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Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between National Identity and Social Trust: Liberal Nationalism Reconsidered

Kikuko NAGAYOSHI

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Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between National Identity and Social Trust: Liberal Nationalism Reconsidered

Kikuko NAGAYOSHI

1. Introduction: Resurgence of National Identity

For the last few decades, many economically advanced countries have witnessed the resurgence of national identity. In European countries, right-wing parties that advocate the importance of national identity and the exclusion of immigrants have become more popular than before. Even in countries that have officially adopted multiculturalism policies, such as Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the U.K., these policies were reformed to ones that emphasize the importance of national identity (Alund and Schierup, 1991; Joppke, 2004). For example, Trevor Phillips, the chairperson of Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in the U.K., stated that multiculturalism, one of the founding principles of CRE, was no longer useful since it encouraged separation between ethnic communities (Baldwin and Rozenberg, 2004). Instead of multiculturalism, he emphasized the importance of core values of “Britishness”.

Academically, the importance of national identity has been repeatedly referred to not only by the conservative right but also by the left. Liberal nationalism is one of the leading schools of thought that argue the importance of national identity (Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001). It advocates that a national identity is necessary for democratic welfare states, since “a national identity offers social glue, one which is potentially inclusive and capable of binding people otherwise divided by economic and ethnic differences into a sharing community” which sustains democratic welfare states (Johnston et al., 2010: 350). However, this assumption is rarely validated.

The present research develops the liberal nationalism theory by examining the role of national identity in cultivating social trust. It seeks to answer two questions: Does national identity actually work as social glue? Does its effect differ according to how (i.e., in ethnic terms or in civic terms) it is defined? The unique data set used in the research, that is, the comparative longitudinal data of Japan and the U.S., enables us to answer these questions.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section overviews the theory of liberal nationalism and discusses its validity. This is followed by an overview of the trajectory for national identity in Japan and the U.S. The fourth section describes the data and variables, and the fifth section shows the results of the analyses. The final section draws out my main conclusion.
2. Two Assumptions of Liberal Nationalism and its Validity

The argument of liberal nationalism (Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001) has two assumptions: social connectedness is essential for democratic welfare states and national identity transmitted through shared cultures is crucial for cultivating social connectedness. While the first assumption has been proven valid to some extent, the validity of the second one is more controversial.

The first assumption is that a democratic welfare state works well when its members trust in, take care of, and feel some sense of obligation to each other. Among these conditions, the importance of mutual trust is often emphasized. According to liberal nationalists, trust is a basis for redistribution and deliberative discussions (Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001). Redistribution demands that people make sacrifices for other members of a society who are complete strangers. Thus, it requires mutual trust, that is, trust that other members will also make sacrifices and that an individual can gain reciprocal support when in need. Moreover, democracies, especially deliberative democracies, work when their members listen to each other and make claims for the common good, and not for individual or sectional interests (Miller, 1995: 96-97). In brief, one can compromise one's interests for the other members when they trust each other; they can make some agreement and accept redistribution. The importance of trust has been proven in different domains of research, including social capital research, religious research, and welfare research (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Uslaner, 2004; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Researchers have found that when people trust each other, they tend to voluntarily undertake social and political activities and satisfy their political institutions, while the society witnesses less corruption and less crime and democratic institutions work effectively.

Moreover, liberal nationalists assume that trust originates from national identity. This second assumption is clearly explained by the following statement of Miller (1995: 92):

I take it as virtually self-evident that ties of community are an important source of such trust between individuals who are not personally known to one another and who are in no position directly to monitor one another’s behavior. A shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and this increases confidence that others will reciprocate one’s own co-operative behavior.

According to Miller, communities need a shared identity in order to trust other members of a society who are anonymous to each other, since shared identity makes these anonymous others “one of us” in some sense. This view is based on a particularistic view of ethics: our sense of responsibility stems from ties between people. From the viewpoint of liberal nationalists,
national identity forms the largest circle of these ties; Kymlicka (2001: 225) declares that national identity, and no other social identities provide trust enabling self-sacrifice for other members of society beyond kinship. According to Tamir (1993: 117-8), a national identity involves “moral community” within which members develop mutual attachments that supply the moral justifications required for assuming mutual obligations. Miller (1995: 82) shares this view: he explains nations as “communities of obligation, in the sense that their members recognize duties to meet the basic needs and protect basic interests of other members.” These statements imply that trust is regarded as woven into national identity. In other words, sharing national identity automatically leads to mutual trust.

