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Part III

HUSSERL AGAIN
ON DIALOGUE IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

1. Dialogue in Husserl's phenomenology

Husserl's phenomenology is often regarded as egological and solipsistic, so that his phenomenology of the Other is criticized as failed. However, this view is in my opinion superficial. Certainly he emphasized “solus ipse” (I, 121) and “a unique philosophical solitude” (VI, 187). In the first logical investigation of Logical Investigation at his phenomenological beginning he seemed to reduce his discussion about “Expression and Meaning” to the stage of “monologue” and never come back to discuss the stage of “dialogue” positively. Incidentally to add, Spiegelberg who had personal contact with Husserl reported as follows: “His (Husserl’s) thinking was fundamentally characterized as monologue even if he communicated only with intimate persons. ... He ordered his personal assistant Eugen Fink to play the role of opponent. Even in trial of ‘symphilosophizing’ he talked with himself” (The Phenomenological Movement).

On the other side, representative phenomenologists who followed Husserl's phenomenology were engaged with issues such as the other, communication, intersubjectivity and co-existence which they found as constitutive, transcendental and existential elements for subjectivity. Then also dialogue is expected not to be rejected simply by Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl, saying that “a transcendental solipsism is only a philosophical elementary step” (I, 69), wrote as follows: “The reduction to the transcendental ego have only an appearance of staying solipsistic studies, whereas it's consequent carrying-out leads to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity” (ibid.). Then it is anticipated that dialogue becomes important in the second step.
I would like to pay attention that Martin Buber who as the founder of philosophy of dialogue began to develop his philosophy of dialogue as a philosophical anthropology wrote in *Problems of Human Being* (1948) as follows: “The school and the method which generated the contemporary and most powerful trial to build a philosophical anthropology had its founder a German Jew, Edmund Husserl”. Buber, quoting sentences from Husserl’s *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* such as “Human being is essentially people in a generative and socially connected humanity”(VI, 13), wrote as follows: “In this sentence Husserl thinks that the essence of human being cannot be found in isolated individuum, because the connection between humanity, generation and society is essential for human being”. We can say that Buber named Husserl as a source of philosophy of dialogue.

I would like to add one more point, although it seems to be secondary, but we should not overlook his scientific correspondence, because it is expected that he had in them opportunities of dialogue with scholars of different fields. Through Göttingen and Freiburg period, by joining of Munich group, a lot of scholars and researchers such as psychologists, mathematicians, linguists, aesthetes, and so on gathered around Husserl. We can get a glimpse in the *Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Researches*, which he began to edit with Max Scheler, even if many collaborators left step by step and Husserl was isolated. When the continuation of publishing of this Yearbook after 11 volumes for 17 years became difficult because of political situation by Nazism and the dream with which Husserl trusted to this publication was going away, he wrote: “Philosophy is not a private matter, but according to its original meaning can be realized only within the working society of philosophers” (VI, 439). Even in his solitude after leaving of many collaborators and disappointment, he did not forget the dream of dialogue.

Lots of his correspondence with such scholars were published in ten volumes of *Husserliana Document “Correspondence”* in 1994. We are astonished how widely he had correspondence. The editor, Karl Schuhmann, by quoting Husserl’s words “Letters are a kind of visit”, wrote as follows: “Writing letters for Husserl was the second best means to exchange thoughts with his fellows. Letters were for him to understand each other with absent persons, in this sense an unsatisfied substitute for direct dialogue of true visit”. We can say that these correspondences were an important part
of his dialogue. The seed of dialogue which Husserl sowed with his corroboration and correspondence with scholars from other fields made a tradition of following phenomenological movement.

2. Dialogue between Husserl's phenomenology and psychology

Among other fields or disciplines with which Husserl made dialogue, we can say the most prominent one is of course psychology. He learned a lot of concepts from his contemporary psychology. It is famous that Husserl learned the central concept for his phenomenology “intentionality” from his teacher Franz Brentano’s work Psychology from a Empirical Standpoint. He learned the concept “fringe”, the important concept for his idea of horizon, from an American psychologist and later philosopher of pragmatism William James who studied with Stumpf in Halle, Husserl's senior colleague of Brentano’s school. From Stumpf’s idea of “origin of space representation” he learned the idea of “genetic” investigation. He learned the concept “Gestalt quality” from Ehrenfels which was one of sources of Gestalt psychology. From Thedor Lipps he learned the concept “empathy” as the most important one for experience of the other (Fremderfahrung). From Sigmund Freud he learned concepts as “unconsciousness”, “impulse (Trieb)” and “suppression”, from psychology of those days the concept of “Kinästhese (kinesis+aesthesis)”, and from Karl Bühler the concept of “crisis”. He adapted lots of concepts and ideas from psychology, however he used those not in their original meaning, but in his phenomenological framework.

Although Husserl called phenomenology a descriptive psychology at first, when he learned it from Brentano, he ceased to use it on the way and began to distinguish between phenomenology and psychology. He thought that psychology can solely give an access to phenomenology. He characterized his idea of phenomenological reduction which he described in Ideas I as “the Cartesian way”, whereas he tried to open different ways in the lecture The First Philosophy in 1923. One of them was “a way beyond psychology” which we can find in the lecture Phenomenological Psychology in 1925 and the Britanniica article. We can find the same “way beyond psychology” in Merleau-Ponty’s work Phenomenology of Perception. On this way Husserl thought there are two steps of reduction, namely the first step to “phenomenological (or pure)
psychology, then the second step to “transcendental phenomenology”, which we can find also in *The Crisis*. On the “way beyond psychology” we must travel around sufficiently in phenomenological psychology and need a dialogue with psychology indispensably. But it is only the first step which would lead us to transcendental phenomenology. As other ways to phenomenology he thought of “a way beyond ontology (regional ontology)” in *Ideas II*, of “a way beyond logics (or formal ontology)” in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, of “a way beyond life-world (or ontology of life-world)” in *The Crisis*. In each ways he was thinking about dialogues with different sciences.

3. Dialogue between Husserl’s phenomenology and psychiatry

In the history of psychiatry or psychopathology there is a tendency which was influenced by phenomenology of Husserl or Daseinsanalyse (analysis of human being) of Heidegger and called phenomenological or anthropological psychiatry. Today I cannot follow the train thought from Jaspers, Binswanger, Minkowski, von Gebsattel, Strauss, Telenbach, Medart Boss, Frankl, Blankenburg and so on. As influence by Husserl we can find describing purely, intuition of essence, intentionality, transcendentality and life-world, whereas by influence by Heidegger we can find Daseinsanalyse or existential analysis, all of which we can characterize as application of phenomenological philosophy. Spiegelberg wrote as follows: “Phenomenology as philosophy made a strong influence on fields of psychology and psychiatry”. But it was one-way influence.

Although Husserl read lots of books and periodicals in psychiatry, as far as we can tell by examining the texts in the Husserl Archive of Leuven, it seems that he didn’t come to introduce any dialogue with psychiatry into his phenomenology. He paid attention to Jaspers’ *General Psychopathology* published in the same year of *Ideas I* and to his article “Phenomenological research tendency in psychopathology” published in the previous year. Husserl evaluated both works of Jaspers, however Jaspers was interested in Husserl’s assistant, namely Martin Heidegger, but not in Husserl himself. Husserl lost his communication with Japers. In 1922 Ludwig Binswanger, a Swiss psychiatrist, read a paper titeled “On phenomenology” and in the
next year visited Husserl to discuss. It is not clear how far the discussion influenced Husserl. We can suppose that from Binswanger, who was originally interested in Freud’s psychoanalysis and then changed his interest to Husserl’s phenomenology, Husserl heard about psychoanalysis, because we can find some terms from psychoanalysis in his *Analysis of passive synthesis* written in 1930s. In the same book there is a passage which we suppose was written by imaging the world of a patient with schizophrenia. However it is what we can call only a trace, further we can not find any dialogue between phenomenology and psychiatry.

