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Fluctuation between Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

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Abstract

Will economic and political globalization homogenize the world? Or will various ethno-national movements break out around the globe instead? To answer this question, we must examine the concept of nation. Nation has two important universalistic ideas embedded in it: 'individual liberty' and 'collective self-decision'. By using these two ideas, nation has unprecedented power to mobilize its people and resources. Yet to tap this power, nation has to make a desirable combination of the two ideas. If the two ideas can be combined easily, nation takes on a universal character, while if they become inconsistent, nation has to rely on its ethnic culture to suppress the inconsistency. Historically, nation has fluctuated between them. But now the two ideas have become autonomous, and various combinations are possible without much support of nation. As every combination seems valid, they compete with each other asserting their own validity under a certain ethnic symbol. In the end, ethno-national conflicts will break out more frequently in the future, but the claims of the ethnic groups will take on more universalistic characteristics than they have in the past.

Keywords : nationalism, ethnic conflict, globalization, civil society, modernization

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1. Globalization or Ethno-National Resurgence?

What will the world be like in the future?

Globalization is rapidly advancing, connecting disparate people across national borders. Firms enter foreign markets, with concurrent growth of international currency exchanges. Many people are migrating to other countries looking for better job opportunities. New communication networks enable people to share information and opinions around the world. These developments may homogenize the globe, with functional relations based on the global economic order transcending national differences.

Meanwhile, many peoples are attached to their local cultures, and cultural movements based on that attachment are on the rise. Almost every country in the world is troubled by ethnic conflict in some way, whether by disintegration of the postcolonial state, secession movements on the periphery, immigration problems, or religious fundamentalism, be it Islamic, Hindu, or Christian. These ethno-nationalist movements may become a principal factor in the politics of the present world.

Which of these two trends will prevail? To begin to answer this question, we must investigate the concept of ‘nation’.

The modern world has been composed of nation-states, that is, states whose basic unit is a nation. The nation itself is composed of civic and ethnic components. The civic components concern formal—that is, the more functional and bureaucratic¹⁾—social relations, such as the modern political and economic order, while the ethnic components concern emotional attachments to cultures, traditions, ancestry, and historical experience. If the civic components determine the nation’s course, then the global order of economics and politics will prevail over individual national differences. But if the ethnic components prove strong enough, emotional attachments to nations or even smaller ethnic groups within nations will prevail over globalization’s homogenizing force.

By considering the nation in this way, we might speculate on the future of the world, and the nation itself.

However, we must consider that the civic and ethnic components of the nation are held in a subtle balance. Ethnic components hinder connection to people outside of the nation because of this emotional particularity. Civic components have the opposite effect. They make it easier for people to connect to those outside their nation through political or economic relations, but are useless—and perhaps detrimental—to creating a tightly knitted community because they have little emotional content to be shared. There is thus a tension between the ethnic and civic components.

Various scholars have argued how exactly the civic and ethnic components relate to each other, and what can

1) Not all the civic components are functional and bureaucratic. The ideas of individual liberty and collective self-decision are supposed to secure individuality and solidarity. Yet the social institutions based on these ideas, such as market and bureaucracy, tend to be functional and bureaucratic.

create or upset a balance between them. The following sections critique those arguments.

2. The Components of the Nation

Before analyzing the arguments on the relation between the ethnic and civic components of the nation, we will re-examine what the components of the nation are. By referring to Smith's (2001) definition²⁾ with slight modification, we can show those components³⁾ as follows.

The ethnic components are:

1. A proper name
2. Shared languages, customs, traditions, and myths
3. Belief in shared historical experiences
4. Belief in having common ancestors
5. Solidarity based on a distinct culture

The civic components are:

1. Clearly demarcated territory and membership
2. Common rights, duties, and culture that protect all individual members equally
3. Common rights, duties, and culture that encourage participation in and subjection to the public
4. A single economy
5. A unified administration

The important modifications to Smith's definition concern the second and third civic components. Smith (2001: 13) points out common public culture as the second and common rights and duties as the third. We, however, don't think this distinction is important because public culture is an indispensable basis for rights and duties and grouping them together is not unreasonable. Much more important is the one between the private and the public, because coordination and antagonism between them are crucial to the characteristics of nation.

