<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th>Linga in the Vaiśesika and the Mīmāmsā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Adachi, Toshihide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citation</strong></td>
<td>待兼山論叢．哲学篇．26 P.27-P.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Date</strong></td>
<td>1992-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text Version</strong></td>
<td>publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/11094/4028">http://hdl.handle.net/11094/4028</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOI</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>rights</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Līṅga in the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsā

Toshihide ADACHI

[1] In the 1920's Hakuju Ui and Herman Jacobi had already pointed out that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (VS) is critical of the Mīmāṁsā school in regard to the following three points: 1) the meanings of dharma in the opening sūtras, 2) the matter of the eternity of śabda (sound, word), 3) the apauruṣeya-tva (not being compiled by a man) of the Veda. In order to more clearly understand the fundamental difference between these two schools, we must analyze not only the three above-mentioned points, but also the difference of the meanings of *līṅga* in their sūtras, because unlike the just mentioned three points, the word *līṅga* is found throughout the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* (MS) and the VS as an original concept in both of them.

To research the concepts of *līṅga* in these two schools reveals their essential difference. The Mīmāṁsā school regards the Veda as the one and only source of dharma (cf. MS 1.1.3-4) whereas the Vaiśeṣika school holds that direct perception through experience is the most reliable means of cognition. The purpose of this paper is to make it clear that their respective concepts of *līṅga* reflect these essential positions of these two schools.

[2] First of all, in the MS the word *līṅga* mostly indicates a passage of the Veda. Āṇātha usually refers to a passage of the Veda as *līṅga* when commenting on a sūtra in which the word *līṅga* occurs. Particularly the word *līṅga* used in such fixed phrases as ‘*līṅga*-dārayānāc ca’ or ‘*līṅga*-ca’ denote a passage of the Veda without exception.
Let me give MS 1.1.23 as an example. This is the last sūtra in the section concerning the śabda-nitya-tva.

liṅgadarśanāc ca. (MS 1.1.23)
“And because we find a liṅga [in the Veda]."

liṅgam caiva bhavati, vācā virūpa nityayeti / anyaparam hīdam vākyam vāco nityatām anuvadati / tasmān nityah śabdaḥ /
(Śabara’s Bhāṣya ad MS 1.1.23)
“And also a liṅga exists [besides the preceding reasons]. Vācā virūpa nityayā’ (O Virūpa, by the eternal word) (Rg-veda 8.75.6, Taittirīya-saṃhitā 2.6.11.2, etc.) — Though the topic [of this passage] is different [from the eternity of word], this passage actually explains the eternity of a word. Therefore a word is eternal.”

As is shown in this example, these two fixed phrases are used as a reason-phrase (and mostly as the last of more than two reason-phrases). In this way, the MS presents a passage of the Veda as a reason for a proposition, and calls such a Vedic passage liṅga. In addition to the MS, about half of the liṅgas in the Brahma-sūtra are also used in this way.8)

[3] We notice, however, that the way liṅgas are used in the MS can also be found in VS 2.2.37, 4.2.9 and (5.2.11).9) For example, VS 4.2.9 reads: santy ayoniṣṭa vedaliṅgāc ceti “Also [we can know that] there exist non-viviparous beings because of a liṅga in the Veda.” Candranānda presents a following passage as the Veda-liṅga: candramā manaso jātaḥ “the moon was born from manas”(Rg-veda 10.90.13, Atharva-veda 19.6.7, etc.). The usage of liṅga in this sūtra is not different from the usage in the MS.

We must, however, pay attention to the respective reasons why the Veda can be liṅga for these two schools. In the
Mimāṃśa school, since *śabda* is eternal (cf. MS 1.1.6-23) and the Veda is considered to be not of human origin (cf. MS 1.1.27-32), the Veda is authoritative.

On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣika school regards the Veda as follows: “the arrangement of the sentences in the Veda is based on *buddhi* (*buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede*)” (VS 6.1.1), and the *buddhi* is not ours, but *rṣī*’s (cf. VS 6.1.2). Thus, for the Vaiśeṣikas the authority of the Veda does not come from its eternity and non-human-origin, but from the *buddhi* (cognitive activity) of *rṣīs*.

That is to say, the most reliable means of cognition is the Veda itself for the Mimāṃśa, but *buddhi* for the Vaiśeṣika.