Where does the national identity come from? Liberal nationalists assume that the national identity is based on shared cultures that are specific to a nation. For example, Miller (1995: 27) raises distinct public culture as a component of national identity. According to Kymlicka (2001: 25), a nation shares societal culture, which is “territorially-concentrated culture, centered on a shared language which is used in wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life.” From the viewpoint of liberal nationalists, people are not connected to each other if there is no shared culture. This can be seen when liberal nationalists criticize the view of civic nationalists who emphasize importance of practice of citizenship and of liberals who value universal norms such as liberty or equality. Liberal nationalists think that common experience sharing the rights and obligations, i.e. practice of citizenship, is not enough to unite members. Miller (1995: 71-2) argues; when a rights and obligation of citizenship is only based on the tie of practice of citizenship itself, members would insist on strict reciprocity, thus they do not support other members if it worsens their individual benefits. Furthermore, liberal nationalists assume that the universal norms such as liberty or equality are not enough to cultivate mutual trust. Kymlicka (2001: 254-64) explains this with referring to the example of the Quebecois in Canada. Even though Quebecois share liberal values with English Canadians, they still actively call for self-determination. They are eager to create their own moral community based on cultures of French Canadians. This example implies that people need to share a specific “national” culture to cultivate mutual trust.

This assumption has been criticized from two perspectives. First, some researchers doubt the necessity of national identity for mutual trust (e.g., Mason, 1999; Abizadeh, 2002). From the viewpoint of these researchers, belonging to the polity but not to the cultural nation is a prerequisite for mutual trust. For example, Mason (1999: 273) draws a distinction between a sense of belonging together and a sense of belonging to a polity. While the former indicates that a person has the belief that people share a history, religion, ethnicity, mother tongue, culture, or conception of the goods, the latter indicates that a person identifies with most of its major institutions and some of its central practices and feels at home in them. Then, she points out that
some multinational states such as Canada, Switzerland, the U.S., and Belgium are stable without common cultures, or “illusion that they belonged together in the relevant sense”. What people share in these countries is secure sense of belonging to the polity. Thus, Mason (1999) suggests that belonging to practice, to institutions, to laws or maybe to ceremonies, is enough to incline people trust each other.

Second, some researchers criticize the civic definition of shared cultures of liberal nationalists (e.g., Kuromiya, 2007). The definitions of shared cultures differ according to researchers even among liberal nationalists. While Kymlicka (1999) emphasizes objective cultures such as language, Miller (1988; 1995) and Tamir (1993) emphasize subjective aspects of national identity. However, they share the view that shared cultures should be defined in civic terms. It is true that liberal nationalists take ambiguous standpoints with regard to the importance of ethnic elements in national identity. On the one hand, they admit national identity sometimes involves ethnic elements. For example, Miller (1988: 657) suggests that “it is therefore almost inevitable that there will be areas in which nationality does trespass on ethnicity”. Tamir (1993: 29) as well mentions that “it is also true that not all choices are similar, that some cultures are more difficult to leave or enter than others, that a particular color of skin or certain physical feature can make assimilation more difficult, and a times impossible”. On the other hand, they take a normative view when they suggest that we should not regard a nation as ethnic community. According to Miller (1995: 140), trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide; in other words, in order to cultivate trust, national identity should be inclusive. Thus, they separate their standpoints from that of the conservative nationalists by defining a nation as a voluntary, variable, and inclusive community. This is clearly seen when Miller (1995: 128) describes that national “identity is always in flux, and is molded by the various sub-cultures that exist within the national society.” Kymlicka (2001: 211) as well remarks that societal cultures is an open and pluralistic one, which barrows whatever it finds worthwhile in other culture, integrates it into its own practices, and passes it on to the subsequent generations. Some researchers assume, however, civic culture, such as shared language, is not enough to maintain national identity; sharing ethnic cultures such as traditions or customs is necessary to make national identity work. For example, Kuromiya (2007) suggests that ethnic values are embedded too deeply into a society to be eliminated. Thus, he claims, a nation should be defined according to those who share a common awareness of the traditions and traditional values, shared by past generations. From this viewpoint, increasing ethno-cultural diversity within a nation might harm social connectedness, since it erodes national identity. The concerns for increase of ethno-cultural diversity spread over European countries (e.g. Wolfe and Klausen, 1997; Goodhart, 2004), and some research has proven that large ethno-cultural diversity weakens mutual trust (Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007).