2) For definitions of the nation, see also Deutsch (1966) and Connor (1978).

3) These are admittedly ideal types. There are few nations that possess these components perfectly. But a group who hopes to be a nation necessarily aims to acquire all of these components.

3. The Civic-Ethnic Tension from a Modernist Viewpoint

Among the arguments that regard the civic components as more important, Gellner's stresses industrialization, the fourth civic component, as a major factor. According to him, the nation has distinctive characteristics that did not exist before.

In industrial society, the complex and changeable division of labour dominates (Gellner 1983: 24), requiring people to be mobile, ready to shift from one activity to another, and able to follow the instructions of a new activity or occupation (Gellner 1983: 35). Thus a shared 'high culture' becomes enormously important.⁴⁾ This includes a high level of numerical ability and universal literacy, which enables communication that does not depend on local context among people who have no previous association (Gellner 1983: 35). Education becomes so costly and requires such a large apparatus that only the state can cope with it (Gellner 1983: 35-7). What Gellner thinks as the ethnic components of the nation are the high cultures that support this fluidity and give some solidarity to the nation. They are transformed from old ethnic cultures to fit the requisites of industrialization (Gellner 1983, 1997).

However, we think Gellner stresses the effects of industrialization too much. Modernization processes other than industrialization must also influence the formation of ethnic components. For example, the fashion of kilts and tartans is a symbol of Scottish nationalism, yet has little direct relation to industrialization (see Trevor-Roper 1983). Scotland's industrial development was a result of its economic integration with England; emphasizing a tradition distinct from England with kilts and tartans seems if anything to oppose this integration. When we focus on industrialization alone, we miss the unique potential of cultural sentiment, which Gellner perhaps too lightly dismisses as 'a sociological self-deception' (Gellner 1983: 58).

Next, we take up state-centred views, focusing on the fifth civic component (e.g., Giddens 1985; Tilly 1975; Mann 1993; Breuilly 1993). They stress the reflexivity of nations. In the modern world, states have to survive the military, economic, or scientific competition with other states, so they need to grasp their territories, members, and resources reflexively. Giddens says that the nation is 'a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states' (Giddens 1985: 116).

Culture plays two important roles for political integration. First, sharing the same ethnic culture makes reflexive mobilization more efficient. Breuilly says that 'the theme of the restoration of a glorious past in a transformed future has a special power which it is difficult for other ideological movements to match' (Breuilly 1993: 68). Second, ethnic culture provides 'ontological security' (Giddens 1990) for people who are released from pre-modern traditions and have nothing to replace them with. To overcome the anxiety of

4) Gellner does not notably describe the legal consequences of industrialization. We think it is proper to presume from his view that industrialization yields equal rights and duties for all members and their participation to the public.

modern society and link people tightly and safely to the administrative body, new national cultures are forged (Giddens 1985: 216-9). This understanding of cultural roles is similar to Gellner's, yet pays a little more attention to the emotional aspect of national cultures than he does.

However, we think this state-centred view also has problems. It is true that nationalism has deep roots in reflexive mobilization of the state. But not all of the reflexive mobilizations are carried out by the state. In late nineteenth-century England, where nationalism flourished (Hobsbawm 1983), there also arose claims for a '*laissez-faire*' or 'night watch state': the state's interference with civil society should be blocked so that citizens could act freely in political, economic, and cultural arenas. A state-centred view may explain this by arguing that putting limits on itself is also a state strategy for citizens to contribute to it voluntarily (see Foucault 1975). Yet the state cannot always manipulate civil society as it aims. Nationalism can prompt economic development or cultural solidarity independent of state aims. As Smith argues, 'most Scots and Catalans, for example, have not to date supported their movements and parties which sought outright independence, and have instead settled for a large measure of social, cultural and economic autonomy within their borders' (Smith 1998: 73). Again, the reflexivity that regulates these civil movements may differ from that of the state.

