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<th>Redefining Internationalization in Higher Education : Global 30 and the making of global universities in Japan</th>
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SUMMARY This chapter critically examines the persistent images of higher education 'internationalization' held within Japan's leading institutions themselves and by outside observers, both of which demand reappraisal in the rapidly changing contexts of globalization and shifting domestic demands. Building upon the analysis of the 'Global 30' project, a new political commitment in Japan to make universities more global and internationally competitive, as well as the government policies to increase the number of overseas students since the 1980s, the study elucidates the construct of Japan's 'invisible' internationalization with strong regional characters and development assistance orientation that is being redefined. Often labeled 'nationalist' by outside critics, the old paternalistic model of internationalization is challenged due to the heightened global competitions for talent and imminent needs for Japan to enhance its engagements with the world. The study showcases the tensions and paradoxes experienced by non-English-language, non-western universities as they grapple with the challenges of globalization and education restructuring.

In July 2010, President Junichi Hamada of the University of Tokyo contributed a strongly worded op-ed to the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Japan's leading economic newspaper, responding to the government’s announcement of its medium-term fiscal plan which called for a massive cut in the university budget from the next fiscal year. In the article, he stated that if the expected 10% across-the-board slash in government spending was implemented, it would be 'a fatal blow' to Japanese universities, and 'the whole university system that has supported Japan’s modernization will be devastated'.
Mayumi Ishikawa

(Hamada, 2010). The cut would amount to 100 billion yen the next fiscal year, and 300 billion yen over the next three-year period. These totals are equivalent to ‘closing down the five former imperial universities, Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Tohoku and Kyushu, one after another’ (Hamada, 2010).

In the same piece, Hamada went on to reaffirm Tokyo University’s steadfast commitment to ‘internationalization’ and ‘education to nurture “tough” Tokyo University students’ amid the fiscal crisis of the state and the university. As the international competition in higher education intensifies, the university’s research power, its dynamism and presence in the world, could, according to President Hamada, only be maintained by creating a learning environment where different values and cultures meet. ‘Campus globalization’ to facilitate such intellectual encounters would therefore continue to be a top priority for Japan’s flagship university.

Such comments highlight the wider currents that have converged to push Japanese universities into an era of fundamental change. Japanese universities, especially the nation’s top-tiered research universities, are not simply contemplating changes under the banner of so-called internationalization but are actively implementing them to stay competitive and relevant in the global higher education arena, with or without government directives.

This chapter examines ‘internationalization’ efforts by Japan’s leading universities that are being redefined as these institutions are in the process of redefining themselves. It critically questions how higher education internationalization, as policy and as impact reflected in the everyday realities of universities, has been reoriented and restructured to cope with the pressure of globalization and shifting domestic demands. By analyzing changing socio-economic circumstances, both at the local and the global levels, that surround Japanese universities, it also addresses how the internationalization of Japanese higher education has been ‘imagined’ both inside and outside the country, and how such images have been created and maintained over the course of three decades.

The first part of the chapter depicts the emergence of a new political commitment to make universities more global and internationally competitive by proactively increasing the number of international students and faculty. In 2009, referring to the achievements of the Bologna Process and the predominance of American research universities, the Japanese government introduced an ambitious ‘Global 30’ project (hereafter G30) that allocates preferential, large-scale funding for the creation of new English-language degree programs at the nation’s major universities. In analyzing this high-profile quest for global excellence in terms of both government aspirations and demands felt by the leading universities themselves in an increasingly transnational higher education landscape, the section critically assesses the objectives, implications and challenges of the project. Analysis is based on extended micro-level participant observation at a national university selected as a G30’s core institution.
The thirteen universities selected for the Global 30 project are among Japan's most prominent institutions of higher education. Six of these are private. This study, however, focuses attention on the seven national (public) universities selected for the first project year of 2009, institutions for which the project requirements arguably pose special challenges. Historically established by the government to train professionals to steer and shoulder nation-building responsibilities, national universities are situated at the forefront of new policy initiatives, charged with the dual roles of the internationalization of research and teaching, and upgrading their capacity for training future leaders and professionals. Many of the policy-makers behind the new G30 initiative are themselves the products of these elite national universities. The majority of these core universities are research-intensive institutions that are among those 'most implicated in globalization' and that are aware they may 'pay the price in diminished effectiveness' should they downplay global connectivity (Marginson & van der Wende, 2007, p. 5).

Next, building upon the preceding analysis of the G30 initiative, the study shifts in the latter half to explore the changing meanings of 'internationalization' in Japanese higher education over the last three decades. Despite doubts about the effectiveness and intention of G30, and notwithstanding the persistently biased socio-cultural image that Japan's higher education internationalization has been tagged with by outside observers, it is argued that the internationalization of higher education is no longer a matter of choice or domestic contemplations.

To make such a case, this section undertakes a critical discussion of the two main government policies to increase the number of overseas students since the 1980s. It argues that the first policy was a reflection of Japan's changing political and socio-economic standing in Asia and in the world. The second, which now provides the rationale for the G30 project, was created in a quite different context: a stronger desire to reform leading higher education institutions amid intensifying global competition and growing domestic demands for global talent. Japan's internationalization, with its strong regional characters and development assistance orientation, a legacy from the 1980s, is thus destined to adjust to this new context. This involves not merely changes in the language of instruction and increases in international students and staff, but fundamental shifts in the kind of education Japanese institutions offer and in the types of graduates they produce over the long term. This endeavor showcases, in particular, the tensions and paradoxes experienced by a non-English-language, non-western country with a relatively autonomous, historically rooted system of higher education as it now grapples with the challenges of globalization and education restructuring.

The account that follows documents the beginning of the Global 30 through its first year (roughly until late summer 2010). As the project is still in an early stage of implementation, the chapter presents an overview of the
policy objectives, intentions and challenges, rather than making claims about effectiveness of policy. Nor is it the intention of this study to judge or compare universities on the basis of their performance, progress or achievements at this stage. It will be close to a decade before the outcomes of these dramatic changes can be measured. Paying attention to the vision is important, however, because it looks set to drive changes in Japanese higher education for years to come. In addition, there is much more that complicates the picture; Japanese policymaking is in a period of uncertainty that has resulted from dramatic changes in the government, shifting political priorities, huge government debts and an imminent need for a major fiscal reform, among other things. The situation precludes any long-term prediction or judgment on the course of higher education internationalization. Amid uncertainties and political volatility, however, the chapter intends to capture a nascent yet dynamic phase in the making of global universities in Japan.

Launching Global Universities: a view from the ‘inside’

On 3 July 2009, Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) publicly announced the selection of 13 universities (Table I), seven national and six private, for the new ‘Project for Establishing Core Universities for Internationalization (Global 30)’. These were the national public universities of Tohoku, Tsukuba, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka and Kyushu, and the private universities of Keio, Sophia, Meiji, Waseda, Doshisha and Ritsumeikan. With funding came high expectations. All of these institutions were charged with playing a major role in dramatically boosting the number of international students educated in Japan as well as Japanese students studying abroad (MEXT, 2009). Each of the universities selected would receive 200 to 400 million yen (approximately US$2.1-4.2 million in July 2009) per year for up to five years in order to, according to the MEXT English language press release dated 26 August of the same year, implement the project’s four ‘action plans’ to ‘create an attractive educational and research environment for international students’ (MEXT, 2009).

