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Kripke on "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language"

Masahiro OKU
Kripke on "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language"

Masahiro Oku

(The original draft of this essay was read in Japanese at "the Wittgenstein Symposium" held at Seijo University, Tokyo, on 29th April 1983. At that "Symposium" three single papers were read, and a panel discussion "On the Recent Interpretation of Wittgenstein" was held. My contribution was to the latter, and the other panelists were Professor S. Ohmori, Emeritus of Tokyo Univ. and Professor W. Kuroda of Tokyo Univ.)

1. In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Saul Kripke writes "the sceptical paradox is the fundamental problem of Philosophical Investigations" (p.78), "although our paradigm of Wittgenstein's problem was formulated for a mathematical problem, it was emphasized that it is completely general and can be applied to any rule or word" (p.58), and "the impossibility of private language emerges as a corollary of his sceptical solution of his own paradox" (p.68).

According to Kripke, the so-called "private language argument" of §§243-315 in Philosophical Investigations (hereafter PI, and references are made as usual) is nothing but a corollary of the problem on "rule-following" discussed in §§138-242 of PI. The community view of language, he claims, follows the impossibility of private language, and he explicates key concepts of the view such as "agreement", "form of life" and "criteria".

2. Kripke's interpretation is seemingly broad and attractive. Nevertheless in my opinion, it is neither conclusive nor suggestive. It is misleading in the sense that it is liable to cause a general trend towards discussing and solving problems sweepingly and thus ignoring particular questions.

There are many problems to be discussed, but time is limited, so I will limit my discussion to three points.

The first point concerns the general attitude of Kripke's interpretation. He believes that he has proposed the formulation and solution of the basic and general problem of Wittgenstein. For my part, I would like to point out that such a stance is not Wittgensteinian.

The second is more particular, but more important. It concerns "disposition". Kripke criticizes his supposed "dispositional analysis of mental concepts" in detail, and his discussion, by itself, is right in general. On the other hand, by doing so he thinks he is criticizing "disposition" generally, and as a result he misses the very important "dispositional" character of some mental concepts: "to know", "to
understand”, “to mean” etc., which Wittgenstein emphasized. With regard to this point, frankly speaking, he does not comprehend the gist of §§138–184.

Thirdly, I will try to rearrange problems discussed by Kripke. In my opinion, he has put many different but interrelated problems into one basic, “paradoxical” problem which he, himself, names “sceptical”. My strategy is, therefore, to take them apart and to show the right place and significance in my scheme of §§201–202 in PI, which Kripke highlights in his interpretation.

3. From Kripke's viewpoint, the portion of PI concerning the 'private language' argument and the problem of other minds should be just one more instance of Wittgenstein's basic sceptical problem. Besides the main text, in the Postscript: Wittgenstein and Other Minds (pp.114–145 of the text) Kripke discussed this problem in more detail.

Here, in the case of the private language problem, he asserts that the sceptical paradox takes the form of solipsism (cf. p.141) and that the sceptical problem is the difficulty in imagining someone else's pain which I do not feel on the model of my own pain which I do feel (cf. p.133).

Solipsism and the above difficulty are indeed very important topics of the private language argument and no one would deny this fact. On the other hand, in that portion of PI, other problems which are irrelevant to the basic sceptical problem are discussed. For example, “what ‘5 o'clock on the sun' means” (§350) and “the earth is beneath us”, namely, the problem of antipodes (§351). Kripke himself accepts this.

In this sense solipsism is not the sole problem of the private language argument, and Kripke seeks his way out by conjecturing that these sections might have come from the earlier stages of Wittgenstein thinking (cf. p.119).

In some places, the main text included, Kripke's analysis and explication are indeed of the highest level but it is not as innovative as his general stance suggests. In fact, probably the only innovation is the introduction of the adjective ‘sceptical’ and the overstatement of the similarity between Hume and Wittgenstein. Even if Kripke's analysis of §§138–242 of PI is right, the private language argument is not just a corollary of his main analysis and it is in need of another independent approach.

4. What I have said so far may seem blunt and polemical and will meet with some criticisms from Kripkians. Firstly, concerning the Kripkians' apology. Kripke has not yet completed the investigation of the ‘private language’ argument. In contrast with the main text, the postscript is a portion of the first draft and needs further elaboration.

I do not have any objection to this kind of apology.

The second point, on the other hand, is more critical. Their own answer is: as
Kripke himself admits that particular problems need various particular treatments, and as a result, we have to examine the private language argument particularly. Nevertheless, this particularity does not affect the contention that Wittgenstein's solution of the private language argument is a corollary of Kripke's main analysis.

