



Title	What is Dasein?
Author(s)	Nakahashi, Makoto
Citation	Philosophia OSAKA. 2007, 2, p. 97-105
Version Type	VoR
URL	<a href="https://doi.org/10.18910/12770">https://doi.org/10.18910/12770</a>
rights	
Note	

*The University of Osaka Institutional Knowledge Archive : OUKA*

<https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/>

The University of Osaka

Makoto NAKAHASHI (Osaka University)

### What is Dasein?

Scholars disagree about how to interpret many of Heidegger's concepts. One particular concept that provokes strong debate is "Dasein." What is "Dasein"? Dasein is a very expansive concept that can be defined in more than one way. It is not an exaggeration to say that Heidegger devoted the whole "Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)" (1927) to its elucidation. In order to contribute to a fuller understanding of Dasein, I will abandon the attempt to arrive at a singular definition of the term. Instead, I will confine this paper to the examination of several related issues. The first aim of this paper lies in the correction of the understanding of Dasein as man. However, many interpreters will be opposed to this. As one of the most convincing disproofs they will cite Heidegger's own description: "As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity — man himself — possesses. This entity we denote by the Term "*Dasein*" (Wissenschaften haben als Verhaltungen des Menschen die Seinsart dieses Seienden (Mensch). Dieses Seiende fassen wir terminologisch als *Dasein*)" (SZ, 11).<sup>1</sup> This passage describes Dasein as man (himself). This being confirmed, there seems to be no room to doubt that "Dasein is man." But at the same time, many questions arise: *Why was the term "Dasein" adopted instead of "man"?* *If Heidegger inquired into the Being of man, was he unable to regard his inquiry as a part of anthropology?* *Why did he have to emphasize the difference between his thought and anthropology including psychology and biology?* It is true that Dasein, at least in "Sein und Zeit," means the Being of man, and that this delineation is verified without the citation to which I have referred. But, even if it may be so, since Heidegger, in order to express our Being in the philosophical discussion, avoided the term "man," an ordinary word, and adopted the term "Dasein," which he recognized as meaning existentia in the tradition of German philosophy (cf. SZ, 42, N2, 400), did he not make here his judgment or choice? Though "Dasein" and "man" are equated in many parts of Heidegger's description, the pursuit of "Dasein" as different from "man" clarifies one of the fundamental features of Heidegger's thought.<sup>2</sup> This will lead us to the new possibility of working out the question of Being, which was left unanswered in "Sein und Zeit." This is the second aim of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1987. The notes are not translated in this edition of "Being and Time."

<sup>2</sup> The difference between Dasein and man is often noticed. Cf. e.g.:

Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, Haper & Row, Publishers New York and Evanston, 1970, p.23.

Günter Figal, *Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie der Freiheit*, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, S.25f.

But these investigations' theme is not "Dasein." I want to reconsider the concept "Dasein" and make it clearer.

## 1 Why is “Dasein” distinct from man?

### 1-1 Why is “man” rejected?

There is a passage in which Heidegger definitely rejects the term “man,” even though he inquires into our Being (SZ, 45-50, esp. p.46). I will presently turn to an examination of this passage.

Heidegger treats “man” as that which belongs to the same dimension as the subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person and so on (das Subjekt, die Seele, das Bewußtsein, der Geist, die Person und so weiter). These traditional concepts of our Being are rejected in Heidegger’s thought, for he thinks that all of these concepts are understood as “something present-at-hand (Vorhandenes) + α,” that, whatever may come to this α, the Being of something present-at-hand is regarded as self-evident and settled, and that these concepts will not motivate him to inquire into Being, which he undertakes as his issue. This sheds light on the reason why Heidegger rejects the traditional sciences of anthropology, psychology, biology and so on. Indeed these sciences treat our Being as Heidegger did, but they have nothing to do with Heidegger’s thought in that they think our Being is self-evidence; they regard our Being as presence-at-hand and will not motivate us to inquire into Being. “Man” understood as something present-at-hand must be rejected in order for Being to be questioned (cf. GA66, 327). “A new field” (GA15, 390) will be needed for this inquiry.

