Who Protects Me from Whom?*
Alliance Formation and Survival of Political Leaders in the Third World

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Abstract

This paper quantitatively examines the mechanism of alliance formation in the Third World, drawing on Steven R. David's omnibalancing theory, which emphasizes the role of internal threats instead of external threats as opposed to the conventional balance of power theory. Many scholars and policy makers have analyzed mechanisms to enhance the security of Third World states, primarily using the balance of power theory. The state-making efforts of international powers, however, often yield more security problems in the Third World. Nine alternative hypotheses regarding the role of internal threats and their interaction with the tenure of political leaders in the context of the Third World are tested by using Banks's dataset, the Correlates of War (COW) Alliance dataset (v.3.03) and Henk E. Goemans's list of heads of state. The results suggest that some internal threats correlate significantly with alliance formation in the Third World, and that the risk of losing office is significantly increased by internal (but not external) threats, but is significantly reduced by alliance formation.

Keywords：alliance, internal threats, leader tenure, Third World

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1. Introduction

The study of alliances has long been one of the major areas of international relations and peace research.[1] Alliances have been used to aggregate state capabilities against threats from other states, and to prevent interstate war. Much attention has been devoted to the purpose of alliances, based on realist and neo-realist paradigms, since the Cold War.[2] Many scholars have supported the balance of power theory, and the empirical literature examining the relationship between alliance formation and interstate disputes in order to explain the purpose of alliances.[3]

However, Steven R. David points out that this widely accepted point of departure for alliance study is not adequate to explain Third World alliances and he advocates the theory of omnibalancing.[4] The theory of omnibalancing is very important in that it covers the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in Third World countries. Because leaders in the Third World are sometimes neither legitimate nor strong and domestic politics in the Third World are seriously at stake, they often find it difficult to stay in power. Some leaders do keep their power by using alliances. Alliances in the Third World are driven more by internal threats to political survival, such as civil war, coups, assassination attempts, and anti-government demonstrations, than by external threats to states. In other words, the leaders with serious domestic threats tend to have alliances in order to remain in office. Omnibalancing departs from realism, and several realists and neo-realists state that alliances in the Third World are positively associated with leader tenure.[5] In fact, during and after the Cold War, political leaders of some countries, such

1) See, for example, Knorr, Klaus. 1976. *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*. Kansas; Allen Press, Inc.

2) Morgenthau, Hans J. 1963. "The Political Conditions for an International Police Force," *International Organization* 17(2): 393-403; Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House.

3) Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Fearon, James D. 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2): 236–69; Reiter, Dan. 1994. "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46(4): 490-526; Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do alliances deter aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances 6 bon the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 427–439; Levy, Jack S and William R. Thompson. 2005. "Hegemonic Threats and Great－Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," *Security Studies* 14(1): 1-33.

4) David defines the term *Third World* as all countries except the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European states, and the People's Republic of China. In this paper, developing countries as categorized by the World Bank are used. See, David, Steven R. 1991. "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43(2): 233-256.

5) Ayoob, Mohammed. 1991. "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics* 43(2): 257-283; Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Barnett, Colaresi N. and Jack S. Levy. 1992. "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14(4): 19-40; Schweller, Randall L. 1994. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," *International Security* 19(1): 72-107; Bergen, Christopher. 2000. *Omnibalancing in Syria: Prospects for Foreign Policy*. California; Storming Media; Fravel, Taylor M. 2005. "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," *International Security*, 30(2): 46–83; Miller Eric A. and Akady Toritsyn. 2005. "Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Security Studies* 14(2): 325-363; Colaresi, Michael and Sabine C. Carey. 2008. "To Kill or to Protect: Security Forces, Domestic Institutions, and Genocide," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1): 39-67.

as Ethiopia, Egypt, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, held on to power by allying with the US or Russia.

A great deal of the international relations literature has analyzed the mechanisms used to enhance the security of Third World states and regions, primarily from the perspective of a developed country's interests and concerns. Ironically, however, the impact on state-making mechanisms (military, political, economic, and technological) by international powers, especially the US, has substantively dislocated the state-making calculations of Third World leaders, and yielded additional security problems in Third World states. Little has been written in a systematic, empirical fashion about Third World states' overriding concerns with security from the perspective of Third World states and the vulnerabilities of their structures, institutions, and regimes. This paper therefore quantitatively analyzes alliance formations and the political survival of Third World leaders using the theory of omnibalancing.

The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, this paper examines whether Third World leaders form military alliances more often when faced with internal threats versus external threats. This issue is the linchpin of omnibalancing. This paper illustrates the link between domestic politics and foreign policy in terms of Third World nations. It also demonstrates how weak regimes influence Third World alliance decisions. Secondly, this paper estimates the impact of military alliance ties on political survival. In fact, while hundreds of Third World leaders have lost power because of internal enemies,[6] some political leaders in the Third World have managed to stay in power for significant lengths of time when they have one or more military allies as illustrated above.[7] This behavior is not covered by the balance of power theory. In this paper, thus, I test the relation between military alliances and Third World leaders.

