concerns.

The first option here is to persuade the U.S. to start negotiations on an FMCT under the terms of the Shannon mandate because a vast majority of states have supported it for more than ten years, then within that mandate, to find a compromised formula for verification which is acceptable to all states. If the U.S. insists that the Shannon mandate cannot be a starter, the second option is to have an informal discussion or exchange of opinions on what kind or what level of verification can be accepted.

How to reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons beyond the SORT?

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation is the only concrete nuclear disarmament measure adopted since the 2000 Review Conference. The Joint Statement by the two submitted to the second PrepCom states that, "The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty represents significant progress by the U.S. and Russia toward the goals of Article VI of the NPT. The treaty's reduction ...is a major contribution to the case of nuclear disarmament."17

The European Union, Japan and some other countries welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty, although the EU added, "In this context, the principle of irreversibility and transparency remain important."18 The Treaty is criticized from the point of the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability, which are included in the Final Document of 2000.

As the NAC at the third PrepCom states, "While we acknowledge the Treaty of

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Moscow as a positive first step, we continue to question whether it is an effective contribution to nuclear disarmament," we should make efforts for further strategic nuclear reduction based on the Moscow Treaty.

Russia is reportedly extending the service life of its multi-warhead SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM and is developing a relatively new three-stage SS-27 missile, known as the Topel M. These missiles, with multiple warheads, would have been prohibited under the START II Treaty. It is also reported that U.S. intelligence cannot follow the reduction process of Russian strategic nuclear forces.

We should ask the U.S. and Russia to overcome such shortcomings (a lack of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility) as well as to start negotiations on the next stage of reduction to be implemented long before the Treaty expires in 2012.

How to reduce Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons?

The main concern surrounding nuclear weapons has shifted from strategic to non-strategic nuclear weapons, because the relationship between the U.S. and Russia has improved with the end of the Cold War, while the threat of nuclear attacks by terrorist organizations has increased after the September 11 attacks, and the recent U.S. interest in producing small nuclear weapons such as bunker busters has emerged.

At the 2002 PrepCom, the EU emphasized the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons and Germany submitted a working paper outlining concrete measures for non-strategic nuclear weapons that was welcomed by Finland and Sweden. At the 2003 PrepCom, the NAC mentioned that non-strategic nuclear weapons posed a great threat based on their inherent nature, and proposed to take urgent actions.

As they could be appealing to terrorists due to their relatively small size and sometimes less sophisticated safety and security devices, it is urgent to take

measures against non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such measures include the formalization of the 1991/2 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, an exchange of data on holdings and the status of non-strategic nuclear weapons, an enhancement of security and physical protection measures for their transport and storage, and, ultimately, the further reduction of these dangerous weapons.