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SOVIET POWER AND BUREAUCRACY

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I

From the end of the 18th century up to the first half of the 19th it was generally understood that administration on the smallest scale possible was the best and the greatest government. With the advent of the 20th century, however, this way of looking on the function of administration as that of a servant in relation to legislation as its master receded entirely into the background, to be replaced by the subject of the "administrative state". This concept of the "administrative state" was obtained through attempts to give new theoretical interpretations to the socio-political phenomenon of the "legislative state" transforming itself into the "administrative state"—a series of the circumstances, seen over the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, in which various social contradictions inherent in the modern state came to the fore and parliamentary government underwent commotion and degeneration, as a result of separating the principle of parliamentarism (whose theoretical structure is based upon the presupposition that society is of homogeneous nature) from its reality (which witnessed aggravating class conflicts and increased proportions of the heterogeneous nature of society); it resulted in that the state gradually had its administrative function increased and qualitatively changed, thus leading to a marked expansion of the administrative machine and a strengthening, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of administration (all of which in their turn represent a relative decrease in the authority of the parliament within the power structure).

The transformation of the legislative state into the administrative, the quantitative increase of, and qualitative change in, the administrative machine, coupled with a remarkable tendency for administrative practice to turn into a matter of specialized technicality, now helped to expand and solidify the bureaucratic apparatus within the state machine to such an extent, increasing at the same time the authority of administrative bureaucrats, that not only for the state machine but for all other kinds of

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large-scale organizations—political party, big company, trade union, etc.—the subject of “bureaucratization” came to assume great proportions. Max Weber, for instance, made an issue of it in one of his major works, “Economics and Society” (pub. 1922), where he, placing the problem in the light of his sociological researches into what he terms “types of dominance”, attempts to justify and theoretically systematize the “legal-bureaucratic rule” by interpreting the structure of “modern” society in accordance with the bureaucracy whose fundamental principle rests upon formal rationalism. Thus his theory is that in every aspect of society (state, church, army, political party, enterprise, interest group, corporation, foundation, etc.) development in any form of modern association is proportionate to that of bureaucratic administration and its constant expansion. He also says in the book that socialism is not free from this inevitable tendency toward total bureaucratization; that bureaucratic administration is a requirement irrespective of how the production of goods is organized, that is, be it capitalistic or socialistic; that even new, “rational socialism” cannot but take over what has remained of such administration and probably even helps to increase it; that even the so-called “dictatorship of Soviet” is found under the sway of a vast number of the new bureaucrats and faculty members and consequently has lost the alleged nature of dictatorship of proletariat.¹⁾ (Studies on bureaucracy, such as are conducted in the U.S.A. today and admit of no essential difference in bureaucracy whether it be under the capitalistic system or the socialistic, start from Max Weber.)

On the other hand, Marxism has put forward the following as points of refutation against what Max Weber has to say as in the foregoing. First, that under the capitalistic system, bureaucracy is, in the last analysis, of a character determined by the nature of relations of capitalistic production, and therefore cannot but turn the means by which the bourgeois class exploits, oppresses and rules the working people for its interest; secondly, that the phenomena of the so-called “transformation of the legislative state into the administrative” and of “general bureaucratization” represent, in reality, nothing but a crisis for, and a total change in, the whole structure of the bourgeois society or state, with capitalism moving into the stage of monopoly and also into that of state monopoly and the bureaucratic machine revealing itself more and more as the enemy and oppressor of the proletariat; thirdly, that bureaucracy is in its very nature proper to capitalism but foreign to socialism, although in actual practice the latter is sometimes not quite free from bureaucratic degeneration of some kind or other.²⁾

As is generally known, every Marxist theory is put forward always with the prole-

tariat engaged in the practical act of revolutionizing in view. It cannot be denied, therefore, that all along a series of its formulas are found some influences of those particular circumstances which happened to help to solve both theoretical and practical problems. That this is also true of the foregoing points of refutation is seen in how "the theory lays bare the bourgeois character of bureaucracy," how "it rejects the machine as a necessary step for proletariat revolution" (especially how it advocates the use of violence for the smashing of the machine), while accentuating, as it does, the extraneousness of the machine to socialism. It is to be admitted that the Soviet state, in building up their theory, were much under the influence of the particular circumstances, both internal and external, prevailing at the time of the Revolution and for some time afterward.