This paper proceeds in four parts. First, I review previous research on Third World leader survival. Second, Third World leader alliance decisions as a response to domestic threats are explored as well as the survival of the political leaders, including testable hypotheses. Next, my research design is presented. Finally, I offer empirical results, draw some preliminary conclusions from the findings, and suggest directions for future research.

6) Goemans, Henk E. 2008. "Which Way Out? The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6): 771-794.

7) David (fn. 4); Miller and Toritsyn (fn. 5).

2. Internal Threats and Third World Leader Survival

Many realists, such as Morgenthau, Walt, and Waltz stress the balance of power as a tool for building international security, and this theory, which is intimately connected with the concept of alliances, is a very important approach to realize peace.[8] According to their arguments, alliances are one means to protect states against threats from other states. In the Cold War period, alliances amplified collective security and hedged against interstate conflict in the bipolar context that World War II created.

In the study of alliance behaviors of the Third World, however, they are not explained only by external threats because alliance formation for Third World leaders is also an instrument to counter internal threats. The ultimate goal of political leaders is to stay in power. Leader choices then are dependent on the expected effect of their policies on their tenure, and political leaders select policies that maximize their time in office, often at the expense of developing their states and promoting long-term security. Adopting this perspective, scholars have argued that alliances are fundamentally driven by the desire to hold onto power.[9]

Miller and Toritsyn provide two examples to support David's omnibalancing. First, in January 2001, Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma faced increased internal threats in the wake of the "Kuchmagete" scandal. Although he never formally allied with Russia, he formed the Ukraine-Russia alliance in order to ensure his position from internal threats, and had its support of a 52-point military cooperation plan from Russia. Additionally, after a 12 February 2001 meeting, he obtained pledges of economic cooperation including high technology, industry, and energy, and aimed at the strengthening of the opposition to himself. Second, Uzbek President Islam Karimov was concerned with the internal threats of Islamic extremism and political opposition to his position during the Cold War. To combat the internal religious threats in particular, he allied with Russia by joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and obtained economic and military support to stay in office. Such alliances unquestionably provided benefits to leaders by enhancing their hold on power.[10] Thus, alliance behaviors in the Third World show the limitations of balance of power theory.

In the next section, I use David's omnibalancing theory, and develop some hypotheses for ex-

8) Morgenthau (fn.2); Walt (fn.2); Waltz (fn.2).

9) David (fn. 4); Levy, Jack S and Michael M. Barnett. 1992. "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14(4): 19-40; Miller and Toritsyn (fn. 5); Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

10) Miller and Toritsyn (fn. 5). The linking President Kuchma to the disappearance of journalist Georgiy Gongadze in September 2000 led to the "Kuchmagete" scandal.

amining whether alliance formation is associated with an increase in internal threats in Third World countries.[11]

3. Hypotheses

David provides two important insights into Third World leader alliance behaviors for this study.[12] The first is that political leaders in the Third World tend to ally with an external superpower when they face domestic political threats, as contrasted with a balance of power. In the Cold War, the US and the USSR were the two superpowers. They were attracted to bilateral wars with Third World countries, such as the wars between the US and Vietnam or the USSR and Afghanistan, as well as several other internal conflicts in Third World nations. This is because the two superpowers tried to establish their superiority in the Third World to control the Cold War and to expand their influence. As a result, leaders of the Third World nations could play off one superpower against the other for gaining some assistance.[13] For example, Ethiopia obtained principal military and economic support from the US. But when an insurgency of Somalian people who lived in Ethiopia led to civil war in 1962, the US did not provide adequate military support to the Ethiopian leadership. The Ethiopian leader Mengists dissolved the Ethiopian-US alliance, and the USSR allied itself with Ethiopia in 1977.[14]

The second is the most important insight. It is that Third World leaders appease other states in order to counter direct and dangerous internal threats. Barnett and Levy suggest that, in the contemporary Third World, it is particularly true that internal threats are more frequently observed than external threats, and political leaders seek external alliances to counter domestic threats.[15] In fact, in the post-Cold War world, Third World leaders such as Colombia, Bolivia, Cambodia and Jordan determine alliances in the light of the increase in internal threats. Internal threats play a determinative role in the alliances of Third World.[16] Thus, drawing on the above insights from David's omnibalancing theory, I get the following hypotheses on alliance formation:

Hypothesis 1: *Political leaders in the Third World do not necessarily form alliances with other states when they face external threats.*

11) David (fn. 4).
12) Ibid.
13) Barkawi, Tarak. 2006. *Globalization and War*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
14) David (fn. 4).
15) Barnett, Colaresi N. and Jack S. Levy. 1991. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," *International Organization* 45(3): 369-395.
16) David (fn. 4).

