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Why Isn't Consciousness Real? (4)

Day 3: Why Is Consciousness Intentional?

Intentionality and the establishment of the objective world by person- and tense-indexicalization

At the end of the previous lecture someone asked a question about Wittgenstein. Please recall that question. In the imagined situation I responded, 'No, that which another person cannot have is *this* pain, but never *that* pain'. After that, I talked about solipsism, but I only discussed Wittgenstein's philosophy, presenting the relation between introducing the criterion of identity and introducing the grammatical position. Let us create a simpler analogy this time.

Suppose that I say as follows. 'I have something which nobody has. My personal experience in a most important sense has no neighbor. Indeed, I am the only one who is reversed inside out.' This time the other person responds in the following way. 'That's right! It is true that I have something which nobody has. My personal experience in a most important sense has no neighbor. Indeed, I am the only one who is reversed inside out!' My response would be as follows. 'That is wrong. The one who has to say that there is something which nobody has is *me*. The one whose experience in a most important sense has no neighbour is *me*. The one who is reversed inside out is *me*. It is not *you*.' I would not admit that the two are saying *the same thing* in the first place.

Since the starting point for raising the problem in the above way is the solipsistic world-view, it is easy to be distracted by that world-view. But the real problem is not there. It is extremely baffling that although there are a number of philosophers who talk of the problem of 'solipsism', most philosophers have no understanding at all of why it is a crucial problem. All the philosophers except Wittgenstein are only saying irrelevant things to each other.

The essence of the problem resides in the point that language is not possible at all so long as the standpoint is that of the above response made by 'me'. Moreover, this standpoint, which makes language impossible, is fully rational. For, as a matter of fact, the world is constituted that way. This is all there is to the problem. Hence, the starting point can be, 'As a matter of fact, the world can only be seen from my eyes for some reason', or, 'It is only my body that really hurts when a body is hit', or, 'This is the only body that can be freely moved'. This is an indubitable, simple fact. So, when another person says the same thing, I

must simply deny his or her statement. Doesn't this follow as a matter of course? For *that* denial was the gist of the first statement.

Do you understand the problem? It boils down to the following. Suppose that I say, 'I ...', and that the other person responds to me by saying, 'I ...'. Then I respond, 'I am me, and I am not you'. The 'problem of other minds' does not intervene here. The problem of whether the other person is a zombie has no relevance. Such a problem can only exist after the current problem. At any rate, that person is not me. (This person is me. I don't know why, but that is a fact!) That is everything. However, adherence to the simple fact would make language impossible. The two people Wittgenstein presents go against the existence of language. It is important to read this in his writing.

But when I encourage such a reading, there are many who readily take the opposite standpoint, i.e. the standpoint of language, regarding the demand of the two people presented by Wittgenstein as utterly absurd. This is not right. What the two intend to say is *utterly legitimate*. Unless you take their demand as your own, and adopt the standpoint of regarding it as utterly legitimate, you would completely fail to grasp what it is about the demand that must be denied – which is the most thrilling part.

To use the diagram from the previous lecture, the two persons adhere to the standpoint of the top row, and deny the progressive reading. To admit that another person can also say 'I' is to admit the progressive reading. To further admit the general establishment of the word 'I' means to go beyond the progressiveness in the opposite direction, place all self-other relations on the same plane, and make them into a single kind of relation. Thus the general concept 'self' is formed, and 'I' becomes an 'indexical'. Let us call this process the 'person-indexicalization'.


There is precisely the same structure with respect to the 'tense-indexicalization'. To avoid trouble, let us put it briefly as follows: by admitting that the points of time other than the actual present can also be grasped as the 'present', the actual present is grasped in the same way as them, and this establishes the word 'present' *qua* an indexical. In fact, as is clear from the consideration of a diary in the first lecture, there is in principle nothing that slips out and fails to be communicated by this way of grasping. If I read the sentence 'it is raining now' written by me ten days ago, I come to know that it was raining then on that day. *Exactly the same* can be said of a case where I at the present time write the sentence 'it is stormy now', and read it at a later time. That the later time will be *actual* now can never come into consideration in the communication here. For once the communicability here is established, and the actuality of the actual now vanishes. Taking such a viewpoint makes the grasping of a general 'present time' possible. And to take such a viewpoint is to take the viewpoint of language.

The same is true of 'I'. When one hears someone say, 'I have a headache', one knows that the person has a headache. Exactly the same is the case when I say, 'I have a toothache'. 'I' am actual in the latter case, but that can never come into consideration in the communication. For in the establishment of the communicability here, the fact that 'I' in either of the cases is actual is nullified. Here, in fact, what does not exist objectively is forcibly given a kind of objective existence, but this will not be noticed because the very meaning of 'objectively' is also changed.

As a result, 'now' and 'I' shift to reflective and reflexive acts. To recall the metaphor of a tinned universe, if what is originally turned inside out is reversed outside in, and is placed among other tins, part of what should have been an objective reference to something inside the world when the tin was turned inside out turns into a reflective and reflexive reference towards inside an individual called the self. The consequence is that 'self-consciousness must accompany all representations'. What was once a universe comes inside a tin, and becomes the content of that tin. This establishes the so-called privacy of consciousness, and yet, by the very same fact, objective communication with other tins becomes possible at the same time.

