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**From “Tiryagyoni“ through “Animal” to “Ferus”**  
**– A Critique of Western Religious Thinking with L. Tolstoy, V.**  
**Rozanov, and F. Kafka. –**

**Takayuki Yokota-Murakami**

The word “animal” derives from the Latin “anima” and it means, as everyone knows, “a living or breathing thing,” that is, “all living things,” including humans. *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages* notes: “[Words like Latin *anima*] mean properly any ‘living creature,’ man included” (137). This was, probably, the most primordial sense of an “animal.”

The Latin language, however, had another series of terms, denoting “animal”: *ferus* and *bēstia*. *Ferus* refers specifically to “wild animal,” as opposed, one should imagine, to domestic animals. Naturally, since a human-being is a *civilized* animal, *ferus* does not include humans. Concerning *bēstia*, *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms* writes: “[Latin *bēstia* is] used of all animals exclusive of man. French *bête*, Italian *bestia*, English *beast* are all, of course, descendants of Latin *bēstia*. (*A Dictionary* also says that Germanic words are, probably, from the same root as the Latin *bēstia*.) Both *ferus* and *bēstia* mean a “wild animal” (as opposed to a domestic animal) and do not include a human-being.

Since stockbreeding was, obviously, mankind’s later development, a sign, incidentally, of civilization, one is tempted to hypothesize that speakers of the proto-Indo-European language originally did not distinguish a man, a living thing, from an animal, also a living thing, but that, possibly, together with the emergence of stockbreeding, began to distinguish between a domestic animal from a wild animal and, accordingly, between a human-being and an animal in general.

Curiously, these layers of conceptions, that is to say, the foundational semantic layer, conceiving both humans and animals indiscriminately as living beings and the more recent layer, distinguishing these two, are reproduced in some modern European languages as well. For instance, the semantic trajectory of the English word *animal* attests to this. *OED* gives its meaning as “a living being” dating from 1368 whereas the sense of “lower animal; a brute, or a beast, as distinguished from man” dates from 1600. (In fact, Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* is the first occurrence that *OED* records.)

In contrast, one finds a tendency to equate a man and an animal in the “Eastern” traditions. In Sanskrit, the word *prāṇin*, indicating “animal,” derives from the root *prāṇa-*, to breathe, following exactly the same logic as “animal”, meant “living creature, man or beast” (*A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms* [129]). This original usage in Sanskrit is, obviously, conveniently in line with the traditional

Buddhist idea, foregrounding the theory of the eternal reincarnation in its clear contrast to the Judeo-Christian conception, where God created man in His likeness which other animals do not possess. For Buddhism, any being eternally continues its reincarnations, at one time into a human-being, at another into an animal. The difference between a man and an animal is contingent.

I am not trying to draw an essentialist, blanket distinction between the “Eastern” and “Western” paradigms, though. Buddhism has its own discriminating perspective towards animals: beasts are lower creatures that men degenerate into and reincarnate as. Some Sanskrit terms, denoting “animal,” do exclude human-beings. *Tiryagyoni*, also meaning “animal,” derives from a word-root, meaning “horizontal.” An animal is, whether it is a quadruped, a snake, or bird, a creature that moves horizontally whereas a man is erect. Sanskrit is not free from anthropocentrism.

Notwithstanding, I should say that the conceptual difference between Judeo-Christianity that irrevocably differentiates an animal from a man as a creature without a soul and Buddhism that sees both an animal and a man as miserable creatures within the cycle of metempsychosis is not to be overlooked or dismissed.

Now, returning to the “Western” conception that draws a boundary between a man and an animal, what has been the philosophical rationales for that distinction, other than the Judeo-Christian belief of man’s connection to God or man’s possession of a soul? Derrida in his essay “The Animal that Therefore I Am,” criticizes the “Western” convention of defining an animal as a creature that does not think, reason, or talk [rationally, that is] (121). In other words, traditionally, logos or language has been considered as a distinctive feature of a human-being. Kojève in *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* maintains that “a man without *freedom* is but an animal” (111). A capacity to laugh is evoked by Bergson as a human trait.

