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# How Does New Public Management Work in the Philippines?

—An Empirical Study on the Local Governments in the Third World—

Kenichi NISHIMURA\*

## Abstract

This paper provides an overview on the extent of diffusion of a new type of public governance named “New Public Management” (hereafter referred to as NPM) in local governments in the Philippines which is one of the spearheads of this trend in the Asian region. Case studies on the local public governance in the Philippines have shown the importance of mayor as a key person for the introduction of a new management style. Therefore, we will analyze if there are significant relations between the types of governance of mayors – “NPM oriented” and “Non-NPM oriented” - and their ways of operation of a council with people’s participation, the relationship with constituents and different political strata, the ways of decision making, and their ideas on local governance. For this analysis, we utilize the results of our elite survey entitled “2011 Local Government Survey in the Philippines” (The principal investigator was Fumio Nagai, Osaka City University). We mainly use analysis of variance (ANOVA) and regression analysis to see the difference of relations.

[Keywords] New Public Management (NPM), Philippines, local government units (LGU), local development council (LDC)

## 1 Introduction

Since late 1970s we have been observing emergence and evolution of a new type of public governance named “New Public Management” (NPM) in local governments around the world (Çetin 2015; Rosyadi & Dharma 2014; Harun et.al. 2013; Pilcher 2011; Tippett & Kluvers 2010; Tanaka 2010; Goddard 2005; Helden & Jansen 2003). The Philippines is one of the spearheads of this trend in the Asian region with examples of NPM-type local governance such as participatory governance in Naga City, environmental management in Marikina City, effective tax collection in Quezon City, effective maintenance of peace and order mechanism in

Cebu City, and others. These cases show the importance of mayor as a key person for the introduction of a new management style. Therefore, this paper provides an overview on the extent of diffusion of new public management style among local governments in the Philippines.

In our previous paper, we found out that the local governments under the leadership of “NPM oriented” mayors perform better than the ones under “Non-NPM oriented” mayors (Nishimura 2016). In this paper we examine the political behavior of “NPM oriented” mayors which can realize better performance of local governance. More specifically we will analyze if there are significant relations between the types of public governance of mayors

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and their ways of operation of a council with people’s participation, the relationship with constituents and different political strata, the ways of decision making, and their idea on local governance. For this analysis, we utilize the results of an elite survey entitled “2011 Local Government Survey in the Philippines” which we conducted in 2011 and 2012 with three hundred LGUs randomly chosen (The principal investigator was Fumio Nagai, Osaka City University). And we mainly use analysis of variance (ANOVA) and regression analysis to see the difference of relations.

## 2 Data

The data we use in this paper is acquired by the survey mentioned above. The population was 1,515 local governments in 16 regions in 78 provinces. Out of all the 1,591 governments in 17 regions in 80 provinces, we excluded 76 governments in 2 provinces in Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) due to their political instability. The population consists of 135 cities and 1,380 municipalities; 771 local governments in Luzon, 336 in Visayas, and 408 in Mindanao. And we used a representative sample of 300 local governments randomly selected in 16 regions, 71 provinces. It consists of 93 cities and 207 municipalities; 170 local governments in Luzon, 67 in Visayas, and 63 in Mindanao.

## 3 “NPM oriented” Mayors in the Philippines

Since the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides more autonomy to local governments and expects them to promote partnership with POs / NGOs as well as private sector, NPM has drawn the attention of practitioners and academe in the Philippines. And more local governments are involved in the endeavor for democratic governance as well as efficient and effective governance. Therefore, to examine diffusion of NPM style local governance in the Philippines, we give a brief description of the norm of NPM to make a

framework for analyzing the relations between types of public governance of mayors and their political behaviors as well as their orientation of political leadership.

