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FUNCTION OF DEMONSTRATIVE *THIS*: FOCUSING ON DEFINITENESS AND MENTAL PROXIMITY*

1   INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we will examine some particular uses of English demonstratives within the discourse of various natural utterances and written texts, and we will try to clarify their pragmatic function by considering the mind or consciousness of both the addresser and the addressee of the discourse. Before commencing our discussion, we will first refer to some basic notions of pragmatics and cognitive linguistics together with some semantic and grammatical terms directly concerning our argument, and then we will introduce at the end of this section a new use of a demonstrative called indefinite *this*.

1.1 Demonstrative Reference and its Grammatical and Semantic Function

There have been various discussions about the referential property of language, in the sense that a language element refers to something else for its interpretation. Here we refer to one of such arguments. In Halliday and Hasan (1976), the types of reference in English are categorized into three: personal, demonstrative and comparative. Our interest in this paper is mainly in demonstrative *this* and its counterpart *that*, so let us quote here their definition of demonstrative reference: 'Demonstrative reference is essentially a form of verbal pointing. The speaker identifies the referent by locating it on a scale of proximity' (Halliday and Hasan 1976:57). They illustrate its system in the following table:

Table 1. Demonstrative reference

Semantic Category	Selective	Non-selective	
Grammatical Function	Modifier/ Head	Adjunct	Modifier
Class	determiner	adverb	determiner
Proximity: near	this those	here [now]	
far	that those	there then	
neutral			the

(Halliday and Hasan 1976:38)

They consider that all demonstratives which belong to the class of determiners, including the definite article *the*, have the experiential function of deictic in both exophoric and endophoric reference. Among those demonstratives, the use of *this/that* initiating a noun phrase is categorized as Modifier, while its pronominal use is categorized as Head. A similar definition is made in Quirk *et al.* (1985).[1]

Furthermore, Halliday and Hasan contrast the semantic property of *the* to that of other specific determiners as selective VS non-selective. They state that definite *this* and *that* are selective demonstratives which contain 'some referential element in terms of which the item in question is to be identified... it is proximity: the item is identified as present in the environment and more, or less, remote' (Halliday and Hasan 1976:71). And contrastingly, they categorize the definite article *the* as non-selective and that 'it contains no specifying element of its own... it merely indicates that the item in question is specific and identifiable; that somewhere the information necessary for identifying it is recoverable.'

1.2 Deixis

Deixis is originally a Greek word meaning 'pointing, indicating', and it was initially used to define a small body of words and expressions that link the speaker with the immediate situation of utterance; it is essentially represented as 'here, now and I'. However, its use has been extended to cover broad range of linguistic phenomena, as is commonly known to contemporary linguistic researchers. They have established various frames to approach such deictic functions of lexical elements. For instance,

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[1] In another categorization a demonstrative as Modifier is called a demonstrative adjective, and a demonstrative as Head is called a demonstrative pronoun.

Lakoff (1974) divides deictic reference into three types: spatio-temporal and discourse, both of which are frequently discussed functions of deixis, and also 'emotional'. The uses of demonstrative *this/that* falling under the third category, as he claims, are as follows:

(1) a.   I see there's going to be peace in the mideast. *This Henry Kissinger* is really something.
    b.   How's *that throat*?
          —*This throat*'s better, thanks.
                    (Quoted in *Sanseido's New Dictionary of English Grammar*:400)

He asserts that in (1a), the use of *this* implies that the speaker holds some particular feelings or emotions for the referent, which he/she expects to share with the hearer. He notes that this use is regarded as natural only when there is an apparent association between *this* NP and what was previously mentioned in the discourse. However, we will see in the following section that such use of *this* is allowed even when the referent has been previously unmentioned or in the 'unpresupposed first mention'.

In the case of (1b), Lakoff considers that the use of *that* implies the speaker's sympathy or pity with the hearer about the disease. This analysis is refuted in Ando (1986a,b) on the grounds that it is not the demonstrative itself but co-occurring emotional expressions and particular intonation which signifies such positive/negative feelings and sympathy felt in the speaker's mind. He asserts that *that* in the first utterance in (1b) is used as spatio-temporal deixis in contrast to *this* in the following utterance, which indicates that 'the throat' is spatio-temporally remote from the speaker. We agree with this reconsideration by Ando. However, Lakoff's intuition about such relationship between demonstratives and emotional expressions will be a helpful clue for our argument.

Green (1995) categorizes deixis in another way, applying some syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic frames:

(2) a.   Referential deixis
    b.   *Origo*-deixis
    c.   Spatio-temporal deixis
    d.   Subjective deixis
    e.   Discourse deixis
    f.   Syntactic deixis

                                                            (Green 1995:21)

Referential and discourse deixis contain semantic meaning, origo-, spatio-temporal, and subjective deixis have much to do with pragmatics, and syntactic deixis, as Green states, includes syntactic forms such as the interrogative and imperative. Demonstratives and the definite article, our main interest in this paper, are situated as referential deixis. As for spatio-temporal deixis, Green argues as follows: it 'includes the temporal adverbs, all non-calendrical time units, the concepts of coding time, content time and receiving time, and the analogous coding place, content place and receiving place' (Green 1995:22). Let us consider the next example:

(3) Are you *coming* to *the pub later*?
     —No, I've got *this work* to finish.   (Green 1995:23)

He defines the progressive verb form *coming* and the temporal adverb *later* in (3) as
spatio-temporal deixis.

However, his way of using the terms 'referential' and 'spatio-temporal' is rather
confusing. We believe that demonstratives function as spatio-temporal deixis in their
exophoric use, in the sense of reference to what is located in the immediate/remote
place and time from the speaker's egocentric view. We do not regard 'referential' as a
function at the same level with 'spatio-temporal' but rather as a semantic cover-term.

1.3 Definiteness and Identifiability

Definiteness, which at first glance seems to be a simple grammatical definition, is in
fact a complex concept, and it is rather difficult to interpret its realization in natural
uses of language. There are a number of different analyses of it from the view of both
semantics and pragmatics using terms such as locatability, familiarity and
identifiability; some of them are quite similar to each other, others are rather
controversial. In this paper, we adopt the following definition: a definite NP has a
referent which is assumed by the speaker to be unambiguously identifiable by the
hearer, whereas an definite NP has a referent which is presumed by the speaker NOT
to be identifiable by the hearer.

