



Title	A Study of the Postwar Evolution of Japan's Island Strategy in the Pacific with a Focus on the PALM Summits
Author(s)	Tevita, Suka Mangisi
Citation	大阪大学, 2009, 博士論文
Version Type	VoR
URL	<a href="https://hdl.handle.net/11094/27597">https://hdl.handle.net/11094/27597</a>
rights	
Note	

*The University of Osaka Institutional Knowledge Archive : OUKA*

<https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/>

The University of Osaka

氏 名	テヴィタ スカ マンギシ Tevita Suka MANGISI
博士の専攻分野の名称	博 士（国際公共政策）
学 位 記 番 号	第 2 3 3 8 6 号
学 位 授 与 年 月 日	平成 21 年 9 月 25 日
学 位 授 与 の 要 件	学位規則第 4 条第 1 項該当 国際公共政策研究科国際公共政策専攻
学 位 論 文 名	A Study of the Postwar Evolution of Japan's Island Strategy in the Pacific with a Focus on the PALM Summits (戦後における日本の太平洋島嶼戦略の展開：太平洋・島サミットの実施を中心に)
論 文 審 査 委 員	(主査) 准教授 R・エルドリッヂ (副査) 教 授 星野 俊也 准教授 栗栖 薫子 教 授 米原 謙 教 授 小林 泉 (大阪学院大学)

## 論 文 内 容 の 要 旨

The Pacific Islands region is composed of 12 independent and 2 self-governing small island developing states. These 14 countries, together with New Zealand and Australia, comprise the membership of the regional political body, the Pacific Islands Forum or PIF. Since 1997, Japan has engaged the PIF at Summit level meetings held in Japan on a triennial basis. These Summit meetings have become known as the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting of PALM.

The PALM Summit is seen as an enhanced Japanese island strategy in the Pacific region. PALM is indicative of a more proactive and independent foreign policy tool used by Japan to conduct its relations with the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) in order to satisfy its vital or national interests. This proactive diplomatic engagement has been indicative of what this work calls “strategic reactivism.”

Japan is generally recognized as what Kent Calder has called a “reactive state.” The “reactive state” theory suggests that Japan lacks or avoids diplomatic initiative regarding international issues, even though it has the capability to do so. Accordingly, Japan is said to react to world events when formulating foreign policy and does not seek to take a leadership or proactive role unless pressured to do so by international or external sources. This external pressure, or *gaiatsu*, is an inherent characteristic of Calder’s definition of a reactive state.

In considering Calder’s definition, this work suggests a need for its reinterpretation. There have been cases where Japan has pursued proactive foreign policy initiatives in times when there were both an absence and presence of *gaiatsu* to do otherwise. Furthermore, this work suggests that Japan’s *prima facie* reactive foreign policy initiatives, in reality are calculated and conscious acts by Japan to protect other vital interests. In such situations, Japan is seen as constantly strategizing, maneuvering, and sensing the international environment (“*kikubari*”) so as to determine whether or not it should respond to international issues in a proactive manner or, be voluntarily reactive, in order to maintain, attain, or enhance other interests whatever they may be at any one time. In considering such situations, this study proposes the concept of strategic reactivism to more accurately describe Japan’s foreign policy initiatives.

In so proposing, strategic reactivism suggests Japan has a calculated foreign policy approach to international issues. It responds to international matters in a manner, either by reacting to *gaiatsu* or by pursuing its own independent foreign policy, as long as its interests are protected. Japan is not reactive in the sense Calder describes but is *strategically* reactive which suggests a conscious and calculated foreign policy initiative whether or not *gaiatsu* is present. In considering the limitations of Calder’s definition of a reactive foreign policy, this work proposes Japan’s foreign policy is more

accurately described as strategic reactivism.

Policy initiative is determined through voluntary calculations which results in measured foreign policy behavior that is best suited to protecting vital interests and allowing foreign policy to evolve with time on any given issue. As such, Japan voluntarily reacted to the Nixon Doctrine to protect its economic and security interests with the U.S. It again voluntarily reacted to the South Pacific Forum’s protests against Japan’s nuclear waste dumping plans in the Pacific Ocean in order to maintain its image as a peaceful and friendly state. Japan voluntarily reacted again to *gaiatsu* from the U.S. when the latter demanded Japan shoulder more of the costs of U.S. security interests in the Pacific Islands region. This resulted in the creation of the “Kuranari Doctrine” and the doubling aid to the region. Following the end of the Cold War, Japan was able to become more proactive in its relations with the Pacific Islands region. It had calculated the new strategic environment and therefore found it could undertake greater independent foreign policy initiatives to that region. This measured proactivism resulted in the PALM Summit initiative and the creation of the Pacific Environment Community. Such strategic calculations in Japan’s reactions to regional or international events is a hallmark of Japanese foreign policy. In terms of the Pacific Islands, the trend appears to suggest future strategy will serve to strengthen its proactive foreign policy approach to the Pacific Islands region and may well result in Japan taking greater leadership initiative over regional affairs.

With regards to the Pacific Islands, this pressure has come from Japan’s alliance partner the U.S. and more recently, from New Zealand and Australia. There have been circumstances however where Japan has actively pursued its own diplomatic initiatives and has been proactive in its foreign policy formulation without any pressure from abroad. In such circumstances, Japan had not reacted to international pressure per se. In perceiving the international circumstances at such times, it had been through conscious and deliberate strategizing that Japan determined it was in its interests to act. Japan does calculate its reactions to international events so as to determine when it can take a more proactive and independent foreign policy initiative in a particular situation or alternatively remain voluntarily reactive.