Apart from these philosophical considerations, a popular distinction between a man and an animal has concerned sexuality. The term, “animal appetite” attests to this. This view may have originated from the more philosophical idea, already mentioned, that a man is a living creature with reason. Animals, in contrast, merely follow their instinct, inclusive of sexual instinct. *OED* records the usage from 1588 in the sense of an “animal,” referring “contemptuously or humorously [to] a human being who is no better than a brute, or whose animal nature has the ascendancy over his reason.” This dating of 1588 coincides with *OED*’s listing for the meanings of the adjective “animal” taken from the 1633 and 1651 texts. The explanations *OED* gives for these meanings are, respectively, “of or pertaining to the functions of animals; or of those parts of the nature of man which he shares with the inferior animals [Thus opposed to intellectual and spiritual]” and; “carnal, fleshly, as opposed to moral, spiritual.” In English, at least, the sense of “animality” in the sense of carnal lust, as opposed to spirituality, which thus derived from ideas of such human characteristics as “intellect” or “reason,” emerged early in the seventeenth century.

This new sense appears to have arisen in the Protestant discourse. Havelock Ellis in his *Studies in*

*the Psychology of Sex* writes:

In Protestant countries the influence of the Reformation, by rehabilitating sex as natural, indirectly tended to substitute in popular feeling towards sex the opprobrium of sinfulness by the opprobrium of animality. . . . Nowadays indeed, whenever the repugnance to the sexual side of life manifests itself, the assertion nearly always made is not so much that it is 'sinful' as that it is 'beastly.' It is regarded as part of man which most closely allies him to the lower animals. (*Studies in the Psychology of Sex* 3; 129-30).

Therefore, although we tend to think that the concept of "animal lust" is ancient and that it has been perpetuated by Judeo-Christianity for milleniums, it may be a rather recent development, appearing only in the seventeenth century.

While this remains a hypothesis and the purpose of this paper is not to verify it, we do find many proponents of such an idea of "animal sexuality" in "modern" writers, not classical. I shall limit myself to the writer among the Western literati, who was, probably, the most adamant in his ascetic ideals and, at the same time, was the most influential, Lev Tolstoy.

After 1880s, Tolstoy made a significant religious turn and in terms of sexual issues began to take a radically ascetic attitude, strictly adhering to the ideals of the New Testament. He renounced all sexual acts as against the teaching of Christ and his disciples. It was a fundamentalist, rather than a revolutionary, move, literally following the early Christian ascetic thought. Tolstoy's biographer, Wilson writes: "There is nothing in [Tolstoy's] ethical view which would not have found an echo in St. Paul, in Clement of Alexandria, in Tertullian, in St. Augustine. It is, in fact, 'mere Christianity'" (377).

Tolstoy thus preaches his fundamentalist asceticism according to the Gospels, prohibiting any sexual intercourse, even within Church sanctioned marriages. With quotes from Matthew as epigraphs ("[W]hosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery" and "If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry"), Tolstoy simply and literally reiterated the ascetic Christian discourse. However, he introduced a new dimension to it, that is, the association of it with animality. As I suggested, this was a later invention, not to be found in St. Paul, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, or St. Augustine. For instance, in the novel *The Kreutzer Sonata* Tolstoy describes the first sexual encounter of the hero's wife and her paramour thus:

From the very first moment that his eyes met those of my wife, I saw that the beast which lurked in them both, regardless of all social conventions and niceties, asked, 'May I?', and answered, 'Oh, yes, certainly.' (88)

Although Tolstoy does not explicitly refer to it, I suspect that his negative view on animality may have a source in St. John's *Apocalypse*. The "beast" there is a name for Anti-Christ. It stands to reason then that St. John (in the English translation) refers to a "beast," not to an "animal" in *Revelation*. So the text reads:

And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy.  
(*Revelation* 13:1 [King James version])

St. John's beast, Anti-Christ, however, is not related to sexual license. Its vice is in its blasphemy, in its claim to the status of God. But this "beast," in contrast to an "animal," is categorically different from a human-being all the same.