[4] The difference in the two standpoints is seen more directly in the form of controversy in the VS, where *liṅga* means a ‘mark’ as a proof of inference. This usage of *liṅga* is standard in the VS, and all the examples[11] except VS 2.2.37 and 4.2.9 mentioned above, can be understood in this meaning.

In the VS, this kind of *liṅga* is divided into two: 1) *drṣṭam liṅgam* and 2) *adrṣṭa-liṅgam*. Prśastapāda’s twofold division of anumāna into 1) *drṣṭam* and 2) *sāmānyato-drṣṭam* (PDh (N): 205, PDh (K): 203) seems to be based on this division.[12] Of these two kinds of *liṅga*, the typical example of *drṣṭam liṅgam* is the *liṅgas* of a cow, i.e., ‘horns’ etc. (VS 2.1.8), and the representatives of *adrṣṭa-liṅgam* are *liṅgas* of the six unseen substances. When such unseen substances as *vāyu* (wind) are explained in the VS, their *liṅgas* are always given at the head of their paragraph. Among these *adrṣṭa-liṅgas*, the VS discussed in particular those of *vāyu* and *ātman* (2.1.15-19 & 3.2.6-14), because *vāyu* is the first of these unseen substances in the order of the nine substances, and because the existence of *ātman* is one of the main subjects in Indian philosophy.

The *liṅga* of *vāyu* is *sparśa* (touch) (VS 2.1.9-10). This
liṅga is analyzed by an opponent as follows:

vāyuḥ iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād ādṛśam līṅgam na 
vidyate (VS 2.1.15)

"[In the case of cow, there exists the direct perception such as 'this is a cow' when a visual organ touches a cow, but] there does not exist the direct perception that [this is] vāyu [even] when [skin] touches [vāyu]. Therefore [in the case of vāyu] a visible liṅga (ādṛśam līṅgam)\(^\text{13}\) [such as 'horns' in the case of a cow] does not exist."

sāmānyato ādṛśāc cāviśeṣah (VS 2.1.16)

"Moreover, [even if you try to infer the basis of 'touch'] by means of [the inference named] 'seen in common' (sāmānyato ādṛśa), [we can know] no distinction [of vāyu from 'ether' etc. as the basis of 'touch', because 'ether' etc. are also imperceptible in the same way as vāyu is]. [Therefore, we cannot infer vāyu through 'touch'.]"

tasmād āgamiṁaṁ (VS 2.1.17)

"Consequently [the statement "(This is) vāyu" is] grounded on sacred Scriptures."

In 2.1.15 the opponent first states the non-existence of ādṛśam līṅgam and in 2.1.16 he then insists that the existence of vāyu can not be established even by sāmānyoto ādṛśa which is a means to know the existence of the basis of ādṛśa-liṅga. After having shown in these two śūtras that the liṅga-theory of the Vaiśeṣika is not efficient in proving the existence of the basis of the liṅga, he finally concludes in 2.1.17 that the knowledge of vāyu is nothing but āgamiṁaṁ, i. e., being grounded on sacred Scriptures (=the Veda).\(^\text{14}\) This objection is not a denial of the existence of vāyu, but it concerns a method of cognition.\(^\text{15}\)
It is supposed by some scholars\(^\text{16}\) that the opponent here is a Mimāmsaka because of the opponent's conclusive assertion. This supposition is well supported by my analysis above of the *liṅga* in the MS, where the Veda is *liṅga*. Therefore, we can regard the objection in 2.1.15-17 as the Mimāmsa's criticism\(^\text{17}\) of the Vaiśeṣika's *liṅga*-theory, in which things and phenomena like *sparśa* are acknowledged as *liṅga*.