Japan’s postwar diplomatic strategy in the Pacific Islands region is an example of strategic reactivism. During the 1990s, there had been an apparent absence of developed country leadership in the Pacific Islands region. This circumstance had been described as “strategic neglect” of the region given the end of the Cold War and any real or perceived threat of communist influence in the Pacific Islands. Japan strategically reacted to these new circumstances by initiating the PALM Summit with the 16-member countries of the region’s political body, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) as a way to furthering its own interests in the region and thus demonstrating its able leadership in Pacific Island affairs. Here we can observe a shift in Japan’s engagement with the region from being voluntarily reactive to being more proactive.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2009, Leaders and representatives of the 16 members of the PIF, the PIF Secretariat, and Japan, gathered in the northern island of Japan at Tomamu, Hokkaido for a two-day PALM Summit meeting; the fifth time it has been held. However with increased non-traditional Pacific power interests taking focus on island regional affairs, the situation today begs greater attention from the policy pundits in Tokyo with regards to how best to maintain Japan’s position amongst the island states today than it was in 1997 when “strategic neglect” was increasingly present. Such attention must not only be focused on hosting the event per se but logistically-speaking, the lead up to the PALM Summit itself, the conduct of pre-negotiations of the PALM declaration and incidental documents, and the organization of the Summit itself, plays an important part in forming a successful, more personal, and cordial relationship between Japan and the PICs.

What this work seeks to do is establish a basis for an understanding of the evolution of Japanese postwar interests in the Pacific Islands region which has culminated in the PALM Summits. In doing so, understanding how Japan approaches and engages the PICs through the PALM mechanism, one must gain the adequate and accurate background knowledge of how PALM came into being in the first place. This work also addresses this need. This study therefore covers a 40-year period from 1969 - 2009. Through a historical approach with support of case studies, the research presented will describe the evolution of Japanese diplomatic engagement in the region and its shift from being voluntarily reactive to being proactive. This work describes how Japan initially had reacted to U.S. demands to shoulder greater responsibility with regards to U.S. geopolitical interests to later finding its own interests in conducting relations with the PICs. This study closes with policy proposals submitted for consideration in light of how Japan’s island strategy in the Pacific may be strengthened further through future PALM summit meetings.

## 論 文 審 査 の 結 果 の 要 旨

この博士号請求論文は、過去40年にわたる太平洋諸島地域における日本外交の変遷に関する政策分析と歴史研究である。特に、日本のリーダーシップの下で3年に一度の頻度で開催しているPALM（太平洋・島サミット）を取り上げ、日本の太平洋に関する政策意図の本質を明らかにしようとしたものである。その手法として、博士学位請求者は、豊富な一次資料やインタビューに基づき、また自らの

現場体験を活かして調査を行った。また、分析手法としては、「strategic reactivism」という概念を提示し、分析を試みた。

本論文は、序論と結論を含めて8章で構成されている。

序論では、日本の当該地域における外交政策意図に関する先行研究を概観し、これらの研究成果が関係諸国や関係機関へ与えた影響について考察した。さらに、日本が如何なる理由で太平洋諸島に関与してきたかという真の意図とその経緯を探り出すために、それを可能とする理論的枠組みや分析概念について検討を行った。

第一章では、太平洋島嶼諸国 (PIC) の地理的、政治・経済的現状、国際関係における地域性を概観し、さらには、日本の同地域との戦前にあった関係についても考察した。第二章では1969年のニクソン・ドクトリンが日本の外交政策に与えた影響について分析した。冷戦時代に米国が統治していた太平洋信託統治領（旧日本の委任統治領）における防衛コストの分担という外圧が、大戦後の日本が本格的にPICへの関与を始めるきっかけとなったことが明らかにされた。第三章では、日本が1970年代後半に、核廃棄物を太平洋へ投棄しようとした試みに焦点を当てた。PICは核廃棄物投棄という政策を一貫して反対し続けた結果、日本は予定していた投棄を断念するだけでなく、PICを太平洋地域における正当な国家主体として認知するに至った。それが、1985年の中曽根康弘首相のフィジー及びバブアニューギニアの訪問、さらには1987年の中曽根内閣の外務大臣であった倉成正の「倉成ドクトリン」へと繋がった経緯と背景を丹念な研究で裏付けている。第四章では、1985年のブラザ合意に焦点を当てた。この合意は、日本も国際社会の安全保障に対して応分の貢献をすべしとの米国の意向に応えるためであったが、具体的には、米国の安全保障政策を資金的に支援するのが主な目的だったこと、そして、これにより日本は多額の資金拠出を決めたが、当時の円高がこの試みを可能にし、結果として太平洋諸島地域に対するODAの倍増につながったことなどが明快に跡付けている。第五章では、1997年から2006年にかけてのPALMサミットを通しての日本の対太平洋島嶼国外交の発展を検討した。これが、日本の太平洋地域に対する積極的な外交的関与、並びに戦略、「strategic reactivism」を実証する重要な事例研究になっている。第六章では2009年のPALMサミットの発展・変化、日本-PIC「共同体」の創設への実現可能性、そして日本が対PIC外交を進める際のオーストラリアとニュージーランドという先進国家の存在意味について政策的観点から論じている。

そして終章では、本論での考察から導き出された新たな知見を要約するとともに、日本とPICとの今後の関係をも展望した。特に、博士学位請求者は、最後に、日本外交にとってPALMが果たす役割の重要性を再確認し、今後も取り組むべき有効な手段であると述べ、物流・人流の更なる活性化が国家間の友好関係の絆を強めていくための基本条件となると指摘した。こうした関係が創出されていくことが地域共同体を実現させるための第一歩になるであろう、と結論し、幾つかの政策提言も行った。

審査委員は一致して提出された論文は博士（国際公共政策）の学位を授与するに値すると認定した。