Today it offers much discussion how, after Lenin, those phases of the subject came to assume excessive proportions for stress, thus checking, instead of prompting, further researches into bureaucracy. Mr. Seisuke Tanaka, for instance, maintains that after Lenin it has not been the concern on the part of Marxism to attempt at new theories on bureaucracy. He goes on to say that while internationally there were the particular circumstances and also internally struggles going on between Trotskyism and Bukharinism, it was the tendency for Marxist theorists to commit everything to the matter of the relations of production by applying an ideological way of thinking in dealing with the subject and to pay no attention to the actual state of bureaucracy; that this way of disposing of problems leads, in the long run, to the exclusion of the subject itself from the field of discussion for the alleged reason that the proposition of the subject itself is inspired by some antagonistic ideology, and, in spite of struggles with bureaucracy actually going on even under the socialistic system, ends in an essential proposition, which of necessity calls for a connivance at possible contradictions or conflicts; that theories on bureaucracy generally came to be inspired in a larger degree by Trotskyism.³⁾

The 20th Congress of C.P.S.U., the "criticism on Stalin", and the Poland and Hungary Incidents started much discussion on the subject of "democratization" in the Socialist state; and more recently, at the 22nd Congress, in dealing with the problems of socialism turning into communism and of the withering away of state, they debated upon such subjects as overall dissemination and perfection of Socialist democracy, voluntary participation by all citizens in the state administration and the state leadership of economic-cultural construction, improvement in the efficiency of state apparatus and strengthening of control by the people over its function.⁴⁾ Moreover, when looked

at from a viewpoint of the general history of the world, which, with all its particular circumstances brought about after the Second World War, provides the subject of the bureaucracy of today with a whole lot of new themes for discussion, it is needless to say that new theories to be developed on the subject should be in full view of such a new historical environment. And this next makes it necessary to fully examine experiences gained not solely by the Socialist states but also by capitalist ones. In the present thesis, however, this writer will confine himself to "Soviet Power and Bureaucracy" by first turning to Lenin's theory on bureaucracy as an initiative approach to the subject.

II

Lenin, in one of his earlier treatises, entitled "The Economic Content of Narodnikism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve's Book" (1894-1895), says, "In modern society the bureaucracy becomes the particular stratum of political power holder. History ... and the conditions under which this class forms and supplements itself ... are there to show that the bureaucratic machine is closely bound up with the bourgeois, the ruling class of modern society. All bureaucracy is essentially and exclusively a bourgeois institution in points of the historical origin, contemporary source and role." In his another paper "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" (1897), Lenin, propounding the problem of full democratization of bureaucracy by the proletariat, says, "Take the civil service, the bureaucracy as representing a special category of persons who specialize in the work of administration and occupy a privileged position compared with the people. We see this institution everywhere, from absolutist and semi-Asiatic Russia to cultured, free and civilized England, as essential organ of bourgeois society ... But except for the proletariat, not one of these strata would agree to the complete democratization of the bureaucracy, because all these strata (bourgeois, petty bourgeois, the "intelligentsia" in general) have some connection or other with the bureaucracy ... The "proletariat" alone has no "connection" with these organs of aristocratic-bourgeois society, the proletariat alone is capable of irreconcilable hostility, and of waging a determined struggle, against them".⁵⁾

