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MASS POLITICS IN THE POST-1955 SYSTEM: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VOTING BEHAVIOR 
IN THE 2011 OSAKA MAYORAL ELECTION

Takahashi Ito*

Abstract

This paper explains Japanese politics in the post-1955 system using the theory of mass politics (Kornhauser 1959). Since the prior theory of class politics does not adequately explain the Japanese situation in the post-1955 system, many scholars have focused on the theory of populism, which does not regard voters as an important aspect. In contrast, the theory of mass politics consists of two aspects that are connected by public opinion: available politicians and accessible voters. The former is synonymous with the concept of populism, and the latter concerns those who are socially and politically marginalized.

This paper focuses on the breakthrough of the Toru Hashimoto camp in Osaka as a model case for Japanese politics in the post-1955 system. Voting behavior in the Osaka mayoral election of November 27, 2011, is analyzed using a social survey on political attitudes and civic participation in Osaka City. Path analysis is used to examine the model, which is based on the theory of mass politics. The results are as follows: (1) \( CFI \) and \( RMSEA \) values show the validity of the analytical model; (2) voters who are socially and politically marginalized voted for Hashimoto because of their distrust of public officials; (3) voters who are not socially and politically marginalized voted for Hashimoto because they favored the competitive principles of the market (neo-liberalism); and (4) there are no indirect effects of voters' socio-economic status on voting behavior. Therefore, mass politics modified by both accessible and non-accessible voters is confirmed. Based on these results, a framework can be presented for analyzing Japanese politics in the post-1955 system.

Key words: voter behavior; 2011 Osaka mayoral election; random sampling survey; Toru Hashimoto

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1. Japanese Politics from the voters’ point of view

1.1. The difference between the 1955 system and the post-1955 system

The purpose of this paper is to present a new framework which explains Japanese politics in the post-1955 system\(^{(1)}\) from the voters’ point of view using the theory of mass politics (Kornhauser 1959), and to demonstrate it in application with representative examples. The characteristics of Japanese politics in the post-1955 system can be described as “cycle of expectation and disappointment” (Otaka 2003: 240) that indicates the phenomena which some politicians with a high volume of support from voters lose their positions in a relatively short period of time. It has been said that this cycle is attributed to a growing number of nonpartisan voters, as well as a public opinion of expectancy and disappointment at social reformation. However, a framework that explains the new correlation between voters, public opinions, and politicians has not been sufficiently examined. In the following paragraph, the significance of this paper will be clarified by making it clear that the differences between the 1955 system and the post-1955 system in terms of the necessity to focus on factors relating to voters.

The voters’ socio-economic status have traditionally been represented by their occupational status and recognized as a major social cleavage that forms political confrontation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In the 1955 system, the supporting party of the voters and their voting behavior were clearly differentiated by the voters’ socio-economic status (Miyake 1985; Watanuki 1986; Hara and Seiyama 1999). In Japan’s case, it has been stated that the confrontation did not happen between capitalists and laborers, but rather, between LDP supporters who were in self-sustained (jimaeteki) occupations (management/administration, self-employed/family owned, and those who were in the sector of agriculture and forestry) and the reformist party supporters in non-self-sustained (hi jimaeteki) occupations (employees) (Miyake 1985). In particular, the correlation between the people in self-sustained occupations and LDP support has been known as stable in a long-term throughout the 1955 system (Miyano 1998). There also is a differentiation by age and education, and confrontation between the LDP supporters who often are aged and with lower educational attainment, and the reformist party supporters who often are younger populations and with higher educational attainment (Miyake 1985).

On the other hand, there is a statement that views political confrontation in Japan as something that is formed by values (political cultures) rather than socio-economic status (Watanuki 1967). The confrontation of LDP supporters with traditional and industrial values against the reformist

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\(^{(1)}\) Seiyama (1998) says there are two schools of thought regarding the understanding of the end of the 1955 system (the beginning of post-1955 system). The first school focused on the confrontation between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP: ruling party) and a reformist party (oppositional party), where this school saw that the 1955 system ended due to the long-lasting regime of the LDP going down to an oppositional party. The second school focused only on the LDP, and if the LDP returned as the ruling party, the school of thought would see this as a revival of the 1955 system. In the discussion of this paper in Section 1.1, the 1955 system and of the post-1955 system are considered as different, taking the position of the first school.
party supporters with anti-traditional and industrial values do not necessarily contradict the
previous statement which claims the importance of socio-economic status, due to the common
insight that the aged and lower education populations have traditional/industrial values, while
the younger or higher education populations have anti-traditional/industrial values (Watanuki
1986). Therefore, Japanese politics during the 1955 system can be explained with the framework
of “stratification politics” (Tanabe 2011: 58). This means that the stability of Japanese politics
during the 1955 system (especially during the LDP’s long regime) can be considered as a
consequence of the socio-economic status of voters functioning as social cleavage.