That which underlies the person-indexicalization and tense-indexicalization is the modality-indexicalization. We can discover something interesting by replacing 'I' and 'now' in the current problem with 'actuality'. There are various fictional worlds in our actual world. There are the worlds of comic books, novels, TV dramas, films, and so on. Aren't such worlds 'actual' in each of them? For if the heroine of a TV drama reads a novel and talks about it, there would be a contrast such that the world of the novel is a non-actual world whereas the world of the drama is the actual world. Then, if there is a scene in the novel in which a character sees a film, the contrast would be extended further, and there would be a progressive structure here again. However, in the case of a fictional world, it does not happen that another fictional world inside a fictional world is the original actual world (although there are many science-fiction stories which seem to insist that this happens). Isn't the same in fact true of person and tense? Don't we simply treat the 'actuality' of a fictional world as an equal and take it to be 'actuality' just for the sake of convenience?

But what does not happen in the case of a fictional world does happen formally in the case of a 'possible world'. That is, it can happen that, from the viewpoint of a given possible world, the actual world is referred to and mentioned as 'one of the worlds that are possible when the given possible world is regard as "actual" '. In the series below, 'actual' on the right-hand side of the top row becomes an 'actual' that can issue at any of the rows below the top row.



(This goes on endlessly.)

The structure here is precisely the condition of the possibility of language, and is taken for granted in the case of person and tense. Therefore, this condition of the possibility of language is also the condition of the establishment of the objective world as we understand it.

If two or more tins come to be placed on a par with each other, the consequence is that there is an outside common to all the tins. In light of the hitherto discussed process of becoming, there was originally no such outside. But all of us now have a world-view which can be roughly stated as follows: there is such a common outside in the first place, and besides it, each person has the inside of the mind, or the interiority. This is in fact not the way the world is, so it is a mysterious world-view which goes against a simple fact. Admitting this world-view inevitably requires that each tin is open in some way, and that each consciousness is *directed* towards the objective world in some way – or that consciousness inside a tin *represents* the objective world. Then there emerges the concept of intentionality.

How does perceptual experience become intentional?

Intentionality is a concept widely used in philosophy, but I feel somewhat uncomfortable with it. I feel that the concept is infused with two contradictory claims – that it is claimed both that the object of intentionality (i.e. what is represented) is inside the mind and that the object of intentionality reaches outside the mind. Let us consider this briefly.

The mind has the capacity to represent the way the world is. A typical case is, of course, that of perception. Besides perception, memory or recollection, which is directed towards the past, anticipation or hope, which is directed towards the future, intention, belief, fear, searching, etc. all represent the world. That is, they are manifestations of intentional consciousness. What, then, are they directed towards?

The following point is sometimes made. Suppose that there is a person searching for a golden mountain. But, of course, there is no such thing as a golden mountain. Then, is the person searching for what is inside his mind? No. There is already a golden mountain in his mind. The conclusion is that he is searching for none other than a real golden mountain. That said, the golden mountain in question is not real, so isn't the person merely searching for a golden mountain that he *thinks* is real (or the representation of a real golden mountain)? Such a question would still remain. The case is analogous to that of the 'concept of the real God', which, as I explained in the previous lecture, becomes central to the ontological proof of the existence of God. Then we can say that the case is also analogous to that of the 'psychological concept of phenomenal consciousness', which I discussed in the same part of the last lecture. (These three cases, however, lead in different directions.)

The same holds for perception and recollection. In the current sense, we always perceive something 'real', and recall an event that was real. Yet, of course, there are cases where we in fact have an illusion or a memory lapse, such that it is found out afterwards from a different viewpoint that the object did not exist. Or rather, doesn't it have to be afterwards or from a different viewpoint (or, as in most cases, from another person's viewpoint) that the object is found not to have existed?

If the tin is reversed again, and if the whole universe becomes the inside of the tin, there would be no illusion or memory lapse. A tree leaf that is seen would of course have to exist. Here the person who is seeing can never be 'him', and must be 'me'. Then, there would no longer be room for the external viewpoint from which what is seen may not *in fact* be real. However, if the tin is reversed outside in, and if I become a person called 'him', my intentionality would again be twofold, split into the aspect of being directed towards objective (or intersubjective) things or states of affairs, on the one hand, and the private aspect internal to the person I am, on the other.

Notice that the way perception represents the world differs from the way a landscape painting does. Firstly, in the case of a landscape painting, it is possible to compare the view itself and the painted landscape by seeing both, whereas such comparison is impossible in the case of perception. So, unlike in the case of a landscape painting, there is no way to confirm that perception is a representation of the world. The reason is, to speak at the most fundamental level, that a painting represents a perceived landscape rather than the world, and the perception *per se* is not something that represents anything. In order for something to be a representation, it has to represent and depict something other than itself, but in perception there is no room for the 're' of a representation. Because there are not two relata in the first place, there cannot be the depicting of something. Perceptual experience can only be something presented immediately.

Secondly, in the case of a landscape painting, it is possible to attend not to the painted landscape but to the way the material, the paint, is applied to the canvas, whereas in the case of perception, it is impossible to attend to the distribution itself of the mental material constituting the landscape representation and see *it*. For the mental material is always penetrated, and the landscape itself is perceived. Then, as regards a landscape painting, there is a three-layered structure consisting of the material of the painting, the painting as a representation of a landscape, and the represented landscape. In contrast, perception only has a single-layered structure.

