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Spoiler or Reformer?
The Uniting for Consensus group and UN Security Council reform

MARINA MAGALHÃES BARRETO LEITE SILVA

OSAKA, JAPAN
JANUARY, 2014
SPOILER OR REFORMER?
THE UNITING FOR CONSENSUS GROUP AND
UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE OSAKA SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY

BY

MARINA MAGALHÃES BARRETO LEITE SILVA

OSAKA, JAPAN
JANUARY, 2014
To all the loves of my life.
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ABSTRACT

During the years of official debates on the reform of the UN Security Council, amidst the clashes of different positions on how to transform the organ, one group was frequently on the receiving end of accusations that it was attempting to hamper the debates, delay agreement, and prevent its members’ regional rivals from acquiring permanent positions inside the organ – the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group.

Using chronological and structural analysis, together with a support measuring system, this research aimed to analyze if the UfC group has real intentions of reforming the Security Council or if they are just a coalition of “angry neighbors”, trying to take the debates to an eternal loop of ineffectiveness. Using the results collected from several angles of analysis, this study concludes that it is possible to declare this group’s claims reasonable and its intentions of reforming the Security Council real. The structure of the formal proposal was proven a model that will actually establish a transformation of the current Council into an organ that is more democratic and with the fairest representation when compared to the other proposals on the table. Furthermore, the numbers that serve as indicators of support for a particular proposal proved that at no time during the debates was an agreement close to being achieved. This demonstrates that there was never a real momentum for the reform of the Council, or an identifiable attempt to block what could be perceived as a momentum towards an agreement.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all I would like to express my deepest appreciation for all the support, the ideas and the motivation given by my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Virgil Hawkins. This dissertation would not be possible without his kindness of initially accepting me as a student in his research group. His guidance and help were the main encouragement for the conclusion of this work.

I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Prof. Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, and the third member of my evaluation committee, Prof. Toshitaka Takeuchi, for the useful comments and observations. All of their ideas contributed to the improvement of this dissertation.

In addition, I would like to thank for the availability of all the individuals that contributed to this work, including UN permanent representatives and scholars. Although many of them must remain anonymous, these diplomats and professors kindly granted me information and thought-provoking viewpoints through interviews and attributed a great value to the results of this thesis.

Finally, but not less importantly, I would like to dedicate all my hard work and efforts to: my lovely parents – Júlio and Cláudia –; my brothers and sister – Júlio, João and Maria Isabel –; my love, Carlos; and my dear friends. They gave me all the support, from the other side of the world, in Brazil, or from some blocks away, in Japan. Their love made all the stress, exhaustion and “saudade” a little less heavy during this entire process.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations and the representation crisis

The Second World War (WWII) changed the concept of international and multilateral organizations forever. After the failure of the League of Nations, the war winners decided to establish an updated and improved version of the previous league. Franklin Roosevelt was considered the father of this new idea of uniting the globe under an umbrella of common interests of peace, security and cooperation. The American president worked together with the great powers of that historical moment – the United Kingdom, France, the USSR and China – and built an organization capable of enforcements against future violations of international peace.¹

The WWII allies therefore started to hold discussions with a view to creating an organization to unite nations – which justifies the choice of the United Nations (UN) for its name – convinced that humankind would not endure a Third World War. The drafting of the document that established the parameters for this new international institution started in April of 1945 during the United Nations Conference on International Organization, in San Francisco. The Conference gathered 50 countries² and resulted in a one-hundred-and-eleven-article long document. In October of the same year, this document was signed as the Charter of the United Nations and created the most prominent arena of international negotiations of the last 68 years.

Over the years, the membership of the United Nations expanded very quickly. During its first 15 years as an organization, the membership almost doubled and reached 99 countries by 1960. The following 30 years marked the addition of 60 other countries and raised the membership of the UN to 159 member states. Most of the countries added to the institution during the Cold War era were from the Asian, East European

² Fifty countries were accepted as official members of the conference and Poland was an observer state by that time.
and African continents. The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 1990s brought another explosive expansion of the UN membership. From 1991 to 1993, 25 new members were added to the list. Currently, there are 193 official members at the organization, apart from its two non-member states that act as permanent observers – the Holy See and the State of Palestine.³

The significant expansion of the membership created an understandable crisis of representation inside the organization. Even with the initial enlargement during the first ten years, the newcomers started to question the structure and procedures inside the UN system. The new members alleged that the founding idea of the institution should be adapted to a situation with an expanding number of states in order to include all members in a fair system of representation. This argument followed faithfully the principle of equality of member states, preserved by the first paragraph of the second Article of the Charter.⁴

The UN Security Council became the most evident example for these claims of representation, due to the great importance of this organ. The Council was created, according to the Charter, with the responsibility to determine the existence of threats or breaches to the peace, recognize acts of aggression, make recommendations or decide on measures to maintain or restore the peace, deal with the pacific settlement of disputes and realize regional agreements. All of these actions, also according to the Charter signed by all members, should be taken on behalf of the general membership. However, this membership was never universally represented in the Council’s composition in a manner comparable to that in the General Assembly.⁵

⁴ “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, Paragraph 1.
⁵ Every member state of the organization represents one vote and has power of decision over the processes at the General Assembly. This system represents the most democratic structure of representation inside the UN.
After the great expansion of the membership that happened during the first 20 years of the UN, the first calls to change the composition of the Security Council emerged. The member states alleged that it was impossible to represent an expanding membership of more than one hundred countries with a Council of only 11 seats. In 1965, the one and only expansion of the Security Council therefore happened, thus bringing the total number of members to 15 with the addition of only non-permanent seats.

In spite of this expansion of seats at the Council, the claims of representation have continued to this day. The creation of groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) mobilized the under-represented majority of the General Assembly and made the calls for representation and effectiveness stronger during the Cold War era. After the end of this period, the increasing demand of the Security Council’s activity and the growing importance of the organ in solving international conflicts transformed these claims into a key topic of the General Assembly’s debates, eventually becoming an official item on the Assembly’s agenda in 1992.

*The UN Security Council reform debates*

The “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters” – title of the agenda topic that was established in 1992 – started an official process of debates on the issue of reforming the Council. These debates were opened to all members of the UN and, as soon as the discussions started in 1993, they established an Open-ended Working Group whose objective was to formulate solutions to the crisis of representation related to the Security Council.
Since then, every year, all representatives of member states have the opportunity to officially present their country’s positions on reforms concerning the entire organization, and the discussion of agenda items are held at the Assembly’s Hall. The debates on these questions have been the main arena for the presentation of all different opinions and proposals towards the reforming process of the Council for more than 20 years.

Multilateralism is one of the strongest characteristics of the UN and this multiplicity of positions took the organization to an “infinite debate” on establishing the fairest representation in the Security Council. Every recognized country has the right to expose and defend its views on international issues inside the UN, as the organization aims to establish and defend interests that are common to all nations. Despite the agreement reached on the need to reform and expand the Council, many important questions remained unresolved after these 20 years of discussions.

During recent years, the debate assumed another political level with the establishment of Intergovernmental Negotiations, despite the fact that there was no agreement regarding the way the Council should be expanded. While the agreements on the matter are just a few, the disagreements are many. Categories of membership, number of new seats, voting power and distribution of seats were the main issues discussed tirelessly by members over the years. However, the General Assembly did not get close to establishing a reasonable solution for this crisis of representation.

It is important to notice that, even with the difficulties involved in the process, there was not lack of attempts by members to push the debates forward. Over the long period of reform debates, many groups of interests were formed. Some fought for the improvement of working methods in the Council, demanding more effectiveness and
transparency, while other groups presented proposals combining the improvement of procedures with the expansion of representation.

The decision-making processes inside the UN are predominantly influenced by the formation of groups. Most of the time, these groups are formed by regions, but other important groups are also formed by like-minded countries united by similar objectives and interests that go beyond regional issues. Especially in cases such as the reform of the Security Council, the strength represented by these groups is very significant. In a situation where every resolution related to that matter relies on the approval of more than one third of the member states represented at the organization, the formation of groups is essential in achieving a positive result when voting.

During the 20 years of reform debates, three main coalitions have assumed an important position inside the discussions regarding the expansion of the number of seats inside the Security Council: The African Union (AU); the Group of Four (G4); and, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC). Their official proposals were presented during the 2005 World Summit, answering the Secretary General’s request for more efforts in advancing the reform processes.

The African Union (formerly known as the Organization of African Unity), among these three main groups, is the only regional-based coalition. Apart from its general claims for a fair regional representation inside the Security Council, the African proposal presents an attempt to remedy the complete exclusion of the continent from the Council’s permanent seats. According to the African Union, a perspective of fair reform would involve the creation of six permanent seats, which would include two seats for African countries. The proposal also calls for an expansion of the number of non-permanent seats, adding another five elected seats to the organ.

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6 The two-thirds majority for every decision on the matter of Security Council reform was established in 1998, by the approval of Resolution 53/30.
Formed by four like-minded countries – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – the Group of Four also aims to address the under-representation of some regions at the permanent category of the Council. Its proposal calls for the inclusion of six new permanent and five non-permanent seats to the Council. According to this group, in a democratic vision of sovereign equality of states, all regions should be represented among the permanent members. Apart from the democratic appeal of the proposal, the four countries present a clear will to fill part of the new permanent seats, giving the other two to African countries.

Unlike the other two proposals, the Uniting for Consensus – known as the Coffee Club in the 1990s – calls for an expansion only in the non-permanent category of seats. According to these like-minded countries, which include Italy, Turkey, Canada, Spain, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, a perspective of democratic reform would not create more differences between members. Their proposal also represents, from a different point of view, the same respect to the sovereign equality of member states as the other two groups.

A case of conflicting ideas

Since the creation of the Coffee Club under the leadership of Italy in the 1990’s, the relations between the G4 and UfC have been marked by debates on positions and opinions about actions. As some of the UfC core members have one of the members of the G4 as a neighbor, the group’s actions were understood by some countries as an attempt to prevent those countries from acquiring permanent positions inside the Security Council.

In 1998, during the debates on the question of equitable representation in the Council, the Coffee Club presented a draft proposing more deliberation time on the
The proposal had the intention of establishing Article 108 of the Charter as the official voting rule for every decision on the Security Council reforms. Facing the threat that such a proposal would represent to their candidacies to permanent seats, the Japanese and the German representatives wrote letters asking the other missions not to become co-sponsors of the document, alleging that it was an attempt to kill the momentum achieved by the debates. These were the first accusations of an attempt to delay the debates directed at the coalition of countries that had lately formed the UfC.

These accusations, which prevail to this day, are the initial point for the study case analyzed in this research. During the 20 years of official debates, the accusations have been supported by several actors inside and outside of the UN. A literature review on the Security Council reform represents a good way to set the stage for this study, and to obtain an overview of the perceptions of the UfC created by these accusations outside the official arena of debates.

_Literature_

Researchers addressed several topics and many assumed an opinion on how the reform processes could end in a positive transformation. The main groups of ideas inside of what we can call “Security Council expansion literature” were: first, publications related to the UN system and the reform in general; second, works on the analysis of groups as important actors in the international arena; third, publications involving general perspectives on all proposals and procedures of the debates; fourth,

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8 “Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.” _UN Charter_, Article 108, Chapter XVIII.
analyses and opinions related to the positions of specific countries; and, finally, a fifth group of overviews on the specific proposals of expansion.

Among the topics largely addressed by the academia, the UfC proposal seems to receive little importance. Most of the researchers consider the members of the G4 as the main actors of the reform, while the UfC proposal is mentioned by the majority as a spoiler or a tactic to delay the process. Even when explained, the position of the UfC members is commonly defined as a minority trying to prevent other actors from acquiring permanent seats at the Council.¹⁰

Generally speaking, there is a clear agreement inside academic output about the necessity to reform the UN. There is also a consensus regarding the difficulties associated with this reform. Most of the difficulty of the reform pertains to the multiplicity of positions inside the multilateral system of the UN. According to Thomas Weiss, the political divergences inside an organization formed by 193 members are inevitable and there is no best solution for its problems.¹¹ The reform of the Security Council, more specifically, is directly influenced by these multilateral positions and, according to the former representative of Namibia at the United Nations, Kaire Mbuende, it became an issue of realpolitik as there is no agreement on how to expand the Council.¹²

The important aspect of academic analyses on attempts to expand the Security Council is the ambiguity between a great interest in some opinions and positions, and a lack of questioning on other perspectives inside the process. A great interest in

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analyzing specific positions by some countries is accompanied by a diminution of positions opposed to this interest.

This interest, when addressing the three main draft resolutions on a possible expansion of the Council, is largely directed to the mainstream proposals. There is a stark difference of approach inside the academia among the African Union, the G4 and the UfC. While the competition for permanent seats between the African position and the G4 receives great attention, the UfC is described as a simple coalition of rival states.\(^{13}\)

The academic position on the UfC proposal comes as a supportive argument for the accusation case against the former Coffee Club. The different points of view and the regional connections condemn the entire group of countries to be characterized as “spoilers of reform debates”.\(^{14}\)

Academia, in terms of production and discourse, appears to have thus also played a role in the “criminalization” of the UfC as an illegitimate group with delaying tactics, exclusively trying to stop the natural course of the debates leading to Brazil, Japan, Germany and India gaining permanent seats. Therefore, the lack of deep analyses on the UfC pointed to the necessity to approach this case and investigate the real intentions of the group inside the reform process.


How to approach the UfC case?

It is easy to question if the UfC has a real proposal to reform the Security Council or if they are just a coalition of “angry neighbors” trying to take the debates to an eternal loop of ineffectiveness; especially by analyzing the reform debates over the last two decades and covering the academic perspectives on how the process is being developed.

However, the question “Is the UfC group really pursuing reform or is it just a spoiler?” is ambiguous. Negative and positive hypotheses can be the final result of a deeper analysis on the UfC activities during the long process of reform attempts.

Negative results for this research would present two determinant aspects: a real proof of attempts to delay the process; and, the definitive perception of the superiority of regional issues as motivations or triggers for this group’s positions. It is possible to define a situation of direct response by the UfC to possible achievements of other groups inside the process as a blockage through the analysis of a chronology of actions and momentum reached by the possibility of enlarging the Security Council. The same could be said about a scenario where a clear positioning against activities by specific countries inside the debates, thus confirming regional issues as the main motivation of the UfC and the disruption of an agreement as their main objective.

Two aspects can be attached to the possible positive results of the present investigation as well: the discovery of a genuine motivation towards reform by the chronological and structural analysis of the group’s positions; and, the establishment of formal parameters to measure the level of support received by UfC. A chronology of actions, democratic aspects and perspectives on the UfC proposal can present results indicating a character of authentic objectives and classify it as a real pursuit of transformation. A deep numerical analysis of the past 20 years of discussions on the
Security Council reform would also result in a demonstration of how the ideas defended by UfC members have been received by the General Assembly and point to a comparison between the UfC proposal and the others in terms of acceptance.

Quantitative and qualitative methods can be used to address this case when following the hypotheses generated by the main research question. The combination of these two kinds of approach will give more reliability to results and answers by the end of this research.

Therefore, the system of studying the UfC case inside the UN reform debates will involve three main steps in this research which will be divided into four main chapters. Initially, a background of the last 20 years of debates on the reform of the Security Council will be presented. Then, to better contextualize the situation of the UfC, the proposals and ideas from the other two main expansionist groups will be analyzed. The final step will then be the analysis of the data collected.

The first two chapters constitute an initial base of analysis that will lead us to a deeper data consideration. Chapter I will serve as the foundations, with a historical analysis of the 20 years of debates at the General Assembly, showing us how the UN membership developed the reform process over the years. This chapter will address the history of the organization together with the continuous efforts and discussions among representatives over the issue of reform, following a general timeline of events inside the UN.

In Chapter II, the research will present a deeper analysis of how the accusation against the UfC became real during the clashes with G4 members, establishing a comparison among the main expansion proposals for the Council and drawing attention to how the different positions were definitive in creating an ideological conflict among member states over the methods proposed to enlarge the number of seats. The second
chapter will present how the scenario of accusations against the UfC was formed and how different actors were responsible for attributing a negative image to this group’s proposal.

The second half of the thesis aims to present a thorough analysis of the data collected, according to the scenario created by the details described in the first two chapters. Chapter III will address the question of the legitimacy of the UfC, with the objective of proving the group’s intentions through technical and factual aspects of its participation in the debates. In this analysis of legitimacy, four steps will be followed: firstly, utilizing chronological aspects of actions focused in establishing an answer to “who first presented and defended specific ideas”; secondly, quantitatively pointing at the importance of the use of the notion of ‘democracy’ as a concept inside the UfC discourse when compared to the G4; thirdly, briefly debating the question of voting power distribution according to each proposal in order to demonstrate the possible final results of a reform according to each of the groups in terms of participation in decision-making processes; and, finally, presenting perspectives about the group and how actors inside and outside the group, or even the UN, see its actions.

Chapter IV will use the content of the speeches on the “Question of equitable representation on and the increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters” to quantitatively analyze the viewpoints of the member states. It will present an analysis of the aspects that were fundamental during the debates over a possible reform of the Security Council, followed by the employment of a system specifically created for this research to measure levels of support. The data generated through the system will examine references to the characteristics considered important during the 20 years of discussions to determine how proposals, ideas and positions were received by the general membership as a whole.
These four parts will guide us to a conclusion that will show how the UfC and its members, as UN actors, are understood by their colleagues inside the UN. The final results will also answer our main question about the political intentions of these countries: pointing to a genuine aim of establishing a real reform or to a primary objective of disrupting it.
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
During its 67 years of existence, the UN Security Council has had its ups and downs inside the international organization’s system, in terms of procedures, but it never lost its importance. The Council passed through years of almost complete inefficiency during the Cold War to reach a moment of great demand in the 1990s. During all this time, however, the Council has always been the center of debates among the UN members. The power exercised by the Security Council inside the UN represents so much of the interests of member states that its functions and composition were always the subject on the agenda of the annual debates.

The Council’s history has been a compilation of activities, criticism, and attempts to change its structure. Its creation, based on the traumatic experience of the League of Nations, granted the UN Security Council an entire existence of contestation, not just about its actions concerning the maintenance of peace and security, but also and especially about the lack of representation of the UN membership.

From 1946 until 2013, the debates on a possible reform of the Council were largely influenced by the historical context and the political decisions presented by countries over the years. This chapter aims to present the historical background of the claims for fair representation at the Security Council, inside the UN General Assembly.

A learned lesson about how not to manage an organization

In the second decade of the 20th century, the idea of creating an international organ that would be capable of mediating disputes and avoiding new conflicts was widespread, especially after the bloody events of the First World War (WWI).

The balance of power in Europe, mostly established in the last decades of the 19th century, saw the continent engage in trench warfare on a massive scale that resulted in an estimated 19 million deaths. This was the highest number of casualties in a
conflict ever seen by humankind. “Amid [this] carnage, in January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson outlined his idea of the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{15}

The League of Nations was created by the countries that won WWI. France, Italy, Japan and Great Britain were the main members, considering the fact that the United States did not join the organization even though it was the sponsor of the idea to create it. It created a perspective of what we would see in 1945 for the UN. Inside this system, there was also an Assembly, a Secretariat, a Court of Justice, and a Council, formed by permanent and non-permanent members.

After some years of activity, the League saw its system’s weaknesses when members started to abandon the organization and its crisis management became unable to oversee a real maintenance of peace and security. Even two of its founding members – Japan and Italy – left the organization due to their pursuit of imperialist aims in Manchuria (1931) and Ethiopia (1936), respectively.\textsuperscript{16} The last breath of the League happened when France and Great Britain attempted to restrain Germany’s advance in Europe and had not enough power to be successful.

The Second World War (WWII) had its outbreak with the invasion of Poland in 1939 and buried forever the expectations carried by the international community for the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the legacy of the League remained in some form and, by the end of WWII, the international community had decided to create a stronger organization with guaranties that the lesson of failure had been learnt. The UN was created by the end of the war, in 1945, as a new attempt by the winner states to keep the menace of war away.

\textsuperscript{16} Japan left the organization, after the condemnation of its invasion of Manchuria, and Italy was expelled, after going against the rules established by the League’s treaty and invaded Ethiopia.
Although the practices of the League of Nations had failed to achieve its goal, the structure of its system was utilized as the foundation upon which the UN’s system was built, and represented a lesson on how the founders should deal with this new organization in order to achieve success.

The creation of the UN as a new international organization started at the United Nations Conference on International Organizations, commonly known as the Conference of San Francisco because of the location where it was held. The gathering of 50 nations happened on April 25, 1945, in the city of San Francisco, with the aim of discussing the draft of a document that would determine the rules to be followed by the new organization. The main result of the conference, the Charter of the United Nations, was signed in October of the same year, establishing the parameters for the organization that would officially start its operation by the following year. Starting with the emblematic sentence: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save future generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”17, the Charter represented original objectives and procedures, chosen by the 50 members of the Conference of San Francisco, which would be the main characteristics of the UN.

The principal purpose of maintaining international peace and security is also presented in the first article of the Charter. During the discussions regarding the draft of the main document of the UN, the responsibility to maintain this first main rule was attributed to the Security Council’s members. The Council received a chief role inside the organization, based on the same structure of the League of Nations. According to the Charter, the purposes of the United Nations are:

17 See the declaration of the People of the United Nations, the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The UN Security Council received the same powers as its predecessor in the League of Nations, but its management assumed a stronger basis, ensuring the association and permanence of the main political powers of the time. The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, the Soviet Union (USSR) and China – winners of the War – were given the power and responsibility under the UN Charter as permanent members of the Council, to guarantee the maintenance of the status quo as a real “definite guaranty of peace.”

The fifth chapter of the Charter lays out the principal functions, characteristics and duties of the Security Council. According to this chapter, the entire UN membership agrees to have a Council initially composed of nine members acting on its behalf on the matters of: pacific settlement of disputes; determination of threats and breaches to peace or acts of aggression; request of military interventions; establishment of sanctions; and, management of regional arrangements. Beyond the establishment of procedures and formal structures, the chapter also clearly attributes to the Council the primary responsibility to act towards the achievement of UN’s chief objective of maintaining international peace and security.

Another important topic related to the establishment and regulation of the Council was the question of voting power. The founders of the UN, aiming to escape

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18 See the *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 1, Paragraph 1, Chapter 1.
19 Hanhimäki, 2008. p. 13
20 This was prior to Resolution 1991A (1965) of the General Assembly, that changed the composition to 15 members, expanding the number of non-permanent members to 6.
21 See the *Charter of the United Nations*, Articles 24, 25 and 26, Chapter 5.
from the unsuccessful experience of the League of Nations, created a model designed to keep the great powers inside the organization. According to this policy, established in the third paragraph of Article 27 of the Charter, the permanent members of the Security Council must give positive votes or abstain from voting on a resolution. This model of voting became known as the “veto power”. Every permanent member has the power of block a decision inside the organization by giving its negative vote.

The veto guaranteed the five great powers some kind of safety for their own interests and gave these countries great power over all important decisions taken in the UN, except for the placatory Articles 18, 27 [2] and 108, which created a mechanism to soften this attribution by the establishment of a required majority as a bottom line for the approval of resolutions. The majority needed gave the other actors inside the UN the possibility to pursue their own interests even with the existing veto.

Hence, the founders of the UN considered they had created a strong organization, based on an influential Security Council, and with a satisfactory distribution of power from the moment of its inception. As the membership expanded, however, questions of representation became the subject of contestation even for this “perfect international organization”.

A Council of gentlemen and its contestation

Following the determinations of the Charter, the Security Council began its work in January of 1946 with a composition of five permanent members – the US, the UK, China, France and the USSR – and six non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term and without the possibility of immediate reelection.

Council members established matters of working methods internally, following instructions of Article 30 of the fifth Chapter. Questions regarding seat distribution,
format of meetings and elections of presidents, for example, were determined inside the Council’s chamber. These methods took the initial distribution of non-permanent seats, also in 1946, to a structure that became known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement”. “The membership of the Security Council in its early years was a reflection of the principal elements of power in the UN on the one hand and the major regional groups of states on the other.”

According to these informal agreements among the five permanent members, representation inside the Council was regionally divided and covered Latin America, the Middle East, Western and Eastern Europe, and the British Commonwealth.

This initial model of distribution worked well for the UN membership for a period of five years even if some regions were not considered at all for participation at the Council during these years. The African and Asian continents did not receive fostering from the permanent five members for non-permanent seat elections and had no opportunities to act prominently inside the UN. As Simon Chesterman affirmed: “In addition to the perennial problems of dysfunctional institutions, inadequate resources, and ephemeral political will, the [UN] has always faced crises of expectations.”

Ten years after the signature of the Charter, the UN membership expanded from 50 to 76 countries. By that time, the number of seats at the Council already represented only 14% of the membership. Among these 26 new members, 50% were Asian nations, and inside the entire membership, countries from this region represented 30% of the General Assembly. In 1955, with this significant expansion of the membership, a first official contestation of the composition and distribution of seats

inside the Security Council occurred. Sixteen Latin American countries and Spain drafted a resolution asking for the increase of non-permanent seats and, consequently, an increase of the majority required for approval in the organ. During the 8th Session of the General Assembly, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Spain and Venezuela joined forces in an attempt to expand the number of non-permanent members of the Council from 6 to 8.

The draft was rejected by a vote of the Assembly, but the growth in membership became faster during the following years. After the impressive increase in the number of Asian countries, it was the turn of African nations to become largely accepted as member states. In five years, from 1955 to 1960, 21 African countries became members of the UN, representing 25% of the General Assembly. By 1960, Asia and Africa represented more than 50% of the entire UN membership, but its representativeness, especially inside the Security Council, was null.