[5] To this objection, the Vaiśeṣika school answers as follows:

\begin{quote}
*saṃjñākarma tv asnadvīśiṣṭānāṁ liṅgam* (VS 2.1.18)

"[Your assertion is] not [right]. The deed of naming [*vāyu 'vāyu'] [which is done] by more excellent people than we, [such] is the *liṅga* [of *vāyu*]."
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇāḥ* (VS 2.1.19)

"Because the deed of naming is dependent on direct perception."
\end{quote}

Candrānanda regards these two sūtras as establishing the *pariśesā* (elimination) which assists and accomplishes the *saṃānyato drṣṭa* in 2.1.16. It is necessary for the establishment of *pariśesā* to limit objects to a fixed number. The Vaiśeṣika acknowledges only nine substances. Candrānanda interprets these two sūtras as a proof of non-existence of a tenth substance, commenting on *liṅga* in 2.1.18 as 'navānāṁ eva dravyānāṁ bhave liṅgam' (the *liṅga* which shows that only nine substances exist). As Nozawa points out (1989: 169–170, 172–175, 1991: 29–30, 32–34), this interpretation agrees with Dignāga's for the most part (cf. PSV (K): 109b6–111a5, (V): 28b3–29b8, Kitagawa 1965: 79ff, Hayes 1980: 249–252).

But in my opinion this is not the original intention of the
sūtras. First, it is hardly possible to read limitations on the number of substances in the statement of VS 2.1.18 itself. Secondly, we cannot find pariśesa-inference in VS 3.2.6-8 paralleling 2.1.15-17. Thirdly, avisesa in 2.1.16 surely make sense without assuming a tenth substance. Lastly, in spite of Dignāga’s interpretation (PSV (K): 110a2-3, (V): 28b6-7), VS 2.1.10 is not considered to be a part of pariśesa-inference. Therefore, it can hardly be understood that VS 2.1.18-19 refers to limitations on the number of substances.\(^{18}\)

If Candrananda’s interpretation is denied in this way, how should we understand these two sūtras?

It is true that these sūtras seem not to be an answer to the objection. In fact, they do not directly refer to the relationship between ‘touch’ (liṅga) and ‘wind’ (liṅgin), which is the main point of the objection. But this answer makes sense when we take the objection quoted above to be a denial of inference.

The objection in VS 2.1.15-17 was that inference is not valid to prove the existence of invisible objects like vāyu\(^{19}\) and that their existence can be known on the ground of the Veda. The answer to this objection ought to be the establishment of the possibility of inference. Indeed, these two sūtras seem to state the possibility of inference. Their intention will be as follows; So long as the name (vāyu) exists, someone must have done the deed of naming (vāyu ‘vāyu’). So long as someone named it, he must have directly perceived it, because it is impossible to name something without perceiving it directly, just as in the case of the deed of naming a new-born child (nāma-karaṇa) (cf. C’s Vṛtti ad 2.1.19). That is to say, as long as direct perception is acknowledged as valid and the name of an object exists, it is possible to infer the existence of the unseen object through the liṅga which is samjñā-karman.\(^{20}\) In this way, VS 2.1.18-19 serves as an answer to the objection.

To sum up the argument examined above, the passage VS
2.1.15-19 reveals the fundamental difference in the basic means of cognition between the Mimāṃsakas and the Vaiśeṣikas; the Veda for the former, pratyakṣa for the latter. At the same time, VS 2.1.18-19 shows that inference of an invisible object holds good if the direct perception of it (which is, of course, not an ordinary person’s, but that of a ṛṣi) has been realized.

[6] The liṅgas of ātman (soul) are pṛāṇa (exhalation) and apāna (inhalation) etc. (VS 3.2.4)21. These liṅgas are criticized by an opponent in VS 3.2.6–8, which is exactly the same as the opponent’s statement on the liṅga of vāyu (2.1.15-17) except the first word.

yahṛadatta iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād dṛṣṭam liṅgam na vidyate (VS 3.2.6=2.1.15)
“There does not exist a direct perception such as ‘[this is ātman called] Yajñadatta,’ [even] when [a visual organ] touches [Yajñadatta who is exhaling and so on]. Therefore, [in the case of ātman] a visible liṅga (dṛṣṭam liṅgam) does not exist.”

sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣāḥ (VS 3.2.7=2.1.16)
tasmād āgamikam (VS 3.2.8=2.1.17)

The opponent’s criticism is that the liṅgas of ātman cannot prove the existence of ātman because of the uncertainty of the connection between those liṅgas and ātman. In reply to the objection, Kaṇḍa tries to prove that those liṅgas are connected with ātman through the medium of the word ‘I’ as follows: (V=Vaiśeṣika, O=Opponent)

V: aham iti śabdavyatirekān nāgamikam (VS 3.2.9)
“Because of the exclusion [of the other substances like
'earth' etc. in regard to the basis of 'exhalation' etc.] by the word 'I', [it is possible to infer the existence of ātman by the lingas such as 'exhalation' etc.]. Therefore [the knowledge that ātman exists is] not grounded on sacred Scriptures.