Nevertheless, if Husserl continued his investigations into psychiatry or with psychiatrists, we can expect that he would deepen a dialogue with psychiatry and learn much also from psychiatry and think about a way beyond psychiatry to transcendental phenomenology. It seems me that psychiatry could shed light from behind on the transcendental which Husserl’s phenomenology was seeking, what Blankenburg tried later.

Contemporary German psychiatrist or psychopathologist Blankenburg tried to connect “the phenomenological” and “the clinical” at the beginning of *Loss of Self-Evidence — Phenomenology of Schizophrenia* (1971), and seeked a possibility “to promote studies of essence and studies of facts each other”. Also contemporary French psychiatrist or psychopathologist Tatotian wrote at the beginning of *Phenomenology of Psychosis* (1979) as follows: “Although psychiatrists often think that psychiatry is an application of results of phenomenological philosophy to psychiatry, both are inwardly intertwined with each other”, or in other words, following Husserl, “the transcendental appears in the empirical”, or following Heidegger, “the ontological appears in the ontic”. They are now looking at a possibility of dialogue between psychiatry and phenomenological philosophy. What we need is no relationship in which one teaches and another learns, but relationship in which each learns from each other. What lacks on the side of phenomenological philosophers it to listen to the voice of psychiatry and others? In order to find and discuss the transcendental and the ontological, we need to travel around the empirical and the ontic. Listening to others, from there an authentic dialogue should begin.

In Japan there was an influential stream of phenomenological psychiatry or psychopathology in the last half of 20th century. The representative psychiatrist was Bin Kimura, who studied phenomenological psychopathology in Germany, developed
such tendency and built a big group of such tendency in Japan. However especially after world war II the influence from United State became very strong also in the field of psychiatry. This stream of psychiatry was of biological character and emphasized evidence-based research of brain imaging, chromosome, epidemiology and pharmaceutical treatment. At the end of 20th century this biological tendency won already the phenomenological tendency at least on the scientific community.

Both tendencies seem to be opposed by the following characterization: the biological evidence-based psychiatry explains the medical condition of patients from a diagnostic and statistic manual of mental disorders (DSM of APA: American Psychiatric Association), so to say, from the outside; the phenomenological psychiatry approaches to or understand the lived experience of patients with clues of phenomenological concepts borrowed or applied from phenomenological philosophy such as Husserl or Heidegger, so to say. However it is questionable which of both can give a better therapy for patients. If we look at the present-day situation at least in Japan as follows, both seem to achieve no magnificent results in past decades.

4. Present-day situation of mental health care in Japan

The figure of beds in mental hospitals in Japan lies nowadays on the top of the world after it grew up since 1960s. It doesn’t mean that there is a lot of people with mental illness who need to be hospitalized, but that even healed patients could not be discharged so easily and stayed there unnecessarily. It is a totally opposite tendency in comparison with European countries where the figure of beds in mental hospitals or institutions has been declined since 1970s.

Since 2004, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare launched a reform plan of mental health welfare “From hospital-centered care to regional-life-centered care”. However, there are lots of patients with mental disorders who were hospitalized for long time and cannot leave hospitals, because they have neither house to be back, nor place to work and nobody to understand them. Even five years later, when the Ministry announced a further reform, it turned out that the reform had not a progress and that there are yet 70,000 of so-called “socially hospitalized patients” who could be discharged originally and some of them stayed
hospitalized for about more than 50 years. It is the present-day situation that so
much patients with mental disorders, for instance schizophrenia, are discharged, so
much patients with dementia are hospitalized.

There are some movements within hospitals to discharge patients with mental
disorders and bring back to each region, but they are only sporadic. We can find only
a few hospitals which began such a movement since 1960s. Since 2008 the ACT
(Assertive Community Treatment), a totally regional support program for persons
with mental disorders, was imported from United States and began their activities
already in 19 centers all parts of the country. However, there is also a reason for why
it is so difficult to decline the figure of beds of mental hospitals, namely that most of
them are not public, but private. This is also the reason why such activity is not
spread nationwide, but stays sporadic.

In the next section, I would like to pay attention to a reflexion within psychiatry
which is expected to change such a situation although as an idea, it is in its infancy.

5. Reflexion within Psychiatry

Already in 1960s Italia there began another tendency in psychiatry. A reform of
mental health began with Italian psychiatrist Franco Bazaglia (1924-1980). At first
Bazaglia studied at first phenomenological psychopathology, he was interested in
Husserl and Heidegger, and was attracted by Sartre’s existentialism. In his bookshelf
there were books of Jaspers, Minkowski, Binswanger, Bleurer and Merleau-Ponty. In
his idea of phenomenology there was a tendency to “go beyond subjective lived
experience and go to an interactive relationship generated from reciprocal
stimulation”, which was called “phenomenology of encounter”. According to him an
encounter is “a dimension of prereflective ‘we’ prior to ‘I’ and ‘You’”. Then he learned
about a group mental therapy technique known as a “treatment community” in
Scotland, began to raise a movement to shut down hospitals and institutions for
people with mental disorders in order that these people can live in normal house and
normal community by “deinstitutionalization”. Bazaglia insisted that pharmaceutical
treatments should be reduced and people with mental disorders should have human
rights to decide about them by themselves. In order for them to live and work together,
Bazaglia introduced “assemblia” (meeting) as a field of group discussion into a mental hospital. From such a background he came to insist: it is just the “institution” that “prevents doctor and patient from such an encounter”. It brought him to grasp a prison and a mental hospital as a similar “institution” and to criticize it, and encourage a process of “deinstitutionalization”. Then he began to build a “gruppo famiglia” (group family) as regional mental health medicine.

In almost the same time, without any direct relationship, a similar movement began at Urakawa town in Hokkaido, northern island of Japan, namely “Bethel’s House”. At the beginning some patients with mental disorders discharged from Urakawa Redcross Hospital began to live at a Urakawa Christian church. There came a social worker, Mukaiyachi, in order to help them live together. The group grew step by step bigger. And a psychiatrist, Dr. Kawamura, who came to the Urakara Redcross Hospital began to support them. The group became a treatment and living community. They have some leading ideas, one of which is: “A meeting is much more important than eating food three times everyday.” It reminds us Bazaglia’s idea of “assemblea”. The psychiatrist Kawamura and the social worker Mukaiyachi intended to reduce medicaments and also the authority of psychiatry. With their supports people with mental disorders began to name their illness with their own vocabularies and to research themselves by themselves. It made the living community at the same time a research community. Mukaiyachi remembers that he learned the starting motto of “Bethel’s House” from phenomenology, namely, “By myself and together!”. Certainly this motto reflects the essence of phenomenology that we should begin with a first person perspective, but go further through exchange of each perspective, and built a phenomenological research community.

6. Closing words

At closing words I would like to mention a new movement of mental health from Finland which is introduced recently in Japan and which we can find a sympathizing idea of “assemblea”. It is called “Open Dialogue” which you know well I suppose. This method is practically inherited as one method to treatment intervention for patients with schizophrenia, centered in family therapists of Keropudas Hospital in Tornio,
west Lappland Finland since 1980s. A team of experts should visit clients in critical situation of acute stage within 24 hours after request and open a dialogue everyday among patients, family and relatives until the situation would improve. This method doesn’t use any medicament, but heal only through conversations. They discuss with all together a method of treatment, a possible pharmaceutical treatment and the pros and cons of hospitalization. They must not decide anything without the person concerned: it is the rule. In an ambiguous situation just a dialogue gives us a hope and a clue to get out of labyrinth.

