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‘V + NP + TO-INFINITIVE’ CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH: A SUBJECTIFICATION ACCOUNT*

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Classification of Verbs in ‘V + NP + To-infinitive’ Constructions

‘V + NP + to-infinitive’ constructions have long undergone numerous analyses and classifications from various viewpoints. Such analyses as submitted by Jespersen (1940) and Zandvoort (1957), that are based mainly on semantic characterizations of verbs, or those by van Ek (1967) and Rosenbaum (1967), which adopt syntactic evidence as their criteria, have provided a rationale for classification of superficially parallel configurations and have outlined useful directions for their followers. With many revisions and totally different frameworks proposed, these constructions are still attracting the attention of many linguists and are a major topic for heated discussion.

In semantic terms, a typical characterization of the verbs at issue would classify them into three groups: verbs of verbal command and requirement (or manipulative/deontic verbs), cognition-utterance verbs (or epistemic verbs), and emotive verbs. A standard analysis posited under the framework of generative grammar, on the other hand, might also present a relatively similar subcategorization pattern as the one based on semantic characterizations:

- (1) They persuaded us to sell the house.
- (2) They believed us to have sold the house.
- (3) They want us to sell the house.

(Mair 1990:98-99)

Sentence (1) is an example of a ‘control’ construction, since an unexpressed subject of the infinitival clause is referentially dependent on (i.e. controlled by) a constituent of the higher clause, in this case, the object of the matrix verb (or, the patient). Passivization of the matrix clause, therefore, is claimed to result in a ‘cognitively synonymous’ sentence, while the passivization of the embedded clause does not.

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- (1') a. We were persuaded to sell the house.
b. *They persuaded the house to be sold. (Mair 1990:98)

Those sentences like (2), with *believe*, are called ECM (Exceptional Case Marking) construction in generative grammar, because they allow not only passivization in the embedded clause but also passivization of the matrix clause, which turns the embedded clause subject into the matrix subject, without changing its 'cognitive meaning' in either case.

- (2') a. We were believed to have sold the house.
b. They believed the house to have been sold. (Mair 1990:99)

The matrix verb *want* in (3) is analyzed as taking a clause with a missing complementizer *for*. This means that the post-verbal NP works only as the subject of the infinitival complement clause and not as the object (or patient) of the matrix clause. Therefore, this construction does not allow passivization in the matrix clause, while passivization in the embedded clause is claimed to present ‘cognitive synonymy’.

- (3') a. *We are wanted to sell the house.
b. They want the house to be sold. (Mair 1990:98)

The result of these syntactic manipulations appears to be quite clear and simple. There are, however, many verbs which pose a challenge to this type of lexical classification of verbs. The borders between the groups are not so clear-cut as we might expect, and rather, as Mair (1990) points out, there is a considerable blurring of the boundaries between the classes which results in ambiguous usage for many verbs. For example, although such verbs as *order* and *allow* are normally regarded as *persuade*-type, as in (1), that is, their complement clause consisting of a direct object of the matrix clause and a controlled infinitival clause as is proved by the tests in (4) and (6)¹, they also allow passivized complement clauses and even syntactic dummies in the clausal object position, which means that the post-verbal NPs in those cases are not the object of the matrix verb but rather the subject of the infinitival complement clause. This data might present a problem for the lexical classification analysis of verbs characterized by their subcategorization properties in the lexicon.

- (4) I ordered the chauffeur to fetch the car. (\neq (5))
 (5) I ordered the car to be fetched by the chauffeur. (Andersson 1985:33)
 (6) We don't allow residents to entertain visitors.
 \neq We don't allow visitors to be entertained by residents.
 (Quirk et al. 1985:1219)
 (7) He wouldn't allow there to be any dancing.
 (Huddleston 1971; in Konishi 1980:37)

¹ The omissibility of the *to*-infinitives here also enables us to categorize them as this type.

Mair (1990:164) gives several other examples of seemingly problematic *persuade*-type verbs that take a passivized complement, and he also observes other patterns of an ambiguous or transitional character among various verbs. (For example, *expect* is transitional between an ECM verb (i.e. *believe*-type) and an emotive verb (i.e. *want*-type).)

Another difficulty this type of analysis must face is the fact that there are many ECM verbs which can appear only in passive sentences and not in active sentences (e.g. *say*, *rumor*). This fact, as Mair says, indicates that 'the active-passive relation is often skewed' for ECM verbs so that 'the passivisation test ceases to be a reliable criterion for classification' (Mair 1990:99).

There is another potential problem concerning the difference in the meaning of *to*-infinitives among *believe*-type (ECM) verbs. If *expect* is followed by a perfect infinitive, a future-perfect interpretation is required, as Mair (1990) also points out. This characteristic is comparable to that of *persuade*-type verbs, while it is not the case for such verbs as *believe*.

- (8) I suppose it's reasonable to expect every person reading English to have bought or somehow to have been given their own copies of Shakespeare.
(Mair 1990:139)
- (9) If you could persuade the fuel oil delivery men to have finished by nine o'clock in the morning, it would be a contribution. (*ibid.*:154)
- (10) The Soviet Union is believed to have made some small sales in Europe.
(*ibid.*:175)

While we cannot attribute this semantic difference among the same group of verbs to the subcategorization properties of any one group in the above classification, this phenomenon is too significant to be ignored, because the constraint it poses on the interpretation is of a systematic nature.

In the next section, I will briefly explain how I address these problems by means of an approach in the framework of Construction Grammar and how various notions ('subjectification', in particular) in Cognitive Grammar play a significant role in my account.

1.2 Construction Grammar Approach to V + NP + To-inf. Construction

The present article aims to give convincing semantic explanations to various syntactic facts with respect to the 'V + NP + *to*-infinitive' (hereafter, *V + NP + to-inf.*) constructions with positing Construction Grammar (cf. Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988, Goldberg 1995, among others) as its theoretical basis. As for the means of analysis, I take full advantage of the achievements in the context of Cognitive Grammar (cf. Langacker 1987, 1990a, 1991, etc.) and research carried out on grammaticization (cf. Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994, Bybee 1998, Hopper and Traugott 1993, Heine, Claudi, and Hünemeyer 1991) and subjectification (cf. Langacker 1990b, 1998; Traugott 1988).

Construction Grammar assigns meaning to the construction (a basic unit of

grammar) itself and recognizes that the lexical semantics of a verb and the semantics associated with the construction are interrelated to form meaning of the expression as a whole. I propose in this paper that the $V + NP + to-inf.$ structure is a construction in the sense of Construction Grammar, though of a highly abstract kind, and that each of the more concrete constructions with $V + NP + to-inf.$ structure should also be taken as an instance of a (sub-)construction under the higher level category of $V + NP + to-inf.$ I also maintain that those subconstructions as instances of this schematic construction are not given their position in this category at random: rather, they are rule-governed and linked to each other. One of the most important mechanisms to guarantee a structure to those subconstructions and to align them into some kind of a gradient is *subjectification* (in the sense of Langacker (1990b, 1998)). Here the concept can be explained roughly as the process of the attenuation of agentive control.

On the gradient motivated by subjectification, the construction which represents the most concrete and typically transitive relation between the participants is regarded as the source structure that occupies one extremity, such as the *persuade*-type semantic structure in (1) above. It is the most basic subtype in the $V + NP + to-inf.$ superconstruction compared with others in that it describes the most clear-cut transitive relation with tangible energetic interaction among the participants involved in the process. *Allow*-type semantic structure might express a less typical situation in the sense of transitivity and therefore might be placed lower on the gradient. Then, the semantic structure instantiated, for example, in *want/expect*-type constructions manifests itself further downstream of this gradient as a highly attenuated form of the agentive control, and the semantic structure exemplified by the verb *expect* in the sense of 'foresee' might be the other extreme of the gradient, which exerts the weakest agentive control over the complement event.

Also the important developments which I assume from this stage of weakest control are (i) the domain shift in the semantic structure for the epistemic type of verbs, and (ii) further strengthening of subjectification which enables passivization in the matrix clauses of those epistemic constructions. In the process of the former (i), the most highly attenuated *expect*-type structure provides a take-off point for the domain shift from the socio-physical domain to the domain of reasoning. The most significant effect of the domain shift at this stage is the removal of the temporal element from the conceptual base structure. As a consequence, the subtype produced in the target domain (i.e. *believe*-type structures), unlike other subtypes, does not assign to its *to*-infinitives a 'future oriented meaning' and *to* is thus left with the most abstract sense of cognitive path, namely, the process of reasoning or inference.

In the latter process of (ii), I claim that the evolution in subjectification leads to the passivization of the $V + NP + to-inf.$ constructions with epistemic verbs, which seems to have a different mechanism from a normal passivization process observed in the typical transitive cases (like some object-control verbs). I will show the evidence for the appropriateness of assuming a different passivization mechanism for those epistemic constructions with regard to their syntactic and semantic behaviors revealed in those passivized sentences.

The present article is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I will briefly review

some of the previous analyses on *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions and those on *to*-infinitives, and the problems of those analyses are given. Chapter 3 describes some theoretical background to the present study. In chapter 4, I propose an analysis of *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions from the viewpoint of Construction Grammar and give the advantages of my account over the explanation that ascribes all peculiarities to the lexical property of the matrix verbs. In chapter 5, I will explicate the detailed mechanism of the passivization process observed in the epistemic constructions and show how its difference from the ordinary passivization process affects the syntactic and semantic behaviors revealed in those passives. Chapter 6 is a concluding remark.