O: yadi ca dṛṣṭapratyakṣo 'ham devadatto 'ham yajñadatta iti (VS 3.2.10).

"If [it is acknowledged that the word 'I'] denotes something cognizable because of [expressions] such as 'I am Devadatta' or 'I am Yajñadatta,'

O: devadatto gacchati viṣṇumitra gacchatīti copacārāc charīrapratyakṣak (VS 3.2.11).

"[we can conclude that the word 'I'] denotes a body [which is cognizable] because of indirect expressions (upacāra) such as 'Devadatta goes' or 'Viṣṇumitra goes'."

V: sandigdhas tūpacārah (VS 3.2.12)

"But the indirect expression is obscure (sandigdha) (i. e., not settled on one conclusion (anaikāntika)) [because it can actually indicate either a body or a soul]."

V: aham iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvād arthāntara-pratyakṣah (VS 3.2.13)

"[The word] 'I' denotes another thing (=ātman) [than a body] since [the word 'I'] is applied to an individual and is not applied to other [people]. [If the word 'I' denoted a body, we would use it on others, too.]"

V: na tu śārīraviśeṣād yajñadattaviṣṇumitrav yānaviśeṣāh (VS 3.2.14)

"[We can] not [know] the difference between Yajñadatta's
thought and Viṣṇumitra’s thought by the difference between their bodies. [Therefore the word ‘I’ denotes another thing than a body.]”

Not only some modern scholars but also Śridhara etc. interpret this series of arguments about aham as another proof of the existence of ātman apart from such lingas as ‘exhalation’ etc... But this interpretation does not agree with the context of the sūtra itself, because nāgamika in VS 3.2.9 shows that this sūtra is a response to the objection asserted in 3.2.6-8 and that the argument about aham in 3.2.9-14 is a continuation of 3.2.6-8. Candrānanda also, as the conclusion of this argument, states in his commentary on VS 3.2.14 that the word aham is valid as an intermediary between ātman and the lingas such as ‘exhalation’ etc. These facts mean that the opponent in 3.2.6-8 is the same as that in 3.2.9-14, that is to say, that the opponent in the argument about aham is not a person who denies the existence of ātman like a Buddhist, but the opponent who asserts āgamika in VS 3.2.8, i.e., a Mīmāṃsaka.

Therefore we can interpret the argument in VS 3.2.6-14 as follows: This is an argument between the Vaiśeṣika school, which argues that ‘exhalation’ etc. are the lingas of ātman by presenting the word aham as an intermediary and attempts to attest the efficiency of its linga-theory, and the Mīmāṃsā school, which, arguing that the word aham denotes a body, criticizes the validity of the linga held by the Vaiśeṣika and asserts that one can know the existence of ātman only on the ground of sacred Scriptures.

[7] Through these investigations, we have made clear the following points:

First, in the MS, the word linga mainly means a Vedic passage which is valid to prove a proposition.
Secondly, though such usage of the word *liṅga* can be found a few times in the VS, too, there is a difference between the Mīmāṁsā and the Vaiṣeṣika as to the grounds on which a Vedic passage becomes a valid means of cognition. For the Mīmāṁsā, the authority of the Veda comes from its eternity and non-human-origin: while for the Vaiṣeṣika, from the *buddhi* of rṣis.

Thirdly, the VS usually uses the word *liṅga* as meaning things and phenomena by which ordinary people can infer unseen objects. Concerning this kind of *liṅga*, we can see the Mīmāṁsā’s criticism and the Vaiṣeṣika’s answer in VS 2.1.15–19 and 3.2.6–14.28)

Lastly, as a general conclusion, it can be pointed out that the usage of the word *liṅga* in the MS and the VS reflects the fundamental standpoints of these two schools and that in the stage of the VS the Vaiṣeṣika school was more closely related to the Mīmāṁsā as a critic than it has been regarded until now.

Notes

* The present paper is a revised and enlarged English version of my article "Vaiṣeṣikasūtra no veda-kan to liṅga," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies), 35–2 (1987) pp. 990–988.