These cases of “assemblea” in Italia, “Bethel’s House” in Japan and “Open Dialogue” in Finland we can find that people practices even against the common knowledge of mental medicine in order that the person concerned can recover talking. In every case we can find a reconsideration of the roll of dialogue in the mental health medicine. By criticizing the situation that only psychiatrists have authority to access to patients, not only against biological psychiatry which professes evident-based objectivity, but also against phenomenological psychiatry which professes originally the first-person perspective, there is now a tendency to reconsider a dialogue among related persons in psychiatry.
ON DIS/ABILITY IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Introduction

Since publishing my dissertation entitled *Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* in 1995 (Sobunsha, Tokyo), I have been engaged in dealing with the issues regarding “Caring” as a concrete field of intersubjectivity, especially after I began to teach the “Clinical Philosophy” seminar at Osaka University, Japan. From such a background I shall re-read Husserl’s phenomenology and suggest how we can develop a phenomenology of Dis/Ability and Ab/Normality based on it. I intend to neither stay rigidly within the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, nor go far beyond it. I’ll examine carefully the possibility of Husserl’s phenomenology on these problems.

1. “I live”

In his “Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook” of *Ideas Vol.1*(1912) Husserl described his idea of “natural attitude” by using the Cartesian word “cogito”, but immediately re-defined it as “the fundamental form of all ‘wakeful (actual)’ living”(III, 59) and, instead of “ego sum, ego cogito” he wrote “I am, this life is, I live: cogito”(III, 97) and called it “the flowing life”(ibid.). However, what does “living” and “life” mean in this context? What did he mean with these words? Usually we would answer, living means breathing, eating, drinking, discharging, sitting, walking, etc. These actions are related to physical sides of living and can’t happen without my body. Living means further feeling, willing, thinking, remembering, expecting, etc.
These actions are related to mental sides of living. We might also say that living means talking to others, listening to others, discussing with others, playing something with others, etc. These actions have a physical and mental relationship to others.

Whereas bodily actions are performed in space and time, mental actions are performed mainly only in time. Life has not only spatial aspects in the expanse, but also temporal aspects in the flowing. Husserl understood the term “cogito” in a wider sense than Descartes did, and Husserl did not develop a body-mind dualism from the “cogito” by seeing the “cogito” only as a mental aspect in “cogito”. Rather, Husserl saw the “cogito” as offering a notion of “life”. When he talked about “intentionality” as the fundamental idea of phenomenology, he used often the word “consciousness”, as follows: “We understand under intentionality the peculiarity of lived experience (Erlebnis) to be ‘consciousness of something’” (III, 188). However later, e.g. in his manuscript for To The Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity (1920, XIII, 71 et passim) or in his lecture The First Philosophy (1923, VIII, 120 et passim), he paraphrased it with the coinage “consciousness-life” (Bewußtseinsleben). Thus he had a tendency to use the word “life” or “living” instead of “thinking” for “cogito”.

2. “Actuality and potentiality”

What does Husserl’s usage of phrases like “all ‘wakeful (actual)’ living” instead of “cogito” mean? Husserl thought that “cogito” in a narrow sense is performed in “actuality”, but “cogito” in a wider sense includes “inactuality (potentiality)” as well. He wrote: “Cogito means ‘I perform an act of consciousness.’ In order to keep this fixed concept we reserve the Cartesian expression of cogito.” (III, 73) Cogito in a narrow sense means for him, only such a performative act in actuality, but doesn’t cover all lived experience or consciousness-life in actuality as well as potentiality. So, he wrote: “The actual lived experiences are surrounded by a ‘garden(Hof)’ of inactual lived experiences. The stream of lived experiences can’t composed only of actuality.” (ibid.) In this context he introduced the important words such as “garden”, “background” and “horizon”.

Husserl wrote: “The actually perceived, the more or less clear present together, is partly accepted and partly surrounded by a darkly being conscious horizon of
undefined reality. ... The undefined surroundings are infinite. There is necessarily a 
hazy and never fully defined horizon.”(III, 57) Or, in other words including an example: 
“The grasping is a grasping out, each perceived thing has a background of experience. 
Around the paper there are books, pencils, inkpot, etc. in a certain sense of ‘perceived’ 
there in the field of intuitions.”(III, 71) The fundamental concept of intentionality is 
now understood in a wider sense, and such understanding includes the concepts of 
actuality and potentiality as well. Therefore Husserl wrote: “Even if the intentionality 
is not ‘performed’ in the special modality of actuality, it can be already ‘stirred’ in 
the ‘background’ without being performed.”(III, 189) Later he called it 
“horizon-intentionality”(XVII, 207).

From his lecture Thing and Space (1905), seven years earlier than Ideas Vol.1 (1912), I would like add some passages regarding the theme of “horizon”: “The thing 
has more than the perceived or appearing front side in the sense of perception. ... 
Original appearance and unoriginal appearance are not separated, but united in the 
appearance in the wider sense.” (XVI, 50) “To the appearance it belongs that the 
visible refers to the invisible.”(XVI, 245) However, how is the perception of the 
“horizon” in potentiality possible? Take this example: there is a house in front of me. I 
am looking at the front of the house and from here I can see neither the side nor the 
back of it. But if I can go around, I can see both. This example brings us to the problem 
of “I as lived body (Ichleib)”(XVI, 10, et passim). There are two relevant and important 
points which he developed in this lecture: On the one hand: “Perception of things is 
perception of what is grasped out from the background.” This is the point I have just 
mentioned in Ideas Vol.1. On the other hand: “Perception has a relationship to my 
lived body (Ichleib).” (“Ego-Body” in translation by Rojcewicz; but in original German 
word “Ichleib”)(XVI, 10) Now I would like to go onto the second point: my lived body.

3. “My lived body (Ichleib)”

In the lecture Thing and Space, Husserl developed the idea of “my lived body” as 
follows: “A perceived thing is not alone for itself, but stands before eyes midst a certain 
intuitive circumstance of things. For instance the lamp stands on the table midst 
books, papers and other things. The physical circumstances are similarly perceived. ...
My lived body (Ichleib) belongs to these things which are perceived together." (XVI, 80) Everything around me is relate to my body. “It [The lived body] stands there as the always staying point of relationship. ... It defines right and left, front and back, above and below. It takes a special position in the perceived world of things."(ibid.)

Husserl emphasized the peculiarity of my lived body among other things around me. “On the one hand the lived body is a thing as well, a physical thing as other things. ... It is a thing midst other things. On the other hand this thing is just lived body, bearer of I. ... The constitution of physical things is intertwined with the constitution of my lived body (Ichleib) in a strange correlation.”(XVI, 162) Because my lived body takes a special position and is located in a special place (here), a thing lying far away can be seen only as a small thing in a distance and only in one side. If I can approach to it and go around it, I am able to see it in details and with multiple sides, and in some case look into it, touch it and analyze it, and then I see what the thing originally is. (cf. XVI, 115f.)

In order to see a thing in details, “the thing must be turned or pushed, or I must move me, my eyes, my lived body, go around it, approach it and go off.”(XVI, 155) My lived body is not a simple thing among other things, but is an “organ” with which I can see, hear, feel, smell, go and move. It is an organ of my perception. “The eyes can move, the head, the upper body, etc, as well. ... Important is the “moving itself”, which is expressed in the kinesthetical senses.”(XVI, 158) The term “kinesthese” was also an important coinage composed of “kinesis(movement)” and “aesthesis (sense)” which Husserl borrowed from the contemporary psychology and changed it into a phenomenological concept. That is, so to speak, no senses I feel at things, but senses I feel with my moving my own lived body.

He wrote: “The touching hand ‘seems’ as having sense of touch. Directed to the touched object smoothness or roughness seems as belonging to it. I look after the touching hand, it has the sense of smoothness of roughness, and it has them at the appearing fingertips. ... If I touch the right hand with the left hand, the appearance of the left and right hand constitutes itself alternately with senses of touch and kinesthese, the one moving on another.”(XVI, 162) He continued: “Here is important that the constitution of physical things is intertwined with the constitution of my lived body (Ichleib) in the strange way.”(XVI, ibid.)