Recognizing its power in numbers inside discussions at the General Assembly where the sovereign equality of states is recognized by the “one member, one vote” system, countries from the Asian and African continents decided to join forces in order to have their interests prevail. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was thus created as a powerful bloc among the UN membership in 1961. According to Bourantonis:

[t]he formation of the Movement reflected the will of its members to create and maintain a cohesive and well organized coalition of states aimed at playing a major regulatory role in the international arena, including UN, through collective and well orchestrated actions.

The process of decolonization following WWII was responsible for the incredible emergence of new countries and actors on the international scene. This

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27 Bourantonis, 2005. p. 20
considerable boom furthermore fed the idea of questioning the representation of some regions inside the UN, more specifically inside the most important decision-making organ: the Security Council.

By 1963, in an organization of already 113 members, the Council represented only 9% of the entire organization. In December of the same year, countries from Latin America and the NAM presented two separate drafts resolutions of expansion for the Security Council at the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly. The proposals were seeking an enlargement of non-permanent seats and an official pattern of seats distribution. After debates on the number of seats to be added, both groups decided to go ahead with the Afro-Asian draft only and claim the addition of four seats.

The official approval of this proposal as a resolution by the General Assembly took six days of intensive debates and almost two years to be ratified. On December 16, 1963, the Assembly accepted the Resolution 1991A, expanding the number of elected seats, but it was only ratified in August 1965 due the extreme division and inefficiency caused by the Cold War relations between East and West.

A cold Council for a Cold War

The Cold War era represented a dark moment for the Security Council’s functions. During this period, the clashes between eastern and western powers turned the UN into a puppet theater, with actions focused on attempts to avoid an end similar to the one suffered by the League of Nations. The widespread use of the veto (See Chart 1.1) transformed the Council into a very restricted body, far from the objective intended by its founders of making its owners feel safe by guaranteeing their interests.

During the four decades of the Cold War, the Council had only one significant moment during the Korean War when a threat to the peace was recognized and a military action was adopted to avoid the communist advance over the south part of the
peninsula. This action was only possible because of the absence of the USSR from the Council due to the question of Chinese representation. As shown in the chart, the Cold War represented a period of constant blockage of actions and decisions taken by the Security Council, with an intense use of the veto. (See Chart 1.1)


After the communist revolution in the 1940s, the major part of the Chinese territory was proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the former representation, originally added at the creation of the UN, was restricted to the government in exile on the island of Taiwan, the so-called Republic of China. The natural course of action by the USSR was to support the new communist leadership, but the same cannot be said of the other permanent members. “To the Soviets, the obvious course was to replace the ‘old’ China with the ‘new’ one. But others – least of all the
Chinese representative in the UNSC – disagreed, refusing even to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC.”

The “Chinese issue” was a direct factor of influence for the Council during the early 1960s. As a result of the clash of opposing permanent members over the acceptance of the new Chinese government, the Soviet representation boycotted the Council and the debate regarding the ratification of the expansion of non-permanent seats for two years.

The USSR's decision to boycott the Council generated the possibility to approve a military intervention in Korea, as mentioned above. In 1950, with the advance by the north side of the peninsula over the south, the UN was able to approve a resolution condemning the attack and allowing US troops to push the North Korean forces back to beyond the 38th parallel. The US action on the peninsula brought the Chinese forces to an alliance with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and escalated the confrontation. The actual conflict in the Korean War lasted for three years. It ended with the signature of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 and resulted in an estimated 1.2 million deaths.

The “Korean case” was the only concrete authorization by the Security Council of a massive military intervention and the consequences of the Soviet boycott of the Council became a hard-learned lesson for the USSR government. After this moment, the clashes between the US and the USSR grew even stronger and the Security Council became paralyzed, not showing actions even during important and violent conflicts, as, for example, the Vietnam War.

28 Hanhimäki, 2008. p. 58
29 The 38th parallel is an imaginary line that divide Korean peninsula in People’s Republic of Korea, at the north side, and Republic of Korea, at south. This parallel was established as border between both countries by U.S. forces, after the Japanese surrender at the end of WWII.
Questions concerning the improvement of representation inside the Council never left the main stage of considerations of the general UN membership and became even more relevant with the stagnation of the organ. The ratification of Resolution 1991A resulted in a long period of debates and negotiations with the constant participation of the USSR and deadlock on the issue of Chinese representation.

Only at the end of 1964 did the USSR agree to sign the Charter amendment, even encouraging other members to do the same. The change of policy was the result of the PRC offering strategic support to the Charter amendments which made the Soviet representation change its position.\textsuperscript{30} By the second half of 1965, all the permanent members, together with more than two thirds of the membership, signed and made the first amendment of the UN Charter official. After this long process and the strategic gain of NAM’s support with the approval of the resolution, the government of the PRC was then recognized by the organization in 1971 and assumed the Chinese seat at the Council.\textsuperscript{31}

After Resolution 1991A, the Council started to work with 15 members, including the five permanent seats and ten other elected countries. According to Dimitris Bourantonis, a remarkable result of this expansion of seats in the Council was the modification in the majority requested\textsuperscript{32} by the Charter to approve resolutions, which also changed the voting power of members and required more negotiation abilities from the permanent members to recruit four instead of two countries in order to have their resolutions passed.\textsuperscript{33} The expansion of non-permanent members improved the importance of these countries and their votes inside the Council, meaning a real reform at that time. The informal regional distribution became: Latin American states

\textsuperscript{30} Bourantonis, 2005. p. 27-28  
\textsuperscript{31} Bourantonis, 2005. p. 29  
\textsuperscript{32} The change of the majority requested by the Charter at the Security Council meant an amendment of Article 27 of Chapter V.  
\textsuperscript{33} Bourantonis, 2005. pp. 28-29
with two seats; Afro-Asian states with five seats; Eastern Europe with two seats; and Western Europe with two seats.\(^{34}\)

Even though the Cold War period represented the achievement of an expansion of seats in the Council, answering the initial claims of representation, this was the only advance possible inside a paralyzed organization. The reform of 1965 raised the representation of the entire UN membership at the Council to almost 13%, but by the end of the following twenty-five years, it would fall back to 9% again because the UN membership had not stopped growing during those years.

As the membership increased, the NAM assumed a powerful position inside the General Assembly and became more active on its claims to democratize the UN system. In 1979, 13 members of this group as well as Japan presented a proposal to add four more elected seats to the Council, changing the regional distribution of seats again. The draft was however deferred in all sessions until 1990.\(^{35}\)

While the Cold War represented very small actions regarding a democratic reform of the Security Council, the 1990s symbolized a resurgence of intense reform activities due to the end of the constant veto blockage and also the growing demand of actions by the Council. Suddenly, after forty-five years, the Security Council appeared to actually assume its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

*From ice-cold to scalding hot*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent end of the USSR, a great change in the political scene was observed. The Soviet bloc was dissolved, many countries became independent, and the UN received a new batch of members. The membership of 159 states in 1990 grew to include 185 by 1994, feeding even more

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\(^{34}\) See Chart 2.3: Distribution of seats by the Resolution 1991A (17 Dec 1963), p. 53.

\(^{35}\) Bourantois, 2005. p. 31
claims for enhanced representation inside a Council that, by then, only represented 8% of the organization as a whole.

Beyond the factor of membership expansion, some other aspects of the Council changed after the end of the Cold War. With the end of the power struggle between the two blocs, international and internal conflicts started to erupt around the globe, calling for an active and prepared Security Council.

Suddenly the Security Council was engaged in conflicts around the world, from the war between Iran and Iraq to fighting in Namibia, Angola and Cambodia. Involvement in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the total collapse of the Soviet Union continued to add to this momentum.36

During the final decade of the 20th century, the Council had to deal with several conflicts: 1990 saw the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which would lead to the Gulf War as well as other conflicts in places such as Liberia; while in 1991, the collapse of Yugoslavia and Somalia began. The Council was sorely tested in 1994 by the Rwandan genocide which then spilled over into Zaire; and in 1995 by the massacre in Srebrenica, Bosnia. 1998 marked the beginning of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo, among others.37 Other than this, the Security Council also had responsibilities in establishing sanctions in the cases of Iraq (1990), Yugoslavia (1991), Somalia and Eritrea (1992), Libya (1992), Haiti (1993), Angola (1993), Liberia (1995) and Serbia (1998).38

In terms of resolutions, the end of the Cold War meant an explosion of decisions taken by the Security Council, almost doubling the number of approved resolutions. The 700 resolutions approved during the first 45 years of the Council’s existence reached

1,300 between 1990 and 2000 alone. While some of the Cold War years, as 1959 for example, witnessed the adoption of just one resolution, years of intense activity during the 1990s, such as 1993, 1994 and 1998, saw around a hundred resolutions adopted by the Council’s membership. (See Chart 1.2) ³⁹

Chart 1.2: Number of resolutions and presidential statements over years (1946 – 2010)

Questions of representation and effectiveness of the Council assumed a central role at the General Assembly’s debates in the 1990s. The improvement of relevance and activity also fed the claims of representation and effectiveness by the general UN membership. “Security Council reform became a ‘hot issue’ in the late 1980s when the end of East-West confrontation opened up prospects for a greater role of the Security Council in world affairs.”⁴⁰

According to Bourantonis, the momentum to work towards the establishment of a new structure for the main organ of the UN was achieved as it started to more actively exercise its functions concerning the maintenance of peace and security. The

⁴⁰ Bourantonis, Dimitri, 2005. p. 32
status quo existing during the Cold War began to be questioned and arguments were made on how the Council’s composition and distribution of powers did not represent recent realities.\textsuperscript{41}

Debates on reform of the Council started in 1955 and increased considerably during the 67 years of the UN. The “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” was also an informal topic of discussion at the General Assembly during the Cold War period. The first demands for change happened in the late 1950s and 1960s, as already mentioned. Nevertheless, during the last years of the USSR’s existence and during the early 1990s, the debates reached unprecedented levels of discussions and positions.

Initially, proposals and claims regarding the improvement of the representation inside the Council at the General Assembly were informally presented by countries and groups. After the end of the Cold War and the spreading of a new perspective of the role of the UN in the international arena, the idea of reforming the entire organization became stronger due to the increase in the demands for action. A reform of the Security Council also assumed a central position in the discussions, as a reform of the organization would not be possible without a change on its main organ. As usually repeated by representatives at the General Assembly Hall, there is no way to think about reforming the UN without transforming its main organ into a more democratic, accountable and effective Council.\textsuperscript{42}

The very beginning of the 1990s was marked by an increase in reform claims as well as the urgency of the demands. In 1990, Japan and Germany started to unofficially present their intentions to assume new permanent seats inside the Security Council.

\textsuperscript{41} Idem. p. 34
\textsuperscript{42} See, for example, the statement given by the Syrian representative on the necessity of reform the UN. This speech is available at the records of the debates on the 61\textsuperscript{st} plenary meeting of 23 November 1993, p. 1-3. (A/48/PV.61)
Council, while Italy also presented its first proposal for regional representation among the Council members. Beyond the polemical substitution of the USSR by Russia as a permanent member, 1991 brought the first official declaration by the NAM related to a review of the composition and the legitimacy of the Security Council. This resulted in a formal resolution to include the item “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” in the provisional agenda of General Assembly by Japan, India and 35 other members of the NAM, which was approved in 1992.

The post-Cold War period represented an increase of discussions on reform and more participation from groups inside the reform debates. Old groups intensified their activities while new actors and groups were created to defend points of view on how the Council should represent the UN membership.

*Calls for representation and the actors making them*

“The breakdown in superpower rivalry resulted in a dramatic increase in demands for multilateral management of a growing range of transnational problems, and much of this demand was directed at the institutions of the UN system.”*43* This necessity of multilateral management created a perfect context for group performances. Groups assumed a very important role inside the UN system, especially in terms of consensus achievement among like-minded countries and voting.

Apart from the increase of activity after the Cold War inside the UN, the entire history of international relations was marked by the importance of groups. Regions, interests or discussion matters are the main reasons for the creation of coalitions, and these groups can be factors of important changes of unfolding processes.

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*43 Smith, 2006. p. 7*
Debates on improving the performance of the Security Council involved, since the beginning, a strong participation of several actors, from the creation of the NAM in 1960, until today. The main actors inside this process were, undoubtedly and beyond simple regional coalitions, the NAM itself, the African nations, developed countries represented by Japan and Germany, and developing countries such as Brazil, India, Pakistan, Argentina and others. Together and individually, these actors had a major influence on the course of debates.

The Non-Aligned Movement

Realizing the quantity factor represented by its numbers on the international scene, the so-called “Third World” decided to assume a more active role in political and economic matters during the Cold War. The post-war decolonization created many newborn states which were not willing to associate their actions and choices to any of the two big blocs that dominated international politics. The Non-Aligned Movement was therefore created in 1961 with the aim of supporting the interests of under-developed and developing countries, avoiding neo-colonialism, and especially preventing western domination.44

The NAM initially comprised 24 Afro-Asian countries plus Yugoslavia, but also followed the UN expansion and reached 99 members by the end of 1983, when it also started to include Latin American and Caribbean countries. Today, the NAM has “115 members representing the interests and priorities of developing countries.”45

During the Cold War and later on, the NAM has always been the most significant group inside the UN, consistently gathering nearly two thirds of the majority necessary to approve decisions inside the General Assembly. Even with some privileged

45 Ibid.
members inside the UN, the power of the NAM is great in terms of voting and support of proposals. According to the movement itself:

[s]ince its inception the Movement therefore attempted to create an independent path in world politics that would not result in Member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers. This resulted in a large part of its history being influenced by the global tension of the Cold War between the two super powers. For the Movement this issue as a priority item on its agenda and its work.46

Representatives of India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Ghana and Indonesia established the foundation of the NAM in 1951 in Belgrade. The group was responsible for policies of non-alignment to the main powers at the time it was created and assumed responsibility on almost all the calls for representation from the creation of the UN until the end of the 1980s. According to the widespread ideology of the NAM, the Security Council has a lack of representation for developing countries.

The 1964 Conference in Cairo, with 47 countries represented, featured widespread condemnation of Western colonialism and the retention of foreign military installations. Thereafter, the focus shifted away from essentially political issues, to the advocacy of solutions to global economic and other problems.47

Supporting these ideals, the NAM sponsored the draft, consequently accepted as a resolution by the General Assembly in 1965, that expanded and amended the UN Charter for the first time in its existence. Later on, the NAM was also responsible for another unsuccessful proposal for expansion in 1979.

From the end of the Cold War, the NAM started to generate sub-groups that, beyond its different points of view of how to deal with the Security Council reform, followed the general ideas presented and decided at NAM summits. The summits

46 Ibid.
happened eight times during the Cold War and many other times after this, being held every time at one of its members’ cities, but with non-specific intervals between them.

Most of the positions of the developing countries during the reform debates supported ideas decided at NAM summits, including: expansion of the Council seats, creation of more opportunities of representation for developing countries; control and possible elimination of privileges such as the veto power; and transparency of working methods.

Organization of African Unity - African Union

Another important actor that was created during the Cold War and represented a great power in numbers inside the UN was the coalition of African countries. After some attempts to create an African organization to unify the continent, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963, three years after the creation of the NAM, with the objectives being to:

- promote the unity and solidarity of African States;
- co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
- defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
- eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa;
- promote international co-operation, giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- and co-ordinate and harmonize members’ political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defense policies.

After years of external domination, the African continent decided to assume their place in the world and try to manage their situations in terms of a larger political actuation. Inside the UN, the OAU worked closely with committees and through its members to safeguard African interests and promote policies benefiting the continent.

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The Security Council debates meant to the Organization of African Unity an opportunity to end the historical inequity which the entire continent had faced over the years. During the Cold War, the activities of the OAU were specially connected to the actions of the NAM, but did not represent much strength. When the Soviet bloc met its end and the debates on reform the Council became stronger, the OAU assumed a new role inside the UN and started stronger demands for better representation inside the main decision-making processes at the organization.

Until the late 1990s, the main idea of the OAU was that the African continent represented a great number of the UN members and, as sovereign equal states, those countries should have a voice inside the Council. For the OAU, Africa should have more seats inside the Security Council, including permanent ones. With 53 members – gathered between its creation and 1994 – and covering almost all the continent, the OAU membership represented about 27% of the General Assembly and consequently assumed the position of a very important actor inside the UN during the reform debates.

In September of 1999, a special meeting in Libya “called for the establishment of an African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.” The following steps in order to establish a unification of the political and the economic organizations of the African continent came in July of 2000, when the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted.

As its predecessor, the African Union (AU) assumed the commitment of securing the interests of the continent in all matters. In terms of politics and representation, the AU maintained the claims of reform of the Security Council and

49 The only African country that is not an OAU member is Morocco that withdrew in November of 1984.
better representation of the African states. During the first decade of the 21st century, the AU was an important and active actor inside the reform debates.

**Developed (or industrialized) countries**

Two actors appeared more decisively after the end of the Cold War. Beyond their previous participation and positioning in discussions on representation inside the UN, Japan and Germany now stepped forward with a claim for permanent seats inside the Council.

The main argument considered by both countries was the remarkable economic growth that took place during the last two decades of the Cold War. The economic power represented by the two former “enemy states” took a central position at the international arena, but did not represent a change inside the UN. According to Reinhard Drifte this situation caused the use of the expression “taxation without representation” by Japan during its claims in the 1990s, what can be understood by the fact that a huge economic growth meant the rise of Japan and Germany to the second and third positions as contributors to the UN budget, respectively.

Initially, the pursuit of permanency was unofficial and started in 1990. Until the mid-1990s, Germany and Japan’s positions were rather discrete, defending just the democratization of the Council by adding worthy countries to its members. Gradually, support to the addition of the “two industrialized countries” as permanent members to the Council began to increase. Over the years, the “two developed nations” have been named and a considerable number of members have presented their support.

None of the claimants assumed a clear position until the second half of that decade. Japan, for example, “did not pursue a consistent line and clearly finds it difficult to decide where the greater tactical advantage lies, that with being seen close to the US

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51 Drifte; 2000. p. 157
or to that of the majority of member states.”

However, in the end, the nominal supportive position by the US, France, Russia and the UK in favor of creating new permanent seats for Japan and Germany brought the two nations to a central position at the debates. The US representation even alleged that no reform would be accepted without considering these countries as new permanent members of the Security Council.

During the years spanning from 2000 to 2010, these countries’ central activity over reform debates did not change, even with some variances of positions by permanent members. In 2002, the US did not mention Germany when defending the creation of new seats, removing its support and reassuming it afterwards. Nevertheless, both governments did not give up on receiving what they considered a fair position inside the Council and continued strong discussion activity until recent years, as two very important actors of the debates.

**Developing countries**

Over the years of debates on reform of the Security Council, even during the very beginning of the representation claims in the 1950s, developing countries represented the most important actors of the entire process, in groups or individually. “Beginning in the late ’40s and gaining speed during the ’50s and ’60s, decolonization reflected cold war politics. Former colonies coalesced in the NAM, the OAU and the Group of 77 (G77) to articulate their perceived security and economic interests vis-à-vis the major powers.”

The Group of 77 (G77) was created in 1964, aiming to promote economic cooperation among developing countries, in the South-South cooperation model. Differently from the several political objectives of the NAM, the G77 assumed an

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52 Idem. p. 169
economic position directed at promoting its members’ development. But even distant from official positioning inside reform deliberations at the UN, it was an example of a power coalition between developing countries and their willingness to be more aggressive inside the international negotiation scene.

The Cold War period represented intense activity by these developing countries in demanding a legitimate representation inside the UN. Beyond the paralysis of the organization during those years, developing members did not avoid the presentation of proposals to the General Assembly. Even during the debates on drafting the Charter, countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Panama and others clearly showed their dissatisfaction with the establishment of the veto power for permanent members.

Every document presented at the General Assembly Hall calling for a more equitable representation at the Security Council was sponsored largely by developing countries. In 1955, the first expansion proposal had 16 Latin American countries and Spain as sponsors. The same happened with the resolution that expanded the Council in 1965: the majority of its sponsors was the NAM members. India with 12 other non-aligned states and Japan also sponsored a proposal of expansion in 1979.

After the end of the Cold War, the roles of these special actors became even more prominent, when they assumed the position of those demanding for change inside a system that, from that moment on, would deal directly in order to represent their interests and problems. The end of the long-standing bipolarity of powers created an opportunity to more broadly use the developing countries’ numerical factor.

The 1990s represented a period of strong demands by these countries inside reform debates. As mentioned before, sub-groups were formed by the NAM and the AU members as well. Beyond their commitment to the general ideals of better representation of developing countries and a respect for the principle of sovereign
equality of the UN member states, individual countries started to defend their interests more specifically.

India, Brazil, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and many other developing countries (together with Italy) began to play individual roles inside the debates, assuming positions, presenting proposals, developing reports and forming new coalitions. One of these coalitions was the “Coffee Club”, an informal debate group formed by Italy in the late 1990s which gathered a considerable number of members. Other important alliances were formed by other countries as well, as the connection of similar interests between India and Brazil with Japan and Germany.

A tumultuous decade

The 1990s presented a great number of turning points in reform discussions on the Security Council. This decade represented the first official steps towards a desire to demonstrate some kind of will to reform the Council.

With the approval of Resolution A/47/RES.62, in 1992, equitable representation inside the Security Council became an official topic of the General Assembly’s agenda. Following the creation of this topic and its debates, an Open-ended Working Group on matters of reform was created in 1993 with the aim to lead member states to an agreement on how the reform of the Council should be held.

The creation of the working group represented the official beginning of the debates we have to this day. From this moment on, the last decade of 20th century witnessed an intense activity from the member states aiming to establish a more transparent Council, more representative of its interests.

Between 1993 and 1999, meetings on the topic “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” were a fertile ground for proposals, opinions and decisions on how the process of reform should be
conducted. Countries and groups presented their positions about what would be a fair method to transform the Council. Each year, in the General Assembly Hall, all interested members stated their points of view, principles, and changes of opinion.

In 1997, after 4 years of deliberations, the President of the General Assembly at the time, Ambassador Ismael Razali, presented a plan to push the negotiations forward and encourage some member states to assume decisive positions on reform matters. According to the schedule organized by the Malaysian ambassador, commonly known as the “Razali Plan”, the General Assembly would initially vote on the expansion of the Security Council with 5 new permanent members and 4 elected seats; in a second stage, the Assembly would approve another resolution specifying the candidates to fill the new seats; and, one week later, the members would vote on the two previous resolutions to be added as amendments to the Charter.54

The plan from Ambassador Razali raised divergent reactions. While a group of countries – Brazil, Japan and Germany – accepted the proposal as an important conduit to create a perfect momentum for reform, other members – Pakistan, Indonesia, Argentina and Mexico – representing the position of the NAM, saw it as a very authoritarian proposition. Japan and Germany understood the plan as an opportunity to finally obtain their desired permanent seats and strongly supported Razali’s proposal. Other regionally prominent countries such as Brazil and India also saw the proposition as an opportunity to achieve higher positions inside the organization. In the opposite direction, the majority of the NAM members saw it as a quick-fix reform that could cause harm to its unity and its consequent power as the majority.

In a controversial decade of endless discussions on the reform aspects, the Razali Plan seemed to serve as an igniter, inflaming the debates. After the presentation

54 Bourantonis, 2005. pp. 74-75
of this plan and the positioning by the NAM, members started to focus their negotiations and statements in establishing a way to either approve or prevent Razali’s schedule as soon as it was possible.

In 1997, the NAM held two ministerial meetings to discuss Razali’s propositions and stated that its 113 members would not be in favor of any formula that would increase discrimination between member states and reduce the ability of the Council to represent the majority of the UN members. With the discussion polarized by conflicting opinions on the plan, the Coffee Club was created by Italy aiming to bring together like-minded countries, mostly from the NAM, to discuss reform possibilities. The Coffee Club assumed the NAM position and started to defend it inside the reform debates.

On October 22, 1997, the group led by Italy presented its first draft resolution with the objective to determine that, following Article 108 of the UN Charter, any attempt to amend the Charter should first be approved by at least two-thirds of the entire General Assembly. This draft generated an immediate reaction by the so-called Razali Group, and especially by Japan and Germany, that saw the action as a tactic to delay the reform process and destroy the momentum achieved.

The polemical draft was discussed for one year and received some adjustments towards the achievement of a consensus among members. Another proposal was presented by a group led by Belgium aiming only to connect the Article 108 to actual amendments and not just to the process preceding it, pointing to obstructionism by the Coffee Club. This document was proved irrelevant by the agreement achieved on

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55 “Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.” Charter of the United Nations, Article 108.

56 See the 42nd letter of the 53rd session of the General Assembly, 18 November 1998. (A/53/L.42)
November 23, 1997, by the Assembly, adopting the proposal by the Coffee Club over the question of Article 108.

With the approval of the idea that any kind of reform proposal in the future would only be submitted for vote with the approval by two-thirds of the entire UN membership, hopes of a quick reform were suppressed, especially from the perspective of Germany and Japan. The last decade of the 20th century, despite its intense activity and strong positioning, ended as it started, continuing into the new century the same old discussions and the same old disagreement among members’ positions.

New century, old topics

The change of century did not mean a change of the UN situation or its main actors. The last decade of the 20th century represented great activity inside the UN with the end of the Cold War and a new expansion of membership. These factors brought to the organization and its members a necessity to improve its system towards better legitimacy of its decisions. The first decade of the 20th century brought more difficulties to the UN system than solutions.