Hypothesis 2: *Political leaders in the Third World are likely to form alliances with other states when they face domestic political threats.*

Hypothesis 3: *Political leaders in the Third World are likely to form alliances with other states when they face domestic revolutionary threats.*

Hypothesis 4: *Political leaders in mixed regimes are more likely to form alliances with other states than in autocratic regimes.*

Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 lie at the heart of the theory of omnibalancing as elaborated above. They suggest that an eruption of internal, rather than external threats will increase the probability of having alliances in the Third World. Internal threats are then divided into domestic political and revolutionary threats, following Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* They show that a political leaders' tenure can be threatened by, principally, *domestic challenges to leadership*: rebellion, demonstrations and civil war, *revolutionary challenges to individual leaders*: coup d'état and assassination attempts and *the political systems they lead*: transition of regime type, and *external threats in the form of military attack by foreign adversaries*.[17] In addition, Hypothesis 4 is intended to examine whether alliance formation differs across regime types. Recently, many scholars, policymakers, and journalists in the field of international relations have examined political regime types in seeking the causes of domestic threats. The higher propensity for internal violence depends to a degree on the type and fairness of regimes. Some researchers estimate the probability by mapping all nominal regime types onto political leaders' incumbent.[18]

According to David's omnibalancing theory, an alliance is a possible shortcut for Third World leaders to stay in power by gaining access to political, military, and economic aid in the battle against bloody civil violence. This point, which is not covered by balance of power theory, leads to the following five additional hypotheses on the survival of leadership.

Hypothesis 5: *The risk of losing office in the Third World is likely to decrease if a state has one or more allies (defense pact or entente pact).*

Hypothesis 6: *The risk of losing office in the Third World is likely to decrease if a state has al-*

17) Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (fn. 9).

18) See Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (fn. 9); Miller and Toritsyn (fn. 5); Gelpi, Christopher and Joseph M. Grieco. 2001. "Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 794-817; Chiozza, Giacomo and Henk E. Goemans. 2003. "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(4): 443-467; Chiozza, Giacomo and Henk E. Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 604–619; Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11): 1279-1301; Svolik, Millan W. 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 477-494.They examine whether and how their risk of losing office influences leaders in different regime types. Chiozza and Goemans divide regime types into democratic, semi-democratic/mixed, autocratic, and regimes in turmoil in "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict."

lies among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5).

Hypothesis 7: *The risk of losing office in the Third World is likely to decrease if a state acquires US military aid.*

Hypothesis 8: *The risk of losing office in the Third World is likely to decrease if a state acquires US economic aid.*

Hypothesis 9: *The risk of losing office in mixed regimes is more likely to decrease than in autocratic regimes.*

Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that there is a relationship between a political leader's tenure and alliances in the Third World. If the theory of omnibalancing holds, the effects of alliances would be empirically supported. In addition, as argued above, some political leaders in Third World nations take advantage of internal threats in order to increase their power. I test whether they intend to receive military and economic assistance from developed nations with or without forming alliances to increase the likelihood of remaining in office (Hypotheses 7 and 8). Hypothesis 9 can be tested as well as the discussion of alliance formation and regime type (hypothesis 4) from past research. The timing of losing office will be different in democratic, mixed, and autocratic regimes, and regimes in turmoil. Hence, Hypothesis 9 is intended to measure tenure lengths in different types of regimes.

4. Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I employ Goemans's updated list of political leaders as a unit of analysis. In the field of security studies, a country-year format is commonly used where it is difficult to identify a leader.[19] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson adopted a leader-year format in which the ruler holding office in a given year is used as a unit of analysis.[20] The quantitative analysis of political leaders has advanced since then. Goemans's data includes all political leaders of countries for the period 1919 through 2003. Among them, I use only Third World political leaders holding executive power from 1945 to 2001, because internal political violence in Third World nations is during and after the Cold War period, and the data of other variables were not available before that point.[21] Using Goemans's list of heads of states, this paper adopts two different models.

19) Goemans (fn. 6).
20) Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89(4): 841–55.
21) Definition of Third World is referred to developing countries, categorized by the World Bank.

First, I utilize a sophisticated binary response model to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4. In previous studies on alliance formation, Morrow and Gibler, Sweeney and Fritz, and Leeds employ a probit model, a censored probit model, and a logit model controlling time dependence, respectively.[22] Panel logit analysis is used for this estimation. Technically speaking, the data for this analysis are unbalanced panel data, with a cross-sectional time-series design, and in the leader-year format. Furthermore, this paper uses a random-effects model to identify some of the coefficients of interests that do not vary over units, because it needs to measure different theoretical arguments. A fixed-effect model, which loses the ability to identify them, is not appropriate for this estimation. The functional form of the model can be represented by:

$$logit\{Pr(Y_{ij} = 1|X_{ij}, \varsigma_j)\} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \beta_3 X_{3ij} + \varsigma_{ij},$$

where Y reflects a decision of alliance formation in a given year. X denotes independent and control variables, and ς is an error term.[23]

Second, to analyze hypotheses 5 to 9, I estimate a semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model following the approach of Colaresi and Goemans.[24] The Cox model has some significant advantages relative to parametric models such as the Weibull and the exponential.[25] In particular, the Cox model does not require assumptions on the specific baseline of hazard in a sample. A great strength of the method is that it takes into account that the risk of losing office decreases the longer a leader is in power. Therefore, the semiparametric Cox hazard model provides superior estimation when testing the linkage between time in office and turnover propensity. Here, for the purposes of this paper, the specific hazard rate is the "risk" of leadership turnover and indicates the odds of losing power in a generated duration framework. The functional form of the model can be represented by:

$$h(Z_i, t) = h_0(t) \cdot exp(\bar{\beta}\bar{Z}_i) = h_0(t) \cdot exp(\beta_1 Z_{i1} + \beta_2 Z_{i2} + \cdots + \beta_j Z_{ij}),$$

where h reflects the rate at which political leaders lose power at time t, given that it has survived until t. Z is the vector denoting independent and control variables.

22) Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 904-933; Gibler, Douglas M. and Scott Wolford. 2006. "Alliances Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type and Alliance Formation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 129-153; Sweeney, Kevin and Paul Fritz. 2004. "Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances," *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 428-449; Leeds, Brett Ashley, Colaresia Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments," *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 461–476.

23) In conventional logit model, this error term is not included in model.

24) Colaresi, Michael. 2004. "Aftershocks: Post-War Leadership Tenure, Rivalry, and Regime Dynamics," *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 713-727 and Goemans (fn. 7).

25) Box-Steffensmeier, J. M. and B. S. Jones. 1997. "Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4): 1414-1461.

5. Empirical Results

5.1 Alliance Formation

Table 1 presents the results of panel logit analysis of alliance formation. In Model 1, the coefficient of external threats is not only negative in sign, but also insignificant, suggesting that the level of external threats is not negatively correlated with alliance formation of the Third World. It implies that David's omnibalancing theory holds true and the balance of power theory does not.[26]

Models 2 and 3, which test the key hypotheses of this paper, produce interesting results. Though the results of Model 3 support Hypothesis 3, the result of Model 2 shows that the effect of domestic political threats on alliances is negative and significant, against Hypothesis 2.

Ayoob offers the most satisfying explanation for this puzzling result. The goal of alliance formation is to get weapons so that leaders can counter internal threats in order to hold power.[27] He argues that leaders in Third World states deliberately intensify the level of internal tension to receive enough military aid from developed countries. Leaders in Third World states escalate threats to the point where the possibility of civil war becomes distinct in order to access arms transfer, and gain military support from developed countries. A partisan and propagandistic way to bring about domestic revolutionary threats is domestic political threats including anti-government demonstrations, coups, assassination attempts, riots, and general strikes. That is why leaders do not seem to decide on alliance formation until intra-state tensions cumulate. Atlas and Licklider imply that there are organized leaders who believe that interests from interethnic tensions are useful in the Third World. They deliberately continue internal violence, and try to gain somewhat.[28] For example, valuable natural resources, such as oil, minerals, (specifically diamonds), and agricultural products engender fierce conflict.[29] People squabble over property rights for the resources. In other words, "Resources offer lootable income over which to fight, making costly strategies of violence viable – a few can 'do well out of war."[30] Then, even Miller and Toritsyn, who support the theory of omnibalancing, allege that when facing pressing threats such as civil war and revolution, political leaders seek external alliances that help eliminate in-

26) David (fn. 4).
27) Ayoob (fn. 5).
28) Atlas, Pierre M. and Roy Licklider. 1999. "Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon," *Journal of Peace Research* 36(1): 35-54.
29) de Soysa, Indra. 2002. "Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 189-99," *Journal of Peace Research* 39: 395-416; Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90; World Bank. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. New York; Oxford U. Press.
30) Quoted in de Soysa, "Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 189-99."

Table 1: Panel Logit Analysis of Alliance Formation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Time Period	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001
Domestic political threats			-0.287**	-0.391***
			(0.15)	(0.164)
Domestic revolutionary threats		0.149**		0.218***
		(0.081)		(0.083)
External threats	-7.863			-9.268
	(9.68)			(10.759)
Mixed regime	-0.222	-0.319	-0.257	-0.218
	(0.21)	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.212)
Democratic regime	-0.911***	-0.994***	-0.978***	-0.982***
	(0.325)	(0.343)	(0.341)	(0.34)
Regime in turmoil	0.445	-0.029	0.423	0.101
	(0.324)	(0.392)	(0.368)	(0.39)
Economic size (log)	1.594***	1.624***	1.626***	1.627***
	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.193)
Total population (log)	-0.436***	-0.453***	-0.403***	-0.41***
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.115)
Energy consumption per capita (log)	-1.584***	-1.603***	-0.609***	-1.601***
	(0.18)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.193)
Number of borders	0.181***	0.174***	0.174***	0.17***
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Percent mountainous terrain (log)	-0.138**	-0.167**	-0.156**	-0.159**
	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Ethnic fragmentation	0.308	0.375	0.443	0.358
	(0.442)	(0.465)	(0.463)	(0.457)
Religious fragmentaion	-0.662	-0.621	-0.619	-0.715
	(0.498)	(0.515)	(0.507)	(0.497)
North Africa/Middle East	1.2***	1.192***	0.967***	1.233***
	(0.262)	(0.274)	(0.271)	(0.266)
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.014***	1.025***	0.967***	0.962***
	(0.331)	(0.341)	(0.337)	(0.336)
Post-Cold War	-0.707**	-0.626*	-0.654*	-0.674*
	(0.383)	(0.385)	(0.383)	(0.383)
Constant	25.186***	25.799***	25.335***	25.527***
	(3.375)	(3.484)	(3.473)	(3.41)
Rho	0.128	0.112	0.101	0.08
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.561)	(0.052)
Number of observations	5232	5053	5057	5052
No. of Operations (Average per Leaders)	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6
Log-likelihood	-704.7	-647.6	-646.8	-642.9
Wald test	134.21	125.9	125.42	134.23