Now we must clarify what is meant by 'identifiable' and 'unidentifiable'. Studies
such as Chafe (1994) and Lambrecht (1994) state that an identifiable referent is one
that is assumed to be already known to, or shared by, the hearer at the point of
reference. Such sharing may be either direct or indirect. What the direct sharing
means is that the referent itself is already known to both the speaker and hearer, such
as when the referent is already mentioned in the previous discourse, and as when it is
present in the immediate situation of the utterance. Also, knowledge about a referent
is sometimes located in the cultural or social environment of a very small group of
people. Consider the following examples:

(4) a.   Are you hanging out at *the park*?   (Chafe 1994:101)
    b.   I want to marry *Susan*.

In the case of (4a), there exists a particular park that is known at least to both the
speaker and the hearer of the utterance. And for the speaker and the hearer of
utterance (4b), there must be one identifiable person called Susan; the referent does
not need to be known by others who are not the participants in the conversation. In
some other cases, the referent belongs to more common and universal human
experience, such as *the moon, the sky*, etc.

The indirect sharing, the other type of sharing between the speaker and the hearer,
holds when the referent is associated with other shared knowledge, as in the next
example:

(5) He was in a Benz and kept honking *the horn* while driving through the street.

Most addressees of this utterance would know that a car has a horn, so the referent is indirectly shared by its association with already shared knowledge. In other words, the speaker of such utterances expects that the referent will be accessible to, or presupposed by, the hearer.

The English grammatical items which mainly have to do with definiteness and identifiability are those categorized within the nominal group: nouns, pronouns, and articles. Among such items, demonstratives had long been considered to refer always to a definite referent both in their pronominal and prenominal (modifying) uses. However, the use of *this* NP to point to an INDEFINITE referent has been observed recently. Now let us move on to the next section and introduce some examples of such a use.

1.4 What is 'Indefinite This'?

It is generally said that demonstrative *this* refers to a definite referent, as all other English demonstratives do. However, there recently appeared a new use of *this* initiating an indefinite noun phrase, which is widely diffused as a natural expression in spoken English. It is called 'indefinite *this*' in studies such as Wright and Givón (1987) and Lambrecht (1994), which state that indefinite *this* is used to introduce a referent into the discourse for the first time and is unidentifiable by the hearer, as in the following examples:

(6) I met ***this guy*** from Heidelberg on the train.   (Lambrecht 1994:83)

(7) "What'd he do in Weed?" Slim asked again.
    "Well, he seen ***this girl*** in a red dress. Dumb bastard like he is, he wants to touch ever'thing he likes...   (*Of Mice and Men*)

Assume these utterances are made in the following context: previously in the discourse the speaker did not mention either *this guy*/*this girl* or any other entities with which its referent is directly associated, and the referent is not present in the place of utterance. Thus the speaker presumes that the referent is neither perceptible nor accessible by the hearer. In such a context, indefinite article *a(n)* had been used traditionally, but Wald (1983) observes that at least in the first half of the twentieth century, indefinite *this* (and *these* in plural) began to be chosen frequently in colloquial speech.[2]

Also, though yet few in number, examples of indefinite *this* appearing in written

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[2] Wald (1983) points out that indefinite *this* is more commonly used among children and adolescents than among adults. Some native speakers commented that this usage is quite popular among high school students. However, almost a century had passed since it first appeared, according to his and other researchers' observation, and thus its range has expanded quite widely among generations.

texts such as letters and journals have been observed recently:[3]

   (8) Dear Abby: There's *this guy* I've been going with for near three years. Well,
       problem is that he hits me. He started last year. He has done it only four of
       [*sic*] five times, but each time it was worse than before...

                                                        (Wright and Givón 1987:16)
   (9) Bob Selig was at a party back in Northern State University in South Dakota,
       feeling bruised and lonely, and *this girl* wouldn't let him alone. "Did you
       kill people?" She kept asking...   (Wald 1983:94, quoted from *Newsweek*)

   We must note that indefinite *this* is constrained to specific individual referents (see
Wald 1983). Therefore:
   (10) a. Non-specific:
            Roxie wants to marry *a/*this linguist*$_i$, if she can find *one*$_i$.

                                                        (Wald 1983:95)

        b. Generic:
            *A/*This dodo* likes peanuts.
        c. Non-referential:
            They were *a/*this* real team.

   We will focus on this striking use of *this* and try to clarify the mechanism of its
pragmatic functions in this paper.

1.5 General Outline

In this paper we will discuss the indefinite use of *this* mentioned in the previous
subsection, and we will contrast it to its definite uses and also to other specific
definites/indefinites: specific indefinite article *a*, definite article *the*, and definite
demonstrative *that*. In section 2, we will first review some previous approaches to
indefinite *this*, then we will outline their problems and some examples they fail to
cover. To clarify such examples, in section 3 through section 4, we will rely on the
theory of 'territory of information' and make a suggestion that indefinite *this* mainly
functions as deixis to represent a referent which is 'mentally proximal' to the speaker.
We will apply this proposal to our analysis of various examples of indefinite *this*. We
will then discuss some uses of *that* as a contrast to indefinite *this* in section 5. Finally
in section 6, we will summarize our whole discussion and also make a brief remark on
some of our prospects which need further examination.

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[3] It is an interesting fact that indefinite *this* used in written language has begun to appear not only in the
style of direct and indirect speech but also within the descriptive parts of the text, though yet rarely.

2 PREVIOUS ANALYSES

2.1 Wright and Givón (1987)[4]

The main claim of Wright and Givón (1987) on indefinite *this* is that it functions as 'a marker of pragmatically-referential indefinites, those that are more important in the discourse' (Wright and Givón 1987:28). To justify this assertion, they propose the following method:

(11) Topic Persistence Measurement:
This method measures the number of times within the next 10 clauses that a referent NP persists as an argument of the clause, following the point in which it is first introduced. The values that are assigned are thus from 0 to 10 (Very rarely the count is 10+...). The Topic Persistence (TP) measure thus assesses, indirectly, the referent's importance in the subsequent discourse. (Wright and Givón 1987:17)

Specifically, the TP value is assigned to a certain referent NP marked by *a(n)* or indefinite *this* by counting the number of recurring references (in the form of full NP or pronoun) to the referent of the first NP within the following 10 clauses. Let us take a look at the next example:[5]

(12) a. ya know ***this kid*** ya know,
b. [he] was waking in the forest,
c. an' [he] saw ***this great big bear***,
d. and [[it]] was, [[it]] was taking big bites out of *a tree*;
e. [he] was scared, and then, and then,
f. and then [he] came to [[the bear]] and,
g. [he] tapped [[him]] on the, little bottom,
h. and [he] says,
i. (...) growl,
j. and [he] says,
k. who's behind [me]?
l. uh uh, [I] am, uh uh, [I]'m just a little boy, yeah,
m. [I] wish [[you]] lived with [me]
n. [I]'m a nice bear

(Wright and Givón 1987:18)

Wright and Givón observe this fragment of a narrated story and point out that *this kid* in (12a), introduced by indefinite *this*, recurs 8 times within the next 10 clauses ((12b) through (12k)); and that *this great big bear*, introduced in (12b), recurs 5 times within

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[4] Also see Givón (1983, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1995).