NPM was introduced in the 1980’s to reform public administration which had been suffering from red tape and inefficiency. As a post-bureaucratic paradigm, NPM puts emphasis on entrepreneurialism, managerialism, and market-based administration. It also pursues customer satisfaction, efficiency and accountability (Kim 2009). Thus, required norms to bureaucracy are mission-oriented, results-oriented and customer-driven behavior, anticipatory and innovative thinking, and competence of communication with community among others (Kim 2009).

Considering the elements of NPM mentioned above, we made a set of questions to mayors on the expected capacity of bureaucrats in their governments providing choices as follows; 1) Basic Legal Competency / Accounting Skills, 2) Professional Skills required in each department/division, 3) Management Capacities for more Strategic Thinking, 4) Management Practices in Private Companies for more Efficient Business, 5) Customer Orientation, Skills to deal with citizens, 6) Civil Service / Professional Ethics, 7) Transparency Management, 8) Others. And we assume that the mayors who choose 1), 2), and 6) as important principles are “Non-NPM oriented mayors”, and the mayors who choose 3), 4), 5), and 7) are “NPM oriented mayors”.

Distribution of “NPM oriented mayors” and “Non-NPM oriented mayors” is shown in Figure 1. As this figure tells us, the principle of NPM is already widely shared among mayors in the Philippines (83% or 250 among 300 mayors can be classi-




Figure 1 Orientation of Governance: NPM vs. Non-NPM (N=300)

fied as “NPM oriented mayors”).

Then we set three levels of the strength of NPM orientation in accordance with the number of mayors’ choices indicating NPM norms mentioned above – a) Management Capacities for more Strategic Thinking, b) Management Practices in Private Companies for more Efficient Business, c) Customer Orientation, Skills to deal with citizens, d) Transparency Management. Distribution is shown in the Table 1. We also utilize this data as independent variables.

Table 1 Strength of NPM Orientation (N=300)

Number of Choice*	Frequency	%
0	50	16.7
1	173	57.7
2	77	25.7

\* Maximum two choices.

In our previous paper, we examined the relations between attributes of mayors such as their age, gender, educational background, family background – political family as well as previous occupation and the type of governance (NPM and Non-NPM) chosen by mayors. The results tell us that there are no significant differences of the type of governance by the attributes of mayors except for age. We found out that the younger the mayors are, the more NPM oriented they are. It is noteworthy that experiences of business don’t necessarily make mayors NPM oriented (Nishimura 2016).

Then we compared the performance of “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors utilizing Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMMS) data as dependent variables. We used ANOVA for analysis. Among six administrative management items, eleven service items and three value indicating items in five performance areas - (1) Administrative Governance, (2) Social Governance, (3) Economic Governance, (4) Environmental Governance, and (5) Valuing Fundamentals of Governance, we observed that NPM oriented mayors realize better performance of “revenue generation” in Administrative Governance ( $F(2, 297) = 2.818, p<.10$ ) and “fishery support” in

Economic Governance ( $F(2, 158) = 4.742, p<.05$ ) (Nishimura 2016).

#### 4 NPM and Peoples’ Participation

According to Kim, NPM is a paradigm to enhance both efficiency and democratic value (Kim 2009: 59). On the other hand, Ocampo points out that some proponents of NPM put emphasis on manager’s leadership (Ocampo 2000). These discussions indicate that there are some conflicts of argument about the principles and practices of NPM – conflicts between leadership oriented governance and the governance balancing both leadership and peoples’ participation. Therefore this section examines if there are any differences of thinking and practice of governance among mayors with different leadership style – “NPM oriented” and “Non-NPM oriented”.

##### 4-1 Mayors’ Thinking on Peoples Participation

First, we examine if there is a relationship between mayors’ style of governance and their thinking about people’s participation. We take the data on the mayors’ thinking about participation of people in the process of public administration as a dependent variable. In our survey we asked mayors a question about good local governance giving two choices as follows; 1) to implement projects with lower cost and faster speed, 2) to satisfy as much as the widest range of constituents regardless of the cost and speed of project implementation. We assume that the mayors who choose 1) as efficiency oriented (“Efficiency”), and the mayors who choose 2) as participation oriented (“Participation”). Table 2 shows the distribution of “Efficiency” mayor and “Participation” mayor. Independent variables are the data on the orientation of governance (Fig. 1).