### 1-2 Why is our Being named “Dasein”?

Instead of the lapsed “man,” Heidegger adopts “Dasein” as a new field. Why is “Dasein” adopted for the question of Being? What does this expression mean? Names often refer to natures. This is valid especially when the name doesn’t derive from a colloquial expression but is adopted anew as a scientific term. Therefore, I will first explore the “nature” of Dasein by examining why it has the “name” Dasein. The clue to this is found at the beginning of “Being-in as such (Das In-Sein als solches),” chapter five of division one of the part one of “Sein und Zeit,” where Heidegger outlines the concept of Dasein in his search for “the unitary primordial structure of Dasein’s Being (die einheitliche urprüngliche Struktur des Seins des Daseins)” (SZ, 130).

There Heidegger describes Dasein as follows:

The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world [=Dasein] *is* itself in every case its ‘there’ (SZ, 132).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Das Seiende, das wesenhaft durch das In-der-Welt-sein konstituiert wird, *ist* selbst je sein >Da<.”

According to this description, Dasein means “Being there (Da-sein)” in a literal sense. There is no simpler explanation for the term “Dasein” than this. Here the expression of “Dasein” has nothing to do with “man” and means nothing but “Being of ‘there’ (das Sein des Da).” However, this definition is not only a literal one. In order for this to be confirmed, the structure of the chapter “Being-in as such,” where this definition is found, should be recalled. This chapter consists of “A. The existential Constitution of the “*there*” (A. Die existenziale Konstitution des *Da*)” and “B. The everyday Being of the “*there*,” and the falling of Dasein (B. Das alltägliche Sein des *Da* und das Verfallen des Daseins)” (emphases added). The explanation of “Dasein” is the explanation of “Being of ‘there.’”<sup>4</sup> Primarily “Dasein” must mean “Being of ‘there.’”<sup>4</sup>

Next, what “Being of ‘there’” means should be explored. What is “there”? Heidegger translates “there” as “disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)” (SZ, 132) and explains it with the Scholastic “lumen naturale.” He says that what has been called “the *lumen natural* in man” means “the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it *is* in such a way as to be its “there” (die existenzial-ontologische Struktur dieses Seienden, daß es *ist* in der Weise, sein Da zu sein)” (SZ, 133). This shows that Dasein i.e. “Being of ‘there’” means that it has illumination in itself, that it is illuminated in itself, and therefore that “it *is* itself the illumination (daß es *selbst* die *Lichtung ist*)” (SZ, 133).<sup>5</sup> Dasein as the illumination is the source of light. As long as the entities are illuminated in this illumination, they are accessible to us. From this, it should be concluded that Dasein is to be regarded as the place where entities, therefore the Being of entities, are disclosed. Dasein is adopted for nothing but the question of Being. This accords with the reason why “man” was rejected.

Then, to return to the question I raised at the beginning of this paper, how is the description that “Dasein is man” understood? Heidegger states in his 1925 lecture:

A material thing occurring in the world is itself never a ‘there’ but is instead encountered in such a ‘there.’ We accordingly designate the entity which we also call man as the entity which *is itself its ‘there.’* With this, we first come to the strict formulation of the meaning of the term ‘Dasein.’ In our terminological usage in accord with the phenomena, ‘Dasein’ means not so much occurring like a ‘there’ and ‘yonder’ but *being the ‘there’ itself* (GA20,

<sup>4</sup> Gadamer says that Dasein is expressed as “Da-Sein (‘there’-Being)” first in “Kant and the problem of metaphysics (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik)” (1929), which makes the concept of “Dasein” clearer not as “an entity whose character is ‘there’ (ein Daseiendes)” but as “Being of ‘there’ (das Sein des Da)” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke, Bd.10, Hermeneutik im Rückblick*, Tübingen, 1995, S.252). But if the characteristic of “Being of ‘there’” lies in the expression of “Da-Sein” as Gadamer says, Heidegger should have understood “Dasein” already in “Sein und Zeit” (1927) as “Being of ‘there,’” for the similar expressions to Da-Sein, such as “Da-sein,” “das Sein des Da,” “Da zu sein,” are found here and there in “Sein und Zeit” (SZ, 133, 135, 142, 160, 170, 175, 220, 270, 350).

<sup>5</sup> John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson put the word “Lichtung” into “clearing”. This translation is plausible, since the word “Lichtung” derives from the French word “clairière” (cf. SD, 71-72). Admitting this, I put “Lichtung” into “illumination” here, because “Lichtung” in this context is explained through “lumen naturale,” through light.