The Millennium Summit was supposed to be a major event of transformation for the UN. It called on member states to assume a firm engagement with the organization’s principles and also with the necessity to transform it into a more global arena of negotiation. All members realized the opportunity for a complete reform and assumed more aggressive positions during the debates, especially in the discussions related to the Security Council’s expansion. Nevertheless, after the beginning of the new round of debates, it became clear that “membership of the UN was still unable to reach even a minimum common position.”57

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57 Bourantonis, 2005. p. 86
In September of 2001, the terrorist attacks on the New York World Trade Center occurred. Although it was not a new practice, terrorism as a threat reached new heights from this event on and became a top concern for the international community. September 11\textsuperscript{th} was a massive tragedy, with more than 2,900 deaths of people from many nationalities and exposed weaknesses in security policies, particularly regarding unconventional threats to peace. This moment generated even more demands of action from the Security Council, adding more pressures for action related to its effectiveness and legitimacy.

The following years, internationally, represented a new period in time for the Security Council in terms of action. The so-called “Global War on Terrorism”, mainly led by the US government, generated several resolutions on sanctions and a high level of activity by the Security Council.

The Iraq War, which began in March of 2003, represented a very negative turning point for the UN system. The US invaded the country without the Security Council’s approval, after accusations of possible possession of weapons of mass destruction and supposed support to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The approval for action against the Iraqi government was denied by the Council as some of the permanent seats, such as France and Russia, threatened to veto a proposed resolution authorizing intervention, because no concrete proof was found on any of the accusations presented by the US representatives. In spite of this, the US army invaded the territory, and started a conflict that continues to this day.

The Iraq War initiated a serious crisis of legitimacy inside the UN and also drew the attention of the civil society to the organization’s internal problems. The debates on the UN effectiveness and legitimacy started to attract the attention of
academics, journalists and even normal citizens. The question was “If a powerful country can overpass Council orders and act by itself on determined threats, what is the real role of this organ in the international arena?”

In the same year, the Secretary General (SG), Kofi Annan, appointed the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. After the failure and crisis related to the Iraq War, Annan declared that if the members wanted “the Council’s decisions to command great respect, particularly in the developing world, [they would] need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgency.” The Secretary General assumed a clear position to push member states for results on reform.

The panel created by Kofi Annan presented a report, A More Secure World: A Shared Responsibility, in December of 2004 which contained two options on reform models for the Council, in an updated version of Razali’s former proposition. The first model (Model A) proposed the enlargement to 24 seats, including six new permanent and three elected members. The second model (Model B) presented the option to create one new standard elected seat and eight seats of a new category, renewable every four years instead of two.

The Coffee Club presented its answer to the SG request for reform effort on February 16, 2005, with the adoption of the Uniting for Consensus document. As the title proposed, the aim of the group was to favor the achievement of a consensus as results of intense negotiation between the parties, and this title was officially accepted as the coalition’s new name.

Kofi Annan presented his report entitled In a larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all to support the panel’s document in March 2005. Members were encouraged by the SG to quickly make a decision on the

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58 Information granted by an anonymous source through interview.
59 See the records of the Secretary General speech of 23 September 2003, p. 4. (A/58/PV.7)
models proposed and reach a consensus by the 2005 World Summit. Following Annan’s positioning, they started to present their positions in favor or against each of the models placed on the table by the panel and also presented their own new proposals of reform style.

The G4 presented its draft resolution on May 13, 2005, confident that they would get the majority of votes and have its draft accepted. On October 23, 2005, the Uniting for Consensus also confidently presented its draft as well as the African Union. These three proposals of expansion became the main points of reference for negotiations among the actors over the reform of the Security Council and the groups assumed central roles in the debates.

These three draft resolutions brought more polemical topics to the discussion and undefined deadlines to a possible – or impossible – reform. The clash between these groups, with its climax in 2005, appeared to further construct the negative image of Uniting for Consensus that we aim to analyze in this research, and influenced the debates until today.

60 Freiesleben, 2008. p. 6
The issue concerning the expansion of seats at the Security Council generated a scenario of strong positions, agreements and disagreements. The African Union, the Group of Four and the Uniting for Consensus were protagonists of an intense exchange of ideas, appeals, demands and accusations, beyond the generalized drama of the divergent opinions among the UN membership.

Some agreements and disagreements were solidly established among the members during the debates on the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council”. While some general topics received complete support by the entire General Assembly, specific ones initiated a complex quarrel. Meanwhile, groups presented their reform drafts aiming to gain their fellow members’ support, but sometimes receiving negative replies on their intentions related to the reform of the Council.

The proposals and ideas presented during debates on the possible reform of the Security Council are the topic of this chapter. This section aims to properly present the differences between projects and also the accusations made about the members of the Uniting for Consensus group and its intentions over the years – namely the perceived delaying or obstruction of a potential agreement.

*Unanimously accepted*

Since the early years of UN history, some issues did achieve consensus among members. All seemed to agree that reform was necessary, and that the Council should be expanded. And, specific demands notwithstanding, all members accepted, at least in principle, that the Council should represent the entire membership in an effective manner. Beyond this, however, consensus was going to be difficult to achieve. Especially after the Cold War, according to Simon Chesteman, a “[m]eaningful reform
of the UN to respond to this new environment and the challenges it brings requires balancing questions of legitimacy, effectiveness, and power.”

Three main topics of agreement were achieved during the discussions on reform the Security Council: the question of equal representation, in numerical and geographical aspects; the question of effectiveness of Council actions, generated by a combination between equality and transparency; and, finally, the question related to improving the working methods through the implementation of new procedures involving all the membership and the Council activity.

“The Council is said not to be representative primarily for two reasons, one quantitative and the other qualitative.” But even with the importance of the qualitative improvement of the Council’s work, the quantitative side of the reform assumed a fundamentally political aspect for the member states. A numerical factor became deeply connected to the legitimacy of its decisions: as a Council that cannot represent the interests of all members cannot be accepted to speak on behalf of them all on important issues.

With the number of UN members increasing until the beginning of the 1990s, it became commonly accepted by members states that the number of Council seats was too small. As with the international dynamics that led to the first expansion of seats in 1965, the post-Cold War world also saw a final great expansion of the UN membership after the fall of the Soviet Union. This enlargement led the General Assembly, during the last decade of the 20th century, to agree that more seats should be added to the Security Council’s table.

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During the debates on the question of equitable representation at the Security Council, it became a commonly accepted that a larger number of seats inside the Security Council’s chamber would be a fair solution for the Council to proportionately reflect the general increase of the UN membership. Since the discussions on reforming the organ started to assume higher importance, most members started to affirm, year after year, their agreement on the necessity to establish a fairer representation of the entire membership.

In 1994, Mr. Gujral, representative of India, presented a numerical explanation of the ratio between the Security Council and the General Assembly:

As representatives know, the ratio between Security Council membership and General Assembly membership has declined from 1:4.6 in 1945 to 1:12 today, and the ratio between the permanent membership of the Security Council and General Assembly membership has declined even more tellingly - from 1:10 in 1945 to 1:36 today.\textsuperscript{63}

Mr. Batiouk, from Ukraine, in the same year, also presented the same concern, affirming that:

It is worth recalling that in 1945 the composition of the Security Council represented over 20 per cent of the total membership of the United Nations; now, in 1993, it represents only about 8 per cent.\textsuperscript{64}

By that time, the “Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related” was just beginning its work, and the membership was still 185 countries; it would reach 193 in 2011.

The agreement on that matter was one of the few matters that that continued to be agreed upon during the twenty years of debates, being reaffirmed by all countries

\textsuperscript{63} See the records of the debates on the 62\textsuperscript{nd} plenary meeting of 23 November 1993, p. 3. (A/48/PV.62)
\textsuperscript{64} See the records of the debates on the 64\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 24 November 1993, p. 15. (A/48/PV.64)
involved in the debates on the reform matters. The representative of Kuwait, for example, declared in 2012, in unison with his colleagues, that:

[A]ny ideas for Security Council reform must stem from the keen interests of all Members, in order to make the Council more representative of the entire membership of the United Nations and to reflect current international realities, which have changed so much since the Organization was established in 1945.65

The continuous increase in membership made the abyss between the Security Council (SC) and the total membership of the General Assembly (GA) even deeper. (See Chart 2.1) This abyss also contributed to discussions on the question of equal regional allocation of seats and on considerations over the lack of credibility of important decisions taken by a very low number of members.

Chart 2.3: UN Membership Growth vs. Security Council Representation (1945-2011)

The need for a redistribution of seats was also something that could be agreed upon during the debates, considering that most of the seats at the Council were concentrated in just a small portion of the globe. The membership agreed that the new

65 See the records of the debates on the 38th plenary meeting of 15 November 2012, p. 15. (A/67/PV.38)
configuration should equally grant a proper allocation of seats to every region in the world.

Although according to the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Charter, there should be an equal regional distribution of seats in the Council, some regions were excluded or barely represented from the beginning. The so-called “Gentleman’s Agreement” established an initial Council with six elected seats, distributed among Western Europe, Eastern Europe, British Commonwealth countries, Latin America and the Middle East. Among these six seats, only Latin America received more than one seat. (See Chart 2.2)

**Chart 2.4: Distribution of seats by the Gentleman's Agreement (1946)**

![Chart of the Gentleman's Agreement distribution](chart.png)

After the one and only expansion of the Council with Resolution 1991A, the British Commonwealth became nonexistent and the Middle East was added to the new group of five seats designated to African and Asian countries. Western Europe also received a new seat, while Latin America and Eastern Europe kept the same number of positions. (See Chart 2.3)
Even an expanded Council did not establish a proper representation of the UN membership after its incredible growth, especially after the 1970s. Africa and Asia, after the increase of the total membership, started to represent more than half of the complete number of countries recognized as members by the United Nations. This discrepancy became so clear that the agreement on a better regional distribution and representation became commonly accepted among the diplomatic missions.

The first paragraph of the second article of the UN Charter says that “[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. The line became a motto and guided most of the contestations to the established structure of the Security Council. According to the members, no sovereign equality could exist with the lack of representation at the most important forum of the UN as a global institution.

As an integral part of the fundamental document of that institution, equality became seen as an important aspect of the what the reform must achieve. As the representative of Sri Lanka stated in 1993 when the Open-Ended Working Group initiated its work:
Sri Lanka believes that the process of considering representation on the Security Council, briefly summarized, should be one which first provides an opportunity for all States to participate on the basis of the sovereign equality of States.  

Considering all factors related to the Council’s functioning and transparency, the question of representation also came to be linked to questions pertaining to the Council’s working methods and accountability. A wider representation has come to mean more reliable decisions, with a larger acceptance by the membership and a bigger participation by all regions, from developed, developing and underdeveloped economies, beyond the size of the states.

The need for improvements in the working methods of the Council was also commonly accepted by member states. The growing actions by the Security Council, starting from the 1990s, established a growing demand for detailed reports, more open meetings and a reduced number of decisions taken during informal consultations and private meetings. Even the provisional rules of functioning in the Council became much criticized for not being established as formal rules by the members of the organ.

As the Egyptian representative declared, when speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2010:

> Transparency, openness and consistency are key elements that the Security Council should demonstrate in all its activities, approaches and procedures. The rules of procedures of the Security Council, which have remained provisional for more than 60 years, should be formalized in order to improve the Council’s transparency and accountability.

The proposal presented in March 2006 by a group formed by Liechtenstein, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica and Switzerland received large support from the general membership as an opportunity to establish more accountable methods inside the Council.

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66 See the records of the debates on the 61st plenary meeting of 23 November 1993, p. 8. (A/48/PV.61)
67 See Chart 1.2: Number of resolutions and presidential statements over time (1946 – 2010), p. 32.
68 See the records of the debates on the 48th plenary meeting of 11 November 2010, p. 5. (A/65/PV.48)
But even with a large number of positive positions on their proposal (draft S/2006/507), the document was not brought to a vote and consequently has not, until now, been approved by the General Assembly. The so-called Small Five (S-5) focused its work on the working methods, assuming that a deadlock was established on the matters of enlargement due to several disagreements among member states on how to expand the Council.

*Disagreements*

While some general topics assumed agreement, specific proposals for the reform of the Council remain fraught with difficulties. During the last twenty years, most of the debates on the expansion the Security Council carried the same conclusions as the states’ positions.

The most significant topics, such as categories of membership, eligibility, number of seats, system of rotation and the so-called veto power, became the highest barriers to the enlargement deadlock. At the same time as “yes or no” questions such as “Should the Security Council be expanded?” were very clearly answered by permanent missions, more specific questions such as “Which categories should be enlarged?” or “Who should be elected?” transformed the debates into a never-ending process.

The first and clearer issue of disagreement on the process was, undoubtedly, the question of categories. Among the several clashes of opinion, the membership was not able to define how the categories of seats inside the Security Council should be modified in a possible reform. Initially characterized as a discordance on which categories to expand, the question of categories became more complex when proposals to create new categories of seats and proposals of possible changes in the current aspects of permanent and non-permanent seats were presented.
After the initial years of debates, a majority of positions was established on the matter of enlargement of the Council and, somehow, more than two-thirds of the General Assembly stated that an expansion should be done in both categories of seats. At the same time however, the representations were not able to establish a minimum consensus on how this expansion should be done. Proposals on creating new categories or changing some aspects of the elections were presented from the beginning, as the one brought to the table by Italy and Turkey as early as 1993. According to Mr. Fulci, the Italian representative at that time:

The core of [the] proposal [was] to leave the traditional categories unaltered and to establish a third category of semi-permanent members. This would mean identifying a group of some 20 Member States on the basis of objective criteria that would include economic factors, human resources, culture, mass communications and so on. Countries meeting those criteria would serve alternatively on the Security Council in biennial rotation.69

Years later, in 2009, Italy and Colombia brought the same proposal back to the table, yet did not attract a large amount of support. This proposal, as many others, received answers assuming that the creation of new categories such as the establishment of a third class of membership would go against the sovereign equality of states, and possibly create more differences among members.

Small and medium-sized countries also presented their suspicions on a modification of the election rules for non-permanent seats, equally mentioned in some reform proposals.70 As established in the 23rd Article of the UN Charter, the elected seats in the Council must have two-year terms without the possibility of reelection.71 In addition, while some members assumed that the abolishment of the reelection

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69 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 24 November 1993, p. 5. (A/48/PV.64)
70 See as example the records of the statement by Slovenia on the 58th plenary meeting of 14 November 1995, pp.20-21. (A/50/PV.58)
71 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 5, Article 23, Paragraph 2.
prohibition would permit a better representation of regions by its best and strongest countries, small states saw that fact as one more difficulty for them to ever occupy a Council seat.

Other systems of rotation were also proposed over the years, but none of them received the necessary support or reached consensus among the General Assembly.

On the issue of the establishment of new permanent members, the problem of which countries would be electable to the seats became the central question; beyond the problem related to the complaints of countries that were against the creation of these new seats, alleging that it would serve to represent a lack of democracy in the Council. Several proposals over the methods for selecting new members were presented, including, among other things, participation in the organization’s activities, contributions to the budget or peacekeeping operation activity, and also characteristics of the country’s international situation such as its economic power or its regional position.

Even with apparent support for the creation of new permanent seats, no agreement was reached concerning which countries would be chosen to occupy special chairs in the Council or which characteristics those seats would have. States such as Japan and Germany that initially seemed to receive positive answers at the beginning of the debates, as well states as Brazil and India that began to pursue a seat more recently, ended up not reaching enough support to realize their aspirations. At the same time, regionally, even with the majority support from the General Assembly, Africa could not reach an agreement on how to establish its seats and which countries to choose.

As agreement was formed on general aspects of a possible enlargement of the Council, specificities were never easy to discern. Speeches, such as the one (below) made by the French representative in 2007, were common during the debates on the
question of equitable representation at the Security Council after the call from the Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004 for more intense efforts to reform the organ. France declared that the country “favors increasing the membership in both categories, with new permanent members Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, and fair representation for Africa.” This was the highest level of specificity that those pushing for expansion of the permanent seats could appear to come close to agreeing upon in the first decade of the 21st century, even though it could not establish a consensus and failed to address the African situation. At the same time, other countries, which composed the majority of the General Assembly, assumed a posture of only affirming their positions supporting the expansion of the seats without mentioning names.

Another specific polemical topic on the creation of new permanent seats has always been the so-called veto power. Also related to the question of equitability, the veto became a fundamental question inside the debates, raising the question on how the Council could become more democratic and representative with the expansion or the maintenance of privileges for some members at the expense of others.

Created together with the organization, the necessity of favorable votes from the five permanent members of the Security Council for the adoption of resolutions was known inside the organization as veto power. When the debates over a reform of the Council gained enough support, claims for the end of this privilege became stronger. The Non-Aligned Movement took to the front line in the battle against the veto and maintained this position over the course of the 20 years of discussions at the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation. The great majority of states supported the position of the NAM during the debates, being against

72 See the records of the debates on the 48th plenary meeting of 12 November 2007, p. 21. (A/62/PV.48)
the veto, but the biggest obstacles to this matter were, needless to say, the permanent members.

As firmly stated from the beginning by all of the five countries, “the present status of the permanent members of the Security Council should be maintained.” And this disagreement could not be solved by questions of majority, considering that even in this case the veto could be used against any attempt of reform regarding this issue.

The position of the P-5 became stronger over the years, replacing the “should be” from the 1990s with the “must be” of the 21st century, when the states started to declare that any change in the veto power would not be accepted. With the negative answer from the permanent members, the general membership started to assume different thoughts on the veto and started to consider that if the privilege continues to exist, it should be expanded to the new permanent members. As the Egyptian representative explained in 2009:

Egypt continues to believe that the veto is the cornerstone in the process of the reform of the Security Council. The African demand for the elimination of the veto in its entirety is closely tied to its demand to grant the same veto rights to the new African permanent members in the Council until its elimination, in full application of the principle of equality between current and new permanent members.

The only small disagreement among the members that was slowly solved during the years was the number of seats that should be created during the possible reform. In the early years of debates, the permanent members tried to fix a modest enlargement up to 21 members, alleging that a bigger Council would become ineffective and paralyzed. From the general UN membership, the majority position, following the

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73 See the records of the debates on the 49th plenary meeting of 14 October 1994, p. 21. (A/49/PV.32)
74 See the records of the debates on the 52nd plenary meeting of 9 November 2011, p. 23. (A/66/PV.52)
75 See the records of the debates on the 43rd plenary meeting of 12 November 2009, p. 8. (A/64/PV.43)
76 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 24 November 1993, p. 7. (A/48/PV.64)
position of the NAM presented at the Jakarta meeting in 1992, was favorable to an expansion up to the mid-twenties. In 2000, the United States changed its mind and declared that an expansion could be done to a number a little higher than 21 seats;\textsuperscript{77} that fact brought the question of number of seats to a middle ground and a number in the mid-twenties somehow became a consensus.

Among agreements and disagreements, the encouraging report \textit{In a larger freedom} by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in 2005, created momentum for the presentation of proposals aimed at the establishment of a consensus among the general membership. Groups as the African Union, the Group of Four and the Uniting for Consensus represented the efforts for expansion at a moment when the UN faced its deepest legitimacy crisis.

\textit{African Union}

The African Union, as mentioned in the second chapter of this dissertation, was formed as a regional group in 1963, aiming to promote solidarity among countries from the African continent and to defend their interests. Initially called the Organization of African Unity, the group worked during its entire existence to establish a better position for Africa, claiming for more assistance and less neglect by the international community.

Members of the African group, except for the founders Egypt, Ethiopia and the former Union of South Africa, began to be accepted to the UN membership from 1955. The decolonization process occurring on the continent generated a high number of new independent states at that time. In twenty years, the African representation inside the UN grew from 3 to 47 countries.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{77} See the records of the debates on the 64\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 16 November 2000, p. 25. (A/55/PV.64)

Considering the historical situation of the continent, the regional group started to request more representation inside the UN. The AU, as a regional organization, currently has 54 members and represents almost 30% of the entire membership of the United Nations, which could easily justify any claim for more participation inside the decision-making procedures. A reform of the structure of the Security Council would be an initial step for a wider participation from Africa that currently shares five elected seats with Asia.

**Chart 2.6: Participation from 1993-2012 (more than 10 speeches)**

During the period of debates on the establishment of a more democratic Council, the African participation was always very active. Especially after the creation of the Open-Ended Working Group, the African group assumed a very specific position that was able to attract positive replies from the entire continent over the years. Algeria, followed by Egypt, Libya, South Africa and Nigeria, were the top African countries in terms of the number of statements made at debates during the twenty years of discussions on the matter of equitable representation at the Security Council. Speaking on their positions or on behalf of the entire group, representatives of Algeria, for example, were present in every single open debate on the issue of reform, showing the African engagement in attempting to change the organ. (See Chart 2.4)

In 2000 the regional organization officially assumed the name African Union and fixed its claims for representation. After years supporting a better representation for
African countries inside the Security Council, the AU presented an official proposal to the General Assembly, following the claims from the Secretary-General in 2005.

The proposal by the African Union for the expansion of the Security Council was presented on July 18, 2005, during the 59th session of the General Assembly. The 43 signatories from African countries stated that they were: “[m]indful of the need to ensure Africa, like all the other regions of the world, effective representation at the Security Council.”

The main topics of the proposal on the expansion of the Council involved quantitative and qualitative issues, considering categories, characteristics and number of seats. Specifically, the group called for a complete reform that would be capable of improving the representation in the Council and its working methods, bringing a positive amendment of the UN Charter.

**Chart 2.7: Distribution of seats according to the AU proposal**

According to the African Union's draft, the Council must be enlarged in the two categories and all the rights attributed to the current permanent members must be also be granted to the new permanent seats, including the right of veto. The proposal

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79 See the draft resolution at the letter number 67, from 18 July 2005. (A/59/L.67)
consists of an expansion with eleven additional seats, creating: two permanent and two non-permanent seats for Africa; one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe; one permanent and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean; and, one permanent seat for Western Europe and other states. (See Chart 2.5) 80

The advantage of being a large regional group gave the African position and the continent’s claims wide support. The number of existing African countries gave this proposal a large head start. While the African position was supported by an entire region from the beginning of the debates, the same could not be said of the other two groups that presented draft resolutions in 2005.

Group of Four

The Group of Four was a coalition formed in 2004 by Brazil, Japan, India and Germany. Recognizing the unbalance existing inside the Security Council and their growing power within the international society, the four countries developed a draft resolution aiming to establish a Council that truly represents the current global state of multipolarity and that connects the decision-making process to all the regions equally.

Despite the appearance of regional representation, the quest of these four countries is, basically, related to the economic and political situation of each of the individual countries. Japan and Germany started the pursuit of a permanent seat at the Security Council back in the late 1980s, when both countries reached great economic growth and became international powers. India and Brazil, almost twenty years later, assumed the same situation regionally and presented enormous international growth.

The positions of Germany and Japan, for example, were always connected to economic issues. These two countries were great contributors to the regular budget for several years. Analyzing the data made available by the UN, both of the industrialized

80 See the draft resolution at the letter number 67, from 18 July 2005. (A/59/L.67)
countries were some of the biggest payers of the budget during the last nineteen years, only losing the first position to the United States which was always the greatest funder of the organization. (See Chart 2.6)

**Chart 2.8: Average Percentage of Contribution for the Regular Budget (1995-2013)**
(Source: United Nations: Regular Budget and Working Capital Fund, Assessments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>22.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the beginning of Germany and Japan’s quest for a permanent seat, especially during the 1990s, the slogan “no taxation without representation” was adopted by the Japanese government\(^{81}\) as an argument trying to support the pursuit. According to the representatives of Japan, the state was clearly ready to assume an important position and could represent an important contribution to the organization, as could be noticed by the budget participation average.\(^{82}\)

In the General Assembly’s High Level Open-Ended Working Group on the Financial Situation of the United Nations, the Japanese government increasingly started to make a link between its growing budgetary contribution and its bid, referring to the link ‘which exists between the responsibility that a Member State is expected to carry out in the Organization and the apportionment of its financial burden’.\(^{83}\)

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\(^{82}\) See the Japanese statement on the records of the debates on the 57th plenary meeting of 13 November 1995, p. 3. (A/50/PV.57)
\(^{83}\) Drifte, Reinhart; 2000. p. 166.
This argument based on the budget burden failed to convince the General Assembly about the necessity of giving two seats to industrialized countries. Nevertheless, the capacity of contribution for the organization’s functioning – peace operations for example – was acknowledged and sustained as a strong characteristic of the two international powers.

Although it not contribute substantially in economic terms to the UN, India was a country that already started its bid for a permanent seat in the 1950s, using another line of reasoning. According to the Indian representation, the country’s capacity to exercise a leading role in the Security Council is based on its position as a developing southern state, on its large participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and on its great population. 