The first of these ‘action plans’ centers on launching new degree programs in English, meaning that students will not be required to have Japanese language proficiency to earn degrees at these institutions. This includes programs at both the undergraduate and the graduate levels. Increasing the number of such courses is the mainstay of the internationalization project, with the 13 universities selected together committing themselves to start 33 new undergraduate and 124 graduate courses by the end of the project period. The second action plan improves the overall support system and services for international students by trained staff in areas such as daily life issues, employment counseling and placement, and language education. This support dimension is also charged with
facilitating and simplifying admission procedures prior to students' leaving their country of origin. The third plan provides high-quality instruction in the Japanese language and Japanese culture. This aspect was originally part of the overall support and services for international students that subsequently became a separate plan of action in English PR materials (see notes 1 and 13, below). The fourth plan is to 'promote strategic cooperation of universities'. Besides setting up links with overseas universities and boosting the number of Japanese students studying abroad, eight of the core universities were selected to set up 'Overseas Offices for Shared Utilization by Universities' in eight cities in seven countries: Tunis, Tunisia (Tsukuba University); Cairo, Egypt (Kyushu University); Bonn, Germany (Waseda University); Moscow and Novosibirsk, Russia (Tohoku University); New Delhi, India (Ritsumeikan University); Hyderabad or South India (Tokyo University); Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Nagoya University); and Hanoi, Vietnam (Kyoto University). These universities will receive additional funding for the start up of the new offices or the enhancement of existing ones that facilitate student recruitment, information dissemination and admission support. The offices will ideally play a role in recruiting and placing overseas students in all Japanese universities, including, but not limited to, G30 core institutions.[2]

The selected universities are to increase the number of international students from 16,000 in 2008 to over 50,000 by 2020, increases amounting to between 2600 to 8000 students per institution (Table I). The target year the Japanese government has set to achieve the goal of hosting 300,000 international students is 2020, a result of the so-called 300,000 International Students Plan (Ryūgakusei Sanjūmann-fun Kaikaku) announced by the then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008, that ambitiously trebled Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s 1980s pledge to host 100,000 students (achieved in 2003). Although the G30 project is for five years (FY2009-FY2013), universities are required to set quantifiable goals to increase the number of international students and scholars, among other commitments, by the year 2020.

The call for G30 applications was publicly announced in mid-April 2009. The application deadline was set in mid-May, exactly one month later. From the announcement to final selection, including briefings by MEXT officials in Tokyo and Osaka, application compilations, and screening interviews by the selection committee, the entire process took a mere two and a half months. The news of the new funding scheme had been spreading among universities for months prior to the official announcement, through administrative and other channels of communication between the government and universities. Yet a period of one month for compilation and consolidation of applications in accordance with MEXT guidelines and securing commitment from faculty and staff for such a significant initiative proved highly challenging.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Total number of students (A)</th>
<th>Number of international students</th>
<th>Total number of international students (B)</th>
<th>% of international students (B)/(A)</th>
<th>Target number of international students by 2020 (C)</th>
<th>Target international student % (C)/(A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tohoku$^1$</td>
<td>18,478</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>17.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsukuba$^3$</td>
<td>17,691</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>25.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo$^5$</td>
<td>28,697</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>12.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya$^6$</td>
<td>16,395</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>18.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto$^7$</td>
<td>23,112</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>13.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka$^8$</td>
<td>24,866</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>12.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyushu$^9$</td>
<td>19,120</td>
<td>1,096$^{10}$</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>20.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keio$^{11}$</td>
<td>(33,352+)</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>11.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophia$^{12}$</td>
<td>12,538</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>20.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji$^{12}$</td>
<td>(31,733+)</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>(845+) N/A</td>
<td>&gt;2.66</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>12.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waseda$^{14}$</td>
<td>53,522</td>
<td>2,439$^{14}$</td>
<td>3,125</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>14.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doshisha$^{15}$</td>
<td>27,017</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>(J-life: 678)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>12.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritsumeikan$^{16}$</td>
<td>38,035</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>10.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I: Global 50 universities and their profile of international students (FY2009). (Office for International Planning and Programs, Osaka University, 2010). Sources: See Appendix.

$^1$ Total number of international students: 2,300

$^2$ Total number of international students: 3,850

$^3$ Total number of international students: 2,300

$^4$ Total number of international students: 1,400

$^5$ Total number of international students: 1,200

$^6$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^7$ Total number of international students: 1,200

$^8$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^9$ Total number of international students: 1,200

$^{10}$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^{11}$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^{12}$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^{13}$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^{14}$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^{15}$ Total number of international students: 1,700

$^{16}$ Total number of international students: 1,700
Redefining Internationalization in Higher Education

Objectives, Eligibility and Budget Cuts

At a G30 briefing held days after the call for application, a senior MEXT official explained the objectives of the project for prospective applicants. Noting the dominant positions of American universities in gathering talent from all over the world, special reference was made to the Bologna Process and the efforts by the European states towards boosting international competitiveness by modifying and standardizing their degree systems. The cases of Germany and France were introduced as examples of non-English countries expanding English-language course offerings. The overarching aim of the G30 project, as explained to participants, was to make these 30 higher education institutions globally competitive, to spearhead internationalization efforts, and to provide the driving force for realization of the 300,000 International Students Plan.

The Global 30 was created in response to a 2008 report by the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) [3], a plan later elaborated and adopted by the Cabinet. The government emphasized to prospective applicant universities that the most important and critical aspect of G30 was the creation of degree programs taught exclusively in English. Additional internationalization issues addressed in the 2008 policy paper were to be covered by other funding projects and schemes. In short, the Global 30 was aimed at significantly increasing the numbers of courses in English language and of international students, seeking to add an international layer onto the core of the Japanese-language higher education.

The first round of applications/selections in fiscal year 2009 was targeted at large-scale universities. Universities that had a minimum of 300 international students as of 2008 (twice the national average) were eligible to apply. These institutions would be required to increase the proportion of their international students to at least 10% of the total student population, preferably 20%.[4] At the same time, they were to increase their international enrollment figures by at least 1000 students to raise the minimum number per institution to 2600 by 2020 (Table I). Setting the target number so high posed serious challenges for smaller institutions. Considering the fact that as of 2008, only three universities had more than 2000 international students [5], and additionally, 13 hosted just over 1000 (JASSO, 2008), the project was clearly targeted at further enhancing the capacity to accept international students at core universities which had already become the major destinations of choice for international students coming to Japan. An additional noteworthy goal was to increase the international faculty to 10%, or if that proved infeasible in the short term, to at least 5%.

