



Title	Linga in the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā
Author(s)	Adachi, Toshihide
Citation	待兼山論叢. 哲学篇. 1992, 26, p. 27-41
Version Type	VoR
URL	<a href="https://hdl.handle.net/11094/4028">https://hdl.handle.net/11094/4028</a>
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## *Linga* in the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā

Toshihide ADACHI

[1] In the 1920's Hakuju Ui and Herman Jacobi<sup>1)</sup> had already pointed out that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (VS) is critical of the Mīmāṃsā school in regard to the following three points: 1) the meanings of *dharma* in the opening sūtras,<sup>2)</sup> 2) the matter of the eternity of *śabda* (sound, word), 3) the *apauruṣeya-tva* (not being compiled by a man) of the Veda.<sup>3)</sup> In order to more clearly understand the fundamental difference between these two schools, we must analyze not only the three above-mentioned points, but also the difference of the meanings of *linga* in their sūtras, because unlike the just mentioned three points, the word *linga* is found throughout the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (MS) and the VS as an original concept in both of them.<sup>4)</sup>

To research the concepts of *linga* in these two schools reveals their essential difference. The Mīmāṃsā school regards the Veda as the one and only source of *dharma* (cf. MS 1.1.3-4) whereas the Vaiśeṣika school holds that direct perception through experience is the most reliable means of cognition. The purpose of this paper is to make it clear that their respective concepts of *linga* reflect these essential positions of these two schools.

[2] First of all, in the MS the word *linga* mostly indicates a passage of the Veda.<sup>5)</sup> Śābara usually refers to a passage of the Veda as *linga* when commenting on a sūtra in which the word *linga* occurs. Particularly the word *linga* used in such fixed phrases as '*linga-darśanāc ca*' or '*lingāc ca*'<sup>6)</sup> denote a passage of the Veda without exception.

Let me give MS 1.1.23 as an example. This is the last sūtra in the section concerning the *śabda-nitya-tva*.

*liṅgadarśanāc ca.* (MS 1.1.23)

“And because we find a *liṅga* [in the Veda].”

*liṅgam caiva bhavati, vācā virūpa nityayeti / anyaparam hīdam  
vākyam vāco nityatām anuvadati / tasmān nityaḥ śabdaḥ /*  
(Śabara’s *Bhāṣya* ad MS 1.1.23)

“And also a *liṅga* exists [besides the preceding reasons].  
*Vācā virūpa nityayā*’ (O Virūpa, by the eternal word) (*Rg-veda*  
8.75.6, *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 2.6.11.2, etc.) — Though the topic  
[of this passage] is different [from the eternity of word], this  
passage actually explains the eternity of a word. Therefore  
a word is eternal.”

As is shown in this example, these two fixed phrases are used as a reason-phrase (and mostly as the last of more than two reason-phrases). In this way, the MS presents a passage of the Veda as a reason for a proposition, and calls such a Vedic passage *liṅga*. In addition to the MS, about half of the *liṅgas* in the *Brahma-sūtra* are also used in this way.<sup>8)</sup>

[3] We notice, however, that the way *liṅgas* are used in the MS can also be found in VS 2.2.37, 4.2.9 and (5.2.11).<sup>9)</sup> For example, VS 4.2.9 reads: *santy ayoniḥ vedaliṅgāc ceti* “Also [we can know that] there exist non-viviparous beings because of a *liṅga* in the Veda.” Candranānda presents a following passage as the *Veda-liṅga*: *candramā manaso jātaḥ* “the moon was born from *manas*” (*Rg-veda* 10.90.13, *Atharva-veda* 19.6.7, etc.). The usage of *liṅga* in this sūtra is not different from the usage in the MS.

We must, however, pay attention to the respective reasons why the Veda can be *liṅga* for these two schools. In the

Mīmāṃsā school, since *śabda* is eternal (cf. MS 1.1.6–23) and the Veda is considered to be not of human origin (cf. MS 1.1.27–32), the Veda is authoritative.

On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣika school regards the Veda as follows: “the arrangement of the sentences in the Veda is based on *buddhi* (*buddhipūrvā vākyaḥ* *vede*)” (VS 6.1.1), and the *buddhi* is not ours, but *ṛṣi*’s (cf. VS 6.1.2).<sup>10)</sup> Thus, for the Vaiśeṣikas the authority of the Veda does not come from its eternity and non-human-origin, but from the *buddhi* (cognitive activity) of *ṛṣis*.