We believe that the expansion of the membership of the Council in the category of permanent members should be decided upon on the basis of agreed criteria of selection. Once criteria are agreed upon, the decision on new permanent members should be made globally by the membership of the United Nations. We have, in the course of the deliberations of the Working Group, suggested certain criteria, such as population, contribution to the United Nations system, support and participation in peacekeeping, and potential for a regional and global role. Other criteria have been mentioned by other countries. We believe that it would be beneficial for the Group to analyze these suggestions and come up with an acceptable set of criteria against which the claims of each country could be assessed. On the basis of such criteria, some countries will clearly qualify for permanent membership. We believe that India will be among them. 84

Being the second most populous country in the world, India now represents 17% of the global population with a number of 1.27 billion people. When the official discussions on the reform of the Council started in 1993, India had a population of 921

84 See the records of the debates on the 56th plenary meeting of 13 November 1995, p. 23. (A/50/PV.56)
million, already representing 16% of the world’s demography at that time.\textsuperscript{85} In terms of numerical representation of the population, India and China would be the fairest choice for permanent seats, considering that both countries represent around 36% of the world’s population.\textsuperscript{86}

As opposed to the other members of the group, Brazil represents a growing power that is attempting to establish a situation of regional leadership in South America. The Brazilian line of reason is similar to that of India: it is a southern developing state, with a great territory, an expanding economy and a great population. Furthermore, the representatives also highlight its constant participation in UN activities, in terms of its frequent participation as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, and the sending of troops for peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

\textbf{Chart 2.9: Ranking of Total Number of Contributions to UN Operations}
\textit{(Source: United Nations, Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, 31 Jan 2013)}

![Chart showing contributions to UN operations]

The great diplomatic tradition in Brazil has made the country well-known as an active participant in international matters. Since the creation of the UN, as a founding


\textsuperscript{86} According to the UN prospects in 2012, the global population reached 7 billion people, while the Chinese population is now around the number of 1.36 billion people.
member, Brazil has occupied an elected seat at the Council for ten mandates. This is the highest number of terms served by a non-permanent member, which is matched by Japan. The frequent reelection of Brazil as non-permanent member appear to attribute a regional leadership role to the country; considering that the choice of representation among the non-permanent seats is decided by the respective regional groups and points to the recognition of the country’s important role in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Another important action taken by Brazil in relation to the UN is its participation in peacekeeping operations. According to UN records, Brazil has taken part in 33 operations and currently has 2,202 military personnel acting in three different continents. Interestingly, India has an even higher participation in such operations, occupying the third place among contributors, with 7,840 military individuals acting around the world. (See Chart 2.7)

The main Brazilian action at present is the involvement in MINUSTAH, in Haiti, where Brazil has been commanding the military operations ever since the beginning of the stabilization mission and has coordinated a great part of the reorganization of the country, especially after the great earthquake in 2010. With its activity in Haiti, Brazil aims to show its power, importance and involvement in international issues, besides its capability to participate more actively in the central decision making processes in the UN.

The union of these countries represented an attempt to overcome the political division between North and South, gather the interests of both hemispheres and establish a better representation of both developed and developing nations. According to the members, at the same time as a fair representation of the developing southern world needs to be established, northern countries that have proven themselves worthy must also be elected for the seats.
Different from the African Union, the Group of Four is not a regional group and, consequently, tries to gain support through intensive negotiations. The participation of the group, despite its low number of members, has been consistent during the twenty years of debates, with continuous statements during the open debates and strong opinions on the method to be followed towards a desired expansion.\(^{87}\)

The proposal by the Group of Four for the expansion of the Security Council was presented on July 6, 2005, during the 59\(^{\text{th}}\) session of the General Assembly. There was a total of 27 signatories from like-minded countries from different regions of the world. Apart from the main members of the group – Brazil, India, Japan and Germany – they were: Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Kiribati, Latvia, the Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine.

The main claims of the draft resolution also involved quantitative and qualitative issues, considering categories, characteristics, methods of election and number of seats. The group’s proposal was more specific than the AU draft, establishing a complete and complex structure for the desired reform.

According to the draft, the Council must be enlarged in the two existent categories. According to the proposal, ten seats should be added to the Council, creating: two permanent and one non-permanent seat for Africa; two other permanent and one non-permanent seat for Asian countries; one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe; one permanent and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean; and, one permanent seat for Western Europe and other states. (See Chart 2.8)\(^{88}\)

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87 See Chart 2.4: Participation from 1993-2012 (more than 10 speeches), p. 64.
88 See the draft resolution at the letter number 64, from 6 July 2005. (A/59/L.64)
The new permanent members shall be elected by two thirds of the General Assembly, in a consecutive voting process, until six states that previously presented their intentions and conditions to assume a permanent seat are chosen. The new permanent members would have the same prerogatives as the current ones, but without the exercise of the veto until the revision of the functionality of amendments made to the resolution of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{89}

Regardless of being a non-regional group, the multiplicity of interests attended by the G4 proposal attracted a considerable number of signatories and gathered important partners. The same happened, however, during the formation of the even more heterogeneous UfC and its relevant number of aggregate members.

*Uniting for Consensus*

The Uniting for Consensus claims to be a group of 40 like-minded countries, created at the end of 1990s as a “negotiating group”\textsuperscript{90} focused on the reform of the Security Council. At that time, the group of countries was called the Coffee Club and was already led by Italy. Basically, the members were brought together by the similarity

\textsuperscript{89} See the draft resolution at the letter number 64, from 6 July 2005. (A/59/L.64)
\textsuperscript{90} Courtney B. Smith, 2006. p.73
of their positions on the expansion of seats and the improvement of working methods at
the Council. By the year of 1997, the coalition assumed an official position on the
fairest method to establish a more representative Security Council and, acting very
intensively, presented a proposal for enlargement in 2005. In the year of the draft’s
presentation, the group assumed the official name of Uniting for Consensus,
emphasizing its major objective – the establishment of the broadest consensus on
reform matters – through its name.

Coalitions like the G4 or the Uniting for Consensus can be classified as
“negotiation groups”. According to Professor Courtney Smith, “negotiation groups aim
to resolve especially contentious areas of disagreement”;\(^\text{91}\), which basically means that
the discussions and positions assumed by these groups are more specific, while larger
groups can allow several different positions under the same umbrella of similar general
objectives. The G4 and the UfC are both heterogeneous groups with most of their
members also connected to the positions of the larger and generalist NAM.

Initially, the Coffee Club congregated a larger number of members, aiming to
debate in informal meetings on better options to guide a reform of the most important
organ of the UN. The idea to create this initial \textit{ad hoc} group was brought to the table by
the Italian representation and has been led by that country ever since. At the formal
presentation of the UfC proposal in 2005, the core members and sponsors were
Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, the Republic
of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.

Since the beginning of the official debates on a possible expansion of the
Security Council, Italy and Turkey always showed a very similar position on the
methods that should be adopted by the General Assembly when the time of actual

\(^91\) Courtney B. Smith, 2006. p.73
reform is attempted. Already in 1993 both countries had presented a proposal to establish a new system of rotation for non-permanent seats, creating a new category of semi-permanent members. At that time, the representative of Turkey declared:

[E]nlargement should not be conceived only as an increase in the number of members; it should also envisage the creation of a new category of seats to be held by States that could be qualified as semi-permanent members. Semi-permanent membership in the Council might rotate among a specific number of States designated according to objective criteria: population, representative weight, geopolitical posture, economic potential, record of contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and geographical distribution. We are particularly pleased to note that a considerable number of countries have made similar proposals in relation to the creation of a new category of membership and the application of the rotation principle.92

Italy also supported a similar idea, saying that:

The core of our proposal is to leave the traditional proposal categories unaltered and to establish a third category of semi-permanent members. This would mean identifying a group of some 20 Member States on the basis of objective criteria that would include economic factors, human resources, culture, mass communications and so on. Countries meeting those criteria would serve alternatively on the Security Council in biennial rotation. The total number of seats in the Council would in no case exceed 25 – that is to say, a manageable number that could still ensure its proper functioning.93

Argentina, Canada and Mexico always presented a similar contrariety to the privileges connected to the permanency at the Council. Always strictly following the principle of sovereign equality of member states, these countries were extreme defenders of the veto’s elimination and the reduction of the great inequality existing inside the Security Council.

92 See the records of the debates on the 61st plenary meeting of 23 November 1993, p. 19. (A/48/PV.61)
93 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 24 November 1993, p. 5. (A/48/PV.64)
Mexico was one of the states that made its position very clear in every debate on the question of equitable representation, affirming that, since the creation of the UN, its position had never changed. According to its representative, the North-American country was never favorable to the establishment of a Council with such a lack of democracy. In 1993, the representative of Singapore highlighted the Mexican participation at the decision-making process over the creation of membership categories at the Council:

At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Mexico proposed that the distinction between permanent and non-permanent members should be made clear. Mexico pointed out that the privileged position of the permanent members should be based solely on the juridical principle that more extensive rights are granted to those states that have the heaviest obligations. Mexico proposed that the phrase “as the States that have the greatest responsibility for the maintenance of peace” be added to qualify permanent Council seats. This laudable proposal was, however, not taken on board, although in practice the five permanent members have generally accepted this added responsibility.94

Over the years, more specific similarities approached the current core members of the UfC and created the possibility of presenting a proposal. In the end, all of the 12 official members and sponsors assumed a very clear position against the expansion of privileges inside the Council, being also very active during the general debates on the matters of a possible reform.95 The group was always specific not only about the question of the veto’s elimination but also presents the opinion that the enlargement by a number of seats at the organ should be done only in the non-permanent category.

As early as 1995, the support to an expansion in the non-permanent seats only was presented by the Republic of Korea, who declared that:

94 See the records of the debates on the 61st plenary meeting of 23 November 1993, p. 6. (A/48/PV.61)
95 See Chart 2.4: Participation from 1993-2012 (more than 10 speeches), p. 64.
In enlarging the Security Council, particular caution should be exercised against taking any decision that would empower a select few Member States by giving them a privileged and irreversible status. We believe that such move would run counter to the trend of democratization and further undetermined the adaptability of the Organization to the continually evolving international environment.

The notions of “permanency” and “the veto” have become rather outdated. Despite the reality of the current permanent members, we are not yet convinced by the argument that without an increase in permanent membership, Security Council reform would be neither balanced nor complete. This cannot be reconciled with the new era of democratization, global cooperation and interdependence.  

The proposal by the Uniting for Consensus for the enlargement of the Security Council was presented on July 21, 2005, during the 59th session of the General Assembly. The signatories were the 23 core members and the main claims were focused, apart from a demand for improvement on the working methods, on the reaffirmation “that any expansion of the Security Council should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable.”

Applying the necessity to reach a two-third majority of support from the General Assembly and affirming the aim to establish the broadest agreement among members, the proposal called for an expansion of ten elected seats. Therefore, with the five current permanent members, the reformed Security Council would have 25 members. The non-permanent seats would also assume the characteristic of being able to be reelected for more two-year terms, according to what would be regionally decided. The distribution of seats at the Council should then be established as: six for Africa; five for

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96 See the records of the debates on the 45th plenary meeting of 30 October 1996, p. 10. (A/51/PV.45)
97 See the draft resolution at the letter number 68, from 21 July 2005. (A/59/L.68)
Asia; four for Latin America and the Caribbean; two for Eastern Europe; and three for Western Europe and other states. (See Chart 2.9)

Chart 2.11: Distribution of seats according to the UfC proposal

The draft resolution proposed by the UfC brought to the table a different reform method perspective, presenting an alternative that would not include new permanent seats, among other different characteristics. Since before the group’s official creation, the constant clash of opinions caused the rise of accusations against member states who were first connected to the Coffee Club and, later on, to the Uniting for Consensus group.

The Accusation

Given the heterogeneous composition of the group led by Italy, the different opinions showed by its members generated several reactions by the other members of the UN. The motivation of some countries was confused with the final objectives of the proposal, a fact that started a process of accusations among some member states and finally created a very negative image for the UfC as a group. Two topics marked the

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98 See the draft resolution at the letter number 68, from 21 July 2005. (A/59/L.68)
accusations against the Uniting for Consensus over the years: tactics to delay the reform process, and issues of regional competition. These elements were also largely adopted by some researchers and commonly presented by the media.

Courtney Smith points out the necessity of group action, but also drawbacks of group action, such as that presented here. “Quite simply, an increasingly diverse membership, an ever-going agenda, and the fact that each member state has an equal vote mean that groups are a crucial mechanism”\textsuperscript{99} inside the UN system. Nevertheless, at the same time, “all the factors that make groups useful vehicles for building agreement among their members can also make it difficult to build agreement across different groups.”\textsuperscript{100}

The initial \textit{ad hoc} groups, formed to discuss the issue of reforming the Security Council, were created after the presentation of the so-called Razali Plan in 1997. While a group of countries supported the options given by the plan, others presented negative responses to the ambassador’s proposal. As explained in the second chapter of this dissertation, at that moment, the NAM saw its membership divided in \textit{ad hoc} groups on the matters of reform and, according to Courtney Smith, “the two most important of these groups, called the Razali group and the ‘coffee club’.”\textsuperscript{101}

Right after the presentation of the plan and the almost immediate division of opinions, the Coffee Club presented a draft resolution aiming to establish the rule of Article 108 of the Charter of the positive vote by a two-thirds majority for any resolution approved over the reform issue. The draft was accepted by the General Assembly in November 1998 and its simple proposal already started a process of constant accusations among the members.

\textsuperscript{99} Courtney B. Smith, 2006. p. 55
\textsuperscript{100} Idem p.58
\textsuperscript{101} Idem p. 73
According to some representatives, the initiative of the Coffee Club meant a clear attempt by its members to block or spoil a moment of wide consensus on a final resolution for the reform. During 1997 and 1998, the debates on the question of equitable representation showed the first signals of this exchange of accusations and defensive statements. Coincidently, those years also marked the beginning of a general feeling of disappointment with the reform progress which fueled a generalized “finger pointing” among the states.

The delegations of Japan and Germany, in 1997, were responsible for distributing letters to all the membership claiming for the non-sponsoring of the Italian proposal. This, beyond a clear accusation against the Italian intentions, could also be interpreted as obstructionism from these future members of the G4 towards the Coffee Club draft.

The Japanese government realized that the reform effort was in very serious trouble and Ambassador Owada wrote the following day an unprecedented letter to all UN missions in New York which urged them to oppose the Italian alternative. The tone of the letter was perceived by most missions as rather strong and undiplomatic. […] The German UN ambassador, Tono Eitel, sent a much more conciliatory letter to all UN missions, asking member states not to co-sponsor the Italian proposal or to support it, while trying to diminish the impact of the Italian proposal by drawing the attention to certain differences between NAM positions and this Italian initiative.\(^\text{102}\)

However, the initial proposal had already received co-sponsoring from all members of the Coffee Club\(^\text{103}\) when first proposed, gathering a total number of 32 supporting countries later in the general debates over the question of equitable representation.

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\(^{102}\) Drifted, Reinhart; 2000. p. 184-185

\(^{103}\) Co-sponsors from the Coffee Club: Canada, Egypt, Guatemala, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria and Turkey.
representation on the Security Council, and ended by having the draft accepted unanimously as Resolution 53/30.

This initial clash involving accusations from future members of the G4 was the trigger for a practice that would occur repeatedly in 2000 and continued beyond, while the endless discussions on the equitable representation matters went on in the General Assembly. When the official proposals were presented in 2005, the accusations started to be used as a way to label groups, and especially the Uniting for Consensus group.

By the G4

German representatives, among the G4 member states, always presented their opinions on the activities by the members of the Coffee Club and the UfC very clearly during the open debates. In 1998, the Ambassador Kastrup accused the sponsors of the group’s proposal of using Article 108 in the debates’ results as an attempt to “preclude serious discussions” and also characterized its members as scared to present “their own concrete reform projects.” In 2000, another representative of Germany explained that the draft resolution presented by the Vice-Chairman of that year in the Working Group failed to succeed during the debates due the action of a small group of states.

It was possible for a minority of Member States – and here again I would like to reiterate the words of my colleague from Australia to the effect that this minority represents a small, unrepresentative number of Member States – to prevent the Working Group from reaching an agreement on this issue.

The statement by Germany in 2002, during the open debate over the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council,” was very clear in painting the proposals of expansion in the non-permanent category

104 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 20 November 1998, p. 19. (A/53/PV.64)
105 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 16 November 2000, p. 15. (A/55/PV.64)
only as actions that run against the will of reform and expansion of representation presented by the majority of states. Ambassador Schumacher declared:

We can only warn against proposals apparently aiming at interim solutions, such as increasing only the number of non-permanent seats and thereby restricting the great regions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean – and to a certain extent even Asia – to non-permanent seats forever. Interim solutions are makeshift solutions, and makeshift solutions are bad solutions. They run counter to the expressed will of our heads of State and Government in the Millennium Declaration: “to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects”.

After the presentation of the official reform proposals by the G4 and the UfC in 2005, Germany was even more specific on its criticism of the group’s position and, for the first time, was openly joined by Brazil and India. The three countries directly cited the proposal of the Uniting for Consensus as an attempt to frustrate the reform objectives of the Council.

The Brazilian representative, Ambassador Sardenberg, said:

Even the handful of countries bent on stalling the process felt compelled to present a proposal, although it was incompatible with the call for consensus that they so vocally maintain. […] A few countries, seeking to avoid any decision on the matter, have taken refuge in appeals for consensus and in claims that the issue is “disruptive”. However, their actions only contribute to the perpetuation of current inequalities in the structure of the Organization and to the frustration of the aspiration of all Members, in particular developing countries, to a more balanced distribution of power in the Security Council.

India, with Ambassador Sen, explained in great detail its points:

I have spoken at great length. I do not want to address all the arguments of the Uniting for Consensus group, which we have addressed in so many earlier debates. Briefly, to recapitulate, when one speaks of equity and equality, one

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106 See the records of the debates on the 27th plenary meeting of 14 October 2002, p. 21. (A/57/PV.27)
107 See the records of the debates on the 49th plenary meeting of 11 November 2005, p. 17. (A/60/PV.49)
should not forget that this also applies within the permanent membership of the Security Council. And when one speaks of small countries, it is worth recalling that many small countries are, in fact, sponsors of the group of four’s draft resolution. Nor should one forget that the arithmetic of the Uniting for Consensus proposal, in particular its emphasis on re-election and permanent presence applicable to all non-permanent seats, might in fact mean that there would be less chance of small countries being elected, whereas the G-4 proposal clearly increases those chances, even if not by a very large factor.

With that, I rest our case. I would only say in conclusion that I think it is a grave error for those who think that the issue of reform will go away to believe that the reform will be a bit like the Cheshire cat: that you will have a grin without a cat. They may well find that the cat has nine lives. In fact, in that sense, they may not only have caught the cat by the wrong tail but caught the wrong cat by the wrong tail.¹⁰⁸

The main differences between the structure proposed by the UfC and the one presented by the G4 were always a topic of great discordance and polemical declarations among these groups. While the proposition of new permanent members always meant a great advance to the democratic system of representation inside the Security Council for the G4, the expansion of seats in this category represented an enlargement of the differences and bias among the Council’s members for the UfC.

At the same time, the question of the veto always distanced the AU and the UfC. The constant and strict position of the UfC against an expansion of the power to new permanent members or even the maintenance of it without any curtailment, clashed with the points presented by the African position, which defended an expansion of the permanent membership carrying on the possibility of new members receiving the same prerogatives as the current permanent five. However, these differences were never as deep as the ones among the Group of Four and the Uniting for Consensus.

¹⁰⁸ See the records of the debates on the 50th plenary meeting of 11 November 2005, p. 13. (A/60/PV.50)
By other delegations

The accusations that started with the episode of the resolution in 1998 and continued on afterwards, also gained the support of other UN members not specifically connected to the G4. According to most of the statements presented during the debates, national interests were being considered in first place, to the detriment of the organization and the entire international community.

In 1998, regarding yet the draft resolution presented by the Coffee Club (A/53/L.16), the representation of the United Kingdom affirmed:

We deplore the divisive and damaging tactics of those who wish to preempt full discussion of some aspects by pressing ahead with draft resolution A/53/L.16.¹⁰⁹

The United States also presented its view on the draft, saying that:

My delegation felt that a debate and possible votes on draft resolution A/53/L.16 or amendments thereto would therefore have been unnecessary and destructive to the delicate deliberative process that we hope will ultimately bring us towards our objective. We questioned the rationale for introducing the draft resolution and its amendments last week. To our knowledge, no Members were looking for or working towards a quick fix or any other mechanism that would not be supported by the vast majority of Members.¹¹⁰

The following years of 2000 and 2001 represented the highest number of open accusations declared at the General Assembly Hall. During these years, other UN members also affirmed their views over a possible attempt to delay the reform process.

In 2000, Australia declared:

Sadly, while these contours are clear and general agreement appears within striking distance, progress continues to founder over the strong opposition of a relatively small number of Member States to one or another of these elements.

¹⁰⁹ See the records of the debates on the 65th plenary meeting of 20 November 1998, p. 34. (A/53/PV.65)
¹¹⁰ See the records of the debates on the 66th plenary meeting of 23 November 1998, p. 9. (A/53/PV.66)
Some oppose an expansion of the permanent membership because they fear an impact on their perceived relative influence.\textsuperscript{111}

Nigeria also pointed, in the same year, to a small group of states that would be holding back the Working Group in the name of consensus\textsuperscript{112}, while Botswana affirmed that “[t]he insistence on limited expansion is a veiled attempt to continue to subordinate the perceived pariahs of the global system and retain the Council as a hub for the privileged few.”\textsuperscript{113}

In 2007, Mongolia was specific when criticizing and considered “objectionable any proposal that entertain ideas of establishing a third tier of membership.”\textsuperscript{114} Jamaica, a current member of the L.69 group, affirmed in 2011 that a “small group of delegations expressed their opposition to the third revision of the negotiation text, throwing the negotiations into suspense mode”\textsuperscript{115} during that year.

In 2012, Malaysia clearly stated that:

The opinion seems to be: “If I cannot make it into the Council, that other Member State should not be allowed to become a permanent member”. I hear subtle voices saying, in effect, “Let us prolong these discussions without reaching any decision, as I stand to lose if country X becomes a permanent member”. Then we hear the same voices asking why the reform process is slow. I am amazed and puzzled.\textsuperscript{116}

During the 20 years of debates on the issue of Security Council reform, these were not the only accusations, and even some UfC members presented their counter-accusations. Generally, these reactions by members of the Coffee Club and the UfC were similar to the ones made by Pakistan in 2004. By then, the country affirmed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[111] See the records of the debates on the 64\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 16 November 2000, p. 5. (A/55/PV.64)
\item[112] See the records of the debates on the 35\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 31 October 2001, p. 6. (A/56/PV.35)
\item[113] See the records of the debates on the 36\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 1 November 2001, p. 9. (A/56/PV.36)
\item[114] See the records of the debates on the 51\textsuperscript{st} plenary meeting of 14 November 2007, p. 6. (A/62/PV.51)
\item[115] See the records of the debates on the 51\textsuperscript{st} plenary meeting of 8 November 2011, p. 5. (A/66/PV.51)
\item[116] See the records of the debates on the 38\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 15 November 2012, p. 28. (A/67/PV.38)
\end{footnotes}
that “[u]nfortunately, consensus has been frustrated by the ambitions of a few States that desire the privileged status of the permanent five.”

It is important to note that the UfC was not the only target of accusations. The permanent members of the Security Council also were the target of several accusations. During the years of debates, the permanent members quietly demonstrated their power, mentioning what kinds of reform would be accepted or not, proposing barriers limiting on how an expansion of the Council membership would be realized. Initially, the United States and Russia imposed limits on how big the new Security Council should be, affirming that a number higher than 21 seats would not be accepted. Any modifications of the veto power have also been openly declared as unacceptable by all five permanent members. Then, starting from 2000, those discrete tactics to control the process were recognized and pointed out by some members. New Zealand affirmed:

Throughout the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group the five permanent members have consistently refused to engage in any meaningful way on the question of the veto. We are not among those who would seek to point the finger at any particular group for blocking reform, but this situation clearly needs to be addressed with determination if there is to be any progress towards the comprehensive reform mandated by our leaders in the declaration of the Millennium Summit.

The G4 also received accusations, generally by UfC members, addressing the selfish objectives of the group. Most of the accusations made by the UfC membership carried the same message as the one from Pakistan in 2008. According to Ambassador Haroon:

We believe the views of two specific groups are inimical and opposed to genuine reform as envisage by the Member States. The first group is that of the permanent members of the Security Council who do not want genuine reform

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117 See the records of the debates on the 24th plenary meeting of 11 October 2004, p. 24. (A/59/PV.24)  
118 See the records of the debates on the 65th plenary meeting of 16 November 2000, p. 12. (A/55/PV.65)
and who believe in the status quo. [...] The second group is comprised of a handful of countries whose goal in the reform exercise is to promote – and rightly so, as far as they are concerned – their self-interests. These aspirants to special status and individual privilege in fact want to become permanent members at any cost.119

Even with the existence of accusations directed at other actors, the ones directed at the UfC were higher in number than the other reformist groups, and they reverberated far beyond the limits of statements inside the General Assembly’s Hall.

By the Academia

The mass production of academic literature over the reform of the UN Security Council has a tendency to cover general matters and to not always give much attention to internal details of the process. When more specific, books and papers on the reform do not deeply address the groups’ calls for an enlargement of the Council’s membership, or only cover the proposals of the G4, giving superficial characteristics to the AU or the UfC.

It is interesting to see how the Group of Four seems to receive some kind of favoritism when it comes to defining these coalitions. The researchers make clear their position of favoritism towards the G4 members, while unconsciously diminishing the UfC position to a simple regional brawl.

Some elements of the literature were strict on the intentions of the UfC, affirming that “’[t]he Uniting for Consensus’ plan is essentially a reaction against the alleged efforts of certain G4 plan proponents to become permanent members of the Council.”120

Following the regional argumentations, the coalition was also called:

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119 See the records of the debates on the 53rd plenary meeting of 18 November 2008, p. 25. (A/63/PV.53)
a loose grouping of countries including Italy (opposed to a permanent seat for Germany), Pakistan (opposed to a permanent seat for India), South Korea (opposed to a permanent seat for Japan), Colombia and Argentina (opposed to a permanent seat for Brazil).

Roberto Rodriguez goes beyond this, considering the apparently sincere intention of the small states to be a disguise for blocking the intentions of the core and stronger members.

While at the superficial level the UfC group recommends a permanent freeze on the admission of new permanent members with veto powers, and this certainly is the declared position of the many small countries in this relatively large group, the main leaders in the group seem more inclined to advance their national interests by depriving another member of their region from becoming a permanent member of the UNSC.

The same agenda is presented by Stefan Schirm and Bardo Fassbender who consider the UfC an anti-G4 group with objectives based on the obstruction of their neighbors’ goal to acquire permanent seats inside the Council. Other researchers pointed to the regional issue of the UfC in opposition to the G4 with a softer political view, but keeping nonetheless the regional situation as an argument, seeing the member’s positions as “easily understandable, since each of these States are fiercely opposed to what they call an unjust reduction of their international political relevance.”