Before the Revolution (in August and September, 1917), Lenin, explaining his stand on bureaucracy in his treatise "The State and Revolution", says: "There can be no thought of abolishing bureaucracy at once, everywhere and completely. That is utopia. But to "smash" the old bureaucratic machine at once and to begin immediate-

ly to construct a new one that will permit to abolish gradually all bureaucracy — this is "not" utopia, this is the experience of Commune, this is the direct and immediate task of the revolutionary proletariat." "This is "our" proletarian task, this is what we can and must "start" with in accomplishing the proletarian revolution. Such a beginning, on the basis of large-scale production, will of itself lead to the gradual "withering away" of all bureaucracy." "The workers, having conquered political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, they will shatter it to its very foundations, they will destroy it to the very roots; and they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same workers and office employees, "against" whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only election, but also recall at any time; (2) pay not exceeding that of a workman; (3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by "all", so that "all" shall become "bureaucrats" for a time and that, therefore, "nobody" may be able to become a "bureaucrat".⁶⁾

What one understands by Lenin in the above-cited passages is that not all bureaucracy is capable of simultaneous eradication or liquidation with the taking possession by the workers of political power, that it can be overcome and destroyed only through constant efforts to smash the old bureaucratic machine, to construct a new proletarian one and to strengthen and develop it, and that Lenin views this all as a process of gradual transition in which all shall become bureaucrats for a time and by so doing, therefore, none in reality shall be incapable of being such. This last state of society represents nothing but the withering away of the state. By this line of argument Lenin was well in a position, on one hand, to defeat Kautskyism-ameliorationism and on the other to reject anarchism, while advocating exertion of unreserved boldness in destroying the entire state machine and also concrete proposition of problems.

However, the theme of "The State and Revolution" encountered criticism from Kautskyism-opportunism, which necessitated it for the writer to bring into the foreground his theory of smashing the state machine by violent revolution. By way of answering those critics who said, "We must not even think of destroying the old state machine; how can we get along without ministries and officials?", Lenin said, "The point is not at all whether the "ministries" will remain, or whether "committees of specialists" or some other institutions will be set up; that is quite unimportant. The point is whether the old state machine ... shall remain, or be "destroyed" and replaced by a "new" one. Revolution consists not in the new class commanding, governing with the aid of the "old" state machine, but in this class "smashing" this machine and

commanding, governing with the aid of a "new" machine".⁷⁾ Here it must be admitted that Lenin's theory on bureaucracy, based, as it is, upon the act of smashing the old state machine by means of violent revolution, is a reflection of the particular historical environment in which the world found itself in those days when, with monopolistic capitalism transforming itself into state-monopolistic, the state machine of each country, with no exception whatsoever, geared to intensifying measures of repression against the proletariat, was extraordinarily gaining in power, and its bureaucratic and military set-ups were expanding on the largest scale of all time, causing almost all hopes for "peaceful transition" to disappear. It was natural that Lenin drew such conclusions for his theory from an interpretation he rendered to the historical situation of the above description.

But, it must be taken note of that there is another side to this theory of Lenin's. That is, Lenin, expounding in his "Can the Bolsheviks Retain Political Power?" (Sept.-Oct., 1917) that for the purpose of approaching or revolutionizing the old state machine there are some other means than smashing, says, "Apart from the main "repressive" apparatus such as standing army, police and bureaucracy, there are also in the modern state apparatus closely bound up with the banks and syndicates, apparatus which perform a mass of accounting and registration. Apparatus of these kinds cannot and must not be smashed. The main point is to take it away from the hand of the capitalist, to cut it off from every bond and yoke of the capitalist and to subjugate it for the use of the proletarian Soviet."⁸⁾

From the above it will be seen that Lenin's stand on the problem was by no means monistic, as it would have been had he had in mind only the "complete smashing" of the old state machine; that he held the working class could not simply lay hold of the ready-made state machine but had to revolutionize it; that he admitted that for the realization of such a revolution there were, beside smashing, such means available as "conversion", "reform" and so on; that he also maintained it depended upon the historical conditions of the time given which means should be best resorted to.