That is to say, the most reliable means of cognition is the Veda itself for the Mīmāṃsā, but *buddhi* for the Vaiśeṣika.

[4] The difference in the two standpoints is seen more directly in the form of controversy in the VS, where *liṅga* means a ‘mark’ as a proof of inference. This usage of *liṅga* is standard in the VS, and all the examples,<sup>11)</sup> except VS 2.2.37 and 4.2.9 mentioned above, can be understood in this meaning.

In the VS, this kind of *liṅga* is divided into two: 1) *dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam* and 2) *adr̥ṣṭa-liṅgam*. Prśastapāda’s twofold division of *anumāna* into 1) *dr̥ṣṭam* and 2) *sāmānyato-dr̥ṣṭam* (PDh (N): 205, PDh (K): 203) seems to be based on this division.<sup>12)</sup> Of these two kinds of *liṅga*, the typical example of *dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam* is the *liṅgas* of a cow, i. e., ‘horns’ etc. (VS 2.1.8), and the representatives of *adr̥ṣṭa-liṅgam* are *liṅgas* of the six unseen substances. When such unseen substances as *vāyu* (wind) are explained in the VS, their *liṅgas* are always given at the head of their paragraph. Among these *adr̥ṣṭa-liṅgas*, the VS discussed in particular those of *vāyu* and *ātman* (2.1.15–19 & 3.2.6–14), because *vāyu* is the first of these unseen substances in the order of the nine substances, and because the existence of *ātman* is one of the main subjects in Indian philosophy.

The *liṅga* of *vāyu* is *sparsa* (touch) (VS 2.1.9–10). This

*liṅga* is analyzed by an opponent as follows:

*vāyuy iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam na vidyate* (VS 2.1.15)

“[In the case of cow, there exists the direct perception such as ‘this is a cow’ when a visual organ touches a cow, but] there does not exist the direct perception that [this is] *vāyu* [even] when [skin] touches [*vāyu*]. Therefore [in the case of *vāyu*] a visible *liṅga* (*dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam*)<sup>13</sup> [such as ‘horns’ in the case of a cow] does not exist.”

*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭāc cāvīṣeṣaḥ* (VS 2.1.16)

“Moreover, [even if you try to infer the basis of ‘touch’] by means of [the inference named] ‘seen in common’ (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*), [we can know] no distinction [of *vāyu* from ‘ether’ etc. as the basis of ‘touch’, because ‘ether’ etc. are also imperceptible in the same way as *vāyu* is]. [Therefore, we cannot infer *vāyu* through ‘touch’.]”

*tasmād āgamikam* (VS 2.1.17)

“Consequently [the statement “(This is) *vāyu*” is] grounded on sacred Scriptures.”

In 2.1.15 the opponent first states the non-existence of *dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam* and in 2.1.16 he then insists that the existence of *vāyu* can not be established even by *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa* which is a means to know the existence of the basis of *adr̥ṣṭa-liṅga*. After having shown in these two sūtras that the *liṅga*-theory of the Vaiśeṣika is not efficient in proving the existence of the basis of the *liṅga*, he finally concludes in 2.1.17 that the knowledge of *vāyu* is nothing but *āgamika*, i. e., being grounded on sacred Scriptures (=the Veda).<sup>14</sup> This objection is not a denial of the existence of *vāyu*, but it concerns a method of cognition.<sup>15</sup>

It is supposed by some scholars<sup>16)</sup> that the opponent here is a Mīmāṃsaka because of the opponent's conclusive assertion. This supposition is well supported by my analysis above of the *liṅga* in the MS, where the Veda is *liṅga*. Therefore, we can regard the objection in 2.1.15–17 as the Mīmāṃsā's criticism<sup>17)</sup> of the Vaiśeṣika's *liṅga*-theory, in which things and phenomena like *spārśa* are acknowledged as *liṅga*.

[5] To this objection, the Vaiśeṣika school answers as follows:

*saṃjñākarma tv asmadviśiṣṭānām liṅgam* (VS 2.1.18)

“[Your assertion is] not [right]. The deed of naming [*vāyu* ‘*vāyu*’] [which is done] by more excellent people than we, [such] is the *liṅga* [of *vāyu*].”

*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ* (VS 2.1.19)

“Because the deed of naming is dependent on direct perception.”