***=significant at the .01 level. **=sig. at the .05 level. *=sig. at the .10 lvel. All tests are two-tailed.
The dependent variable is alliance formation. Each observation is coded as 1 with the first year of alliance formation, and 0 otherwise.

ternal threats.[31)]

Yet, in fact, the strong relationship between domestic revolutionary threats and alliance formation is observed in Models 2 and 4 at the 0.01 or 0.05 significant level. Of the control variables, North Africa/Middle East and Sub Saharan Africa variables are positively significant. Most of the states in those areas were created in the 1960s, and suffer from a high risk of riots and internal conflicts as compared to other countries. They are more likely to have alliances.

The regime type variables appear to have disparate effects in Model 4. The benchmark of estimation is autocratic regime. This result does not provide empirical support for Hypothesis 4. Mixed regime has no difference from autocratic regime in alliance formation. On the other hand, a democratic regime is less likely to make an alliance in this analysis as compared to an autocratic regime. Gibler, Wolford, and Kimball lead to the same result.[32)]

Overall, those models have no consistent effects in the hypothesized directions, but Hypothesis 4 is rejected in the models. This connection plays a stronger role in explaining the calculations of Third World political leaders.

5.2 Survival of Leaders

The results of the semiparametric Cox proportional hazard with leader tenure as the dependent variable are presented in Table 2. The coefficients assess the overall effects of explanatory variables on the risk of losing office. Thus, negative coefficients indicate that an increase in the value of independent variables is associated with a decrease in the risk of being removed from office.

Models 1 and 2 report estimation results of equations that include defense pacts and entente pacts as representative of alliance commitments. The findings are consistent with the theory of omnibalancing. Coefficients of defense and entente pacts are negatively significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. In other words, allies in defense and entente pacts decrease the risk of losing office.

Models 3 to 7 reports linkages between the risk of the loss of office and alliance with five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. The coefficients of alliance with P5 are almost significant statistically, but carry opposite signs in the submodels. Alliances with China and Russia decrease the risk of a removal from office, but those with the US and France increase it.

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31) Miller and Toritsyn (fn. 5). They refer to Brown's more comprehensive definition of internal armed conflicts. See Brown, Michael E. 2001. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. London; CSIA Studies in International Security.

32) Gibler and Wolford (fn. 24); Kimball, Anessa L. 2006. "Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link," *Journal of Peace Research* 43(4): 371-389.

Table 2: Cox Model of Leadership Survival

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Time Period	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1972-2001	1972-2001
Alliance (defense pact)	-0.223***							-0.253**	-0.256**
	(0.102)							(0.13)	(0.13)
Alliance (entente pact)		-0.211**						-0.096	-0.09
		(0.111)						(0.149)	(0.15)
Ally with China			-1.011***						
			(0.328)						
Ally with France				0.245*					
				(0.15)					
Ally with Russia (USSR)					-0.433***				
					(0.192)				
Ally with UK						-0.034			
						(0.136)			
Ally with US							0.32***		
							(0.101)		
US military aid								-6.173*	-0.725*
								(4.241)	(5.06)
US economic aid									1.479
									(3.303)
Domestic political threats	0.212***	0.214***	0.215***	0.217***	0.216***	0.215***	0.213***	0.155***	0.156***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Domestic revolutionary threats	0.163***	0.157***	0.157***	0.156***	0.157***	0.157***	0.16***	0.205***	0.205***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)
External threats	-6.06***	-6.124***	-6.145***	-6.023***	-6.235***	-6.25***	-5.076**		
	(2.481)	(2.385)	(2.396)	(2.399)	(2.4)	(2.383)	(2.437)		
Mixed regime	0.614***	0.683***	0.695***	0.713***	0.644***	0.705***	0.653***	0.481***	0.477***
	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.173)	(0.173)
Democratic regime	1.135***	1.2***	1.217***	1.222***	1.154***	1.232***	1.13***	1.116***	1.115***
	(0.158)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.16)	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.213)	(0.213)
Regime in turmoil	0.633***	0.665***	0.667***	0.683***	0.633***	0.674***	0.66***	0.855***	0.848***
	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.189)	(0.116)	(0.183)	(0.238)	(0.239)
Ethnic fragmentation	-0.24*	-0.364***	-0.369***	-0.377***	-0.378***	-0.353***	-0.264**	-0.343**	-0.337**
	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.178)	(0.179)
Religious fragmentaion	0.005	-0.158	-0.155	-0.163	-0.163	-0.173	-0.011	-0.317	-0.321
	(0.202)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.204)	(0.253)	(0.253)
W	-0.692***	-0.682***	-0.659***	-0.671***	-0.623***	-0.67***	-0.672***	-0.386	-0.376
	(0.21)	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.209)	(0.28)	(0.282)
S	-0.23***	-0.227***	-0.216***	-0.217***	-0.214***	-0.216***	-0.224***	-0.253***	-0.254***
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Percent mountainous terrain (log)	0.01	0.018	0.016	0.012	0.015	0.017	-0.002		
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Latin America	0.471***							0.154	0.153