Arguments about both industrialization and administrative integration tend to subordinate ethnic components to civic components in the formation of nations. Neither can explain why nationalism can culminate in terror and destruction in the late modern world, and as long as they emphasize a single process in national mobilization, they will continue to be unsuccessful. In reality, national mobilization is more complicated than that. Industrialization and administrative integration do not necessarily align. Without grasping this complication, we cannot understand the real relation between the ethnic and civic components of the nation.

4. The Civic-Ethnic Tension from a Culturalist Viewpoint

In contrast to Gellner and Giddens, Smith emphasizes the cultural aspect of the nation, arguing that nations have authentic and unique cultures with their own inner rhythms and energies (Smith 1998: 90). Such a culture has been inherited, though it may have changed over time.

Smith calls a pre-modern group with a distinct culture that is to be a prototype of the nation an *ethnie*. Ethnies possess such features as 'an identifying name, myth of common origins and shared historical memories' (Smith 1998: 196). But ethnies lack national features such as 'a clearly delimited territory or "homeland", a public culture, economic unity, and legal rights and duties for everyone' (Smith 1998: 196). In short, an ethnie lacks all of the civic components noted in Section Two and possesses all of the ethnic components, though in more primitive ways. It is through modernization that ethnies develop into nations.

Smith thinks of two kinds of modernization process, 'bureaucratic incorporation' and 'vernacular mobilization'. Bureaucratic incorporation concerns 'lateral ethnies', which are 'fairly extensive and diffuse in character, but their ethnic culture is confined to the upper classes' (Smith 1995: 59). Within a lateral ethnies, common civic rights and duties take form, but only upper classes enjoy them. They come to be shared with lower classes and peripheries through a process in which the lower classes and peripheries are incorporated into the lateral ethnies's bureaucratic body (Smith 1991: 54-61).

Vernacular mobilization concerns 'vertical ethnies' with more distinctive cultures. They are 'territorially more compact', and 'their ethnic culture spreads to all classes of the community and barriers to entry tend to be high' (Smith 1995: 59). In the pre-modern age, these ethnies are static, or apolitical. But modern national cultures should possess great power to mobilize and be compatible with economic and administrative systems. Therefore, cultures of vertical ethnies become politicized. Such 'vernacular' cultures as national homelands, landscapes, and glorious pasts are rediscovered to mobilize more people effectively. Through these processes, vertical ethnies develop into nations (Smith 1991: 61-8).

Smith wants to stress nation formation as a more ethno-characteristic process than Gellner and Giddens think it is. Even 'bureaucratic incorporation' cannot be realized without continuity of the ethnic components (Smith 1991: 70). Though Hobsbawm (1983) argues most traditions are newly invented in the modern era, Smith think they must have a continuous root in the pre-modern, because otherwise, they do not resonate with large numbers of the designated 'co-nationals' (Smith 1998: 198). Whether ethnic cultures change greatly or slightly, they are the basis on which modern nations emerge.

In the modern nation, there is an uneasy but necessary symbiosis of ethnic and civic elements (Smith 1995: 100), but he believes that the ultimate superiority of ethnic components can make it stable. According to him, the modern state uses the latest science and technology to mobilize and control populations more efficiently. Such rational state shakes the authority of religion and 'intervenes in society and tries to solve problems (of illness, famine, crime, even ignorance) that have previously been thought insoluble in this world' (Smith 1991: 86-7). However, it also undermines the solidarity based on old traditions and causes identity crisis, especially of intellectuals. Smith calls this 'the crisis of dual legitimation' (Smith 1991: 96). To overcome the identity crisis while maintaining the growing power of the rational state, historicism is needed; instead of old religious world-views, new myths and symbols rediscovered in the state's history legitimate and ground human thought and action (Smith 1991: 96-8).