Although the second assumption of liberal nationalism is highly contestable, it is rarely tested. One rare exception is the study conducted by Johnston et al. (2010), which examines the effects of national identity on trust, as well as the support of various welfare policies, in Canada. They analyze the public opinion survey data conducted in English-Canadian populations and find that both interpersonal trust and trust in government are strong when people have strong national identities. Moreover, national identity cultivates a more inclusive view toward immigrants, including a more supportive view of health care and of redistribution policies among those in higher economic positions, although it does not affect a supportive view of pensions. From these results, they conclude that national identity bears considerable significance for the welfare state in Canada.

Interpreting this result might be controversial, since the Canadian case is often used as an exceptional case in liberal nationalism. Miller (1995: 95) claims that despite cultural differences, Canadians share a Canadian identity that is more than merely being a member of a single state. From the viewpoint of Kymlicka (2001: 212-3), Canada can have redistributive policies thanks to federalization of the political system; people participate in a larger society through each territorialized language group which they feel belonging to. However, according to liberals (e.g., Mason, 1999; Abizadeh, 2002), the Canadian case indicates the deficiency of liberal nationalism and the importance of belonging to a polity. Thus, we can say that further research is required to examine the validity of liberal nationalism.

The present research explores the validity of the second assumption of liberal nationalism by examining whether national identity has the same impact on trust in other settings. The U.S. is regarded as a model case by Miller (1995), since it has a strong and inclusive national identity that embraces new immigrants. In contrast, the Japanese national identity has been colored with an ethnic view of a nation, which is rejected by liberal nationalists. By comparing these two cases, I can explore how the way of defining national identity influences the relationship between national identity and trust, and thereby investigate what people need to share to cultivate mutual trust.

Furthermore, the present research examines the dynamic relationship between national identity and trust. Positive effects of national identity on trust might imply that the decline of national identity causes a decline of trust, as some researchers worry (e.g., Wolfe and Klausen, 1997; Goodhart, 2004). However, the interpretation can change if we regard trust in a different way. Crepaz (2008) explores change in an average level of trust in seven countries and concludes that trust is a trait rather than a state. This means that “for any given reason, some societies are either more or less trusting and increasing diversity does not significantly affect trust levels in these societies” (Crepaz, 2008: 97). If this view is valid, the causality is in contrast to the assumption of liberal nationalism; trust maintains strong national identity. In order to figure out the dynamic
relationship between national identity and trust, I use a comparative longitudinal data set. I then adopt a structural equation model and add lagged effects. This method makes it possible to explore the relationship between change in trust and change in national identity.

3. Settings: National Identities in the U.S. and Japan

Before proceeding to the analysis, I will provide an overview of how the definition of national identity changed during the survey period (from the 1960s to the 1990s in the U.S. and from the 1970s to the 2000s in Japan). The period from the 1960s to the 1990s can be seen as a period when national identity in the U.S. underwent change. The American society had a self-image as a civic nation whose members share universal values instead of ethnic cultures, and they had confidence in its power of assimilating immigrants into this common culture. From the 1960s, however, the skeptical view toward this “melting pot” model began to spread. Many researchers questioned “its validity as a concept and its desirability as ideal” (Alba, 1990: 2). As an ideal, the melting pot model was more and more perceived as forced assimilation to WASP cultures, and “Americanization” was attached to an image as discrimination toward non-European immigrants (Schlesinger, 1991). Moreover, after the immigration law was revised in 1965, the country of origin for immigrants changed from European countries to South American or Asian countries, and it occasioned a resurgence of race as a legitimate category of group identification (Joppke, 1999). Against this backdrop, “ethnic revival” or “cultural pluralism” surfaced. The movements were active especially in the field of education, and as a result, multicultural education and bilingual education were actively adopted during the 1960s and the 1970s (Higham, 1993; Joppke, 1999; Hero and Preuhs, 2007).

From the 1980s, however, this “cultural pluralism” began to be revised and the importance of American national identity, E Pluribus Unim, was stressed again (e.g., Ravitch, 1990; Schlesinger, 1991; Hollinger, 1995). They believe that emphasis on ethnic differences and differentiated treatment of each ethnic group essentializes cultural differences and creates social tension within a society. Instead of cultural pluralism, they reevaluate incorporative aspects of American identity. This ideal can be seen in Glazer’s (1997) description of the “best” normative model of American national identity concerning its ethnic and racial diversity:

Let us have respect for identity in the context of a common culture, but let us avoid the fixing of lines of division on ethnic and racial bases. Let us accept the reality of exit from an ethnic-racial-religious group, as well as the right of differential attachment, as a common American way, and let us agree that ethnic and racial affiliation should be as voluntary as religious affiliation, and of as little concern to the state and public authority. Let us understand
that more and more Americans want to be Americans simply, and nothing more, and let us celebrate that choice, and agree it would be better for America if more of us accepted that identity as our central one, as against ethnic and racial identities (Glazer, 1997: 159).

