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## SUMMARIES

### **A Study in the *Tsung-Ling So* of the Southern Sung**

**Kyōzi KAWAKAMI**

This article discusses the general aspects of the *Tsung-ling So*, a military-cum-financial institution of the Southern Sung, which was first introduced in the regions of *Hwai-hsi* (淮西), *Hwai-tung* (淮東), and *Hu-kuang* (湖廣) in 1141, and then was further established in Szechwan in 1148, in order to finance the armies stationed regionally at some strategical points on the extensive borderline alongside the Yangtze River Valley.

At the early stage of its history the institution worked rather well. Through this institution the Sung, who felt constantly harried under the pressure from the northern enemy, the Chin (金) Tartars, succeeded in mobilizing local resources and manpowers on the one hand, and on the other, in maintaining direct control over the financial administration of its regional armies.

At the end of the Southern Sung, however, a new national crisis was brought about by the invasion of the Mongol armies. To cope with the situation the Sung had to centralize its military as well as financial powers all the more, and it followed that the *Tsung-ling So*, whose command at regional resources and manpowers was absorbed largely into the finance of the central government, could not but survive only nominally.

### **Lord Milner's Strategy and Peace Plan in the Later Period of the First World War**

**Masahiro FUJII**

There is a traditional thesis that the important origins of British Appease-

ment in the 1930's lie in the attitudes of the Left towards Germany and Europe during the First World War. But the logic of British Appeasement for reconciliation with Germany based on bloc-imperialism differs basically from that of the Left on internationalism. It is Lord Milner's strategy and peace plan in the later period of the war that should be paid attention to as an important origin of that policy.

Lord Milner was a British race patriot and became an Imperialist. The Unity of the Empire, racial, political and economic, was his goal. His policy and peace plan towards Germany and Europe in the later years of the war originated in his Imperial Unity Strategy. It is essential for Britain to keep stability and peace in Europe so that she could devote herself to consolidating the Empire. Thus, in the last stage of the war Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War at that time, came to the conclusion that instead of knocking out Germany to the bottom the British should support and negotiate with the stable German government shorn of the "Prussian militarism." The reasons why he thought so are that the stable Germany stands as the chief bulwark against Communist expansion into Europe and as the leading factor to keep balance of power and stability in Europe, and that thereby Britain can afford to centralise all her energies to destroy the revolutionary fever within and on the borders of the Empire and achieve Imperial Unity.

Lord Milner's logic for "moderate peace" with Germany, as stated above, based on bloc-imperialism, is considerably similar to that of British Appeasement in the 1930's. And the core of "Clivden set" which exercised a considerable influence on the policy-making of British Appeasement was made up of the Milnerites. Furthermore, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, who carried out British Appeasement, were on the lines of Joseph Chamberlain-Milner's Imperial thought and therefore had much in common with Milner's logic fundamentally. Thus, Lord Milner's strategy and peace plan in the later period of the First World War is a more important origin of British Appeasement than that of the Left.