2) The first three of the five questions about *dharma* such as *ko dharmah* which Candrānanda poses in his *Vṛtti ad* VS 1.1.1 are the same as the first three of the five questions about *dharma* in Śabara’s *Bhāṣya ad* MS 1.1.1 (p. 105–5).
3) The eternity of *śabda* is discussed in MS 1.1.6–23 and VS 2.2.30–43: the *apauruṣeya-tva* of the Veda in MS 1.1.27–32 and VS 6.1.1–2.
4) Frauwallner (1961: 118) points out that the sūtras which treat the *śabda-nitya-tva* in the MS do not belong to the oldest layer of the MS. In addition to this, Frauwallner (1984) and Wezler
(1982: 671-674) insist that VS 1.1.1-3 which explain the dharma did not belong to the original VS.

5) As exceptions, e.g., MS 8.3.3-4, 9.1.45.

6) līṅga-darśanāc ca: MS 1.1.23, 2.2.8, 2.3.9; 15, 3.3.42, 3.4.36; 45, 3.5.51, 3.6.13; 26, 3.7.5, 3.8.27, 4.1.10; 23, 5.3.18, 5.4.4, 6.1.18; 52, 6.6.17, 6.7.17; 7.1.19, 7.2.10, 7.3.15, 8.1.4; 8.4.13; 20, 9.2.22, 9.3.2; 5; 28, 10.1.5; 21; 41, 10.3.49, 10.4.5, 10.5.2; 51; 74; 87, 10.6.26, 10.8.26, 11.2.33; 46, 11.3.28, 11.4.12, 12.2.10, 12.4.4. līṅgāc ca: 3.2.8, 3.3.3, 5.3.38, 7.3.8, 7.4.14, 8.2.28.

7) Renou points out that līṅga in the ritual literature means 'a characteristic element' or 'la "caractéristique" d’un mantra', which is usually the name of a deity (1941-42: 153-154 (note 2), Renou & Silburn 1954: 71). However, the līṅgas in Kātyāyana-śrāvastīyaśāstra 1.8.37 and 12.6.30 indicate a passage of the Veda as is the case in the MS. Furthermore, the līṅga in MS 3.3.14 is defined as one of the six means supporting the viniyogavidhi. As to this līṅga, see Artha-sāṃgraha (p. 12 & 16ff), Kane 1962: 1309-11, Yoshimizu 1987.

8) BS1.1.22; 31, 1.3.15; 35, 1.4.17; 20, 2.3.13; 15*, 3.2.11; 26, 3.3.44*, 3.4.34*; 39*, 4.1.2*, 4.3.4*, 4.4.21*. The līṅga in the sūtras marked with an asterisk is used in the same way as in the MS.

9) VS 5.2.11: vaidikam ca. C’s Vṛt(i)ti on it: vaidikam vākyam ... līṅgam.

10) VS 6.1.2: na cāsmadbhuddhibho līṅgam rṣeh. This sūtra is rather hard to understand. Candrānanda identifies the līṅga in the sūtra with vijñāna. But from the context, this sūtra should be interpreted as follows: ‘And [the arrangement of the sentence in the Veda] does not [arise] from our buddhi. [Therefore this arrangement is] a līṅga [of the existence] of a rṣi.’ This interpretation is supported by the anonymous commentary (VS (M): 58).

11) VS 1.2.18, 2.1.8; 9, 10; 14, 15; 18-21; 26; 2.2.1; 6; 12; 30; 37, 3.2.1; 4; 6, 4.1.2, 4.2.9, 5.2.10, 6.1.2; 3, 7.1.29, 9.20.


13) As to its substantial meaning, see Nozawa 1991: 21.

14) There is no example of āgama which means the Veda in the MS,
where it is usually called \( \text{sruti} \) etc. However, \( \text{āgama} \) is sometimes used in the meaning of sacred Scriptures in general including the Veda. Cf. e.g., *Manu-smṛti* 12.105–106, *Vākya-padiya* 1.30, 1.148, 2.489, *Tarkajvālā ad Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* 8.17, Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya ad BS* 2.1.11 etc. (cf. Nakamura I: 255, Nakamura IV: 155–159). Vātsyāyana also uses \( \text{āgama} \) or \( \text{āgamika} \) in the meaning ‘(based on) verbal testimony’ in his *Bhāṣya ad NS* 2.1.17 (NS (C): 440).