349).<sup>6</sup>

“Dasein” means primarily “the entity which *is itself its ‘there’*” or “*being the ‘there’ itself*,” therefore “Being of ‘there,’ ” which can again be confirmed by the expression “the strict formulation.” And “we also call” Dasein “man.” This makes the relation between “Dasein” and “man” clear. When the attention is paid to “also” in “we also call man,” it is clear that “Dasein” i.e. “Being of ‘there’” is grasped also as “man” and that one aspect of “Dasein” i.e. “Being of ‘there’” is “man.” This means that Heidegger’s “man” is defined by “Dasein = Being of ‘there’ = illumination (Lichtung).” Therefore, he says “Dasein is the essence of man” (cf. Ges, 22, KM, 229f., GA9, 187, GA48, 260, GA69, 150).

The above explanation will be enough to confirm that Dasein means primarily Being of ‘there’, not man. But this is not the whole of Heidegger’s inquiry. His final purpose is not at all the foundation of a new anthropology based on Dasein (cf. SZ, 17, GA66, 321). His thought always steers towards the question of Being. His argument over Dasein always moves in this domain. The answer to the question “What is Dasein?” will be arrived at through the introduction of Dasein into the question of Being.

### 1-3 Why has Dasein come to be discussed?

It is not easy to confirm Heidegger’s motivation to introduce Dasein into the question of Being. This is because the description of the introduction of Dasein into the question of Being is confusing. First, his description should be examined (SZ, 7).

After the enumeration of Beings, consisting of “the fact that something is, its Being as it is, Reality, presence-at-hand, subsistence, validity, Dasein,<sup>7</sup> and “the ‘there is,’ ”<sup>8</sup> Heidegger writes: “In *which* entities is the meaning of Being to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure of Being to take its departure?”<sup>9</sup> In order to the answer to these questions, Heidegger introduces Dasein as “our example (das exemplarische Seiende).”

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena*, translated by Theodore Kisiel, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1985.

The original description by Heidegger is: “Ein in der Welt vorkommendes, ein materielles Ding ist nie selbst ein >Da<, sondern begegnet in ein solches. Deshalb bezeichnen wir das Seiende, das wir auch Mensch nennen, als dasjenige, das *sein* >Da< *selbst ist*. Damit kommen wir erst zur strengen Formulierung der Bedeutung des Terminus >Dasein<. >Dasein< heißt in unserer terminologischen Verwendung gemäß den Phänomenen nicht so viel wie >da< und >dort< vorkommen, sondern *das* >Da< *selbst sein*.”

<sup>7</sup> To this Heidegger makes a note: “Still the ordinal concept and nothing but this (Noch der gewöhnliche Begriff und noch kein anderer)” (SZ, 439).

<sup>8</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Daß- und Sosein, Realität, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, >es gibt<.”

<sup>9</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “An *welchem* Seienden soll der Sinn von Sein abgelesen werden, von *welchem* Seienden soll die Erschließung des Seins ihren Ausgang nehmen?”

It seems that “our example” is, since it is introduced as what the meaning of Being is to be discerned in after the enumeration of the variety of Being, the best embodiment of Being among various entities in which Beings, such as subsistence and validity, are discerned. Then, does Dasein as “our example” contain in its Being the fact that something is, its Being as it is, Reality and so on? Of course not. The Being of Dasein is nothing but “existence (Existenz)” (SZ, 12). After noticing this, Heidegger later added to the description: “In *which* entities is the meaning of Being to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure of Being to take its departure?” His note is as follows: “Two different questions are here strung together; misleading, especially concerning the role of Dasein,”<sup>10</sup> (SZ, 439) “but the meaning of Being is not discerned in this entity” (SZ, 439).<sup>11</sup> Dasein is not “our example,” in whose Being the meaning of other Beings is discerned and, precisely, “Dasein is not a case of entities to represent and abstract Being...” (SZ, 439).<sup>12</sup> The qualification that Dasein is “exemplary” is also affirmed by the later Heidegger (SZ, 439). Then, in which meaning is Dasein “exemplary”? The term “Dasein” is introduced into “Sein und Zeit” in the following description:

This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term “*Dasein*”(SZ, 7).<sup>13</sup>