My own reply is as follows: the relation between Kripke's analysis and the private language problem is not the relation between the general and the particular in the sense that various problems such as free fall, simple pendulum, coupled harmonic oscillators etc. are particular applications of the more general Newton's second law of motion.

Kripke's analysis of his main problem and the 'private language' problem, I daresay, are different in kind.

5. I'll be met here with the third and stronger counterattack, and with the question: Do you think that problems concerning mathematics are totally different from the 'private language' problem? Is the property of 'following a rule' valid for all language games without exception?

As far as I know, Wittgenstein rejects the existence of any language game which does not follow any rule, and he thinks that 'regularity' is essential to language (cf. PI I-207).

On the other hand, the concept of 'rule' itself is a 'family resemblance' concept. When Kripke claims that his analysis is basic and general, and that it is applicable to every word and rule without exception, he does not think of this 'family resemblance' character at all and has become a victim of the philosophical disease of "nourishing one's thinking with only one kind of example" (PI I-593). Just to make the point, I'll quote a passage from PI II xi (p. 227) as a counterexample:

Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the genuineness of expressions of feeling? —— Even here, there are those whose judgment is 'better' and those whose judgment is 'worse'.

Correcter prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of mankind.

Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through 'experience'. —— Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip. —— This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here. —— What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules.

What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words.

6. If my above assertion that the concepts of "rule" and "following a rule"
have "family resemblance" is right, then there is no single property which is attributed to all rules, nor is there any single criterion by which we can decide, in every case, whether it follows a rule or not. Therefore, Kripke's main analysis is not general but it has only analysed one aspect of "following a rule" in the case of arithmetic calculations.

7. Concerning "dispositions". In his main text, Kripke attacks the dispositional analysis of mental concepts in detail (pp.22-37 etc.). According to him, "dispositional theory views the subject himself as a kind of machine, whose potential actions embody the function" (p.35), and "attempts to avoid the problem of finiteness of my actual past performance by appealing to a disposition" (p.26). Nevertheless, the dispositional analysis is not immune from the sceptical paradox. Kripke thinks that Wittgenstein and he are on the same side against the dispositional view. Our present question is whether Kripke's interpretation is right or not.

Kripke's long discussion on the "dispositional analysis" might have made one think that Wittgenstein himself had discussed this analysis in some detail and that Kripke had followed Wittgenstein's analysis. Nevertheless, in fact, there are only two passages in PI where the term "disposition" appears; they are, §149 and pp. 191-2 of Part II Chapter x.

The terminology Kripke uses, "dispositional analysis", does not seem to be based on the exegesis of PI, rather it is independent of Wittgenstein's terminology, or under the influence of Ryleian thinking. Therefore, our problem is what Wittgenstein in fact says about disposition.

In §149 Wittgenstein calls a state of a mind — in this case knowing the ABC — a disposition, and then examines the line of thought explaining this state of mind as a state of mental apparatus, or perhaps, of the brain. 2) Wittgenstein's attitude towards this line of thought is negative. We can say that on this point Kripke and he are on the same side. However, this does not imply at all that Wittgenstein rejected the idea of "disposition" in general. Although he criticized the line of explanation given above of knowing the ABC, he accepted that knowing the ABC is a disposition. And with regard to this I'd like to illustrate this point by references to the text:

The first is another passage, pp.191-2, where the term of "disposition" occurs in PI. Here Wittgenstein asserts that believing is a state of mind and that this state of mind is a disposition. We cannot find any trace of his questioning the dispositional character of believing at all.

The second is §§148, 150, 154, p.59 n., and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II §45. Wittgenstein emphasizes the contrast between two types of "mental concepts". Thinking of something, a pain increasing and decreasing,
hearing a tune or a sentence etc. belong to the first type: they are mental processes (occurrences) or states of consciousness. Believing, knowing, understanding, being able to, intending, and others, belong to the second type. An important difference between these two kinds consists of the fact that the latter are not interrupted by a break in consciousness or a shift in attention. In RPP II §45 Wittgenstein calls them “dispositions”.

I admit that the “disposition” is conceptually delicate and is in need of further elaborate investigation. On the other hand, I think there is no doubt that Wittgenstein recognizes the latter as “dispositions”. In admitting this, he could, in reality, reject other possible solutions by trying to explain these mental concepts as mental processes, states of consciousness or mechanisms.3)

8. If one recognizes the above dispositional character of some mental concepts, one can say without hesitation: “When I laid out the rule of addition to you, I meant you to say 125 in the case of 68+57”, even if he did not think of this case as he laid down the rule; for “to mean it” does not mean “to think of it”. (cf. PI I §692) In other words, this recognition implies the legitimacy of the above conditional.