However, in 1990s, discussion over the hypothesis that voters’ socio-economic status no
longer from the social cleavage which used to actively create political confrontation(2) took place
(Clark and Lipset 1991; Pakulski and Waters 1996). As for Japan in the post-1955 system, some
studies point out that the correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and their supporting
parties or the voting behavior had been weakened particularly in the later years of 2000 through
2010 (Hirano 2007, Tanabe 2011). This phenomenon has been identified as “break from
stratification politics” (Tanabe 2011: 59), that attributes to not only the shift from supporting
reformist party to non-affiliation in younger, non-self-sustained occupations, higher educational
attainment that had already begun in the 1955 system (Hara and Seiyama 1999), but also the
significant shift from supporting the LDP to non-affiliation in group of lower educational
attainment. Behind “break from stratification politics,” some studies point out the collapse of the
socialism system and the rise of a wealthy society (Hara 1993) that resulted in conventional
political ideology and the loss of collective interests based on socio-economic status. In other
words, Japanese politics during the post-1955 system emerged as a result of loss of the effect
that socio-economic status of the voters had as social cleavage.

1.2. Critical reverification of Populism

If Japanese politics during the 1955 system can be explained by the framework of stratification
politics, what other framework would explain Japanese politics during the post-1955 system?
The framework for the break from stratification politics only presents the passive standpoint that
the voters’ socio-economic status is no longer the factor thus, this is not sufficient as a framework
to explain the Japanese politics of the post-1955 system. In other words, it is necessary to
consider new frameworks in detail to explain Japanese politics of the post-1955 system.

In recent years, the concept of “populism” has come to be used among researchers in addition
to the press and mass media as a new framework that explains Japanese politics in the post-1955
system. Populism is a complex concept that includes various meanings and it is not always
consistent (Taggart 2000). However, Otake (2003), Yoshida (2011), Zenkyo et al. (2012) as well

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(2) In overseas countries, discussions over the end of class politics brought development on refining class classification
and analytic methods, which demonstrated the difference among class politics in each country (Evans ed. 1999).
as Matsutani (2013) pointed out four characteristics of populism as a framework for analyzing Japanese politics. The first characteristic is simplification into the dualism of good versus evil for the purpose of creating an enemy. The second is denying the existing authorities (primarily politicians, bureaucrats, public officials). The third is procuring direct support from voters via mass media (TV), and the fourth is gaining strong support from voters as a result of the third characteristic. Add to that, from the perspective of policy, the neoliberalism reform which focuses on competition through reduction of public services by deregulation and privatization has been highly prioritized. The press or mass media tend to refer to populism through focusing on policies made by the politicians such as Junichiro Koizumi and Toru Hashimoto, who highly prioritized the neoliberalism reform. There ought to be a sense of surprise and crisis that why those politicians who highly prioritized the neoliberalism reform gained a high level of support, even though this reform would force the voters with a low socio-economic status to suffer, motivated press or mass media to feature those politicians and the concept of populism. However, the concept of populism has two different problems.

The first problem is that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd characteristics of populism are to some degree, commonly used strategies among today’s politicians. That is because, as it has already been revealed, under the post-1955 system where the voters’ socio-economic status does not function as social cleavage, politicians must adopt some form of populism in order to survive regardless of its effectiveness. Otake (2003) exemplifies some politicians such as Shintaro Ishihara, Junichiro Koizumi, and Makiko Tanaka as typical ‘good’ (successful) populist in Japan, but it is difficult to overcome the criticism that such study provides just an analysis of popular politicians (Matsutani 2011: 189).

The second problem is the fact that even though populism requires a high rate of voters’ support (the aforementioned 4th characteristic), the given characteristics do not give us any indications of the features of the voters who support those populists. Therefore, the analysis on populism and its voters has always been both exploratory and descriptive. And this commonly adopted approach that focuses on the analysis on politicians is the reason there are few insight into voters who in fact drives populism. Therefore, if populism during the post-1955 in Japanese is really the consequence caused by the change in voters, there must be some theories that explain this phenomenon.