This image of a "beast" that is never to be identified with a man, that belongs to the different category, was to be standardized in variety of "Western" discourses. In the Russian original of *The Kreutzer Sonata*, too, Tolstoy in the above quotation uses the word, *zver'*, corresponding to "beast," not *zhivotnoe*, corresponding to "animal." Naturally, the beast in *Revelation* in the Russian standard translation is also *zver'*.

According to *OED* the word, "beast," just like "animal" "in early times" denoted a living being, an animal, "explicitly inclusive of man." *OED* does not explain what is meant by "early times," but this definition is followed by the the explanation that "in later times, [the word 'beast' was] applied to the lower animals, as distinct from man." The usages, given for this sense, are taken from 1220 and 1300. We are to understand that a beast came to denote purely "a lower animal," not human, in the twelfth century.

Approximately at the same time a "beast" began to denote mainly "a quadruped (as distinguished from birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, etc. as well as from man."

Further, *OED* records the sense of "beast," denoting "the animal nature [in man]" from 1667. A quote from 1647 which reads: "All histories afford us strange examples of voluptuous beasts" may attest to the beginning of the association of "beast" with sexual license. The quote from Shakespeare's *Othello*, referring to "the beast with two backs," taken from Rabelais's "faire la bête à deux dos," ties into this new association. Thus, very roughly speaking, the "Western" culture shifted slowly from the idea that man and animal constitute the same group to the distinction between the two. The new notion, at first represented in the new meaning of "beast" (at that time, that of "animal" as well) in the sense of base desire in the seventeenth century and onwards definitely created the semantic system where man and beast (or animal) were sharply differentiated once for all: the former was associated with spirituality; the latter, sensuality.

Let us now return to the "Eastern" tradition again. The Japanese term, *iki-mono*, meaning "living

thing,” neatly corresponds to “animal,” as *iki-* means “to breathe.” Just as an animal means a breathing thing, and hence, a living thing, *iki-mono* means all living beings. But, in contrast to the “Western” paradigm, this term never developed a sense of a “beast,” a “quadruped.” It remains “all living beings,” including men, beasts, birds, reptiles, insects, etc., whereas the “Western” strategy was to restrict the sense of “animal”: from all living things to living being other than men, eventually merely to quadrupeds. Let me quickly add, once again, to avoid the sweeping generalization that it was not a categorical shift in the West, that is, in some instances, “animal” still included birds, fish, reptiles, insects, etc. (Nietzsche speaks of a snake as a wise animal and Heidegger was much into the behavior of bees as animals) and that the “Eastern” tradition also had a similar strategic move. In Japanese there is another term, *ke-mono*, “a hairy thing,” which refers to a quadruped and this word normally carries a negative nuance. Paradoxically, the negative nuance comes from the Buddhist preachings which prohibits meat diet, “paradoxically” in that Buddhism has the notion of reincarnation. In Japan this negative association (for quadrupeds) was coupled with class discrimination as well as the outcasts were engaged in disposition of dead animals (quadrupeds) and of meat, which were considered to be filthy. (This reminds us of the image of a butcher in the West. [By the way I am interested in the situation concerning this in Korea where meat diet is accepted.]) However, the man/animal distinction was, all the same, far more ambiguous than in the West because of the theory of metempsychosis. And animality was never attributed to a lack of reason or a language, but to a lack of empathy: Animals were believed to be harsh and cruel in comparison to man who were humane. Let alone was animality associated in Japan or in other Asian countries with sexual license till modernization.

We will now return to the issue of animality in the sense of sexual lust, as explored by Tolstoy. *The Kreutzer Sonata* and his other ascetic treatises caused a serious scandal not only in Russia, but also in Europe in general. Many thinkers reacted fervently in their own ways. One of them was a religious philosopher, Vasilii Rozanov. His response addressed the issue of “animality” in man, which he sought to valorize, rather than depreciate as Tolstoy. In a religious tractatus, *In the World of the Ambiguous and the Undecided*, Rozanov criticizes Tolstoy and calls for the recuperation of animality in man: “Seek God in the animal; seek [God] in life; seek Him as the lifegiver” (54; translation is mine).