Husserl developed the idea of “lived body” further about ten years later in the
manuscript of Ideas Vol.2. “The lived body (Leib) is the medium of all perceptions and the organ of perception. It is necessarily present in all perceptions.”(IV, 56) The lived body is no dead body or thing, but the living body which is functioning in the center of my perception. “The lived body becomes the bearer of the point of orientation, the zero point, and of here and now, from which the pure I gets intuitions of the space and the whole world of sense. Therefore each appearing thing has in itself a relation of orientation to the lived body, and not only the really appearing thing but also each thing which can appear.”(Ibid.) “I have all things oppositely, they are ‘there’ — with a sole exception of the lived body which is always ‘here’.”(IV, 159)

My lived body stays in the center of my perception, even if I move with it. Husserl wrote: “Whereas I have against every other things the freedom to change my stand point to them voluntarily, I have no possibility to remove me from my lived body. Therefore, the variety of possibilities as to how the lived body may appear is limited. I can see only the certain parts of the body in a special shortening of perspective and the other parts (e.g. the head) are unseen at all for me. The same body which serves me as medium of all perceptions stands me on my way of perception and is a strangely imperfectly constituted thing.”(IV, 159)

Merleau-Ponty, who read Husserl’s manuscript of Ideas Vol.2 at the Husserl Archive in Leuven quoted in his Phenomenology of Perception as follows: “I have appearance of touch by touching the left hand. Namely I don’t only feel, but perceive and have appearance of a soft and such and such formed smooth hand. ... But by touching the left hand, I find there a series of senses of touch which are localized there. ... If I speak of physical thing ‘left hand’, I ignore these senses. ... If I add them to it, the physical thing doesn’t get rich, but it becomes a lived body, it senses.”(IV, 145) A lived body is not only an object as a thing similar to other things in surroundings, but also a medium with which I can sense and move, further a living body, i.e. a subject which senses and moves.

4. “I can”

In connection with the idea of “lived body (Leib)”, Husserl often used also “I can (Ich kann)”. E.g. in Ideas Vol.2: “The subject has ‘ability(Vermögen)’(I can) to move the
lived body freely and to perceive the outer world through it.” (IV, 152) In the paragraph 59 titled with “The I as subject of ability (Vermögen),” Husserl wrote: “The I as unity is a system of ‘I can’. There it is to distinguish between the physical and the physical mediated ‘I can’ and the mental ‘I can’. I have an ability on my body, am the one who moves and can move this hand. I can play piano.” (IV, 253f.) Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean that I can always do so, but sometimes I can’t do it. He continued: “But it doesn’t work always. I forgot playing it again and am out of practice. I learn my body. ... But if I am ill for long time, I must learn going and come into it soon. But if I am mentally ill (nervenkrank), I lost control of parts of my body. ‘I can’t’. In this sense I became an other.” (ibid.)

In this context Husserl discussed many issues regarding “ability” also in relationship to actuality and potentiality, as follows: “The mental I can be grasped as an organism of ability (Vermögen) with its development in a normal typical style, namely with steps of children, youth, ripeness and elderly. The subject ‘can’ be various and is defined according to its ability through stimulus and actual motive to do. It is always active according to its ability and changes, gets rich, strong or weak always through its activity. The ability is no empty ‘can’, but a positive potentiality which comes into actuality and is always ready to go to activity.” (IV, 254f.) I am not always able to do something and I change from potentiality to actuality and vice versa, and change from inability to ability vice versa.

Husserl continued: “At last everything is sent back to primary ability (Urvermögen) of subject and then to acquired ability, sprung from the earlier actuality of life. The I as a person constitutes itself in the original genesis not only as impulsively defined personality, from the beginning and always impulsed by original ‘instincts’ and following them, but also as higher, autonomous, free active, especially lead by motive of reason.” (IV, 255) Husserl initiated here the idea of a genetic phenomenology which he developed later.

Husserl characterized “able / capable” as a practical possibility and said: “What I can, am able to, am capable for, what stands for me consciously, is a practical possibility.” (IV, 258) Then he continued: “In the experience the ‘I can’ and “I can’t” are distinguished according to it’s phenomenological character. There is an action without opposition or a consciousness of ability without opposition, and an action with overcoming of opposition. ... There is a degree of opposition and power of overcoming.
The opposition can be irresistible. Then we are pushed to ‘it doesn’t work’, ‘I can’t’, ‘I don’t have the power’.(IV, 258f.) Husserl mentioned here our today’s theme of “ability and inability or disability” which I have according to the situation.

5. “Capability” (Vermöglichkeit)

In this context Husserl discussed “can” and “ability” in various passages, e.g.:
“All my ‘can’ (Können) in the physical sphere is mediated by my ‘bodily activity (Leibesbetätigung)’ and by my physical ‘can’ (leibliches Können) and ability (Vermögen).” (IV, 259) However, I’m not always able to do something, or sometimes am unable or disable to do a certain thing, e.g. as follows: “My hand falls asleep. — now I can’t move it, it is benumbed temporarily. ...The hand puts aside something that stands on the way, ‘it works’. Sometimes it works ‘with difficulty’, ‘with less difficulty’, ‘without resistance” and it doesn’t work sometimes. The opposition is unovercoming in spite of all endeavours.” (ibid.) Then he concluded as follows: “It is of importance to bring out the contrast between the possibility in the sense of mere ‘logical’ possibility and the practical possibility of ‘can’ (Können) with examples.” (IV, 261)

Husserl mentioned later, e.g. in The Crisis of European Sciences (1938) (VI, 164 et passim), this practical possibility of the “can” or possibility based on ability with his coinage “Vermöglichkeit”. This is a compound word composed of “be able to (Vermögen) and possibility (Möglichkeit) and I would like to translate it with the English word “capability”. If I can make a bridge between the idea of the “lived body”, “horizon”, “potentiality” and “capability”, I would say, inactuality of horizon means potentiality and possibility, e.g. “I can go further”. It is no empty logical possibility, but the “capability” (Vermöglichkeit) motivated by “I can go” with my kinesthetic lived body. The horizon is thus a “playing space” (Spielraum) of the possible and physical experience. It has a relationship to “my lived body (Ichleib)” as the “zero point” of orientation and perspective.

It means, however, that the horizon is not only opened by capability, but also is limited by or depends on my capability of e.g. “I can go”. If I could add the above mentioned genetic phenomenology to this point, I would say that this horizon has diversity according to the steps of my development from childhood, youth to elderly
and my conditions as healthy, sick, fatigue, awake or asleep. And each of us human beings has a different ability or disability, a different way of going, seeing, hearing and smelling. We all have different horizons, and how they differ depends on our own dis/ability.

6. “Normality and abnormality”

In this context, Husserl sometimes mentioned the dichotomy of the “normal / abnormal”, and “normality and abnormality” which he used in his posthumous manuscripts To Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity (XIII-XV). We should examine this dichotomy carefully, because he introduced it in order not to discriminate, but to develop his genetic phenomenology. He wrote: “Abnormality is a modification of normality, stands out from it, and comes to it. ... Each subject has his normality within which abnormality emerges as a certain style of disturbing”(XV, 154) He continued: “Normality has various forms and steps which belong to the constitution of human beings where he or she ‘becomes’ him- or herself and from child to normal ripe man or woman.”(ibid.) “Child” could be characterized as abnormal only in contrast to ripe normal adult. Abnormality is a relative concept which can be defined in contrast to normality.

Abnormality as well as normality has various steps. Husserl wrote: “The steps of normality and abnormality correspond to the steps of constitution of beings. The world constituted in the normality is constituted as world including the abnormality. ... Each normal subject has occasionally abnormal deviations from his normal experience.”(XV, 155) As examples of abnormality Husserl sometimes uses the terms “children”, “crazy”, “disease”, “sleep”, “loss of consciousness” and “animals”. He introduced these examples not in the sense of discrimination, as something apart from normality, but as various “modifications”, “steps”, “changes” of normality. We ourselves could be developed from such abnormality and could fall into such abnormality.