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Time Period	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1945-2001	1972-2001	1972-2001
	(0.029)							(0.147)	(0.147)
New state	-0.895	-1.482	-1.534	-1.487	-1.654	-1.55	-0.583	-0.637	-0.692
	(1.147)	(1.129)	(1.148)	(1.147)	(1.172)	(1.15)	(1.14)	(1.148)	(1.175)
Post-Cold War	0.05	0.021	0.022	0.028	0.015	0.02	0.045	0.175*	0.174*
	(0.093)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.105)
Number of observations	5138	5138	5138	5138	5138	5138	5138	3243	3243
Number of subjects	932	932	932	932	932	932	932	576	576
Number of failures	817	817	817	817	817	817	817	462	462
Log-likelihood	-4585.8	-4593.9	-4595.9	-4594.7	-4593.9	-4595.9	-4590.2	-2311.4	-2311.3
Wald test	265.94	254.83	254.23	260.36	259.47	253.17	266.7	167.24	166.8

***=significant at the .01 level. **=sig. at the .05 level. *=sig. at the .10 lvel. All tests are one-tailed. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.

Control Variables

1. *Economic size* (logged) is Diehl regression-based index of military resource allocation that Fordham and Walker (fn. 52) utilize. Thia data is one that regresses energy consumption and iron and steel production separately onto military expenditure, and it is the average measure of the annual value expected by their two regressions. The increase of internal threats can increase the level of military spending. This variable plays a role for capturing that effect.
2. *Total population* measures the log of the total population in each country in any given year. It is an indicator of state capability.
3. *Energy consumption per capita* (logged) is an indicator to measure the level of economic development.
4. *The number of contiguous borders* is the total number of states by land or sea contiguous to state.
5. *Ethnic and Religious fragmentation* represent cultural characteristics of a state. Data is obtained from Fearon and Latin's (fn. 35).
6. *Percent mountainous terrain* (logged) is utilized as aproxy to measure state strength (Thyne, Clayton L. 2006. "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6): 937-961).
7. *North Africa/Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa* are regional dummy variables. Most of those areas were born in the 1960s. A decision of alliance formation may be easily observed, as these areas suffer from the higher risk of riots and internal conflicts as compared to other ones. Data is obtained from Fearon and Latin's (fn. 35).
8. *The winning coalition (W)* is the subgroup of the selectorate who help retain office and in exchange gain special privileges are important factors of leadership tenure. It is a 5-point measure.
9. *The selectorate (S)* is the set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a probability of gaining access to special privileges given by leaders. It is a 3-point measure.
10. *New state* coded dichotomously; states in their first and second years of independence are the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. It may have lower risks of losing office than older states, because it may not have constructed. Data is obtained from Fearon and Latin's (fn. 35).
11. *Latin America* is also a regional dummy variables. Data is obtained from Fearon and Latin's (fn. 35).

* 2 to 4, 8, and 9's data were taken from the COW project, available in Eugene program (http://www.eugenesoftware.org/; Bennett and Stam, 2001).

Though all the Models, autocratic dyads positively shape alliance formation to bring peace,[33] as I described in the interpretation of Table 1. Most states having alliances with China and Russia, which had a higher level of autocracy in the Cold War period, are autocratic states. In contrast, the US and specifically, France are more inclined to form alliances with democratic states. It also suggests that alliances with the US do not allow Third World leaders to hold on to power. Atkinson statistically shows that US alliances with authoritarian states were associated with a greater chance of undergoing a democratic transition. It is because military training and education programs, which US provides, help in consolidating a coherent democratic identity.[34]

Nevertheless, in Model 8 and 9, the coefficients of US military aid are weakly negative and significant. US military aid to Third World nations decreases the risk of losing office. Contrary to US ally, states that were less democratic have a tendency to receive greater amounts of military aid from the US. For instance, the US has provided substantive military support for countries with a low level of democracy, such as El Salvador, Indonesia, Pakistan Somalia, and Zaire.[35] In particular, it provided military assistance in 1954 to recruit Pakistan as a Cold War ally, because Pakistan is located in a key region to oppose the Soviet Union. Pakistan's leader stayed in power for over a decade.