With the plan came a large number of eligibility requirements and guidelines for target-settings, budget plans, and formulation and implementation of new degree courses. The university’s past achievements in (international) education and research (e.g. number of degrees awarded, number of public research funds granted, existence of an overseas office for international exchange purposes, and number of students dispatched for
study overseas) as well as its plans for the future and sustained commitment, over and above the scope to be covered by the project funds, were to be scrutinized. The universities that thus applied and were selected were comprehensive universities (with the exception of the smaller, liberal arts-oriented Sophia) which were in a position to not only deal with the magnitude and scope of the substantial influx of funds but also had the means to sustain the programs after the project completion in March 2014. Some smaller colleges and universities - national or prefectural, with smaller student sizes - that initially considered application later reportedly backed off. It was said to be the intention of MEXT that such institutions would be given an opportunity to participate in a subsequent round of applications. Yet this second round was later scrapped due to a change in government, an intense budget scrutiny, and the massive cuts in public spending that followed.[6]

The G30 project, in its second year of implementation, thus has remained a ‘Global 13’ project, undertaken by the core 13 institutions rather than the 30 universities initially envisaged. Those 13 universities are more or less Japan’s flagship universities, in terms of size, status, and international profile. The seven national universities selected were already the seven top institutions in terms of the number of international students enrolled. Six were former imperial universities, the nation’s highest-profile comprehensive research universities. In effect, the project provides new resources for institutions that were already among the most international, pushing them further and faster into an era of intense global competition for excellence in research and talented human resources.

Faculty Mobilization for Undergraduate Education in English

For national universities, by far the biggest challenge is to create English-language degree courses at the undergraduate level. The completion of four-year bachelor’s degrees requires more credits and classes across a broad range of disciplines, as compared with specialized programs at the graduate level. Besides formulating new degree courses in a very short period of time, institutions faced the challenge of securing internal support from existing faculty.

In generating university-wide support and mobilizing manpower for challenging new initiatives such as G30’s undergraduate courses, faculty autonomy in decision-making on financial and academic matters has traditionally proven to be ineffective. After the ostensible privatization of national universities and their becoming ‘incorporated’ (hōjinka) in 2004, a new leadership structure was created with a president at the top of the apex of loosely affiliated faculties and administration (Tsuruta, 2003, pp.134-135; Amano, 2008; Newby et al, 2009, p. 17). This marked a stark change from the old ‘bottom-up’ system to a new ‘top-down’ approach (Amano, 2008, pp. 138-141). In practice, however, the new form of governance has been
implemented in various ways among national universities. Conventional governance mechanisms such as professors’ councils still hold considerable power of veto, resulting in decisions of significance often made in a reactive, negative way, rather than in a positive and proactive manner (Newby et al., 2009, p. 32). Lasting, broad-based support for, and impact of, the G30 project within an institution now seems to be dependent on whether or not a particular university employs a strategic approach in making critical decisions and mobilizing its resources to implement them.

Difficulty in generating internal support among faculty has also derived from the lack of a strong foreign-language capacity or motivation to internationalize curricula. The majority of faculty members in Japan are educated in domestic institutions and thus may be unwilling to change the medium of instruction to English, as compared with their counterparts in any Asian research-intensive universities. Japan has maintained a rather sustained, national language-based higher education system, where university degrees have held little relevance for upward mobility in the existing national social ladder. Except for periods immediately following Meiji Restoration (1868) and the establishment of the modern university system in the late nineteenth century, Japan has never relied on foreign languages or scholars to operate the nation’s higher education institutions (Yamanoi, 2009). The share of overseas degree holders and non-Japanese faculty has significantly increased, however, in recent decades, and made up out 10% of the total, when combined, of the total faculty by the early 2000s (Yamanoi, 2007a, p. 119). It is still a small proportion, however, for introduction of bilingual education on a significant scale. Resistance to such introduction is strong, not only because of a fear of deteriorating quality instruction, but also due to a long-standing tradition of and commitment to education in the national language. The issue of international faculty will further elaborated in the second part of the chapter.

Faculty resistance or hesitance to commit to new English-language courses also reflects the mounting pressures on faculty after national universities became incorporated. On the one hand, demands for reform and improving the quality of education and services for students, albeit largely considered positive, have increased faculty workload. On the other hand, the number of faculty and staff has decreased due to budget cuts. According to an interim review of the progress of university incorporation conducted by MEXT in 2010, almost 80% of national university faculty surveyed stated a decline in their research time [8], and the number of academic papers they produce has continued to drop since 2005 (MEXT, 2010).

_Education for Whom? Japanese and non-Japanese quota issue_

: national research universities, especially the high-status former imperial universities, the majority of international students have thus far enrolled in graduate programs. At the undergraduate level, a small number have been
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admitted, usually outside regular student quotas allocated for domestic students.[9] International undergraduate students are usually required to have a specified level of Japanese proficiency to take regular courses that are offered, almost without exception, in the national language. As Table II shows, the ratios of graduate students to the total international student population among G30 national universities are all over 85% (except Osaka, where the percentage dropped after the merger with Osaka University of Foreign Studies in 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Total number of students (international)</th>
<th>% of International Students Enrollment by Program Levels</th>
<th>% of international students at undergraduate level</th>
<th>% of international students at graduate level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undergraduate (international)</td>
<td>Graduate (international)</td>
<td>A+B (a+b)</td>
<td>A/(a+b) : b/(a+b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A (a)</td>
<td>B (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tohoku</td>
<td>17848 (950)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10967 (127)</td>
<td>5681 (823)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>16585 (1165)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10174 (161)</td>
<td>6411 (1004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>27831 (2119)</td>
<td></td>
<td>14057 (242)</td>
<td>13764 (1877)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya</td>
<td>1589 (1031)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9640 (150)</td>
<td>6049 (881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>22446 (1098)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13255 (138)</td>
<td>9191 (960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>23793 (1059)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15937 (245)</td>
<td>7856 (814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyushu</td>
<td>18598 (1096)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11713 (132)</td>
<td>6875 (964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33352 (777)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keio</td>
<td>28479 (348)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11929 (292)</td>
<td>3873 (429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophia</td>
<td>10958 (181)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11971 (111)</td>
<td>1371 (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiji</td>
<td>41733 (945)</td>
<td></td>
<td>29278 (634)</td>
<td>2455 (209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waseda²</td>
<td>53532 (2430)</td>
<td></td>
<td>44829 (956)</td>
<td>8693 (1443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doshisha</td>
<td>26268 (326)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Ritsumeikan</td>
<td>36539 (1083)</td>
<td></td>
<td>33212 (661)</td>
<td>3327 (422)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Regular students' usually mean degree-seeking students. Non-degree students such as research students, auditors, and exchange students are not included.
²Data includes non-regular students such as those enrolled in e-learning programs.

Table II. Global 30 Universities: profile of international students by program levels (FY2009) (data only concerns regular students).¹ (Office for International Planning and Programs, Osaka University, 2010.)
Sources: See Appendix.
Except for prestigious private universities with sizable graduate schools, such as Keio and Waseda, where more than half of the international students enroll in graduate programs, other private institutions are strongly oriented towards undergraduate education. As G30 calls for a dramatic increase in the number of international students, the crucial question for leading national universities is whether or not setting up new undergraduate courses in English for international students will reduce the number of places available for domestic students. This is clearly a cause for concern among prospective Japanese students and parents, as well as in high schools and cram schools, which are among many additional stakeholders that will continue to influence the decisions made by 30 institutions.

With the arrival of the ‘universal enrollment’ (zen-nyû) era in Japanese higher education in which there are more available places than students graduating from secondary school (Kariya, 2011), nearly 40% of private four-year institutions have been unable to fill their quotas for incoming students in recent years (Nihon Shiritsu Gakkô Shinkô Kyôsai Jigyôdan, 2009). Competition to enter the nation’s top universities, however, has remained unchanged, and these universities have continued to enjoy a steady flow of applicants into most of their undergraduate schools and faculties (Kariya, 2011). Only at the graduate level, especially after MEXT introduced measures to expand graduate schools by dramatically increasing graduate enrollment quotas in the 1990s (Fujimura, 2004), have universities faced problems of not having enough students to fill the required quotas, most notably in, but not limited to, science and engineering disciplines. Graduate-level English language courses therefore had been developed prior to G30 implementation, primarily in those disciplines, as a way to attract students from Asia.