[5] Most examples they examine are narrative texts told by 8-10 year old native speakers of American English. Expressional errors in the original utterances including restatements and hesitations are recorded verbatim (as are other examples in this paper).

clauses (12d-m).[6] Contrastingly, indefinite referent *a tree* introduced in (12d) does not recur in the following 10 clauses.

Application of this measurement to a number of texts leads them to conclude that in many examples, *this*-marked NPs show higher TP values than those of *a*-marked NPs and thus are thematically more important.

2.2 Wald (1983)

The usage is called 'new-*this*' by Wald (1983), but here let us call it 'indefinite *this*' to avoid confusion. Wald considers that the introduction of a referent by indefinite *this* implies that more information about the referent will be added in the following discourse, a similar view to that of Wright and Givón (1987) and some other studies. He shows that an indefinite *this* referent tends to receive further information by modifiers and other adjuncts within a single sentence. There are also frequent appearances in a discourse of the expressions coreferential with the indefinite *this* NP. Such coherent reference sometimes crosses, as Wald states, the boundary of discourse units (i.e. units containing local topics and are constituents of an overall discourse), which suggests that the referent maintains its topicality through the whole discourse.

(13) a. Relative clause adjunct:
         ... n there's ***this guy*** that goes into the next door neighbors'es house.
                                                               (Wald 1983:98)

     b. Simple conjunction:
         ... like, in back of where I live my father knew ***this guy*** n *he* had two sons...   (Wald 1983:99)

(14) ...No, I was just standing by in my friend's house. I was talking to her. N then ***this man*** comes out with a gun. I was where V is n *the man* was right over there w——... So *this man* started to——to shoot n I ducked down cz *the man* had the gun toward where I was.   (Wald 1983:108)

Moreover, Wald situates indefinite *this* in the English determiner system and considers that it introduces 'the first mention of nonpresupposed referents' (Wald 1983:113), in contrast to the uses of other determiners such as *the* and *that* to make a presupposed first mention.

2.3 Inexplicable Examples by Wright and Givón (1987) and Wald (1983)

Both of the analyses surveyed in 2.1 and 2.2 claim that the use of indefinite *this* implies the persistence of its referent as a discourse topic, mostly with information about the referent expressed subsequently. Now let us consider the next two

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[6] I doubt whether these TP values assigned to the referent NPs are correct. That is, their judgment that *he* and *me* in (12h) through (12k) are coreferential with *this kid* and not with *this great big bear* seems suspicious to me.

examples:[7]

>   (15) Ya know we've got into ***this big fight***, and uh, he said uh, well
>   probably the worst thing that anybody's ever said to me, he he accused
>   me of being terminally unhappy. And uh, as I I thought and thought and
>   thought about how he could say such a thing, I I realized that he knew.
>   Ultimately I would never be happy with him...   ("Ally McBeal Ⅱ")

>   (16) I told it was her I told it was her birthday and he like threw his arms up
>   said Oh you should have told me earlier. He says I would have made
>   special day for you Yeah And he got ***this cake*** and he cut *this massive*
>   *piece of cake* didn't he Yeah and then disappeared into the kitchen candles
>   in then come back. And it was FX [a woman's name] he called you didn't
>   he Yeah. FX. Erm but it was nice wasn't it.
>
>   (CD: UK spoken)

In (15), *this big fight* marked by indefinite *this* never recurs again in the discourse. According to the TP measurement of Wright and Givón (1987), the TP value assigned to the referent is thus 0. Besides that, it is followed by no modifying expressions as those shown in Wald (1983).[8] Similarly in (16), *this cake* is also assigned the TP value of 0, and little information about the referent is added further.[9]

Accordingly, it is difficult to consider that indefinite *this* in these utterances functions as the marker of topicality in the discourse. Not a few similar examples are found in various texts, a fact admitted in both Wright and Givón and Wald. But neither of them specifically explains why indefinite *this* is preferred to indefinite *a* in such cases.[10] Such examples are the ones we focus on and try to clarify in this paper. We will argue on this problem specifically in section 3.

2.4 Oda (1994)

Another important piece of previous research we should mention is Oda (1994), though it is not a direct examination of indefinite *this*. As a study of English proper

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[7] Dictation of colloquial speeches from TV programs, (15) and (26), is mine.

[8] It should be noted that the clause immediately after *this big fight* describes what was said during 'the fight'. Therefore the referent can be considered to be linked to the immediate discourse topic, although in the next sentence the subject already digresses from 'the fight'.

[9] The TP value of *this cake* may be counted as 1 if its referent and the referent of *this massive piece of cake* is regarded loosely as the same. Anyway, however, *this* NP in the example above is assigned an extremely low TP value.

[10] Wright and Givón observe that 33% (14 out of 43) of 'indefinite *this*'-marked NPs in their examples are of low-TP value (0-2). They note that '[o]n closer examination we find that most of them are either themselves thematically important regardless of frequency, or else they are associated with thematic high points in the narrative' (Wright and Givón 1987:29). However, they do not argue further on 'thematic importance' of such indefinite *this* NPs nor suggest any devices to measure such importance other than the TP measurement. Furthermore, Givón (1989) notes that '[t]he obvious, though tentative, explanation is that thematic importance and text frequency... never correlate 100%. Grammatical marking of indefinites by *this* is ultimately sensitive to the **psychological** [emphasis mine] dimension of importance, not to mere frequency' (Givón 1989:192).

noun phrases, Oda (1994) analyzes demonstrative expressions co-occurring with proper names. He treats the whole use of *this* as a demonstrative which directly refers to a specific entity in the real world. And he asserts that its referent must be an entity which can be 'physically referred to', or directly witnessed and pointed at, by the speaker. Notice that he only considers the speaker's mind or consciousness and not the hearer's, and so he does not use the concept of definiteness in his argument.