At this point, however, if the tin is reversed outside in again, and is made into something that is on a par with other tins and contains the inside of the mind, it becomes possible to view perceptual experience as also having a three-layered structure. Then, since the material *per se* for representing the world, the material inside each tin, is not visible from the outside, it becomes possible to raise a problem by, say, suspecting that the material might in fact be inverted between different tins.

There is a discussion often derived from the above stage. It is the discussion on the following sort of problem: when we look at the green colour of a leaf in the external world, for example, can we be said to see green *qua* mental material? Those who answer this question 'yes' insist that what is seen in such a case is mental and private. The advocates of the notion of intentionality disagree with them by answering 'no', claiming that what is seen is the green colour of a leaf *qua* an intentional object, i.e. the green colour that is (or, more precisely, seems to be) 'in the external world', and that it is impossible in the first place to see anything apart from it – anything that might be called 'private green *qua* experience'. That is, we can be conscious of the features of an intentional object, but cannot be conscious of the intrinsic features of our experience generating that object. However, the following objection might be raised: it is not necessary, to begin with, to be conscious of any such thing as the intrinsic features of this experience, because, for example, being experienced as the green colour of a leaf in the external world *is* the intrinsic feature of the experience. The proponents of intentionality would respond to this by holding that we must draw a distinction between the intrinsic features of intentional objects and the intrinsic character of experiences.

I would cast a damper on the intentionalists' claim in the following way. Whether intentional objects have an intrinsic character, or whether experiences have, aren't they merely experienced as such? Isn't it rather a characteristic of intentionalism to assert that they are? But if there is only introspection of experience, how do you know that there is a distinction between the 'intrinsic character of intentional objects' and the 'intrinsic character of experience itself' for other people as well? Don't you know this because the distinction is in fact a fabrication constituted by the three-layered structure?

If consciousness is essentially intentional, zombies would be impossible. In the current context, what Chalmers refers to as 'functional' or 'psychological' can also be called 'intentional'. Therefore, I naturally do not accept the anti-intentionalist position, rejecting as misunderstanding the view that human perception generally contains non-intentional elements, and I adopt the position which readily acknowledges the existence of the state of affairs that is the source of the misunderstanding. This state of affairs is none other than the asymmetry between self and other and the progressive structure in the sense hitherto explained, and is not in fact related to the internal structure of (one of the kinds of things called) perception.

To begin with, my perception has no intentionality. For the tin is reversed inside out, and so need not represent the 'external world'. One might say: even if the tin is inside out, aren't the world and I still independent of each other? It can be said that they are. But if what is seen cannot be touched, isn't there simply something that can be seen but cannot be touched, rather than there being an illusion or hallucination? It is not necessary to suppose that there is something in the external world that is independent of cognition, which is seen wrongly at times. Nor is it necessary to suppose that there is a situation in the past that is independent of memory, which is remembered wrongly at times. In sum, there is no necessity yet to suppose that there is intentionality. (In the case of future-oriented attitudes such as intention, anticipation, and hope, it might seem possible to draw a distinction between intentional objects and the objective actuality without the intervention of another person, but what is meant by the objective actuality should be perceptual experience.)

In contrast, all the reports of perception by other people are intentional from the beginning. And when I need to live with others and compare my perception against theirs, the tin is reversed outside in, and even I must admit that perception has an intentional structure. Let us consider a case where I give an order, saying 'Fetch me a green leaf', or where I obey such an order. In this case, the green colour of the leaf is of course experienced as the colour of an object called a leaf. Even if colours appear in different ways to different people, or all the more if they do, the grasping of the direction in which the tree is or the grasping of something as a 'leaf' must be shared by all. That is, the framework in which there can be non-intentional qualitative experience must be shared. When I attend to the 'colour' of the 'leaves of a tall tree standing in the centre of a park', I *ipso facto* can no longer attend to the intrinsic quality of the experience. This has nothing at all to do with any fact about consciousness discoverable by introspection, but is a structural necessity.

Thus, even when I report my perception using language, I must make myself another person and become entirely intentional. To use an idea from the previous lecture, I must make myself a zombie and become entirely intentional. Even so, the elements of my

perception include more than those that can be reported by language. This, which I am inclined to say, *cannot be said*, as in the case of making myself a zombie. And, of course, another person can also insist on saying what I am inclined to say here, but again, what is asserted persistently becomes a manifestation of ‘intentional consciousness called “non-intentional consciousness”’. That is, the person striking himself on the breast, who appeared in Wittgenstein’s discussion, appears here again, and Wittgenstein’s problem returns.

I have said that the tin is reversed outside in when comparing my perception against others’ perception. However, when I only obey an order such as, ‘Fetch me a green leaf from the tall tree standing in the centre of the park’, the tin need not be reversed outside in. The need of reversal really arises when what others say is green does not look green to me, when what others say is hot feels cold to me, when what others ... , and so on. But the tin is decisively reversed when, beyond mere disagreement with others, there comes to exist the objective fact assigned to the external world itself, and it becomes possible for me to realize that I have had a belief that disagrees with that objective fact. In other words, the tin is decisively reversed when it becomes possible for me not only to disagree with others, but to realize that I have seen or remembered something wrongly, that is, to realize that I have had a false perception or false memory. But wasn’t this already possible when the framework in which there can be non-intentional experience was shared? Wasn’t that already possible when the grasping of the direction of the tree or the grasping of the colour of the ‘leaves of the tree standing in the centre of the park’ was shared?