Table 2 Mayors’ Thinking on Peoples Participation

	Frequency	%
Efficiency	179	59.7
Participation	121	40.3
Total	300	100.0

We utilized both chi-square test and ANOVA for examination. Results show us that there is no significant difference on the thinking of people’s participation between the mayors of “NPM oriented” and “Non-NPM oriented”. This result may reflect a conflict in the principles of NPM – which are efficiency and participation.

In the next section we will see if “NPM oriented” mayors operate local development council in more participatory manner than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

#### 4-2 Management of Local Development Council

Local Development Council (LDC) is one of the local special bodies mandated by the Local Government Code (Sec. 106-115) to discuss and recommend the development plans (annual, medium-term and long-term) as well as the investment plans (annual, medium-term) of each locality. The membership of LDC includes the mayor as a chairperson, the chairperson of the appropriation committee of the local assembly, the congressperson or a representative of the congressperson from same district, all barangay captains in the city or municipality, and representatives from NGO/PO who should occupy no less than one-fourth of the members of the fully organized council. Then LDC should have the general assembly at least twice a year and have the executive committee for discussion on the matter of development planning while there is no assembly held. The executive committee is composed of the mayor, the chairperson of the appropriation committee of the local assembly, the president of the city or municipal league of barangays, and a representative of nongovernmental organizations that are represented in the council.

The institutional arrangements abovementioned in mind, we set two questions to explore how LDCs are operated by mayors. The first question is “Does the executive committee have extra-members from NGOs in addition to the members designated by law?” The second one is asking how many times LDC holds general assembly in a year. We assume

that if the executive committee of the LDC has extra-members from NGOs and if the general assembly is held more than twice a year, such LDC is more open to people’s participation. Figure 2 shows that 128 (42.7%) among 300 LDCs have extra-members from NGO/PO in the executive committee.




Figure 2 Executive Committee of LDC has Extra-Members from NGO/PO (N=300)

Figure 3 tells us that 106 (34.7%) of 300 LDCs have general assembly three times or more in a year, above the prescribed frequency. On the other hand, 70 (23.3%) of 300 LDCs have general assembly less than twice a year, not following the law.




Figure 3 Frequency of General Assembly of LDC (N=300)

We will utilize these data to analyze the relations between type of governance of mayors and the ways of management of LDC by mayors. The questions here are as follows. First, do the “NPM oriented” mayors open the door of executive committee wider to NGOs than the “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do? And second, do the “NPM oriented” mayors have more general assembly than the “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do?

We used ANOVA to examine the first question, and the multiple regression analysis to test the second question. The results show us that there is no significant difference in the number of NGOs which are the members of the executive committee between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. However, regarding the frequency of general assembly of local development council, the model does not have interpretability (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> is .032),

although the frequency of general assembly under “NPM oriented” mayors seems to be less than the frequency of that under “Non-NPM oriented” mayors (Table 3). Therefore we can say that there are no significant differences regarding the frequency of general assembly between these two types of public management.

Table 3 “NPM oriented” Mayor and Frequency of General Assembly of LDC

	b	S.E.	β
constant	2.398	.124	
NPM oriented Mayor	-.123 †	.067	-.105
Business family	-.090	.089	-.059
Political family	.023	.088	.015
Participation	-.044	.089	-.029
City	.029	.094	.018
Income Class 1	-.165 †	.089	-.109
Visayas dummy	.114	.110	.063
Mindanao dummy	-.270 *	.111	-.145
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.032		
n	300		

†p<0.10; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

#### 4-3 Frequency of Contact with Local People/ Constituents

In our survey, we asked mayors how often they contact with local people/constituents – barangay/village captains, assemblymen of local council, people from NGOs, people from peoples’ organizations (POs) operating within the city/municipality, people from civic organizations such as Rotary Club, people from business corporations and common local residents - in a year giving choices as follows:

1) Several Times/week, 2) Once / Week, 3) 2 – 3 times/month, 4) Once / Month, 5) Several times/year and 6) None. Distribution of frequency of contact is shown in Table 4.