Any move to give up already tight quotas allocated for local students to international students would prove unpopular among faculty, although many would still be willing to fill ‘vacancies’ with talented international students at the graduate (and some at the undergraduate) level. A common assumption that all international students will eventually become part of the regular student quota/cohort, enrolling alongside domestic students in the era of the 00,000 International Students Plan. Most universities, especially national universities, have thus chosen to start new courses by announcing a fairly limited number of initial student intakes in order first to see the development and implications of this new endeavor. Japanese students may be allowed to enroll in new English-language courses, although their number is not likely to contribute to the positive evaluation or success of the new programs, which is to be measured by their attractiveness and popularity as viewed by foreign students.

In response to enrollment quota concerns, MEXT has recently signaled its intent to allocate a small number of additional undergraduate quotas to
newly created G30 English-language programs. The dilemma may eventually be solved when the merits of having more international undergraduate students, such as that of offering a diversified, multicultural environment for young students, are recognized not only by the faculty and staff but also by students and society. This cuts into a core issue concerning the changing mission of national universities in an era of transnational higher education: are national universities to remain primarily mandated to train Japanese citizens to become future leaders of the nation, or will they shift to become more globally oriented? Which education programs and student profiles are appropriate to be among the world’s top higher education institutions?

Who Benefits? Limited Opportunities for Japanese Students and Scholars

The Global 30 sets rather rigid regulations concerning the ways the project funds can be utilized. For instance, it prohibits grant allocation for scholarship or tuition waivers, housing support, and/or related expenses. The G30 encourages hiring new foreign faculty but does not cover the cost of hiring Japanese faculty, although a small number of experts (such as counseling staff and/or Japanese language instructors) may be employed with the project funds. The focus of new recruitment, particularly for the instructors of the new English-language courses, must be foreign or non-Japanese citizens (exceptions being newly naturalized Japanese citizens, who do qualify; see note 6). This rule was reportedly made as a result of budget negotiations between the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and MEXT. The former required the funds not to be used as salaries for Japanese faculty, as these should instead come from regular university resources.

This raises the issue of what profit and opportunities the G30 funding would bring to Japanese students and scholars. The project does not have components which directly improve job prospects for Japanese students and scholars, nor provide them with opportunities for overseas exposure or language training that would internationalize Japan from within. There has been growing concern in Japanese society recently over ‘uchimuki’ (inward-looking) youths: young people who are no longer interested in traveling or studying abroad.[11] Critics cite the stagnating numbers of high school and university students studying overseas since 2000, during which time the number of tertiary-level students studying abroad has increased more than 50% worldwide, and they blame a lack of youth aspiration. Yet the situation is a reflection of multiple factors such as economic woes, tightening employment situation, and declining job security for young people, and is by no means only psychological. The broad-based G30 project perspective in fact addresses the issue of internationalization of Japanese students and suggests that core universities provide more overseas study experiences. However, these programs are under-elaborated and not included in G30 funds, instead envisaged as falling under other MEXT funding schemes, projects that now rest on an uncertain financial resource base.
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Yet, Opportunity Cannot BeForgone

The selected national universities have now begun to implement the five-year G30 project with varying degrees of fanfare, but all face enormous challenges. With little time to develop and consolidate new educational programs and little time, too, for internal mobilization and consensus building, the foundation for G30 could never have been hoped to be particularly strong.

To be sure, the massive influx of funds from 200 to 400 million yen per year is a welcome infusion in the current climate of fiscal belt tightening, even if only for a duration of five years. Benefits include improving basic services for international students and staff, bringing in more experts to lessen the workload of faculty and staff, creating more of a bilingual environment on campus for studies and daily life, jointly undertaking proactive publicity and student recruitment overseas, and streamlining or introducing strategic admissions procedures to recruit more students from overseas. Considering the broad-based G30 project scope and the time-bound, fairly specific channeling of funding, however, only universities with the fiscal flexibility to absorb, redirect and supplement the G30 funds can take part in the exercise. This means that large, comprehensive research universities such as former imperial universities are naturally the most qualified.

Yet to match and amplify the MEXT start-up funds is becoming increasingly implausible for these national universities. Even before the announcement of a massive slash in government spending, highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, a yearly 1% reduction in the state subsidy for the national universities' operational budget has been imposed following their 2004 incorporation.[12] This is despite the fact that Japan's public spending on tertiary education is already among the lowest among OECD countries (0.6% of GDP, compared with the OECD average of 1.3%) (Newby et al, 2009, pp. 39-40). Unlike other countries that host large numbers of overseas students, especially the English-speaking nations such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, international students do not always bring economic benefit to host universities in Japan. Instead, overseas students are, if Japan is indicative, usually heavily subsidized in national research universities due to different support needs (e.g. provision of language classes, recruitment of bilingual support staff, scholarship and tuition waivers for students in need). Having more international students thus puts a greater financial strain on universities, requiring, among other costs, improved services and marketing mechanisms for proactive student recruitment. These are new demands for national institutions that would have been difficult to meet without the availability of external funds specifically allocated for such purposes.

As seen above, the challenge of G30 is primarily to implement comprehensive internationalization measures and make universities more globally competitive amid shifting political priorities and financial
constraints. These shifts have led to an uncertainty about the future of the project, making long-term planning and commitment difficult for participating institutions. More importantly, the challenge is not solely about the creation of new curricula, or changes in the language of instruction, in the approach to student recruitment, or in institutional leadership. It is also about the tensions that this maverick initiative is destined to create within institutions: the contestation of values between old norms and new demands that are both global and local, and their manifestations. These are, of course, typical challenges of globalization and educational restructuring that are proceeding the world over, but they are particularly apparent in non-English-speaking countries. While strongly shaped by the local culture, socioeconomic conditions and history in unique ways, the overall tensions are by no means specific to Japan.

Changing Meanings and Contexts of University Internationalization

‘Opening Up’ or ‘Closing In’? The view from the outside

This section focuses on locating the G30 project within the wider policy formulation arena and delineates the most critical change in the so-called internationalization efforts of leading national universities in Japan. As the previous section examined the internal concerns and difficulties initially encountered within the core national universities, this section will turn to criticisms and concerns expressed from outside. What follows then analyzes the changing meanings and contexts of Japanese university internationalization over the past three decades, setting the scene for further contemplation of the core challenges facing G30 and the making of global universities in Japan.

Shortly after the launch of G30, a pair of articles were featured in the Japan Times, the nation’s leading English daily, both predicting a rather gloomy future for the project. One pointed out that the ‘contradictory’ nature of the G30 goals makes the project implementation problematic because of the contradiction between a ‘desire to protect and strengthen Japanese national identity’ and making Japan more competitive by ‘embracing global trends, currents and standards’ (Burgess, 2010; see also Burgess et al, 2010). The author of this first article, Christopher Burgess, cited the G30 ‘focus’ on teaching ‘high-quality instruction in Japanese language and culture’ as an example of a persistent ideology of Japanese cultural superiority and the desire to export this ideology abroad.[13] The second article cited as negative factors resistance from conservative faculty to the increase in international faculty and students, and the project’s questionable future sustainability (Klaphake, 2010). It then called for the real integration of international students and faculty rather than treating them as guests. Both articulate a supposed propensity that Burgess dubs ‘closing in at the same time as opening up’.