The October Revolution offered an opportunity to give these theoretical problems their practical solution, in the course of which, it is needless to say, themes and plans, which had been proposed in the form of the *roy* upon the experience gained by the Paris Commune, were adopted as principles to be implemented. However it is also true that change or revision of some kind or other was inevitable in putting them in practice. Examples were: first, the juxtaposition, within the central organs of the Soviet power, of the Workers' and Peasants' "Government", generally called the Council of People's

Commissars (C.P.C.), and its Peoples' Commissariats which should serve as "ministry" of each Commissar, both organs of which were rejected in the Commune, with All Russian Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.) and its departments which had their places also in the Commune; secondly, the incorporation into the whole apparatus of the Soviet State, in organizing its respective Commissariats, of not only the apparatus closely bound up with the banks and syndicates but of no small part of apparatus belonging to bourgeois bureaucracy, though not without conversion or reform, and also of old bureaucrats and specialists at high wages; thirdly, that all of the employees of the People's Commissariats were not chosen by election.

However, no matter how extensive was each particular part of the old state machine incorporated into the new apparatus of the Soviet, it must be pointed out that conversion, reform and other means are found to have been only secondary to that of smashing by violence.

The character of the Soviet Revolution and the subsequent construction of the Soviet power is to be ascribed, first, to the particular historical circumstances then in existence and, secondly, to the national peculiarities of the Russia of the time. In more detail, the significance of the first lies in that the Socialist Revolution broke out both in relation to the First World War, waged by imperialistic powers, and under all its influence, thus cutting off the imperialistic chain of power controlling the entire world at its most vulnerable point; while the second point is significant in that economically, politically and culturally Russia was a petty-bourgeois country whose farming population constituted the far greater majority of the whole and that the backwardness of the country had kept the growth of her bourgeois democracy on a low level, allowing autocracy and militarism to prevail over the general masses and to leave them deprived of human right. These necessitated a seizure of political power by armed uprising and smashing of the old state machine by violent force, for the purpose of constructing a Soviet Republic, essentially different from the old one of a bourgeois description, which in itself was incapable of continuous development or transformation.

III

After the Revolution, the Soviet power had to carry out the construction of state and economy despite conditions under which it was severely exposed to the attack by the counter-revolutionary forces and to the intervention by imperialist countries. For this purpose it was obliged to lay emphasis on the violent and military moment of pro-

letarian dictatorship, and it was in need of "high centralization of power" by extraordinary means. This situation, along with the low cultural level of the Russian masses and the petty bourgeois spontaneity arising out of their living conditions extremely aggravated by the First World War and its subsequent civil war, led to the revival of bureaucratism within the Soviet institution.

The revival of bureaucratism was discussed at the Eighth Party Congress of March, 1919. Lenin, in his report "On Party Programme" read on this occasion, commented as follows: "In our struggle against bureaucratism we have done something that no other nation in the world has ever done. The apparatus that was bureaucratic to the core and bourgeois-oppressive ... this we have destroyed to its very foundation. Further, the Soviet power has also laid the legislative basis for overcoming bureaucratism by eliminating "thousands of legislative obstacles which prevent the working people from participating in the administration". But "we are suffering owing to the immature development of Russian capitalism. Obviously the Germans would have found their way out of it sooner. In this respect the lack of cultural forces is most keenly felt. This low cultural level has actually reduced the Soviet which, according to its program, is the organs of administration by working people, to those conducted not by them but by the vanguard of the proletariat for the benefit of the working people. The stratum of workers in charge of administration at present is extraordinarily and incredibly thin." It is certain that "from all symptoms there will be in the near future huge reserve forces, replacing the overworked representatives from the thin stratum of proletariat", but "anyhow our present situation is extremely difficult in this respect. The bureaucracy has been overthrown. The exploiters have been ousted. But the cultural level being as low as it is, the bureaucrats still hold their former status. A far more extensive organization of the proletariat and peasants than ever before, and the actual execution of measures enlisting the working people in the administration are the only effective means for getting rid of bureaucracy. It is only when the whole inhabitants participate in the administration that we can expect to fight with bureaucratism to the bitter end and win complete victory over it.⁹⁾