15) Candrānanda replaces \( \text{āgamika} \) with \( \text{pravāda-mātra} \) (a mere rumor). On the basis of this interpretation, Wezler states that the opponent is fictitious because ‘it can hardly be assumed that an adherent of a rival school ever denied the existence of the ‘substance’ wind alone’ (1983: 50). But C’s replacement is a forced one. Cf. note 28 below.


17) I have not yet found such a criticism in the Mimāṃsā literature. However, the assertion that some objects cannot be inferred by \( \text{laukikām} \text{ liṅgam} \) is found in *Vākya-padiya* 3.14.321 (=3.1021) (cf. Nakamura IV: 155–157).

18) *Pariśeṣa*-inference is adopted in *VS* 2.1.24–26 where \( \text{śabda} \) is proved to be a \( \text{guna of ākāśa} \) and in *VS* 2.2.27–29 where it is proved to be \( \text{guna} \). Limitations on the number of objects, however, do not come into question there either.

19) The objection in *VS* 2.1.15–17 can apply to all invisible substances.

20) Not \( \text{samjñā-karman} \) but \( \text{sparśa} \) is considered to be the basic \( \text{liṅga of vāyu} \), because \( \text{sparśa} \) works for the inference of both an individual wind and wind in general. On the other hand, one should understand that \( \text{samjñā-karman} \) is a supplementary \( \text{liṅga} \) for the inference of the latter.

21) *VS* 3.2.4: \( \text{prāyāpānamoḥonmeṣaṁjñāvamanamogatindriyāntaravikārōḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādevasau prayatnaṁ cety ātmalīṅgāni.} \)


23) An expression such as “Entertain a stick with food (\( \text{yāṣṭikāṁ} \)
"bhoyaya)" is presented as an example of \textit{upacāra} in \textit{Nyāya-bhāṣya ad} NS 2.2.62 (NS (C): 663). Here a Brahmin is signified by the word \textquote{stick}. \textit{Devadatta} and \textit{śārīra} in VS 3.2.11 are considered to correspond to the stick and the Brahmin in this example respectively.

24) Cf. VS 3.1.11–12 and C\'s \textit{Vṛtti ad} 3.1.11.
26) PDh (N): 85\textsuperscript{a}ff.
27) C\'s \textit{Vṛtti ad} 3.2.14: \textit{evam ahaṁśabdena ekādhi karavaatvāt sukādaya ātmaviśayanāḥ prānādayāḥ ca tannimittāḥ}.
28) Such a controversy does not appear in the literature of either the Mīmāṁsā or the Vaiśeṣika except for the VS as far as I research. The main reason may be because, introducing some philosophical concepts from the Vaiśeṣika in later ages, the Mīmāṁsā school came to hold a similar view to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in some matters. For example, Vṛttikāra\'s inference-theory is close to that of the Vaiśeṣika (cf. PSV (V): 42\textsuperscript{a}, PSV (K): 123\textsuperscript{b}, Frauwallner 1968: 86, 87, 97–98, Nozawa 1991: 28 & note 5), and the concept \textit{liṅga} held by Kumārila is also similar to that of the Vaiśeṣika (cf. e. g., \textit{Śloka-vārttika, anumāna-pariccheda}, kk. 4, 156). In addition Śabara proves the existence of ātman by using the \textit{liṅdās} of ātman in VS 3.2.4 (pp. 72–73, Frauwallner 1968: 50, 51, 111).

\textbf{Texts and Abbreviations}

\textbf{MS} : Mīmāṁsā-śūtra, with Śabara\'s Bhāṣya, Ānandāśrama S. S., 97.
\textbf{VS} : Vaiśeṣika-śūtra, with Candrānanda\’s \textit{Vṛtti}. Gaekwad\’s Oriental Series, 136.
\textbf{VS (M)} : Vaiśeṣika-śūtra, with an anonymous commentary. published by Mithila Institute.
\textbf{BS} : Brahma-śūtra, with Śaṅkara\’s Bhāṣya. ed. by J. L. Shastri,
Motilal Banarsidass.

C : Candrāṇanda.

PSV (K): Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, Karnakavarman’s tr.
PSV (V): Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, Vasudhararakṣita’s tr.
Peking ed. Vol, 130.

Secondary Literature
Faddgegon, B., 1918. The Vaiśeṣika-system. Amsterdam.
Ling in the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsā

1981.

(Research Fellow, The Eastern Institute)