The reason why Dasein is introduced into the question of Being lies in its character of “inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being.” And for something to be inquired into, it must be understood beforehand, however vague it may be. Then, the reason why Dasein is “exemplary,” i.e. plays an “exemplary” role in the question of Being, will be found in the fact that only Dasein is able to inquire into Being, i.e. that only Dasein understands Being. From this it is inferred that Dasein is needed as “the place of the understanding of Being (die Stätte des Seinsverständnisses)” (SZ, 439). When Dasein is grasped as the place of the understanding of Being, then the reason why Dasein is defined as the pure “example” in which the meaning of the variety of Beings is to be discerned, such as “the fact that something is, its Being as it is, Reality, presence-at-hand, subsistence, validity, Dasein, the ‘there is,’ ” becomes explicit, for the variety of Beings is understood only in Dasein. It is because it plays the role of the point of departure to question Being that Dasein, where Being is given as understood, is adopted into the question of Being. The definition of Dasein as the place of

<sup>10</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Zwei verschiedene Fragen hier aneinander gereiht; misverständlich, vor allem bezüglich der Rolle des Daseins.”

<sup>11</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Aber nicht wird an diesem Seienden [=Dasein] der Sinn von Sein abgelesen.”

<sup>12</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Dasein ist nicht ein Fall von Seiendem für die vorstellende Abstraktion des Seins, ...”

<sup>13</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Dieses Seiende, das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem die Seinsmöglichkeit des Fragens hat, fassen wir termenologisch als *Dasein*.”

understanding of Being is often repeated in the lectures and papers after “Sein und Zeit” (SZ, 439, EM, 22, 64, GA26, 20, GA66, 146, 328).<sup>14</sup>

This definition of Dasein as the place of the understanding of Being is, however, not conclusive in spite of its high estimation by Heidegger (cf. GA26, 20). The reason why Dasein was introduced into the question of Being was found, as we have seen above, in the answer to the questions: “In *which* entities is the meaning of Being to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure of Being to take its departure?” The first question is already denied, but the second is not. Then, is it not concluded that it is as the answer to the question: “From which entities is *the disclosure of Being* to take its departure?” (emphases added) that Dasein is “exemplary”? In other words, the understanding of Being is not important, but, simply, the disclosure of Being. A deeper consideration tells us that understanding is a kind of disclosure. It is the disclosure (disclosedness) of Being that Heidegger needs in order to begin to question Being. The reason why Dasein is introduced into the question of Being is found in the acquisition of the place of the disclosure (disclosedness) of Being. These being taken into consideration, “Dasein” is needed by Heidegger in the literal sense — “Being of ‘there’” = “Being of disclosure (disclosedness)” — as is confirmed above, and “Dasein” is nothing but the expression given to the disclosure (disclosedness) of Being. And in this respect, Dasein doesn’t have to be restricted within “man,” who discloses Being as the understanding of Being. Truly, in “Sein und Zeit” it is *mainly* Dasein of “man” that is mentioned as the place of disclosure of Being, and it is *mainly* the understanding of Being that is mentioned as the disclosure of Being. But this doesn’t exclude other variations of Dasein and the disclosure of Being. Even in “Sein und Zeit” Dasein is treated not only as an individual but also as a folk (Volk) (SZ, 384). And after that, Dasein is often extended to “polis” (EM, 117, SU, 12f., GA39, 51, GA53, 108, 117, 132, GA54, 133). Dasein has many variations.

The provisional conclusion is as follows: Dasein can *also* be “man”; it is not restricted to man. “Man” is only one shape of Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger, when he wrote “Sein und Zeit,” might not have taken into consideration variations of Dasein other than a human Dasein. But the reconsideration of the definition of Dasein and of the motivation to introduce Dasein into the question of Being shows that Dasein doesn’t have to be “man”.<sup>15</sup> The primary characteristic of Dasein consists, rather, in what is nonhuman.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins, Eine Erläuterung von “Sein und Zeit” I*, Frankfurt am Main, 1987, S.70.

<sup>15</sup> Therefore, an interpreter says that Dasein grasped as human is misleading and that Heidegger avoided the expression “human Dasein (>menschliches< Dasein)” — though he says this is true of the 1923 lecture.