Thus, this paper verifies that we can explain Japanese politics during the post-1955 system by theory of mass politics especially from the perspective from voters, utilizing the modified theory of populism and an analytical model on the typical example of Japanese populists. In the following section, I will first focus on Toru Hashimoto’s dramatic strides in Osaka as a typical example of the theory of mass politics, and then develop the analytical model and operationalize hypotheses.
2. Mass politics and a case of Toru Hashimoto

2.1. Theory of mass politics

The theory of mass politics derive from two concerns from different perspectives in relation to the expansion of vote during the late 19th century and the early 20th century, when an unprecedented number of people (the masses) obtained the chance to participate in politics (Kornhauser 1959). The first concern is based on the view of aristocratism and it criticizes the collapse in exclusivity of politicians and the rise of voters’ opinions and its influences (Mannheim 1940). This draws the concept of “available politicians” as one of the characteristics of mass politics. The second concern is from democratic perspective that criticizes the possibilities that some politicians might mobilize voters as a whole (Arendt 1951). This draws the concept of “accessible voters” as another characteristics of mass politics(3). The most important thing is to integrate these two concerns from two different perspectives since they both are the consequences of social atomization through decline of intermediary groups such as labor unions or party organizations.

Since atomization of society deprives reality from a collective interests based on socio-economic status, therefore, the relationship between politicians and voters should be different from that of the other type of society. Thus, the theory of mass politics (Kornhauser 1959) explains the characteristics of available politicians and accessible voters as follows: accessible politicians are those who depend heavily on popularity from his or her voters. Due to the decline of intermediary groups, politicians lose their decisiveness and autonomy, and become sympathizers who uniform and flow with public opinions. Moreover, because of the necessity to survive, these politicians happen to utilize the strategies of populism. It can be referred that accessible voters are those who are socially alienated, in all ranks of socio-economic status. Voters lose the reality of the collective interests based on their socio-economic status and being forced to autonomously make decisions, they happen to choose to be manipulatable. Generally speaking, those who have a low socio-economic status tend to be more mobilized, however, it is more likely to be those who identify themselves as socially alienated that is easy to mobilize, within a group of same socio-economic status. This implies that mass politics mobilize voters of all socio-economic statuses and therefore, accessible voters cannot be ascribed to a specific socio-economic status. Also, it can be estimated that voters who are both politically and socially alienated might be targeted by the politicians who challenge the existing political system.

In mass politics, available politicians and accessible voters directly connect to one another through public opinions (Lipman 1922; Koanhauser 1959), the further explanation can be indicated as follows. Firstly, public opinions tend to be stereotypical and unstable since they are

(3) Kornhauser (1959) uses the phrases “available elite” and “accessible non-elite”. This paper expresses these terms more specifically as “politicians” for “elite,” and “voters” for “non-elite” for the sake of conveniences, both for ease of understanding and analysis, but what they mean is identical.
the opinions formed by voters’ social recognition (stereotype). In a society where the voters’ socio-economic status does not function as social cleavage, voters are forced to participate in politics as autonomic individuals. However, they lack both time and abilities to evaluate little information on politics that is often unfamiliar to the most of the people. This is one reason why public opinions easily become stereotypical and unstable. This triggers the phenomenon where available politicians happen to uniform themselves to the public opinions in order to compete with other politicians and accessible voters become mobilized by the politicians who convey the policies built based on public opinions. Under these circumstances, the simplification of Good and Evil Dualism described above stands out.

Lastly, let me organize the relationship between the theory of mass politics and populism. On the side of the politicians, the concept of available politicians is fundamentally the same as politicians considered as populist, while the concept of accessible voters gives some additional characteristics of voters that populism could not portray. Another characteristic of the theory of mass politics is that mass politics also pays attention to social structures that are prone to generating mass politics. Thus, the theory of mass politics stands out as it enables to include the factors of populism from both politician and voters’ perspectives. In the past, this theory was often utilized and applied for analyzing Nazi totalitarianism, etc., however it has been swept away since the era that voters’ socio-economic status functioned as social cleavage begun. However, it seems to be particularly appropriate to refer to this theory again since this is the era where voters’ socio-economic status does not function as social cleavage unlike it did in the previous era.