In this statement, American national identity is described as integrative. Although there are diverse ethnic, racial, and religious groups within a nation, they are all regarded as Americans who are willing to be Americans. In other words, American national identity is based on trust in the will of other “Americans” with various backgrounds. This view is shared by the public. Citrin et al. (2001) analyze the public opinion survey conducted in 1994 and find that a majority of American people support the older liberal idea of a common civic identity at the same time that they support the cultural maintenance of ethnic minorities. They reject multiculturalism only when it comes to articulated ethnic representation in politics or schools. In practice, bilingual policies were revised and the Official English Law spread during the 1980s and the 1990s (Hero and Preuhs, 2007). After the age of multiculturalism, American society re-created an integrative national identity based on shared civic cultures in the public domain with cultural diversity in the private domain.

In Japan, national identity has continued to be colored with “blood” and “ancestry” from the 1970s to the 2000s. The Japanese nation was once regarded as a multiethnic nation comprising colonial citizens such as Koreans and Chinese during the Japanese imperial period, but it shrunk to a homoethnic nation in the face of their defeat (Oguma, 1995). Even after the democratic development in the 1970s, the national government refused to admit that Japan was a multicultural society, as is evident from its official declaration in 1980 that cultural minorities were not present in Japan (Maher, 1997).

In the 1980s, since this bias, as well as the closed Japanese economy, was denounced by foreign countries, the concept of internationalization was adopted to alleviate the pressure (Burgess, 2004; Ertl, 2008: 84). It aimed to open Japanese society to foreign people through tourism, trade, and international cultural exchange programs such as sister-city relations (Graburn and Ertl, 2008: 7). National identity based on ethnicity, however, was still a part of this internationalization movement. According to Yoshino (1994), the Nihonjinron, the literature on unique Japaneseness, gained popularity around the 1970s and the 1980s. The literature was prepared for the public by business elites who believed that an understanding of the unique behavior pattern of the Japanese and their way of thinking is necessary for communicating with foreign people. It is well known that Kazuhiro Nakasone—the former prime minister and one of the advocates of internationalization—claimed that the economic success of Japan stemmed from its ethnic homogeneity. The myth of ethnic homogeneity is maintained under internationalization.
In the 1990s, social movements by activists collaborating with international organizations succeeded in convincing the Japanese government to admit that there is an ethnic minority group in Japan. Subsequently, in 1997, the Japanese government enacted the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act, which guaranteed the cultural rights of the Ainu. Moreover, in discourses, many terms that recognize and appreciate cultural diversity within a society, for example, *tabunka kyosei* (multicultural coexistence) or *tabunka shakai* (multicultural society), emerged to describe the ideal society as early as the late 1990s. However, it does not mean that an ethnic connotation of national identity disappeared. For example, in 1991 the Japanese government revised the immigration law and accepted foreign workers without posing the limitation of them having to seek work permissions only for the Japanese descendants from South America. This revision can be regarded as a compromise to strike a balance between the need for additional labor force and the myth of ethnic homogeneity. The continuity of the myth of homogeneity is evident in the public opinion research that shows that Japanese society continues to believe in the myth of homogeneity (Jones and Smith, 2001; Tanabe 2001). Tsuda (2006) observes that Japanese people are likely to be shocked when they meet those who are on boarder between “Japanese” and “non-Japanese”: Japanese descendants who cannot speak Japanese, foreign nationals who speak Japanese fluently. Then, they try to make boarder robust by introducing more strict criteria as Japanese: those who share both “blood”, cultures, and citizenship (Burgess 2004; Lie 2001; Tsuda 2006). In other words, the Japanese national identity has always been based on Japanese ethnicity.

4. Data and Variables

4.1 Overview of the Data

In this research, I used the data set of the Work and Personality Survey, a longitudinal survey conducted in the U.S. (the first wave in 1964, the second wave in 1974, and the third wave in 1994) and in Japan (the first wave in 1979 and the second wave in 2006). The questionnaires were designed to maintain comparability between the waves and countries. In this research, the first and third waves in the U.S. and the first and second waves in Japan were used. The intervals of the two surveys are not equal but are relatively similar between two countries (thirty years for the U.S. data and twenty-seven years for the Japanese data).