Rozanov, however, simply inverts Tolstoy’s religious conclusion, relying on his pagan beliefs: Christ preached to become spiritual, viz. not to fornicate, not to become an animal; Rozanov recommends to become physical and sacred, becoming an animal. The axiological hierarchy is inverted, but the man/animal boundary remains intact.

A similar inversion is curiously observed in contemporary feminist discourse, too. An American radical feminist, Andrea Dworkin, devotes a chapter in refuting *The Kreutzer Sonata* in her polemical book, *Intercourse*, in which she argues that every sexual act is a rape [Incidentally, it is reminiscent of Tolstoy’s categorical argument that every sexual act without exception is sinful].

Dworkin appears to be sympathetic of Tolstoy’s critique of animal appetite and of his

description of the way it seizes a human-being. Her dissatisfaction is directed at Tolstoy's discriminating view on women, viz. Dworkin wishes to restrict Tolstoy's critique to men alone, not to women. If Tolstoy is calling for the spiritualization of mankind, for Dworkin, it is men that are trapped in animal sexuality while women are spiritual beings. Thus, Dworkin speaks of "Tolstoy's period of rut" in which Sophia Tolstaia had to submit to Tolstoy's animal desire. In fact, Sophia recollects, how Tolstoy fervently made love to her after working on *The Kreutzer Sonata*. This surely puts Tolstoy's moral preaching in jeopardy, but we are not particularly interested in moralistic criticism of the writer. Dworkin repeats the same logic throughout the book, treating Tennessee Williams, Mishima Yukio, James Baldwin, et al. For instance, writing of characters in Williams's *A Streetcar Named Desire*, she maintains: "[P]ut against Stanley's animal sexuality, [Blanche's sexuality] emerges as a distinctly human capacity" (42) as "with no interior life of human meaning and human remorse, any fuck is simply expressive and animalistic" (44). Thus, once again the axiological hierarchy of man and woman is overturned, but the binary framework of spirituality/physicality, humanity/animality, interiority/exteriority is intact.

The cases of Tolstoy, Rozanov, and Dworkin demonstrate how deeply rooted the Western dichotomous thinking of man versus animal. Rozanov's and Dworkin's version of animal philosophy was simply the reversal and the recuperation of the dichotomy of animal/man and physicality/spirituality. Such a move, naturally, merely recuperates the binary. What we need is a dismissal of the dichotomy and a redrawing of the boundaries: man, animal (quadruped), reptiles, insects, etc. This brings us back to the original sense of "animal" in Latin, comprising of all the above, all living creatures. Also, this issue directs our attention to the Japanese literary tradition in which insects occupied a major place and they were often the soul-mates of "human-beings." The most significant example is a medieval story entitled, "A Tale of a Princess Who Loved Insects," included in the collection *Tsutsumi Chunagon monogatari*. The heroine, supposedly a quite charming lady, is much fond of caterpillars.

A similar enthusiasm in insects has been observed widely in the history of Japanese culture. To name a few examples, I may refer to Katsushika Hokusai's encyclopediac collection of sketches, *Hokusai manga*, which devotes its large section to the loving description of insects. The contemporary comic artist, Tedzuka Osamu, was also known to be a big lover of insects.

Now, I have been following the history of the concept of "animal sexuality" in the West and the concurrent conceptual exclusion of men, birds, reptiles, birds, insects, etc. from the category of "animal" (that is, anything other than "quadrupeds" from the concept "animal").

Earlier, we have traced the literary versions of asceticism, connected to "animality," from Tolstoy via Rozanov to contemporary feminism. The reference to Russian literature was dictated by my familiarity with the given field, but a similar genealogy is, naturally, easily found in other "Western" literary traditions. However, the genealogy, as we have ascertained earlier, seems to have an origin in

modernity. Tolstoy thought his was a fundamentalist move, that he was recuperating the original idea found in the Gospels. As a matter of fact, his move was protestant and reformationist (which, actually, is in line with his strict adherence to the Biblical text).