2 PREVIOUS ANALYSES AND PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS

2.1 Previous Analyses of *V + NP + To-inf.* Constructions and their Problems

As was mentioned in the first chapter, the *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions have received a great number of semantic analyses that have only resulted in much the same pattern of characterization. Among others, I will take up three analyses here: Quirk et al. (1985), Mair (1990) and Langacker (1995). These studies not only are most typical and highly influential, but also seem superior in that they share an attitude to seek for the possibility of those various constructions as forming some kind of continuum to cover the transitional cases. They also share several characteristics, however, which have shown up as serious problems. These problems will be pointed out in 2.1.4.

2.1.1 Quirk et al. (1985) Quirk et al. (1985) basically provides a three-tiered analysis of the complementation patterns of the *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions, which are monotransitive (SVO), complex transitive (SVOC_o), and ditransitive (SVO_iO_d) categories. The first group consists of verbs 'denoting (not) liking or wanting,' such as (*can't*) *bear, desire, hate, like, love, prefer, want, and wish*. As for *desire, expect, and intend*, they show some hesitation about categorizing them in this group and would rather categorize them as the second type, i.e. the complex transitive (SVOC_o) category, because those verbs accept the passive of the 'raised object', while acknowledging that they 'fit into this category with respect to introductory *for* and the extraposed passive' (1985:1194).

The second group poses many problems, as has been commented on by Mair (1990). It includes verbs which can be replaced by an indicative *that*-clause, verbs of intention, causative verbs, verbs with a modal character, and a variety of other 'influencing' verbs. This means that the present category contains both the *believe*-type verbs and the causative verbs which are normally categorized as *persuade*-type, such as *force, drive, and compel*. It also includes *cause, get, and enable* which do not normally allow passivization at all. In short, this category has been used to take on all the verbs whose properties fall short of the criteria for other two categories.

The third category consists of verbs which take, respectively, the subject as a speaker of some speech act, the indirect object as an addressee, and the *to*-infinitive

as an indirect directive. It includes such verbs as *advise*, *ask*, *command*, *persuade*, *remind*, *tell*, and *urge*. Although this categorization might appear plausible at first glance, it is highly doubtful whether the manner of the subject's attempt to influence the object (i.e. verbal or not) should be the ultimate criterion to determine the category of complementation, since we can find many examples which contradict this characterization:

- (11) The signs on the wall ask/advise/command/remind/urge us to work harder.
(Michael T. Wescoat, p.c.)

While the criteria for verb categorization are open to discussion, it still deserves special mention that the authors have acknowledged the possibility of these three complementation categories forming a 'gradient'. The biggest concern here, however, is that the consequent gradient is again not very persuasive, since the authors have heavily depended on various kinds of substitution tests, which are questionable as testing criteria, as Mair (1990:94) points out. The most obvious problem is that they have put the complex transitive type in between the monotransitive type and the ditransitive type based on the syntactic evidence of passive acceptability. This order on the gradient disregards the characteristic features of the largest sub-group of the complex transitive verbs, namely the cognition-utterance verbs such as *believe*: firstly, future orientation in the interpretation of *to*-infinitives suddenly disappears with those verbs, while this feature is maintained among the verb groups on both edges of the gradient; and secondly, those cognition-utterance verbs are under a strict constraint on the selection of infinitival verbs and thus only *be* or *have*, normally, can be used with those verbs. If we put the complex transitive type between the monotransitive type and the ditransitive type, we have to assume that these peculiarities appear in the middle of the gradient and disappear there again, which seems very unlikely.

2.1.2 Mair (1990) Mair (1990) fabricates his outstanding corpus-based analysis of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction by making Quirk et al.'s (1985) framework its foundation. He has made some notable modifications of it, especially reorganizing the notorious complex transitive type, by making such verbs as *believe* and *consider* its core members and reassigning other verbs either to the monotransitive class or to the ditransitive class. He fully acknowledges the gradience in syntactic coding and the existence of transitional constructions and syntactic blends, thus giving a warning by saying:

Ultimately, any classification of infinitival complement clauses which leans too heavily on a single syntactic criterion will be inadequate because it fails to do justice to the gradient transitions between categories. (p.99)

Furthermore, what is most remarkable in his analysis is that he poses questions on the reliability of passivization as a criterion for classification, and presents two possible paths to the passives, namely, "transformational" passives which are derived from corresponding active forms', and "paradigmatic" or "serial" passives

which are due to analogy with other passives' (p.99). What he proposes is this: in ditransitive patterns of infinitival complementation, we can 'derive' passives from corresponding active forms; in monotransitive patterns, only those verbs which would also be allowed in the ditransitive patterns such as *allow* or *order* will be qualified for having 'derived' passives; others that are never used in ditransitive patterns, such as *expect* or *intend*, will instead rely on the latter strategy, i.e. 'serial' formation of passives. I will discuss the issue of the latter possibility of passives further in Chapter 5.


All these arguments are fairly plausible and convincing. The only regrettable point is that he has paid little attention to the variation in meaning between the different instances of the *to*-infinitive clauses. While acknowledging the semantic difference between the complex transitive pattern and other types with respect to the temporal reference of *to*-infinitives, he does not give any further explanation. This indifference toward the temporal element causes him to end by concluding that the embedded subject of complex transitive type is, like that of ditransitive one, a separable element from the infinitive and therefore allows 'derived' passives, unlike the cases of *expect* and *intend*. This, however, is totally contradictory to the data produced, for example, by the pseudo-cleft test:

- (12) *What John believed Peter was to know French.
(Michael T. Wescoat, p.c.)
- (13) *What we like the parents is to visit the school.
- (14) ?What they asked the students was to attend a lecture.
(Quirk et al. 1985:1219)

2.1.3 Langacker (1995) Langacker (1995) provides detailed explanation how the mechanism of 'raising' should be treated in the context of Cognitive Grammar, especially in order to guarantee the semantic feature of 'transparency'. The device he adopts in his account is 'metonymy'. For example, in the case of the verb *expect* in a Subject-to-Object Raising construction, it is not in fact the object referent (i.e., the landmark) but the schematic process elaborated by an infinitival complement that has a direct relationship with the subject of *expect* (i.e. the trajector): but the landmark is much more salient than the schematic process as a whole (since it is the trajector of that process), so the landmark is invoked as a reference point for the process as an active zone: thus, the trajector of the complement process is chosen as the landmark of the focused relation by means of an 'active-zone/profile discrepancy', namely, a metonymy. Likewise, he claims that all three patterns of raising (Subject-to-Object Raising, Subject-to-Subject Raising, and Object-to-Subject Raising) should be accounted for in a parallel way, i.e. by means of positing a metonymical processing in the semantic structures of raising constructions.

Although his explanation raises many questions, I will take up only those which are relevant here. First, since he posits only two patterns of construction concerning the *V + NP + to-inf.* configurations, namely, the raising construction and the control construction, the former naturally includes both the *expect*-type verbs and the *want*-type verbs. He thus should be required to give a plausible explanation why only the *expect*-type verbs are allowed passivization while the *want*-type verbs are not. If he

claims that the *expect*-type and the *want*-type have the metonymical structure in common, and the passive of *expect* is sanctioned by the metonymical effect of the shift of prominence on the same conceptual base, we then do not see any reason that might deter passivization merely in the case of the *want*-types.



<Figure 1>

The second problem is metonymy itself. While he admits, tentatively though, that the raising and control constructions could form a continuum with those classic examples occupying each extremity, metonymy would bar such analysis: because metonymy (and metaphor, too) is a relation which either holds or does not, that is, it cannot afford such situations as holding a little bit or halfway, it might not come to terms with such notion as gradience at all. Thus, metonymy might not be an ideal device to be incorporated here if we absolutely need to posit gradience among those constructions.

Last but not least we have the problem of gradience. Langacker assumes that verbs of perception and causation are examples of transitional types situated somewhere on the path from the raising construction to the control construction. This clearly shows that he assigns no tangible meaning to the complementizer *to*, in that he places bare infinitive constructions in the midst of a gradience whose both extremities are occupied by *to*-infinitive constructions. Concerning the meaning of *to*, Langacker (1990a) states as follows:

The morphemes deriving infinitives and participles have the semantic effect of suspending the sequential scanning of the verb stem, thereby converting the processual predication of the stem into an atemporal relation. Where these morphemes differ is in the additional effect they have on the processual notion that functions as their base. I analyze the infinitival *to* as having no additional effect whatever: in *the first person to leave* or *Jack wants to leave*, the infinitive *to leave* profiles the same sequence of relational configurations as the verb stem *leave*, but construes them by means of summary scanning as a single gestalt.

(Langacker 1990a: 82, underline mine)

In Langacker (1995), however, his stance changes slightly with regard to the understanding of the notion of *to*, as in:

To imposes a holistic (atemporal) construal on the envisaged event, and probably also places it in the future with respect to a temporal reference point, but it is not force-dynamic and does not focus on the evolutionary momentum of reality.

(Langacker 1995: 37, underline mine)

In any case, he seems to assume no meaning in *to* other than a rather *ad hoc* notion of 'futurity'. Thereby he can no way explain the different patterns in time reference between *believe*-types and *expect*-types, nor can he make any comment on the selectional constraint on the *believe*-type infinitives.

2.1.4 Discussions I have briefly reviewed three major analyses and pointed out the problems observed one by one. These topics are summarized and further developed here.

The first point to note is that all three analyses above have neglected the existence of the potential meaning of complementizer *to*, which is the only shared element in all types of the present construction (except, maybe, Langacker's tentative hypothesis of continuum which, however, also includes constructions with bare infinitives (i.e. without *to*) as members of the same continuum). First, as I mentioned above, the difference in the meaning of *to*-infinitives between *persuade/want/expect*-type verbs and *believe*-type verbs should not be overlooked: as for the temporal relation between the matrix verb and the infinitival verb, while *persuade/want/expect*-type verbs only assign their *to*-infinitives future or hypothetical readings, *believe*-type verbs invariably require concurrence between the matrix clause event and the event denoted by infinitives. This has been clearly shown in the case of perfect infinitives in (8)-(10) above.