2.2. The case of Toru Hashimoto as a typical example of politics in the post-1955 system

This paper exemplifies a case of Toru Hashimoto (voting behavior in the Osaka mayoral election of November 27th, 2011) as to describe typical Japanese politics of the post-1955 system. Let me verify whether the case of Hashimoto is a typical example of Japanese politics of the post-1955 system and how it can be understood in relation to the theory of mass politics. To begin with, it can be pointed out that some studies have identified the case of Hashimoto as the typical example of populism due to the political strategies he utilizes (Yamaguchi 2010; Yoshida 2011; Ninomiya 2012; Matsutani 2013). Another important characteristic of his policy is that he prioritizes neoliberalism reform such as privatization and public services through deregulation. It can be analyzed that he attempts to implement some of the significant elements of the post-1955 system primarily policy that Nakasone’s LDP established in late 1980s that emphasized to privatize national institutions such as “Japanese National Railways”, “Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation” and “Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation” (Hara and Seiyama 1999; Otake 2003; Yoshida 2011).

Next, let’s take a look at the facet of available politicians in relation to the theory of mass politics, Toru Hashimoto is such a politician who highly rely on popularity from voters. That is
firstly because he had not had any specific support bases as a politician, though he did have recognition as lawyer who frequently appear on TV. Especially in the first Osaka prefectural governor election of January 27th, 2008, he gained a victory through his intentional acting as an amateur who did not rely on any existing political parties (edited by the Yomiuri Shimbun Osaka head office local news department, 2009: 74–76). After this, he formed Osaka Ishin no Kai as to confront existing political parties and competed as a candidate in the 2011 Osaka mayoral election. Secondly, Toru Hashimoto has consistently promoted administrative reform based on both distrust in public officials (Yomiuri Shimbun Osaka head office local news department ed. 2009: 311) and competition principle and importantly he was supported by many voters (Sunahara 2011: 142). His manifest for the 2011 Osaka mayoral election, named the Osaka Metropolis plan and the public officials’ reform was established along his initial promotion.

Lastly, there have been no studies that examine voters and their votes for Toru Hashimoto from the perspective of accessible voters although the press and media to some extent refers to it. Those discourses are to be categorized into two topics, one is that the correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and their vote for Toru Hashimoto and another is the correlation between voters’ a sense of social alienation and vote for Toru Hashimoto which ought to be influenced by public opinions.

First, there are two different insights on the direct correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and voting for Toru Hashimoto. The majority of studies indicate that voters with a low socio-economic status voted for Toru Hashimoto. The definition of low socio-economic status varies depending on researchers; however, there tend to describe “poor” as youth, women, non-regular employees, people with lower educational attainment (Yamaguchi 2010; Nakajima 2011; Ueno 2012; Ninomiya 2012). A few studies sees that voters with high socio-economic status voted for Toru Hashimoto. This statement defines high income earners and permanent employees as high socio-economic status (Sakai 2012). There lie the issues of severe wealth gaps and poverty that Osaka City faces that brings up the discourse that points out the correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and vote for Toru Hashimoto. However, the theory of mass politics warns us not to ascribe the characteristic of voters to a particular group of socio-economic status.

Secondly, the point on voters’ social alienation and voting for Toru Hashimoto via public opinions can be further divided into the following three categories: (Yamaguchi 2010; Ninomiya 2012) (1) the discourse of the effect that voters’ socio-economic position has on both social alienation and public opinions, (2) the discourse of the effect that social alienation has on public opinions, and (3) the discourse of the effect that public opinions has on vote for Toru Hashimoto. In relation to the severe social condition of Osaka City described above, voters with low socio-economic status who are more likely to feel alienated, it has been said that these are the people to be mobilized by the two types of public opinions that will be described later. These socially alienated voters grow distrust toward public officials as a result of being mobilized by the
simplification that Toru Hashimoto forms which criticizes the and portray them as enemies. Also the dissatisfaction derives from social alienation leads voters to support neo-liberalistic reform. Finally, voters who form and support those public opinions result in voting for Toru Hashimoto. This discourse is partially compatible with the theory of mass politics compared to the previous one. However, this discourse is most likely the same as the discourse that insists the direct correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and the vote for Toru Hashimoto.