Thus, we have observed paradigm shifts in the Western thought, concerning animality. One concerned the semantic shift of an “animal” from a living being in general (including a man) to an animal other than a human-being, especially, a quadruped. Another is a new association of animality with base sexuality. These two paradigm shifts, however, appear to have taken place approximately at the same time, and at an unexpectedly late stage of history, sometime in the seventeenth century and onwards. That is to say, these paradigm shifts are, more or less, products of modernity.

In Japan, too, the association of animality with base sexuality was, on the whole, a modern phenomenon. The term, *juvoku*, animal appetite, although it was sometimes used in the popular didactic fiction in the early nineteenth century (for instance, Shogakkan’s *Great Japanese Dictionary* cites Takizawa Bakin’s *Kinsei setsu bishonen roku* as the earliest example), was propagated mostly in the moralistic discourse of Protestant writers in the second half of the nineteenth century after the access to Western religious discourse. In it clearly the concept of “animal appetite” was conceptualized in its binary opposition to spiritual love. For instance, a Quaker thinker and poet, Kitamura Tokoku, wrote in an influential essay, discussing the popular fiction of the pre-modern period:

Bear in mind how far apart love is from lust in literature: lust is the liberation of the basest brutality of mankind while love is the exaltation of the spiritual beauty of mankind. To describe lust is to expel mankind into the bestial world of corruption. To describe true love is to equip a human being with beauty and spirit. Any author who is an encourager and an interpreter of lust thus turns man into a lesser creature and impairs love, which ought to be most beautiful and most wonderful in literature (64).

Animal appetite was, thus, a product of the Protestant, bourgeois romantic love ideology. However, what were the sources of Tokoku’s declaration is not particularly clear. Tokoku was an ardent reader of Ralf Emerson and his writings on this topic are believed to have been influenced by Emerson’s essay, entitled “Love.” In the essay, Emerson speaks of deification of love, its spiritual aspect, and the rejection of carnal lust and of body in general, and so on. He does not refer to animality, though. Alice Stockham, an American gynecologist, whose ascetic treatise, *Tokology*, Lev Tolstoy read with much interest and sympathy while writing *The Kreutzer Sonata*, propounded chastity, sexual modesty (even among the married couples), and spiritualization of love, but unexpectedly she spoke of sexuality of animals as purely neutral. She writes:

Among the animals, except for the very few cases among the domestic animals, a female



animal accepts a male animal for a sexual act only for the reproduction of a species. Such a rule, except for the infrequent exceptions, exists among the primitive peoples of mankind as well. Only the civilized peoples, who pride themselves for their religious and moralistic principles, propagates others and in practice themselves adhere to the view that pleasure of sexual demand for a human-being should not be restricted, depending on certain occasions, and argue, as if such is a law of nature (141-42).

For the Quaker genealogist it is man, not animal, that actually has animal appetite. And, possibly, relying on Rousseau, a civilized man is criticized. Thus, the man/animal dichotomy that was translated into the civilization/nature dichotomy or into the high/low dichotomy is overturned. But still, the idea that it is animal that is in the sphere of “nature” is retained. It is better to be natural and animalistic than to be civilized and human.

The exact discursive relationship of the Japanese moralism and the Western Puritanical thoughts, in the former’s new formulation of animal sexuality is, thus, still to be established, but doubtlessly the connection of animality and (pervert) sexuality was an unexpectedly recent phenomenon both in the West and in the East. I just suggest here that, to my view, this liason was, probably, much reinforced by the theory of evolution, which hierarchized living beings. Birds, reptiles, amphibians, insects, and so on, were now considered as “living beings” in the lower rungs of the evolutionary development. They were farther away from human-beings. In contrast, quadrupeds were now, in fact, closer to mankind. In this evolutionary scheme, I believe, the idea of animal sexuality developed. And, I also believe, that it has much to do with the imagination concerning a sexual act. That is to say, the proximity to humanity is a correlate of whether a sexual act of any species is imaginable or not, that is, a sexual act in the likeness of human-beings. One can imagine a sexual act of a quadruped. That is the very condition of bestiality. Also, one speaks of a canine position of sex. This anatomical “closeness” is, I hold, the basis for the modern concept of “animal sexuality” and also for the human abhorrence of it. A quadruped is a human-being’s Other with the capital O and that explains our anxiety and our moralistic antagonism for these animals.