Moreover, Oda categorizes reference to a specific entity in the real world into three types: pointing by demonstratives, naming by proper nouns and describing by common noun phrases. Let us take a look at the next example:

(17)   It was named after ***this guy*** *Ossenberger* *that went to Pencey*.

    this   *n*   (named) *N*   that is *p*
  (pointing)   (naming)   (describing)

                                                    (Oda 1994:77)

He considers that particularly when all three types of reference are made as in (17), they altogether have the effect of reinforcing the identification of their referent. And as a part of such reference, according to Oda, this NP (in (17) *this guy*) merely functions to point at its referent as an entity located before the speaker's eyes, and it leaves naming and describing functions to other constituents of the nominal expression (the relative clause describes the property of the referent in (17)).

There are some points on which we cannot agree with Oda (1994). First, he does not seem to apply his definition that a referent of *this* must be 'a specific entity which can be directly witnessed and pointed at by the speaker' to his analysis in a strict or literal sense. Most examples he examines are from the novel *The Catcher in the Rye*, a first-person narrative in which the main character recollects and relates his past experiences. And in spite of the definition above, according to Oda, all the following entities seem to be equivalently referred to by *this*: those which are directly witnessed by the speaker in the present space and time in the strict sense, those which were once directly witnessed by the speaker in the remote space and time, and those which merely exist in the speaker's mind and not in the real world. That is to say, his approach cannot grasp the difference between those entities and entities referred to in other syntactic forms such as specific definite *a* NPs and *that* NPs, since he does not take the hearer's consciousness and the notion of definiteness into consideration.

Also, as we have mentioned previously, Oda does not separate the use of *this* corresponding to 'indefinite *this*' from its definite use. We cannot say this is a problematic point, but in this paper we take a different view.

Having surveyed some previous studies, we are now going to propose an alternative approach to indefinite *this* and explain some problematic examples. But before that we must clarify our theoretical assumption.

3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: TERRITORY OF INFORMATION

3.1 Kamio (1990, 1997) and Kamio and Takami (1998)

In this paper, we rely on the 'territory of information' theory proposed and developed by Kamio and others. The basic assumption of the whole theory, first proposed by Kamio is as follows:

> (18) There holds a one-dimensional psychological distance between the speaker/hearer and information conveyed by a given sentence. The distance is measured by the following two scales: 'proximal' and 'distal'.
>
> (Kamio 1990:21, my translation)

In Kamio (1990) this assumption is applied to information conveyed by sentences, and to discuss the territory of phrasal information he proposes another assumption as follows:

> (19) There holds a one-dimensional psychological distance between the speaker (or the hearer, though rarely) and information being conveyed by a phrase constituting a sentence. The distance is measured in principle by the following two scales: 'proximal' and 'distal'. However in some cases, an intermediate scale ('medial') is admitted.
>
> (Kamio 1990:143, my translation)

Here we should note that psychological scale 'medial' in assumption (19) is applied to Japanese phrases, particularly those with demonstrative morphemes *ko-*, *so-* and *a-*. To analyze English *this/that* NPs, Kamio uses binary 'proximal/distal' only (see Kamio 1990, 1997). Also, Kamio asserts that 'the hearer's territory' is not considered in analyzing English phrases, but he admits it in the case of Japanese phrases.

In this paper, we will use assumption (18) to argue on *this* NPs, and we will take the hearer's territory into account though the examples are English phrases. On these points we differ from Kamio.

Kamio (1997) and Kamio and Takami (1998) advance the theory of territory of information and illustrate relationship between various texts, mainly sentential examples, and information they carry. They define as follows:

(20)   There are two linear psychological scales, one for the speaker and the other for the hearer, which measure the distance between the speaker/hearer and a given piece of information.

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                         information
        Speaker     |┄┄┄┄|┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄|┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄|
                    1       n                          0

                                         information
        Hearer      |┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄|┄┄┄┄|┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄|
                    1                                 n                  0
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A given piece of information is located on these scales and can take any value between (and including) 1 and 0.

(Kamio 1997:17)

(21)   There are two conceptual categories called the speaker's and the hearer's territory of information. A given piece of information that is closer to the speaker than **n** belongs to the speaker's territory of information, and that which is closer to the hearer than **n** belongs to the hearer's territory of information, where n is a specified value between 1 and 0 and designates the outer boundary of both territories.   (*ibid.*)

The calculation they provide of 'a linear psychological scale for the speaker/hearer' assigning a piece of information with values from 0 to 1 is too complicated, and thus we will not use it in this paper. But we will apply some of their conditions to our examples in section 4.

3.2 Ando (1986a,b)

According to Ando (1986a,b), English *this/that* expressions are defined as deixis, either place deixis or discourse (text) deixis, and they are deeply concerned with the territory of the speaker and/or the hearer. We should note that his notion of 'territory' does not correspond exactly with Kamio (1990, 1997) and Kamio and Takami (1998) mentioned above, since it is based only on the early arguments on territory. Ando makes a brief remark on the use of *this* which corresponds with indefinite *this*:

(22)   I met *this weird guy* the other day.   (Ando 1986a:73)

He claims that the speaker introduces a topic of new information into 'the field of discourse' with this usage of *this*, and so it must enter the territory of both the speaker and the hearer, as is illustrated in the following figure:

(23)

this
S, H

(Ando 1986b:71)

In this paper, we do not agree with this claim and carry out a different analysis of such examples, as we will argue in the next chapter.

4 CONSIDERATION ON INDEFINITE *THIS*

4.1 Proposal

To analyze the indefinite *this* examples such as are mentioned in 2.3. and to clarify the overall usage, let us now propose the following:

(24) Indefinite *this* is an extension from definite *this*, and its main function is a deictic reference to a referent which the speaker presumes to be 'mentally proximal' to him/her.

Together with the proposal above, let us consider the following table:

Table 2. Deictic function of this *on the scale of proximity*

	main function	sub-function
definite *this*	spatio-temporal proximity	mental proximity
	discourse proximity	
indefinite *this*	mental proximity	

First, let us categorize the main function of *this*, focusing on its use in definite NPs, into two types: indication of spatio-temporal proximity and discourse proximity. And besides that, we assume that it has a sub-function to indicate 'mental proximity', the term we coin for this paper (we use the term 'mental' in almost the same sense as 'psychological'). Consider the following examples:

(25) Definite *this*:
    a.   *This room* is too cold.   (Quirk *et al.* 1985:372)
    b.   Why do you talk to me about *this person*?   (Ando 1986a:72)
    c.   Look at *this mess*!   (Wald 1983:97)
    c.   This is not some job, flipping burgers at the local drive-in!... Yes!—
         your approach to *this whole damn case* bothers me!   (IMDb)

Definite *this* signifies as its main function that its referent is proximal to the speaker, either in spatio-temporal reference as in (25a) or in anaphoric reference within the field of discourse as in (25b), and these are the generally well-known characteristics of *this*. It should be noted here that the pronominal use of *this* can make not only an anaphoric but also a cataphoric reference and that its antecedent/backward antecedent is obligatory in the discourse field, though the pronominal use is not in the scope of this paper.