The possibility of seeing or remembering something wrongly, and, furthermore, that of an illusion, hallucination or delusion, is acknowledged. That is, failure to represent something, or the *truth or falsity* of a representation, is acknowledged. Only then does perception become what represents the world, acquiring the intentional structure isomorphic to a ‘painting’. This comes with the other side of the same coin, which is the assumption that what was seen should have been there *as it was seen*. ‘As it was seen’ means ‘even if it was not seen’. Note that a painting represents the world from the beginning because the conception of a representation of the world, the conception formed through the above process, is transcribed to a ‘painting’, but not vice versa. A painting is regarded as representing the world because there can be a false landscape painting that is parallel to a case of seeing wrongly. In this sense, a painting is already language. This should be the only answer to the question of how we know that a painting is a painting of something. It is not by the resemblance to the real things that we do. If a resemblance was all that mattered, whether there is a resemblance or not would always be unstable because of the dependence on the point of view.

Similarly, perception does not resemble what is perceived. They are ‘the same’. Two or more representations of the same thing that each person has also need not resemble each

other. Rather, they must be 'the same'. So, it must be impossible for non-intentional elements to be involved here. As I said, it is possible for pain in the right leg and pain in the left leg to resemble or not to resemble each other. (This is why qualia inversion is actually possible.) It is also possible to think of a resemblance between pain felt in the past and pain felt now, or between pain felt in the past and pain felt at another time in the past. However, pain felt in the past and *that* pain I recall now are simply the 'same', however much it accompanies qualia. The colour of a leaf and *that* colour of a leaf I perceive are also simply the 'same'. The case where they are not is the case of seeing wrongly, where they are simply 'different'. It is never the case that they resemble or do not resemble each other.

Thus, perception has the aspect of depicting an object and of representing (or being a representative of) it like a painting, while it also has the aspect of immediately reaching the object. It is worth noting that the 'wrongness' of seeing or remembering wrongly, which has played an important role in the above discussion, is fundamentally different in structure from the 'wrongness' of, say, a 'dream' in the context of scepticism. For even in a dream, we have intentional experience, which allows seeing something wrongly or misrecognizing something, and a 'dream' is what assigns the entire intentional experience a new position as a non-actual world rather than as a false experience. A dream is not an incorrect perception. A dream is, as it were, a meta-misrecognition, in the sense that the entire intentional experience of a world, in which there is already the distinction between truth and falsity, is a wholly false representation. That is why it is conceivable that one's entire life could be a dream. Then, such possibilities as that of being deceived by a malicious demon and that of being a brain in a vat are possibilities of meta-meta-misrecognition. For we could dream even in a world created by a deceiving malicious demon or in a world spontaneously created by a brain in a vat.

That which connects between intentionality and intension

The concept of intentionality is often discussed in relation to its connection with the concept of intension. How is intentionality grasped in the above way connected to intension? Let us briefly consider this question.

A context is called intensional when it is not extensional. What is an extensional context? It is a context in which the truth or falsity is not changed by replacing an expression with another expression referring to the same thing. I am Hitoshi Nagai, and, at the same time, I am a philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. Since I am the only philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007, the philosopher is the same object as Hitoshi Nagai. If what is said of this object by

referring to it as ‘Hitoshi Nagai’ is true, then what is said by replacing that name with ‘the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007’ should also be true. This is an extensional context. The truth or falsity of a sentence cannot be changed by replacing a word with another word that refers to the same object. By the way, I am also the author of a book entitled *Kitaro Nishida*.

Hitoshi Nagai wrote *Kitaro Nishida*.

This statement is true. The following sentence is obtained by replacing ‘Hitoshi Nagai’:

The philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007 wrote *Kitaro Nishida*.

The first statement cannot be made false by the above replacement.

Hitoshi Nagai wrote *An Inquiry into the Good*.

This statement is false. It cannot be made true by replacing ‘Hitoshi Nagai’ with ‘the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007’. The reason is extremely simple: the two different expressions refer to one and the same person.

This might seem too obvious, but there are cases to which the same does not apply. They are intensional contexts. Suppose that some person S thinks that Hitoshi Nagai wrote *Kitaro Nishida*, but does not know that Hitoshi Nagai is the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University 2007.

S thinks that Hitoshi Nagai wrote *Kitaro Nishida*.

This statement is true. However, the following statement is false:

S thinks that the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007 wrote *Kitaro Nishida*.

So it is possible for the truth or falsity of a statement to change simply by replacing one expression for another that refers to the same object. But how is this possible? And how does this relate to intensionality and intentionality?

In the above example, intensionality is shown by the sentence ‘The person S thinks that

...', which describes intentionality. When there is intentionality, the intentional object is internalized in consciousness as a representation (i.e. the re-presentation or the representative of the real object). So the truth of the sentence is determined not by the way Hitoshi Nagai really is in the external world, but by the way S grasps Hitoshi Nagai. In other words, what matters is not the person Hitoshi Nagai himself, but Hitoshi Nagai as S represents him, or as he is intentionally internal to S's mind. And the latter is not the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. In this case, S not knowing Hitoshi Nagai as the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007 corresponds to seeing or remembering wrongly. Hence, we can say that intentionality creates an intensional context.