These are the discourses that the press and mass media refer to, but due to the lack of appropriate social survey data, there have been few empirical researches that examine who exactly voted for Toru Hashimoto in the 2011 Osaka mayoral election. Some researches reveal that the possibilities of voters with relatively high socio-economic status voted for Toru Hashimoto with the evidence cross chart on correlation between the vote for Toru Hashimoto and each main factors of individuals’ status in occupation, educational attainment and household income (Matsutani 2012; Zenkyo et al. 2012). Next, as for the correlation between public opinions and the votes for Toru Hashimoto, Matsutani (2012) suggests the possibility that voters with a strong distrust in public officials as well as voters who feel positively towards competitivism with a facet of neo-liberalism voted for Toru Hashimoto. On the other hand, as for the correlation between political alienation and the vote for Toru Hashimoto, Zenkyo et al. (2012) suggests the possibility that there was no correlation between them. However, since these analyses use limited samples and other factors had not been controlled, the result needs to be carefully interpreted. This highlights two significant research tasks, firstly is to re-verify the findings based on the appropriate social survey with a sufficient number of samples and, secondly is to develop and adopt the complicated analytical model depending on the theory of mass politics.

Thus, this paper examines whether the mass politics is the cause of the case of Toru Hashimoto by analyzing from the perspective of voters, through examining the correlation between the public opinions that both socially and politically alienated voters support and the vote for Toru Hashimoto, and the characteristics of voters for Toru Hashimoto are somewhat described as manipulatable.

2.3. Analytical model and hypotheses of the case of Toru Hashimoto

To analyze voting behavior in the 2011 Osaka mayoral election, I have developed an analytical model shown in Figure 1, based on the discussions up to Section 2.2. Using this analytical model, I will examine two subjects. Firstly, whether or not the case of Toru Hashimoto can be explained by the theory of mass politics. Secondly, to what degree the discourses formed by the press and mass media are precise. In the following, these are tested under four hypotheses: (1) voters’ socio-economic status, (2) social alienation, (3) political alienation and (4) public opinions.

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(4) In addition to the previous works introduced in this paper, there is Matsutani (2013) which analyzed determination of support for Toru Hashimoto and LDP from the nationwide survey data in 2009, and similar results are obtained.
The hypothesis regarding voters’ socio-economic status deals with the effect on social alienation, public opinions, and voting for Toru Hashimoto. Among them, the hypothesis in relation to the effect on voters’ socio-economic status derives from the theory of mass politics, the hypothesis in relation to the effect on public opinions derives from discourses formed by the press or mass media, and the hypothesis about vote for Toru Hashimoto comes from the theory of mass politics which goes against the discourse of the press or mass media.

Since the definitions of the high socio-economic status and low socio-economic status vary among researchers, this paper uses variables of gender (female), age, occupational status (non-regular employment), educational attainment (years in education) and household income as socio-economic status. For public opinions, distrust in public I use officials and competitivism based on the discussion introduced in Section 2.2 and Matsutani (2012).

**Hypothesis A1:** Low socio-economic status is prone to being socially alienated  
**Hypothesis A2:** Low socio-economic status is prone to being distrustful public officials  
**Hypothesis A3:** Low socio-economic status is prone to having a trait of competitivism  
**Hypothesis A4:** Socio-economic status and voting for Toru Hashimoto have no correlation

The hypothesis on social alienation focuses on the effect of political alienation on public opinions. Among them, the hypothesis regarding the effect on political alienation comes from the theory of mass politics, and hypothesis regarding the effect on public opinions derives commonly from the statements in the theory of the mass politics and the discourses of the press and mass media.

**Hypothesis B1:** Social alienation is prone to being politically alienated  
**Hypothesis B2:** Social alienation is prone to being distrustful public officials  
**Hypothesis B3:** Social alienation is prone to having a trait of competitivism

**Figure 1.** Analytical model based on the theory of mass politics

Note 1: A1 through D2 in the Figure corresponds to each hypothesis (direct effect) discussed in Section 2.3  
Note 2: A4 not shown in the figure corresponds to the hypothesis (indirect effect) of socio-economic status to voting behavior
The hypothesis on political alienation focuses on the effect on public opinions and vote for Toru Hashimoto based on the theory of mass politics. Zenkyo et al. (2012) suggests that the correlation with the vote for Toru Hashimoto has been rejected, however, the correlation with public opinions has not been examined yet.