As for mental proximity, we consider that it does not function saliently in the case of definite *this*. However, as a basis for it, we cite here examples of co-occurrence of definite *this* with emotive expressions such as exclamations and phrases, expressing the speaker's emotions and subjective evaluation of the referent.

In (25c) with the spatio-temporal use and in (25d) with the anaphoric use of *this*, cooccur the emotive expressions, which implies the function of mental proximity.

Now let us proceed to the case of indefinite *this*. Extended from the definite use, indefinite *this* no longer functions to indicate either spatio-temporal or discourse proximity. Alternatively, mental proximity is given salience and becomes its main function. These are what the proposal in (24) and Table 1 illustrate.

We should notice that there are examples of so-to-speak 'intermediate' use of *this* between definite and indefinite. Particularly, about the discourse reference, Wald (1983) points out that indefinite *a* can be used when the speaker reintroduces a referent as a new topic despite of having been already referred to in the previous context, and that it can be replaced by indefinite *this*.

4.2 Specific Analysis

Having established the framework of our argument, let us now specifically examine some examples of indefinite *this*:

(26)   (The speaker is an actress; talking during an interview about how she created one of the characters she acted, she refers to a woman she once saw:)
       ...And, uh uh this this, I went to ***this one restaurant*** in LA and I just looked around, and oh my god *there* she was, and I just, you know, copied her. She told she was a poetess. And this woman was reading poetry, awful poetry, to this, a person, she was dining with her, was basically sleeping through the whole episode, and I thought oh my god that's her!
                          ("Inside the Actors Studio")

(27) The first football game of the year, he came up to school in **this big goddam Cadillac**, and we all had to stand up in the grandstand and give him a locomotive—that's a cheer. Then, the next morning, in chapel, he made a speech that lasted about ten hours...   (*The Catcher in the Rye*)

We claim that in the examples above, the referents of indefinite *this* NPs are regarded by the speaker as MENTALLY PROXIMAL TO THE SPEAKER and DISTAL FROM THE HEARER. Let us apply here a part of the condition from Kamio & Takami (1998) mentioned in 3.1:

(28) Condition for information to enter the territory of the speaker/hearer (in English cases):
    a. Information must be obtained through the speaker/hearer's internal direct experience, or
    b. information must be obtained through the speaker/hearer's external direct experience, including information verbally conveyed to the speaker/hearer by others and presumed by the speaker/hearer to be reliable.
    (Kamio & Takami 1998:56-57, my translation (based on Kamio 1997:18))

The term 'internal direct experience' is defined as follows:

(29) ...'internal direct experience' means so-called internal feelings such as pain, emotion, memory and belief which are directly felt within an experiencer's mind.   (Kamio 1997:18)

If (28a) and/or (28b) hold only in the case of the speaker, which means that if a referent NP carries information given only to the speaker by his/her internal or external direct experience, then mental proximity holds only for the speaker and not for the hearer. We consider that indefinite *this* is chosen to indicate it. On the contrary, specific indefinite *a* is not concerned with such proximity. Furthermore, it must be noted that we assume an external direct experience must involve some internal direct experiences, and therefore (28b) must involve (28a) but not vice versa. In the cases of indefinite *this* in (26) and (27), both (28a) and (28b) hold.

Another important point to notice is the latter part of (28b):

(30) ...including information verbally conveyed to the speaker/hearer by others and presumed by the speaker/hearer to be reliable.   [(=28b)]

Kamio (1997) and Kamio and Takami (1998) propose this part according to the fact that in English, information which the speaker presumes is reliable, even if it is given by others, can be expressed in a 'direct form', or assertive form. And to information conveyed by such expressions, they assign certain values approaching 1 on the speaker's psychological scale. On the other hand, when an utterance is made in an 'indirect form', using non-factive predicates such as *seem* and *appear*, or expressions implying the speaker's uncertainty about information (*I think...*, *I hear...*,

etc.), the value of the psychological scale of information decreases approaching 0, though they consider that information is sufficient (28b). Making such calculations is rather confusing, and therefore to simplify our analysis, we only assume that as for the speaker information conveyed by an 'indirect' utterance does not satisfy (28b).

4.3 Justification of Proposal

Considering what we have previously discussed, let us try to justify our claim: indefinite *this* is selected frequently instead of *a* to indicate strongly that the referent is mentally proximal to the speaker.

4.3.1 Reliability of Information   First, whether the speaker regards information about a referent as reliable or not appears to matter in choosing either indefinite *this* or *a*.

> (31)   I think there's *a piece* on FX's and MX's [Note: a man's name]
>   international study that came out Well the nature article [*sic*] came out
>   and there was a piece in the New York Times and ***this reporter*** called me
>   to ask you know that I was on some list you know to make some
>   comments Mm. About the study Mm. for you know this article and Mm. I
>   just really didn't have the time to look at the article.   (CD: UK spoken)

> (32) a.   Information must be obtained through the speaker/hearer's internal
>   direct experience, or
>   b.   information must be obtained through the speaker/hearer's external
>   direct experience, including information verbally conveyed to the
>   speaker/hearer by others and presumed by the speaker/hearer to be
>   reliable.   [=(28)]

In (31), *a piece* is first introduced by specific indefinite *a* NP, and indefinite *this* is used to state *this reporter*. The expressions, *I think there's a piece...* at the beginning and *I just really didn't have the time to look at the article* at the last part, are in indirect forms, and they apparently tell us that the speaker has not perceived the referent of *a piece*. Thus reliability or certainty of information conveyed by *a piece* is not high enough for the speaker to satisfy condition (32b) (corresponding to (28b) in 5.2). We consider this to be the reason why the referent is introduced first by indefinite *a*, not indefinite *this*, nevertheless it recurs as many as 4 times in the discourse (4 underlined NPs). Contrastingly, in the case of definite *this* NP, the referent of *this reporter* has been directly perceived by the speaker and thus holds (32b). This strongly indicates mental proximity for him/her, and therefore indefinite *this* is chosen.