Besides this dichotomy in the interpretation of *to*-infinitives with respect to temporal reference, whether *to* has any meaning or not can also be confirmed by comparing two usages, i.e., constructions with *to*-infinitives and those with bare infinitives, of the identical verbs that allow both constructions. If those interpretations have any kind of difference in meaning, it can be claimed that *to* has some meaning. Bolinger (1974) and Duffley (1992), as we will see briefly below, provide some evidence of the discrepancy in meaning between them. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that *to* is not meaningless and thus claims due attention.

The second point also has relevance to a peculiar feature of *to*-infinitives in *believe*-type verbs. Those verbs pose a strict selectional constraint on the infinitival verbs they take, i.e., they require their infinitival verbs to be 'stative' or 'imperfective'. Declerck (1991:475) goes so far as to say that 'some verbs [i.e. verbs of saying, hearing, thinking, etc.] allow the construction "V + NP + infinitive" only if the infinitive is *be* or *have*.' Although many grammarians have pointed out the constraint in some form or other, they do not give a convincing reason for the necessity of the constraint besides positing something like '*to-be* insertion' rule, as Mair (1990) does. He proposes that 'NP + *to*-infinitive' should be regarded as an elaboration of the verbless 'small clauses' in the SVOC pattern of complex transitive complementation (p.175). This reasoning does not seem to be plausible, since it does not account for the fact that passivization of *believe*-type construction 'lowers all bars' (Bolinger 1974:77) to this construction. Moreover, the explanation is not

compatible with the rather widely acknowledged fact that *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions diachronically came about as a reduced form of *that*-clauses, not as an elaboration of small clauses. Therefore, we have to look for other means for explanation of this restriction.

The third point of discussion concerns the structure of the gradient. It is remarkable that all three analyses above have assigned some kind of gradient structure on the *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions. The problem, however, is the internal structure itself. As has been shown, all of the three analyses posit the subject of the infinitival clause in *believe*-type (or *expect*-type, in Langacker's case) constructions as the 'true' object of the matrix clause in order to explain their behavior in passivization. Leaning too heavily on a single syntactic criterion, however, might be dangerous, because it would cause us to stop thinking about other possibilities and to overlook a very important symptom. Thus we should not exclude the possibility that there could be some kind of external influence on the passivization process, such as various pragmatic requirements, which overrides the otherwise normal syntactic restrictions. For example, Bolinger (1974) notes as follows:

The most important effect of the passive [of the *believe*-type construction] is the one that is complementary to shifting the focus onto the subject of the subordinate verb..., namely, the shifting of the focus *away* from the main subject and the main verb. It is no longer important who does the believing or supposing and the believing or supposing itself becomes ancillary to the subordinate proposition. (p. 78)

Calling this process 'adverbialization', Bolinger also points out that this process is responsible for another very important aspect of restriction on passives of the *believe*-type constructions: i.e., the fact that the agent (or rather, experiencer) must be people in general. He shows that if the main verb excludes this possibility, the passive cannot hold:

(15) I dreamed it to be as big as a house.

(16) *It was dreamed to be as big as a house. (Bolinger 1974:81)

These facts, which are also plausible intuitively, indicate a totally opposite line of argument from what Quirk et al., Mair, and Langacker maintain, i.e., the embedded clause subject in *believe*-type constructions should be the 'true' object of the matrix clause.

I do not call the process which enables the passivization of *believe*-type constructions 'adverbialization'; rather, I hypothesize that the mechanism which realizes the passives of *believe*-type constructions is 'subjectification', although the consequences it brings about is very similar in effect to adverbialization. I assume subjectification motivates not only the gradience from *persuade*-type to *expect/want*-type, but also the apparent 'passivization' process of *expect*- and *believe*-type verbs.

In the next section, we will briefly review the previous analyses on *to*-infinitives, an indispensable constituent of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction, by paying special attention to Duffley's (1992) analysis of *to*-infinitives.

2.2 Analyses of To-infinitives

2.2.1 *Meaning of to in To-infinitives: 'Futurity'* OED gives a comment on the development of *to* as complementizer as follows:

Originally, ... *to* before the dative infinitive ... expressed motion, direction, inclination, purpose, etc., toward the act or condition expressed by the infinitive; as in 'he came *to* help (i.e. to the help of) his friends', 'he went *to* stay there' ... But in process of time this obvious sense of prep. became weakened and generalized, so that *to* became at last the ordinary link expressing any prepositional relation in which an infinitive stands to a preceding verb, adjective, or substantive. ... [W]hen the infinitive is the subject or direct object, *to* has lost all its meaning, and become a mere 'sign' or prefix of the infinitive. (s.v. *to*)

As the OED's description clearly shows, an assumption that *to* in *to*-infinitives has lost all its original prepositional meaning and is now assigned the role only as an infinitive marker is highly predominant. Declerck (1991:467), for example, states as follows; 'in most cases *to* is no more than an "infinitive marker", i.e. a lexically empty function word signaling that an infinitive is about to follow.' In the tradition of generative grammar, *to* has been considered to be a morpheme that 'can hardly be said to have a meaning in any independent sense' (Chomsky 1957:100). Anderson (1985:57) distinguishes between the preposition *to*, which has a meaning, and the pure *to*-infinitive marker, 'which only has the syntactic function of introducing an infinitive,' taking examples as follows:

- (17) a. He trained the dog to perform some very clever tricks.
 - b. He taught the dog to perform some very clever tricks.
- (Anderson 1985:267)

Anderson claims that while in (17a) *to* is prepositional and therefore has its own meaning, in (17b) *to* is a pure infinitive marker and does not carry any meaning. This stance is hardly acceptable to me, with not only a totally parallel configuration between (17a) and (17b), but also the semantic contiguity of (17b) with (17a).

If *to* is meaningless at all in such cases as (17b), *to* should have been omissible, which is not the case for (17b). Even when *to* apparently seems omissible as in the case of *see*, such cases do not manifest themselves as the evidence for meaningless *to*, but rather they provide a strong ground that *to* has a meaning in its own right, because the omission of *to* results in the obvious shift in meaning. A good example is provided by Bolinger (1974):

- (18) a. I saw them to be obnoxious. (I apprehended the fact that they were.)
 - b. I saw them be obnoxious. (I beheld their acts.)
- (Bolinger 1974:66-67)

While *see* with the bare infinitive denotes 'immediate perception' (in Jespersen's (1940) terms), that with the *to*-infinitive depicts 'inference' or 'logical conclusion'. The contrast in meaning between (18a) and (18b) not only opposes the idea that *to* is

meaningless, but also provides an insight into the possible meaning of *to*.

Among those grammarians who postulate that complementizer *to* (or *to*-infinitive) has some semantic meaning (not a functional meaning, such as Givón (1980, 1990) and Langacker (1990a)), the majority of them attribute to it some kind of 'future' sense (cf. Wierzbicka 1988, Langacker 1995), 'a sense of mere 'potentiality' for action' (Quirk et al. 1985:1191), 'hypothesis or potentiality' (Bolinger 1968:124), or 'an agent moving towards some unrealized activity' (Dixon 1984:592). Under these notions applied to *to*-infinitives lies, without doubt, the meaning of the preposition *to* in the spatial sense of movement towards a point, which takes on the role of furnishing the conceptual base to complementizer *to*. The potential meaning of *to* in *to*-infinitive is naturally, as Duffley (1992) claims, more abstract than that in the spatial use of preposition. He goes so far as to note that the essentially spatial sense of the preposition has shifted to a 'strictly temporal sense' with the infinitive. Then, he describes the latter sense as follows:

The possibility of a movement from a point in time conceived as a before-position to another point in time which marks the end-point of the movement and which represents an after-position with respect to the first. (p.16)

Mair (1990), although he does not propose any basic meaning for the *to*-infinitive, points out a noteworthy character of predicates which are followed by *to*-infinitives:

The semantics of almost all *V + to-inf.* constructions is such that the action or state referred to in the infinitival clause follows the action or state referred to in the matrix clause in time ... Most matrix verbs taking subjectless infinitival object clauses could, therefore, be described as 'forward-looking', or if they are not exclusively forward-looking---as, for example, *remember* or *regret*---they take infinitival complement clauses only if used in a forward-looking sense. (p.103)

Though this comment is not made directly on the *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions, we can assume this as a general tendency of *to*-infinitives and reasonably apply it to other configurations that would choose *to*-infinitives as their components.

What is common in all of these analyses (with Dixon (1984) being the only possible exception), and clearly shown in particular in Duffley's, is the characterization of *to* as a mere temporal marker of 'posteriority (or futurity)' abstracted from the spatial meaning of 'movement towards'. As has been cited in 2.1.3, Langacker (1995) also maintains that *to* could have a sense of 'future' reference but not a force-dynamic implication. In addition, Duffley claims that this feature of 'before/after sequence' should be incorporated equally in all the conceptual constructions of *believe*-type verbs.