The new program, which was adopted at the above-mentioned congress in accordance with Lenin's report, admitted the "partial revival of bureaucratism" within the Soviet institution and at the same time stated: "Conducting the most resolute struggle against bureaucratism, the Russian Communist Party advocates for the complete overcoming of this evil the following measures: (1) an obligatory call on every member of the Soviet for the fulfilment of a definite task in the administration of the

state; (2) a systematic variation in these tasks in order that they may gradually cover all branches of the administration; (3) a gradual drawing of the whole working population individually into work in the administration of the state, the full and universal application of all these measures, which represents a further step on the road trodden by the Paris Commune, and the simplification of the functions of administration accompanied by a rise in the cultural level of the workers will lead to the abolition of state power".¹⁰⁾

As was seen above, Lenin clarified the basic standpoint that "it is only when measures enlisting the working people in the administration are actually put into execution" and "the whole inhabitants participate in the administration" that they could thoroughly eliminate bureaucratism. But at the same time he urged that for this purpose and for the construction of Socialism as well, they should not forget to make thorough exploitation of the science and technology that Capitalist Russia had left behind and of the experiences of old bourgeois specialists. He said: "We are not dreamers who think the construction of Socialist Russia is something to be achieved by a new class of people. We utilize the materials that the old capitalist world has left us. We place older people in new conditions, properly control them from without, put them under the proletariat's jealous watch and employ them in work necessary for us. This is the only way in which we can construct (our Socialist Russia—by the quoter)."¹¹⁾

Lenin himself, however, had already a year before admitted (in his article "The Immediate Task of the Soviet Government"): "The enlistment of bourgeois specialists by means of extremely high salaries," "such a measure is clearly a compromise, a departure from the principles of the Paris Commune and of every proletarian power." But "to conceal from the masses the fact would be sinking to the level of bourgeois politicians and to deceiving the masses. Frankly explaining how and why we took this step backward, and then publicly discussing what means are available for making up for lost time, means educating the masses and learning from experience, learning together with the masses how to build Socialism." We "must study the peculiar features of the extremely difficult and new path to Socialism without concealing our mistakes and weaknesses, and strive in good time to do what has been left undone."¹²⁾

Thus Lenin frankly confessed to the weaknesses of the Soviet power arising from the backwardness of Russia, even acknowledged their departure from the Paris Commune and tried a realistic approach towards realization of that basic proposition (extermination of bureaucratism through participation of the whole population in the admi-

nistration of the state) always referring back to reality. Besides, his efforts were evolved amidst his confrontation with such deviators as Democratic Centralists, the Workers' Opposition and Trotskysts.

Ossinsky, of Democratic Centralists, at the Eighth Party Congress ascribed the revival of bureaucratism to the centralization of all the legislative and executive function upon very small-sized limited cells (upon executive organs or even individuals endowed with unlimited authority), and proposed the following measures. They were, among others, that the Praesidium of the CEC and the CPC be integrated with a view to perfect unification of legislative and executive businesses; that the CEC be divided into various sections in order to make of the CEC a constantly "functioning collegiate organ" which was to be mainly composed of active members of the workers' organizations in the central regions; that detailed regulations be drafted concerning the division of authority of central and local Soviet organizations in order to eliminate the harmful influences arising from the centralization of power.¹³⁾

The Eighth Party Congress rejected the Democratic Centralists' demand for the abolition of the CPC, and decided that the division of the CEC into sections would only foster the growth of bureaucratism, that the members of the CEC should be chosen mainly out of local active members constantly working among laborers and peasants, and that the authority of the Praesidium of the CEC should be formulated as an organ controlling the CPC on behalf of the CEC which would stop its constant functioning on account of this method of choice. It also declared that various congresses of local Soviets and general meetings should be strengthened so as to eradicate the tendency toward bureaucratic centralism, an indication that the departments and administrations of the local Executive Committees stepped out of subjection to their respective local Soviets and had direct dealings with their respective People's Commissariats in the central government.¹⁴⁾

In the period following the civil war, when the major tasks of the Soviet power were switched over from those of military to those of peaceful, economic construction, "the evils" of bureaucratism "assumed clearer and more distinctive forms."¹⁵⁾ With the transition from the reconstruction of national economy to NEP, the state administration and the economic administration became pressing, and bureaucratism found its happy hotbed.