   To support this argument, let us take a look at some examples checked by native speakers:

(33) a. I heard he was with $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} a \\ \sqrt{/?this} \end{array} \right\}$ man or woman.

   b. Mary told me she saw $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} a \\ \sqrt{/?this} \end{array} \right\}$ white unicorn, but I don't believe her.

   c. I don't remember well, but the last time we met we may have got into $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} a \\ ?this \end{array} \right\}$ fight.

In an 'indirect' utterance as in these examples, using indefinite *this* to introduce a referent is sometimes regarded as slightly unnatural, different from indefinite *a*.

4.3.2 Co-occurrence with Emotive Expressions   Another supplementary proof to our argument is the frequent co-appearance of indefinite *this* with emotive expressions as mentioned in 5.1.:

(34) a. ...he came up to school in *a/this big goddam Cadillac*...   [=(27)]
   b. On my birthday last year, he bought *a/this massive cake* for me.

In these examples, modifiers in the italicized NPs indicate some emotional movement in the speaker's mind, and these utterances clearly indicate the speaker's internal direct experience, which leads us to state that information they carry satisfies condition (32a)(=(28a)). Some native speakers answered that with these expressions they prefer using indefinite *this* to *a*, while others perceive no difference between them. So it can be inferred that indefinite *this* NPs with emotive expressions strongly indicates that its referent is mentally proximal to the speaker, but on this point we must make further observation.

4.3.3 Co-occurrence with 'Historical Present'   A number of researchers have been observed that *this* often cooccurs with a special use of the English tense called the 'historical present'. Consider the following examples:

(35) a. Last week I'*m* in the sitting-room with the wife, when ***this chap*** next door *staggers* past and in a drunken fit *throws* a brick through our window.   (Ando 1986b:76)
   b. So one day ***this traveling salesman*** *comes* around.   (Wald 1983:97)

In these utterances, the present tense does not have the 'one instance right now' meaning of a true present, as is easily seen from the co-appearance of adverbials expressing the specific point of past time: *last week* and *one day*. The accepted description of the historical present is as follows: the speaker describes past events as if they are happening right now in an eye-witness situation to bring them to life. Thus *this* as spatio-temporal deixis is frequently used with such a special tense. Notice that in (35b) *come*, the verb form of spatio-temporal deixis also occurs. These uses are often found in narratives as a strategy for a dramatic storytelling. A typical example is (35b), the beginning of a joke told by a stand-up comedian.

We believe that the considerations above do not conflict with our claim on

indefinite *this*. The referent of *this* is introduced into the discourse as proximal to the speaker, as if it is spatio-temporally proximal in the immediate situation, but in the strict sense it is only proximal on the psychological scale.

Furthermore, Chafe (1994) points out that sometimes the speaker first uses the past tense and then shifts to the historical present within the same discourse, as in the following:

(36) a.   Like one day I *was* just
     b.   I *was* uh *carrying* my baggage,
     c.   to the garbage dump.
     d.   And ***this guy** came* by on a motorcycle$_i$.
          • • • •
     e.   And then,
     f.   I'*m walking*,
     g.   Like back to my house and,
     h.   ***This motorcycle***$_i$ *gets* slower and slower and slower...

                                                            (Chafe 1994:208)

In the utterance above, the speaker switches from the past tense to the present in (36f). Chafe argues that the speaker tends to 'slip into the historical present' at the point which he regards to be the climax of the narrative. Here, let us focus on the uses of *this* in (36). It cooccurs both with the past tense in (36d), and with historical present in (36h). We assume that *this guy* in (36d) is an indefinite *this* NP, but it is hard to determine whether *this motorcycle* in (36h) is a definite or an indefinite. It possibly be falls into the 'intermediate' use of the discourse reference, which we have mentioned in 5.1, which is coreferential with *a motorcycle* in (36d). Whether there is a difference between these uses of *this* remains unsolved here.

4.4 (Un)topicality of the Referents Introduced by Indefinite This

Finally, let us examine the facts already shown in the previous studies we surveyed in section 2: the use of indefinite *this* with further information about the referent and recurrence of the referent NPs in the subsequent discourse. We consider such coherent reference to be arbitrary, though we admit that it can be seen in many examples. Even if it is first introduced by indefinite *this*, the referent neither recurs nor is further information added to it when the speaker does not intend to inform the hearer more fully about the referent. In such examples, the referent remains mentally distal from the hearer. Most such cases must occur when the referent is not linked to the discourse topic, but let us take a look at an interesting example given in Wald (1983):

(37) (During an interview:)
         Q: Who's your best friend?
         A: ***This guy***. (referring to no one present)
         (interruption)   (Wald 1983:98)

In this conversation, though the hearer (=the interviewer) apparently wants the speaker to talk about the referent of *this guy*, the speaker withholds further information.

Contrastingly, if further information is attached to indefinite *this* NP in the subsequent discourse as in the following examples, then the referent becomes mentally proximal not only to the speaker but also to the hearer.

(38) But there was one nice thing. ***This family*** *that you could tell just came out of some church were talking right in front of me*— *a father, a mother, and a little kid about six years old.*   (*The Catcher in the Rye*)

(39) Q: Is there anything about your appearance that bothers you?
       A: My hair bugs me. Conan O'Brien was saying on his show that everybody should have their own personal groomer. So as a joke, he had ***this guy*** *straddled around him, hanging onto him wherever he went, constantly fixing his hair.* I kinda wish I had somebody to do that for me.
                                                                                    (*Jane*)

So far we have made a detailed examination of *this.* In the next section let us turn to *that*, the counterpart of *this* in the system of demonstrative reference, focusing on its particular use which stands in interesting contrast to indefinite *this*.

5   *THAT* AS A CONTRAST TO *THIS* ON THE SCALE OF PROXIMITY

5.1 Argument on That *as a Whole: Referring to Previous Studies*

5.1.1 Spatio-Temporal Reference   The frequently discussed function of demonstrative *that* is that it indicates spatio-temporal distance from the speaker while *this* indicates proximity to him/her. And in many cases, *that* indicates that its referent is also distant from the hearer.

(40) a.   Look at *that flower* over there.
      b.   When I woke up with you *that morning*, somehow there was something special about you.   (IMDb)

However, it is observed that *that* sometimes implies PROXIMITY TO THE HEARER, not distance from the hearer, as in the following examples:

(41) a.   Give me *that filthy lollipop*, Marvin! Don't put it in your mouth.
                                                                            (Ando 1986a:72)
      b.   Could you give me half of *that*?   (Quirk *et al.* 1985:372)

In both examples, the referent of *that* is spatially proximal to the hearer and distal from the speaker.