This, however, is not always the case. It is often pointed out that intensionality does not necessarily constitute an intensional context, and that an intensional context does not necessarily accompany intensionality.

Let us consider the first of the above two points. It is often said that a sentence expressing an intentional state may not be intensional. An example is a sentence mentioning a perceptual experience. We should already know well the reason why it is an example. If S sees Hitoshi Nagai, he sees the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007, whether or not S thinks that this is the case. (At the same time, S sees the author of *Kitaro Nishida*, whether or not he knows that this is the case.) For perception immediately and directly reaches the object.

Of course, in the above case too, there is a context in which it can be said that S sees Hitoshi Nagai, but not the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. For the object that S's perception directly reaches is represented only as Hitoshi Nagai, but not as the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. In contrast, lightning, for example, does not represent an object, so if lightning strikes Hitoshi Nagai, it necessarily strikes the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. For lightning, aiming at nothing, lacks intentionality, and therefore cannot have intension. This is why lightning cannot mistakenly strike something. Compared to such a wholly extensional relation, an intentional relation always allows an intensional interpretation.

Let us turn to the second point. Is there a case of being intensional and not being intentional? A typical case is a modal context, which is manifested by a sentence involving possibility or necessity. The statement 'The philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007 was necessarily a philosopher at Chiba University' is true. Since Hitoshi Nagai is the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007, let us replace 'the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to

Nihon University in 2007' with 'Hitoshi Nagai'. Then we have the sentence 'Hitoshi Nagai was necessarily a philosopher at Chiba University'. But this sentence is false. For it is not necessary that Hitoshi Nagai was a philosopher at Chiba University. Thus, the truth or falsity of the whole sentence can be changed simply by replacing 'the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007' with 'Hitoshi Nagai' (or vice versa), which are expressions referring to an object that is actually one and the same. The reason for this, however, is unrelated to the problem of intentionality.

Let us make a comparison between the problem of modality and that of intentionality. It is of course merely a truth in the actual world that Nagai transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. So this truth cannot be extended to all possible worlds. Nor can it be extended to S's representational world. For in a possible world, and in S's representational world, Nagai did not transfer from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007. The former case is the problem of modality, and the latter is the problem of intentionality.

Now, isn't a representational world a possible world? Generally, it would be possible to regard the representational content of seeing or remembering wrongly as a possible world. The reason for this should be that even accurate perception or correct memory is grasped as a possible world. Intentionality has to involve modal structure. That is, lightning cannot grasp the world modally. When we acknowledged in the foregoing discussion that perception is intentional by acknowledging the possibility of seeing wrongly and that of illusion, we understood that the actual world in perception is one possible world. This is the way that our communal world, which opens from the juxtaposition of two or more tins, has to be, and therefore, our language incorporates such structure.

This is clear from the fact that simply saying, 'This stone is small', already presupposes the possibility that it is big. The expression can be used even if the stone is not *actually* small. Conversely, it is also possible to tentatively regard the stone as actually big and to conceive of the possibility that it is small. We can use *the same linguistic expression* regardless of what is actually the case. Isn't this astonishing? And of course, we can, and must, also treat the 'self' the same way we treat the stone. So far as we have grasped ourselves as one of the tins reversed outside in, we have to be incorporated into part of the intentional-modal structure. For person is a kind of modality.

However, the possibility here would have to be that which is based on the primary intension. If it was based on the secondary intension, it would be possible for impossible things to be the objects of intentionality, and so a world of intentionality would be an impossible world. For example, Rika Kayama is the author of a novel titled *Enjeru*. Since the real name of Rika Kayama is Naoko Nakatsuka, it follows that Naoko Nakatsuka is also the author of the novel *Enjeru*. A world in which Rika Kayama is the author of *Enjeru*

and Naoko Nakatsuka is not is an impossible world. However, it is sufficiently possible to believe, hope, or have a memory that Rika Kayama is the author of *Enjeru*, and that Naoko Nakatsuka is not. This possibility is the same as that of believing or hoping that water is not H₂O, though it is necessarily H₂O. Hence, when I started from the fact in the actual world that Nagai transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007, and argued that this fact cannot be extended to a representational world, my argument was not precise. In the case of intentionality, the impossibility of such extension must be thought of as going in the opposite direction.

The actual fact that Hitoshi Nagai is the philosopher who transferred from Chiba University to Nihon University in 2007 is negated in S's intentionality and in a possible world. This is parallel to the following phenomenon: the *a priori* determination in the actual world that 'pain' is what is felt in the knee when one falls over and groans can be negated afterwards by the first counterattack and by the second counterattack. The actual fact about Nagai is negated in S's intentionality and in a possible world. Similarly, pain obtains by the first counterattack a phenomenal quality detachable from the *a priori* contexts, and obtains by the second counterattack a necessary determination independent of the *a priori* contexts. What I have just said concerning 'pain' applies perfectly to water being that sort of clear and drinkable liquid, heat having that sort of feeling that is felt when putting a hand close to fire and withdrawing it automatically, red being the colour of a tomato, sunset, blood, etc., and so on.