David Malone, in one sentence, characterizes the unimportance of the UfC when comparing it to the favoritism of the G4 so largely reproduced by the academia.

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The researcher does not even name the coalition or the countries involved, simply stating that:

In 2005, drawing on the report of the HLP, this debate eventually revolved around an attempt of Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil to secure permanent seats for themselves, which failed given strong opposition from China and a number of other member states and, to a lesser extent, from the United States and Russia.\textsuperscript{126}

By the Media

The media has also presented a negative image of the UfC and produced a similar same agenda to that of the academia’s, simply attributing anti-G4 characteristics to the group and describing it as a spoiler of the reform process most of the time. In a brief analysis of the impact of the Security Council reform on the media, is also possible to confirm the widespread thought about the members of the Uniting for Consensus.

This section aims to determine how the UfC case was addressed by the media over the years of debate, through an overview of the coverage by the \textit{New York Times} (NYT). Considered as a major influence on the agenda of the many other media corporations, the NYT is one of the most important sources of media analysis. Beyond its importance in terms of agenda, the newspaper is also favorably located in the same city as the UN Headquarters.

Covering the period spanning from January 1, 1993, to September 1, 2013, we were able to find a total of 12 articles presenting thoughts on a possible expansion of seats inside the UN Security Council. Despite the clear irrelevance of the theme over the years and a concentration of articles in the period ranging from 2003 to 2005, only two of them deeply covered the ideas of the UfC, but yet, without considering the entire group.

With the exception of those by David Malone\textsuperscript{127} in 2003, and the former Italian Prime Minister Lamberto Dini\textsuperscript{128} in 1997, none of the articles favorably addressed the UfC or even covered the group in any substantive detail.

In 2003, Thomas M. Franck wrote about how the UN would be formulated if we tried to make it from scratch today, and affirmed indirectly that a Security Council without countries like the G4 members would be unimaginable, affirming that:

In the United Nations, the distortion is now so great as to be destructive of its institutional legitimacy. Five countries (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States) have permanent seats on the Security Council and can veto any substantive decisions. Meanwhile, countries like India, Brazil, Nigeria, Japan and Germany are excluded from this circle of five that holds most of the cards. How could this be mitigated?\textsuperscript{129}

In the same year, Warren Hoge wrote:

The debate is expected to be intense because of the importance of the issue to many countries that want to be included and possibly just as many that object to the inclusion of others. Bill Rammell, a British Foreign Office minister who presented his country's ideas to the panel this summer, commented on the regional rivalries at work.

“For every country you can name,” he said, “there are two or three next in line who feel their positions entitle them to frustrate the process.”

In Africa, the leading contestants are South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. In the Americas, Mexico and Argentina will have doubts about the primacy of Brazil. In Asia, Pakistan can be expected to oppose India, and China is wary of admitting Japan and, with its veto, could single-handedly keep Tokyo out.

[...]

Italy, which does not want to be the only major Western European country without permanent representation on the Council, has publicly sought to undermine Germany’s candidacy. It suggests instead that there be a seat for the

European Union, although the charter at the moment recognizes only nation states, not groups of states, as members.\textsuperscript{130}

In 2004, an editorial article clearly showing the position of the NYT about the reform debates, giving open support to the bids of Japan and India, and affirming that “the U.N. can only gain in authority and relevance by adding newly important countries from the developed and the developing world.”\textsuperscript{131}

The year of 2005 presented general articles on the debates, considering the important moment of reform activities in the organization. Moreover, Joel Brinkley wrote about the lobby created by nations wanting to join the Security Council and how G4 members had to fight against the “counterlobby” created by the UfC members to block their success.

[I]n this effort, no nation can count on its neighbors. Argentina and Mexico oppose Brazil. Japan is facing serious opposition from North and South Korea as well as China, where tens of thousands of protesters took part in angry anti-Japan demonstrations last month.

Italy opposes Germany, while Pakistan is trying to block India. And those two countries in opposition, along with South Korea, are leading a counterlobby pushing a proposal that would not award new permanent seats to anyone.\textsuperscript{132}

In September of the same year, Vance Shercuk wrote about the good fight and strategies of the G4 and some of the UfC members towards the reform claims, saying:

Just consider the maneuvers this summer by four aspirants to the Security Council – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – which have joined together in the so-called Group of Four and have been furiously trawling the developing world for support. Rivals of these countries, like China, Italy and Pakistan, have meanwhile been working to block them. The resulting game of chess has been


Warren Hoge wrote again in November of the same year, for the first time considering the three groups claiming for an expansion of seats in the Security Council. Talking about the reform proposals, Hoge said:

Of last summer’s resolutions, one from the African Union would have added 11 seats – 6 permanent ones, including 2 for Africa with veto power, and 5 rotating ones. A second measure, from a group of midtier countries including Italy and Pakistan, wanted a 25-member Council with 10 new rotating seats. The most heavily promoted plan was from the so-called Group of Four, or G4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. It posited a 25-member Council with three new members that would have two-year rotating terms and six permanent seats for the four sponsors, along with two unnamed African countries.\footnote{Hoge Warren. “U.N. Envoys See Loss of Steam for Expanding Security Council” \textit{New York Times}, November 18, 2005.}

In 1997, Ambassador Fulci, representative of Italy, stated:

My delegation, the delegation of Italy, has been accused of favoring the status quo. This is simply not true. Our only aim has been, and remains, to firmly oppose unfair and discriminatory proposals. […] We continue to strongly believe that Security Council reform is long overdue. This is why we have presented our own proposal, modified it in response to helpful suggestions and kept it on the table.\footnote{See the records of the debates on the 62\textsuperscript{nd} plenary meeting of 4 December 1997, p. 21. (A/52/PV.62)}

The Pakistani representative also defended the country’s position saying:

This procedural draft resolution was intended neither to derail nor to delay the process of Security Council reform, as has been alleged by some. Its main objective was to ensure that any decision on Security Council reform should be as broadly supported as possible by the members of the General Assembly, so that we do not repeat the mistake of 1945, when the view of a number of
countries was ignored and no consensus was reached on permanent membership and the veto.\textsuperscript{136}

San Marino also defended their support of the objectives of the first draft resolution presented by the Coffee Club, saying that:

The Republic of San Marino is one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/52/L.7, because it is convinced of the need for an increase in the membership of the Security Council. We also believe that such an important decision has to be adopted by consensus or with the widest possible agreement. […] It is absolutely not true that we are against reforms and that we want to postpone them indefinitely.\textsuperscript{137}

In summary, observing the discussion on the sources of the accusations, it is possible to confirm that the negative perception of the UfC is real and became widely reproduced even outside of the General Assembly Hall, even surpassing the barriers of the academic production and reaching the general public through the media. The UfC was clearly labeled as simply being a spoiler group, aiming to delay the reform process based on regional rivalries.

Analyzing the accusations in light of the composition of the UfC, it is possible to conclude that among the claimed 40 members, or even only counting the 23 core representatives of the Uniting for Consensus, the portion related to these so-called situations of regional rivalry can be considered low. Among the 40 members, only 5 can be connected to issues of regional power, and it can be difficult to consider how much this argument can influence the position of the other countries involved with this proposal. It is also necessary to note that motivations and final objectives must be separated when classifying something as legitimate or not, especially in terms of Security Council reform.

\textsuperscript{136} See the records of the debates on the 63\textsuperscript{rd} plenary meeting of 4 December 1997, p. 14. (A/52/PV.63)
\textsuperscript{137} See the records of the debates on the 63\textsuperscript{rd} plenary meeting of 4 December 1997, p. 36. (A/52/PV.63)
According to the researcher Shashi Tharoor:

At the same time, the medium-sized and large countries that are the rivals of the prospective beneficiaries (that is, the G4) deeply resent the prospect of a select few breaking free of their current second-rank status in the world body. Some of the objectors, such as Canada and Spain, are genuinely motivated by principle: they consider the very existence of permanent membership to be wrong, and they have no desire to compound the original sin by adding more members to a category they dislike. Many others, however, are openly animated by a spirit of competition, historical grievance, or simple envy.138

Very cleverly, Tharoor expands the simple and somehow general overview on the position of the UfC to another level of complexity, when he affirms that a real intention to reform may exist among the group’s members.

Thus, in light of these accusations (including what could potentially seen as bias and/or contradictions), and considering the complexity of the topics involved in a classification of the UfC bid, a deeper analysis of the UfC and its proposals is required, with a focus on issues of legitimacy and levels of support. This analysis must consider: First, a chronological overview of initiatives and responses between the two groups and also among specific members (to determine if the UfC is taking initiative or simply responding to momentum); second, an analysis of official discourses; third, an analysis on the degree of representation that each proposal can realize if achieved; and, finally, an analysis able to measure levels of support for each of the proposals from UN member states from the last 20 years of open discussions on the agenda’s topic “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council.”

CHAPTER III

LEGITIMACY
One of the most important aspects that must be considered when analyzing the Uniting for Consensus group is the legitimacy of the reforms it calls for. The proposal by the UfC can be considered as legitimate according to the veracity of the group’s intentions and the individual members’ intentions (although this is difficult to ascertain), and by considering whether or not the objectives of this reform model can generate real changes that will be beneficial to the UN membership as a whole. Thus, the question of legitimacy demands a deep analysis of the discourse and parameters established by the proposal, connected also with perspectives presented by the actors involved in the matters of reform.

Following the complexity required by the topic, four main methods were used to establish a base for examining this legitimacy: a chronology of proposals/positions; an analysis of the use of the concept of democracy in statements; a brief consideration on voting power distribution; and, finally, the presentation of perspectives on the group’s position.

With the chronological analysis of the positions of the UfC’s members in direct comparison with other UN member states, this chapter will show how the countries of the UfC maintained a constant position over the years and took the initiative to set the topics of the reform. In terms of the democratic parameters of the proposal, this session will also analyze how much the concept of democracy was used by the UfC when compared with the G4, aiming to associate the group’s intentions to a democratic and egalitarian new Council. Other more specific characteristics of the UfC proposal analyzed in this chapter will be the distribution of voting power, with the aim to show how the final results of a reform based on the group’s model would represent a real reform beneficial to the UN membership as a whole in terms of participation and decision-making. Finally, this session will also present perspectives on the activity by
UfC members regarding the reform, thus aiming to present how these countries’ positions can be considered legitimate in terms of political procedures.

Chronology

Initially, it is important to analyze the chronology of actions and responses among the UN membership over the reform issues, focusing on the presentation of documents and the feedback received by specific states.

By historically organizing the facts, it is possible to construct a complex timeline of the events that occurred during the debates on the question of equitable representation, also adding processes directly connected to the discussions on a possible reform, but not exactly treated or reported in the official records. The use of such a timeline can serve as a useful tool to analyze the processes of initiatives and responses, causes and consequences.

Timelines are mostly used for the study of historical facts and the establishment of chronologies. In the case of the Uniting for Consensus proposal and the political issues related to its legitimacy, a timeline can represent an important source of evidence in determining which country took the first steps towards reform and how the counter-argument or the reaction by different groups happened in the context of temporal space.

Basically, a chronological analysis of this case will point to which country was responsible for first presenting a determinate position inside the reform debates over the years, or how the positions of countries were maintained or changed during the period of discussions. The importance of this type of analysis lies in the fact that results and an order of events can directly characterize the actions and decisions as reactions or not, thus helping in answering whether the UfC is a legitimate coalition or if its actions can be characterized as an actual blockage attempt.
By analyzing facts in a linear organization\textsuperscript{139}, it is possible to say that UN members started playing an active role regarding matters of transforming the representation inside the Security Council very early in the organization’s history. Some of them engaged have kept the same position from the beginning until today, while some strategically changed their views about what would be the best method of transformation for the organ’s membership.

Already in 1955, sixteen Latin American countries and Spain presented a first proposal of expansion of the Council’s seats. According to their draft, the Security Council would have two additional non-permanent members. Among the sponsors of this document were Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Spain, countries that thereafter would become active members of the Uniting for Consensus and the Group of Four. At that time, the idea of non-permanency was more acceptable to Brazil as well as its Latin Americans fellows, considering the international scene then.

After the creation of the NAM in 1960, the proposal and promulgation of a first actual pattern of seat redistribution occurred in 1963 and the only reform of the Council and the amendment of the Charter were implemented two years later. Latin American and Asian-African countries, including again members of both the G4 and the UfC, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Mexico and Pakistan, sponsored the draft resolution that enlarged the Security Council from nine to fifteen members.\textsuperscript{140}

The year of 1979 marked the successful attempt by NAM members to include the question of reforming the Security Council on the General Assembly’s agenda. At the same time, a new proposal aiming to add four new non-permanent seats to the Council also presented but was unsuccessful. This proposal was sponsored by Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, India, Iraq, Japan, the Maldives,

Mauritius, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Syria.\textsuperscript{141} It is worth noting that two members of the G4: Japan and India, were involved in this attempt.

During the ’90s, as noted above, activity regarding the reform matters became much more intense and complex. The number of proposals and options presented were high, and at the same time, the politics involved in these actions assumed other objectives in the new global context of the post-Cold War period.

In 1990, Italy presented its first proposal of regional representation in the Security Council, affirming that an option to transform the organ would be the substitution of France and the United Kingdom for a regional European and a Japanese seat. At the same time, Japan and Germany also started an unofficial campaign for permanent seats. According to Dimitris Bouratonis, the Italian Foreign Minister at the time, Gianni de Michelis, was responsible for this idea which was believed to be a strong path for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Community.\textsuperscript{142} This moment represented the first clash among future members of the G4 and the UfC as it was the first time that a contrary position specifically directed towards the German bid was presented by the Italian mission. Nevertheless, a chronological analysis of this clash is unable to generate a decisive result as the campaign by the two industrialized countries assumed an unofficial character and does not have registers of any specific starting point that year.

During the following years and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NAM heads of state called for a revision of the Council’s membership. The call led to intense activity in 1992 when the report “An Agenda for Peace” was presented and the General Assembly approved the inclusion of the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” as an item of the agenda. The draft


\textsuperscript{142} Bouratonis, 2005. p. 35.
proposal was sponsored by Japan, India and 35 other countries, including Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{143}

The approval of the draft in September of 1992 represented the last time future members of the G4 and the UfC worked together towards the common objective of reforming the Council. After the great change of the political scenario represented by the end of the Cold War, positions and objectives were also modified in terms of reform models. The new positions assumed by some countries about a possible expansion of the Security Council separated the paths of UN members who, in the future, would become members of the two divergent groups.

In 1993, after becoming an item on the agenda of the General Assembly, the question of equitable representation began its official open debates. In the first year, the Assembly decided to create an Open-Ended Working Group to discuss and find options to solve the reform issues. During the debates, Italy and Turkey presented their proposals which aimed at establishing a new category of elected seats, with the possibility of reelection, following regional decisions on matters of representation.\textsuperscript{144} Also, at the beginning of 1993, Chile and Egypt presented another proposal to create regional seats.\textsuperscript{145}

During the following year, the United Kingdom, the United States and France made public their official support for the bids of Japan and Germany\textsuperscript{146} and, for the first time, the African group presented its call for fair representation for the continent

\textsuperscript{144} See the records of the Turkish statement on the 61\textsuperscript{st} plenary meeting of 23 November 1993, pp. 18-20 (A/48/PV.61); and the records of the Italian statement on the 64\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 24 November 1993, pp. 5-6 (A/48/PV.64).
\textsuperscript{145} See the records of the Chilean statement (pp. 3-5) and the records of the Egyptian statement (pp. 16-18) on the 61\textsuperscript{st} plenary meeting of 23 November 1993. (A/48/PV.61)
\textsuperscript{146} See the records of the English statement on the 31\textsuperscript{st} plenary meeting of 14 October 1994 (A/49/PV.31); statement by the USA (pp. 23-24) and the records of the French statement (pp. 17-18) on the 30\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 13 October 1994. (A/49/PV.30)
inside the Council. Africa was already staking its claim for permanent seats, following regional parameters.

Members saw the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the UN in 1995 with great expectations in terms of reform, which were represented by intensive activities concerning those issues. In February, the NAM formed its platform to reform the Security Council. The proposals were also numerous that year. The Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – presented a proposal to create permanent seats for Germany and Japan as well as 3 more non-permanent seats. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia proposed the creation of permanent seats for the industrialized countries and 2 to 5 more seats. Turkey presented a proposal to enlarge the Council with 10 more elected seats, while Mexico presented the option of add five new non-permanent seats and a rotational one for Japan and Germany.

In 1996, the report of the Working Group declared unacceptable any kind of “quick fix” formula for the reform. During that year, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Libya, Botswana, Colombia, Mexico, Argentina and Pakistan presented a proposal to increase non-permanent seats at the Council, using the argument of democratization. Spain also presented a proposal to create non-permanent seats, but with extended terms. It was a year of intensive activity by the future members of the Uniting for Consensus group.

147 See the speech of the Tunisian representative on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on the 30th plenary meeting of 13 October 1994, pp. 9-11. (A/49/PV.30)
148 See the speech of the representative of Denmark on the 57th plenary meeting of 13 November 1995, p. 23. (A/50/PV.57)
149 See the records of the Slovenian statement on the 58th plenary meeting of 14 November 1995, pp. 20-21. (A/50/PV.58)
150 See the records of the debates on the 57th plenary meeting of 13 November 1995, pp. 19-20. (A/50/PV.57)
151 See the records of the debates on the 57th plenary meeting of 13 November 1995, pp. 5-7. (A/50/PV.57)
152 See the records of the debates on the 44th plenary meeting of 29 October 1996, p. 15. (A/51/PV.44)
153 See the records of the debates on the 46th plenary meeting of 30 October 1996, p. 13. (A/51/PV.46)
March 1997 marked the presentation of the famous plan by the Ambassador Razali. The feedback given by members was very diverse. In April and September of that year, two ministerial meetings by NAM heads of state were held to discuss the plan. While the United Kingdom, France and the United States affirmed their positions of support to an expansion limited to a total number of 21 members, the Coffee Club presented its first official proposal as a group. On October 22, 1997, the future Uniting for Consensus gathered 32 supporters asking for the establishment of Article number 108 as the base for any decision related to the reform.154

In the same year, as an answer to the action taken by the Coffee Club, Japan and Germany sent letters to the entire UN membership, asking countries to not support the draft resolution. This was the beginning of a process of constant accusations against members of the group led by Italy.

The discussion over the draft lasted for one year. In 1998, while attending the negotiations, the Coffee Club presented a second draft that had received around 80 sponsors and significantly expanded its base of support. Among those countries were: Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.155 Almost all the core members of the Uniting for Consensus acted together for the first time when this draft resolution was presented.

During the same year, Belgium led a group that also presented a draft resolution and, at the same time, accused the Coffee Club initiative as being obstructionist.156 But even with the accusations, in the end, the draft resolution presented by the coalition formed by future members of the UfC and other UN members was approved on November 23, 1998, as Resolution 53/30.

155 See the complete list of sponsors in the 16th letter of the 53rd session of the General Assembly, 20 November 1998. (A/53/L.16/Rev.1)
156 See the 42nd letter of the 53rd session of the General Assembly, 18 November 1998. (A/53/L.42)
The year 2000 represented great deal for the UN membership, especially with the Millennium Summit held in September of that year. With the end of the millennium, the wait for reform became more uncomfortable for the representatives that had started a strong exchange of accusations during the open debates. Another important detail was the recognition by the United States of the majority support for an expansion into the mid-twenties, changing its first position to one also supportive of the Council’s with a number of members around 25.157

After September 11, 2001, and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the focus of debates on the reform of the Security Council shifted to a stronger approach on the working methods. The threat of terrorism assumed a central point of concern for the membership and the debates on enlargement assumed a secondary role.

In 2003, a great crisis of legitimacy emerged inside the United Nations, after the non-approved invasion of Iraq in March. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan then presented a proposal to create a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change as an attempt to motivate members to engage in a real effort to reform the organization.

During the following year, the high-level panel released its report ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’.158 During the open debates of that year on the question of equitable representation, the Group of Four was officially presented as a group by the Brazilian mission159, following the claims for efforts made by Annan in the report.

2005 was a turning point in the reform discussions. In February, the Uniting for Consensus document was presented by the group’s members, officially heralding the creation of the coalition. That year, the Secretary General also released another report

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157 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 16 November 2000, p. 25. (A/55/PV.64)
159 See the records of the debates on the 25th plenary meeting of 11 October 2004, p. 3. (A/59/PV.25)
entitled ‘In a larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’.

In this report, Kofi Annan asked again for efforts from the UN membership and supported two models of reform. These models were recommendations to be followed by the representatives in their proposals to reform the Security Council.

On July 6, 2005, the Group of Four presented its proposal of reform, followed by the African Union on July 18, and the Uniting for Consensus on July 22. Although it is not possible to accurately pinpoint the moment of the elaboration of each document, the official dates of presentation occurred in that order. On November 10, the proposal by the Small Five (S5), focusing on the working methods of the Council, was first presented.

The S5 proposal received great feedback from the UN membership, easily gathering a majority of positive positions in 2006, but it was not enough to have the draft approved due to political matters related to a possible restriction of the veto power.

The year of 2006 also marked a very important moment in the reform discussions, with the decision to implement intergovernmental negotiations as a new procedure of decision-making on the matters of expansion of the Council. Thus, the negotiations were approved on September 15, 2008, and started in February 2009.

After the first round of negotiations in 2009, the representatives of Italy and Colombia, core members of the UfC, presented a new draft resolution adapting the one distributed in 2005. The new proposal added one of the first proposals of Italy and Turkey inside the official reform debates, calling for the establishment of reeelections.

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161 See the 64th letter, 6 July 2005 (A/59/L.64), and the 67th letter, 18 July 2005 (A/59/L.67), of the 59th session of the General Assembly.
162 See the official draft resolution on the 49th letter of the 60th session of the General Assembly, 17 March 2006. (A/60/L.49)
163 See the explanation on the original proposals at page 88.
as a possibility for non-permanent members, according to regional choices, as a kind of semi-permanent membership.

After the intensive activity of the first half of the decade, the second one did not represent much of an advance for expansion matters in terms of results. With the intergovernmental negotiations, the platform of debate changed but the deadlock remained. In May 2009, as an attempt to gather support and consequent results for the reform process, the first Rome Ministerial Meeting organized by the Uniting for Consensus members was held. The meeting gathered 120 states aiming to debate the reform issue and present the UfC group's intentions.

Following this meeting and its developments, a new group was created which presented its own proposal on September 6, 2011. African, Latin American and Caribbean countries created the so-called L.69 group and its proposal was a mix of G4 and AU objectives. In November of the same year, India allied itself to the group, becoming a member of both similar groups, the G4 and the L.69. The group, as was the case with the other three main \textit{ad hoc} coalitions competing to realize reform, did not receive enough support to have its proposal approved by the General Assembly.

The Rome Ministerial Meetings were held during the following years in February 2012 and March 2013. However, the debates on the reform, even after so many years of official and unofficial efforts, never reached a final decision.

From the very beginning of the Security Council activities during the 1940s, and the subsequent developments in the UN, it is possible to view the activities by countries that, after decades, would become participants of the Uniting for Consensus group. While initially working side by side with members of the current Group of Four and aiming at similar objectives in terms of expansion, the change of positions caused by the transformation of international dynamics set regional and political partners on different
sides of the current discussions regarding the way the Security Council should be expanded.

During the entire period, and with very rare and small changes, the positions of the UfC members were consistent, from the creation of the UN or presented from the 1990s with the official establishment of the debates on the question of equitable representation.

The accusations, when analyzed through a chronological point of view of actions and responses, have two possible interpretations. While Italy’s position can potentially be seen as a response to the unofficial bid by Germany from the 1990s, the same cannot be said about Argentina, considering its long history of support of an expansion of non-permanent seats only. And while Mexico worked consistently towards a democratic Council since San Francisco, Pakistan showed more activity on reform matters after India showed its first dreams of permanency.

Nevertheless, the chronological complexity of the Uniting for Consensus position can be clarified by other quantitative and qualitative analyses of states positions during the open debates on the question of equitable representation in the Security Council. These analyses initially consider how the concept of democracy – a key characteristic of the group's reform ideas – was presented by the UfC and its members during the debates.

Democracy

During the last 20 years of debates, democracy has been a concept often used by representatives over the question of reform of the Security Council. According to almost all the states that aim to establish a reformed Council, the main objective of a possible enlargement of the number of seats is to create a broader representation of UN members inside its most important organ, but the question of how the establishment of
this representation will bring more democracy to the Council also assumed a very important position during the debates and in characterizing the proposed models.

While some countries focused their concerns on establishing a more equitable representation inside the Security Council loosely based on regions and other criteria, others assumed that the promotion of such 'equitable' arrangements would not be enough to establish real equality among the UN member states. Based on the argument for the need for equal and fair representation to all regions in the Council, the AU is an example of a coalition with concerns directed to wider representation. The UfC, on the other hand, firmly assumed the focus of establishing a better representation based on broader democratic principles.

Through official statements, unofficial declarations and even personal interviews, representatives connected to the UfC group always affirm very precisely the call of its members for democracy, with more representation and less distinction among the membership of the Security Council.

The basic philosophy of the United for Consensus movement is that the UNSC should be as democratic and flexible as possible. As an anonymous South Korean diplomat explained, there is no way to predict future politics, so a democratic, electoral system is the best solution; “international politics is not permanent, and permanent solutions will not work.” UfC members argue that their solution makes the most logical sense from an unbiased perspective and is the only solution that will work in the long term.164

Democracy is a concept that was first created in Greece. It basically means: the rule (kratos) of the people (dêmôs). After its historical evolution, democracy started to be connected to the modern principle of political equality which, when related to the United Nations, was adopted for internal matters as a question of equal representation

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and wider participation in the decision-making process by its member states inside the organization.