This survey was originally conducted by Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler in the Laboratory of Socio-environmental Studies. For the U.S. data, the first waves included area probability samples drawn by the National Opinion Research Center; the samples comprised males over 16 years old with civilian jobs (Schooler et al. 2004). The sample size was 3,100 men, and the response rate was 76%. The sample for the second wave was randomly selected from a sample of men aged less than 65 years. The final sample size of the second survey was 687 men, and the
response rate was 88%. The sample of the third wave was selected from the sample of the second survey. The sample size was 351, and response rate was 80%.

The Japanese replication was carried out by researchers at Tokyo and Osaka University under the direction of Atsushi Naoi and in collaboration with Carmi Schooler. For the Japanese data, the sample was randomly selected from the working male population aged over 26 years old and living in the Kanto area. The first wave was conducted by the research group in Tokyo University. The sample size was 629 men, and the response rate was 75% (Naoi and Schooler, 1985). The second wave was conducted with all valid samples of the first wave by our research group in Osaka University. The sample size was 223 men\(^2\), and the response rate was 44%.

In both countries, the sample size became quite small after the initial samples because of the long interval between each wave. Moreover, in the U.S. data, the proportion of African-Americans, those who were older, poorly educated, or who were not employed in the second wave were likely to drop in the third wave (Schooler et al., 2004). On the contrary, the response rate of the Japanese third wave was not high, but there was little deviation found in the data. Although the degree of representation of the samples is not great, the uniqueness of the data set can compensate for this weakness.

Since our data include missing values (maximum of 7.1% in the U.S. data and 24.7% in the Japanese data), I use Mplus version 4.21’s full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation approach\(^3\) (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2007).

4.2 Variables

The main indicators in this research are national identity and trust. As indicators of trust, I use a standard measure of interpersonal trust (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner, 2004), namely, the question “Can most people be trusted?” This indicator might be problematic, since it refers to trust for people in general not to people in their own country, which liberal nationalists focus on. However, we live in a world of banal nationalism; people take it for granted that people belong to a nation (Billig, 1995). In other words, nation is a unit that people generally refer to. Therefore, we can assume that people refer to other people in a country when they are asked about people in general.

As an indicator of national identity, I use the question, “How often do you feel your idea is different from others in your country?” There are two problems with this indicator. The first problem concerns a unit of reference. This item refers to a state, which is not necessarily composed of a single nation. Liberal nationalists assume that a nation as a unit of reference with regard to national identity. For example, Tamir (1993) or Kymlicka (2001) supports the idea that sub nations like Quebec have a right of self-determination within federation system because of their unique “national” identity. Thus, the item in this research may be inappropriate. However,
this does not hamper the present research much, since people in the U.S. are regarded as sharing a national identity by liberal nationalists (e.g., Miller, 1995). Moreover, the size of the sub-national population is quite small and usually invisible in Japan (Peng-Er, 2005). Thus, in both cases, a state seems to be a unit of reference of national identity. The second problem concerns the content of an item. In the view of liberal nationalists, people do not necessarily share the ideas in order to share identity. In this aspect, the item might be too narrow. However, this item can help to identify, at least partly, what is overlooked in previous research: to what extent do people feel commonality with other members of a state? In other words, this indicates what Mason (1999) call “feeling of belonging together”, since it concerns for the shared values and ideas.

In addition to these two indicators, we use social demographic variables, for example, age, education, household income, and ethnicity (only for the U.S.), as controlling variables.

5. Results

First, we examine how much trust and national identity changed between the two waves. Figure 1 shows levels of agreement to the statement that “most people can be trusted” for the two waves in both countries. It indicates that American people show more trust than Japanese people in both waves, although American society is more heterogeneous than Japanese society. Around 15% of the respondents “disagree” in the U.S., while in Japan, around 23% of the respondents “disagree.” On the contrary, level of trust changed little between the two waves in each country. In both countries, the rates of those who answer “agree” decrease only by around 3%, and the averages of the two waves are not significantly different. As Crepaz (2008) points out, trust seems to be mostly developed in the early years of life and does not change much in old age. When we look at the correlations between the two waves, they are a little stronger in the U.S. ($r = 0.316$) than in Japan ($r = 0.289$). This means that the level of trust is more stable at individual levels in the U.S. than in Japan. Although the U.S. experienced a tide of multiculturalism from the 1960s, its citizens changed little in their level of trust.