2.2.2 Meaning of to in To-infinitives: 'Direction of Agentive Control' Positing only the temporal meaning in all the uses of *to*, however, may raise some problems. First, it is often pointed out that *persuade*-type verbs can take only verbs of volitional action as their infinitives. Thus, while *He made us laugh* will allow two interpretations, i.e., 'we' laughed unwillingly because 'he' required us to do so or 'we' laughed spontaneously because of 'his' funny story or behavior, *He forced us to*

laugh has only one reading, i.e., 'we' were made to laugh. This factor can be related to the Riddle's (1975) notion of 'controllability'; this notion has the implication that the matrix subject controls, and therefore is responsible for, the complement event in that he/she initiates the process of realizing the complement event although the actual agent of the process is the object referent. The shift of agent does not eliminate the influence of the subject upon the implementation of the infinitival process by the object's hand. Thus, the infinitival event obviously denotes the target or result of the influence/control by the matrix subject, and, therefore, must be a volitional action taken by the object under the subject's control. This restriction imposed on the infinitival verb clearly shows that *to* conveys the meaning of 'direction of the control by the matrix subject' with some definite implication of force-dynamic relation, in addition to the element of temporal posteriority.

2.2.3 Meaning of To in To-infinitives: 'Logical Sequence' The second point which seems problematical in the temporal meaning of *to* is again related to the *believe*-type verbs. As for his argument that *to* is adopted in conceptual (i.e. *believe*-type) constructions on the grounds of the existence of a temporal relation, or a 'before/after sequence', between the matrix event and the infinitival event, Duffley makes a comment on a conceptual use of perception verbs as in (18a), in comparison with a perceptual use as in (18b) where the perception concurs with the infinitival event, as follows:

A perceived event then is not in the same relation to the act of perceiving it as an inferred event is to the act of inferring it. The former exists throughout the process of perception; the latter, however, has no existence before being conceived by the mind, and exists only as a conclusion which arises as a result of, after, the mental operation of inferring that the state of affairs it describes is true. (1992:33)

What he makes of the situation is definitely plausible, but why should he choose the 'temporal' element as the most distinguishable feature of *to* here, rather than the notion of 'logical sequence' itself which might be much easier to capture in cases of conceptual uses? The idea that the event (or rather, situation), depicted in the complement clause in conceptual uses, occurs after the perception, in a temporal sense, is at any rate contradictory to our intuition. We cannot but agree that the existence of a mental operation to reach the conclusion, i.e. inference, is the most prominent feature incorporated in the conceptual structure of this construction. The very mental operation then should be the grounds for adopting *to* here; that is, *to* denoting the direction or path of the mental operation of inference.

The reason why Duffley insists on the temporal meaning of *to* even in those conceptual uses is obvious: he couldn't abstract it away because it is the only remaining element among those pertaining to the spatial meaning of *to*. If he abandoned this from the notion of the complementizer *to*, there would be nothing left for the meaning of *to*, which definitely would undermine the rationale of employing *to* in this construction. The fundamental problem, however, is the postulated domain: he started from the spatial meaning of *to*, i.e. the meaning in the spatio-temporal domain, and, by abstracting all the spatial meaning away, he ended up with

the temporal meaning, which is the only element left behind with *to* and, therefore, which he cannot give up. We can assume, however, that there is another element in *to* as a complementizer, as I have mentioned in 2.2.2 above: i.e., the infinitival event denotes the target or result of the influence/control by the matrix subject and *to* conveys the meaning of 'direction of the control by the matrix subject' with an implication of a force-dynamic relation. Duffley himself acknowledges the existence of such an element when he many times describes the relation between the matrix event and the infinitival event as 'condition-consequence/result' or 'stimulus-reaction'. If, then, he had posed this as an intrinsic element in the conceptualization of these constructions, or in other words, if he had postulated not a spatio-temporal but a socio-physical domain from the beginning, he could have disposed of the temporal meaning in conceptual constructions, leaving behind only one element, i.e. the 'condition-consequence' relation as mental operations, such as reasoning and drawing inferences.

In the next chapter, we will consider the basic tenets of Construction Grammar as the theoretical background of the present analysis, along with some relevant notions such as subjectification.

3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We have so far reviewed some of the previous analyses of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction as a whole and its most essential constituent, *to*-infinitives, and have brought up several points for discussion. Based on these preliminary discussions, we can now proceed to the argument of the present hypothesis; *V + NP + to-inf.* construction as a whole undergoes the process of subjectification. Before that, however, I will briefly look at the theoretical framework this analysis is committed to and several other relevant notions adopted here.

3.1 Construction Grammar

The present analysis most fundamentally draws on the framework of Construction Grammar (Fillmore 1988, Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor 1988, Goldberg 1995). Construction Grammar posits constructions as the basic units of language. Constructions are defined as 'form-meaning correspondences' (Goldberg 1995:6), and, therefore, in order for a configuration to be defined as a construction, it must meet the condition that 'one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from knowledge of other constructions existing in the grammar' (1995:4). Thus, if we can show that the meaning and/or the form of a particular pattern is not compositionally derived from other constructions existing in the language, we can posit it as a construction in the grammar of the language.

Another important point to note is that in this framework 'no strict division is assumed between the lexicon and syntax' (Goldberg 1995:7). Every element from morphemes or words, phrasal patterns, to constructions in a traditional sense, all can be regarded as 'constructions' in this school as long as they are pairings of meaning

and form that are not predictable from anything else. Thus, the advantage of this system is that there is no restriction on the level of specificity to recognize some structure as a construction, and therefore we may deal with both a rather schematic structure and more concrete instances of the schema as constructions in common, as long as they satisfy the above mentioned conditions.

Although it is the case that constructions are grammatical entities that must be listed in Construction Grammar, the collection of constructions is not assumed to consist of an unstructured set of independent entities, but instead it is taken to 'constitute a highly structured lattice of interrelated information' (Goldberg 1995:5). They form a network and are linked by inheritance relations which motivate many of the properties of particular constructions while at the same time allowing for subregularities and exceptions.

As for the inheritance links, Goldberg postulates four major types: polysemy links, metaphorical extension links, subpart links, and instance links. Among others, polysemy links capture the relation between a particular sense of a construction and any extensions from this sense, with those extensions inheriting the syntactic specifications of the central sense. (19) is an example of a polysemy link given by Goldberg for the ditransitive pattern:

- (19) a. 'X CAUSES Y to RECEIVE Z' (central sense)
Example: Joe gave Sally the ball.
- b. Conditions of satisfaction imply 'X CAUSES Y to RECEIVE Z'
Example: Joe promised Bob a car.
- c. 'X ENABLES Y to RECEIVE Z'
Example: Joe permitted Chris an apple.
- d. 'X CAUSES Y not to RECEIVE Z'
Example: Joe refused Bob a cookie.
- e. 'X INTENDS to CAUSE Y to RECEIVE Z'
Example: Joe baked Bob a cake.
- f. 'X ACTS to CAUSE Y to RECEIVE Z at some future point in time'
Example: Joe bequeathed Bob a fortune. (Goldberg 1995:75)

Goldberg acknowledges that the force-dynamic causal relation (cf. Talmy 1976, 1985) is the central component of the central sense and that several of the extensions, in particular, enablement, resistance, and aiding, are concepts that are force-dynamically related to causation in the sense that these concepts involve two entities which are interacting via transmission of energy either in the same or in opposing directions. Though she recognizes that the force-dynamic causal relation plays an important role in the polysemy links of different constructions, she simply shows the pattern of realization of the causal relation and does not step further into structuring those notions involved in the polysemy links.

One of the biggest advantages of Construction Grammar to be noted here is that on a constructional approach to argument structure, systematic differences in meaning between the same verb in different constructions are attributed directly to the particular constructions (Goldberg 1995:4). This explains why many verbs can appear different types of *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions: if the semantics of the verb

is eligible to lexically code, or elaborate, the events designated by more than one construction, we can achieve seemingly different meanings of the verb in different constructions by attributing the discrepancy to the constructional meaning itself, without presupposing ad hoc polysemy in the verb.

This framework of Construction Grammar provides us with highly promising measures for analyzing the meaning of a construct which only has a very schematic structure, such as *V + NP + to-inf*. While sentences with this structure share some idiosyncratic semantic features and, thus, can be justifiably regarded as belonging to the same category, they do not have any lexical items but only one in common, that is, *to*. Therefore, it would be almost impossible to recognize and analyze these clauses as one category if we had drawn on a lexical analysis, instead of a constructional analysis. If we are, on the other hand, allowed to recognize a form-meaning correspondence in such an abstract structure and to prove that even the mere word order of *V NP to V* could be regarded as a meaningful linguistic unit, the possibility of structural analysis will certainly expand a great deal.

Thus, the framework of Construction Grammar meets our needs highly satisfactorily. The remaining problem here is how we can provide a structure for the internal relation in the polysemy links. Metaphor (and metonymy also), for example, cannot subsume a gradual change of meaning: since metaphorical transfer (or mapping) implies a jump of the image from the source domain to the target domain, it can not incorporate a gradual or gradient process between the source meaning and the target meaning. Therefore, if we want to explain some semantic character which gradually fades away or gradually strengthens, we have to come up with some other strategy to enable such gradual processes. I will here introduce a concept that is expected to fulfill this requirement: i.e. subjectification. Subjectification (or grammaticization) is a concept which originally is applied to diachronic change, but I will use this term in a synchronic sense and apply this to synchronic phenomena in this article. In the next section, we will briefly consider this notion.

3.2 Subjectification

Subjectification represents a common type of semantic change which figures in the process of *grammaticization*. Subjectification is an increase in subjectivity with regard to the perspective with which the conceptualizer construes a particular entity or situation (cf. Langacker 1990b:6-16). Langacker (1998) characterizes this notion as a gradual process of progressive *attenuation*; i.e. a fading process of the objective facets of the conceptualized event, leaving behind a subjective relationship that was originally immanent in it. He gives an example of this progressive attenuation in the case of *be going to*:

- (20) a. He was going to mail the letter but never reached the post office.
- b. He was going to mail the letter but never got around to it.
- c. If he's not careful he's going to tumble over the railing.
- d. Something bad is going to happen---I just know it.