At this period, Lenin made an issue of bureaucratism "being connected with the petty-bourgeois spontaneity and its dispersiveness."¹⁶⁾ Further, he sought to find out the socio-economic sources of bureaucratism and pointed out that they lay in

"the loose dispersiveness of small-sized production, its destitution, non-culturism, roadless conditions, illiteracy, lack of dealings between agriculture and industry, and lack of the solidarity and interaction between them (most of which were due to the consequences of the civil war and the interventions). He made it clear that bureaucratism "had thoroughly uncovered itself" as "an inheritance" from the "encirclement" by imperialists and as the "super-structure" on the living conditions of the masses devastated by the civil war and on the loose dispersiveness of small producers.¹⁷⁾

At this period the problem of bureaucratism was "taken up on a wider scale" and discussed at party congresses, other party conferences and Soviet congresses, but at the same time decentralist-syndicalist deviation caused the distortion of problems. In some party programs this problem was brought forward rather indiscreetly to say the least, and what was worse, was always looked upon from the petty-bourgeois viewpoint.¹⁸⁾

In the spring of 1920 there emerged two positions out of the controversy concerning the economic administration. Tomsky held that the collegial administration was the sole fundamental principle upon which to secure the participation of the workers in the industry administration. The Democratic Centralists maintained that collegiality was one of the effective means of preventing the Soviet apparatus from falling into bureaucratism, that collegiality in some form or other was a necessary basis of democracy, and that collegiality should be unconditionally recognized as a fundamental principle for building various apparatus on every basis link of proletarian dictatorship.¹⁹⁾

Lenin objected to those positions favoring collegiality, criticizing: "It is often assumed that collegiality means administration by the workers and that one-man management means administration by non-workers," but this shows that the controversy confuses the question of "whether new classes should participate in the administration in accordance with collegiality or one-man management" with that of "in what respects the rule of class can be observed." Discussions on collegiality, he said, are quite often full of ignorance and anti-specialist tendency.²⁰⁾

Lenin further impeached, saying that the position of the defenders of collegiality "was now forcing them backwards," because the basic propositions concerning collegiality and one-man management had already been clarified in the article "The Immediate Task of the Soviet Government" published two years before and moreover it had been passed as a formal resolution at the CEC held in April, 1918.²¹⁾ The fundamental propositions read as follows in the above-mentioned article. "The large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the founda-

tion of Socialism——” “demands that the masses unquestioningly obey the single will of the leaders of the labour process.” “We must learn to combine the “public meeting” democracy of the toiling masses ... with “iron discipline” while at work.” Soviet socialist democracy consists with the one-man management (individual responsibility). “The more resolutely we now have to stand for a ruthlessly firm government, for the dictatorship of individuals “in definite process of work,” in definite aspects of “purely executive” functions, the more varied must be the form and methods of control from below in order to counteract every shadow of possibility to distorting the principles of Soviet Government, in order repeatedly and tirelessly to weed out bureaucracy.”²²⁾

At the end of 1920 the controversy on the trade unions was raised, involving common problems arising out of the policy change from War Communism to NEP. The workers’ Opposition insisted on the “trade-unionization of the state,” and Trotsky held to the “state-organization of trade unions.”