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G30 goals may exhibit a certain contradictory nature, now that Japan’s higher education internationalization policies are in a period of flux and uncertainty. Japan’s whole push for internationalization (kokusaiha) has been linked to multiple meanings, used differently in different settings, by (and for) different actors and institutions (Goodman, 2007). The perception of Japan’s internationalization aspiration as ‘modernist nationalism’ (Goodman, 2007, p. 72) is a recurring theme in discussions of Japan’s attempts to internationalize, including Burgess’s article cited above, and in other academic work as well (for a recent example, see Kariya & Rappleye, 2010). Internationalization is indeed a highly context-specific term, but not enough attention is given to the changing contexts in which the word is used and the concomitant changes in the meanings of the word.

To illustrate the point, let us briefly compare two policies aimed at increasing the number of international students as examples internationalization initiatives - one from the 1980s, and the other from the present. Such a comparison reveals the changed focus and language that reflects socio-economic and political circumstances both at the local and global levels. The outside viewers who attach the label of nationalism to recent internationalization efforts tend to overlook the changing contexts from the 1980s to the present that influence the construction of the meanings of international initiatives. Although the realities behind internationalization have changed, it is striking how Japanese education that is imagined from afar has undergone far less change.

The changing context that has caused this gap between real change and imagined analysis derives from two major trends. First, since the 1980s, Japan’s position in the world has changed dramatically. Second, and roughly over the same period, higher education globally has undergone a major shift. It is the convergence of these larger tides that has modified Japan’s policies concerning higher education internationalization.

*From Paternalism to Global Competitiveness: two policies concerning international students[14]*

Put forth in 1983, the government’s first goal of accepting 100,000 international students (Ryugakusei Ukéire Jíman-nin Keikaku) was a political commitment made by then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, announced soon after his state visit to Southeast Asia earlier that year (Takeda, 2006, p. 83). This was the time of Japan’s rapid economic expansion and increasing assertiveness to take up a political role in world affairs more consistent with its economic power (Atarashi, 1985). The presence of Japanese corporations, the prevalence of their products, and Japan’s overall influence was growing, particularly in Asia, often causing tension with local host societies. Those familiar with Southeast Asian politics and their relations with Japan at the time still recall the mounting friction that manifested itself in protests, boycotts of Japanese products, demonstrations and flag-burning incidents,
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recurrently reported in the media from the late 1970s on (e.g. Atarashi, 1985, pp. 111-112; Takeda, 2006, p. 83).

At the same time, there were growing expectations and increasing eagerness among Asian neighbors to learn from Japan (Atarashi, 1985, p. 110) and/or to receive loans, aids, direct investment and technology transfer, as they similarly aspired to achieve rapid economic prosperity and development (Kosai & Tran, 1994, pp. 170-172). It was not long after Japan had received widespread international recognition as having become a member of the ‘advanced’ industrialized nations. There also existed a growing awareness among Japan’s political leaders that its contribution as a ‘supplier of knowledge’ or a provider of university education was relatively limited when compared with western developed nations (Kosai & Tran, 1994, p. 173).

The 100,000 International Students Plan was thus created partly out of concern for national security, partly to improve the relationship with neighboring countries, and partly to have an improved political presence in Asia through the exchange of people (Takeda, 2006, pp. 83-84), as well as to demonstrate Japan’s presence on the world stage. The plan was heavily dependent on the government budget for Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).[15] Japan’s past policy concerning international students was thus primarily located within an ODA/development framework (Ninomiya, 2008; Ninomiya et al, 2009). The funds not only covered scholarships for Japanese government-supported students, but also were used for financial support for privately funded students, most of whom came from Asian countries. Scholarships to study in Japan offered by other governments such as Malaysia and Indonesia were also ‘undoubtedly part of the ODA scheme’ (Ninomiya, 2008, p. 58). According to Ninomiya (2008, p. 59), from this initial policy comes a particular legacy – namely, the difficulty for Japanese universities to perceive international students as a source of income through, for instance, charging higher rates of tuition, a common practice in major English-speaking host countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia. Rather, host institutions in Japan have found it hard to expand their numbers without due consideration of the costs to be incurred. Although perceptions toward and patterns of affiliation of privately funded students vary according to the type of host university (see Goodman, 2007), Ninomiya reiterates that they too constitute part of the Japanese government’s aid policy scheme towards developing countries (p. 59).

While it was not uncommon for governments in the world to tie their state-subsidized scholarship programs to diplomacy, national security and development assistance (Sidhu, 2006, pp. 6-13; Naidoo, 2006, pp. 334-335), many underwent a shift from the 1980s to the 2000s, from a traditional ‘aid’ approach to overseas students to a ‘trade’ approach. Germany and France, together with Japan, however, were among the few exceptions (Naidoo, 2006, pp. 335-338). From the late 1980s, Asian countries have steadily graduated from the status of aid recipients, led by Korea and Taiwan (Kosai
Yet, to this day, Japanese national universities continue to function primarily as host institutions for the majority of the Japanese government scholarship students, and have never adopted a trade or service industry perspective.

It is worth adding that the 100,000 Plan had another dimension: rehabilitating Japan’s image of being a beneficiary, rather than a benefactor, of the world’s intellectual currents. As the country was accused by the West of not making its ‘long-established and well-financed system of education’ available to other countries and of ‘exporting’ a large number of its tertiary students to American and European institutions, the plan was meant to show Japan’s willingness to reciprocate by ‘importing’ a sufficient number of students from overseas, thereby balancing the trade (Walker, 2005, p. 171).[16]

After an initially sluggish period, the ‘100,000’ goal was achieved two decades later (in 2003). It was realized by a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, such as: the deregulation of overseas study by non-government-sponsored students in neighboring Asian countries; the growing demand for higher education and the subsequent massive influx of Chinese students to Japan; active recruitment by Japanese universities to make up for the decline in domestic higher education demand; and a temporary easing of immigration controls (see e.g. Hanatani, 2007; Terakura, 2009). As of May 2009, Japan hosted more than 130,000 international students (ryūgakusei), 32% of whom came from Asia, and 78% from China, Korea and Taiwan (JASSO, 2009). These are highly skewed figures, as Goodman (2007, p. 76) has pointed out, for one of the largest education systems in the world - a significant point that I address later on in the chapter.