Candrānanda regards these two sūtras as establishing the *pariśeṣa* (elimination) which assists and accomplishes the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* in 2.1.16. It is necessary for the establishment of *pariśeṣa* to limit objects to a fixed number. The Vaiśeṣika acknowledges only nine substances. Candrānanda interprets these two sūtras as a proof of non-existence of a tenth substance, commenting on *liṅga* in 2.1.18 as ‘*navānām eva dravyānām bhavati liṅgam*’ (the *liṅga* which shows that only nine substances exist). As Nozawa points out (1989: 169–170, 172–175, 1991: 29–30, 32–34), this interpretation agrees with Dignāga's for the most part (cf. PSV (K): 109b6–111a5, (V): 28b3–29b8, Kitagawa 1965: 79ff, Hayes 1980: 249–252).

But in my opinion this is not the original intention of the

sūtras. First, it is hardly possible to read limitations on the number of substances in the statement of VS 2.1.18 itself. Secondly, we cannot find *pariśeṣa*-inference in VS 3.2.6–8 paralleling 2.1.15–17. Thirdly, *aviśeṣa* in 2.1.16 surely make sense without assuming a tenth substance. Lastly, in spite of Dignāga's interpretation (PSV (K): 110a2–3, (V): 28b6–7), VS 2.1.10 is not considered to be a part of *pariśeṣa*-inference. Therefore, it can hardly be understood that VS 2.1.18–19 refers to limitations on the number of substances.<sup>18)</sup>

If Candrānanda's interpretation is denied in this way, how should we understand these two sūtras?

It is true that these sūtras seem not to be an answer to the objection. In fact, they do not directly refer to the relationship between 'touch' (*liṅga*) and 'wind' (*liṅgin*), which is the main point of the objection. But this answer makes sense when we take the objection quoted above to be a denial of inference.

The objection in VS 2.1.15–17 was that inference is not valid to prove the existence of invisible objects like *vāyu*<sup>19)</sup> and that their existence can be known on the ground of the Veda. The answer to this objection ought to be the establishment of the possibility of inference. Indeed, these two sūtras seem to state the possibility of inference. Their intention will be as follows; So long as the name (*vāyu*) exists, someone must have done the deed of naming (*vāyu* 'vāyu'). So long as someone named it, he must have directly perceived it, because it is impossible to name something without perceiving it directly, just as in the case of the deed of naming a new-born child (*nāma-karaṇa*) (cf. C's *Vṛtti ad* 2.1.19). That is to say, as long as direct perception is acknowledged as valid and the name of an object exists, it is possible to infer the existence of the unseen object through the *liṅga* which is *saṃjñā-karman*.<sup>20)</sup> In this way, VS 2.1.18–19 serves as an answer to the objection.

To sum up the argument examined above, the passage VS

2.1.15–19 reveals the fundamental difference in the basic means of cognition between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiśeṣikas; the Veda for the former, *pratyakṣa* for the latter. At the same time, VS 2.1.18–19 shows that inference of an invisible object holds good if the direct perception of it (which is, of course, not an ordinary person's, but that of a *ṛṣi*) has been realized.

[6] The *liṅgas* of *ātman* (soul) are *prāṇa* (exhalation) and *apāna* (inhalation) etc. (VS 3.2.4)<sup>21</sup>. These *liṅgas* are criticized by an opponent in VS 3.2.6–8, which is exactly the same as the opponent's statement on the *liṅga* of *vāyu* (2.1.15–17) except the first word.

*yajñadatta iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam na vidyate* (VS 3.2.6=2.1.15)

"There does not exist a direct perception such as '[this is *ātman* called] Yajñadatta,' [even] when [a visual organ] touches [Yajñadatta who is exhaling and so on]. Therefore, [in the case of *ātman*] a visible *liṅga* (*dr̥ṣṭam liṅgam*) does not exist."

*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ* (VS 3.2.7=2.1.16)

*tasmād āgamikam* (VS 3.2.8=2.1.17)

The opponent's criticism is that the *liṅgas* of *ātman* cannot prove the existence of *ātman* because of the uncertainty of the connection between those *liṅgas* and *ātman*. In reply to the objection, Kaṇāda tries to prove that those *liṅgas* are connected with *ātman* through the medium of the word 'I' as follows:  
(V=Vaiśeṣika, O=Opponent)

V: *aham iti śabdavyatirekān nāgamikam* (VS 3.2.9)

"Because of the exclusion [of the other substances like



'earth' etc. in regard to the basis of 'exhalation' etc.] by the word 'I', [it is possible to infer the existence of *ātman* by the *liṅgas* such as 'exhalation' etc.]. Therefore [the knowledge that *ātman* exists is] not grounded on sacred Scriptures."