Therefore, Husserl introduced the genetic method which he called “Abbau”(XV, 133) and could be translated with the English word “deconstruction”. According to this method, by imagining a step where some dimension of the normal constitution
which the world lacks, we can imagine the world of above mentioned abnormality such as “crazy”, “disease”, “sleep”, “loss of consciousness”, etc. This is so to speak, a method to understand abnormality as a modification of normality. Husserl understood the dichotomy of normality and abnormality rather in relativity. He wrote: “Abnormal people are only abnormal regarding to a definite layer of characteristics of normal common world, whereas they have experience otherwise in total harmony with normal people and are normal in other points.”(XV, 158)

We could understand this relativity of normality and abnormality from the point of view of ability and disability. Normality is characterized by ability by which someone is able to do something as normal people, whereas abnormality is characterized by disability by which someone is disabled, and that disability prevents them from doing something as normal people. If I fall in the situation of abnormality, I’m not able to do what I was able to do in my normality. Husserl wrote in a text: “I become somehow sick. From the inner side I have a lived experience as abnormal. Because of continuing of bad feelings I get consciousness of weakness such as disability for moving in a normal way, performing my familiar ability and gathering my thoughts. I feel the disappearance of my consciousness.”(XLII, 2) In my abnormal situation of sickness I lost my ability I have in normal situation.

My ability could open my horizon and “life-world” as “a horizon of horizons”, whereas my lost of ability namely my disability could limit my “life-world”. The extent of my “life-world” depends on my ability and disability. Husserl mentioned “adult” and “children”, as another example for normality and abnormality. This should be understood in terms of development and the genetic phenomenology. Genetic phenomenology should cover not only issues of development and genesis, i.e. how we get ability and normality, but also issues of ageing and losing them, i.e. how we lose ability and normality and fall into disability and abnormality, what we could call a de-genetic phenomenology or a phenomenology of decline1. And what is interesting for me is that Husserl introduced the issues of “birth and death”(XV, 138 et passim) in this context, namely as an extreme pole of abnormality. He characterized both extreme

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1 We can find examples of such a de-genetic phenomenology in the following works: Simone de Beauvoir: *La Vieillesse*, Gallimard, 1970; Lisa Folkmarson Käll: “No Simple Loss: Selfhood in Age Related Dementias”, read at the Osaka University, 28. February 2014, Japanese translation of which was published in the *Journal Clinical Philosophy*, No.16, 31. March 2015.
cases as “problems of border” (cf. XLII) with which the phenomenological method can’t cope well.

Husserl asked himself: “Now it is important to set world, birth and death seriously in the essential relationship and to show how far they are not only a fact and how far a world and humans without death is unthinkable.” (XV, 172) I myself am also interested in the issues of “ageing and death” because Husserl wrote: “Also I myself will die — like I was once born, developed into adulthood and got old. But the question is, what this means.” (XXIX, 332) I myself have been interested in the issues of “birth, ageing, disease and death” in Buddhist ideas. In his late manuscript (1930/31), Husserl himself used terms “birth, ageing, disease, death” (XV, 168). However, these themes would go beyond today’s theme and should be discussed in another chance.

**Closing words: Intersubjectivity of dis/ability**

In ending this talk I would like to mention the theme of intersubjectivity of dis/ability in Husserl’s phenomenology. As said previously, he discussed normality and abnormality in relativity, namely we can talk about normal and abnormal only in relationship to each other. Then we should discuss the contrast between ability and disability in relationship to each other as well. Dis/ability is not a characteristic which individuals possess by him- or herself without any relationship to each other. I’ve tried to translate Husserl’s coinage “Vermöglichkeit”, i.e. possibilities based on ability with “capability”. Also this concept should be understood not as something belonging to individuals, but something characteristic of relationships or circumstances where individuals are living. Although we can’t find in my opinion so much passages leading to this thought in Husserl’s text, it is important and remarkable that he discussed issues of dis/ability in the context of phenomenology of intersubjectivity.
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Chapter 20

TO LIVE TOGETHER WITH OTHERS
— FROM HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY —

1. Introduction

In the U.S. the presidential candidate Mr. Donald John Trump insists that a huge wall against Hispanics from Mexico should be built and the frontier should be guarded against Islamic refugees from the Middle and Near East, with the motto “America, First!”. He is supported by those who hope to prevent foreigners and others minority to groups from livin in America. Also, a referendum in the U.K. was held in June of this year, and British citizens voted in favor of the U.K. to leave the European Union, an event commonly reffered to as “Brexit”. One of reasons why people voted for “Brexit” was an antipathy against a growing numbers of Islamic refugees and migration to Britain in general. After the vote, attacks on non-British people were reported in the media. Similar tendencies are to be found in other European countries including Germany and France. It seems me that people in the western world are losing sight of how we can live together with others, and especially “foreign others”. When I began to research Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the 1990’s, about 28 years ago, I had a similar impression when I was confronted with the situation after the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as other East European socialistic countries, a concern worse by splitting of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
2. Husserl as founder of philosophy on others

At the turning point of 19th century to 20th century, from the modern period to the contemporary period, the first philosopher who regarded “others” as one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and wrestled with it for the first time in the history of European philosophy was the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. It is not accidental that many philosophers who were respectively influenced by him and took over the spirit of phenomenology differently, e.g. Heidegger, Levinas, Schutz, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, even if they used the term “phenomenology” or not, they engaged with the problem of “others” more or less in their own ways, offering different perspectives. Because in so far as they turn their eyes towards the idea of “phenomenon”, they cannot help ask “for whom” it appears and ask about the difference or the sameness between the “phenomenon” appearing “for me” and appearing “for the other”. In this sense, phenomenology cannot help but include the problem of the “other” as one of its essential concerns from the beginning. This is just the key of solving the following enigma: Why the philosophers who were influenced by Husserl, despite taking different directions, nonetheless kept the problem of “others” as central to their work.

Another interesting point was that those philosophers took over the problem of “others” from Husserl, but developed their own theory of “others” by criticizing Husserl’s theory of “others” from their own points of view respectively. Although they took over Husserl’s spirit regarding it as a fundamental problem of philosophy, all who engaged with Husserl’s ideas were not satisfied with his theory of “others”. However, Husserl himself was not entirely satisfied with the theory he himself developed, and this is evidenced by the following example.

The fifth meditation of Cartesian Meditations written based on the speeches in Paris and Strasbourg 1928 of his later years is well known as Husserl’s theory of “others”. This work was first published 1931 in a French translation (partly worked on by the young Levinas). What he added to the manuscript of speech with almost the same amount as the original one at the publication was the fifth meditation in question. Cartesian Meditations was almost a patchwork of manuscripts that was gathered quickly from notes he had written until then, and was by no means a systematically controlled work. Although Husserl afterwards intended to revise it to
a precise German version, he had other plans for publication in those days. The plan of revision was not realized in his life, and the original German version *Cartesianische Meditationen* was published in 1950 as the first volume of the *Husserliana*, the complete works of Husserl, based on the efforts of the Husserl Archive later.

The theory of “others” in the fifth meditation of the *Cartesianian Meditations* is nothing but the tip of an iceberg, works that he saved through his wrestling with the problem, and there remain lengthy manuscripts several times more than the published one about the problem of “others”. They were published as *Towards Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*, the 13th to the 15th volume of *Husserliana* 1973. They are composed of massive drafts that began in 1905 when he had just thought of the “phenomenological reduction” and continued for 30 years to 1935 just before his death. They covered almost all periods when he faced philosophy and were entwined with every problem he coped with. Although there are some manuscripts for his lectures among them, most are “working manuscripts” and were not offered for publication. They were not expression of a finished thought, but a document of his thinking processes in a “state of being born”, in his unique style of writing by thinking with the stenography called “Garbersberger”. What must be emphasized here is that almost all of this work by Husserl in these three volumes are remained unknown to the philosophers I mentioned above, and so many of Husserl’s philosophical successors were simply unaware of the ideas contained within these volumes. Those who attempt to wrestle with Husserl’s theory of “others” must not get along not only with *Cartesian Meditations*, but work with the three volumes of *Towards Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*.