The subsequent 300,000 International Students Plan announced by then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008 constitutes the policy compass and core rationale for the Global 30 and relevant schemes. The plan is more than just the next installment of the 1980s plan, as has been imagined by some. Instead, it reflects the renewed context of changing domestic demands and global competition. Illustrating this is the fact that the new 300,000 initiative is a joint endeavor by six ministries rather than a policy under the sole jurisdiction of MEXT. Clearly, internationalization is no longer considered an issue of higher education alone, and is set in a broader context that incorporates the nation’s economy, and immigration and labor. In effect, international student policies have shifted gear from ‘Asia and developing country-centered’ that focused on ‘capacity building and international contribution through ODA’ to ‘recruiting high-quality foreign students who can contribute to the research agenda of host universities and help increase the overall competitiveness of Japanese universities in this era of globalization’ (Takeda, 2006; Ninomiya et al, 2009). According to Masahiro Ōkota (2009), the departure from the old ODA model is seen as necessary or the better integration of international students by treating them not as guests but as highly qualified human resources. Moreover, the ODA rhetoric
may no longer be well accepted among Japanese taxpayers, who increasingly demand prioritized fund allocation to domestic issues during prolonged economic recession (Yokota, 2009). Ninomiya and Yokota were themselves members of the government committee that deliberated the 300,000 Plan. Their insider accounts help clarify the meanings of this new round of internationalization policy. They argue that recent policies are a fundamental shift from 'aid' and 'train and send home' to 'proactive recruitment' for 'boosting competitiveness'. Rather belatedly, perhaps, Japan now aspires to join the league of many host governments of the world that implement policies to proactively recruit, educate and retain international students as future bearers of the 'knowledge-based economy' (Peters, 2003; OECD, 2008).

After the goal of hosting 100,000 international students was achieved, subsequent policy discussions turned attention to the competitiveness of universities - or rather, the lack of their global competitiveness in attracting talent from overseas. Higher education bore much of the brunt of the blame for the purported 'Japan passing' - Japan being passed over by Asia's brightest (METI, 2006). It was argued that a 'Dejima-style exclusivism' in universities keeps foreign scholars and students in a detached confinement rather than fully integrating them (Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative, 2007).[17] By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the decisive shift has been pushed further from international cooperation toward a national strategy for the future, crystallizing in G30.

Such a move derives in a large part from Japan's domestic risk factors that include demographic trends, economic stagnation and new societal demands. Japan is among the world's most aged and most rapidly aging societies. The proportion of the elderly is expected to grow from 20.2% as of 2005 to more than one quarter of the population of Japan by 2013 (Kaneko et al, 2008). Declining birth rates and a shrinking workforce necessitate Japanese companies turning to under-utilized human resources (i.e. women, the elderly and foreigners) to fill the labor gap. Japanese companies at the same time envision the enhancement of their overseas operations, that are purportedly more lucrative, rather than competing for a larger share of the shrinking domestic market. To cultivate new overseas markets and to cater for the needs and demands of diverse consumers, they require staff who can operate in a complex web of global business networks. Japan's corporate sector thus needs non-traditional sources of employees and those with the kind of skills and capacities to meet the demands of globalized business. The strongest voice for university reform in fact comes from business and industry, Japan's most powerful lobby (see note 17), rather than from education specialists and scholars.

At the same time, the heightened mobility of students and scholars and intensifying competition for talent and prestige in the global setting have necessitated a new approach to recruit (and retain) international students. Indeed, just as Japan faces internal needs to go global, so university
internationalization has unfolded in such a way globally that contests and competitions for talent, profit and prestige are becoming the norm (Altbach, 2004; Geiger, 2004). The increasingly competitive climate of higher education in the world reflects the growing need for skilled professionals, in view of a general trend of population decrease in the developed world and the expected shortage of a highly qualified labor force (Hawtborne, 2008; OECD, 2008). The expectations for leading universities have thus been transformed from training/research ground for domestic leaders to ‘ideal talent catching machines’ (The Economist, ‘Opening the Doors: governments are joining in the hunt for talent’, 5 October 2006) on a global scale. It is becoming a common belief, not only in the United States but the world over, that:

For universities the challenge became recruiting the most able students from across the country, and indeed around the world. The same was true for faculty and researchers. The success of a university as an educational institution and as a knowledge conglomerate came to depend on its ability to compete for scarce and vital inputs. (Geiger, 2004, p. 2)

In this climate, how successfully the government and institutions fare in such global (educational) race is linked to the future course of the nation, an awareness that constitutes the primary rationale behind the G30 project. Yet Japan faces competition in its efforts to attract the best students and researchers, not only from the West, but increasingly from countries in the Asia Pacific such as Singapore, Malaysia, Korea, and, more recently, China (idem, 2006; Ziguras & Law, 2006; Douglas & Edelstein, 2009).

Another aspect of the high mobility and transnational character of higher education is the creation of dominant ‘world-class’ models (Altbach & Alán, 2007; Huisman, 2008), as seen in the prevalence of university rankings and league tables. Japan’s top universities struggle for recognition in the world amid the emergent global models, lists dominated by well-known, comprehensive, research-oriented, and English-language-medium universities. Japan’s tradition of national language education and research, as well as of self-sustenance in human resources, is challenged and rated against de facto standards and models (Ishikawa, 2009). The rankings receive much public attention and are discussed frequently in Japanese government and political circles (Yonezawa, 2010). As Japanese universities fare poorly in so-called internationalization indicators due to the dearth of foreign-born students and scholars, increasing their number is considered a logical way to move up in the rankings. Despite highly questionable methodological issues (Ishikawa, 2009), these league tables are perceived as objective or external and therefore help justify the concentrated public investment in a limited number of universities such as Global 30 (Yonezawa, 2010, pp. 124-125).
The comparison of the two policies concerning international students, as seen above, showcases changing points of reference for university internationalization in Japan. The first national goal of hosting 100,000 international students might have derived from a rather expedient motivation, amid the rapidly growing Japanese economic and political presence and mounting tensions surrounding the country. Phrases such as ‘making the outside world know and understand Japan’ were often used in policy documents at the time. In this context, the scope of internationalization was not truly global and was more concerned with bilateral relations between Japan and other countries and/or regions, especially neighboring countries.

The subsequent 300,000 plan, however, is of a different nature. It is clearly directed towards creating a better mechanism for recruiting talent, though a strong regional twist and character have continued largely because of the geographic position and traditional student flows established under the previous plan. Perhaps this is why Japanese higher education has been considered to be ‘closing in’. Let us analyze this qualitatively where international students increased from 15,000 in 1991 to over 130,000 in 2009 (JASSO, 2009): almost a nine-fold increase in merely two decades. As seen above, this was driven by a drastic increase in Asian students. The presence of foreign faculty and Japanese with overseas degrees in the Japanese academic market has constantly been growing, particularly in selected private institutions and research universities (Yamanoi, 2007a, p. 119; 2007b, pp. 255-258). According to MEXT, the number of foreign faculty increased by 9% for full-time categories, and by 13% for part-time categories, between 2002 and 2007.[18]

These aspects of internationalization, however, have remained somewhat ‘invisible’ to the naked eye. The increase in foreign faculty has been led by a surge in the number of young Chinese scholars (Yamanoi, 2007a, p. 119). Reflecting a significant increase in the number of Chinese and Asian students in Japanese universities since the early 2000s, young Chinese scholars have increased their numbers in science and engineering faculties of research universities. Unlike the older generation of foreign faculty in senior posts, typically American and older Chinese university-educated professors in the social sciences and the humanities (educated in universities in China and taught Chinese or China-related subjects), this new wave comprises those who are younger and hold junior posts, many of whom find employment in Japan after having completed their degrees in Japanese universities (Yamanoi, 2007b). Among national universities, by 2003 over 60% of foreign faculty consisted of Asian nationals (Suh, 2005). Their presence on campuses may not enhance the international ‘flare’ of universities, however. Despite considerable progress statistically, this invisible internationalization makes it easier to perceive that Japan has failed to open
up, particularly when viewed from the West (see Tsuneyoshi, this volume, for a similar conclusion).