O: *yadi ca dṛṣṭapratyakṣo 'ham devadatto 'ham yajñadatta iti* (VS 3.2.10).

"If [it is acknowledged that the word 'I'] denotes<sup>22)</sup> [something] cognizable because of [expressions] such as 'I am Devadatta' or 'I am Yajñadatta,'

O: *devadatto gacchati viṣṇumitro gacchatīti copacārāc charīra-pratyakṣaḥ* (VS 3.2.11).

"[we can conclude that the word 'I'] denotes a body [which is cognizable] because of indirect expressions (*upacāra*)<sup>23)</sup> such as 'Devadatta goes' or 'Viṣṇumitra goes'."

V: *sandigdhas tūpacārāḥ* (VS 3.2.12)

"But the indirect expression is obscure (*sandigdha*) (i. e., not settled on one conclusion (*anaikāntika*))<sup>24)</sup> [because it can actually indicate either a body or a soul]."

V: *aham iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvād arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ* (VS 3.2.13)

"[The word] 'I' denotes another thing (= *ātman*) [than a body] since [the word 'I'] is applied to an individual and is not applied to other [people]. [If the word 'I' denoted a body, we would use it on others, too]."

V: *na tu śarīraviśeṣād yajñadattaviṣṇumitrayor jñānaviśeṣaḥ* (VS 3.2.14)

"[We can] not [know] the difference between Yajñadatta's

thought and Viṣṇumitra's thought by the difference between their bodies. [Therefore the word 'I' denotes another thing than a body.]"

Not only some modern scholars<sup>25)</sup> but also Śrīdhara<sup>26)</sup> etc. interpret this series of arguments about *aham* as another proof of the existence of *ātman* apart from such *liṅgas* as 'exhalation' etc... But this interpretation does not agree with the context of the sūtra itself, because *nāgamika* in VS 3.2.9 shows that this sūtra is a response to the objection asserted in 3.2.6-8 and that the argument about *aham* in 3.2.9-14 is a continuation of 3.2.6-8. Candrānanda also, as the conclusion of this argument, states in his commentary on VS 3.2.14 that the word *aham* is valid as an intermediary between *ātman* and the *liṅgas* such as 'exhalation' etc..<sup>27)</sup> These facts mean that the opponent in 3.2.6-8 is the same as that in 3.2.9-14, that is to say, that the opponent in the argument about *aham* is not a person who denies the existence of *ātman* like a Buddhist, but the opponent who asserts *āgamika* in VS 3.2.8, i. e., a Mimāṃsaka.

Therefore we can interpret the argument in VS 3.2.6-14 as follows: This is an argument between the Vaiśeṣika school, which argues that 'exhalation' etc. are the *liṅgas* of *ātman* by presenting the word *aham* as a intermediary and attempts to attest the efficiency of its *liṅga*-theory, and the Mimāṃsā school, which, arguing that the word *aham* denotes a body, criticizes the validity of the *liṅga* held by the Vaiśeṣika and asserts that one can know the existence of *ātman* only on the ground of sacred Scriptures.

[7] Through these investigations, we have made clear the following points:

First, in the MS, the word *liṅga* mainly means a Vedic passage which is valid to prove a proposition.

Secondly, though such usage of the word *līṅga* can be found a few times in the VS, too, there is a difference between the Mīmāṃsā and the Vaiśeṣika as to the grounds on which a Vedic passage becomes a valid means of cognition. For the Mīmāṃsā, the authority of the Veda comes from its eternity and non-human-origin: while for the Vaiśeṣika, from the *buddhi* of *ṛṣis*.

Thirdly, the VS usually uses the word *līṅga* as meaning things and phenomena by which ordinary people can infer unseen objects. Concerning this kind of *līṅga*, we can see the Mīmāṃsā's criticism and the Vaiśeṣika's answer in VS 2.1.15-19 and 3.2.6-14.<sup>28)</sup>

Lastly, as a general conclusion, it can be pointed out that the usage of the word *līṅga* in the MS and the VS reflects the fundamental standpoints of these two schools and that in the stage of the VS the Vaiśeṣika school was more closely related to the Mīmāṃsā as a critic than it has been regarded until now.

### Notes

\* The present paper is a revised and enlarged English version of my article "Vaiśeṣikasūtra no veda-kan to līṅga," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*), 35-2 (1987) pp. 990-988.