Earlier I referred to the pre-modern novelist Takizawa Bakin, who was, possibly, the first Japanese author to have used the term, “animal appetite.” And it is significant that he is the author of the fabulous *Nanso satomi hakken den*, the legend of the eight samurai-knights who are born of the union between the princess Fusehime and her faithful dog. We do not conceive of a sexual act of an ant or a bee. That is why they are outside our imagination of “animal sexuality.”

But in fact, we do conceive. In a seventeenth century great prosaic Ihara Saikaku writes in the preface to his treatise in defence of gay love that homosexuality is superior to heterosexuality as a dragonfly makes love in the way homosexuals are engaged in sex: and since Japan is a rice-growing country and dragonflies dwell in rice fields, they represent our national spirit and demonstrate the

supriority of male love: “In the beginning when gods illuminated the heavens, Kuni-tokotachi was taught the love of boys by a wagtail bird living on the dry riverbed below the floating bridge of heaven. From this sprang his love for Hi-no-chimaru. Even the myriad insects preferred the position of boy love. As a result, Japan was called ‘The Land of Dragonflies’ ” (51). The Japanese were imagining sexual acts of insects. This is also a significant fact in understanding the different attitude in their formulation (or un-formulatoin) of animal sexuality.

So far we have historicized the concept of animal sexualilty in parallel with the semantic change in the notion of animals, from all living things to quadrupeds, both occurring fairly recently. It is now apt to take a look at the movement in the inverse direction, that is to say, the expansion of the category of animal, to include insects and what not. I am referring here to Franz Kafka’s *Metamorphosis*. (P6)

Gregor Samsa turns a beetle, but his life as an insect is constantly conceptualized as that of an animal. When the metamorphosis first takes place, the chief clerk’s comment is “That is a voice of an animal.” As Samsa listens to his sister Grete playing violin, the author asks “Was he an animal if music could captivate him so?” When the sister finally decides to get rid of him, she explains, “We’ve only harmed ourselves by believing it for so long. How can that be Gregor? If it were Gregor he would have seen long ago that it’s not possible for human beings to live with an animal like that and he would have gone of his own free will.”

Kafka thus recuperates the meaning of “animal,” possibly including all living things; at least, including insects as well. But he still bestializes living beings other than “human-beings,” as something intolerable, creepy, alien, *unheimlich*, restoring the Judeo-Christian antropocentrism. Nevertheless, Kafka’s recuperation opens up a further possiblity of breaking through the modern Western conception of animality. We are naturally referred, through Kafka, back to Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, where conversions of men into all living things, not only to quadrupeds, are richly described. Men change into birds, snakes, fish, flowers, trees, and so on, or sometimes even into a non-organic being such as a river or a rock. Ovid is, obviously, relying on the ancient “Western” belief in metempsychosis, to which adhered philosophers like Pythagoras and Plato. The shifting identities between men and “animals” or other living beings were thus commonly believed in the classical, pre-Christian “Western” world, the fact, corresponding to the semantic trajectory of the word “animal” that we have confirmed at the beginning.<sup>1</sup> However, the belief in metamorphoses survived in folktales, or in the literary imagination of various writers, including John Donne, Edgar Allan Poe, and James Joyce.

I would like to conclude my paper in my attempt at subverting the Western anthropocentrism, the othering of animals and the dismissal of insects, drawing a comparison between the European ascetic and dichotomous conceptions and the Japanese more ambiguous beliefs and perspectives, by returning

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<sup>1</sup> Here one can conceive of metamorphoses in the other direction, too: totemism. In totemism man is a bird, a snake, a fox, etc. turning into a man.

to Kojève, who saw the end of History and the end of Man in the Japanese society.