Subsequently, how does the level of national identity change? Figure 2 shows the level of national identity in Japan and in the U.S. in each wave. Before seeing the change, we need to note that there is a problem in the indicator. In the U.S., the scale of the indicator is five-point in 1964 and it is seven-point in 1995. It makes comparison of the average between the two surveys, as well as between countries, difficult. However, in a cross-national comparison, we can see a clear difference between the two countries; Japanese people show far stronger national identity than Americans do. More than 60% of the respondents “never” or “rarely” feel that their ideas are different from other Japanese while less than 20% of the respondents do in the U.S. This result supports the assumption that “myth of homogeneity” within a nation leads strong national identity.
Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between National Identity and Social Trust: Liberal Nationalism Reconsidered

Figure 1 Level of Trust in the U.S. and Japan
Notes: Japan: Change of Average: 0.075 (p > 0.1), r = 0.288 (p < 0.01), n = 213
The U.S.: Change of Average: -0.062 (p > 0.1), r = 0.316 (p < 0.01), n = 341

Figure 2 Level of National Identity in the U.S. and Japan
Notes: Japan: Change of Average: -0.244 (p < 0.1), r = 0.214 (p < 0.01), n = 201
The U.S.: r = 0.224 (p < 0.01), n = 326
When we compare the two waves, the level of national identity declines in Japan; the rate of those who “never” feel that their ideas are different from the other Japanese is 41.6% in 1979 while it is 29.7% in 2006. The average is significantly different between the two waves on 10% significant criteria (−0.244). In the U.S., levels of national identity decline a little during these thirty years; 14.2% of the respondents “never,” “very rarely,” or “rarely” feel that their ideas are different from the other Americans in 1995 while 18.8% of the respondents of those who “never” or “rarely” feel this in 1964. In addition, in both countries, correlations between the two waves are not so high (0.214 in Japan, 0.224 in the U.S.) This means that the level of national identity changes in individual levels and it changes randomly; some strengthen and some weaken it.

How these two attitudes relate each other? When we look at correlations between these attitudes in each survey in both countries, we can find no significant correlations except the third wave in the U.S. (Table 1). In Japan, both in 1979 and in 2006, strong national identity did not mean higher level of trust. People believe others even when they do not perceive commonality within a nation. This result leads us to doubt the assumptions of liberal nationalists. More interestingly, in the U.S. strong national identity did not mean higher level of trust in 1964, but it did mean in 1994. The first wave of the U.S. survey was conducted in the time of the failure of “melting pot” and the second wave was conducted in the time when one American national identity was emphasized again. Under these conditions, trust and national identity came to inter-relate each other.

### Table 1 Correlation between National Identity and Trust

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<td>Correlations</td>
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Notes) ** p < 0.01, n.s. = not significant

Subsequently, how does change of national identity affect change of trust? To analyze the effect of national identity on trust, I use a structural equation model with cross-lagged effects as in Figure 3. Controlling variables, i.e. age, education, household income, and ethnicity for the U.S. data, are set to have effects on trust and national identity in both waves, since they can be assumed to affect a level of change of these attitudes. For example, those who are more educated are less likely to reduce their trust. Moreover, to solve a problem caused by the differences in the scale of the indicator of national identity for the U.S. data, I use standardized indicators for trust and national identity. This indicator means respondents’ relative levels of trust and national identity in each country in each wave.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between trust and national identity in Japan. It illustrates that national identity in the first wave significantly affects level of trust in the second wave (0.131), while trust in the first wave does not affect level of national identity in the second wave. Those who had strong national identity in 1979 trust more in their later years. This goes along with the assumption of liberal nationalism: A national identity maintains trust. Moreover, these attitudes do not correlate with each other in both waves. In short, national identity has retarded effects on trust. From this result, the decline of national identity might cause a decline of trust in the future.
In addition, education has positive effects on trust in the second wave (0.186): Education works to maintain trust in old age. Household income affects levels of trust in the second wave (−0.164), while it does not influence trust in the first wave. This means that those who are in economically vulnerable positions reduce their level of trust. Social inequality became a serious issue in Japan in the 2000s. Under these conditions, those who are in economically vulnerable positions trust others less.