We use this data as dependent variables to analyze whether there is significant difference in frequency of contacts with local constituents between the mayors who have NPM orientation and the ones who don’t have such orientation. One of the NPM principles - participation - in mind, we set the hypothesis that a “NPM oriented” mayor contacts with local constituents more often than the “Non-NPM oriented” mayor. Especially, it is expected that a “NPM oriented” mayor contacts with “Members of NGO”, “Members of Local PO”, “Members of Civic Organization”, “Peoples from Business Corporations” and “Common local residents” more often because these people are the expected representing partners of governance under NPM style local governance. Therefore including “Barangay Captain”, “Members of Local Assembly” who are traditional political contacts in the locality for mayors, we will compare the frequency of contacts between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors, utilizing the ANOVA for analysis.

We found that “NPM oriented” mayors contact “Common Local Residents” more frequently than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do. We also conduct multiple regression analysis to check if there are influences of other factors to this finding. Results are shown in Table 5.

Table 4 Frequency of Contact with Local People/Constituents (N=300)

	Barangay Captain	Members of Local assembly	Members of NGO	Members of Local PO	Members of civic group	Business people	Local people
	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)
None	0(0.0)	0(0.0)	3(1.0)	4(1.3)	55(18.3)	16(5.3)	2(0.7)
Several times / year	18(6.0)	16(5.3)	75(25.0)	73(24.3)	89(29.7)	97(32.3)	44(14.7)
Once / month	59(19.7)	27(9.0)	77(25.7)	80(26.7)	64(21.3)	72(24.0)	23(7.7)
2 – 3 times / month	41(13.7)	29(9.7)	56(18.7)	55(18.3)	38(12.7)	44(14.7)	25(8.3)
Once / Week	42(14.0)	103(34.3)	34(11.3)	38(12.7)	24(8.0)	25(8.3)	24(8.0)
Several times / week	139(46.3)	123(41.0)	53(17.7)	49(16.3)	28(9.3)	45(15.0)	181(60.3)
Missing	1(0.3)	2(0.7)	2(0.7)	1(0.3)	2(0.7)	1(0.3)	1(0.3)



Table 5 Contact with Local Common Residents

	b	S.E.	$\beta$
constant	110.327	18.707	
NPM oriented Mayor	14.913 *	5.949	.144
Business family	9.164	7.968	.068
Political family	2.902	7.819	.036
Participation	3.841	7.966	.028
City	10.661	8.383	.074
Income Class 1	-9.090	8.019	-.068
Visayas dummy	-10.018	9.866	-.063
Mindanao dummy	-13.437	10.063	-.082
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.020		
n	298		

†p<0.10; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table 5 shows that “NPM oriented” mayors contact local common residents more frequently than “Non-NPM oriented mayors do. There are however no significant differences in contacts with “Members of NGO”, “Members of Local PO”, “Members of Civic Organization” who are classified as the actors who provide innovation to public governance, between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” ones.

#### 4-4 Substances of Contacts of Mayors with NGO and Private Sector

Here, we examine substances of mayor’s contacts with NGO and business persons. As shown above, we didn’t find significant differences in the frequency of contacts with NGO and business persons between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” ones. Then, what topics do mayors discuss when they contact with NGOs or business persons who can be classified as innovative factors for public management?