The unbalanced internationalization of today – not truly multicultural, but strongly Asia-centered/biased – was not totally 'unintended' but was partly a consequence of the paternalistic, development assistance-minded internationalization policy of the 1980s. Nor was it the ‘unintended consequence’ of a policy attempt to ‘bolster national identity through internationalization’, as those such as Kariya & Rappleye (2010) claim. In the rapidly changing contexts of higher education globalization, the old internationalization model, at least among national universities, has survived for too long without being challenged in a major way. In much the same way, the discourses of Japanese education internationalization have centered too much on conservatism and nationalism, depicted as static over the three decades as if the Nakasone doctrine dominates the political consciousness of the Japanese up to this day.

In short, the internationalization of higher education has proceeded this past three decades, but it is perceived quite differently within and outside of Japan and by Japanese and non-Japanese observers. Both perceptions find their roots in the image of internationalization prevalent in the 1980s, a legacy of Japan’s rapid economic growth and its increasingly prominent role in regional development. Old images persist, despite the contextual changes and challenges of globalization and transnational higher education. Both demand reappraisal in the vastly different socio-economic and political conditions surrounding Japan’s higher education today.

Conclusion: challenges ahead

Japanese higher education internationalization is now being redefined, from the former ‘domesticated’ (Roesgaard, 1998, p. 225) internationalization to one reconfigured along global lines. While the expectations and traditional horizons of higher education institutions continue to change worldwide, at Japan’s leading institutions old norms and conventional logic have remained up to today firmly in place without any major challenges. Universities have been protected by domestic hierarchies and remained accountable almost wholly to the local society, expected mostly to produce graduates who are to become the national elite. Such norms, in turn, have affected the way the outside world perceives Japanese higher education. Yet, now that a century-long formula is in the process of dramatic transition, the rules of the game are being rapidly rewritten.

The Global 30 project was created at tremendous cost to Japanese taxpayers at a time of deepening fiscal crisis and reform. Nevertheless, the core universities have already set out to implement this major internationalization scheme, despite the uncertainty of the financial ground beneath them and considerable resistance from within about departing from the old norms. The catalyst for change comes not from so-called nationalist
sentiments and efforts to uphold Japan's tradition and culture, but instead from the challenge for Japan and the Japanese to engage with and embrace the world for the survival of their institutions and, by extension, the nation.

What, then, are the real challenges ahead for the making of global universities in Japan? To conclude, let us return to the insightful words of President Hamada of Tokyo University that began this chapter. His statement shows that the real ‘opening-up’ challenge is to achieve campus globalization and enhance capacity training for all students to strengthen their global outlook as well as their competitiveness. First, that means creating a wider, representational diversity in terms of the student body, and across different program levels, despite institutional demands that have thus far favored graduate-level international enrollment. The low percentage of international students in the undergraduate student population means young Japanese students are having fairly domestic learning experiences, in terms of both language and cultural interaction. As the undergraduate schools of leading institutions produce Japan’s top government officials and corporate leaders, diversified learning experiences can broaden the outlook of the future national leadership.

Second, the ‘opening-up’ challenge means mainstreaming international programs such as the G30 courses into the overall university curricula and integrating their student and faculty as part of everyday campus life. For this, English-language training, rather than ‘quality-Japanese language training’, is an issue, as most students do and will come from Asia, meaning their native language is not English. Furthermore, it means improving educational quality assurance along global lines, regardless of the medium of instruction.

The third challenge is opening up in the face of an inward-looking tendency reportedly emerging among students. The Global 30 has made it much easier for foreign scholars and students to enter Japan, but an arguably far bigger challenge is preparing institutions to create conduits for Japan to reach out to the world. Without appreciation of multicultural interactions and learning experiences, there may even be a hidden danger of new nationalism emerging as scholarship opportunities and jobs seem to be going to foreign students or graduates.

The commitment to creating global universities in Japan means adjusting the scope of internationalization to the context of the new millennium. Although local circumstances differ, the making of global universities in the world perhaps converges into the same point: weighing diversity and quality more than quantity of, say, foreign student numbers or English-language programs alone. For Japan, the Asian element of internationalization will continue to matter and will remain a significant part of the university profile. Japanese higher education is thus charged with the dual role of balancing ‘local and global’ as well as ‘regional and global’ - a fairly unique role, but one that is again not specific to Japan. As with the other leading institutions in the world, Japanese universities have the role of maintaining the cultural autonomy of local languages and values, in the face
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of the homogenizing and standardizing power of globalization. Seen in this light, the questions that now face G30 and its ultimate success go beyond the realm of the higher education arena, but illuminate the intellectual development of generations that will construct and sustain knowledge, within Japan and globally, well into the future.

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Notes

[1] This document was clearly prepared for external audiences and prospective students overseas, and thus the nuance was somewhat differently communicated to core universities. The funds also carried requirements not necessarily good for publicity in terms of attracting prospective international students but nevertheless considered essential by MEXT. These were, for example, enhancement of administrative function, comprehensive planning, and financial commitment by core universities to undertake the overall internationalization efforts over and beyond the scope of G30.

[2] The offices were selected from locations and countries that the universities proposed as shared offices in the G30 applications. These exclude countries where Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) already had existing offices (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia) and countries where a considerable number of Japanese universities had set up their own offices prior to G30 implementation, such as China.

[3] The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) is a high-profile consultative body set up within the Cabinet Office of the Japanese government and headed by the Prime Minister. Its 2008 report stipulates basic policy concerning economic and fiscal reform. It calls for the bold internationalization of education through the Global 30 and other measures conducive to the goal of the 300,000 International Students Plan. It addresses other issues of education internationalization, such as ‘strengthening English language education’ and ‘encouraging study overseas’, as well as further encouraging the entry of highly skilled foreign workers in an increasingly competitive environment (CEFP, 2008).

[4] The minimum number of 300 is by counting only students with international student visa status. Under the 300,000 Plan, a new, wider definition for the classification of ‘ryügakusei’ (international student) and a modified methodology in data collection would be used. Besides including former shigakusei (non-university students, such as Japanese language school students) to simplify and ease visa processes, overseas students without...
official 'study abroad' visas – for example, those with spouse visas or short-term students without visas on exchange or other educational programs – were now to be included. The target year for the 300,000 Plan was thus set earlier than first planned in a government committee, a shift that was possible because the change in the definition would result in an obvious nominal increase in the numbers of foreign students (Kimura, 2009).

[5] They are Waseda University, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, and the University of Tokyo. As of 2009, 35 universities had more than 300 undergraduate international students, and 19 at graduate level (with three institutions overlapping). About 70 institutions hosted more than 200 international students at the undergraduate level (Asahi Shimbun, 2009).