Whereas, Kripke repeatedly asserts that there is no “past fact” supporting saying 125 rather than 5 in the case of 68+57, that is “there is no fact as to what I meant, whether plus or quus” (p.38), and also that there is no “fact of the matter as to which I meant”. (p.41).

Kripke claims that §§138–242 of PI are the main portion of this work, namely concerning “rule-following”. In a sense I can agree with him on this point. However, §§138–184 concern concepts of “knowing” and “understanding” exclusively but for the intervention concerning “reading”, and, if what I have said above is right, these two concepts are dispositions. Despite this fact, Kripke does not concern himself with this point. It seems to me that Kripke is unable to see the significance of these sections.

9. With regard to Kripke’s basic sceptical problem, my own feeling is that he has created one basic problem from many different but interrelated problems by fusion and it seems his assertion is complicated, and somewhere he himself seem to create confusion.4)

In what follows I will try to take Kripke’s basic problem apart and rearrange it into five cases which are different but interrelated. By doing so I wish to cover all important aspects of Kripke’s problem, and furthermore to show the right place and significance of §§201–202 which Kripke highlights in his interpretation.5)

10. Case 1: Two persons, A and B, know two calculi, namely a normal addition and a bizarre quaddition. Both are indeed intelligent enough to understand these two and calculate them. Both agree: 68 plus 57 is 125, and 68 quus 57 is 5.
Moreover, they can justify these calculations.

Now A claims he is not sure whether he meant addition or quaddition by ‘plus’ when he did the calculation yesterday.

There are some possible reasons for his doubt: an insane frenzy, a LSD trip, a momentary ‘high’ (p. 9), a feeble memory, drunkenness etc.

In some cases his doubt might be clarified, in other cases it might be left unsettled without causing any serious results, but perhaps sometimes it might lead to a serious situation. ①

Suppose A’s doubt continues. B might reply: “‘plus’ means addition, ‘quus’ means quaddition. This is a grammatical rule. Nevertheless, you are asking if you meant addition by ‘plus’, namely, if you meant addition by ‘addition’. Is there any particular reason for your doubt? If not, I must ask you: Haven’t you learnt English?” ⑦

11. Case 2. C learnt addition as a child. C does not need to know quaddition. C says, “If I had been asked 68 + 57 yesterday, I would certainly have answered 125”. How can he say this although he did not even think of 68 + 57 yesterday?

For Wittgenstein this is a question of some significance. He answers that we can say this, and warns that we should not be misled by the grammar of “mean” and “know”, because neither “to mean” nor “to know” means “to think of”. (cf. PI I §187, 692. See above p. 247 also.)

For Kripke too, this is a significant problem. Nevertheless, he seems to ignore Wittgenstein’s warning because he repeatedly says that “there is no fact as to what I ‘meant’ ” (cf. p. 8, 10, 21, 38, 70-71, etc.) as I above indicated, and denies C’s above conditional legitimacy. In this sense Kripke’s analysis is not Wittgensteinian.

In reality, “to mean” is a delicate concept which should be investigated elsewhere in more detail. Wittgenstein himself referred to this concept in various sections of PI, and especially concentrates on it in the last portion of Part I, §§661-693. In a sense the understanding of “following a rule” depends on the understanding of the word “mean”. Therefore one might perhaps assert, contrary to Kripke, that the last portion is the most important in PI. This is not altogether surprising, as it depends only on the emphasis of interpretation. In PI Wittgenstein “travels over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction”. (Preface)

To return to the point, what is the problem and what is the answer? Wittgenstein writes in PI I § 692:

But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such? —— The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion
of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion.

Probably Kripkians think this passage is good evidence for the community view. In my opinion this is nothing but a misunderstanding. As Kripke claims “we can say that Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language based ... on assertability conditions or justification conditions” (p. 74), Kripkians generally seek justification of utterances, and the community view is their last resort of justification. They want to find justification even in cases where there is no justification. (See Kripke’s comment on PI I §289 in note 63.)

In order to make this point clear, I ought to investigate such concepts as “justification”, “criterion” etc. in some detail. For the time being, I, instead, quote another passage from Wittgenstein as a counterexample against the community view theorists:

“I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules. I may now e.g. make a talkie of such instruction. The teacher will sometimes say ‘That’s right.’ If the pupil should ask him ‘Why?’—he will answer nothing, or at any rate nothing relevant, not even: ‘Well, because we all do it like that’; that will not be the reason.” (Zettel §§ 318–319)

“Because we all do it like that”; that will be the genuine answer for the community view theorists.