To explore the issue mentioned above, we asked mayors a question about the topics of discussion with NGO and business person providing the following choices; 1) New projects of the local government, 2) New projects of the organization itself, 3) Social issues in the municipality / city, 4) Management issues of the LGU itself, 5) New ordinances, and 6) Others. We assume that if a mayor chooses “New projects of the organization itself (question number 2)”, NGOs or business persons with whom a mayor

contacts are conducting lobbying as an interest group whose purposes are benefiting themselves (“Lobbyist”). On the other hand, if a mayor discusses on “New projects of the local government (question number 1)”, “Social issues of local community (question number 3)”, “Management issues of the local government (question number 4)” and “New ordinances (question number 5)”, we assume that NGOs and business persons are functioning as partners for the development of a local community (“Partner”). Distribution between “Lobbyist” type contacts and “Partner” type contacts in the case of NGO is shown in Figure 4 and in the case of business person is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 4 Type of Contacts with NGO (N=300)




Figure 5 Type of Contacts with Business Persons (N=300)

Using the ANOVA to test the relationship between type of public governance of mayors and type of contact with NGO and business person, the results tell us that there are no significant differences in the types of contact with NGO and business person between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

## 5 NPM and Policy Process

Regarding the thinking on people’s participation, management of LDC and the relationship with local constituents of mayors, we could not find significant differences between “NPM oriented”

mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors except for frequency of contacts with common local residents. In this chapter, we will explore if “NPM oriented” mayors are different from “Non-NPM oriented” mayors in actual state of policy process.

**5-1 NPM and Policy Input**

Under the principle of NPM which puts emphasis on economic input, efficient output and effective outcome (Gray & Jenkins 1993), “NPM oriented” mayors are assumed to pursue effective policy input with minimum cost. Thus there may be distinctive features in inputting policies of “NPM oriented” mayors. To explore this assumption, we examine if there are any difference of sources for new policies in the sectors of environment and infrastructure.

In line with this we asked mayors from whom they obtain ideas for new projects in the sectors of environment as well as infrastructure giving choices as follows: 1) Mayor, 2) Members of Local Assembly, 3) Barangay/Village Captains, 4) Businesspersons, 5) NGO, 6) Local PO, 7) Officials from Local Government, 8) Common Local Residents and 9) Others. Distribution of actors from whom mayors obtain ideas about new policy is shown in Figure 6. We classified these policy sources into two categories – “Government” and “Private”. “Mayor”, “Members of Local Assembly”, “Barangay/Village Captains” and “Officials from Local Government”

are categorized into “Government” category. And we put choices of “Businesspersons”, “NGO”, “Local PO” and “Common Local Residents” into “Private” category. Table 6 and 7 shows distribution of policy source categorized into “Government” and “Private” in environment and infrastructure respectively. From Figure 6, we can see that mayors conceive ideas themselves mostly after which they solicit ideas from the barangay captains and local government officials (“Government”). This result tells us that most mayors have an image of governance with their own strong leadership and with the initiative of local government.

Table 6 Policy Input (Environment)

	Frequency	%
Government Source	190	63.3
Private Source	110	36.7
Total	300	100.0

Table 7 Policy Input (Infrastructure)

	Frequency	%
Government Source	224	74.7
Private Source	76	25.3
Total	300	100.0

To see if there are any distinctive features of policy input of “NPM oriented” mayors, we made cross tabulation using chi-square test to examine any significant differences of “NPM oriented” mayors




Figure 6 Source of Ideas for New Policy in Environment & Infrastructure (N=300)



from the “Non-NPM oriented” ones regarding actors from whom mayors obtain policy idea. However, results didn’t show us any significant difference between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors both in environmental sector and infrastructure.

### 5-2 Frequency of Contact with Other Politicians

In our survey, we asked mayors how often they contact with other politicians/government officials – the president of the Philippines, secretaries and under-secretaries (USECs) of the departments of central government, senators, congressperson from same district, party-list congressperson, and governor - in a year giving choices as follows: 1) More than Once / Month, 2) Once / Month, 3) Several times / Year, 4) Once / Year, and 5) None. Distribution of frequency of contact is shown in Table 8.