These characteristics of *that* are well captured in Halliday and Hasan (1976) as

follows: 'near you, or not near either of us, but at any rate not near me' (Halliday and Hasan 1976:59). They present the supporting fact that many languages have a set of three demonstratives to distinguish 'near me', 'near you' and 'not near either of us' from each other, such as Japanese demonstrative morphemes *ko-*, *so-* and *a-*. And in the case of English, as Halliday and Hasan point out, this system is found in some dialects, mostly of North England, which have *this* ('near me'), *that* ('near you') and *yon/yond/yonder* ('not near either of us'). The latter are survivors from OE and ME, but they are not located in contemporary Standard English.

(42)   But look, the morn in russet mantle clad. Walks o'er the dew of *yon high eastward hill.*   (CobuildDirect: *Hamlet*)

(43)   I sleep 'neath a tree at *yonder waterfall.*   (CobuildDirect: UK books)

(44)   "... So stay in the company of friends, close to that Customs officer's pretty wife, or Mrs Dainty, or *yon Scotch lass,* or—...
                                        (CobuidDirect: UK books)

(45)   See *yon rich, unwary traveller*? I'll rob him of his gold, and give it to some poor unworthy slob! That'll PROVE I'm Robin Hood!   (IMDb)

We infer that *yon* was gradually merged with *that* in Standard English, and we consider it as a proof that in some cases the use of *that* implies that the referent is 'near you' and in other cases 'not near either of us'.

Furthermore, we must note that the spatio-temporal reference by *that* NP has sometimes almost as the same meaning as definite *this*.

(46) a.   Have you seen *this report* on smoking?
     b.   Have you seen *that report* on smoking?
                                        (Quirk *et al.* 1985:374)

Quirk *et al.* consider that in certain contexts the use of *this* implies its referent is 'the one I have recently been thinking about' while *that* implies 'the one I was looking at sometime ago', though they can also occur in the same situation; they assert that the only difference in such a case is the speaker's subjective measurement of proximity.

Another approach to such examples is made briefly in Halliday and Hasan (1976). They analyze such use of *this/that* both as exophoric (spatio-temporal) and as implying anaphoric (discourse) proximity to/distance from the speaker, as in the following:

(47) a   What about *this exhibition*?
     b.   What about *that exhibition*?
                                        (Halliday and Hasan 1976:61)

They suppose that (47a) may imply something like 'that I told you is on now; shall we go and see it?', whereas (47b) may have such an implication as 'that you told me was on earlier; did you go and see it?'; it cannot be the other way round.

These two arguments reinforce our suggestion that some uses of that imply mental proximity to the hearer as in (47b), while others imply distance from both the speaker

and the hearer.

5.1.2 Anaphoric Reference   From the view of proximity, let us briefly mention here the use of pronominal *that* within the discourse field to make explicit anaphoric reference (as is well known, the cataphoric use is not allowed for *that*).

> (48)   I like the lions, and I like the polar bears. *These* are my favourites.
> —*Those* are my favourites too.   (Halliday and Hasan 1976:60)

As many researchers point out, the speaker of the first utterance uses *these* to refer to what he/she has just mentioned (*the lions* and *the polar bears*) and thus proximal to him/her. And as in section 4, we assert here once again that it implies the referents' proximity or a strong link in the speaker's mind. On the other hand, what has been just mentioned by the other person cannot be proximal to the hearer (= the speaker of the second utterance), and therefore he/she can hardly use *these* in place of *those*.

The distinction between the anaphoric use of pronominal *this* and *that* is more difficult in some other cases:

> (49) a.   ...Jackson thus claims that the first theory should be preferred over the second in terms of its explanatory power.
> *This/That* is the view expressed by him in his celebrated 1945 article.
> b.   ...Jackson thus claims that the first theory should be preferred over the second in terms of its explanatory power.
> *It* is the view expressed by him in his celebrated 1945 article.
> (Kamio 1990:159)

In (49a), the use of *this* is easily explained by the same reason as *these* in (48): its referent is what has just been expressed by the speaker in the first utterance and therefore considered to be proximal to him/her. But the fact that anaphoric *that* can be used in the same situation is not predictable from this viewpoint. Kamio (1990) and Kamio and Thomas (1999) approach this problem by contrasting *that* to pronominal *it*. They assert that *it* as in (49b) refers broadly to prior information and the set of related facts and events. That is often information central to the speaker's knowledge. In contrast, *that* as in (49a) points rather narrowly to incoming information which is likely to be more peripheral to the speaker's knowledge, and it may be followed by information more central to his/her knowledge or focused in the discourse.[11] Therefore in such cases, *that* does not function to indicate discourse or textual distance as a contrast to *this*, differing from such examples as (48).

Our interest in this paper is mainly in the uses of demonstratives as articles or determiners in NPs, so we should rather contrast *that* to definite article *the*. However, the points mentioned above are helpful for our analysis, since *it* and *the* derived from *that* and thus show some parallel characteristics in contrast to *that*. We will deal with

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[11] As when the speaker does not agree with the view, and when there is another view expressed by Jackson on which the speaker is going to give more focus than that view, *etc.*

them in the following subsection.

Keeping these arguments in mind, we will make a special analysis of *that* as 'a presupposed first mention'.

5.2 The Use of That as a Presupposed First Mention

It is widely known that both *the* and *that* are used to refer to shared information. What we particularly wish to discuss here is the use of *that* with which the speaker presumes that its referent is presupposed by, or accessible to, the hearer though the referent is previously not mentioned. Wald (1983) observes some interesting examples of the use:

> (50)   ...There's a lady that went on *a roller coaster*. No, not really a roller
>   coaster. You know Knotts Berry Farm, **that thing** that goes up?
>   (Wald 1983:96)
> (51)   My sister works in— you know **that deer**?   (Wald 1983:113)

In (50), the referent of *that thing* is not previously mentioned in the strict sense, since it is not coreferential with *a roller coaster*. But it is accessible to the hearer by the direct link between those referents and by the shared, in this case cultural or social, knowledge about the ride. The use of *that* is more striking in (51), as Wald considers: 'shared information appealed to by the speaker allows the Hartford Insurance Company to be located as the referent of *that deer* (i.e. the information that the company symbol is an elk)' (Wald 1983:113).