Cf. Christoph Jamme, Heideggers frühe Begründung der Hermeneutik, in: *Dilthey Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, Bd.4, Göttingen, 1986-87, S.81f.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger himself says that “In *Being and Time* Da-sein still stands in the shadow of the “anthropological,”

#### 1-4 Dasein unrestricted within “man”

From the above discussion we can conclude that the opinion that “to the later Heidegger” “the question of ‘Being’ occupies pride of place, and allusions to ‘Dasein’ become only a distant unsentimental memory,”<sup>17</sup> should be opposed, for it is Being that Heidegger had been concerned with since “Sein und Zeit” and it is Dasein that is the sole departure point for the question of Being. As long as Being is questioned, an allusion to Dasein is essential. It is true that Heidegger seldom mentions Dasein or ‘human’ in his later thought. But this signifies only that Dasein changes itself from the human shape into other ones. In Heidegger’s later thought Dasein is succeeded as “work (Werk).”<sup>18</sup> The insistence that “Dasein is work” may sound strange. But this is confirmed first by combining the following two citations.

The site for the moment holds sway from out of enowning, as the strife of earth and world. Strifing of this strife is Da-sein (GA65, 30).<sup>19</sup>

The work-being of the work consists in the strifing of the strife between world and earth (HW, 35).<sup>20</sup>

The commonality between Dasein and the work (being) will be plausible when it is noticed that they are handled the same way in the question of Being (HW, 70, GA65, 392). Furthermore, both Dasein and the work have in common that it is in the world of Dasein and the work that entities and Being are disclosed and this enables us to approach the riddle of Being. The problem of Dasein is developed in the problem of the work. The possibility and question of Dasein, then, will be more revealed through the analysis of the work.

---

the “subjectivistic,” and the “individualist,” etc. — and yet the opposite of all of this is what we have in view (Das Da-sein steht in >Sein und Zeit< noch im Anschein des >Anthropologischen< und >Subjektivistischen< und >Individualistischen< u.s.f., und doch ist von allem das Gegen-teil im Blick) (GA65, 295).

Cf. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, USA, 1999.

I use this translation to get the English citation from “Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis).”

<sup>17</sup> Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p.37.

<sup>18</sup> “*Polis*,” which is a different variation of Dasein than “man,” is also named “work (Werk)”(EM, 146).

<sup>19</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Die Augenblicks-Stätte west aus diesem [= Ereignis] als der Streit von Erde und Welt. Die Bestreitung des Streites ist das Da-sein.”

<sup>20</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Das Werksein des Werkes besteht in der Bestreitung des Streites zwischen Welt und Erde.”

## 2 The limitation and possibility of the question of Being with the aid of the analysis of ‘there’ (Da)

Dasein should be reconsidered, in my opinion, through the analysis of the work, for it is Dasein grasped as the work that gives us the possibility to work out the question of Being in “Sein und Zeit” and to fulfill its primary intention. The outline is as follows:

One aspect of the question of Being in “Sein und Zeit” was, since Being had already been disclosed with the acquisition of Dasein, to be accomplished as “the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself — the pre-ontological understanding of Being”<sup>21</sup> (SZ, 15, cf. S.152). This radicalization means the elucidation of ‘there’ (Da), which is the place of the understanding of Being. That is, the elucidation of ‘there’ is regarded as equal with the grasp of Being. This elucidation of ‘there’ is accomplished concretely as that of the world (Welt) (cf. SZ, 132, 143, GA24, 237).

However, this clarification of the world remains deficient. The reason lies in the building up of the conception of the ontological difference, which should have enabled the question of Being. Heidegger calls our attention to the difference between the entities and Being, when he inquires into Being. This difference should be held firmly. But caught by the ontological difference, Heidegger, in “Sein und Zeit,” emphasizes more than necessary that it is only the entity that *is*, and treats anything but this as *nothing*. This is true also of Being or the world, which itself can not be the entity because it is the foundation to enable the entity (SZ, 187, 276). But *nothing* refuses to be grasped. The understanding of ‘there’ (Da) in “Sein und Zeit” prevents us from solving the question of Being.