The different relationships between trust and national identity can be seen in the U.S. As Figure 5 shows, national identity in the first wave does not have effects on the level of national identity in the third wave. On the contrary, level of trust in the first wave positively affects the level of national identity in the third wave (0.147). This effect is significant; those who trust other people maintain their level of national identity. In the U.S., national identity does not influence trust; rather, trust influences national identity. In addition, trust and national identity do not correlate in the first wave while they do correlate in the third wave even after controlling other variables. This means that those who strengthen national identity strengthen trust at the same time. From the 1960s, American people have been re-creating national identity partly by a force of trust, thus trust and national identity began to correlate closely in 1990s.

![Diagram showing relationships between variables such as age, trust, household income, national identity, education, and ethnicity.](image)

When we look at the effects of controlling variables, education has significant negative effects on national identity (−0.171) and significant positive effects on trust (0.136) in the first wave. Education prevents people from having strong national identity and strengthens trust. Moreover,
household income affects the level of national identity positively in the first wave (0.137). In the U.S., those who were experiencing poorer economic conditions were more likely to have strong national identity in 1964. However, the significant effect of household income does not appear in the third wave. National identity spread across economic stratification in the 1990s. In addition, ethnicity has a significant negative effect on trust in the third wave (−0.114). African Americans lost their trust during these thirty years more than European Americans did. Thus, we can say that the gap in the level of trust become bigger between European/African Americans. Age affects trust negatively only in the third wave on the 10% significant criteria (−0.103).

6. Discussions

This research examines whether national identity works to cultivate social connectedness, which is frequently referred to by liberal nationalists. By the analysis of the comparative longitudinal survey data of the U.S. and Japan, I find the following results which demand the review of validity of the liberal nationalists’ assumption. First, the level of trust changes little between two waves. Moreover, the level of trust is higher in the U.S. than in Japan while national identity is stronger in Japan than in the U.S. Japanese people perceive that their nation is quite homogeneous, but they trust other people less than American people do. As Crepaz (2008) mentions, trust may be a trait and some countries (the U.S.) are more trustful than other countries (Japan). This indicates that trust does not necessarily stem from a feeling of commonality, at least when measured by our indicator.

Secondly, trust and national identity actually relate to each other, but in more complicated ways than the liberal nationalists assume. Through the analysis of the cross-lagged effects of both attitudes, it is found that the level of national identity in the first wave positively affects the level of trust in the second wave in Japan; on the contrary, the level of trust in the first wave positively affects the level of national identity in the third wave in the U.S. This difference might relate to contents of a national identity in each country. American national identity is regarded as something constructed, not as something inherited. Through the age of multiculturalism, American national identity has been re-created as one based on trust through the years. On the other hand, Japanese national identity colored with ethnic cultures works as social glue. It might make the theory of liberal nationalism controversial. As we saw above, liberal nationalists suggest that shared cultures should be civic, but national identity connects its members only when they share some ethnic cultures as conservatives suggest (e.g., Kuromiya, 2007). If mutual trust is based on ethic cultures, however, what the mutual trust causes might go against a normative standpoint of liberal nationalists. Crepaz (2008) points out that primordial trust, that is, trust only for people who are like themselves, strengthens negative attitudes toward outgroup. There is a possibility that national identity based on ethnic cultures cultivates trust at the same
time it strengthens negative attitudes toward cultural others. Further research is required to examine whether this is the case or not.

In order to create national identity in the form that liberal nationalists expect, trust is required first. In fact, Miller (1995: 128) admits that the political system has to resolve group conflicts without being able to rely on a shared sense of national identity to create mutual trust when a country accepts immigrants. In other words, trust should be cultivated in other ways in a multicultural society. From this viewpoint, liberal nationalists might need to look into what makes people trust each other in a multicultural society in order to avoid the risk of falling into conservative nationalism.

The third finding suggests one possible way to cultivate trust: education. Education affects the level of change of trust in both countries. Higher education prevents the level of trust from declining in Japan while it strengthens the general level of trust in the U.S. Moreover, it has been found that in the U.S., a negative view toward a generous welfare system is partly caused by stereotypes of racial/ethnic minorities’ dependency on social security (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Trust toward others is harmed by these stereotypes, and many researchers find that education weakens prejudice toward ethnic/racial minorities (Hjerm, 2001; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). Therefore, we can say that education leads to a more tolerant and trustful society, though it decays the belief of commonality within a nation.

In addition, the results suggest that racial cleavage in trust becomes strong in the U.S. while economic cleavage in trust does in Japan. In previous research, it has been found that African-Americans have less trust than European-Americans (Putnam, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2009). By using the longitudinal data, I find that these differences become more and more salient. Social cleavage caused by ethnicity or economic conditions may decay democratic society through weakening trust. According to these findings, the way to maintain a liberal and democratic society is not to strengthen national identity but to reduce discrimination and economic inequality within a society and to cultivate trust through education.