He contrasts this particular use of *that* to indefinite *this* which introduces a referent as a nonpresupposed first mention, as we briefly quoted in 2.2. Wald claims that both *the* and *that* do not extend to nonpresupposed first mentions, since the extension would lead them to lose their ability to indicate the speaker's expectation of prior 'sharedness' of information which they convey. On the contrary, unstressed *this* has never gained such an ability, and so *this* is never used in the same situation as in (50) and (51):

> (52) a.   ...There's a lady that went on *a roller coaster*. No, not really a roller
>   coaster. You know Knotts Berry Farm, *this thing* that goes up?
>   b.   My sister works in— you know *this deer*?

Now we raise a question which is left untouched by Wald (1983): if both *the* and *that* have the same function of indicating a presupposed first mention, why does the speaker of utterances such as (50) and (51) prefers *that* to *the*? We will try to clarify this by using the notion of mental proximity to the hearer, the notion we have already proposed in section 4. Let us analyze the following examples:

(53) ...So you're going out of town towards Hove and then you're turning off the Western road. Yeah. Mm. And going down to the seafront one of ***those roads*** not all that far from Waitrose but a bit further on.

(CD: UK spoken)

(54) I used to enjoy ***those enormous hotel breakfasts***. (Quirk *et al.* 1985:375)

(55) It gives you ***that great feeling of clean air and open spaces***.

(Quirk *et al.* 1985:375)

In these utterances, *that/those* is used to make a presupposed first mention, and information with which the referents of *that* NP are associated is neither located in the immediate place of utterance nor in the previous discourse; it is only located in the shared cultural or social experience of the participants of these utterances. We suggest here that the use of *that/those* signifies the speaker's strong expectation or confirmation of such 'sharedness' with the hearer of information about the referent, and therefore to indicate MENTAL PROXIMITY TO THE HEARER of information. Here let us repeat once again the condition we have previously applied to mental proximity in the use of indefinite *this*:

(56) Condition for information to enter the territory of the speaker/hearer (in English cases):

   a. Information must be obtained through the speaker/hearer's internal direct experience, or

   b. information must be obtained through the speaker/hearer's external direct experience, including information verbally conveyed to the speaker/hearer by others and presumed by the speaker/hearer to be reliable.   [=(28)]

We assert that in (53-55) the speaker expects that information about the referent of *that/those* NP is familiar to the hearer for the sake of the hearer's external and internal direct experience about the referent. For instance in (55), the use of *that* as a presupposed first mention implies something like 'that feeling you know well'; it is the speaker's presumption that the hearer has directly experienced *that great feeling of clean air and open spaces* and is familiar with it. This apparently satisfies at least (56a) and thus mental proximity holds for the hearer. We infer that in such uses of *that*, condition (56) also holds in the case of the speaker, but that it is not given salience, in contrast to indefinite *this*, since the main function of *that* in such cases is to signify proximity for the hearer.[12]

Furthermore, we predict that *the* can be used instead of *that* in (53-55), but it is neutral or not concerned with such proximity/distance.

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[12] Also, it may imply that the referent is spatio-temporally distal from the hearer, if we interpret (53-55) as an exophoric reference to specific entities; though in (54) and (55) it is ambiguous whether the use of *that* and *those* is specific or generic ('those kinds of breakfast/that kind of feeling').

5.3 Summary of Argument on That

To conclude our discussion on *that*, let us unify its uses roughly into the following table, applying the notion of proximity for both the speaker and the hearer:

Table 3. Deictic function of that *on the scale of proximity*

	speaker	hearer	
spatio-temporal proximity	−proximal (distal)	+proximal	(58)
		−proximal	(57)
discourse proximity	−proximal	+proximal	(59)
	neutral		(60)
mental proximity		+proximal	(61)

(57)   Look at *that flower* over there.   [=(40a)]
(58)   Give me *that filthy lollipop*, Marvin! Don't put it in your mouth. [=(41a)]
(59)   There seems to have been a great deal of sheer carelessness.
        —Yes, *that*'s what I can't understand.   (Halliday and Hasan 1976:60)
(60)   Every grant awarded to a professor should be reported to administration
        without exception. *That* is what the administration has decided.
                                                              (Kamio 1990:158)
(61)   It gives you *that great feeling of clean air and open spaces*.   [=(55)]

This is the gist of our argument in this chapter. We must note that each of the three types of proximity functions together in the same use of *that*. For instance, the use of *that* which implies both spatio-temporal distance and discourse distance as anaphoric reference from the speaker, as we have mentioned in 5.1.1.

(62)   What about *that exhibition*?   [=(33b)]
        (Implication: 'that you told me was on earlier; did you go and see it?')

Moreover, we have claimed in 5.2 that some examples of the use of *that* as a

presupposed first mention, the main subject of our examination here, simultaneously carry two types of function: mental proximity to the hearer and spatio-temporal distance from the speaker. However, we consider that spatio-temporal distance from the speaker is less salient in contrast to mental proximity to the hearer as a function of such use of *this*.

It should be also noted that this table does not cover all types of usage of *that*; there are some uses, particularly of discourse reference, which are not associated with proximity.

6   CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, we have dealt with demonstratives *this* and *that* from the view of definiteness, specificity, presupposition and proximity. We have proposed that indefinite *this* mainly functions to indicate that its referent is mentally proximal to the speaker, and we have made analyses of various indefinite *this* examples, comparing it with definite *this* and with specific indefinite *a*. Furthermore, we have claimed that the appearance of further information following an indefinite *this* NP is arbitrary though it is found in many examples.

Consideration of all the variations of usage argued in this paper leads us to suggest the possibility that indefinite *this* might be becoming less limited in its use. For instance, the existence of the intermediate use between definite and indefinite *this* of discourse references can show that the subpart of the whole system of *this* has become free from the function of signifying discourse proximity. Moreover, with our assertion that marking discourse topic and coherence references are not the obligatory function of indefinite *this*, we might consider that the limitation on the use of indefinite *this* is very small, though at least it must make a reference to a referent which is at the same time specific, indefinite and also mentally proximal to the speaker as we have established in this paper. And it might be suggested that indefinite *this* is gaining an independent position as an article in contrast with indefinite specific *a*. However, further examination is necessary on these points.

We have also applied our notion of mental proximity to the use of *that* as a presupposed first mention and asserted that it strongly signifies the speaker's expectation that its referent is mentally proximal to the hearer, whereas *the* in the similar use is irrelevant or neutral to such proximity. We should observe more examples of these uses for the further development of our argument.

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