[6] The new Democratic party government’s budget screening of the debt-laden national budget (jigyō shihaka) led to the slashing of the G30's second-year funding by approximately 20%, with no calls for additional applications. Much of the MEXT funding for other schemes already implemented to contribute to the goals of the 300,000 International Students Plan and the internationalization of universities, such as sending graduate students and researchers overseas or supporting collaborative projects with overseas institutions, were also either discontinued or suspended indefinitely. In November 2010, the G30 underwent another jigyō shihaka screening exercise, resulting in an additional 100 million yen (or over 4%) reduction in its third-year budget. The project would officially be renamed to reflect the changed focus from 'establishing core universities' to 'networking among universities' from fiscal year 2011. The commonly known label ‘Global 30’ would be kept, however. The change also led to deregulation of some requirements such as lifting a ban on hiring Japanese nationals.

[7] According to a study on the status of English-medium programs at five leading Korean universities conducted by a delegation from Osaka University in March 2010, in which the author participated, faculty members with overseas degrees are reported to comprise at least 70-80% of the total faculty. Though not statistically validated, officials at Seoul National University and the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) estimated that more than 80% and 85%, respectively, of the total faculty members at those institutions had obtained degrees from higher education institutions overseas, predominantly those in the United States.

[8] A total of 23.3% of the respondents stated that their research time ‘declined’ (sukunaku natta), while 56.0% said it ‘somewhat declined’ (yaya sukunaku natta) (MEXT, 2010).

[9] Enrollment capacity is among the organizational and pedagogical conditions prescribed in the ‘Standards for the Establishment of Universities (Daigaku sekchi kijun)’, the 1956 regulations that set the minimum standards for establishing and running a university. Japanese universities are thus legally obligated to adhere to these requirements for quality assurance concerning, among other things, the organization of the curriculum, staff qualifications, student-faculty ratio, graduate requirements, facility and space, and administrative structure (see Newby et al., 2009, pp. 89-90).
National universities conferred 58% of Japan’s master’s and 71% of its doctoral degrees in 2005, even while 74% of undergraduate students completed their studies at private institutions (Amano, 2008, p. 213).

Glenn Fukushima (2010) deplored such inward-looking tendency or ‘insularity’ among students of leading universities and young professionals. Also see Hobo, 2010 and Tsuji, 2010 for examples of recent national debates on the issue.

This 1% reduction may seem minuscule, but consider the example of Osaka University; in the first five years after the university became an incorporated institution, the state subsidies for the university’s operational budget were reduced by more than 3.4 billion yen (approximately US$36 million) (Hase, 2009).

Such a perspective partly results from the different picture of G30 presented in English to the external audience compared with the one communicated to and required of Japanese universities. Though considered important, instruction about the Japanese language and culture was never an area of focus as far as Japanese universities were made to understand during the application and selection process. It was located as part of the overall efforts in improving the services for international students, and was rather irrelevant to the strong ideological inclination that Burgess claims. In the English press release, the Japanese language and cultural instruction was highlighted for prospective students, presumably to enhance the attractiveness of studying in Japan, as well as to emphasize how it can improve the career prospects of graduates, as the language acquisition is crucial for those who choose to stay after graduation (see note 1, above).

The comparative review of the two policies, especially concerning their formulation processes and relevant policy statements, is a theme well documented by Japanese scholars. For a comprehensive overview of the history and background of policies concerning international students in Japan, as well as a review of relevant literature in Japanese, see Terakura (2009). Takeda (2006) analyzes historical and socio-economic factors behind these policies vis-à-vis Japan’s changing place in the world.

From 1987, the government’s ODA budget was allocated for financial support and services for students from developing countries (Hotta, 1991). It was the time of Japan’s ODA expansion (it became the largest donor country in the world in 1989). Japan’s ODA heavily concentrated on, though it was not exclusively allocated to, Asia (Kawai & Takagi, 2004). As the Japanese government faced a growing demand to change the nature of aid from developmental to humanitarian, the proportion of educational assistance gradually expanded (Hotta, 1991). Although it comprises a mere 5-6% of the overall ODA expenditure, funding on international student related matters has depended heavily on the ODA sources. For instance, in the budget plan for FY2003, when the target number of hosting 100,000 international students was achieved, 96% of the total state funding of the international student-related budget came from the government’s ODA sources (MEXT, 2002; Ishikawa, 2007).

Looking back at the political economy of the time, trade disputes intensified over the import/export imbalance and limited access to the Japanese market,
particularly between the United States and Japan. Discussions between Japan and the United States or Europe about higher education internationalization focused primarily on 'balancing' student mobility in much the same way that the trade talks were configured with both the United States and Europe demanding that Japan balance the flow by creating more English programs to enable American/European students to enroll and take advantage of educational opportunities in Japan (Mori, 2009).

[17] The first quote is from the ‘Global Economic Strategy’ released by METI in April 2006. It says: ‘Japan is losing out in an ever fiercer global competition for highly skilled persons, and East Asia’s best researchers and students pass over Japan to head to Europe and the US.’ The phrase ‘Japan passing’ is coined from ‘Japan bashing’, often used in the 1980s and early 1990s to counter American criticism over Japan’s trade policies. Its newer variant, ‘Japan nothing’, shows the country’s inability to reassert itself from years-long recession and political malaise, thus becoming overshadowed by the growing economic and political presence of China in the region. The report represented opinions of Japan’s business sector as it was based on a survey conducted in more than 300 corporations, both domestic and overseas. The ‘Asia Gateway Initiative’, released in May 2007, was a showcase policy of the administration of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. It criticizes and seeks to reorient the mission of Japanese universities that 'lag behind in internationalization'. Dejima refers to the Dutch enclave off the Nagasaki coast that had remained the sole trading post open to the West from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century. In forthright language rather atypical of official documents, the initiative declares that highly skilled human resources can no longer simply be ‘accepted’, but must be proactively ‘sought after’.

[18] According to MEXT (2008), the number of full-time (honmu sha) foreign faculty increased from 5286 in 2002 to 5763 in 2007, and from 10,046 to 11,316 for the part-time (henmu sha) category over the same period. Their percentages in the total faculty, however, remained more or less constant over the same period: 3.4% and 6.7% respectively in 2007. These figures are thus used to provide a rationale for new policy drivers, such as the 300,000 International Student Plan and the G30, that encourage the employment of non-Japanese faculty to raise their overall share rather than their numbers in real terms in the Japanese higher education institutions.

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**APPENDIX**

**Sources for Tables I and II**

Unless specified otherwise, all data are derived from official websites of universities listed as of 20 August 2010 and J-Life (2009).

1 http://www.tohoku.ac.jp/japanese/profile/about/06/about0601/

2 http://www.tohoku.ac.jp/japanese/profile/about/09/about0905/


1. [Annual Report: fiscal year 2009].

2. [Profile of Nagoya University: Appendices].

3. [Profile of Nagoya University: Appendices].

4. Number of non-regular international students is based on an estimate from data on total number of international students and regular international students.

5. Data obtained by an inquiry to the university’s administrative office.

6. Non-regular student data by an inquiry to the university’s administrative office.

7. [Profile of Nagoya University: Appendices].

8. [Profile of Nagoya University: Appendices].

9. Non-regular student data by an inquiry to the university’s administrative office.


11. Data obtained by an inquiry to the university’s administrative office.

http://www.meiji.ac.jp/chousaka/2009houjingaiyou.pdf. Non-regular students’ statistics including those of international non-regular students are not available.

13. Total students include non-regular students such as those enrolled in e-learning programs.

14. Non-regular student data by an inquiry to the university’s administrative office.

http://www.ritsumei.jp/profile/pdf/houkoku_000.pdf