There is a limitation in the present research, however, which relates to its sample. The present research uses quite limited samples in space and time. Therefore, I need to acknowledge the generality of the results by analyzing data which include more recent generations and can represent broader populations as well as individuals in other geographical areas. In addition, it grasps only one dimension of a national identity, feeling of commonality; further research into its various dimensions is required to clarify what form of national identity is required for mutual trust.

[Notes]
1) While Miller (1995) assumes that there is Canadian national identity, Kymlicka (2001)
emphasizes Quebec national identity. This difference is worth arguing, but goes further the argument in the present article. What examines in the present article is the core assumption shared by both researchers: whether national identity influences trust and whether definition of national identity, ethnic or civic, affects its impact on trust.

2) The Japanese survey includes face-to-face interview and placement methods, whereas the U.S. survey includes only the face-to-face interview method. The analysis in this research uses the face-to-face interview data, except household income, which was sought through the placement method in the second wave in Japan.

3) Even when we include only the samples with valid answers to the questions used in this research, the results are mostly the same as shown here, except for some minor differences. Detailed results are available with the author.

4) Level of education is indicated by the number of years of the respondents’ full-time education. Household income is divided into two categories: low (=1, those who are below the lowest quartile) and middle/high (=0, otherwise). For the Japanese second wave, this indicates household property. Ethnicity is divided into two categories (African-Americans = 1, European-Americans = 0). I do not include other ethnicities such as Asians or Hispanics, since these categories are not included in the questionnaire. Six respondents who answered “other categories” were excluded from the analysis. For the Japanese data, no information about respondents’ ethnicity is included. Moreover, the number of ethnic others assumes to be quite small (foreign nationals comprise less than 2% of the 2006 population) in Japan. Therefore, I do not include ethnicity in the model for the Japanese data.

5) Some people may suspect that these results are caused by small sample size. Although we can find significant correlations when we use whole samples (596 for the Japanese first wave, 651 for the U.S. subsamples participating in the second wave), the correlations are quite weak (0.085 in Japan, -0.086 in the U.S.). Therefore, we can think that there are little correlations between trust and national identity at that time. Moreover, when we put controlling variables into the model, correlations become insignificant in the U.S. and remain weak in Japan (0.109). Further results can be accessible from the author.

6) Age, education, and ethnicity are assumed to be the same between the two waves, while household income is calculated separately between the two waves.

[References]


Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between National Identity and Social Trust: Liberal Nationalism Reconsidered


Cross-National Analysis of the Relationship between National Identity and Social Trust: Liberal Nationalism Reconsidered

Kikuko Nagayoshi

Abstract

This research aims to examine whether national identity is required to cultivate trust within the members of a society. Liberal nationalism assumes that national identity enables the cultivation of trust, which acts as the basis of a democratic welfare society. However, the validity of this assumption is being debated. The critics of liberal nationalists mainly target the ambiguity with regard to what people actually need to share for ensuring a shared national identity. Liberal nationalists stipulate the necessity of shared cultures that are inclusive of all members. However, liberals assume that belonging to the polity is enough, while conservatives believe that shared ethnic cultures are needed.

This research explores liberal nationalism from two perspectives. First, it examines whether national identity cultivates trust; more specifically, how does the difference in the definition of national identity influence its relationship with trust? Second, the research examines the dynamic relationship between national identity and trust; how does a change in the degree of national identity influence changes in the level of trust? This analysis is facilitated by a unique data set—comparative longitudinal data of the U.S., a civic nation, and Japan, an ethnic nation.

The analysis results show that the relationship between national identity and trust is more complicated than what liberal nationalists assume: the degree of national identity strengthens trust in Japan, while trust strengthens national identity in the U.S. From this result, we can assume that national identity cultivates trust in a “monoethnic” nation, while trust is required to cultivate national identity in a multiethnic nation. This might render the theory of liberal nationalism controversial. As we explored earlier, liberal nationalists suggest that shared cultures should be civic, but national identity connects its members only when they share some ethnic identity. In order to create national identity in the form that liberal nationalists expect, trust is a prerequisite. From this viewpoint, liberal nationalists might need to determine what makes people to trust each other in a multicultural society in order to avoid the risk of falling into conservative nationalism. This research suggests three possible ways to cultivate trust in a multicultural society: reducing discrimination, decreasing economic inequality, and through education.