Of course, in the above argument too the 'actual world' may not be this actual world, which is the actual world *simpliciter*, but can be a possible actual world. This phenomenon is parallel to the following phenomenon: the person named S has not been a person who is me *simpliciter*, but has merely been a person who is possibly me from the beginning. The progressive structure of modality and that of person are isomorphic. So, the 'actual world' too can be thought of as the only tin that is reversed at the centre. Of course, modality is established when that tin is reversed outside in in a normal way, such that it becomes possible to juxtapose it with other worlds. This is just as person is established when juxtaposition with other I's becomes possible.

The ultimate answer to the question of why consciousness has to be intentional would be the same as the answer to the question of why the world has to be modal, although the answer to the former question in particular would be, 'Because we are zombies'.

Towards the pre-primary intension of 'I'

I have said as follows: so far as I have grasped myself as one of the tins reversed outside in, I have to be incorporated into part of the intentional-modal structure. This means that what I have just said concerning 'pain' applies not only to 'water', 'heat' and 'red', but also to 'I'.

The starting point for 'I', too, is the primary intension. The pre-primary intension and secondary intension are discovered afterwards. Just as the primary intension of pain picks out the firing of nerve fibres, which is the secondary intension, as a result of the investigation of the actual world, the primary intension of 'I' picks out a certain person as a result of the investigation of the actual world. That person, of course, differs depending on the person who uses the word. In such a case, perhaps it is better to call the primary intension 'character', using Kaplan's term. Then the secondary intension would be called 'content'. If Hitoshi Nagai is picked out as the secondary intension, it would be that 'I' refers to Hitoshi Nagai in all possible worlds. There would be no possibility that I am not Hitoshi Nagai. I would be Hitoshi Nagai's self-reflecting consciousness.

Now, preceding this, the primary intension of 'pain' has already picked out 'that' sensation as the pre-primary intension. As we saw, it is private in the sense that it cannot even be *asked* whether it differs depending on the person. Similarly, the primary intension of 'I' also picks out the peculiar 'this' as the pre-primary intension. 'This' here is not private in the sense that it cannot even be asked whether it differs depending on the person, but is the basis of the creation of the kind of privacy concerning which it cannot even be asked whether something differs depending on the person. Thus, 'this' should be called the 'non-intension' rather than the pre-primary intension.

The reason why it is impossible to even ask whether what is picked out differs depending on the person is that when 'I' *qua* the non-intension is reached, the tin is reversed inside out, with all other things coming inside the tin, and so it becomes impossible to make a comparison by standing in the horizon of equality. If it is nevertheless thought that anyone can reach such an 'I', it is in a sense possible to make a comparison by standing in the horizon of equality. However, this is precisely what the non-intension of 'I' refuses. The privacy of consciousness is not privacy due to there being some epistemological wall, but it is a privacy due to the impossibility of ontological juxtaposition.

Of course, as I have said repeatedly, if the progressive structure is equalized, and if 'I' on the top row is put on the same plane as other instances of 'I', or, in other words, if there is no hierarchy in the first place, then the tin becomes normal and outside in, and there comes to exist the interiority which it might seem possible to peep into by some means – that is, there comes to exist 'consciousness'. In order for this situation to obtain, a particular person who is

the secondary intension must be reached, and then 'I' *qua* the original non-intension must be reinterpreted as the person's reflexive and reflective grasp.

'I' *qua* the non-intension is discovered afterwards since the above discussion begins from language. But the fact of the matter is that 'I' *qua* the non-intension is the starting point for everything; everything except it can only exist by depending on it in the first place. So the whole language that is learned through imitation can only exist inside it. Hence, the discovery of the secondary intension in this case is an earth-shaking event which identifies such a singular, incomparable thing as one of the individuals in the world. To repeat what I have said many times, this earth-shaking event is not something general or uniform that occurs to every person. Rather, it is, as a matter of fact, something that occurs only to me for some reason. I only attribute the same process to others by, as it were, reversing the inside and the outside. For it is precisely my being able to make such an attribution that enables me in turn to identify myself as one of the individuals. Obviously, I cannot become a mere individual, and, conversely, others cannot become more than just individuals. This fact itself can never be surmounted. However, because what is said here can be said by anyone, the structure is *taken* to have been surmounted. (Of course, this is a dream that language shows.)

In giving a description of 'I' *qua* the non-intension, it would be possible to *say*, 'it is, as a matter of fact, the only thing from whose eyes the world can be seen for some reason', or, 'it is, as a matter of fact, the only thing whose body, when hit, yields real pain for some reason', or, 'it is, as a matter of fact, the only thing whose body can be freely moved for some reason'. But these ways of saying what the description is are not truly non-intensional. For they presuppose that others should also be able to see, feel pain, and move the body in the same sense. (So they presuppose that others can also say the same thing.) In order for them to be truly non-intensional, it would be necessary to attach 'this' to them all. 'This' here is never referred back to as 'that'. Thus, there cannot be an expression that is truly non-intensional. Since 'I' *qua* the non-intension is before language, it is at odds with being spoken in language.