- 1) Ui 1924: 29-42, 56-64. Jacobi 1929: 159-160, 162-164.
- 2) The first three of the five questions about *dharma* such as *ko dharmah* which Candrānanda poses in his *Vṛtti ad* VS 1.1.1 are the same as the first three of the five questions about *dharma* in Śābara's *Bhāṣya ad* MS 1.1.1 (p. 10<sup>2-3</sup>).
- 3) The eternity of *śabda* is discussed in MS 1.1.6-23 and VS 2.2.30-43: the *āpauruṣeya-tva* of the Veda in MS 1.1.27-32 and VS 6.1.1-2.
- 4) Frauwallner (1961: 118) points out that the sūtras which treat the *śabda-nitya-tva* in the MS do not belong to the oldest layer of the MS. In addition to this, Frauwallner (1984) and Wezler

(1982: 671–674) insist that VS 1.1.1–3 which explain the *dharma* did not belong to the original VS.

- 5) As exceptions, e. g., MS 8.3.3–4, 9.1.45.
- 6) *liṅga-darśanāc ca*: MS 1.1.23, 2.2.8, 2.3.9; 15, 3.3.42, 3.4.36; 45, 3.5.51, 3.6.13; 26, 3.7.5, 3.8.27, 4.1.10; 23, 5.3.18, 5.4.4, 6.1.18; 52, 6.6.17, 6.7.17; 7.1.19, 7.2.10, 7.3.15, 8.1.4; 8.4.13; 20, 9.2.22, 9.3.2; 5; 28, 10.1.5; 21; 41, 10.3.49, 10.4.5, 10.5.2; 51; 74; 87, 10.6.26, 10.8.26, 11.2.33; 46, 11.3.28, 11.4.12, 12.2.10, 12.4.4. *liṅgāc ca*: 3.2.8, 3.3.3, 5.3.38, 7.3.8, 7.4.14, 8.2.28.
- 7) Renou points out that *liṅga* in the ritual literature means ‘a characteristic element’ or ‘la “caractéristique” d’un mantra’, which is usually the name of a deity (1941–42: 153–154 (note 2), Renou & Silburn 1954: 71). However, the *liṅgas* in *Kātyāyana-śrauta-sūtra* 1.8.37 and 12.6.30 indicate a passage of the Veda as is the case in the MS. Furthermore, the *liṅga* in MS 3.3.14 is defined as one of the six means supporting the *vinīyogavidhi*. As to this *liṅga*, see *Artha-saṅgraha* (p. 12 & 16ff), Kane 1962: 1309–11, Yoshimizu 1987.
- 8) BS 1.1.22; 31, 1.3.15; 35, 1.4.17; 20, 2.3.13; 15\*, 3.2.11; 26, 3.3.44\*, 3.4.34\*; 39\*, 4.1.2\*, 4.3.4\*, 4.4.21\*. The *liṅga* in the sūtras marked with an asterisk is used in the same way as in the MS.
- 9) VS 5.2.11: *vaidikam ca*. C’s *Vṛtti* on it: *vaidikam vākyaṃ ... liṅgam*.
- 10) VS 6.1.2: *na cāsmadbuddhibhyo liṅgam rṣeḥ*. This sūtra is rather hard to understand. Candrānanda identifies the *liṅga* in the sūtra with *viññāna*. But from the context, this sūtra should be interpreted as follows: ‘And [the arrangement of the sentence in the Veda] does not [arise] from our *buddhi*. [Therefore this arrangement is] a *liṅga* [of the existence] of a *rṣi*.’ This interpretation is supported by the anonymous commentary (VS (M): 58).
- 11) VS 1.2.18, 2.1.8; 9; 10; 14; 15; 18–21; 26; 2.2.1; 6; 12; 30; 37, 3.2.1; 4; 6, 4.1.2, 4.2.9, 5.2.10, 6.1.2; 3, 7.1.29, 9.20.
- 12) See, Nozawa 1983: 142, 145 & note 42, Nozawa 1989: 163–166, Nozawa 1991: 25–27 & note 5.
- 13) As to its substantial meaning, see Nozawa 1991: 21.
- 14) There is no example of *āgama* which means the Veda in the MS,

where it is usually called *śruti* etc.. However, *āgama* is sometimes used in the meaning of sacred Scriptures in general including the Veda. Cf. e. g., *Manu-smṛti* 12.105–106, *Vākya-padīya* 1.30, 1.148, 2.489, *Tarkajvālā ad Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* 8.17, Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya ad* BS 2.1.11 etc. (cf. Nakamura I: 255, Nakamura IV: 155–159). Vātsyāyana also uses *āgama* or *āgamika* in the meaning '(based on) verbal testimony' in his *Bhāṣya ad* NS 2.1.17 (NS (C): 440).