Smith recognizes the complexity of nationalism; he thinks that a desire for national autonomy, unity, and identity cannot be reduced to a single factor such as industrialization or administrative integration and that nation formation is an intricate process in which political, economic and cultural factors are tangled together. Among these factors, Smith thinks culture is essential. The culture decides the characteristics of the nation, and supporting industrialization or administrative integration is only a part of it. Under the ultimate

superiority of a national culture various factors are brought together, regardless of whether they are accommodated or inconsistent, to make the nation into a unified body.

Smith, however, cannot explain satisfactorily how cultural belongingness sometimes fades or declines in our daily life. The aspects in culture that cannot be reduced to a single civic factor seem to vary over time⁵⁾. To understand these fluctuations, we have to return to the civic components of the nation to examine the accommodations and inconsistencies between them. If they are inconsistent to some extent, culture should play a role in integrating them into the national body. If they are well accommodated, we do not have to be very conscious of culture. Yet Smith's stress on the superiority of culture makes this consideration impossible.

5. The Interdependence and Conflict of Two Universalistic Ideas

The modern nation has abilities to mobilize its people and resources powerfully. But what makes it possible? Basing national values on universalistic ideas⁶⁾ like 'individual liberty' and 'collective self-determination' appears to make mobilization more powerful than it would be otherwise, as these ideas enable the nation to reach very different groups of people. The formality and abstractness of the ideas allow them to co-exist and interact⁷⁾ across the population.

Industrial development requires individual liberty to be secured in the market. Individuals—conceptually speaking—must be able to act of their own free will, never obliged by anything but contracts they voluntarily make. Free choice means the efficient matching of goods, money, labour force, and information for industrial development.

Meanwhile, the idea of collective self-determination should be a part of establishing a modern administration. It dictates that the will of a group should be determined by general agreement among its members and not by the desires of a privileged few. Only a kind of administrations that align with general participation can have legitimacy. This is why modern administrations incorporate wider range of territories and classes and establish legitimate jurisdiction over them.

Now we turn back to the list of civic components. It includes two ideas and two institutions, and these have internal relations among them, as mentioned above. The primary purpose for the nation is mobilization rather than realization of these ideas, but those ideas are very useful and indispensable to powerful mobilization.

As we have argued above, the relation between industrialization and administrative integration is crucial to nation formation. By examining this process through the lens of the two universalistic ideas of individual

5) Hobsbawm says that the incidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after 1989 were not necessarily caused by ethnic factors, but later took on national or ethnic characteristics (Hobsbawm 1992).

6) We don't use an objective word 'universal' for these ideas, because they are expected to be universal but not necessarily proved to be.

7) That 'individual liberty' and 'collective self-determination' are principal and exclusive characteristics of modern polity is shown by Dahl (1971).

liberty and collective self-determination, we can understand the balances and tensions between the ethnic and civic components of the nation.

The relation between the two universalistic ideas has two key properties. First, they are interdependent. 'Individual liberty' means that every individual should be equally respected and have certain rights that others cannot interfere with. This is apparently a primary norm in modern society, but theoretically speaking, there may be any other ideas superior to it; it is almost impossible to ground individual liberty rigidly, as the many contending philosophical arguments about it show. In practice, its primacy is due to the support of the other idea, collective self-determination. People often believe that they have made a fundamental agreement to respect individual liberty primarily, somewhere in their tacit consciousness, or in the counter-factual world (e.g., Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1977). This belief makes the concept legitimate.

Individual liberty also supports collective self-determination. For collective self-determination to happen, decisions should not be affected by a few elites' will, special interest groups, or the superficial emotions of a crowd. Then, what is the authentic will of the collective, and how is it guaranteed? It is a difficult problem to solve in theory. In practice, however, there is something vague that people can approximately assume as an authentic will. Cannot we call a collective decision 'authentic' when it is made through the voluntary participation of people with equal freedoms? Is not a decision legitimate when it is made through an open discourse in which almost all members are satisfied with its openness? Through individual liberty, people consider certain type of collective decision-making legitimate (e.g., Habermas 1981; Taylor 1991).