The Uniting for Consensus proposal and political position can be analyzed from several points of view. The democratic aspect of its possible legitimacy can be approached in three ways: the first is related to a basic statistical discourse analysis; the second aims to analyze the democratic structure of the proposal; and, the third one is related to perspectives by individuals about the group.

In terms of ideas and compared to the Group of Four, for example, how often can references to the concept of democracy be found in UfC statements? After the presentation of the official proposal by the UfC and the G4, how strong was the use of the word “democracy” and its derivatives? In statistical analysis, how significant is the use of this concept by the group during the debates in terms of the characterization of its bid?

Using a basic method of discourse analysis associated with statistical tests, we have a method to analyze how certain ideas are repeated and affirmed in declarations from both groups. Notwithstanding the fact that the simple use of words does not define the intention covered by the discourse, a comparison between the use of a concept by two groups can however provide a useful point of reference.

Discourse Analysis is a general practice of the linguistics’ field, especially related to the verification of ideological constructions in a specific text. Inside the field of discourse analysis, the corpus linguistics is a specific area that considers the group of linguistics data as object of research. In the case of a comparison between the G4 and the UfC, the corpura used during the research were the statements over the question of equitable representation in the Security Council from 2002 until 2011.
From the corpus linguistics, it is possible to create statistical proofs, following a method of word counting. This counting is based on the concept of keywords, which are considered to be the single terms that identify ideas and main themes in a discourse. Using this basic theoretical knowledge as foundation, the word “democracy” and its derivatives – “democratic”, “democratically”, and so on – were chosen as keywords in the linguistic analysis of G4 and UfC statements, with the aim to highlight the democratic characteristics of these groups’ official positions.

During the debates, the representatives of the UfC affirmed many times how important the establishment of a more democratic Council would be for the entire functioning of the UN as an international organization. The concept of democracy mentioned by the group’s member was always related to the transformation of the Council into an organ were the entire UN membership would be represented and where member states would have more power of decision.

The UfC was always connected to the idea of democratic representation in a different way than the coalitions that called for fair and equal regional representation inside the Security Council. It is important to highlight that equal representation does not exactly mean the establishment of a democratic system. The addition of permanent members from all the regions would indicate equality among these regions but not exactly a wider participation of their countries. As such, a comparison of the total number of mentions of a democratic Council or a democratic transformation inside the debates can indicate how significant this idea is for the UfC position.

The counting process, as noted before, covered ten years of debates and considered the use of the concept by each core member of the two groups. In general numbers, a major difference was found between the two groups; showing a considerably larger emphasis of democratic ideas by the UfC.
Considering the important difference of the number of members between both groups (23 core members for the UfC and just 4 members for the G4), it is important to consider the number of times the concept was mentioned based on the percentage resulting from the total number of statements specifically presented by each of the groups. A comparison based on a percentage of the total number of statements by the entire UN membership could be considered biased as the UfC has more members. However, even restricting the analysis of the total UN membership statements to a comparison of numbers exclusively related to both groups, the UfC has more mentions to democracy. According to these numbers, the UfC talked about democracy in 63% of its statements from 2002 until 2011, while the G4 used the concept only 38% of the time. (See Chart 3.1)

Chart 3.1: Percentages of mentions and non-mentions of “democracy” by the Uniting for Consensus and the Group of Four (2002-2011)

The words “yes” or “no” were used in reference to the use or non-use of the words, respectively, during the statements by year. For the establishment of statistical proof involving the word count, the Fisher Exact Test, based on 2x2

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165 See Annex II: Tables on the Use of the Concept of Democracy by the Group of Four and the Uniting for Consensus applied to the Fisher Exact Test, p. 166.
166 “Fisher’s exact test is a statistical test used to determine if there are nonrandom associations between two categorical variables.” (Source: Weisstein, Eric W. “Fisher's Exact Test.” MathWorld - A Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/FishersExactTest.html)
matrices, was used. These matrices are basically results of the analysis of two different outcomes from two different samplings.

The connection of the test to the linguistic approach aims to indicate how significant this numbers can be in terms of determining the use of a concept as a determinant characteristic in a discourse analysis. Basically, the discovery of significance from the calculation of the comparison between the word counting for the UfC and the G4 would indicate that the use of concepts is a determinant of the groups’ ideas.

Applied to the comparison between the Uniting for Consensus and the Group of Four, the test uses the parameters already described of the use or non-use of the concept of democracy during the ten years of the evaluation. The test considers the total numbers from the UfC – 75 uses and 45 non-uses – and the total numbers from the G4 – 15 uses and 25 non-uses –, in a method that is not affected by the disproportional number of members between these groups.167

The calculation based on the total number of outcomes by both groups results in a P value168 of 0.0095, a very statistically relevant result.169

More importantly, the results achieved through the discourse analysis of statements made by the G4 and the UfC mean that, even with a larger membership, the number of times the democratic idea was presented by the UfC was not a coincidence and represented a larger number of times in which the idea was mentioned by its

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167 See Annex II, p. 166.
168 The value of P is “the probability that a variate would assume a value greater than or equal to the observed value strictly by chance”. (Source: Weisstein, Eric W. "P-Value." MathWorld - A Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/P-Value.html)
169 As P values and confidence intervals (confidence interval is a concept of statistics that is used to indicate the reliability of an estimate) are intertwined, the significance of the P is considered according to how a hypothesis can be considered null by the confidence interval. The case presented by our study, counting the keywords of the statements, is considered very statistically significant because the value reached was 0.0095 and “if the P value is less than 0.05, then the 95% confidence interval cannot contain the value that defines the null hypothesis.” (Source: GraphPad Software. “Interpreting results: P values from contingency tables”. http://graphpad.com/quickcalcs/prism6/statistics/index.htm?stat_interpreting_results_contingen2_2.htm)
members. Thus, the results would appear to represent the desire by the UfC to attach a democratic characteristic to its bid for reform.

The result of this analysis on a democratic ideology of the UfC can be supported by other evidence, such as an analysis of whether the structure proposed by the group will be able to establish a more democratic distribution of power inside the Council or not.

Voting power simulations

In terms of democratic structure, it is possible to elaborate two questions: How can the proposal presented by the UfC be considered more democratic? How would the UfC option of reform make the distribution of power more equal inside the Council?

The voting power inside the UN mechanisms of decision-making represents the possibility of changing the results of political processes through the democratic practice of voting. When it comes to the reform of the UN Security Council, a reshaping of the significance of votes points to a real transformation of representation matters, because a new distribution of power can attribute to members who do not have much voice on decisions inside the current Council’s system, more influence over the political outcomes.

In order to determine the legitimacy of the UfC as a reformer group, the consideration of the voting power established after a possible reform becomes very important. If the final objectives of the structure proposed by the UfC can mean a more equal distribution of power among the general membership of the Council, it definitely reflects the democratic characteristics of the proposal and consequently to what could be interpreted as a genuine intention to transform the organ in such a manner.

The distribution of seats, according to the UfC proposal and as noted before, aims at the creation of ten new non-permanent seats inside the Security Council. These
new seats would have the possibility of being reelected, considering decisions by their regional groups.\footnote{170} However, the number of new members is not just associated with a larger representation in accordance with the number of countries that would be able to participate in the Council meetings, but it also represents a new balance of power for the membership.

When the Council was first expanded in 1965, the new number of members directly affected the majority required for approval inside the organ. Article 27 of the Charter was amended with the enlargement and from then on, nine positive votes, including the five permanent members, were required for the adoption of resolutions, instead of the former seven necessary votes. This change meant “a serious blow to the influence of the permanent members as a group.”\footnote{171} Basically, the enlargement signified a better distribution of power among the membership, making the negotiation a little bit harder for the permanent members, even with the existence of the veto power.

In the earlier 11-member Council, the permanent members, if they were to act in unison, had no difficulty in easily passing a procedural or a substantive resolution by the number of votes required (i.e. seven votes). They needed to carry only two non-permanent members with them. But the 1965 amendments changed considerably the voting balance between the permanent and non-permanent members and caused serious voting complications for the former. They had to exert more effort to enlist at least four additional votes for the passing of procedural or non-procedural resolutions by nine votes, as required by the amended Article 27.\footnote{172}

The recent proposals of expansion also have this aspect. A higher number of seats would mean an even broader distribution of decision power among members and require completely different majorities. An expansion to 25 or 26 members according to the claims by the G4 and the AU would require a new majority of 14 positive votes, while an expansion to 24 members according to the UfC would bring the majority

\footnote{170} See Chart 2.9: Distribution of seats according to the UfC proposal, p. 76.
\footnote{171} Bouratonis, 2005. p. 28
\footnote{172} Bouratonis, 2005. p. 28-29
required from 9 to 15. Those possible new majorities would be a significant transformation for the process of negotiation inside the Security Council.

It is also important to consider that the question of veto obviously affects this distribution of power in terms of concentrating more privilege in the permanent category and subduing the position of non-permanent seats. According to Toshitaka Takeuchi, in the current organization of the Council, the veto represents nine times more voting power than what the non-permanent seats have.\(^ {173}\)

Some academic researchers using methods of probability and game-theory made a basic comparison of how the expansion proposals would affect the voting power inside the Security Council and how positive some of them would be in terms of democratic distribution of this power. The probabilistic analyses on the matters of reform were performed aiming “to explore some of the logical possibilities for reforming UNSC decision procedures by means of weighted voting.”\(^ {174}\)

According to Strand and Rapkin’s analysis, the enlargement of the majority would be proportionally equal to the expansion of the decision power to all member states, blocking or not a resolution inside the Council.\(^ {175}\) The conditionals involved in the probability are complex, but considering only the numerical aspects, it is possible to determine the possibility excluding the political process. For the researchers, according to the numbers, “the selection of a majority decision rule is a crucial factor for both individual voting power and the probability that the Council will be able to pass a resolution.”\(^ {176}\)

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\(^ {175}\) Ibid
\(^ {176}\) Idem. p. 21
At the same time that questions related to the effectiveness and the functioning of the Council are common when addressing a limited expansion of the organ, the other way around is valid in terms of democratic and equal representation. According to Toshitaka Takeuchi, the representation inside the Council is divided between the “winning coalition” and the “losing coalition”, where every single country has the power to change the voting situation results with only a complication: the question of the veto. Using the Bolger Index, a method well known inside the game-theory field, he tested all the three main proposals for expansion – from the AU, the G4 and the UfC – and determined how the voting power would be distributed among the seats, including the uncertainty of the veto.\footnote{Takeuchi, 2009.}

Joining the results of Strand and Rapkin to the conclusions achieved by Takeuchi, the analysis favorably supports the democratic aspect of the proposal of the Uniting for Consensus. While a higher established majority would influence the distribution of power, the distribution would mean more democratic representation depending on how the expansion of this majority would happen.

The proposal by the AU would reduce the voting power of the permanent seats, diluting the current power among the possible 11 seats, and reducing even more the power of influence of the elected members. The G4 proposal would represent, during the period of non-veto for the new permanent seats, a maintenance of the current balance, without a proper reform in the matters of voting power transformation. Among these three groups, the Uniting for Consensus would represent the more drastic change with the expansion of only non-permanent seats, because it would establish a better voting power for all the members (compared to their current situation), mainly to the
major actors, such as Brazil and Japan, which are frequently elected to the Council’s non-permanent members.\textsuperscript{178}

Thus, following the combination of the results obtained from the two separate approaches, it is possible to conclude that such an expansion would affect the majority, and the distribution of power. Considering the interference of an expansion to the veto or a simple expansion of the permanent category, the UfC proposal would be the most advantageous change in terms of equal representation. The creation of only non-permanent seats would not allow the expansion of privileges to a few more countries that would keep most of the decision-making under the power of the permanent seats. At the same time it would not allow the maintenance of the status quo, considering that an expansion of permanent seats without the veto power would keep the same balance of power. An enlargement of elected seats would represent more decision power to every single state elected, reducing the predominance of the permanent members.

The voting power simulation is one of the factors that points to the democratic character of the UfC proposal. This simulation supports also the keyword counting already presented, which pointed to a higher use of the concept of democracy by their representatives during official statements. Both results are arguments in support of the technical legitimacy of this group as a fair and acceptable model for the UN membership as a whole, which appear to reflect genuine objectives of transformation.

Personal perspectives from actors directly involved in the process are also very important to support the aspects and results already mentioned, providing an inside view of how the proposal is received by the international community. Academics and

\textsuperscript{178} Takeuchi, 2009.
national delegates can provide important keys to a better perception of how legitimate the Uniting for Consensus intentions can be considered.

**Perspectives of legitimacy**

There are several different (and often conflicting) points of view regarding the intentions by the UfC members among the UN membership. While people related to the group and some researchers defend and affirm the legitimacy of UfC’s claim, sources related to other groups or other academic views present opposing arguments.

Today, with the increasing exhaustion after 20 years of debates, it is difficult to collect perspectives from delegates or other actors. Considering the deadlocked status of the reform processes, most of the missions have decided to focus on the working methods of the Council rather than pursuing an endless discussion on expansion and all the problematic topics related to it. When asked for some thoughts on the matter, most missions simply ignore the subject or affirm that the best sources are the actor directly connected to the groups. It seems that for many members of the UN, the will for pursuing the enlargement of the membership of the Council has faded somewhat over time.

During interviews, sources connected to the Uniting for Consensus defended the group’s position, affirming that everybody knows that the Council needs to be reformed, but that an enlargement of permanent seats would be complicated. According to one of the sources, the members of the group defend a reform that would really improve the Security Council’s effectiveness, representation and transparency; these were the intentions in assuming this position from the beginning of the debates, even before the official creation of the group.\(^{179}\)

\(^{179}\) Information collected from an interview given by an anonymous source connected to the Uniting for Consensus, in 11 April 2013.
A specific source connected to the UfC explained the position on the creation of new permanent seats, saying:

We think that new permanent members would not make the Council more democratic and specially would not make the Council more accountable, because accountability at the UN is basically going through elections in front of the membership and the permanent members would not go through elections. Adaptable because we think that with more permanent members we would not have an adaptable Council, we might end up in fifteen, ten years time with the same situation we are living today, with the need to adjust the Council to a new international reality and at that point, if you had a reform with new permanent members, you cannot propose the same way of reforming in fifteen, ten years. If we say that another country, another two countries are growing and want to get more responsibility, how would you reform that Council in fifteen, ten years? Adding permanent members at that point you would end up with a General Assembly and not with the Security Council. So the effectiveness of the Council would be jeopardized. Permanent members were decided in a special situation in the world international affairs, in the after war. The winners, as usually happens, so designed the rules of the new international order and for themselves they decided to assume permanent membership, but it is not the solution in this time.\(^{180}\)

At the same time, the opposite view is clearly presented by sources connected to other groups. The legitimacy of the UfC’s intentions is, as explained before, denied by actors that have in mind some different opinions on the reform of the Security Council. According to one of the consulted sources related to one of the other opposing groups, the position of the UfC is complicated and has much more capacity to be flexible because the group presents a negative proposal. This anonymous source affirmed that they are not searching for a special model of reform; they are fighting against a model. In these terms, the status quo would not be a problem for the UfC as long as a reform following another model was not approved.\(^{181}\)

Sources connected to specific positions inside the organization are understandable, considering their necessity to support their own political aims.

\(^{180}\) Quote from the interview given by a source connected to the Uniting for Consensus, in 19 April 2013.

\(^{181}\) Quote from the interview given by an anonymous source, in 11 July 2013.
Accusations and defenses, when presented by actors involved with the promotion of a particular draft, are directly influenced by the position of actors in the debates and how they interpret or try to convince other actors to similarly understand the facts. Despite the rarity of external actors wishing to express their perspectives on specific activities realized by other fellow representatives and missions, the ones that decided to present them represent a great argument in terms of how positions are seen by other countries when no political interest is involved.

The UfC position, considered by some representatives as an attempt to block the development of the entire reform process, was defended by representatives and sources not directly connected to the Uniting for Consensus as members. One of these sources was a permanent representative at the UN. The diplomat affirmed that:

They do not agree there should be new permanent seats and so I think it is only legitimate to make their own proposal and I might say, to the credit of Uniting for Consensus, they have actually moved on in their position. Because initially they just wanted regular two-year seats and now they are making a forward step by saying that the seats could be longer, maybe even up to five years, what could be interesting for people that are in the other way of the spectrum. So, I mean, of course they do not want to be outvoted in the General Assembly and are holding on to their position now, but I see nothing wrong with that.182

During the debates, also, some missions recognized the legitimacy of all resolution drafts, even thanking the groups for their efforts in presenting proposals and implementing the debates. The representative of Belarus, in 2005, presented the mission’s gratitude to the AU, the G4, and the UfC for their contribution to the debate:

Belarus commends Member States for their efforts in the run-up to the United Nations summit to advance the issue of Security Council reform. Those efforts significantly reinvigorated the discussion on the issue of Council expansion. We are sincerely grateful to the group of four countries – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – to the

182 Quote from the interview given by a representative in 27 April 2013.
African Union (AU) and to the Uniting for Consensus group, for their important contributions to the discussion on ways to enlarge the Security Council.\footnote{See the records of the debates on the 49th plenary meeting of 11 November 2005, p. 8. (A/60/PV.49)}

The clash of opinions on the Uniting for Consensus group goes beyond the internal affairs of the UN, reaching also the academia. Some researchers see the legitimacy of the proposal in political terms, while others agree with the allegation that its members are using the group as a venue to prevent their regional rivals for being new permanent members at the Council.\footnote{Information collected from an interview given by an anonymous source connected to the Uniting for Consensus, in 11 April 2013.}

An anonymous source connected to the Uniting for Consensus defined the group as a reunion of like-minded countries that follow their own ideals, aiming to propose more flexibility to the reform debates.\footnote{Quote from an interview with Courtney Smith, in 4 March 2013.} The same is supported by Courtney Smith, researcher and specialist on the political processes inside the UN.\footnote{Information collected from an interview given by a researcher and specialist on the political processes inside the UN, in 4 March 2013.}

Although not very optimistic on the actual achievement of the creation of new permanent seats with veto power or even an actual reform, Smith accompanied the reform processes during the 1990s and continued his research on political activity inside the UN. According to him, after interviewing a fair number of Coffee Club members in that decade, they seem to have a very genuine interest in a Council reform.

They were just very nervous by the speed in with the quick fix on the Razali proposal was moving forward and the idea of identifying certain countries within the regions that may get new seats and the potential exclusion of others within these regions. I think that, initially, the Coffee Club emerged as a … spoiler is not the right word, I mean, it implies that they have negative kinds of issues for motives and I do not want to do that. Because they have a genuine interest and countries have the right to pursue their interests in UN. In this particular issue there is a lot of disagreement among these different countries and that is why we are not reaching an agreement, but it does not
mean that the countries that disagree are unjustified for tensing the positions they have. I think the Coffee Club was very interested on being protective.\textsuperscript{186}

The action by the group during the times of the Coffee Club and more recently as the Uniting for Consensus did not represent an attempt to spoil the process as it just represented that its members have a different point of view. According to Smith, the difference does not mean that the group is against the reform, it just points to the pursuit of a more widespread agreement on a model of reform.

At the same time an anonymous source affirms that the content of the proposals are ultimately irrelevant for the UfC as the group would not accept any proposal from countries that are pursuing permanent membership. He thinks that since the core members of UfC have no chance of becoming new permanent members, they are trying to prevent their more powerful regional rivals from being chosen for the new seats.\textsuperscript{187}

Nahory and Paul strongly affirm that proposals with permanence claims would have difficulty in establishing a better and democratic Council, using and reinforcing the same argument as the UfC.

Some reform proposals, couched in democratic language, would multiply this problem – enlarging the oligarchy by adding five or six other powerful governments. More permanent members would scarcely make the Council more representative, accountable, transparent, legitimate or even-handed. Self-interest, not democracy, motivates these membership claims, and a Council loaded with more permanent members would suffer from gridlock and political sclerosis.\textsuperscript{188}

Seen in terms of legitimacy, the Uniting for Consensus activity as a group has elicited a considerable amount of criticism from some actors, but the defense of its rights to promote its own model of reform is not inexistent. Even when assuming an

\textsuperscript{186} Quote from an interview with Courtney Smith, in 4 March 2013.
\textsuperscript{187} Information collected from an interview given in 17 August 2013.
\textsuperscript{188} Nahory, Céline; Paul, James A. “‘To contribute to the maintenance of international peace and Security…’ The Case for Democratic Reform of the Security Council” \textit{The Quest for Regional Representation Reforming the United Nations Security Council}, critical currents n. 4 (2008): 31
action represents an attempt to block other models, some sources are clear in stating that this kind of position, inside an international and multilateral organization, is normal and genuine.

In summary, considering the perceptions about the group and the chronology since its initial positioning as a coalition in 1997 and even observing its members before it became official, it is possible to analyze a pattern of actions. As with the other groups, the members by themselves and the coalition as a whole had always maintained the same position on a possible future enlargement of the Council. The possibility of an enlargement of permanent seats was never seen as a good option by its members.

The importance of democracy and its practice in terms of representation were considered by some members from the creation of the UN, during the conference in San Francisco. The use of this concept during discourses was maintained by members not by chance, showing a genuine pursuit of a democratic and equal representation in the Council. This is also reflected in the characteristics of the proposal itself, which if achieved, would produce a fairer distribution of voting power among members when compared to the other proposals. But analysis of such intentions aside, it can also simply be argued that the coalition, like its counterparts, has the right to defend its interests and ideals in the reform process without necessarily being labeled as a “spoiler”.

A second and perhaps even more important aspect of the UfC case is addressed in the next chapter. The measuring of the possible support received by the group’s ideas, especially when compared with the support received by the other two proposals (those by the AU and the G4), is fundamental to an analysis of how the group’s ideas were received by the UN membership and needs to be considered regarding the issue of
whether or not the UfC was an attempt by a minority to block a momentum for reform by a majority.

The open debates on the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” held at the UN General Assembly hall, represent an ample base of analysis of positions and ideas circulating among permanent missions on the issue of reform.
CHAPTER IV

SUPPORT
The support received by some ideas during the discussions on a possible reform of the Security Council is a very important source of analysis. Positive mentions and the defense of specific ideas by members in the General Assembly can mean the approval of a possible reform of the Security Council. In the case of the UfC, when analyzed, support levels can indicate how the ideas and the formal proposal by this group were understood by the UN membership.

Expressions of support for specific topics that were discussed over the reform debates can show how some proposals and groups are accepted by the member states, indicating whether some of the presented ideas are considered as viable candidates for reform or not. The qualification of a draft as a mere attempt to spoil the process, as in the case of the UfC, can be better considered when examining the numbers generated by these positive mentions, especially in a comparison with the other main groups – the AU and the G4. To reveal the levels of support for the proposals, this research analyzed all official statements made in the General Assembly on the question of equitable representation on the Security Council from 1993 to 2012. Initially, it was necessary to create a numerical system of measurement to approach the material and generate an overview of the overt levels of support during the 20 years of discussions. The system, as explained in this section, was then used to create visual tools with which the opinions of the General Assembly as a whole on the topics addressed during debates on reform could be viewed.

This chapter first presents the measuring system created by this research and then its results, aiming to establish one last piece of evidence that will shed light on the position of the UfC inside the reform debates. The final objective of this analysis, also a main objective of this research, is to determine whether the activities and proposals by UfC members did or did not represent an attempt to block or delay the reform process.
This session will quantitatively demonstrate that the UfC was not responsible for any specific blocking of the outcomes of the process and did not hinder any so-called momentum of the discussions.

Support Measuring System

The basic material of analysis used in this research, as explained before, were statements made by representatives at the UN General Assembly Hall during the 20 years of open debates on the agenda item “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council.”

Although the Open-Ended Working Group on the question of equitable representation in the Council conducted work on the proposals and possible solutions for the matter at hand, the open debates serve as a forum for broader expressions of intent by member states. The records of these statements are available in the form of the so-called verbatim records of its meetings (PV).

It is important to highlight that the best source for an establishment of official levels of support inside the UN would obviously be voting results. However, as an anonymous representative affirmed:

While support for the various groups and their positions does not seem to have changed significantly over the years of discussions/negotiations, it should be noted that the levels of support for the different positions have not been formally tested in a vote.\(^\text{189}\)

During the debates on a possible expansion of seats in the Security Council, with exception of Resolution 53/30,\(^\text{190}\) other ideas for methods to reform the Council never received enough support to be taken into consideration in a voting process. In the absence of indicators of actual support that would have been seen in voting patterns, this research focuses on the next best alternative: overt expressions of support seen in the

\(^{189}\) Quote from an interview given by an anonymous permanent representative, by email.

\(^{190}\) Resolution that established the rule of Article 108 for all reform decisions in the General Assembly, approved unanimously in 1998.
statements in the General Assembly. These PV were, in fact, in the case of the reform debates, the only official sources for a somewhat reliable measurement of how the expansion ideas were addressed by the UN membership, at least in public. The main objective of creating a system of measurement to generate quantitative results from a qualitative analysis of each speech from this period was to construct a map of the debates based on these statements and recognize important characteristics of the process and, in particular, the aspects related to the UfC and its participation in the reform discussions.

**Chart 4.1: Number of statements per year (1993-2012)**

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<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The system of analysis covered 1,556 statements distributed across the period considered: the 20 years of debates. The statements reached their peak between 2004 and 2005, a moment of intense activity on the issue of the reform of the Council which
also represented the years when the key proposals were presented to the Assembly. (See Chart 4.1)

In more specific detail, the Support Measuring System is based on the reading, the classification and the counting of certain aspects that were referred to during the speeches.