We use this data as dependent variables to analyze whether there is significant difference regarding political network between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. The hypothesis here is that a “NPM oriented” mayor contacts with other politicians/officials more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayor because of the necessity to develop wider political network for enhancement of effectiveness of policy process.

We use the multinomial logistic regression and we take the distribution on the degree of NPM orientation among mayors as independent variables to test the hypothesis mentioned above. Through

Table 9 Contact with Senator

	b		S.E.	β
constant	2.280		.276	
NPM oriented Mayor	-.242	**	.088	-.152
Business family	-.036		.117	-.017
Political family	-.128		.116	-.104
Participation	-.164		.118	-.078
City	.629	***	.124	.283
Income Class 1	.063		.118	.130
Visayas dummy	-.181		.145	-.073
Mindanao dummy	-.350	*	.149	-.137
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.119			
n	294			

†p<0.10; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

analysis we found that there are no statistically significant differences between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors in terms of frequency of contacts with other politicians/officials except for senators. In the case with senators, the stronger a mayor incline toward NPM, the less he/she contacts with them (Table 9).

### 5-3 Development of Management Capacity of Bureaucracy

Principle of NPM delegates some authorities for management such as budget allocation and personnel affairs to the middle managers of bureaucracy. And NPM encourages governments to introduce innovative ways and means which have been practiced by private sector for strategic policy making and efficient supply of effective public services to local community. Thus, required skills and capacities to bureaucracy are management capacities for more strategic thinking, management practices in private

Table 8 Frequency of Contact with Politicians/Officials (N=300)

	Governor	District Congress-man	Party-list Congress-man	Senator	USEC	Secretary	President
	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)	Count (%)
None	27(9.0)	34(11.3)	100(33.3)	88(29.3)	84(28.0)	82(27.3)	147(49.0)
Once a year	8(2.7)	9(3.0)	66(22.0)	85(28.3)	87(29.0)	86(28.7)	83(27.7)
Several times / Year	83(27.7)	91(30.3)	81(27.0)	99(33.0)	102(34.0)	103(34.3)	63(21.0)
Once / Month	64(21.3)	50(16.7)	29(9.7)	13(4.3)	15(5.0)	17(5.7)	3(1.0)
More than Once / Month	97(32.3)	113(37.7)	20(6.7)	10(3.3)	8(2.7)	8(2.7)	0(0.0)
Missing	21(7.0)	3(1.0)	4(1.3)	5(1.7)	4(1.3)	4(1.3)	4(1.3)

companies for more efficient policy making and implementation, and skills to deal with citizens, among others. It is, however, not so easy to develop these skills and capacities through on the job training within local governments because their strategic and innovative organizational capacities have been weak for a long time. Therefore, one of the effective ways for bureaucracy to enhance its administrative productivity is providing them seminars and trainings which are organized based on theories and practices. And these seminars and trainings have been provided by research institutes and universities such as Local Government Academy.

In our survey, we set a question to ask about the frequency of training for their staff provided by research and educational institutes. The question is “On average, how often has your LGU sent your staff to the seminars / workshops offered by the Local Government Academy and other research / educational institutes?” We provided choices as follows: 1) three times a year or less, 2) quarterly in a year, 3) more than quarterly but less than once a month, 4) once to 3 times a month, and 5) once a week or more. Distribution of frequency is shown in Table 10. Average of frequency of training in a year is 2.67 (SD. 1.482).