### 3. Problematics of “Intersubjectivity”

Problematics of “Intersubjectivity”, Husserl named as a title of all the problems of “others”, are on the one hand a inquiry into the relationship “between subject and subject”, but on the other a problem of the relationship “between subject and object”, namely a thought that the world in itself is no object apart from the subject, but is constituted “intersubjectively”. Husserl investigated the theory of “others” just in such a context. This characterizes Husserl’s theory of “others” and it is decisive
because it is not impossible to understand it without this context. What does it mean?

What is the nature of “others”? Normally I don’t call my family members like my wife, children, parents, siblings “others”. But in the sense of “physically separated” we can call even the most intimate family members, everybody except myself, “others”. Moreover there is another usage of this term according to which we call “other” or “different” or “foreign” people “others”. For instance women are “others” for men, children are “others” for adults, elderly are “others” for minors, foreigners are “others” for nationals, and vice versa. To widen the example, students are “others” for teachers, patients are “others” for doctors, cared for persons are “others” for caregivers, disabled persons are “others” for persons without disabilities, and vice versa. In this sense, men or women are not “others” for each other, adults or children are not “others” for each other. We don’t draw a line between “I” and “others”, but between “we” as a group in various senses and “others” as a different group. Also, the concept of “others” doesn’t presuppose that “others” are human beings. After all, all animals are “others” for humans, if we take animals as subjects, humans are “others” e.g. for a wild bear, dogs are “others” for monkeys.

If we return to human beings, in everyday life, we make contact with “others”. When we greet them unintentionally, talk about work or study, go together somewhere and do something together, we know they are “others”, but never think about them as “others”. There is no space for using the term “others” in everyday life. But once something happens that changes the situation, the “other” to whom I have some kind of relation, changes suddenly to the foreign, estranged and unfamiliar — “other”, a person who is thinking something I don’t understand. Suddenly, persons around me become foreigners for me or I myself become a foreigner for them. They appear suddenly as “others”. Imagine e.g. when I fall in depression, into dementia or when I’m informed that I do not have long to live because of cancer. The term “others” comes to be used in everyday life suddenly, and in the introduction of “others” disrupts our way of thinking and acting in the world. Thus we can say, against “others” as the fact of affairs the term “others” brings an unusual thing which we didn’t have in our daily life. Here I would like to call problems emerging from usual “others” to unusual “others” as the theory of “others”.

If we look back over history of philosophy, the European modern philosophy which René Descartes opened with the thought “Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I
am)” was fundamentally a philosophy which intended to make “I” or “subject” the starting point, where the theory of “others” was not considered as a philosophical problem. Descartes thought “Good sense (Reason) is given to everybody innately”, “The certainty of sum(I am)” is applied to everybody who can “think”. He never imagined that “you think” or “he or she thinks” is not certain, but doubtful, whereas “I think” is certain and undoubted. What we can say about “me” we can say about “everybody” as well. He overlooked the difference between “I” and “everybody”.

The English empiricist John Locke thought differently. He denied “innate ideas” which according to Descartes are innate commonly to everyone and thought that human beings are born in the state of “tabla rasa (white paper)” and get every cognition from “experience”. Different persons get different ideas through different experiences. The English empiricism school took for the first time the difference between “I and others” seriously and brought it into question. According to Locke “I” can’t see “ideas in the mind” of “others” and only can reason them by analogy through words and bodys as outer “signs of ideas”. By succeeding to Lock’s idea of “other minds” David Hume intended to consider “sympathy” as a way to “other minds” in “human nature”. Although J. S. Mill in 19th century tried to explain it with “reason by analogy”, the German translator of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, Theodor Lipps criticized Mill’s discussion and developed “empathy (Einfühlung)” as fundament of aesthetics and ethics. In this way, the question “How can I get knowledge about other minds” was discussed in the tradition of the English empiricism since Locke and further by other thinkers in the contemporary philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussions from his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Logical-philosophical Treatise) to his Philosophical Investigations on “other minds” stayed in the same tradition. We might expand that thought further, “the theory of mind” discussed in the contemporary primatology or the developmental psychological study of autism offers an expansion of thought along similar lines. Recently, through the discovery of “mirror neuron” people have begun to discuss the theory of “empathy” in the connection with neuroscience, I mention it only in passing here.
How did Husserl develop an interest in the question of “others”? In the first investigation titled “Expression and meaning” of his breakthrough work *Logical Investigations* vol.2 (1901), when he mentioned “expression in the communicative function” in contrast to “expression in the solitary mental life”, he mentioned the question of “others” for the first time. He said that communicating with words only becomes possible by “the listener’s understanding the speaker’s intention” and “the listener’s grasping the speaker as a person who doesn’t produce only sounds but is talking to oneself”. Thus he said, “speaking and listening, i.e. the speaker’s letting the mental experiences know and listener’s receiving them are related to each other. Therefore the “expression in the communicative function” works as “sign for speaker’s thoughts” and he called it “function of letting know”. The listener’s understanding of speaker’s letting know is neither a conceptual knowing nor reasonable judging, but it means “listener’s intuitionally grasping speaker as a person expressing so and so”. Then Husserl said, “In the ordinary usage we apply the word ‘perception’ to the mental experience of other persons and we say that we ‘see’ his or her anger or pain. Such a usage is totally right.” He continued, “The listener perceives the speaker’s expressing his or her mental experiences, and in this sense the listener perceives the speaker’s experience. But the listener doesn’t experience it by him- or herself, doesn’t have any ‘inner’ experience but only an ‘outer’ experience”. He proceeded to say that a “mutual understanding” is realized, “it demands a mutual relationship developed in both sides of letting know and getting it, but no complete equality”. But his interest concerned the following issue; that “also in the mental life without transmitting in communication, the expression has an important role”, that “even the expression in the solitary mental life expresses something and has the same meaning as in conversation”, and entered into the meaning function which works in both scenes. Thus he continued his discussion by leaving the question concerning how we get know about other’s experience aside. In *Logical Investigations* he never returned back to the problem of “others”.

The stimulus from the above mentioned Lipps’ theory of “empathy” seems to have triggered him to consider the problem of “others”. The publication of *Logical Investigations* inspired many scholars; one of them was the group of scholars around
Lipps in Munich University. They visited Husserl in Göttingen often (later called Munich’s phenomenological school). Probably in such an exchange Husserl was interested in Lipps’ works and theory of “empathy”. Max Scheler was in those days among this group, and later joined Husserl’s circle in Göttingen, and cooperated with the editing of *The Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenological Studies* with Husserl. Scheler published his maiden work *Towards Phenomenology and Theory of Sympathy and of Love and Hate* (1913) and discussed the theory of empathy critically, which was a common interest with Husserl. It was no coincidence that at the same period Edith Stein, Husserl’s first assistant, wrote her dissertation titled *Problems of Empathy* (1917).

But Lipps’ theory cannot be identified simply with the above mentioned theory of “other minds”. Since the latter asks the question “How can I get knowledge of other minds?”, the problem of “other mind” is examined within the intellectual inquiry of “getting knowledge” and Mill’s theory of “reasoning by analogy” is presented as part of the same discussion. From critics against such theory, Lipps intended to state that the theory of “empathy” was not an intellectual theory, as it had an emotional or instinctive dimension. If we may say more, Husserl, by criticizing Lipps’ theory of empathy, tried to consider it before “other minds” and just as grasping “other body” as “living body (Leib)”. This was a trigger to let Husserl think again about the mind-body relationship, just as Scheler criticized Mill and Lipps with the “undifferentiated experience of mind-body” and lead him later to the idea of “pairing (Paarung)” of my lived body and other lived body, which we can find in *Cartesian Meditations*.