It is important to note that, as the only available and official sources for analysis were these statements, the mentions do not necessarily accurately reflect the reality in terms of actual intentions, at least not in their entirety. Expressions of support during the debates at the General Assembly do not exactly point to a position as it would be played out in a voting process, which occurs after a long process of informal negotiations. As such, the results generated by the system should only be taken to reflect informal levels of support, as mentioned above, not necessarily a scenario that will predict definitively the future outcome of these reform debates.

However, the importance of these informal levels cannot be overlooked, they do show how ideas were carried by the membership during the discussions. Thus, using a list of specific topics related to the reform as a method of classification inside the system, this study counted how often each of the items were positively mentioned during speeches in order to generate final numbers. The list had a total of 60 topics that represented options for reform, taking into consideration every new idea presented by members during the years of debates.191

More importantly, these categories guided the qualitative analysis of the speeches, making the identification of what should be considered relevant inside these discourses easier.

One table was created for each year of the debates. Each table contained one line for each of the participants in the debate, with columns representing each of the possible categories of the analysis. A circle in a column marked an expression of support for a particular aspect of the reform process. (See Chart 4.2)

**Chart 4.2: Example of Organizational Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>NAP</th>
<th>NNP</th>
<th>NC</th>
<th>NNC</th>
<th>GT</th>
<th>PR</th>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After a content analysis of the statements and with the data organization concluded, the results were tallied. Each circle meant one point for the correspondent category during the year, and the final number of points determined the proportion of expressions of support for specific issues out of the total number of statements in the debates for that year. The calculation of this proportion was then used as the base of a comparison with the proportion that would be necessary for approval in a vote in the General Assembly, two-thirds of the participants – 66% of positive votes. This process generated an indication of the informal levels of support and possible speculations of which topics would receive approval if submitted to a voting process in the Assembly, disregarding the complex variable of the veto power.

In a first analysis, the final numbers generated by the system generated immediate and clear conclusions. It could be seen, for example, that after a consensus was recognized on a general topic, the subject was not mentioned by the delegates
anymore: the consensus on the expansion of seats, independent of categories, assumed an absolute character from the beginning of the debates and in a specific point, the countries concluded that it was not necessary anymore to mention this support for an expansion; the only mention to keep the status quo occurred in 1995, in a statement by the representative of Swaziland. In another example of clear numerical exemplification, when cross-checked with the chronological data, it is easy to notice a pattern of positions according to the development of the discussion: factors like disappointment and accusations started after the first failure to achieve an agreement and finish the process in 1998; and, interestingly, discourses became more objective and specific after the Secretary General’s statement calling for more efforts in reforming the Council in 2003.

However, the generated numbers and impressions need more careful evaluation to generate concrete data, which increases the complexity of the results and can create different and intermediate categories. Considering the proposals and ideas analyzed, it is important to have broader information, such as: which countries support an expansion in both existing categories or just in the non-permanent one, unlike the data on which categories were supported separately by each country to be expanded even when the same country mentioned both of them? Or, which countries are against the veto power but do support an expansion of the power based in terms of equality among members? Every minimal detail in the content of the speeches can mean a different outcome and demands caution during the qualitative analysis.

For a better evaluation and aiming to answer the questions proposed by this research on the matters of expansion models and the UfC case, the statement topics considered more important among the list of categories are the ones related to:
expansion of seats; direct support to specific countries; new types of seats; proposals; veto; and, structural ideas.

Expansion of seats

The Security Council is currently made up by two categories of membership: permanent and elected seats. Considering the differences between the three main reform proposals, this question of the expansion of seats was the cause of all main clashes among the groups. Whether or not an expansion of the number of permanent members was supported, was the point that determined the final separation between the UfC and the groups calling for more permanent seats: the G4 and the AU.

The issue of the expansion of the number of seats in the Council thus assumed a very important status during the debates. More specifically, this issue included variables on methods of enlargement and addressed the visions of which of the existing categories need expansion. Most of the references to expansion included specifications regarding whether the missions had a preference for an expansion in both categories or in just one of them.

According to the measurement system and the analysis of the outcomes, it is possible to read the data in different ways. One of the readings points to how many times the support for an expansion of each category was mentioned. Therefore, if just the specific percentages of mentions to new permanent or exclusively to new non-permanent seats are considered separately, even for countries that may support expansion on both categories, the results show an absolute majority of support for an expansion of non-permanent seats.¹⁹²

During most of the analyzed years, the percentage of countries supporting an expansion of elected seats reached the proportional majority of the General Assembly:

two-thirds of the general membership. Across the 20 years of the analysis, 6 years presented a relevant majority of support for new non-permanent seats, against only 2 years of a majority reached for the support of new permanent seats.

These numbers represented the base of support to the ideas presented by the NAM in the 1990s. According to the group, as no agreement on a possible expansion of permanent seats, or even on the method of this enlargement, was reached, an initial increase of non-permanent seats would be the best solution as there was a clear agreement on raising the number of elected seats.

In 1996, the representative of Colombia spoke on behalf of the NAM members over the question of equitable representation and presented the decisions adopted at the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in October 1995. When mentioning the question of seat expansion on the report elaborated at the conference, the ambassador stated:

The report also emphasizes the wide support for the proposal of the Non-Aligned Movement that, should no consensus be reached on other categories of membership, the increase in the number of members should for the time being take place only in the category of non-permanent members. Support for this position not only included that of the 113 members of the Non-Aligned Movement, but also that of a considerable number of other countries that are not members of the Movement.¹⁹³

Before the claims from the Secretary General in 2003, a large number of countries agreed with the NAM’s idea of an initial expansion of non-permanent seats. In 2003, the representative of Iran affirmed once more the compromise of the country with the reform and expansion of the Council, adding that the fall back position by the NAM should be maintained: “if no agreement is not reached on the expansion of the

¹⁹³ See the records of the debates on the 44th plenary meeting of 29 October 1996, p. 24. (A/51/PV.44)
permanent membership, then the expansion should be limited, for the present, to the non-permanent seats.”

Referring specifically to the UfC, the expansion of permanent seats is not an acceptable option, so it is important to discern representatives that present support for this idea from the missions that support other proposals claiming for new permanent seats as well. The positive view of an enlargement of permanency at the Council is automatically connected to possible support to the G4 or the AU.

In 2002, for example, at the same moment that Uruguay made the clear affirmation that “no state is opposed to the increase in non-permanent membership”, the African representations started to be clearer in specifying that an expansion in the non-permanent category alone would not be accepted by the AU. The complexity of the situation, demonstrated by this clash of declarations, is one of the arguments that supports the fact that the expansion of categories demands a deeper evaluation of the variables that characterize the discussions.

In these terms, two specific categories of analysis were created inside the measurement system: expansion in both categories, and expansion in non-permanent seats only. These categories represented more important results towards the study case approached by this research and presented results more closely related to the draft resolutions.

The separation between the two new categories transforms completely the map of support for enlargement among the UN membership after the adoption of more specific considerations. The support for an expansion in solely in the non-permanent category assumed a very low percentage while the support for an expansion in both categories reaches higher numbers during the 20 years. The enlargement of both

194 See the records of the debates on the 30th plenary meeting of 14 October 2003, p. 23. (A/58/PV.30)
195 See the records of the debates on the 32nd plenary meeting of 16 October 2002, p. 16. (A/57/PV.32)
categories reached the absolute majority considered in comparison to the total in the General Assembly of 2005, with 72% of participants presenting positions in favor. (See Chart 4.3)

**Chart 4.3: Percentage of supportive mentions to an expansion of existing categories (1993-2012)**

Through an observation of the data, it is possible to confirm some of the arguments presented by the G4 and AU. Members of these groups affirmed that there is a majority agreeing on expanding both categories of the membership of the Council. The open support for an expansion of elected seats alone had its highest percentage in 2001, when 22% made expressions in favor of the notion. This result would not be favorable to the UfC proposal in terms of support, as the group defends an exclusive expansion of non-permanent seats. According to an anonymous source connected to one of the groups claiming for permanent seats, the UfC represents a clear minority when
compared to the idea of an expansion reform on both categories, which was always supported by a majority.\textsuperscript{197}

However, aside from the fact that apparent support was only achieved in a single year over the 20-year period, the problem of this majority is exactly the lack of specificity on the permanent category. Regardless of a majority supporting an expansion in both existing categories of the Council, the same cannot be said about the choice of countries understood as capable of assuming responsibilities as permanent members. During the 20 years of discussions, the participants were not able to clearly and consistently agree on which countries should assume those positions.

\textit{Direct support to specific countries}

As mentioned before, the 20 years of debates on the expansion of the seats at the UN Security Council saw agreements over some topics but also long years of disagreements. Despite the support from the majority to a possible enlargement in both categories of seats inside the Council, the direct specification of which countries would be considered competent to assume the responsibilities and privileges of permanence, never represented a real possibility of resolution.

No country actually received enough support from the general membership for their bids, even when receiving direct support from three of the five permanent members: France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Only six countries were ever specifically mentioned as potential candidates to occupy a permanent seat: Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa. While the members of the G4 received comparatively more support, Indonesia and South Africa received just one mention each during the 20 years of discussions, which, for the purposes of the measurement system, were negligible.

\textsuperscript{197} Quote from the interview given by an anonymous source, in 11 July 2013.
In the beginning of the 1990s, a rise in support for the bids of Japan and Germany did occur, but even with this gain, neither came remotely close, in terms of expressions for support from the participants in the discussions, to the majority required. During the entire period of the 20 years of debates on the reform, explicit expressions of support towards the two industrialized countries were never observed in more than 25 percent of of the statements on the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council.”

The initial specific supportive mentions occurred in 1994, when France, the United Kingdom and the United States officially presented, together with other missions, their support for Japan and Germany. India and Brazil began to receive at least one mention per year from 1995 onwards. The beginning of the 2000s represented a separation between the two industrialized countries when Germany started to receive fewer mentions of support. For Brazil and India, the opposite was observed, with an increase of mentions from the end of the 1990s. The apex of specific support for these four actors occurred in 2004 and 2005, with the presentation of the reform draft.
resolutions. At that moment, the percentages of support reached were 24% for Japan, 19% for Germany, 16% for India and 12% for Brazil. (See Chart 4.4)

Considering the required two-thirds majority required for General Assembly decisions, none of the actors that actually received direct mentions from UN members came close to reaching the necessary level of support that would allow for possible election as a new permanent member. While the lack of explicit support in the debates does not necessarily mean that these countries in question would not vote in favor of proposals attributing permanent status to the four hopefuls (and the same applies to support for any of the other proposals examined below), the results would certainly not have been considered encouraging by the G4.

The low rates of support on this question indicate that possible actions by the UfC are not the main reason impeding the resolution of the expansion issue. While some researchers maintain that the G4 members face primarily “the strong resistance from neighboring countries such as Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Italy and Argentina”\(^{198}\), the numbers show that this resistance is not very significant given the apparently low level of direct specific support expressed for them by the general UN membership. Considering the lack of expressions of direct support among the entire membership at any point in time in the 20-years of debates, it is quite a stretch to blame regional divisions, or a minority group blocking momentum for reform.

Another important topic that connects the issue of categories with the analysis of draft resolutions is whether to create a third kind of seats for the Council or not. According to some representatives, a positive option to the reform would be to create new seats with new features, such as the periods of terms in the Council and how decisive the regional groups can be in these participations.

\(^{198}\) Lee, Seryon. "Feasibility of Reforming the UN Security Council: Too Much Talk, Too Little Action?" Reforming the UNSC. p. 411
**New categories**

Adding a third category of seats is an old idea in the reform debates. As mentioned before, Italy and Turkey were responsible for proposing the creation of a semi-permanent category of seats already in 1993. After the dynamic first two years of the debates, the subject assumed several variables. When the UN membership showed a position against the implementation of more differences among members of the Council, the missions started to adapt the idea of creating a new category (referred to for the purposes of this study as NC), characterizing the new seats as: regional representation (RR) with seats for regional groups; rotating permanent seats (PRS); and, more recently, an intermediate category (IC). (See Chart 4.5)

**Chart 4.5: Percentages of positive mentions to the creation of new categories (1993-2012)**

As was the case with specific candidates for permanent seats, there was also no agreement or enough support for the creation of new categories of seats. However, it is interesting to observe how the terms were adapted over the years in an attempt to change the situation. There was a clear decrease of mentions regarding the option of regional seats or simply new kinds of membership during the 1990s. That situation only

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199 Numbers 8, 9, 12, 14, 15 and 58 in Annex II: List of Categories for Support Measuring, p. 167.
changed with the presentation of the permanent rotating seat option by the African position in 1997. During the 2000s, the mentions of a regional representation made a comeback and, in 2007, the idea of creating an intermediate category of seats became a topic again and brought it back to the debates. (See Chart 4.5)

At the same time, the positions against the creation of a new category underwent similar transformations during the years, accompanying the discussion basically as a position contrary to the creation of new types of seats. During the 20 years of debates, some countries presented negative views about the creation of new categories of seats and also of the rotating permanent seats proposed by the AU. (See Chart 4.6)

**Chart 4.6: Percentages of mentions against new types of seats (1993-2012)**

The creation of a new kind of seats was an idea always supported by members of the UfC, even before the creation of the group. Two important characteristics of the official draft resolution by the UfC were: the creation of regional seats or of an intermediate category; and the removal of the barrier to re-election for non-permanent members. The lack of support for a new categories among the UN membership made the group change the focus of its bid, highlighting a possible change of the conditions of
existing categories, changing, for example, the rule of re-election for non-permanent seats.

Elected members are not allowed to be re-elected right after their 2-year terms in the Security Council. According to the 23rd Article of the UN Charter, “a retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.” Initially, the UfC connected the idea of immediate re-election to the new category to be created and, during 1993 and 1994, the immediate re-election proposal was met by expressions of support in 22% of the statements made. (See Chart 4.7)

When the member states also started to associate a new category with the issue of re-election, the decrease in support for the creation of new types of seats also represented a diminution of mentions regarding a modification of the election system. Small states assumed a position against the change, recognizing in the modification of the re-election rule a disadvantage for their participations at the Council. As the representative of Kuwait mentioned in 1997:

Kuwait supports maintaining the machinery for electing non-permanent members to the Council, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the United Nations Charter. This would afford a greater chance to small states, including Kuwait, to gain membership in the Council and to take part in its work.

In 2003, members of the UfC reiterated their wish to abolish the prohibition on re-election in a different way. Instead of establishing the re-election as a characteristic of a possible new category, the group started to defend the establishment for the existing non-permanent category.

When the option of creating an intermediate category of seats was brought back to the discussion table in a different perspective by the report of the working group in

201 See the records of the debates on the 64th plenary meeting of 5 December 1997, p. 20. (A/52/PV.64)
2007, the mentions on re-election regained visibility in the percentages of mentions. (See Chart 4.7)

**Chart 4.7: Percentages for and against immediate re-election (1993-2012)**

Like most of the details inside the reform debates, the creation of new categories was another topic with low level of support by the general membership. Likewise, the abolition of the prohibition of re-election was just an option mentioned at the General Assembly Hall. Both of these options represented great interests for the UfC members over the years, but did not received enough positive mentions to make these ideas viable for a possible vote on the matter.

Paying attention to other specific details that influenced the support given to the groups, it is also important to briefly analyze the complex issue of the veto power and how this matter was observed by the member states during the debates, while taking into consideration the fact that the veto is one of the important differences among the drafts resolutions of the AU, the G4 and the UfC.

**Veto**

As mentioned above, the veto has been questioned since the very creation of the UN and has always represented a complex issue among the membership. When
analyzing the question of the veto, two topics of categorization become important: mentions favorable to the maintenance or the expansion of the veto to possible new permanent members; and, mentions against the existence of a veto power or favorable to its curtailment.²⁰²

Before the beginning of the official debates on the reform of the Council, the power to block decisions held by the permanent members was widely criticized by the general UN membership as a privilege that was against the principle of the sovereign equality of states fixed by the UN Charter. During the first years of discussions, the question of the veto remained a practice rejected by most of the members, with the obvious exception of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, the five permanent members. (See Chart 4.8) The rejection of the veto by other members was demonstrated in diverse ways, from calls for a simple constraint of power to calls for the absolute abolishment of the power.

Views in support of the rejection of the veto dominated the debates on the matter during most of the years, but positive positions on a possible expansion of the power gained strength from 1997. During that year, the African position assumed the claim of equality between the possible candidates for new permanent seats and the current ones, and implemented a new variable of complexity to the analysis: at the same time that the African members were against the veto power, they started to affirm that an expansion of the power would be reasonable in terms of equality of member states.

As the representative of Namibia explained on the position of his country in 1999:

[...] the exercise of the right of veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. However, if the veto is to be maintained in any form whatsoever, it must also be accorded to the new permanent members in the reformed Council.203

From that moment on, the argument of equality gave support to mentions favorable to a veto expansion. This moment was accompanied by affirmations that no such power reform would be accepted by the current permanent members who would definitively block any attempt of modification over the veto. Nevertheless, statements in the talks against the veto still dominated the debates and almost reached the required majority in 2001 at 64%. (See Chart 4.8)

The veto power is one of the most complicated topics inside the reform debates and is probably the only that achieves somehow an agreement among the membership, but it will not be solved anytime soon because of that very same power that the permanent members can use to block the possible solutions. It is also well known that any probable expansion of the veto to new members is a very unlikely event in the future of the UN.

203 See the records of the debates on the 82nd plenary meeting of 16 December 1999, p. 5. (A/54/PV.82)
Among the proposals, the AU was the only coalition calling for the veto, while the G4 assumed a defensive position on the issue, initially proposing permanent seats without the veto. The UfC maintained its members’ position of completely rejecting the existence of this privilege, considering any attempt to expand permanent seats or the veto power as a serious violation of the principle of sovereign equality of member states. However, despite the differences between these groups, the veto is the only issue that will probably equally frustrate all the claims.

It is interesting to note that if the expressions of support for positions made in statements to the General Assembly can be taken as an indication of support in the broader sense, most of the specific characteristics of the proposals never received enough support to make any of the groups’ proposals acceptable to the majority. Simply put, if the specificities proved difficult to agree on, the support of entire proposals was also going to be very difficult to achieve.

Proposals

The three main proposals analyzed in this research were first officially presented as draft resolutions during the 59th session of the General Assembly in 2004-2005. After the presentation of the documents, the groups started to receive direct mentions and gather support.

The African Union, existing as a regional group already before the presentation of its draft, was the only coalition that received mentions during the early years of the debates. The so-called African position was presented since the beginning of the discussions in 1993. The AU presented its official proposal in 2005, but the informal levels of support to its ideas already existed before this. This justifies the fact that the AU was the only coalition that appears on the graph with supportive mentions before and after the presentation of the official draft resolution. (See Chart 4.9)
When the draft resolution presented the ideas of the Ezulwini Consensus, bringing the entire continent together as a strong group to the debate, it officially only repeated the claims presented in the reports of the Organization of African Unity during the 1990s. The proposal represented the official documentation of a position already defended since the beginning of the discussions.

**Chart 4.9: Level of support received by African proposals over the years (1993-2012)**

In 1998, with the Razali Plan and the notions of a possible momentum for the matters of reform to be solved, the African ideas received the highest percentage of mentions, with support from around 24% of the participants. With rare exceptions, the levels of support for the African Group were never lower than 10% of the participating countries; not forgetting to mention the aspect of the number of members in the group that always gave a strong base of support to the claims. But at the same time, even at the highest points of support, the levels were never enough to suggest approval would be possible in a vote at the General Assembly. (See Chart 4.9)

Notwithstanding the previous existence of the Coffee Club, and separate positions offered in the past by members of what would become the G4, expressions of
support for the UfC and the G4 could be seen after the official presentation of their proposals to the General Assembly. Considering the necessary majority needed for approval at the Assembly, none of the groups would have seen their drafts pass, as the highest percentage reached was 19% for the UfC in 2012. (See Charts 4.10 and 4.11)

Chart 4.10: Levels of support received by the G4 proposal over the years (1993-2012)

Chart 4.11: Levels of support received by the UfC proposal over the years (1993-2012)
Initially, the G4 received strong support – similar to the support received by the AU – during the debates. In a different manner, the UfC started with low levels of positive feedback from other missions but was able to acquire more support by 2012. But in any case, the percentage of support received by each of the groups was never enough to reach the needed majority of the General Assembly. Thus, if we can consider the percentage of expressions of support received from the countries that participated in the discussions on an equitable representation inside the Council as a proxy for support, it can be said that none of the reform packages presented was ever even close to being adopted.

It is important to note that the support received by the proposals could be construed as being independent from the actions of other groups. Especially in the case of the accusations against the UfC, the numbers show that the levels of support that would allow the acceptance of any project was simply not there, and that each of the groups received roughly the same level of supportive mentions. This indicates that attempts to gather support for their own project, by all of the three groups, were equally unsuccessful.

*Structural aspects of the debates*

During the 20 years of discussions and beyond the specific topics regarding a reform of the Security Council addressed by the representatives, some details of the procedures as well as issues associated with the structure of the debates influenced the members’ positions and opinions. The UN membership reacted immediately with a repositioning of the proposed methods involved in expanding the Council when some such events occurred.

The cases that characterized these topics of observation were: the presentation of the Razali Plan in 1997; the presentation of the draft resolution on the use of Article
108 of the Charter as rule for decisions on the reform by the Coffee Club in 1997, and the its consequent approval as a resolution in 1998; and, finally, the presentation and establishment of Intergovernmental Negotiations as a new method for debates in 2007.

When the Razali Plan was presented, the proposal generated 28% of positive mentions by the participants in the debates over the question of equitable representation on the Council, while just 7% officially declared their opposition to the plan. The Coffee Club, at the same time, presented a draft proposal on establishing a necessary majority of two-thirds of the entire UN membership as a requirement for any approval concerning the reform of the Security Council, seemingly in response to the Razali Plan. The Coffee Club's draft, which was later approved by the Assembly as Resolution 53/30, gathered expressions of support from 32% of the participants in 1997, and 50% in 1998, while only receiving 15% of negative feedback in that same year.204

After almost 15 years of the the work of Open-ended Working Group on the matters of the Security Council reform, the idea of an evolution of negotiations to a new political level was officially presented in 2007, with the proposal of the creation of intergovernmental negotiations. The creation of a new arena of debates more related to the states and less connected to the General Assembly Hall was well received by the membership. Initially, the member states supported the idea with 33% of positive positions by the participants and, when it was approved in 2008, it received 72% of supportive mentions before being unanimously accepted.205 The positive views on the new method of debates decreased in 2009 due to newly-felt disappointment with the progress of the discussions, but the member states did not discredit the importance of the official intergovernmental meetings.206


205 Ibid

206 Ibid
The deadlock of opposing proposals in the reform debates in the UN have seen the discussions continue for 20 years. The “endless” characteristic of the discussions generated another factor of influence in the structure of the debates: the disappointment by members with the lack of advance in the negotiations.

Declarations of disappointment started in 1998, after the rejection of the Razali Plan, which represented one of the biggest hopes for some of the members’ bids during the reform processes. In that year, the disappointment level reached almost 8% of the participating states, rising to 10% in 1999. The years of 2002 and 2003 represented the apexes of dissatisfaction, with levels of 20 and 24%, respectively. After the presentation of the proposals, the number of negative views on the reform process decreased as, somehow, an advance was made, but in recent years, the levels have risen again, reaching 17 and 21%, in 2011 and 2012. (See Chart 4.12)

Chart 4.12: Levels of disappointment in the reform process (1993-2012)

Interestingly, the increase in levels of disappointment was accompanied by the outbreak of accusations among member states. Apparently, according to the arguments presented during the “finger pointing” inside the General Assembly, the reason for the slow advance in the reform debates was the attempt of a minority to block the reform
procedures by defending their own interests over the common interest of all, as seen in the Chapter II.

The accusations presented during the debates never reached a majority or demanded any kind of decision, but the relatively high percentages reflect how common such accusations became as the years passed in the reform debates. After the first accusations were formally made at the debates on the question of equitable representation by the representative of Germany in 1997, three defensive speeches were made in the same year and, over the years, the defensive positions decreased in percentage. The apex of accusations happened in 2001, when the percentage of participants formulating accusations against groups or members reached 13% of the participating countries. (See Chart 4.13)

**Chart 4.13: Percentages of accusations (A) and defenses (D) during the debates (1993-2012)**

Another interesting fact concerning the accusations inside the negotiations was the moment when the countries that had previously been the target of the accusations started to present their accusations against other actors, as if in response. This strange situation generated new targets of criticism, even involving the permanent members of the Council, as mentioned in the second chapter of this dissertation.

In 2011, the accusations started over, as the disappointment began to rise again with the lack of progress, even after the upgrade of the debates to a higher political level.
The factors of influence of the debate were fundamental to some positions assumed by member states during the discussions and generated the topic at the origin of the subject of this research. The accusations against the members of the UfC were a consequence of the activities related to the Razali Plan of 1997. The disappointment with the slow progress of the reform process set off a long chain of “finger pointing” among the UN membership.

However, the results of the analysis of the numbers related to the factors that influenced the debates do not point to any agreement over the reform process either. As most of the analyses presented here relied on statements regarding the question of equitable representation, the levels of support for important topics related to the establishment of structures for the debates did not represent a decisive result in terms of a considered majority.

*The variable of permanence*

Despite the fact that the main objective of this chapter consists in performing a numerical analysis, the permanent members of the Security Council, as the most powerful individual actors inside the UN, deserve a separate explanation regarding their positions. The variable of the positions of the permanent members of the Council (the USA, the UK, France, Russia and China) is fundamental to the organization’s decision-making processes and will be crucial for a possible solution for the reform procedures. As such, it is important to briefly explain the positions of these five countries in regard to the informal levels of support established by this research.