Now that Dasein is grasped as the work (Werk), the question of Being is properly prepared. In “The Origin of the Work of Art (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes)” (1935/36), where the work is thoroughly analyzed, it is said that “the work holds open the open region of the world” (HW, 30)<sup>22</sup> and “World ... lets entities attain to the open region of its paths” (HW, 49).<sup>23</sup> This means that the world here is treated as what is itself disclosed (open) while it discloses (opens) the entities in it. When it is treated as what is disclosed, the world becomes graspable.<sup>24</sup> This grasp of the world is enabled by the consideration that the ground of entities, which itself is not the entity and therefore could be named *nothing*, is not directly combined with the world but is found under the world. When the earth (die Erde), which is “the thing which is essentially undisclosable that shrinks from any

<sup>21</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “die Radikalisierung einer zum Dasein selbst gehörigen wesenhaften Seinstendenz, des vorontologischen Seinsverständnisses.”

<sup>22</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Das Werk hält das Offene der Welt offen.”

<sup>23</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: “Welt ... lässt das Seiende in das Offene ihrer Bahnen gelangen.”

<sup>24</sup> Figal points out that Heidegger’s object of projection (Entwerfen) was the own impending Being (das eigene bevorstehende Sein) in *Sein und Zeit* and that it was world (Welt) in the lecture 1931/32 (Günter Figal, *Heidegger zur Einführung*, 2., überarb. Aufl., Hamburg, 1996, S. 101). The world, treated as the object of projection, becomes graspable.

disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up" (HW, 32),<sup>25</sup> i.e. a kind of *nothing* that itself refuses to be disclosed, is found under the world, the world becomes the intermediate sphere between the disclosed entity and *nothing* that refuses to be interpreted (disclosed).<sup>26</sup> The 'there' (Da) thus grasped fulfills the above-mentioned condition to work out the question of Being in "Sein und Zeit." I conclude that it is in this 'there' (Da) that the possibility is given to exhibit concretely the variety of Beings that are ambiguously disclosed and to grasp the unified meaning.

Heidegger, however, did not take this path. He thought it vital to ask for the earth, which was "beginning (Anfang)" (GA13, 26), once the earth was found under the world. He missed the elucidation of the intermediate sphere that should have been inquired into primarily, seized by the retrogradation back to the source.

### Annotation

Heidegger's documents cited from the complete works of Heidegger (Gesamtausgabe, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main) are expressed as, for example, "GA5, 10," which means "Volume 5, page 10." Heidegger's other documents have following abbreviations:

- EM: *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 5., durchges. Aufl., Tübingen, 1987.
- Ges: *Antwort. Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*, hrsg. von Emil Kettering, Pfullingen, 1988.
- HW: *Holzwege*, 6., durchges. Aufl., Frankfurt am Main, 1980.
- KM: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 5., Aufl., Frankfurt am Main, 1991.
- N2: *Nietzsche zweiter Band*, 5., Aufl., Pfullingen, 1989.
- SU: *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat 1933/34*, Frankfurt am Main, 1983.
- SZ: *Sein und Zeit*, 17., Aufl., Tübingen, 1993.
- SD: *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 3., Aufl., Tübingen, 1988.

Mr. Brett Evan Gross helped me to translate this paper into English. I express my gratitude to him. However, it goes without saying that I am responsible for the contents of this paper.

©2007 by Makoto NAKAHASHI. All rights reserved.

---

<sup>25</sup> The original description by Heidegger is: "die wesenhaft Unerschließbare ..., die vor jeder Erschließung zurückweicht und d.h. ständig sich verschlossen hält."

<sup>26</sup> Only when it is grasped as an intermediate sphere, is the world able to show itself in various ways. The world must have its variations. Otherwise, it would contradict not only the fact but also Heidegger's intention, for he must have admitted the world, i.e. the understanding of Being in the Occident to be various in each time, even though its variations are under the influence of the Greek understanding of Being, since one aspect of Heidegger's question of Being is the retrogradation to the primary experience of the Greek ontology. It is vital to analyze each world in each time, so that each understanding of Being in each historical time can be examined, which should have been the issue in the part two of "Sein und Zeit." But it is only after Heidegger treated the world as the disclosed that he was able to enter into the history of Being within the sphere of the question of Being. Figal points out also, in the above-mentioned book, that in the late Heidegger the world changed itself to the object of production (Herstellen), that the projection of Being became that of the world, and that this was the formation of the world (*ibid. S.108f.*). If the world was not treated as what was to be disclosed, the projection of Being would be only a behavior of Dasein in *one* world.