Opposed to the assertion by the Workers’ Opposition that the state should cease its bureaucratic-centralistic control of economy and that the control of the whole national economy should be turned over to a central organ (all-Russian Congress of Producers) whose members were chosen by the trade unions, the Tenth Party Congress replied by saying that this was exactly the syndicalist-anarchist deviation, a radically wrong idea from the theoretical point of view, and that it meant the complete breaking with Marxism and with the synthesis of actual experiences of the proletarian revolution. The Congress rejected Trotsky’s idea, saying that in Soviet Russia the relation of trade unions to the state is very unique; that the trade unions were already carrying on such functions as the state organs’ at a given moment; that the functions of trade unions would gradually see expansion in the Soviet State; but that however the unnatural and immediate state-organization of trade unions might be carried out, it would never improve the economic conditions of the nation, and “would even prove to be a significant political blunder” by hindering to a great extent the execution of the characteristic role and tasks of the trade unions.²³⁾

Lenin clarified the following points in the controversy on trade unions: “According to our party programme ... our State is found to be a Workers’ State which is bureaucratically distorted.” Therefore, “in a state of this kind which has actually been established”, trade unions bear the important responsibility of struggling against the bureaucratic distortion of the state organs and of constantly correcting their errors and excesses, “in order to protect the material and spiritual benefits of every one of the organized proletariat,” and to “defend the workers against their own state and to defend

our State by the workers.”²⁴⁾

IV

Lenin emphasized in his last article “Less Quantity But Of Better Quality” the rationalization or simplification of the state apparatus, saying, “We must curtail the state apparatus to the greatest possible extent. We must oust from the state apparatus all the traces of many of the useless remains which we have inherited from Czar Russia and its bureaucratic-capitalistic apparatus.”²⁵⁾ But the subsequent development of the national economy, Socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivization brought about divergences of business in the state administration and economic administration and also the enlargement and complication of these apparatus; it further magnified the relative importance of the central government and the various People’s Commissariats, and strengthened the tendency towards centralization. And in spite of the improvement in the general cultural level brought forth by the economic development and the betterment of material life, the bureaucratic distortion of the Soviet institutions is yet to be solved, and the struggle against bureaucratism is proposed.

However, it would be a simple one-sided view of the matter if we decided once for all from the above-mentioned conclusion that centralization (especially the unified economic projection and the centralized economic administration by the state) leads directly to bureaucratism, and that the only measure to weed out the evils of bureaucratism is in the decentralization of administration (especially the economic administration) and in the autonomous management of economic enterprises by groups of producers; that is, that centralization means bureaucratism and decentralization democratization. Lenin pointed out that “centralization is constantly confused with despotism or bureaucratism.”²⁶⁾

The role of the state in national economy under Socialism not only enlarges itself, but becomes the conscious, planned operation. Socialism, based on large-scale production, necessitates the centralized economic planning and administration by the state, which in turn necessitates a comprehensive central organ of control that should insure the balanced development of the whole national economy. The decentralization and the autonomous management by groups of producers, in disregard of the preceding fact, will hold in check the overcoming of bureaucratism by maintaining the dispersiveness of small producers, petty bourgeois spirit, and cultural backwardness, all of which Lenin cited as the economic, and social sources of bureaucratism, and will fall into the

syndicalist-anarchist deviation supported by the Workers' Opposition which Lenin also severely criticized.

At the Eighth Party Congress where Lenin confessed the difficulty of the task of overcoming the bureaucratism in Russia, he said: "The staff in the fields of administration ... are hard-boiled officials, that is, bureaucrats", and yet "we could not live on without an apparatus of this kind. All the departments of administration produce the necessity of this kind of apparatus."²⁷⁾ And at the Tenth Party Congress he showed, by pointing to the connection of bureaucratism and petty bourgeois spontaneity, that the struggle against bureaucratism was otherwise connected with struggle against the petty bourgeois spontaneity and that against the petty bourgeois influence which had been brought in among the workers and their vanguard. This is because both authoritarianism towards the masses and servility to them (surrender to petty bourgeois spontaneity) will necessarily lead to alienation from the masses and consequently to bureaucratism. That is to say, with Lenin the problem of bureaucratism was always posed in connection with the "opposition" and "unity", as it were, of the two moments: centralized leadership by the state as against the active participation of the people in it, or centralization as against decentralization, or collegiality as against one-man management. Therefore the actual struggle against bureaucratism is evolved through the struggle against the deviation either to left or right which is caused by the one-sided strengthening or enlarging of these two moments.