For Kojève, nature is eternal and man is a being in Time. The end of man and history is inevitable. Now, man in Kojève's view, is Action in negation, the subject opposed to the object, a self-consciousness that is bound to change nature, something that an animal does not possess. It is significant that Kojève speaks of animal desire in this connection. Animals consummate desire by devouring or by satisfying their sexual desire. But by so doing, they are dependent on the objects. Human desire transcends the objects by being directed not towards the objects, but towards another Desire, thus becoming self-conscious. Kojève visited Japan in 1959 and became convinced that such transcendental, human desire does not exist in Japan and the end of History had in fact taken place in Japan. He explains: "[In Japan] I was able to observe a Society that is one of a kind, because it alone has for almost three centuries experienced life at the 'end of History'—that is, in the absence of all civil or external war. . . . [In 'Post-Historical Japan']. [s]nobbery in its pure form created disciplines negating the 'natural' and 'animal' given which in effectiveness far surpassed those that arose, in Japan or elsewhere, from 'historical' Action—that is, from warlike and revolutionary Fights or from forced Work" (161).

It is significant in this connection that Kojève's notion of animal involved living creatures other than quadrupeds. He describes the world after the end of Man in this way: "men would construct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts" (159; although I should add he talks about sexual acts of beasts, but not of cicadas). Remarkably Kojève's notion of animal includes birds, spiders, frogs, and cicadas.

The Japanese philosopher, Azuma Hiroaki, borrows and develops Kojève's idea and argues that otaku, cybor-freaks of Japan, are now animals in this sense. I hold that Azuma misinterprets Kojève in this respect, though. The French philosopher did *not* maintain that Japanese had turned animals; Kojève thinks that post-historical Man remains human all the same. He speaks of "the Japanese nobles, who ceased to risk their lives and yet did not for that begin to work" and they were, Kojève writes, "anything but animal" (161). Kojève is speaking of a new man in the post-historical period in differentiation from a Historical man that has been opposed to "nature" and "animal."

Leaving this misunderstanding aside, Azuma develops a unique view that the Japanese otaku are snobs in the post-historical periods, who are interested only in consumptions and in spontaneous consummation of sexual desire. It should be marked here, though, that consummation of sexual desire implied here is not the "natural" consummation, but the cybor, fantastic, and imaginary consummation. Otaku are notoriously interested and sexually stimulated by 2D, that is, flat, not 3D, realistic, representations of sexual objects. They are highly voiced about their indifference to the real objects of sex. Such desire is different from both of the two types of desire, described by Kojève: animal desire and human desire. The former is directed and consummated by the objects. The latter, while being

opposed to the (real) objects of desire, eventually transcends them. Otaku's desire is the one without an object.

In the construction of sexuality, otaku discourse significantly diverts away from the conventional conceptual frameworks such as spirit, body, nature, etc. In this connection I can refer to a work like *Ghost in the shell* that, assumedly, typically demonstrate a new, or revised, conception of spirit, body, nature, etc. The main characters are "fortified men," with steel-hardened "shell." One's body is closer to that of an insect or a crustacean with an empty shell than to an animal with flesh.<sup>2</sup> The mental activities are mostly reduced to computer programs, implanted in the shell, but there appears to exist a "ghost," which functions in a way inexplicable for digital programming, something that may correspond to what we used to call "spirit."

One of my basic theses of this paper has been that the conceptualization of animal (as Other) has been a correlate of the notions of sexuality. The new form of sexuality *is* emerging in Japan that is not subject to the binary oppositions of civilized/barbarian, human/animal, spiritual/material, artificial/natural, interior/exterior, etc. The complete revision of animality together with the end of Man may in fact be taking place.

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<sup>2</sup> We should note that some of the attempts at deconstructing humanity in the post-structuralist thoughts which have referred humans back to machines have relied on the image of a beast. For instance, Haraway's cyborg is still a man turned back to a fleshy animal.