**Hypothesis C1**: Political alienation is prone to being distrustful in public officials.

**Hypothesis C2**: Political alienation is prone to having a trait of competitivism

The hypothesis regarding public opinions is about the effect on voting for Toru Hashimoto, and is commonly obtained from mass politics and the comments by the theory of the press or mass media.

**Hypothesis D1**: Distrusting public officials is prone to voting for Toru Hashimoto

**Hypothesis D2**: Having a trait of competitivism is prone to voting for Toru Hashimoto

In the following section, analysis based on these hypotheses will be conducted.

### 3. Data, Variable, Analysis Methods

#### 3.1. Data

The data utilized in this analysis come from the sample of the “Social Survey on Political Attitudes and Civic Participation in Osaka City.” As described above, the incoherent insights on correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and votes/supports for Toru Hashimoto derives from the absence of appropriate social survey data with a sufficient number of samples for multivariate analysis. To overcome this obstacle, I conducted a mail survey from December 16, 2012 through January 31, 2013, using multistage random sampling method which targeted 4,800 individual voters in Osaka City aged between 20 and 79 (all 24 wards of Osaka City). The valid responses were 1,293 and the response rate was 26.9%. For the analysis, only 944 cases with no missing variables are included.

#### 3.2. Variables

The dependent variable is the voting behavior (1 = Toru Hashimoto, 0 = Kunio Hiramatsu), the respondents are asked who they voted for in the Osaka mayoral election of November 27, 2011. The respondents who casted a blank vote, didn’t vote, or did not have voting rights are not included in the analysis.

Independent variables are socio-economic status, social alienation, political alienation and public opinions. For the variable of socio-economic status, gender (female), age, occupational status (regular employment [reference category], non-regular employment, self-employed/
family-owned business, unemployed), educational attainment (years in education), and household income (log) are used. For social alienation variable, the reversed question “people’s livelihood has been gradually worsened,”(5) (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) is used. For the political alienation variable, the reversed question “most politicians are engaged in politics for their own interests only,” (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree or disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) are used. For public opinions variable I use two questions, one is “how much do you trust local public officials?”(6) (1 = Very much, 2 = To some degree, 3 = Not really, 4 = Never) to operationalize distrust in public officials and another is “which is closer to your standpoint, A (competition is the source of vitality in society) or B (competition comprises many problems, including an increase in social disparity),” (1 = close to B, 2 = on the B side, 3 = on the A side, 4 = close to A)(7) to operationalize competitivism. The descriptive statistics of variables used for this analysis are shown in Table 1(8).

(5) According to Kornhauser, social alienation is expressed as a lack of trust for others or their futures (Kornhauser 1959). This paper used living standard as an indication of social alienation because recognition that one’s living standard is deteriorating can be interpreted as loss of trust for the future, and because Matsutani (2013) has already used it as the indicator for social alienation.

(6) Distrust in public officials is an indicator of the political efficacy, but Matsutani (2013) points out that the importance of separation between efficacy toward politicians and towards the political party system. Since this paper analyzes the 2011 Osaka mayoral election, only the efficacy toward politicians (distrust of politicians) is used as an indicator of political alienation.

(7) Competitivism is considered as an indication which corresponds to the 3 aspects of neoliberalism, along with anti-egalitarianism and anti-welfarism (Maruyama 2013).

(8) The theory of mass politics pays attention to the decline of the intermediary group as a social structure prone to generate mass politics. Even in Japan under the post-1955 system, quite some time had passed after the decline of labor unions or political party organizations had been pointed out, but this paper does not incorporate these intermediary groups’ participation with our analytical model. There are two reasons to state about this. One reason is that membership to labor unions is only 12%, and membership to political party organizations is only 8% of the data. The second reason is that the decline of these intermediary groups created circumstances where even their members could not see collective interests as a self-explanatory consequence of the loss of reality of collective interests based on voters’ socio-economic status (Kornhauser 1959). Therefore, the reasoning that mass politics will not work because no differences will rise between members and non-members is too straightforward and incorrect.