In this way, individual liberty and collective self-determination support each other. Without this interdependence, neither of them has legitimacy in modern society, and thus, mobilization efforts, like those of industrialization and administrative integration, cannot utilize them. Nevertheless, the two universalistic ideas are apt to be inconsistent (Berlin 1958; Hirschman 1970) and the more industrialization and administrative integration proceeds, the more frequently they may conflict with each other.

Industrial development vitalizes various kinds of interests, which sometimes makes collective decision-making difficult. The development of the market connects many people who are linked only by a temporal consent in transaction. This new group of people may not have a common public culture which is indispensable to proper will formation. They may need collective self-determination merely to the extent that it secures economic freedom. Thus, the emphasis on individual liberty may spoil the basis of collective self-determination. Hegel (1996 [1821]) examines this anxiety by considering civil society as a system of needs and the state as a superior to overcome its difficulties. Many Romanticists, such as Rousseau, Herder, and Byron, hold similar anxiety, asserting the importance of a community maintaining emotional solidarity against modernization (Schmitt 1986).

Meanwhile, such a statist politics may suppress individual liberty and make a society unstable as a result. It tends to prefer equality and solidarity among people to individual liberty, and respect liberty only to the extent

it lends legitimacy to the political decision. A ruling few often arbitrarily thought that people's authentic will is concealed deeply in their mind and only a wise ruler can articulate it. Stress on social integration may stifle individual liberty and growing discontent of individuals may jeopardize social stability. Such a case has repeatedly arisen in history: the Levellers during the Puritan Revolution, the Jacobins during the French Revolution or the communism and fascism in the twentieth century, all failed in upholding equality or solidarity at the cost of individual liberty.

In short, the civic components of individual liberty and collective self-determination are not always accommodated in the development of the nation. However, without interdependence between them, neither of the two universalistic ideas can be sustained in modern society at all. Though modern mobilization endangers these universalistic ideas by shaking their interdependence, mobilization itself is almost impossible without them. It is therefore necessary to accommodate the two universalistic ideas even by pretending there is no such a conflict between them. This is the role of the ethnic component, that is, national culture.

6. The Role of National Culture

The role of national culture is not confined to the support of industrialization or administrative integration, as Gellner and Giddens respectively depict. National culture should bring cultural unity to those who otherwise focus on their own economic interests, prompting them to participate voluntarily in public life. National culture is also needed to keep collective decision from stifling individual liberty and destabilizing society, by showing such collectivism is deviated from a reasonably cultivated tradition that has gone hand in hand with individual liberty. National culture thus has to sustain the interdependent set-up of the two universalistic ideas.

In Britain, for example, industrialization advanced prior to other countries, through transactions within the bourgeoisie that were free from both state protection and interference. As the famous remark 'a nation of shopkeepers' shows, there was anxiety that the British were possessed by economic interests that would damage solidarity. But public integration was still sustained, in part because of the middle class's transformation into gentlemen; after the mid-nineteenth century, the middle class were eager to live a rural life, hoped to educate their children at Oxford or Cambridge, respected the classical humanities rather than technical knowledge, and valued sportsmanship (Wiener 1981). These cultural inclinations contributed to make bourgeoisie to share a tradition unique to political elites and enabled political integration peculiar to Britain.

There was also another cultural inclination on behalf of integration not spoiling individual liberty. The British parliament had great power, as is shown in the famous phrase that 'Parliament can do anything but make a man a woman and a woman a man'. Yet the British common law, the abstract and generally principled

law developing from the accumulations of judicial precedents, worked as an obstruction to the parliament using its power arbitrarily (Hayek 1973: 84-5).