The founders of the UN created a system to ensure that the great powers prevail inside the organization and thus maintain their interest in being members of the organization, as mentioned in the second chapter of this dissertation. Hence the creation of the veto.
This model of voting established the necessity of the positive votes or the abstentions from the five permanent members of the Security Council. The well known “veto power” became a very important variable for some decisions inside the UN, especially in cases related to a possible reform of the Security Council.

After the application of Resolution 53/30 (1998), the variable of the veto started to have more influence on the issue of reform, as every decision pertaining to the process started to be considered as an amendment of the Charter and became subjected to the following rule:

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.207

The five permanent members of the Council therefore also assumed very important positions inside the reform debates. Their approval of every decision about the transformation of the Council by two thirds of the entire membership was reinforced by Resolution 53/30 as mandatory for the entire reform process.

However, it is very important to highlight that this analysis, in looking at the possibility of the adoption of the reform proposals on the table, has primarily concerned itself with the ability to achieve of a two-thirds majority, and did not consider the veto power held by the permanent members. Despite its definitive influence in possible decisions taken inside the discussions, the position of the permanent members on reforming the Security Council is a very complex issue.

In terms of official statements, the US, the UK, France, Russia and China were never completely clear about their preferences on a possible new Council. The only situations that had specific positioning by permanent members were: first, the obvious

207 See the Charter of the United Nations, Article 108, Chapter 18.
defense of the maintenance of current rules for their veto power; initial positions on a specific number of possible seats for the new Council; and, finally, some mentions as to which countries would receive their support in a final decision about new permanent seats.

The Russian representative, for example, expressed very clearly the permanent members’ position concerning the general desire for change in the veto power. In 2011, the diplomat affirmed:

[W]e cannot accept some of the issues brought up today – regarding the veto power, for example. We also need to remember that the veto is an important factor that impels both the permanent and non-permanent members to seek balanced decisions.  

Another example of positioning occurred in 1995, when the representative of the US stated two aspects of some of the permanent members’ positions in the same speech, indicating which countries received the country’s support as candidates to new permanent seats, and indicating the number of seats that a reformed Council should have. France and the UK also presented the same position regarding which countries should assume permanent seats in the Council, initially indicating Japan and Germany, and later extending their support to the entire G4. Russia also supported the same number of seats for a new Council until the early 2000s. In the year of 1995, Mr. Inderfurth stated:

In particular, first, we enthusiastically endorse the candidacies of Japan and Germany for permanent membership. Their record of constructive global influence and their capacity to sustain heavy global responsibilities merit the very wide support their candidacies are now receiving. Indeed, the United States could not agree to a Council enlargement that did not result in their permanent membership. […] Thirdly, we would support a modest number of additional seats beyond those for Japan and Germany. However, we believe the total size of the Council should not exceed 20.  

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208 See the records of debates on the 52nd plenary meeting of 9 November 2011, p. 23. (A/66/PV.52)
209 See the records of debates on the 58th plenary meeting of 14 November 1995, p. 5-6. (A/50/PV.58)
Despite the examples quoted above, the permanent members remained relatively quiet during the 20 years of debates. Most of the statements by permanent members on the question of equitable representation on the Security Council presented the same general lines as mentioned by the Chinese representative in 2002 as follows:

China is prepared to participate actively in the discussion on Security Council reform and to work with all others for the further enhancement of the role of the Council, so that it can better assume its responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security, entrusted to it by the United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{210}

This relative silence and failure to take a clear stance on the comprehensive issue of reform was understood by some countries as an attempt to obstruct or at least delay the reform process, similar to the accusations levelled against the UfC. Some countries also branded the permanent members as spoilers of the process\textsuperscript{211}, considering their strict position on the question of veto\textsuperscript{212} and their capacity to block any decision.

The position of the permanent members could possibly point to a genuine desire to delay the reform process and make it long enough to become obsolete. Nevertheless, this issue would require other topics of study not specifically related to the main objective of this research: the case of the accusations against the UfC.

During the analysis undertaken for the purposes of this dissertation, the possibility of the use of the veto in the reform process was not taken into account. The question of its relevance for this research aside, as already noted, it would not be practical to do so in the absence of any attempt to take a vote on the issue. The expressions of support or opposition were considered here on the same level as those of the rest of the UN membership. By the same token, there is no question the issue of

\textsuperscript{210} See the records of debates on the 27\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 14 October 2002, p. 22. (A/57/PV.27)
\textsuperscript{211} See pages 84-85 of “Chapter II: Proposals and Positions”, at this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{212} See the records of the debates on the 65\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of 16 November 2000, p. 12. (A/55/PV.65)
the veto will certainly come into play when or if it comes to voting decisions inside the UN.

Therefore, the variable that is the veto of the permanent members was not treated as a factor in influencing the lack of agreement seen in the numbers generated by the Support Measurement System. The support presented by countries did not depend on the support of permanent members during the years of debates and, despite the existence of support – or the lack thereof – from permanent members, an agreement on relevant topics of the reform was never reached. Not even the G4, which was supported by a number of permanent members, received enough support towards an approval of its project by the General Assembly. The veto remains a shadow hanging over any reform proposal that will come close to reaching the voting stage in the General Assembly.

In summary, the informal levels of support resulting from the analysis of statements regarding the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council” indicated a clear lack of agreement among UN members. Specific topics on the reform never received enough official support to make them viable. The absence of consensus during the debates pointed to a very important consideration. The reform of the Security Council probably never had real momentum during the 20 years of official debates on the issue. The reform of the Council was never close to happening, which contradicts the arguments of representatives and scholars who suggested that a minority of states were blocking a certain momentum.

The results thus show that the position and actions of the UfC did not represent an attempt to block the progress of procedures, but rather one of three somewhat equally balanced contending proposals for reform. The numbers did not indicate a significant
change due to any idea presented by the UfC, even during moments where its members clearly acted towards the achievement of results inside the reform debates. Important years of activity for the members of the UfC did not mean less attention to different ideas from other coalitions. A relevant example would be the creation of the Coffee Club in 1997 and the official presentation its first draft resolution. In the same year, a number of events took a prominent place in the Security Council reform debates. However, as the Coffee Club started to show itself as a strong actor inside the discussions, the main ideas of the coalition did not start to receive more official mentions, nor did contrary ideas see a reduction in their level of support. The numbers are clear in showing a constant situation of disagreement among the membership, a failure of any of the proposals to generate levels of support approaching a majority. The results generated from this analysis demonstrate that the accusations made against the UfC members, specifically their branding as spoilers of the debates, are unsubstantiated. An actual activity of blockage or obstruction towards the debates would be detected by the number of official mentions to specific aspects of the reform inside the General Assembly, especially if the reform discussions were close to a conclusion, and even considering the complex variables applicable to the political processes inherent to the UN.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to believe that, despite 20 years of debates on the reform of the UN Security Council, the process has not progressed to a stage in which a positive and concrete conclusion can be expected. Researchers, representatives and observers now have a very pessimistic point of view of the issue, when considering the complexity and the political constraints of the multilateral arena of negotiations existing inside the UN.

Notwithstanding a statement from an anonymous source confirming an increasing interest of the civil society over the matters of reform of the Security Council\(^\text{213}\), it is difficult to not agree with the following pessimistic statement by one of the sources among the permanent representatives: “the considerable distance between the major alliances for reform will likely make it difficult to find definitive agreement any time soon on changes in terms of the composition and size of the Council.”\(^\text{214}\)

The question of reform and expansion is in constant debate, but agreement or conclusions have never been reached, nor have they been close to being reached. The Security Council may be the object of interest beyond the arena of the policymakers and generate some public opinion due its importance on matters of peace and security, but expectations, limitations, disappointment and disillusion are, at all times, elements connected to the political processes in the UN. The impossibility of finding a satisfactory composition and format for the decision-making process of the Security Council is one of the biggest problems of the UN since its creation, as repeatedly affirmed in this research.

For a representative at the UN, a reform is highly unlikely to happen anytime soon. When asked about which agreement has the highest probability of reaching some form of agreement, the diplomat said:

\(^{213}\) Information collected from an interview given by an anonymous source, in 11 July 2013. 
\(^{214}\) Quote from the interview given by an anonymous permanent representative, by email.
I really don’t see any agreement being reached at all, to be frank. We make a compromise proposal because we think that is a logical compromise, so my answer should be that I think in the end we will agree on a compromise proposal similar to what we suggested. But I think the truth is much more complex and there are many actors that are pursuing their particular interests and are not really into compromise. For example, in Africa, I don’t see at all how the Africans could move ahead from their position. They are really stuck in this place and I don’t see them accepting anything else then what they suggested, but what they suggested is also not acceptable, in particular not to the current permanent members. It is obvious that the P5 would not allow another country to also get the veto. There will be simply no agreement.  

The constant disagreements that keep this reform from becoming a possible reality have always been characteristic of these talks. As the process wore on during the years of debates, the uncomfortable reality was that amidst the hope and frustrations, no potential solution ever generated a real momentum for the reform to happen.

_The momentum never came_

Analyzing the speeches and positions on the “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters,” it is possible to trace a map of the positioning of permanent missions during the last 20 years of official discussions on the reform matters. After using a basic numerical system to comparatively measure the levels of support among the UN members for specific proposals, some conclusions became very clear.

The debates, held at the General Assembly hall, were opened to the entire member states and every state interested in participating or making its claims was able to express its opinion on the issue. The participation was basically divided in half, with intensive action by groups with proposals to make (or members of these groups, before their official creation), and the others from the general membership.  

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215 Quote from the interview given by a representative in 27 April 2013.
216 See Chart 2.4: Participation from 1993-2012 (more than 10 speeches), p. 64.
measurement of these positions contributed to a broad understanding of how the process advanced over the years.

The levels of support presented during this long period of debate on the enlargement of the Council were conclusive in pointing to the fact that no agreement was likely to be reached over specific aspects of the reform. While a majority of positive positions over general characteristics were easily achieved,\textsuperscript{217} no country was able to receive, for instance, more than 25\% of the participants’ explicit support to be chosen as new permanent member.\textsuperscript{218}

In 1997, even with the presentation of the Razali Plan, which was heralded as a proposal with great potential, the numbers did not indicate any advance towards acceptance either, which points to the affirmation that no momentum worthy of serious consideration for a voting procedure was achieved. According to Courtney Smith, the expectation on the first real proposal for a structure for reform presented by Razali made the missions understand the step as a momentum, when it did not actually happen.

I think there were a lot of people that thought since the reform did not happen in the 50\textsuperscript{th} session, in 1995, that it would definitively happen during the 51\textsuperscript{st} session, when Razali was president. And I think that sense of desire to get it done created a momentum around the proposal that did not have widespread agreement.\textsuperscript{219}

Even when the proposals by the AU, the G4 and the UfC were presented to the general membership, none managed to convert this presentation into momentum. None of the proposals by these groups received a percentage of positive mentions high

\textsuperscript{217} See Chart 4.3: Percentage of supportive mentions to an expansion of existent categories (1993-2012), p. 132.
\textsuperscript{218} See Chart 4.4: Percentages of direct support to G4 members (1993-2012), p. 134.
\textsuperscript{219} Quote from the interview with Professor Courtney Smith, in 4 March 2013.
enough to make their drafts deserving of voting: the highest amount of expressions of support any of the three coalitions could muster was 23%.

According to Simon Chesterman, one aspect of the support that needs attention is the fact that there is a gap between support for a reform on the enlargement in general, and support for a specific structure for this expansion. This makes the realization of actual momentum a great effort.

The problem is the disjunction between supporting expansion in theory and opposing any specific model in practice. Key actors such as the US adopt this position, but so do many others. In the absence of crisis, I struggle to see what would push a consensus.

A genuine aim

The case of the Uniting for Consensus is a special example of how complex the negotiations on the reform of the Security Council can be. By chronologically analyzing the activities by the states that decided to create a coalition at the end of the 1990s, it is possible to observe that, since 1955, countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica and Spain advocated for an enlargement of the Council. The same position was also maintained during the following years, always claiming for the establishment of more elected seats in the Council. During the Cold War, the future members of the UfC, the G4 and the AU assumed a common position: fighting for fair representation inside the most important organ of the UN.

With the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international political scene, the last joint action happened in 1992, when the member states officially formed the Open-ended Working Group to work on possible reforms of the

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220 See Chart 4.9: Levels of support received by African proposals over the years (1993-2012), p. 142; Chart 4.10: Levels of support received by G4 proposal over the years (1993-2012), p. 143; Chart 4.11: Levels of support received by UfC proposal over the years (1993-2012), p. 143.

221 Quote from the interview given by Professor Simon Chesterman, by email.

222 See Annex I: Timelines of the UNSC Reform Proposals (1946-2012), p. 159

223 Ibid.
Council. From that moment on, some changes in positions by some countries happened. As most of the future members of the UfC maintained their position over the expansion of the organ in the non-permanent category only, other states initiated their bid to establish what they saw as fair representation in the form of the creation of more permanent seats.

From this divergence of views on, actions were taken by both sides to give strength to their arguments. Although flexible in adapting their propositions, the states connected to the UfC strictly maintained their positions from the beginning. The complexity of the chronology of the activities of UfC members lies in the difference among the actors. At the same time as the majority of members started to act towards a democratic transformation of the Council since San Francisco, other members only appeared on the game board after some strategic movements.

While some actors defined the Coffee Club and the UfC activities as a clear attempt on the part of its members to prevent regional rivals to gain a permanent seat in the Council, the results of a structural analysis of the Council’s discourse and the terms of the draft proposal pointed to a genuine aim of reform. It is not possible to limit the entire group’s objectives only to “delaying tactics” when its proposal would indeed provide a positive transformation of the Council’s system, even when considering the possibility that some UfC member states may have been motivated by regional rivalries. When branding the group as a spoiler coalition or a reformer, the motivations of some of the members cannot take away from the legitimacy of the content of its proposals if its objectives aim at a truthful transformation.

Numerically speaking, the use and defense of the concept of democracy was never casual for UfC members, and the group used it more often than any other coalition; its activities and ideals resulted in a proposal that would in reality establish a
more democratic Security Council, distributing the voting power among the Council’s seats more equally.

The establishment of a two-thirds majority as a requirement for approval in 1997 was considered by some states as an attempt to slow down the process, but, upon analysis, the draft was proposing the necessity of a basic consensus among the UN membership towards a reform. This consensus would make the final decision about a real transformation of the Council more widely agreed upon, and not just a quick-fix reform that would later require another long process like the current one.

The proposal from 2005 was an official step forward for the former Coffee Club, contributing to this possible consensus; the draft formally presented what they saw as a proper structure on which to base a reformed and democratic Council.224 After the presentation, the branding of the group as a spoiler group prevailed for many actors inside and outside the General Assembly, putting the UfC aside as a reform option, even with the UfC's clear and reasonable argument that the creation of new permanent seats would aggravate the differences between the two categories of members in the Council.

In terms of support levels, the UfC proposal did not show substantial differences when compared with the AU’s and the G4’s, as none of them received enough positive feedback to be considered in a voting process.

According to a thorough investigation of statements over the 20 years of debates on the matters of representation in the Council, in comparison with the majority needed for approval of resolutions in the General Assembly, nothing about the reform process reached a level of support that would allow a possible reform, which explains why none of the proponents ever attempted to put their proposals to a vote. Looking at the comparative levels of support for each of the proposals over time, it is possible to

224 See Chart 2.9: Distribution of seats according to the UfC proposal, p. 76.
observe that, while the discussions went on, no action by UfC members or even the presentation of drafts by this group were responsible for a change in support levels of the others. During the debates, the support for proposals rarely had any real variation and never reached more than 25%, while support for specific aspects of the reform never reached more than 20% of the number of countries participating in the open debates.  

While members of groups opposing the UfC were quick to accuse that group of attempt to block reform, their arguments were rarely persuasive. Furthermore, a number of representatives of member states unattached to the main reform groups inside the UN recognized the legitimacy of the UfC as a group. Many researchers and diplomats highlighted the fact that UfC’s motives were genuine in terms of defending its members’ interests, and that its actions during the debates did not represent more than common practices inside the UN political procedures.

Therefore, to answer the central question of this research – “Is the UfC group really pursuing reform or is it just a spoiler?” , it is possible to say that the Uniting for Consensus is a reformer group. Throughout the results collected from several angles of analysis, based on timelines of actions, content analysis, calculations of power distribution and with the creation of a system to measure the level support expressed by the members of the UN, it is possible to declare that the proposal for reform this group is calling for is reasonable, would prove beneficial to the membership as a whole, and that it is genuinely pursuing the realization of this reform.

The clashing of divergent points of view is standard practice inside the 193-country-large UN membership. As mentioned by Courtney Smith, even if the members of Uniting for Consensus are working to prevent the adoption of the Group of

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225 See Charts 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11, with the levels of support received by AU, G4 and UfC (1993-2012), p. 142-143.
Four proposal, it does not mean they are a spoiler, particularly if that proposal is far from achieving a majority, and they are pursuing their own proposal. It just means that they want something different, that they have a different point of view.

Unlike the position presented by the current permanent members over the details of what would be an acceptable reform for the five countries – basically declaring that they would actually block any proposal for reform that does not correspond to their demands, the actions by the UfC did not amount to an attempt to disrupt reform efforts. During the 20 years of reform discussion, no momentum was really achieved, and none of the proposed structures got us closer to having an enlarged Council. As a result, neither the attempts of the UfC to expand the number of elected seats, nor the other groups’ attempts to enlarge the number of permanent seats were successful.

Considering that the reform discussions never advanced beyond the establishment of more reasonable working methods, it is difficult to brand the UfC as a spoiler group. The numbers prove that there never was any real momentum that was clearly blocked by other states; the minority commonly mentioned by so many representatives was never really able to change the situation during the debates, even when acting and presenting different options. Furthermore, while most members have clearly given up on the debate in recent years, the UfC has continued to actively engage in negotiations and present its wish to establish a dialogue among the membership in order to reach the desired result.

The lack of openness and flexibility by member states can perhaps be considered as the real ‘spoiler’ of the Security Council reform since the progress of negotiations on establishing a proposal that can be widely accepted by the General Assembly has largely been prevented by due to the fixed and non-negotiable positions towards reform assumed by some states.
The UN is a heterogeneous arena of negotiations that aims to establish a pacific agreement among its member states. If the membership is not open to genuine negotiation, the resolution of any problematic issue inside the organization, as for example the reform of the Security Council, will remain out of reach.
ANNEXES
Annex I: Timelines of the UNSC Reform Proposals (1946-2012)

UNSC Reform (1946-1989)

- **[1946]** Beginning of UNSC functioning
- **[16 Dec 1963]** Resolution 1991A was ratified by the member states and the Charter was amended for the first time
- **[1971]** PRC became UNSC permanent member
- **[14 Dec 1979]** Proposal by India, 12 more non-aligned states and Japan (15 to 19 non-permanent)

1st proposal of reform - 16 Latin American states and Spain (increase of the non-permanent members of the Council and the majority required, 6 to 8 non-permanent)

Creation of the NAM (24 Afro-Asian states plus Yugoslavia members in the beginning, 99 in 1983, including Latin America and Caribe)
UNSC Reform Debates (1990-1995)

1990
- (Dec) Creation of the Open-Ended Working Group (operating until nowadays)
- (Nov) Proposal by Chile and Egypt of a new category of membership (regional representation)
- (Aug) Britain support to Germany and Japan (conditional)
- (Jun) US support to Germany and Japan's permanent seat

1991
- (Sep) Inclusion of the provisional agenda item "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council (NAM states)"
- (Dec) A/47/RES.62 - UNSC Reform as na agenda item (Japan)
- (Dec) Collapse of USSR
- (Mar) France support to Germany and Japan (conditional)
- (Sep) OAU calls for African representation (regional selection of permanent members)

1992
- (Jun) "An Agenda for Peace"
- (Sep) NAM calls for a review of UNSC membership

1993
- (Feb) NAM political platform for Council reform
- (Jun) Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Germany, Japan and more 3)
- (Sep) Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia (Germany, Japan and more 2 or 5)
- (Sep) Turkey suggestion of add 10 non-permanent members

1994
- (Nov) Mexico proposal of create 5 non-permanent seats (one rotative for Japan and Germany)

1995
- (Dec) First Italy proposal (Minus two, plus two)
- (Apr) 1st Germany and Japan start to unofficially pursue a permanent seat (economic argument)
UNSC Reform Debates (1996-2000)

- (Oct) The "quick fix formula" was considered unacceptable by the Open-ended group report.

- (Mar) Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Botswana, Libya, Sri Lanka and Lebanon proposal of increase non-permanent seats (democratization argument).

- (Feb) Spain proposal of more non-permanent members with extended mandates.

- (Oct) 2nd draft resolution by the Coffee Club.

- (Nov - Day 23) The draft resolution presented by the Coffee Club was unanimously adopted by the GA (becoming the resolution 53/30).

- (Nov - Day 20) New version of the first draft, by the Coffee Club, with the addition of 8 new sponsors.

- (Nov - Day 18) Draft resolution by the group led by Bulgaria, with an accusation of obstructionism by the Coffee Club.

- (Oct) 1st meeting of NAM states about the UNSC reform.

- (Apr) 1st meeting of foreign ministers of NAM states about the Razali Plan.

- (Jul) Britain, Russia and US explicitly declare that will not support any increase to beyond 20 or 21 members.

- (Sept) 2nd meeting of NAM about the UNSC reform.

- (Oct - Day 22) 1st draft resolution by the Coffee Club.

- (Oct - Day 23) Japanese letter to all UN members about how the draft presented by the Coffee Club is not a "quick fix formula".

- (Dec) Germany letter to the members of UN about the Coffee Club proposal.

- (Sept.) Millennium Summit.

- (Oct - Day 15) US declares that will accept an increase for a Council containing slightly more than 21 members. / New Zealand points the P5 as the ones trying to block the debates.

UNSC Reform Debates (2001-2005)

- Intensification at the debates on the working methods
  - (Sept) Terrorist attack to the World Trade Center, NY

- First appearance of the G4 as an official group

- (Feb) Uniting for Consensus document

- (Mar) In a larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all [report]

- (6 Jul) G4 Proposal
- (18 Jul) AU Proposal
- (21 Jul) UfC Proposal
- (10 Nov) Small Five proposal
UNSC Reform Debates (2006-2012)

- Strong support to the proposal by the Small Five group
- Decided the implementation of Intergovernmental Negotiations
- (15 Sept) Unanimous approval of the Intergovernmental Negotiations
- (Nov) India member of G4 and L.69
- (May) First Rome Ministerial Meeting by UfC - gathered around 120 states
- (Feb) Beginning of International Negotiations
- (Apr) New proposal by UfC (semi-permanent seats)
- (Feb) Rome Ministerial Meeting by UfC - gathered around 80 countries
Annex II: Tables on the Use of the Concept of Democracy by the Group of Four and the Uniting for Consensus Applied to the Fisher Exact Test

Use of the concept by the Uniting for Consensus (2002-2011)

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Basic structure of organization for the Fisher Exact Test applied to the study case

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Annex III: List of Categories Considered for Support Measuring

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<td>5</td>
<td>New non-permanent members (NNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Expansion in both categories (EB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Expansion just in the non-permanent category (JNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>New category of members (NC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Non-creation of a new category (NNC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gradual transformation, with elimination of permanent seats (GT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Periodic review of the reform (PR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Regional representation (RR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Regional system of rotation (SR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Regional system of rotation for permanent seats (PSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Against the regional system of rotation for permanent seats (APSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Immediate re-election (IR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Against immediate re-election (AIR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Country (new permanent member): Japan (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Country (new permanent member): Germany (GE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Country (new permanent member): African country (AC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Country (new permanent member): Brazil (BR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Country (new permanent member): India (IN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Composition: 25 members - 11 perm. (CG4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Composition: 26 members - 11 perm. (CAU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Composition: 25 members - 5 perm. (CUFC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Number of members: 21-26 (21-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Number of members: until 21 (-21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Expansion/Maintenance of veto (V)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>End of veto / Non-expansion of veto / Control of veto power (NV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ideas: Coffee Club / Uniting for Consensus (IUFC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ideas: NAM (INAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Ideas: Org. of Africa Unity / Africa Union (IAU)</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Ideas: Group of Four (IG4)</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Italy (IIT)</td>
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<td>Ideas of specific countries: Brazil (IBR)</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: India (IIN)</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>Ideas of specific countries: Turkey (ITR)</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Kenya (IKN)</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Egypt (IEG)</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Argentina (IAR)</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Mexico (IMX)</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Spain (ISP)</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Ideas of specific countries: Tunisia (ITN)</td>
</tr>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Proposals by Uniting for Consensus (PUFC)</td>
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<td>Proposals by Group of Four (PG4)</td>
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<td>Proposals by Africa Union (PAU)</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>Favorable to the application of Article 108 (F108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Against the application of Article 108 (A108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Disappointed with the progress / Favorable to a time-frame (DIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Against the establishment of a time-frame (ATF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Razali Plan – Favorable (RPF)</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>Razali Plan – Against (RPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Favorable to the Intergovernmental Negotiations (ITN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Proposal by the Group L.69 (L69)</td>
</tr>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Favorable to the Intermediate Category (IC)</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>Accusation</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>Defense</td>
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Annex IV: Extra Graphs Elaborated Through the System of Support Measuring

Chart XII: General percentages on expansion and enlargement of existing categories (1993-2012)

Chart II: Percentage of supportive mentions to the expansion of each existent category (1993-2012)
Chart III: Factors of influence on the debates’ structure (1993-2012)

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Chart V: Official support to periodic reviews of UN Security Council reform (1993-2012)

Chart VI: Support to a possible number of seats in the new Council (1993-2012)
Chart VII: Support to NAM position (1993-2012)
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