- e. It's going to be summer before long.

(Langacker 1998:79)

The subject's physical movement and his/her intention to engage in the infinitival activity, both implied in (20a), fades away in (20b) and in (20c), respectively. In (20d), even the subject's responsibility with regard to the potential realization of the future event has disappeared. The force-dynamic component undergoes total disappearance in (20e) and nothing but an event downstream in time from a reference point is left behind.

Langacker (1998), which is a revised version of his 1990's explanation of this same notion, thus dispenses with the 'space-to-time metaphor' which he had incorporated in his original account for the grammaticization of *go* to a future marker. He proposes that the conceptualizer's subjective movement through time (in the form of the temporal scanning used to situate the envisaged process downstream in time, which is characteristic of the future sense,) is immanent in the original physical motion sense, in that the conceptualizer is necessarily scanning through time subjectively in conceiving of the subject following a spatial path through time (1998:78-79). One of the advantages of this characterization is that it enables us to conceive subjectification as a gradual process (as in (20)), which might be difficult if we drew on the metaphorical account.

While Langacker identifies subjectification with semantic *bleaching*, Traugott (1995) questions this by saying that although certain semantic properties may be reduced, they are replaced by pragmatic strengthening. She describes subjectification as follows:

'Subjectification' refers to a pragmatic-semantic process whereby 'meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief/state/attitude toward the proposition', in other words, towards what the speaker is talking about.

(Traugott 1995:31)

She further notes:

'Subjectification in grammaticalisation' is, broadly speaking, the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of speaker belief or speaker attitude to what is said. It is a gradient phenomenon, whereby forms and constructions that at first express primarily concrete, lexical, and objective meanings come through repeated use in local syntactic contexts to serve increasingly abstract, pragmatic, interpersonal, and speaker-based functions. (*ibid.*:32)

Traugott (1995:48-49) criticizes Langacker that his view of subjectification as 'semantic attenuation' and 'bleaching' comes up against many counterexamples. She therefore claims that in the process of grammaticization, certain semantic properties may be reduced, but they are replaced by pragmatic strengthening, that is, the subjective stance of the speaker.

Her criticism seems to merit attention, because the idea of subjectification only as an *attenuation* process somehow goes against our intuition. However, it is not necessarily metonymy or metaphor, as she claims, that should be counted on to

increase subjectivity: rather, it can only be the strengthened participation by the conceptualizer in the situation conceptualized that features the subjectification process (while the element of (weaker) 'participation of the conceptualizer' itself is immanent in its original sense). Thus, the conceptualizer's subjective construal becomes increasingly foregrounded as he/she plays more of a complementary role to the attenuated role of the agent. I regard this as very crucial in the notion of subjectification and refer to this as 'complementary strengthening'.

Some opposition might be raised to adapting the notion of subjectification or grammaticization to constructions rather than to the lexical items. This point, however, is not a problem from the Construction Grammar's standpoint as we have seen in 3.1: nor is it in view of the claim on the grammaticization by Bybee et al. (1994) and Langacker (1998) that it is the entire construction, not just the lexical item, that grammaticizes. I will take up this issue in more detail.

Grammaticization, as Traugott (1988) states, refers to the dynamic, unidirectional historical process whereby lexical items in the course of time acquire a new status as grammatical, morpho-syntactic forms. This process is typically depicted as a continuum of bondedness from independent units occurring in syntactically relatively free constructions at one end of the continuum, to less dependent units such as clitics, particles, or auxiliaries, to fused agglutinative constructions, inflections and lexical fusion, and finally to zero (cf. Traugott 1988:406). Thus, grammaticization can be said to be an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in semantic complexity (i.e. semantic bleaching), pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom (i.e. decategorization), and phonetic substance (i.e. erosion) (cf. Heine and Reh 1984: 15).

Grammaticization has been dealt with mainly in the context of a lexical change, for example, as the process where the verb *go* grammaticizes into a future marker. Here, however, I have to make objections on several points. First, what is dealt with in the present study is limited only to the earliest stages of the grammaticization process, where a verb continues to retain its status as a verb. The second point is more important: I assume in my hypothesis that not a single lexical item but the construction as a whole goes into the grammaticization process. An approximate stance can be observed in Bybee et al. (1994) and Bybee (1998):

It is the entire construction, and not simply the lexical meaning of the stem, which is the precursor, and hence the source, of the grammatical meaning.

(Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994:11)

A lexical morpheme does not grammaticize, rather, a lexical morpheme (or combination of grammatical ones) *in a construction* grammaticizes.

(Bybee 1998)

Langacker, in his comment on the grammaticization of *be going to*, also points out that it is not just the verb *go*, but the entire construction *be going to V*, that grammaticizes.

Thereby we can assume that, although the construction itself is fairly abstract, the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction would grammaticize. We should also note that, along with the semantic change of the construction as a whole, the meaning of complementizer *to* also changes through this process: from the meaning of indicating

the direction of the energy transmission in the socio-physical domain, which is already quite an abstract meaning, to the more abstract meaning of the indication of the direction of mental path in the same domain or, in some cases, in a more subjective domain, and finally to the most abstract meaning of simply indicating the route or path in the domain of reasoning which the mental operation might follow on its way to the conclusion.

We now move on to the detailed analysis of the specific constructions with *V + NP + to-inf.* structure in the framework described above. The explanations on each of *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions along the cline of subjectification are provided along with some brief comments on the relation between the semantics of the constructions and their syntactic behavior.

4 PROPOSALS AND ANALYSES

4.1 *V + NP + To-inf. as a Construction*

First I will show that *V + NP + to-inf.* sequence dealt with in the present study forms a construction in the sense of Constructional Grammar; that is, it represents a form-meaning correspondence, and the meaning of the construction isn't strictly predictable from its component parts or from other previously established constructions, thus forming some kind of gestalt.

It is not the case that any *V + NP + to-inf.* sequence can be regarded as a 'construction', or the target of the present study. Consider:

- (21) These women want a legal education (mainly) to prepare themselves to assault invidious laws. (Bresnan 1979:157)

In (21) the infinitival clause which expresses a purpose of the agent is omissible. The reflexive *themselves* clearly shows that (21) contains a direct object followed by a purpose clause.

Object-control is not a sufficient condition, either:

- (22) It's difficult to design a honeycomb to stand up to the temperature of the burning gases. (Mair 1990:203)

The infinitive in (22) expresses some notion of manner, thus may be considered adverbial in the sense 'It is difficult to design a honeycomb in such a way that it will stand up to the temperature of burning gases' (Mair 1990:203). There are in fact transitional kinds, such as:

- (23) We sent him to buy the tickets. (Mair 1990:207)

This type of clause may be regarded as a borderline case. However, when we think about the most characteristic nature of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction, that is, implication of potential or actual causation, or in other words, direct cause-

(24) We sent him to the box office. (Mair 1990:207)

(25) a. We like all parents to visit the school.
b. What we like the parents to do is to visit the school.
c. *What we like the parents is to visit the school.

(26) a. We asked the students to attend a lecture.
b. What they asked the students to do was to attend a lecture.
c. ?What they asked the students was to attend a lecture.

(Quirk et al. 1985:1218-1219)

(27) a. 'X CAUSES Y to MOVE Z' (central sense)
Example: Pat pushed the piano into the room.

b. Conditions of satisfaction imply 'X CAUSES Y to MOVE Z'
Example: Pat ordered him into the room.

c. 'X ENABLES Y to MOVE Z'
Example: Pat allowed Chris into the room.

d. 'X CAUSES Y not to MOVE FROM Z'
Example: Pat locked Chris into the room.

e. 'X HELPS Y to MOVE Z'
Example: Pat assisted Chris into the room. (Goldberg 1995:76)

As we can see from these examples, the only difference between the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction and the caused-motion construction is the element 'Z' (as long as we can interpret the meaning of 'MOVE' rather metaphorically): 'Z' as a prepositional phrase representing some place in the latter construction is realized in an infinitival verb form in the former, representing an action or an event. Other elements, however, both syntactically and semantically are quite parallel each other, as you can see from comparing (27) with (28), which is the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction version of the polysemy pattern that I tentatively present as an approximation:

- (28) a. 'X CAUSES Y to DO Z' (central sense)
 Example: Pat forced him to do the work.
 b. Conditions of satisfaction imply 'X CAUSES Y to DO Z'
 Example: Pat ordered him to do the work.
 c. 'X ENABLES Y to DO Z'
 Example: Pat allowed Chris to go out.
 d. 'X HELPS Y to DO Z'
 Example: Pat assisted Chris to do the work.

This parallelism derives in due course from the existence of *to* in the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction which occupies a parallel position to the prepositions in the caused-motion construction. We can naturally conclude from this fact that *to* in the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction has the meaning of indicating the 'direction of causation' or the 'direction of the metaphorical movement of the object NP'. Therefore, the central meaning of this construction is something like this: 'X does something to Y which (may) cause(s) Y to do Z.'

We will now consider each subconstruction of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction in more detail and show how they are related to each other in terms of a subjectification gradient.

4.3 Subjectification in V + NP + To-inf. Construction

4.3.1 Type 1: *X ACTS on Y to CAUSE Y to DO Z* The central sense of the *V + NP + to-inf.* complementation pattern (which is also the source construction of the subjectification process) may be exemplified in sentences with verbs such as *ask*, as in (29). The sense expressed in the construction can be stated as (30).²

- (29) I asked John to meet Mary.
 (30) Type 1: 'X ACTS on Y to CAUSE Y to DO Z.'