- 15) Candrānanda replaces *āgamika* with *pravāda-mātra* (a mere rumor). On the basis of this interpretation, Wezler states that the opponent is fictitious because 'it can hardly be assumed that an adherent of a rival school ever denied the existence of the 'substance' wind alone' (1983: 50). But C's replacement is a forced one. Cf. note 28 below.
- 16) Ui 1926: 520, Nozawa 1991: 29, cf. Nakamura I: 484–485.
- 17) I have not yet found such a criticism in the Mīmāṃsā literature. However, the assertion that some objects cannot be inferred by *laukikam liṅgam* is found in *Vākya-padīya* 3.14.321 (=3.1021) (cf. Nakamura IV: 155–157).
- 18) *Pariśeṣa*-inference is adopted in VS 2.1.24–26 where *śabda* is proved to be a *guṇa* of *ākāśa* and in VS 2.2.27–29 where it is proved to be *guṇa*. Limitations on the number of objects, however, do not come into question there either.
- 19) The objection in VS 2.1.15–17 can apply to all invisible substances.
- 20) Not *saṃjñā-karman* but *spārśa* is considered to be the basic *liṅga* of *vāyu*, because *spārśa* works for the inference of both an individual wind and wind in general. On the other hand, one should understand that *saṃjñā-karman* is a supplementary *liṅga* for the inference of the latter.
- 21) VS 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimēṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni*.
- 22) As to the translation of '*pratyakṣa*' in VS 3.2.10–11 & 13, see Nozawa 1988: 466–465, Nozawa 1991: 34–35. But, cf. Murakami 1990: 119–121.
- 23) An expression such as "Entertain a stick with food (*yāṣṭikām*

*bhojaya*)” is presented as an example of *upacāra* in *Nyāya-bhāṣya ad NS 2.2.62* (NS (C): 663). Here a Brahmin is signified by the word ‘stick’. *Devadatta* and *śarīra* in VS 3.2.11 are considered to correspond to the stick and the Brahmin in this example respectively.

- 24) Cf. VS 3.1.11–12 and C’s *Vṛtti ad 3.1.11*.
- 25) Murakami 1975, Oetke 1988: 338–343; and also Ui 1917: 138, Faddegon 1918: 247ff, Potter 1977: 95.
- 26) PDh (N): 85<sup>20</sup>ff.
- 27) C’s *Vṛtti ad 3. 2. 14*: *evam ahaṁśabdena ekādhikaraṇatvāt sukhādaya ātmaviśayāḥ prāṇādayaś ca tannimittāḥ*.
- 28) Such a controversy does not appear in the literature of either the Mīmāṃsā or the Vaiśeṣika except for the VS as far as I research. The main reason may be because, introducing some philosophical concepts from the Vaiśeṣika in later ages, the Mīmāṃsā school came to hold a similar view to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in some matters. For example, Vṛttikāra’s inference-theory is close to that of the Vaiśeṣika (cf. PSV (V): 42a1, PSV (K): 123b3, Frauwallner 1968: 86, 87, 97–98, Nozawa 1991: 28 & note 5), and the concept *liṅga* held by Kumārila is also similar to that of the Vaiśeṣika (cf. e. g., *Śloka-vārttika, anumāna-pariccheda*, kk. 4, 156). In addition Śabara proves the existence of *ātman* by using the *liṅdas* of *ātman* in VS 3.2.4 (pp. 72–73, Frauwallner 1968: 50, 51, 111).

#### Texts and Abbreviations

- MS : Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, with Śabara’s Bhāṣya, Ānandāśrama S. S., 97.
- VS : Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, with Candrānanda’s Vṛtti. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 136.
- VS (M) : Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, with an anonymous commentary, published by Mithila Institute.
- NS (C) : Nyāya-sūtra. Calcutta S. S., 18 & 29 (rep. Rinsen Sanskrit Text Series, 1).
- BS : Brahma-sūtra, with Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya, ed. by J. L. Shastri,

Motilal Banarsidass.

PDh (N) : Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha, with Nyāyakandalī. Viziana-gram S. S., 4 (rep. Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, 13).

PDh (K) : Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha, with Kiraṇāvalī. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 154.

C : Candrānanda.

Kātyāyana-śrauta-sūtra: ed. by A. Weber. (rep. Vanarasi 1972).

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PSV (K) : Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, Karnakavarman's tr.

PSV (V) : Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, Vasudhararakṣita's tr.

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(Research Fellow, The Eastern Institute)