Domestic political and revolutionary threats within threat variables significantly increase the probability of a leader's removal, and this is in line with earlier results obtained by Chiozza and Goemans, Bueno de Mesquita et al., and Goemans.[36] However, the level of external threats reduces a leader's risk rate. This finding is contrary to Goemans, but may support the effect of "rallying around the flag," which means the effect of an increase in support for the government caused by involvement in international war.[37] Threats from a foreign adversary make the sense of identities of each group weaken, and they become more likely to support their leaders.[38]

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33) Kimball (fn. 32).

34) Atkinson, Carol. 2006. "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 50(29): 509-537.

35) Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 2005. "Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports," *International Studies Quarterly* 49(4) 647–667.

36) Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict"; Bueno de Mesquita et al. (fn. 9); Goemans (fn. 6).

37) Goemans (fn. 6).

38) See Lai, Brian and Dan Slater. 2005. "Rally 'Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1984-2001," *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2) 255-272. Additionally, in control variables, the size of the selectorate (S) and winning coalition (W) were negatively significant predictors of a leader's hold on power. Leaders who are selected by a larger selectorate and winning group of people are less likely to lose power. Colaresi and Flores report a similar result. In addition, the coefficients of ethnic fragmentation are negatively related with a leader's tenure in all models. (See Colaresi, Michael. 2004a. "When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover," *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 555-570; Flores, Alejandro Quiroz. 2009. "The Political Survival of Foreign Ministers," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5(2): 117-133.) They are frequently used as control variables in research on the onset of civil war. Perhaps countries, which have higher levels of ethnic fragmentation, may protect their atmosphere of stability, because most of the previous findings conclude that there is no relation between ethnic fragmentation and onset of civil war (See, for example, Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S. and Gleditsh, N.P. 2001. "Toward a democratic civil

Here, as seen in all models that include regime type, they show a strong relationship between the risk of losing office and the four regime types. The effects of regime type variables are positive, significant at 0.01 levels. The results are consistent with past studies. Because autocratic regimes serve as the excluded baseline category, democratic, mixed regimes and regimes in turmoil all increase the risk of losing office, as compared with the autocratic regime type. It implies that leaders in autocratic regimes are less prone to leadership turnover.

Without exception, the data are supportive of the hypotheses proposed in this paper. This suggests that alliances do influence the likelihood of leader survival, but the direction of that influence may have some connection to the type of regime. Autocratic regimes are relatively apt to prolong political leader tenure.

6. Conclusion

A question of fundamental interest to both scholars and policymakers in international relations is why political leaders in the Third World decide to have military alliances, and whether or not alliances decrease the risk of losing office. This paper referred to the theory of omnibalancing and examined the alliance behaviors of Third World leaders quantitatively. The answer is not simple. When political leaders in Third World nations face domestic threats rather than foreign threats, they are likely to form alliances. However, theoretical expectations contain a variety of domestic threats, and different domestic threats can have different impacts. Domestic revolutionary threats promote alliance formation, but domestic political threats are not necessarily followed by alliance formation. Third World political leaders unquestionably enhance their hold on power by forming alliances (defense and entente pacts). Notably, authoritarian regime leaders are more likely to maintain power by having alliances with similar regime types.

There are two important implications that can be drawn from this research.

First, while many realists (e.g., Morgenthau; Waltz; Walt)[39] have argued that balance of power theory explains the assurance of the security between states for a long time, David points out that its theory is inadequate to explain alliance formation in the Third World, indicating that the theory of omnibalancing is more valid than is usually thought.[40] This study supports David's theory, because the sense of insecurity in the Third World comes from within their boundaries rather than from outside. This is why a weak leader, such as Kravchuk in the Ukraine has allies

peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992," *American Political Science Review* 95: 33-48; Fearon and Latin, (fn. 31)).

39) Morgenthau (fn.2); Walt (fn.2); Waltz (fn.2).

40) David (fn. 4).

to protect his political life from domestic threats.

Second, this study points to the importance of Third World leader alliance behavior as a factor influencing the foreign policies of developing countries. Traditionally in international relations studies, the vulnerabilities of the Third World have been almost exclusively written from the perspective of advanced countries' or the US' interests and concerns, and a systematic approach from the point of view of the Third World has been almost always neglected. As a result, most scholars have been focusing on the impact of US foreign policy, to find a correlation between its policies and development of Third World.

Paying attention to the connection between alliance formation and internal threats in the Third World has interesting implications for developed countries. In most cases, developed countries decide to form alliances with Third World states in order to somewhat bolster their security. Yet, alliances between minor and major power sometimes imply a higher risk of domestic security. This is because one state may rely on its partner for its military capability, when one state has stronger power within the effect of bilateral alliance.[41] For example, Hook and Spanier describe that Congo (Zaire) and Pakistan has slipped into poverty and internal turmoil due to dependence on military aid from the US. Thus, though *asymmetric* alliances are easier to form, they have a shorter duration.[42]

The purpose of alliance formation in the Third World is often to maximize a leader's time in office at the expense of their states. Congo and Pakistan have had disastrous results due to US military assistance through alliance formation, but their respective leaders expropriated much of the aid for their own purposes and enhanced their power. Even if the result of an alliance is regarded as a failure by developed nations, the Third World leaders accomplish their personal aims. Thus, there is always a gap between developed and underdeveloped country aims. Policymakers must pay close attention to the aims of Third World leaders, as conveyed through the commitments they make. My study is intended to bridge the gap by attempting to provide a quantitative analysis of Third World nations.