This meaning cannot be drawn simply from the composition of the ordinary sense of the monotransitive construction and that of *to*-infinitives. In this sense, Type 1

² Some verbs may imply the accomplishment of Z and others may not, as is shown in the examples of (28a) and (28b). However, I don't see any convincing motivation that necessitates the distinction of those two types in the light of subjectification. So I put (28a) and (28b) in the same group here.

construction can be regarded as a 'construction' in the sense of Construction Grammar. The same rationale applies to all the other examples below, so I will not repeat the justification in every case.

The verbs typically used in Type 1 constructions are verbs of verbal (or other manners of) communication or verbs of 'pressuring' (without a manner specification in some cases). This is because they can naturally elaborate the V-slot in the specifications of this construction. Verbs denoting suasion, command and manipulation represent the basic conceptual structure with a direct energetic interaction between the agent and the patient, which occupies the highest level of substantiality scale. Note that the number of candidate verbs for this construction is very large: as Mair (1990) points out, based on his corpus-based research, the number of monotransitive raising-verbs (i.e. approximate correspondents of verbs used in Type 2-4 below) is small but most of them are very frequently used, while the number of ditransitive matrix verbs (which include Type 1 verbs) is large but most of them are infrequent. He also reports the existence of many nonce-formations in the latter type (1990:151). His data clearly represents the highly productive nature of this construction, which might be attributed to the typicality or the centrality that the semantics of this type takes on.

4.3.2 *Type 2: X ENABLES Y to DO Z* The second sense of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction is exemplified in (31), and it can be stated as (32):

- (31) We allowed him to leave.
 - (a) = We gave permission to him to leave.
 - (b) = We did not prevent his leaving.
- (32) Type 2: 'X ACTS on Y to ENABLE Y to DO Z.'

I consider this type to have a somewhat attenuated meaning compared with Type 1, because here the agent plays a relatively restricted (or less active) role in the causative process even with the interpretation in (31a): it is not the agent, but the patient, who mainly hopes for the accomplishment of Z, and the agent does nothing but remove the obstacles to its realization for the sake of the patient. In this sense, the agentive control on the patient or on the infinitival process is attenuated to some extent. The loss of some of the objective facets in its meaning, as Langacker (1998) indicates, can be regarded as a factor of subjectification.

What is characteristic in the semantics of this type is the willingness or the tendency on the side of the patient to carry out the action described in the infinitive clause. This property functions as the most significant factor in giving rise to a second subtype in Type 2; i.e. the interpretation of (31b). The verbs in Type 1 necessarily present explicit social force interactions between the agent and the patient which might possibly be accompanied by some observable action from the outside; otherwise, the patient would not do Z. In Type 2, this characterization mostly applies to (31a), but it is not always the case for others. As for (31b), although the matrix subject undoubtedly controls the occurrence of the infinitival event, their agentive control is directed not directly to the subordinate subject but, rather diffusely, to the situation of the subordinate clause as a whole. It is also probable

that the matrix subject does not perform any physical action (including verbal communication) that is objectively observable. It is, therefore, the internal tendency or willingness of the subordinate subject that enables this non-typical causative relation to be realized: thus, the matrix subject's direct imposition of social force on the subordinate subject towards the latter's manifesting the infinitival action is highly attenuated in this case.

The verbs that can elaborate the constructional meaning of this type are, as we saw, verbs of permission or helping.

4.3.3 *Type 3: X INTENDS Y to DO/BECOME Z* The third meaning of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction is realized in (33), with its specification given in (34):

(33) We intend the plan to be carried out.

(34) Type 3: 'X INTENDS Y to DO/BECOME Z.'

At this stage of the semantic attenuation, all the physical and social interactions between the matrix subject and the subordinate subject are stripped away; only the psychological force of the matrix subject remains. Psychological forces such as intending, expecting, or wanting cannot be directed by nature to some specific participant in the event directly. Rather, they can only target the event or the situation as a whole, as was the case for (31b) in Type 2. Thus, postverbal NP's in this construction are always given the status of the subject of the infinitival clause.

The set of verbs which may lexically code this construction includes verbs of intention and planning. *Expect*, when interrelated with this construction, may amount to expressing its volitional sense of 'regard it as the duty of'.

The specific sentences of this type no longer express a causative relation in a strict sense; it only constitutes a part of the necessary conditions for the causation. However, if the event described by this construction actually occurs, it is highly likely in the natural course of events that the next step necessarily follows: that is, it is a preliminary state for, or one step before, the occurrence of actual causation. Therefore, although it is the case in this type that the subordinate event as a whole (including its subject) is a product of the matrix subject's mental process, it is always held in reference to the real world in terms of its feasibility or probability and, thus, kept under the matrix subject's control.

There is, however, another important subset of verbs here: i.e. verbs of wanting or liking.

(35) I wish John to meet Mary.

(36) Type 3': 'X HAS-SOME-EMOTION (for) Y to DO (or BECOME) Z.'

The construction elaborated with these verbs is similar to that of intention verbs, in that both constructions include only the psychological forces as the force element, and that this psychological force is directed towards the infinitival event as a whole. There exists, however, a significant dichotomy between the verbs of this class and all other verbs taken up here: as for the former, the infinitival event is nothing more than the product of uncontrollable emotion, such as desires and wishes, so that the matrix

subject has no control, or so people tend to think, as is disclosed in the research of the folk model (D'Andrade 1987). Therefore, the infinitival event or situation here is not necessarily the reflection of the real world, nor is it a part of the preliminary steps for its realization. It is just an entity in the matrix subject's psychological world. It cannot exist in the real world by itself without the matrix clause as its container. This may explain why the instances of this type usually resist the upgrading of subordinate clauses and the passivization (I will discuss this point more in 5.2.3).

(37) a. *She'll arrive, I want.

b. *She is wanted to arrive.


(Mair 1990:115)

4.3.4 *Type 4: X PREDICTS Y to DO/BECOME Z* The fourth, and the highly attenuated, sense of the *V + NP + to-inf.* construction is exemplified in (38), with its specification in (39):

(38) We expect the flying time to be around one hour.

(39) Type 4: 'X PREDICTS Y to DO/BECOME Z.'

Here, even the psychological force by the matrix subject has almost disappeared and only the mental path which the matrix subject traces is left behind in order for the latter to locate the infinitival event downstream in time. The agentive control by the matrix subject is so bleached out that he/she no longer has an intentional nor emotional commitment to the event; he/she simply plays the role of making an objective prediction of the likely event in the future, elaborated by the infinitival clause. The verb *expect* is the only candidate that is frequently used in this construction, which results in the verb's surface sense of 'regard as likely'. Figure 2 shows the gradient of the four types of constructions explained so far.



<Figure 2> Subjectification Gradient

Incidentally, I will return at this point to the problem I have left open in 4.1, where I was giving some evidence for the *V + NP + to-inf.* structure to be eligible as a construction. The problem was this: what is the cause of the difference in acceptability between (40c) and (41c) while they both are regarded as the same *V + NP + to-inf.* construction?

- (40) a. We like all parents to visit the school.
- b. What we like the parents to do is to visit the school.
- c. *What we like the parents is to visit the school.
- (41) a. We asked the students to attend a lecture.
- b. What they asked the students to do was to attend a lecture.
- c. ?What they asked the students was to attend a lecture.

As we have seen in this chapter, each subtype occupies some part of the gradient of subjectification. *Ask* is among the highest, and *like* is much lower in the gradient.

Those verbs in the highest position denote the source conceptual structure of this construction, which expresses the most concrete, basic meaning with clear-cut energetic interaction. Compared with the much lower verbs on the scale, analyzability of the conceptual base of those verbs is relatively high. On the other hand, the lower are those verbs placed on the scale, the more idiosyncratic or developed meaning of the construction they may denote. This idea may be provided some support by the Mair's (1990) corpus-based research. According to his survey, with limiting ourselves only to the active uses, as for ditransitive verbs (which are approximate counterparts of Type 1 and Type 2 verbs here), 59 verb types appeared in total of 363 tokens, while as for monotransitive verbs (which are approximate counterparts of Type 3 and Type 4 here) it was only 17 verb types appearing in total of 366 tokens. What is more significant is that, in ditransitives' case, *ask* and *tell* accounts for 40% out of the total, and that the average token of the remaining 57 verbs is only 3.8. On the other hand, monotransitives' uses are fairly evenly distributed, with the average of 21.5 per verb.

Various interpretations may be derived from this data, but what we should look at now is the productivity of the ditransitive conceptual pattern. The data clearly shows that people will use the ditransitive pattern, or Type 1, for a variety of verbs, including many nonce uses, while the monotransitive verbs form rather a closed class and their conceptual base structure resists nonce uses. Thus, it would be safe to say that the conceptual base structure of those verbs which are the highest on the scale (i.e. Type 1) is rather concrete and analyzable, while those verbs lower on the scale have a more idiosyncratic, abstract type of conceptual base structure, thus rejecting its productive use. Now, this difference in the analyzability between the constructions including the verb *ask* (which is of Type 1) and the verb *like* (which is of Type 3) might be reflected in the difference in the acceptability between (40c) and (41c).

The semantic structure of this level of schematicity in Type 4 construction is crucial: it provides a take-off point for three directions. The first development is complementary strengthening of the attenuated force by the conceptualizer. The attenuated force-dynamic vector is supplemented with relatively high level of subjectivity by the conceptualizer, thus the notion of 'responsibility' can be assigned to the agent based on the rather subjective interpretation of the situation by the conceptualizer. The second development is the domain shift from socio-physical domain to reasoning domain. I assume that a metaphorical domain shift can occur only when the source meaning is schematic enough to allow for the possibility. These possibilities are discussed in the next section.