We may say that essentially "bureaucratism is not inherent", viewed from the fundamental character of the Socialist society and Socialist state. But so long as there are various contradictions (one between productive power and relation of production, or between production and consumption, or between physical labor and mental labor) in the actual economic structure (basis) of the society and also as long as there are contradictions as well as correspondences between the economic basis and the super-structure, the contradictions between the above-mentioned two moments (since the joining of both is realized under actual, tangible conditions) always spring up. They appear, after all, as contradictions in human relations, that is to say, as those between government and people, or between leaders and the masses. Accordingly, if one moment is overstrengthened without proper and timely solution of these contradictions, the consequent contradictions emerge taking the forms of bureaucratism.

There may be other factors to be cited contributing to the emergence of bureaucratism under Socialism. Among others we must not forget to point to the fact that the factors are inherent in Socialist society itself. It is not true to attribute all the

evils of bureaucratism to the outside and past of the Socialist society, by unduly emphasizing the fundamental character of the material basis of Socialist society.

That bureaucratism arises out of the one-sided strengthening of one moment points to the fact that with proper Socialist leadership its emergence can be avoided and even overcome. And also it must be admitted for the facts that under Socialism, unlike capitalism, the society holds within it the forces and conditions to correct bureaucratism, should democracy be partially encroached upon and bureaucratism spring up, and that democracy inherent in proletarian dictatorship is capable of producing all the prerequisites for successfully overcoming the bureaucratic trends by inducing an ever wider range of working people to participate in the administration and by properly using various forms of control from below.

However, from Lenin's fundamental proposition (standpoint) mentioned above, we must admit that Socialist power will never be completely released from the evils of bureaucratism, and various factors (possibilities) capable of producing these evils will continue to exist, until all the people can carry out functions of control and supervision, be bureaucrats for a given period of time, which makes it impossible for anybody to be a bureaucrat (the participation of the whole inhabitants in the administration), that is, until the withering away of the state.

- 1) Vgl. Max Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, III. Abteilung, Tübingen, 1922, S. 128-129.
- 2) See The Academy of Sciences of U.S.S.R., Institute of Jurisprudence: *Theory of the State and Law*, 1949, translated by Isamu Fujita, Vol. II, pp. 154-168, Ganshōdō Publishing Co.
- 3) See Seisuke Tanaka: *Bureaucracy and Social System*, Shisō, August 1957, p. 57.
- 4) See Resolution on Party Program of the 22nd Congress of C.P.S.U.
- 5) V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 399-400, and Vol. 2, pp. 312-313.
- 6) *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, pp. 397-398, 452.
- 7) *Ibid.*, pp. 457, 459.
- 8) *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 81.
- 9) *Ibid.*, Vol. 29, pp. 160-162.
- 10) Resolution and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congress, etc., Part I, 1954, p. 416.
- 11) V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 5-6.
- 12) *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, pp. 220-221.
- 13) See The 8th Congress of R.C.P. (B), *Protocol*, 1959, pp. 187-197, 303-311.
- 14) See Resolution and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congress, etc., Part I, 1954, p. 445.
- 15) V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 330.
- 16) *Ibid.*, p. 167.
- 17) *Ibid.*, pp. 330-331.

- 18) Ibid., pp. 166-167.
- 19) See The 9th Congress of R.C.P.(B), Protocol, 1960, pp. 562-566.
- 20) See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 400, 425-428.
- 21) Ibid., pp. 443-444.
- 22) Ibid., Vol. 27, pp. 238-242, 244-245.
- 23) See Resolution and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congress, etc., Part I, 1954, pp. 530-532, 539.
- 24) See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 6-7, 78-79, and Vol. 33, pp. 161-162.
- 25) Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 459.
- 26) Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 29.
- 27) Ibid., Vol. 29, p. 160.