In the above sense, saying 'this' with no more attempt to put any description after it is the most appropriate expression. There are no other instances to which such expressions as 'see', 'feel pain', and 'move the body' are applicable, so it is meaningless to attach 'this' to *them*. Rather, the expression 'this' would suffice, and it would not matter what description follows it. What is really said is, 'It is this'.

'I', in the correct sense of the word, might not in fact 'see' or 'feel pain' or 'move the body'. 'I' might be recognized as a zombie from the outside. Yet *this* exists without doubt, and, indeed, *this* alone exists. Thus, in fact, the meanings of such words as 'see', 'feel pain', and 'move the body' no longer play any substantial role here.

I have said that ‘I’ comes to refer to Hitoshi Nagai in all possible worlds. This means that ‘I’ refers to Hitoshi Nagai even if Nagai is not *this* in the above sense. ‘I’ transforms into a reflexive referring expression that the person Nagai has.

In the beginning, heat means that which feels hot. It turns out that heat is in fact molecular motion. Then it becomes possible that heat is not hot, or that what is hot is not heat. The thread of the story here is very important. But if the hotness that can be felt is the starting point, what is ‘hotness’? There should be two kinds of ‘hotness’ – the hotness of the primary intension and the hotness of the pre-primary intension. As we saw, Chalmers thinks as follows: the primary intension, though not necessary, is *a priori*, so the meaning is determined independently of the way the world in fact is, which is discovered as a result of empirical investigation. He thinks that it is therefore possible to bring the ‘necessary-contingent’ relation back to the epistemological stage, and superimpose it onto the ‘*a priori-a posteriori*’ relation. That is, it is possible to take a viewpoint from which the fact that heat feels hot is a fact obtaining in the actual world, and from which the way that the actual fact turns out to be is a possible world. Then it becomes possible to think of the possibility that the essence of heat that feels hot is phlogiston rather than molecular motion. This would make ‘Heat is *that* thing which feels hot’ a *necessary a priori* truth. Let us construe the argument here as concerning the pre-primary intension rather than the primary intension. Although this is not the way Chalmers uses his terms, his view should be substantially the same.

In the above argument, the way the actual world has really turned out to be does not play a crucial role. Whatever way the actual world turns out to be, it is only the way the world happens to be, and therefore is a *contingent a posteriori* truth. That is, that heat is molecular motion is a *contingent a posteriori* truth. On this account, if ‘that’ feeling of hotness turns out to be phlogiston rather than molecular motion, then heat is phlogiston in the actual world in question, and therefore ‘heat’ refers to phlogiston in all possible worlds viewed from that actual world (which is a possible actual world). If I turn out to be Usain Bolt, I am Usain Bolt in the actual world in question, so ‘I’ refers to Usain Bolt in all possible worlds viewed from that actual world (which is a possible actual world).

As I said, I *qua* the non-intension cannot even be described as a thing from whose eyes the world is actually seen, or as a thing whose body yields real pain when hit, or as a thing whose body can be freely moved. It is merely *this*. Nevertheless, strangely enough, *this*, as a result of investigating the world, turns out to be identical with a thing that is regarded as a human being called Hitoshi Nagai in that world. This is something truly astonishing, something that would literally *overturn the world*. However, according to the present idea, it is only an *a posteriori* contingent truth. It would then follow that I am not Hitoshi Nagai in all possible worlds. It would be a possible state of affairs that I am another person. Just

as it is possible that heat could have been phlogiston, and that water could have been XYZ, so it is possible that I could have been Usain Bolt. This means that after investigating the world, *this* could have turned out to be identical with a Jamaican person who is called Usain Bolt in that world. To put it in a more compromised way, there is only one physical object that has eyes which actually see, that has a body which yields real pain when hit, and that can be freely moved, and it happens to be a Jamaican person named Usain Bolt for some reason. This is something truly astonishing, something that would literally *overturn the world*. The reason is not that I am the fastest man in the world. It is rather that there exists this sole exceptional thing, I, for some reason, and that that exceptional thing is also one among a countless number of ordinary 'conscious individuals' existing in the world. This makes the commonplace fact astonishing. (I hardly see why, but there are people who really cannot understand the philosophical meaning here, misunderstanding that the problem concerns something extremely rare happening by chance. This is a caution against such misunderstanding.)

However, independently of what I turn out to be in the objective world, I am the only physical object that has eyes which actually see, that has a body which yields real pain when hit, and that can be freely moved, and so on. Or rather, I am always simply *this*. So the non-intension remains as it is, continuing to be a necessary *a priori* truth. Whatever it turns out to be, that which turns out to be something will always remain as that which can still be grasped independently of what it turns out to be. This is the same as the case of heat or pain continuing to be *that*.

The above discussion is not difficult at all. Doesn't it just say something plainly true? If the consideration of the progressive structure is added, it should be evident that the discussion is suggesting something utterly obvious that anyone would acknowledge. I occasionally come across people who disagree with the points made here, but to be honest, I cannot understand what it means to disagree with it. I rather think that the genuine problem resides in the differences between interpretations that would arise after agreeing with it.

Lastly, although there would be no need for repetition, I would like to make a literally unnecessary addition. The problem here is independent of the problem of it being unknowable whether others really have consciousness. It is fine for others to have consciousness in a normal sense. And the scepticism concerning others' consciousness is presented by presupposing the hitherto discussed problem. For consciousness is precisely a derivative of the structure of this problem from the outset. Then, however, most philosophers get distracted by the sceptical discussion, and miss the basic problem. Scepticism is only an exaggeration to emphasize the problematic character of the problem. It does not embody the essence of the problem.