Table 10 Frequency of Training of Bureaucracy

	Frequency	%
Three Times a Year or Less	98	32.7
Quarterly in a Year	40	13.3
More Than Quarterly but Less Than Once a Month	70	23.3
Once to Three Times a Month	60	20.0
Once a Week or More	21	7.0
Depend on Necessity and Invitation	9	3.0
Other and Don't Know	2	0.7
Total	300	100.0

The hypothesis here is that “NPM oriented” mayors send their staffs to seminars and trainings more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do. To verify this hypothesis, we utilized ANOVA to compare the average number of seminars and trainings to which mayors send their staffs. We used the

distribution of “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors as independent variables. And for making dependent variables we excluded the categories of “Depend on Necessity and Invitation” and “Other and Don't Know”. The result does not show any significant differences of frequency of seminars and trainings between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. Then we also utilized multiple regression analysis to examine this assumption. Here we take the distribution on the degree of NPM orientation among mayors as independent variables, and we use variables of “Political Family”, “Business Experiences”, “Educational Background”, “Type of Political Leadership”, “City / Municipality”, “Income Class”, and “Island Group” as control variables. Again we could not see any significant effects of the style of public management to the frequency of seminars and trainings.

## 6 Discussion

In this paper we tried to explore some distinctive features of management style of “NPM oriented” mayors in the Philippines in terms of people’s participation and policy process.

### 6-1 People’s Participation

First, we examined whether there is a relationship between mayors’ style of public management and their thinking about people’s participation. The hypothesis here is if a mayor opts for NPM style management with principles of customer orientation, accountability and transparency, he/she puts importance on people’s participation more than a “Non-NPM oriented” mayor does. It yielded the result that there is no significant difference on the thinking of people’s participation between the mayors of “NPM oriented” and “Non-NPM oriented”.

Second, we explored how mayors manage local development council (LDC), one of the local special bodies which functions as an inclusive local government organization, to examine whether “NPM oriented” mayors manage local government in a consultative and participative manner. Particularly,

we firstly checked if “NPM oriented” mayors open the door of the executive committee of LDC wider to NGOs than the “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. Secondly, we tried to see whether “NPM oriented” mayors hold general assembly more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do. The results report that 1) there is no significant difference regarding the number of NGOs which are the members of the executive committee, and 2) there is no significant differences regarding the frequency of general assembly between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

Next, we compared the frequency of contacts with local constituents – barangay/village captains, assemblymen of local council, people from NGOs, people from peoples’ organizations (POs) operating within the city/municipality, people from civic organizations such as Rotary Club, people from business corporations and common local residents - by the type of public management. We assumed “NPM oriented” mayors contact people from private sector more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors because they put importance on communication with private sector who can provide innovative ways and means of public management to local government. We could find that “NPM oriented” mayors meet more frequently with common local residents than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. There are however no significant differences regarding frequency of contact with other stakeholders including NGO, PO, members of civic groups such as Rotary Club, and business persons. Considering NGO, PO, civic club and business persons are source of innovative practice of management, it’s striking that there is no significant difference regarding the frequency of contacts with them between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

Fourth, we explored substances of mayor’s contacts with NGO and business persons. We examine, more particularly, if there are any differences of topics of discussion with NGO and business persons between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. Hypothesis here is “NPM oriented” mayors discuss with these people issues

related to public interests rather than individual interests of NGO and business. In other words, NGO and business contact “NPM oriented” mayors as “partner” rather than “lobbyist”. This hypothesis was not supported by the results because it didn’t show any significant differences in terms of substances of contacts between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

To sum up, the results on the four points discussed above show that there are no distinctive features of “NPM oriented” mayors regarding participatory governance. The only exception is that “NPM oriented” mayors contact common local residents more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do.

Politics in the Philippines have been described for a long time as patronage system and mayors have been depicted as patrons who provide personal benefit to constituents in exchange for their political support (Anderson 1988; Mckoy 1994; Mckay 2006). It should be noted that mayors (patrons) usually stand in a dominant position to control relations with common local residents. This position is reinforced by the other characteristics of mayors in the Philippines – “boss” (Sidel 1999). According to Sidel (1999), mayors have appeared as bosses who abuse their political and administrative power and use coercive measures to control constituents. Mayors, in this aspect, are unapproachable for common residents. With these characteristics, mayors traditionally have been controlling their relations with local constituents and selecting people to contact, even though they have been communicating with common residents in local communities constantly.