41) Morrow (fn. 22); Kimball (fn. 32).

42) Alliances between states of different power levels are called asymmetric because each state receives different benefits from the alliances. See Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 904-933; Bennett, Scott D. 1997. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 846-878; Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Burcu Savun. 2007. "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?" *Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1118–32.

DATA

Dependent variables

Alliance formation[43] is a dummy variable that measures whether Third World leaders decide to form alliances with other states. Each observation is coded with 1 as the first year of alliance formation, and 0 otherwise. All alliances that have only nonaggression and neutrality provision are excluded. As pure nonaggression pacts need no active coordination, the Third World state leaders who require arms imports do not prefer such alliances. Therefore, I examine a decision for a Type I alliance (defense pact) or Type III one (entente). Alliance formation, the dependent variable, has a one period lead in models to reflect prior information. A defense pact is a promise to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked. An entente pact commits states to consult or/and cooperate in a crisis, including military attack. Furthermore, focusing alliance formation, it cannot be recognized about either bilateral or multilateral alliance. This paper sees both alliance formations' decision. Also, since COW alliance datasets are unavailable for 2001, a dummy variable measuring alliance formation is missing for 2001.

Political survival[44] is a dummy variable that measures how long a political leader has stayed in office. It takes on a value of 0 for all years in which a leader remains office and a value of 1 for a given year in which a leader loses office. A value of 1 means the risk of a leader losing power.

Independent Variables

Domestic political threats[45] *are a composite indicator representing anti-government demonstrations, coups, assassination attempts, riots, and general strikes in each country in any given year. This indicator is yielded by applying a factor analysis.*[46] *This is to avoid serious collinearity issues, because these variables all are highly correlated.*

Domestic revolutionary threats[47] are also a composite indicator representing revolutions, civil war, guerillas, and transitions of regime type in each country in any given year, as well as domestic political threats.

External threats[48] are an indicator that measure threats posed by a given state. They are

43) Data were taken from the Correlates of War (COW) Alliance dataset (v.3.03).
44) Data were taken from Goemans's (fn. 6) datasets.
45) Data is Cross-National Time-Series data by Arthur Banks in 2001 (See Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (fn. 9)).
46) Iqbal, Zaryab, and Christopher Zorn. 2006. "Sic Semper Tyrannis? Power, Repression, and Assassination Since the Second World War," *The Journal of Politics* 68(3) 489–501.
47) Data is Cross-National Time-Series data by Arthur Banks in 2001 (See Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (fn. 9)).
48) Data are taken from Fordham, Benjamin O. and Thomas C. Walker. 2005. "Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?" *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (1): 143-59.

measured based on ‘‘strategic rivals” that Thompson has identified for each state.[49]

Regime type[50] is output by Polity IV's 21-point indicator of regime type. I classify this scale into three types and identify each type of polity with a dummy variable using polity score as a 21-point indicator of regime type. Countries with a score of +7 or higher are coded as a democratic regime; those with a score of -6 to +6 are mixed regimes, and those with score -7 or less are coded as autocracies. Scores of -66/-77/-88 are also included in polity IV data, and they stand for countries experiencing periods of interruption, transition, or interregnum, and are coded as a regime in turmoil. Democratic, mixed, and regime in turmoil are measured on the baseline of autocracy.[51]

Defense pact and *entente pact*[52] are dummy variables indicating the presence of an alliance. There are political leaders with several alliances in a year, but this estimation does not study the effect of the number of alliances, but rather the effect of the presence of alliances on leadership tenure. Therefore, each of them takes the value of 1 whenever a leader has an alliance tie and 0 otherwise.

Alliances with five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5)[53] are dummy variables to identify the effect of bilateral alliances with the Security Council of the United Nations: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US. In 1973, Taiwan was replaced by the People's Republic of China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, according to the COW project, China is recognized as a major power from 1950 onward. Thus, allies with China after 1950 are included in the equation.

US military assistance and *US economic aid*[54] are included in an equation from 1972-2001. US military assistance means US, military financial aid for each country-year normalized by the country's GDP, and is ultimately beneficial for building up the military power of a country. At the same time, an indicator measuring US economic aid, which promotes a function of socialization, is estimated in this statistical analysis. These two indicators are unavailable before 1972, because the US did not preserve accurate records about those aid before that.

Control Variables can be seen below in Table 2.

49) Thompson, William R. 2001. “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 557–586.
50) Posted online 2001.
51) Chiozza and Goemans, “Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict” ; Goemans (fn. 6); Colaresi (fn. 24).
52) Data were taken from the Correlates of War (COW) Alliance dataset (v.3.03).
53) Ibid.
54) Atkinson (fn. 34).