Needless to say, there is no single correct coordination between the two universalistic ideas and many other arrangements than in Britain are possible. To integrate people who are connected only on economic terms, also effective is loyalty to the official even in the private sector, as in Japan; or the construction of a welfare state that ‘cater(s) to the middle classes as successfully as to workers’ (Baldwin 1990: 30), as in Sweden. Meanwhile, to keep collective decision from stifling individual liberty, effective is the American culture of respecting small groups of self-helping persons and being sceptical about the central power of government (Tocqueville 2002 [1835, 40]); or Lutheran ethics, emphasizing that ‘the private realm of individual and the family assumed enormous ethical and educational significance over and against the public’ (Turner 1994: 215).

All of these have something imperfect. Every set-up assumes a particular cultural model of members. In early industrial Britain, this meant middle-class white men who preferred rural living and trusted in Parliament. Women, the underclass, and ethnic minorities were excluded. Even in modern society, though there are many declarations of human rights, they do not always work properly. It is because modern nations prefer social stability to the completeness of the ideas.

It was not until the modern age that they appeared clearly in society at all. In the beginning, they were naturally unstable and fragile and national culture should hasten to arrange their set-up—to root them—regardless of their completeness. Any set-up was all right if it could make people trust institutions based on them and mobilize people powerfully. Requiring their completeness before employing them may cause them to conflict with each other and threaten their existence in society. Before the dominant set-up was stabilized, those who were not protected in it, such as the lower class and ethnic minorities, may find it difficult to criticize the set-up, as their critiques may be taken not as suggestions improving it, but as negation of the universalistic ideas themselves. Dissenters who were not against the ideas themselves had no other way of being assimilated into the dominant national culture, or if possible, forming another nation.

There are two different ways in which national culture forces the ideas to be incorporated. In each case, the relation between the ethnic and civic components differs.

In the first case, a prototype of the set-up has already formed somewhere in the nation. With the nation mobilizing wider range of people, or its territory expanding to the periphery, the two ideas coordinated before are likely to be inconsistent. However, if there pre-exists somewhat comprehensive national culture in the prototype, it can be used to suppress or erase the inconsistency. Therefore, as long as the national culture succeeds in it, it can maintain a civic appearance of the nation, not easily betraying its culturally unique character. Britain, France, and the United States belong to this case.

The second case is that there is no or a weak prototype, and someone has to intentionally forge the set-up of

the two universalistic ideas. Since the community is often underdeveloped in this case, the creation of the set-up has to be hastened. As the inconsistencies of the set-up are likely to be great in the rapid modernization, much intensified culture is needed to suppress or erase them. The Japanese Empire of the nineteenth century faced this problem. It had to hasten its modernization, while there was a weak prototype in the former Tokugawa regime. It thus had to suppress or erase inconsistencies with a newly forged national culture. One of the prominent inconsistencies was antagonism between the *zaibatsu* and the military (see Inoue 2001; Takenaka 2002). The *zaibatsu* took advantage of Japanese industrialization by sacrificing rural communities. Many poor villagers were incorporated into the military and held antipathies against industrialization. Partly owing to it, the military became a dominant political power and began to interfere with the *zaibatsu*. What forced them to compromise was the Tenno system, which had a very intense ethnic character. By emphasizing Shinto or blood relation to the Emperor, it created the relation in which even economically oriented people should have political loyalty to the Emperor's regime while entrepreneurial activity was promoted as long as it contributed to wars the military pursued.

To conclude, when the two universalistic ideas can be easily accommodated, the civic components of the nation predominate, while when they became inconsistent or when their interdependence does not exist in the first place, the ethnic components come to the fore.

7. Self-Standing of the Two Universalistic Ideas

Given the dynamics between the components of the nation regarding the two universalistic ideas, how will the relation between the ethnic and civic components change in the future?

The first point to make is that the nation does not necessarily have to keep incorporating the two universalistic ideas. Though the nation was essential for it formerly, now the ideas can be self-standing. The reasons are as follows.