Discussion

Question: Is it right to say that the ‘private language’ which you mentioned in the first lecture (*Philosophia OSAKA*, No.6, 2011, p. 56) is a language for talking about the pre-primary intension?

Answer: Yes. It is a language to talk about the pre-primary intension, which is separated from the primary or secondary intension, and is linked with ‘I’ *qua* the non-intension. Such a language is possible because it is introduced together with the progressive structure in the very beginning. So, in the wording of the first lecture, it becomes possible when ‘I’ becomes ‘one reflectively conscious of oneself’. In the wording of the third lecture, it becomes possible when the reversed tin becomes a normal tin reversed outside in, with a language for the pre-primary intension coming to be admitted as a language to speak of the inside of the mind of an individual person existing in the world. The pre-primary intension thereby needs to be mutually complementary with the primary intension in communication, but becomes a language that can be used independently by the self. There are many who insist that a private language is impossible, but it is a more difficult task to reach a private language, which is impossible due to its link with ‘I’ *qua* the non-intension.

Question: Is what you have just said related to the point that another person’s qualia cannot be immediately felt, whereas my past qualia can be immediately recalled or stored in memory in a raw state.

Answer: Yes. And the sole essential question is this: does that discussion hold for *me* or for *us*? If the answer is ‘us’, it follows that even a zombie or robot could store its past qualia in memory immediately in a raw state. For it would only need to have a function that could be acknowledged as enabling such memory. And I am one of us. The impossible private language is reached only when this is denied from the standpoint where I am not one of us.

Question: I remember that Chalmers said as follows. Suppose that there is a twin Earth identical with our Earth, not in a possible world but in this universe. There is of course water on the twin Earth, but it is XYZ rather than H₂O. Because I live on the Earth where water is H₂O, the word ‘water’ uttered by me refers to H₂O. On the other hand, ‘water’ uttered by one who lives on the twin Earth and who is identical with me refers to XYZ. Although he and I both live in the same actual world, the extension of ‘water’ differs between us. The primary intension (or the ‘character’) of ‘water’ picks out that water around me from the beginning. Since it is in fact H₂O, the secondary intension (or the ‘content’) of ‘water’ in the language of this Earth refers to H₂O. That is, the word ‘water’ can be a self-referential word as ‘I’ and ‘now’ are. What do you think of this consideration?


Answer: I think that the point of that consideration is hidden in the contrast between ‘one being me and the other not being me’. For in virtue of this contrast, the pre-primary intension

is supplied from the top row. If there are simply twin persons, it would only be that 'water' is a word that has meaning relative to a region of the world. If the example is 'heat' or 'pain', it is possible to reach 'I' from the pre-primary intension of sensation in a reverse manner, but in the case of 'water', this seems impossible. Then let us suppose that the two meet each other. I say, 'Water is ...', and my twin says, 'Yes, water is ...'. I can say, 'No, what is ... is water', as in the case of 'I' (pp. 41-2). Well, I cannot, but I would like to say so. And this is fully reasonable, because this person here is me at any rate whereas that person there is not me. I do not know why, but that is the fact of the matter. That the other person has *just the same* right is, as it were, a superficial agreement. But without that superficial agreement, language could not be established, as I have discussed. This starts the progressive structure. For at the level of language, the other person can say exactly the same thing as me (and that makes it impossible for me to say what I want to say).

To add a few words to this, the problem here is isomorphic with, say, that of egoism, and is the most essential problem in my view. I truly wonder why everyone does not think about this problem and thinks only about superficial problems.

Question: Does it follow that there is a progressive structure also for the progressive structure itself?


Answer: That is true, of course. That is why the structure is progressive. Otherwise, the top row would simply be conceptualized and relativized, there being nothing further. There would be only two stages. Rather, within what is conceptual (or relative) there would necessarily arise the conflict between the non-conceptual and the conceptual again. The property of being the top row is itself relativized. This can be illustrated by the following diagram.



(This goes on endlessly.)

Question: Is what you mean the same as what is called ‘deconstruction’ in ‘continental’ terminology?

Answer: It is. But to make it manifest that it is deconstructive, it is better to change the way of progression. For example, the progression of the ‘actual-possible’ conflict that I have just mentioned would be as follows.



(This goes on endlessly.)

This means to acknowledge this actuality as what is ‘possibly actual’, rather than acknowledging what is ‘possibly actual’ inside what is possible. To use the case of I and another, the direction of progression is that of acknowledging myself as me merely in the sense in which it can be said that another is also me, rather than the direction of acknowledging that another is also me. As I said earlier, this is precisely what makes language possible. So, in the current case, too, it is a far more difficult task to reach the answer to ‘What has to be deconstructed?’ or to reach the very thing that has to be deconstructed than to talk about deconstruction. For solipsity easily degenerates to an objective truth.

Question: You said that what Chalmers intends to say ‘cannot be said’. If that is true, wouldn’t it also be true that what this lecture intends to say ‘cannot be said’ after all?

Answer: That is presumably a correct interpretation.

(translated by Shogo SHIMIZU)