The third possibility of further development is the passivization by means of subjectification. I will take up this issue in Chapter 5.


4.4 Other Factors in V + NP + To-inf. Construction

4.4.1 Complementary Strengthening The subjectification process explained above was mostly presented as the progressive attenuation of agentive control, as Langacker (1998) claims. We can, however, observe another factor working here.

(42) a. He allowed the cake to burn.
b. The ineptitude of the guards allowed the criminal to escape.
(Michael T. Wescoat, p.c.)

In (42a), however, it is very likely that, not only there was no evidence that *he* actually helped to make *the cake burn*, the matrix subject had no intention to *allow* the infinitival event to occur. There is even the possibility that *he* had not noticed the baking going on at all (which is the same case as (42b) below). It could even be that, by choosing *him* for the subject, the conceptualizer is blaming him for the occurrence of the infinitival event (which is realized by the use of the verb *allow* in this situation) where in fact he was not responsible at all. Thus, the 'responsibility' factor on the matrix subject for the occurrence of the infinitival event in this construction can be traced back solely to the conceptualizer's subjective judgment or interpretation of the situation.

The relation between these examples and the Type 2 constructions might be worth mentioning. In the former case, the conceptualizer may well have noticed the occurrence of the infinitival event first: he/she then looks for someone/something to blame for its occurrence from the circumstances based on his/her subjective construal. In applying this conceptualization pattern to some construction, there must be a specification for the construction that its subordinate event is something that would occur in any case if left unattended, even without any external inducement. This prerequisite makes possible the use of only those verbs that are compatible with the Type 2 construction patterns which require willingness or tendency for the patient to bring about the infinitival action. It may therefore be concluded that the complementary-strengthened construction is a strategy taken by the conceptualizer to force into the semantic structure described in the Type 2 construction the observed situation where others may not necessarily find the connection between the occurrence of the infinitival event and the subject. Thus, the gist of this strategy lies in bringing those, in an objective sense, atypical situations for expressing with *V + NP + to-inf.* structure back to the fairly typical semantic structure describable with Type 2 construction.



<Figure 3> Complementary Strengthening

4.4.2 Domain Shift The fully schematic structure of Type 4 triggers another significant process, i.e. the domain shift. Up to this stage, the conceptual structures of Type 1-4 have been situated in the socio-physical domain, where such elements as energetic interaction in a social, interpersonal or psychological sense, and also the 'time' element are considered indispensable. Fundamental elements such as the energy transmission from the agent or psychological path of the patient have been depicted along the time axis, which means that those social or psychological processes have been followed along the passage of time. The social interaction gradually fades away, and at stage 4 with a highly schematic semantic structure, every kind of energy disappears; the remaining element is the mental path followed by the agent and the 'time'.

The 'time' element was not so prominent in this *V + NP + to-inf.* construction and might have hardly been recognized. That does not mean that it was not important: it was just because we normally take up only those elements which show changes; we can abstract away all the other elements which are common in every stage or are not relevant to the process at issue. As for the subjectification gradient here, all the conceptual structures up to now were in the same domain, and therefore the common element 'time' could hardly be recognizable. However, once it is shifted to the other domain, 'what was' and 'what is not' become obvious and the presence or the absence of the 'time' axis becomes salient.

The most schematic structure represented by Type 4 puts its infinitival event in the future from the reference point of time (= the point of the matrix verb) for the conceptualizer. Thus, 'forward-looking' (as Mair (1990) says) verbs look 'forwards' (= future), and the object is pushed 'forward', and finally *to* brings us to the event 'forward'. All these processes proceed on the same time axis.³

The significance of the presence of the temporal axis is clear: as we saw in (8)-(9), repeated here as (43)-(44), this element assigns the perfect infinitives 'future perfect'

³ The only possible difference might be the 'subjective' verbs in Type 3, where the infinitival event could be shifted to some kind of more hypothetical subjective domain which might not have a time axis:

- (i) I hate you to say things like that.
- (ii) Mary hated John to play the piano.

This might be further grounds for dividing Type 3 verbs into two groups.

interpretation only:

- (43) I suppose it's reasonable to expect every person reading English to have bought or somehow to have been given their own copies of Shakespeare. (Mair 1990:139)
- (44) If you could persuade the fuel oil delivery men to have finished by nine o'clock in the morning, it would be a contribution. (*ibid.*:154)

However, once they are shifted to the domain of reasoning as in (10), repeated here as (45), this constraint on time disappears: verbs look 'forward' in the reasoning process, and the infinitival subject is pushed 'forward' on the path, and finally *to* brings us to the 'forward in the reasoning'. Thus, the result of 'inference' or 'reasoning' is attained.


- (45) The Soviet Union is believed to have made some small sales in Europe. (Mair 1990:175)

As a result of domain shift, the target conceptual structure, namely Type 4', does not contain a temporal element to express 'futurity', but instead it attains a reasoning sense.

Verbs which bear this conceptual structure are those of cognition and utterance. Contained in this type of conceptual structure are: *believe, consider, conceive, find, know, imagine, think, claim, proclaim, report, see, hear, feel*, etc.

- (46) a. Mary believes a spy to have been planted among us.
 b. Mary believes there to be a spy among us.
 c. Mary believes John to have turned out to be a spy. (Bresnan 1979:151)

There is only a mental path from the subject to the infinitival event as a whole; there is no direct interaction between the subject and the object and, therefore, ordinary (or dynamic) passivization is not allowed. (I will discuss another possibility for passivization in the next chapter.) Since the embedded subject is not the target of the energetic interaction, they are highly transparent, taking expletives fairly freely in that position.



<Figure 4> Type 4': Domain Shift

What seems no less idiosyncratic is the restriction on its infinitival verbs. As is often pointed out, infinitival verbs are under rather strict constraint in this shifted type; i.e., normally, only *be* or *have* is accepted (cf. Declerck 1991:475). This

powerful tendency can be explained as follows. The function of this shifted type of uses is to make inference, to carry out reasoning or judgment on the infinitival subject, based on the information which the matrix subject has at that very moment; i.e., there is some information concerning the infinitival subject which is available for the matrix subject, and the latter undergoes some kind of cognitive process to reach a conclusion with regard to the former utilizing that information they have recourse to; thus, they decide that the infinitival subject is now in a particular state. What is most significant in these processes is that the final judgment is not submitted as a future expectation (since no temporal axis exists in that direction), but rather as the report of the present situation/condition. Thus, what is reached in this construction by the reasoning or inference is not future-oriented idea, but rather a present-oriented conclusion. In order to refer to someone's present situations or conditions, we normally have to use either imperfective expressions to describe the present state, or to use the perfect tense of an action to denote that the person is in the resultant state of the action. This is the reason why Type 4' constructions are under such strict constraints on their selection of infinitival verbs.

5 PASSIVES OF MONOTRANSITIVE CONSTRUCTION

5.1 *Two Passives: Are They the Same?*

As we saw in Chapter 2, both Quirk et al. (1985) and Mair (1990) assume that various types of *V + NP + to-inf.* construction form a sort of continuum. To my regret, however, both of them maintain that *believe*-type verbs should be placed in between the *persuade*-type verbs and the *want*-type verbs. It is because, firstly, *believe*-type verbs are similar to *want*-type verbs in that both groups take a monotransitive pattern of complement while *persuade*-type verbs take a ditransitive pattern of complement: and secondly, concerning the possibility of passivization, *believe*-type verbs are in line with *persuade*-type verbs in that they can be passivized, while *want*-type verbs cannot. As a result of these characteristics, *believe*-type verbs are often to be placed between *persuade*-type verbs and *want*-type verbs.

However, as I have repeatedly claimed above, *believe*-type verbs have many idiosyncratic features of their own and less in common with *persuade*-type verbs. Therefore, it is unconvincing that they should be placed next to *persuade*-type verbs only because they have passives. I will show in this chapter that the mechanism for generating passives of *believe*-type verbs is quite different from the ordinary process of passivization that we observe, for example, in the case of *persuade*-type verbs. I claim that here again subjectification plays a central role in enabling the passives for *believe*-type verbs.

5.1.1 Skewed Behavior of Passives of Monotransitive Constructions It is widely accepted that *believe*-type verbs are passivizable in general, but the active-passive correspondences are not so equable among these verbs, such as:

- (47) a. These facts are purported to be true.

- b. *We purport these facts to be true. (Bolinger 1974:80)
- (48) a. He is known to hold moderate opinions.
- b. *People know him to hold moderate opinions. (Declerck 1991:476)
- (49) a. That judge is believed to accept bribes.
- b. *They believe that judge to accept bribes. (Bolinger 1967:52)
- (50) a. John was believed to be lying.
- b. ?We believe John to be telling a lie. (Bolinger 1967:50-52)
- (51) a. *It was dreamed to be as big as a house.
- b. I dream it to be as big as a house. (Bolinger 1974:81)
- (52) a. It was intended to be seen.
- b. ?John was intended to be examined by the doctor. (Palmer 1988:182)

When they are used in the *V + NP + to-inf.* constructions, these monotransitive verbs show a striking tendency that they appear more in passive sentences rather than active ones. In particular, such verbs as *purport* in (47), *say* and *allege* can occur only in passive sentences. In other cases, these verbs are less constrained in the passives than they are in the actives. For example, as we see in (48) and (49), active sentences of this construction must meet a severe requirement that their complement verb in the *to*-infinitive form generally has to be either *be* or *have*, while passives are apparently less constrained and can even take an action verb as their complement verb. Other examples also show various kinds of defect in the active-passive correspondences in this construction. These variations concerning acceptability in the active-passive alternation will be explained when we assume subjectification as the generator of passives.