First, reflexivity has increased. When the two ideas had not yet fully prevailed in society, their set-up was very important to get people to trust in them. But in the late modern age, they have penetrated people's consciousness as people have come to reflexively re-examine various social matters using universalistic ideas as measures (Habermas 1981; Luhmann 1990; Giddens 1990). Many national cultures that make the set-up regardless of whether the ideas are truly universal are criticized. The American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s is an example (see Graham 1990). It was thought formerly that the stability of the US Constitution was of foremost importance, and it could be maintained more easily by applying the civil rights only to a homogeneous group other than African and Native Americans. However, as the universalistic ideas penetrated into the whole society, and stability declined somewhat in importance, such exclusion came to be

criticized.⁸⁾

Second, the diffusion of media has also promoted the self-standing of the universalistic ideas, albeit in a particular way. Monetary economy makes people free and autonomous as long as they have enough money to do anything they want (see Barry 1986), and money circulation is self-proliferating, easy to penetrate different cultures and worldviews (Luhmann 1973). This does not necessarily need the support of the nation. Meanwhile, communication media, such as newspapers, television, and the Internet, also promote collective self-determination. Because they deliver constant messages and information, people can share opinions and interests about various social issues easily. Though they may have some negative aspects—controlling public opinions, or spreading dull and hedonistic culture (see Tomlinson 1991)—they also heighten people’s concern and commitment over democratic will formation (Habermas 1981 vol.2: 571-5). Such collective self-determination doesn’t always need national support.

However, media doesn’t secure the universalistic ideas firmly, but only raises opportunities that people enjoy freedom of choice or probabilities that people exchange, share, and criticize political opinions that are crucial to democratic will formation, without strictly defining the realm of individual liberty or the process of collective self-determination. Because of this ambiguity, the inconsistencies between the ideas can be so vague that various peoples, cultures, and worldviews are permitted to flow into our society. Nevertheless, inconsistency problems will never be exterminated. Once they arise, we have to specify the ideas and try to contrive their set-up. In such a circumstance, competitive claims of different set-ups occur. Dissent claims were once apt to be taken as dismissals of the ideas themselves, but now they can claim their own validities because stability problems are not pressing.

Consider immigration problems. The advance in both individual liberty and collective self-determination has contributed to increased immigration. Free economic activity extends beyond borders, while the concept of collective integration comes to include both immigrants and ‘natives’. Immigrants and natives, however, have different concrete understanding of the ideas. Concerning collective integration, natives often think that the host country can limit immigration and restrict immigrants’ social rights to protect native employment and avoid disturbing the public order. Even if membership in their group is extended over time, natives believe collective decisions should be made by them only—as occurred with the Pasqua act, the French immigration act revised in 1993, or the revision of Article 16 in the German constitution in 1993. Concerning individual liberty, natives believe that prejudice and discrimination should not be overlooked, but that immigrants should be self-helping like other natives, without any special support of the state to overcome their economic disadvantages or protect their distinct culture (Schlesinger 1992).

Immigrants, perhaps unsurprisingly, think otherwise. Concerning collective integration, they think that since

8) It is true that increased reflexivity has an emancipative effect, but it can also increase economic and administrative control over people. See Foucault (1975) and Habermas (1981).

they are residents in the host community, not temporary workers, they should have social and participatory rights similar to natives' to cope with various matters in community life (Castles and Miller 1998: 253-82). Concerning individual liberty, they think that the dominant conception of liberty in the host country is rather biased, imposing its culture tacitly on them. They want another kind of liberty that allows them to hold their distinct cultures and worldviews freely, even if they seem odd to natives (see Young 2000).

Though both views are apparently valid, they are inconsistent. Similar competition⁹⁾ is also seen in internal conflicts over disparities between centre and periphery (see Hechter 1975; Touraine et al. 1981). These competitions will create many ethno-national conflicts in the future society, for the following reason.