However, I must now explain why I said at the beginning that Husserl wrestled with the problem of “others” as a fundamental problem of philosophy for the first time. I mean that whilst Husserl didn’t remain concerned with the problem of “other minds” throughout all his writings, he wrote on other philosophical issues, he nonetheless clearly and demonstrably grasped the problem of “others” in wider sense and stated it as the “Fundamental problem of phenomenology”. Considering “others” as a fundamental problem of philosophy doesn’t mean anything different from stating it within the context of phenomenology of intersubjectivity. He tried to discuss his investigations on “others” as problematics of intersubjectivity since his early period.
5. What is the “intersubjectivity”?

We may say, “intersubjectivity” is concerned with the relationship “between subject and subject”. To offer a metaphor, imagine we were observing two “subjects” at the same distance from outside, or if we may borrow Merlau-Ponty’s expression “observing from a bird’s-eye view by flying in the sky”. However, one of two subjects should be just “I myself” and if I think by entering the one, “another subject” is called “the other”. Then the “between subject and subject” is called “between me and the other”, and the problem of “intersubjectivity” turns up as the problem of “others”, or differently expressed, we can say, the problem of “others” turns up as one side of the problem of “intersubjectivity”, although the problem doesn’t however end here.

Through the modern philosophy the term “object” was used as an antonym of “subject”. Also usually we hear often the confrontation between “subjective” and “objective”, such as in the usage, “His explanation is too subjective” or “Her explanation is objective and reliable”. “Subjective” means biased to one’s own opinions or points of view and not taking other’s opinion into consideration, thus self-satisfied. In contrast to it, “objective” means not biased to any specified opinions or points of view, not contaminated by them, and seeing the things “as it were”. Therefore “objects” are assumed to be independent from “subject” and beings (reality) in themselves, independent from whether they become to be known by “subjects” or not. For instance the Andromeda Galaxy apart from Earth in approximately 780 kiloparsecs at the velocity of light existed in itself since far earlier times than it was discovered by humans. It is assumed to be an existing “object” independent from human “subjects”.

Immanuel Kant, however, called such “objects” that are assumed to exist “in themselves”, to be “things in themselves” and thought that they are unknowable and that they can come into existence in the relationship with “subjects” in so far as they are recognized and become “appearances”. As far as we can say so, the recognition can come into effect only in the frameworks of “subjects” (i.e. time and space in the sensitivity and forms of category in the understanding) which Kant called “transcendental”. Such frameworks are “what precedes experience and makes it possible”. Kant thought that such “transcendental” functions are innate in “subjects”, subjects that are not empirical or individual “subjects”, but so to speak are “trans-individual subjects”.
Although Husserl grasped the fundamental idea of phenomenology in his *Logical Investigations*, he thought that it is hidden by the view of world which is taken for granted in the everyday life (which he called “natural attitude”) and that the method of “phenomenological reduction” (“taking it in parenthesis” or “shutting down” or in Greek word “epoché”) is necessary in order to get the phenomenological view. Around the year of publishing *Logical Investigations* Husserl visited Ernst Mach who had used the term “phenomenology” already. Probably recommended by him Husserl read Richard Avenarius’ *Human Concept of World*. In Husserl’s manuscript for his lecture “Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology” in the first volume of *Towards Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* he discussed the “natural attitude” in context with Avenarius’ “natural concept of world” and began to talk about the idea of “phenomenological reduction”. This idea began to grow up for the first time during his stay in Seefeld in Tirol in the summer of 1905. While he had an interest in Kant in the background, Pfender and Daubert, both disciples of Lipps, had accompanied his stay. We can presume that the awaking of the idea of reduction and the commitment with Lipps’ theory of empathy introduced by both scholars were progressing at the same time. In order to develop his idea of “phenomenological reduction” Husserl learned Descartes’ “methodological skepsis” as a method for getting a view of the new world of phenomenology, but tried to interpret it as a way leading to the dimension of Kant’s “transcendental” problematics. But Husserl thought, if he regarded the “subject” as functioning in this “transcendental” dimension as a human being within the world, he fell into a paradoxical situation that what is only a part of the world holds the whole world (he called it “paradox of subjectivity”). Just in order to solve the paradox he stepped into the direction regarding the “transcendental subjectivity” as “intersubjectivity”. It was the reason why the idea of “reduction” and the interest in “intersubjectivity” developed almost simultaneously.

It is also interesting that Husserl in *Cartesian Meditations* of his late period introduced the term “monad” from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, rephrased “intersubjective” with “intermonadic”, and that his interest in this term began very early, almost in the same period of his interest in the problem of intersubjectivity. It means, although the problem of “I and others” can be easily connected with Cartesian Egology, he thought about it in the connection with Leibnitzian Monadology. The egological appearance was set within the pluralistic framework.
In this way, the idea of “intersubjectivity” didn’t stay as the problem “between subject and subject”, but migrated to the idea that “object” “in itself” is born “intersubjectively”. This is just the reason why Husserl came in the 1920’s to think that his phenomenology so far was only “static” and intended to take the essential structure in the present out, but in order to understand the structure genuinely it must be complemented by a “genetic” investigation. It demanded of him a fundamental change of phenomenological method, and at the same time it brought the above mentioned “subject” into the problematics of “intersubjectivity”. Neither “object” nor “subject” is something which exists independently and later goes into relationship, rather “subject” is born just within the relationship with “other subjects” and it’s “genesis” should come into question. In his late period he paraphrased the term “empathy” he loaned from Lipps with the term “other/foreign-experience (Fremderfahrung)”, incidentally speaking, the German word “fremd” means “other” as well as “foreign” or “strange”. And he put not only its structure but also its genesis into question. In this context he found the pass to “others” that were hidden in his theory of time in his later period. This is the idea that Husserl found the pass to “intersubjectivity” in the most central core of “I”, if I may here only suggest it.

So far I’ve discussed that Husserl’s problematics of “intersubjectivity” was connected to traditional or contemporary philosophers. Now I would like to mention that they are intertwined with most of problems he investigated in various ways. Besides what I mentioned already, we can point out their connection to psychology (Husserliana vol.9), nature and spirit (Husserliana vol.32), theory of time (Husserliana vol.10, 33, Materialien vol.8), the lifeworld(Husserliana vol.6, 39), even if we can’t insist that he developed them enough. It is not without reason that Towards Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity with totally 1,914 pages are composed of three volumes of Husserliana with 40 volumes up to now and overwhelming in his left posthumous manuscripts not only in the quantity but also in the length of period where he discussed it.

6. Ontology and phenomenology

At any rate, why do the problematics of “intersubjectivity” spread their roots so
widely in most of problems he investigated in his phenomenology? It must have a reason. One clue for it lies in the nature of “phenomenology”. “Phenomenology” is proposed in contrast to “ontology” above all. If we may say that “ontology” is a question of “What is being?” or “What exists?”; we can say that “phenomenology” is a question of “What is a phenomenon?” or “What appears?”. I would like to compare both situations of saying “Something exists” and saying “Something appears”. If I say “Something exists”, “For whom” is out of the question, whereas if I say “Something appears”, “For whom” is an indispensable question. Without somebody “for whom something appears” we cannot talk about “appearing” with meaning.

Then, that something appears for A (me) and that it appears for B (the other) are not always the same situation. There is a gap between them which Husserl called “perspective” or “aspect”, in order to point out that the same thing seems to appear, but a subtly different thing appears. And if A grasps it as “appearance for A”, it presupposes already that it has for B a different “appearance for B”. What is more, it means that A grasps the thing as something beyond it which A can’t collect into “appearance for A”. Then we see that something appearing in appearance appears as something beyond appearance. What supports this situation is our understanding each other that there is a gap between “appearance for A” and “appearance for B”. It means that problematics of “intersubjectivity” come into the structure of “appearance” in itself.