5.1.2 Standard Passives In his argument on passives, Langacker (1990a) points out that in order to use passive sentences, the conceptual base must comprise 'a two-participant process whose trajector exerts a force that induces the change in its landmark' (Langacker 1990a:130). He further notes that '[t]he passive can be thought of as a special construction which accommodates the frequent discourse need to put the primary focus on the tail (instead of the head) of an action chain' (Langacker 1995:21). Thus, he maintains that sentences that do not involve an action chain leading from subject to object should not passivize, and proves his argument by giving instances of setting-subject construction (which do not involve an action chain) as evidence:


- (53) a. The following year witnessed another series of amazing political events.
- b. *Another series of amazing political events was witnessed by the following year.
- (54) a. The beautifully wrapped box contained a very cheap present.
- b. *A very cheap present was contained by the beautifully wrapped box. (Langacker 1995:21)

What he claims here, therefore, is that passivization is possible only when there are two participants in the process and one of them (or the agent) exerts a force directly

on the other (patient) which causes some change in the patient. According to his argument, if there is no direct energetic interaction between the agent and the patient that may affect the latter, such sentences cannot passivize.

Having checked the requirement for the standard passives, let us return to the semantic structure of variations in *V + NP + to-inf.* construction.

As we see in Figure 5(b), the semantic structure of *persuade* completely fulfills the above requirement for passives: that is, the trajector and the landmark establish a direct action chain from the former to the latter which induces the change in the landmark. On the other hand, the semantic structure of *expect* depicted in Figure 5(a) does not meet any of the requirements for passivization: firstly, there is no energy involved in the situation which is strong enough to cause some change in the patient; secondly, there is no direct interaction between the trajector and the landmark of the profiled event because the infinitival complement event as a whole mediates their interaction and stops the necessary action chain between them.




(Langacker 1995:40)

<Figure 5>

Based on these facts, we might conclude that *expect* in this construction does not passivize while *persuade* does so without any objection. However in fact, as we all know, *expect* in this construction actually has passive counterparts. How does this passivization process occur? In the next section, I will propose another type of passivization, i.e. passivization by subjectification, and explain how this process enables those monotransitive verbs to be passivized.

5.2 Subjectification Passives

5.2.1 Mechanism The notion of subjectification has already played a significant role in the process of organizing the various subtypes of *V + NP + to-inf.* construction. In the discussion of the gradient of subconstructions motivated by subjectification, I stated that the Type 4 semantic structure (e.g. the semantic structure for *expect*) has the most schematic structure with only the mental path from the subject to the complement event left behind. This (already highly abstract) stage is the start-off point for another level of subjectification.



<Figure 6> Type 4

The mechanism for passivization is as follows. In Type 4, the agentive control exerted by the trajector has already been attenuated, the physical component in the process has already been lost, and only the mental aspect remains. As subjectification proceeds, further attenuation of the agentive control leads to progressive diffusion in the role of agent as the locus of potency. The trajector as the locus of potency will become more and more diffuse, to the level of being unspecified or even not being localizable at all. Finally, the source of the potency being no longer onstage as the object of conceptualization, it is identified with either the ground itself or some facet of the ground's immediate circumstances, namely 'current reality' as assessed by the speaker (cf. Langacker 1998, 1999).

As the attenuation proceeds and the agent as the locus of potency becomes more and more diffuse, the necessity to present the agent as a topic of the sentence also fades away. Eventually the agent is totally defocused and backgrounded, and the subject of the complement clause comes in to substitute for the defocused agent. Here, we have to note that if, as Shibatani (1985) maintains, the major function of passives is to defocus the agent, the attenuation of the agentive control, as above mentioned, serves immediately to motivate passivization of this construction. In addition, the subjective commitment to the conceptualized event by the conceptualizer complements the role of the backgrounded agent, which eventually provides the base to enable the passivization of monotransitive constructions.

We will see below how various kinds of semantic/syntactic features or peculiarities of passives of monotransitive constructions are accounted for when we assume subjectification as the central motivation.

5.2.2 Unspecificity of Subject It is often pointed out that in the passives of monotransitive constructions, the backgrounded subject must always be associated with unspecified people or people in general, and no specific agent can be named or assumed. Bolinger (1974:81), for example, states that in these uses, 'the agent is people in general' and 'that if the main verb excludes that possibility, the passive is wrong,' as in (55):

- (55) a. I dreamed it to be as big as a house.
 b. *It was dreamed to be as big as a house. (Bolinger 1974:81)

On the other hand, Palmer (1988:182) comments on the possibility of passives with verbs *intend* and *mean*, saying 'passivization is possible but rarer [than *expect*],' and gives (56) and (57) as the evidence of lower acceptability:

- (56) a. It was intended to be seen.

- b. ?John was intended to be examined by the doctor.
 (57) a. John was meant to come at four.
 b. ?The doctor was meant to examine John. (Palmer 1988:182)

According to the Mair's (1990) corpus-based report, however, the active-passive ratio in the actual usages is 0:10 in the case of *intend*, and 1:10 in the case of *mean*. The data shows that the actual uses of passives with these verbs would be far from 'rare'. Palmer does not give any further explanation on this point, but I would say those examples of high acceptability such as (56a) and (57a) are rather easy for us to associate with unspecified subject interpretation, while the situations described in (56b) and (57b) seem to resist such interpretation.

We can take the data above as indicating that the backgrounded subject of passivized monotransitive constructions should always be associated with unspecific people, or people in general. This might be another support for the subjectification as the most powerful motivation for passivization in this construction.

5.2.3 Universality Required Verbs of emotion may provide another piece of evidence for subjectification-based passivization in the monotransitive construction. Verbs of emotion are realized in the monotransitive construction, but many of them do not allow passivization at all, as in (58):

- (58) *We are wanted to sell the house.
 cf. They want us to sell the house. (Mair 1990:98)

This difference can be explained as follows. Although verbs of emotion (such as *want*, *wish*, and *like*) show similar features to verbs of intention (such as *intend* and *mean*) to a large extent, they have significant dichotomy on one point: i.e. controllability of the target entity as a mental product by the subject. According to D'Andrade's (1987) research on the folk model of the mind of Europeans, the mental situation described as the complement of verbs of emotion (e.g. desire, likeness, etc.) is considered as uncontrollable for the experiencer of the emotion (i.e. the matrix subject). What is important here is that such uncontrollable mentality can only reside in the mind of its originator: we cannot cut someone's uncontrollable emotion off the person and objectively abstract it to show as if it could be possessed by any anonymous person in the situation, which is the process required for passivization at issue. That is why verbs denoting this type of mental situation are not incompatible with passivization under subjectification, where we have to deal with the emotion as something that can freely be applied to an unspecified people or to the general mass. Therefore, many verbs of emotion cannot be passivized even through subjectification.


5.3 Subjectification Further: The Way to Modal

The last but not least point I want to discuss is another peculiar feature of this type of passives: that is, the high frequency of the use of passive constructions compared to


their active counterparts. This point has been discussed and explained from various viewpoints, but most of them are some form of functional account (e.g. Bolinger (1977) based on responsibility of the utterance, Mair (1990) and Noël (1998) based on information structure).

These functional accounts are very convincing and I do not have any reason to reject them. However, when we think of the peculiar meaning only to be found in passive sentences or the frequently observed relaxation of constraints only to be found in the passive uses, it seems that we need some more semantic explanations to supplement those functional accounts.

Figure 7 shows the stage where the subjectification of this construction further proceeds and the backgrounded agent is identified with the ground. Note that this configuration is very similar to the configuration which Langacker (1998) describes as the original main-clause verbs that later become modals (Figure 8). Therefore, we may conclude that this passive construction is in a state to further evolve into a modality expression by way of subjectification. This can be confirmed by such expressions as (59): *be supposed to* as a whole has already attained the status as a modal expression and is often used as an element to express obligation or permission, which is the deontic element of modality.



<Figure 7> Passive Construction



(Langacker 1998:83-84, cited & modified)

<Figure 8> Grammaticization of Modals

(59) You're supposed to be there at nine.

cf. *They suppose you to be there at nine.

(Declerck 1991:476)

6 CONCLUSION

I have argued, under the framework of Construction Grammar, that the structure *V + NP + to-inf.* should be regarded as a construction in the sense of CG, and the meaning of the specific instances of this construction is achieved through the interrelation between the meaning of the construction itself and the lexical meaning of the verb. I also proposed that various subtypes under this schematic construction, which are related by polysemy links, are structured into a cline in the network of constructions, with subjectification functioning as the linking.

One of the advantages of the present analysis compared with a lexical analysis is its ability to explain the transitional nature observed in many verbs. By attributing the systematically recognizable elements in meaning with various verbs in a particular construction directly to the construction itself, rather than to the lexical meaning of the verbs, we can dispense with the ad hoc characterization of the complementation pattern for each verb.

Also, allowing for subjectification as an inheritance link in the network of constructions enables us to capture the gradual change of meaning among different constructions, which cannot be given enough structuredness when we only assume the polysemy links as Goldberg (1995) has posited.

In the last chapter, I proposed another development of subjectification in this construction, namely passivization. By explaining the passivization process of *believe*-type verbs as a result of subjectification, we can give an integrated account for various phenomena with respect to the passive constructions of those verbs.

Passives of this construction demonstrate a variety of interesting features and there are many other points waiting for discussion. I will take up these issues at the next opportunity.

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