Competitions do not necessarily develop into conflicts over ethnicity or nation. The disadvantages of immigrants can also be solved through universal measures such as human rights and distributive justice. Even in the same ethnic movement, members do not necessarily share the same socio-economic interests; universal measures are rather helpful in these cases (Barry 2001). In spite of this, these problems often develop into ethno-national conflicts because of limitations in our cognitive abilities. It is often too heavy a task for us to break a problem into discrete units and then examine how universal human rights or distributive justice work in each case. An ethno-national solution can be much simpler, tying people with similar (if not identical) views of the universalistic ideas together under the same symbol (see Touraine et al. 1981). Though the nation's role of securing the legitimate basis for the two ideas has faded, national or ethnic culture is still helpful for various groups to form and claim their own set-up. In addition, it completes this task in quite natural and tacit ways.

Thus, even in the present age where universalistic ideas almost prevail over nations, ethno-national conflicts still occur. Their characteristics are as follows.

First, they occur frequently and from various origins, such as disparities in wealth, developmental gaps among regions, environmental problems, antagonism over access to natural resources, anxieties about identity, or different views of history (Bell 1975: 143-6). Ethno-national symbols give these issues a simplified scheme, and evoke emotions to pursue their claims powerfully (Nielsen 1985).

Second, ethno-national conflicts in the future will take on a more civic character than before.¹⁰⁾ Now, each ethno-national movement has to defend the legitimacy of its set-up of the ideas against other competing ones. Set-ups are strictly examined whether the ideas are, if not completely, realized. Nevertheless, as ethno-national movements simplify the problem, people in the midst of the movements often forget the reference to the universalistic ideas, allowing their efforts to develop an irrational character. This irrationality sometimes explodes if hostilities accumulate through repeated conflicts.

9) There are several types of the set-up adopted as immigration policy. See Soysal (1994).

10) Habermas (1998: 203-36) and Kymlicka (1995) think that present national cultures are so civic and generalized that various ethnic groups can live together in the same state peacefully. But it is possible only through much effort; if not, ethno-national conflicts, originated from the different set-ups of two universalistic ideas, break out frequently.

Third, in future conflicts, ethno-national symbols can be replaced by others to a certain extent. If the point under contention can be specified, the problem can be better solved with basic human rights or distributive justice. Local governments, or transnational organizations, such as the European Union and the United Nations, as well as nations, can form the set-up of the two ideas. Indeed, some ethno-national conflicts can be solved by sharing the burden between nations and these bodies (Tamir 1993: 150-63). To arrange the set-up, the nation is still the most helpful; it has a historical background and is sensed as natural. It is a matter of helpfulness, never of essence (see Hobsbawm 1992). But owing to this condition, the nation will still be a leading factor in the rise of future conflicts.

Conclusion

Will economic and political globalization homogenize the world? Or, will various ethno-national movements break out across the globe? Our answer to this question is that ethno-national conflicts will break out more frequently than before. The claims of the ethnic groups will basically take on more universalistic characteristics, though an explosion of irrationality will sometimes happen.

This conclusion is drawn from the study of the two universalistic ideas composing the nation. Without noting these factors, the complex character of nationalism cannot be properly explained. Though Gellner says that ‘late industrial society no longer engenders such deep social abysses, which could then be activated by ethnicity’ and it ‘can be expected to be one in which nationalism persists, but in a muted, less virulent form’ (Gellner 1983: 121-2), he cannot explain how nationalism creates terror and destruction even in the late modern world. Though Smith says ‘the nation and nationalism provide the only realistic socio-cultural framework for a modern order’ and national identity ‘is felt by many people to satisfy their needs for cultural fulfilment, rootedness, security and fraternity’ (Smith 1995: 159), he cannot explain why we sometimes forget or miss an attachment to the nation.

There is a subtle and changing balance between the civic and ethnic components of a nation, which can be explained only through the study of the two universalistic ideas of individual liberty and collective self-determination. These ideas are sometimes aligned; but other times, they are not.

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