Then we can see that the problematics of “intersubjectivity” is related to one of fundamental concepts of phenomenology, i.e. the term “intentionality” which Husserl learned from his teacher Franz Brentano. The situation I just mentioned that something appearing in appearance appears as something beyond appearance is another side of the same coin as what Husserl said that consciousness is always “consciousness of something” and intends to something beyond experience. “Intentionality” is not a secondary relationship “between subject and object”, in which both exist independently already, but means a “field” from which “subject and object” come to exist simultaneously. What exists primarily is just the “between” of “intentionality” — the between “subject and object”. The very idea of “intentionality” breaks the dualistic scheme of “subject and object”, and gave birth to the idea of “between”. Thus, we can say that the idea of “intentionality” prepared the phenomenology of “intersujectivity”. Thus problematics of “intersubjectivity” becomes
the “fundamental problems of phenomenology” and becomes related to the fundamental concept of phenomenology, i.e. “intentionality”. This is just the clue to solve why almost every problem Husserl investigated is connected to problematics of “intersubjectivity”.

7. Conclusion

In parallel with my research on “intersubjectivity” of Husserl’s phenomenology, since 2002 I have been also engaged with the problem of “caring” as one of concrete fields of “intersubjectivity”. With this term “caring” I don’t mean only “nursing” for patients in a narrow sense, but also “caring” in a wider sense including “caring” for children, elderly, people with various disabilities, palliative caring and up to end-of-life caring, or differently speaking, up to “caring for others” in our everyday life, not only for humans but also for animals or plants. In this wide field, from the background of my research of “intersubjectivity”, I have been engaged with thinking how “to live together with others”, what I cannot however unfortunately develop today.

Recently in Japan there was a horrible and abominable incident. In the newspaper reported: “A knife-wielding man went on a rampage early Tuesday at a care facility for people with disabilities in Sagamihara, Kanagawa Prefecture, killing at least 19 people and wounding 25 others, 20 of them seriously, in one of the worst mass killings in modern Japanese history.” (July, 26. 2016) The suspect, a former staff of this care facility for people with intellectual disabilities, hand-delivered on February a written petition to the official residence of the Lower House speaker in Tokyo demanding that people with severe disabilities would be euthanized. It is also reported, he said “I want to kill disabled people as they are worthless, but the government does not give me permission”. I’m afraid that people consider the suspect as a special wicked ghoul, a mentally diseased or a narcotic. In my opinion we should elucidate how he got such an idea and whether he got it from the inner hidden eugenics widely spread in the unconscious zone of normal people as well. From such an investigation we should learn how “to live together with others”. Also in this context, I hope, a research on Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity could play an important role.
POSTSCRIPT

The list papers in this monograph in order of their appearance:

1. **Relativism and Communication — from a Husserlian point of view —**

2. **Zur Phänomenologie des Unsichtbaren: Husserl und Heidegger**

3. **Nature and Spirit — from Ideas II to Nature and Spirit —**
   Read at the conference Issues Confronting the Post-European World / A conference dedicated to Jan Patocka (1907-1977) on the occasion of the founding of the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations (OPO), 8. December 2002, in Prague (Czech) and published in *Jinbun-Ronshu* (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Shizuoka University), No.53-2, pp.1-12.

4. **Schütz und Husserl — Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität —**
   Read at the International Conference “ALFRED SCHUTZ AND HIS INTELLECTUAL PARTNERS”, 3. April 2004, at Waseda University International Conference Center (Tokyo) and published in *FOCUS PRAGENSIS*, Yearbook for the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion, pp.115-137.

5. **Dialogue between Husserl and Schutz — For Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity —**

6. **Phänomenologie und analytische Philosophie in Japan**
   Read in English version at Lecture ”Contemporary Philosophy” at the Seoul University, 27. March 2007, Seoul University (Korea).

7. **Zu einer Phänomenologie des Dialogs: Husserl und Heidegger**
   Read at the Phänomenologisches Kolloquium von alten Wuppertalern: KLAUS
HELD UND NEUES LICHT IN DER SOZIALPHÄENOMENOLOGIE—Zur
University (Kyoto) and published in *Jinbun-Ronshu* (Faculty of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Shizuoka University), No.52-2, pp.1-16.

8. Phänomenologie und das sich organisierende System
Read at the symposium for grounding the Society of German Integrative
Sciences, 14. October 2014, Hotel “König” in Bonn (Germany) und published in
*Symposium zur Gründung einer Deutsch-Japanischen Akademie für integrative
Wissenschaft*, hrsg. von Daiseion-ji e.V. und der Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz

Sicht —
Published in *Jinbun-Ronshu* (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Shizuoka University), No.58-1, pp.1-18 and published in *Jinbun-Ronshu* (Faculty
of Humanities and Social Sciences, Shizuoka University), No.58-1, pp.1-18.

10. Caring from the Phenomenological Point of View — Decision-making in
terminal care in Japan —
Published in *Jinbun-Ronshu* (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Shizuoka University), No.58-2, pp.1-15 and published in *Jinbun-Ronshu* (Faculty
of Humanities and Social Sciences, Shizuoka University), No.58-2, pp.1-15.

11. Narrative and Perspective
Read at the 7th annual meeting of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, 25.
April 2009, Tampele University (Finland) and also at the 3rd East Asia
Conference for Phenomenology (PEACE), 21. September 2009, Seoul National
University (Korea).

12. Towards a Phenomenological Approach to the Problem of Organ
Transplantation after Brain Death
Read at the Fourth International Conference of PEACE (Phenomenology for
East Asian CirclE), 9-13. December 2010 at the National Sun Yat-sen University
in Kaohsiung (Taiwan) and published in *BORDER-CROSSING - Phenomenology, Interculturality and Interdisciplinary*, Kwok-ying Lau / Chung-Chi Yu (Eds.),

13. A Comparative Inquiry on “Advance Decision” in Japan, Germany and
UK
Read at the Medical Humanities Seminar Series Spring 2015, *The Body: Health,
Wellbeing and Vulnerability*, 18. February 2015, University of Hull (UK).

14. Towards Studies of Nordic Caring — A Different Phenomenological
Approach
Published in *Clinical Philosophy* (edited by seminar for clinical philosophy of
Osaka University), vol.14-2, 31. March 2013, pp.2-20. This is an English
15. **Caring und Phänomenologie — aus der Sicht von Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität** —

16. **Intersubjectivity of Ageing — Reading Beauvoir's The Coming of Age —**
Read at the seminar for philosophy at Helsinki University, 18. September 2015, Helsinki University (Finland) and published in *Clinical Philosophy* (edited by seminar for clinical philosophy of Osaka University), vol.17, 31. March 2016, pp.24-36.

17. **Intersubjectivity of Person-centred Care: A Phenomenological Perspective**
Read at the Centre for Person-Centred Care (GPCC), 22. September 2015, University of Goteborg (Sweden) and published in *Reports on Care and Its System in a Stationary Society,* March 2016, pp.71-82.

18. **Dialogue in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Psychiatry**
Read at the interdisciplinary workshop “DIALOGUE AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY”, 16. September 2015, Helsinki University (Finland) and published in *Reports on Care and Its System in a Stationary Society,* March 2016, pp.61-70.

19. **On Dis/Ability in Husserl’s Phenomenology**
Read at the 7th PEACE (Phenomenology for East Asian CirclE) Conference “Phenomenology of Dis/Ability”, 16-18. December 2016, at the University of Tokyo (Tokyo) as well as at the Annual Conference of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology “Phenomenology and the Body — Contemporary Perspectives”, 15-17. June 2017, at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim (Norway) and will be published in *Clinical Philosophy* (edited by seminar for clinical philosophy of Osaka University), vol.19, in preparation for publication.

20. **To Live Together With Others — from Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity —**
Read at the Renmin University of China, 20. September 2016, Beijing (China) and published in *Clinical Philosophy* (edited by seminar for clinical philosophy of Osaka University), vol.18, pp.191-205.
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