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**Table 1. Descriptive statistics**

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S. D.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Poll</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>54.610</td>
<td>14.326</td>
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<td>Kunio Hiramatsu</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>12.917</td>
<td>2.412</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Female</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>14.858</td>
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<td>Employment Regular</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>3.816</td>
<td>1.070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment Non-regular</td>
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<td>4.230</td>
<td>0.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Self-employed</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.579</td>
<td>0.703</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>3.015</td>
<td>0.765</td>
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Note: N = 944.
3.3. **Path analysis**

I use the path analysis, a type of structure equation model (SEM) as an analytical method. Path analysis enables to make the complex causal structure between observed variables and its effects verifiable, therefore, this analytical method is thought to be appropriate to verify the hypotheses this paper focuses on\(^{(9)}\). And for the analysis, I use the software program M-plus 7.11, the estimator used is the robust weighted least-squares means and variance (WLSMV).

4. **Results**

The results of the analysis on the voting behavior for Toru Hashimoto in the Osaka mayoral election with the analytical model based on the theory of mass politics using the path analysis are shown in Figure 2\(^{(10)}\). The indices of this mode are acceptable, $CFI = 0.968$ and $RMSEA = 0.018$. Thus, the analytical model based on the theory of mass politics (Figure 1) is appropriate. The following paragraphs explain the results of the analysis in details.

Firstly, I look at the effect of voters’ socio-economic status. The effects of age and self-employment on social alienation are positive and statistically significant, and educational attainment and household income are also statistically significant but have negative effect. The

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\(^{(9)}\) The structure equation model (SEM) such as path analysis is mainly used to analyze continuous variables, but it is applied to analysis of a discrete variable (categorical data) (Muthén 1983). Using M-plus makes it possible to estimate by probit regression analysis (WLSMV) or logistic regression analysis (RML). The coefficient of determination in probit regression analysis such as Mckelvey and Zavoina $R^2$ (Mckelvey and Zavoina 1975) can also be worked out.

\(^{(10)}\) Through preliminary exploratory analysis, the next 2 points are confirmed. Firstly, multilevel logistic regression analysis (null model) is performed using the data of wards in Osaka city. From there, random effect of residual variance is not significant and the value of intra-class correlation (ICC) is extremely small, so I have confirmed that there is no regional difference. Secondly, by conducting the usual logistic regression analysis that factored voters’ socio-economic statuses into independent variables, the fact that voters’ socio-economic status (excluding age) is not directly correlated to the vote for Toru Hashimoto is confirmed.
higher the age, the self-employed individuals compared to regular employment, the lower educational attainment and household income tend to result in social alienation. Next, the effect on public opinions; as for on distrust in public officials, non-regular employment has positive effect and age, educational attainment and household income have negative effect, they both are statistically significant. This implies that the younger the age, non-regular employment compared to regular employment, and the lower educational attainment and household income tend to result in increasing distrustful in public officials. As for the public opinions on competitivism, although significant at the 10% level, household income has positive effect. In short, the higher household income is the more people are prone to competitivism.

Secondly, I look at the effect on social alienation. Social alienation is correlated with political alienation and public opinions that are distrust in public officials and competitivism, but its effect is different from that of on distrust in public officials and competitivism. To start off, the effect on social alienation is positive and voters who feel more socially alienated are prone to perceive themselves as politically alienated as well. This effect is statistically significant. The next effect on public opinions, as for distrust in public officials, social alienation has positive effect and as for competitivism it has negative effect. These effects are statistically significant. To combine them together, socially alienated voters tend to increase distrust in public officials however not likely to be competitivism.

Thirdly, I examine the effect on political alienation. Political alienation is correlated only with distrust in public officials among public opinions, which is positive and statistically significant. In other words, politically alienated voters are prone to distrust in public officials; however, this does not always mean that political alienation is prone to causing competitivism.

Fourthly, I look at the effect on public opinions that are distrust in public officials and competitivism. The effects that distrust in public officials and competitivism have on voting for Toru Hashimoto are positive, which both are statistically significant. In other words, those voters who are more distrustful in public officials or competitivism tend to vote for Toru Hashimoto.

Fifthly, looking at the indirect effect, the effect that voters’ socio-economic status have on vote for Toru Hashimoto is not only insignificant, but also extremely small in value, which proves that there is no correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and vote for Toru Hashimoto.