12. Case 3. D's results of addition have agreed with E's so far. Now, a difference appears. To 68 + 57, D answers “125”, and E answers “5”. They each investigate their opponent's calculations with further tests and then each finds that the other has made a systematic mistake. How should this be treated? The treatment is not prescribed uniquely. (cf. PI I §143) Suppose many other people behave as D. In this case E’s reaction is probably regarded as a bad habit (Unart), and he will be punished, purged from the community, or re-trained. However, even then, another course of action is possible. If the society is more liberal and intelligent, then D, as a member of the majority, might pretend to accept E's calculation as a valid one, persuade him soothingly to recognize the calculation done by the majority as a variation (Abart) of his own, and in the end ask him just to behave as the majority do: answer “125”, and adjust only his outer behaviour without affecting his inner faith.

If D's persuasion in a liberal society is successful, the problem is virtually solved, because the point of agreement between them does not lie in opinions but rather in “forms of life” as Wittgenstein emphasized. (cf. PI I §241)

Several other cases can be imagined, but I will not describe them further.

Incidentally, had D and E been following the same rule before their mutual deviation or different rules already? This answer is not unique either as several
different answers are possible, whereas Kripkians think the question should be answered uniquely. Cf. Wittgenstein's remark on two types of double negation (PI I §§556).

13. Case 4. A person or group F does calculations similar to our addition. To us, F seems to have changed the rule at a time, say tₐ. Namely, F seems to have followed the rule of addition until tₐ, and to have followed the rule of quadrition thereafter. On the other hand, F insists that calculations were continued in the same way.

Case 4 is our counterpart to Goodman's 'grue' which Kripke discussed at p. 58 et al.

This case differs from Case 3 as follows: Whereas in Case 3 D and E would always follow one rule, addition and quadrition respectively, here in Case 4 F seems to change his or its rule ad hoc at tₐ. Nevertheless, we can say that F follows the rule of addition first, and then the rule of quadrition, because repetitions are recognizable during each part of the time. Repetition is a necessary condition of "following a rule" in contrast with Case 5.

14. Case 5. A person G reacts at random to addition problems. He gives numbers at random as sums. We say he does not understand addition and he does not follow any rule. On the other hand, he claims that he is following a rule in his own way.

He defends himself in two ways. The first is theoretical. G asserts: If one admits that D, E and F in Cases 3 and 4 follow rules, then one should admit this in the case of G, too. He claims that, instead of saying that G reacts at random, one should say G seems to others to follow another rule at every stage. For his part, G maintains, he always follows the rule in the same way, because at every stage he can "make up" a calculus consistent with all his previous answers. This leads to the general conclusion: Whatever numbers anyone might give as sums, one could say he follows a rule by giving an appropriate interpretation to signs.

This is exactly the case of §201 in PI. Kripke takes or mistakes this as Wittgenstein's central problem, named "sceptical paradox". In my interpretation, this is one of several cases Wittgenstein considered concerning "following a rule". Wittgenstein's solution seems to me clear from the context. It is as follows:

Interpretations should come to an end somewhere and their infinite regress should not be permitted, because "interpretations themselves do not determine meaning" (PI I §198). Therefore, "a way of grasping a rule" is "exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases". (PI I 201) "Hence, also 'obeying a rule' is a practice". (PI I §202) As obeying and following a rule presupposes repetition and custom, one cannot obey a rule only once. (cf. PI I §199, 204, 205)
The last point shows the difference of Case 5 from previous cases. In my interpretation, G's theoretical defence should be rejected because repetition is lacking in his case.

The second defence is less theoretical, rather emotional. G swears that he sincerely follows a rule, whatever others may say of him. This is the case of §202.

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's reply is as follows:

If the only evidence for G's claim is his own testimony of sincerity, then this is insufficient to conclude that he is obeying a rule, because "otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it". In this sense "it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately' ".

Kripke and Peacocke read this section as if it showed the impossibility of private language and the necessity of 'community view'. I disagree with them in the sense that I think this section alone does not imply either. In my opinion, Wittgenstein would not accept the dichotomy between "following a rule privately" and "public criteria" lightly.

15. This is my analysis of Kripke's basic problem. In my opinion, Kripke misplaced his emphasis and considerably deformed Philosophical Investigations.