Considering these traditional descriptions of mayors stated above and the principles of NPM which put importance on communication with private sector including wide range of people in a local community, the finding that “NPM oriented” mayors contact with common local residents more frequently than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors indicates that they opt for increasing contact with common residents over controlling them.

## 6-2 Policy Process and Personnel Development

Based on the assumption that “NPM oriented” mayors pursue effective policy input with minimum cost, we firstly examined if there are any difference of sources for new policies in the sectors of environment and infrastructure. Hypothesis here is that “NPM oriented” mayors incline to approach to private source of policy. Results however didn’t show us any significant difference regarding sources of new policy between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors both in environmental sector and infrastructure.

Second, we explored how an “NPM oriented” mayor does networking with other politicians. We assumed that an “NPM oriented” mayor contacts with other politicians/officials more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayor because of the necessity to develop wider political network for enhancement of effectiveness of policy process. Using data on the frequency of contacts with governor, congressperson, senator, secretary and undersecretary of the departments of central government, and the president, we examined whether there are any difference of political networking between “NPM oriented” mayor and “Non-NPM oriented” mayor. Result reports that “NPM oriented” mayor contact senators less frequently than “Non-NPM oriented” mayor does. As to other politicians we didn’t see any significant differences between them.

Thirdly, we examined whether “NPM oriented” mayors send their staffs to seminars and trainings more often than “Non-NPM oriented” mayors do. If a mayor is NPM oriented, he/she would send staff to seminars for them to obtain capacities and competence for strategic and innovative thinking and other norms of NPM. The result does not show any significant differences of frequency of seminars and trainings between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

According to the results of the examinations on policy process and personnel development of local governments, there are no significant difference in the practices of policy input as well as personnel

development between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. One exception is the frequency of contact with senators and this result is against our expectation. One possible reason is that the way of contact with other politicians is still old style – patron-client and rent seeking – which is against the principles of NPM. Especially congresspersons and senators have “pork barrel” which has been blamed as a cause of corruption. If “NPM oriented” mayors want to avoid the possibility of involvement in this, they would incline to decrease contact with them.

As to the frequency of training of bureaucracy, there may be a possibility that “NPM oriented” mayors recruit persons who already have certain level of competency (Kikuchi & Nishimura 2017). In fact, Local Government Code provides some conditions for manager class bureaucrats such as planning and development coordinator, engineer, health officer and others.

## 7 Concluding Remarks

From the analysis, we found that “NPM oriented” mayor is widely spread around the country as shown in the 83% of mayors expecting their staff to acquire the capacities defined by NPM norms and principles. This is a reflection of the promulgation of Local Government Code 1991 which encourages local governments to promote partnership with POs / NGOs as well as with the private sector. Twenty-five years have already passed since the Code was enacted and the principles of the Code may have been embedded in the practices of local governance. This can be one of the backgrounds why we observe that “NPM oriented” mayors don’t show significant difference in most elements of participatory practices of local governance and policy process as well as development of personnel resources from “Non-NPM oriented” mayors.

Besides, we may say that the behavior of mayor is depended on the position as mayor. If you are a mayor, you should contact other politicians and government officials as well as local constituents

regardless your style of governance.

And then, the historical background of the introduction of NPM is another reason why there are no significant differences regarding participatory governance between “NPM oriented” mayors and “Non-NPM oriented” mayors. NPM puts emphasis on efficiency more than democratic practices because NPM was introduced to address inefficiency of government.

There may be another reason for this ambiguity of results. Performance of local government is not influenced by the orientation on governance of mayor solely. NPM is a complex concept which includes several factors of bureaucracy such as behavioral ethics to take risks and flexibility, organizational designs and others. The mayor is, of course, one of the most important factors which influence the practices of local public management. But he/she her/himself can't change everything of his/her government. We need therefore go through holistic analysis to derive more relevant results.

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