5. Conclusion and discussion

5.1. The case of Toru Hashimoto as mass politics

This paper examines the voting behavior in the 2011 Osaka mayoral election using an analytic model based on the theory of mass politics. The results indicate the validity of the analytic model and some significant findings have been revealed. Firstly, the characteristics of those who are prone to socially alienated are aged, self-employed, the lower educational attainment and
household income in terms of socio-economic status, this proves hypothesis A1 correct expect the effect of age and occupational status. Voters who are younger, non-regular employees and with lower educational attainment and household income are prone to distrustful in public officials, this finding proves hypothesis A2 correct. Also those who have high household income are prone to be competitivism, therefore hypothesis A3 is to be rejected. Next, voters who are socially alienated are prone to be politically alienated, distrustful in public officials, and not to be competitivism, therefore, these findings support both hypothesis B1 and B2, however not B3. Furthermore, politically alienated voters are to be distrustful in public officials, this supports hypothesis C1, but this is not correlated with being competitivism thus hypothesis C2 is to be rejected. Voters who are prone to distrust public officials and be competitivism are likely to vote for Toru Hashimoto, therefore both hypothesis D1 and D2 are supported. Lastly, looking at the facet of indirect effects, voters’ socio-economic status is not correlated with vote for Toru Hashimoto, this supports hypothesis A4.

The analysis results of this paper indicate that the case of Toru Hashimoto generated by two qualitatively different types of supporters. Socially and politically alienated voters vote for Hashimoto due to their distrust in public officials. On the contrary, voters who are not socially alienated vote for Toru Hashimoto due to competitivism. These results reveal that voters who voted for Toru Hashimoto due to their distrust in public officials can be said as manipulatable however it is not the same to those who voted for him due to competitivism which contradicts the theory of mass politics. In other words, if the original supporters for Toru Hashimoto are to be who are positive toward neo-liberalistic reformation, they also should not be socially alienated. This implies that in order to mobilize socially alienated voters who do not support neo-liberalistic reform, it was necessary for Toru Hashimoto to emphasize the distrust in public officials that often these socially alienated voters share, as a strategy. Uniforming to two public opinions, Toru Hashimoto obtained support from voters across various socio-economic status regardless of social cleavage. This phenomenon could be identified as modified mass politics that mobilized both accessible and non-accessible voters. This is considered to be the primarily factor for Toru Hashimoto’s electoral triumph in the 2011 Osaka mayoral election. Furthermore, from this result, it can be stated that the discourse of the press and mass media described above is completely wrong in a way that it misleads the correlation between voters’ socio-economic status, social alienation and competitivism also the correlation between voters’ socio-economic status and vote for Toru Hashimoto, though it shares little element with the theory of mass politics.

5.2. Mass politics during the post-1955 system

What do the findings of this paper imply about Japanese politics during the post-1955 system? In this section I firstly, address how those findings can be interpreted within the context of analysis on Japanese politics during the post-1955 system, and secondly, the vision on the analysis on Japanese politics during the post-1955 system.
Firstly, contributions of this paper is that it has presented the analytical model based on the theory of mass politics as a new framework explaining Japanese politics during post-1955 system from voters’ perspective using the case of Toru Hashimoto. The framework that explains Japanese politics during post-1955 system had not been developed enough so that only few case studies exist. In contrast to this, this paper presents a new perspective to analyze Japanese politics during post-1955 system and then verifies its validity. As previously pointed out, the characteristic of Japanese politics during post-1955 system is described as a new relationship between voters, public opinions and politicians, in other words, a cycle of expectation and disappointment. This paper presents the analytical perspective to explain cycle of expectation and disappointment, and this allows more studies to come along.

Secondly, the analytical model based on the theory of mass politics must be taken account when analyzing Japanese politics during the post-1955 system. In particular, more studies need to come along to verify the characteristics of voters and public opinions through various survey data and case studies. If Japanese politics during the post-1955 system is to be identified as an example of mass politics, greater focus on public opinions should be put than on pass politics itself. In this case, Here, it is important to include public opinions that both effective and non-effective for voting behavior, because although the period of the post-1955 system is the era that faces widening gaps (Tachibanaki 1998), and inequalities and redistribution are the main political issues, other factors determine the mass politics and its policies. Back in the period of the 1955 system, the reason why the correlation of voters’ socio-economic status with politics attracted a primarily interest in sociology was because politics was the issue of social stratification in relation to inequality and redistributions. Even in the post-1955 system, which is named as economically stratified society, its importance remains the same; however, it is also important to examine how public opinions on social welfare are to be formed under the mere situation that the correlation of voters with political parties or voting behavior is weaken. The more studies that share the same perspective are expected to come along in the future.

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