Perhaps I might be asked by Kripkians if I admit that the practice of obeying a rule presupposes a community. Of course I do not deny the fact that language games have social character, but the answer depends on what the concept "practice" means. I think these sections emphasize the repetition and custom of practice rather than the community. In this sense the "private language" argument is not a corollary of the solution to the "sceptical paradox". There are many delicate problems concerning the "private language" argument and related topics. Before long I would like to discuss them elsewhere.

My visiting London in the academic year of 1981-82 was a good chance to reflect upon myself and review my own previous study of Wittgenstein. The present paper is the first product thereafter.

I wish to thank Dr. Malcolm Budd for his seminar and discussions from which I have got a great deal concerning my stance against Kripke (See his unpublished paper Wittgenstein on Meaning, Interpretation and Rules.), Mr. Rush Rhees for his valuable comment on my earlier draft, and Professor Peter Winch for letting me see the typescript of his Review on Kripke's book (now appeared in The Philosophical Quarterly Vol.33 No.133 Oct.1983) while I was preparing for the present version.

NOTES

1) Published in 1982 by Basil Blackwell, Oxford and Harvard University Press, U.S.A. This is the revised and enlarged version (with postscript) of the earlier one, which

2) Here we can say something about a ‘machine-as-symbol’ (§193f.) also, as Kripke rightly suggests.

3) Wittgenstein's rejection of this last approach should be discussed elsewhere in more detail as his rejection of psycho-physiological or psycho-mechanical parallelism.

4) I am thinking of Kripke's assertion that Humean conclusion on causality might be called “the impossibility of private causation” (pp.67-8). Hume's argument, as Kripke puts it, is “to say of a particular event a that it caused another event b is to place these two events under two types, A and B, which we expect to be constantly conjoined in the future as they were in the past”. (p.57) Hume's emphasis is clear here: it is on the constant conjunction. He asserts that we can speak of causation only under the supposition of repetition. Whereas, curiously enough, Kripke interprets, or rather misinterprets, this assertion as the impossibility of “private causation”, which does not seem to be Humean terminology. On this interpretation or misinterpretation, Kripke intends to find a similarity between this impossibility and the impossibility of “private language”.

5) To be honest, the following discussion is rather complicated. On the one hand, I try to resolve Kripke's problem concerning 'plus' and 'quus' as far as I can, not for Kripke himself but for those who find themselves interested or absorbed. I've, therefore, cut possible criticisms against Kripke for the sake of argument. On the other hand, I ought to show my final disagreement with Kripke's analysis. In order to satisfy these two rather conflicting requirements, I split his “basic” problem into more intelligible, simpler parts, and discuss them one by one to show what points he does not give attention to. Because of this strategy, my analysis is of course tentative and probably inconclusive. In particular I would have discussed Case 2 in more detail. This case is a genuinely problematical one that I would like to consider in a future paper.

6) Wittgenstein writes in PI p.225: There can be a dispute over the correct result of a calculation (say of a rather long addition). But such disputes are rare and of short duration. They can be decided, as we say, 'with certainty'. Mathematicians do not in general quarrel over the result of a calculation. (This is an important fact.)—If it were otherwise, if for instance, one mathematician was convinced that a figure had altered unperceived, or that his or someone else's memory had been deceived, and so on—then our concept of 'mathematical certainty' would not exist.

7) My treatment of Kripke's question "whether one meant addition or quaddition by 'plus' “ seems unfair to him. His formulation of the question is made plausible chiefly by appealing to the distinction between 'use' and 'mention' and by making use of synonyms ('addition' and 'plus'). Wittgenstein, however, questioned the technical distinction between 'use' and 'mention' generally. Concerning the latter point, if we delete the synonym 'plus' as I did above, the question becomes banal. Naturally, his formulation includes other points. However, I hope the following considerations can cover all of them.

8) From A and B's viewpoint, D does addition and E does quaddition. For D and E, on the other hand, there exists only one 'right' addition. They do not have any idea of two sorts of addition.

9) The question how exactly we could decide t₀ is irrelevant to our main problem.

10) Wittgenstein himself examined the claim of "continuing in the same way" in §185 of PI. His example is a pupil who has been taught to continue a series of +2 but, beyond 1000, writes 1004, 1008, 1012.

11) A variant of Case 4 might seem more plausible. A group F seems to change its rule periodically, namely in leap years they seem to do quaddition and in other years to do addition. Nevertheless, they do not admit any change. They insist that they always calculate in the same way. In the end we guess their way of calculation might be the most natural for them, and we can make a conjecture that there might, perhaps, be a religious reason for their way of calculating.