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## A COGNITIVE ACCOUNT ON TRANSFERRED EPITHET\*

### 1 INTRODUCTION

In this paper we are concerned with an incongruous kind of modifying relation called *transferred epithet* (henceforth TE) as in the following verses:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) The plowman homeward plods his *weary way*,<sup>2</sup>  
And leaves the world to darkness and to me.

(T. Gray, *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*)

where syntactically *weary* does modify *way*, but semantically does not seem to do so. The modifier and the modifiee are incompatible because *way* cannot be *weary*. How then can the adjective be attached to the noun?

This paper will argue from a cognitive viewpoint that the modifying relation of TE is quite a natural way of expression. In some linguistic frameworks which view figurative language as a special and problematic phenomenon, only few attempts have been made at this kind of expressions so far. They have been treated this kind of modifying relations as a particular one mainly used in poetry. On the contrary, from a cognitive perspective which we will commit here, it will be shown how naturally our recognition of the world is projected straight onto the linguistic form. More precisely, in a cognitive event involved in such as internal states, the most salient entity is likely to be the substantive of the adjective as a *reference point* of the state of the target principal. Then, an incongruous *active-zone/profile discrepancy* comes about. This discrepancy, that is, a fictive relation, is complemented by the conceptualizer's *subjective construal*. Thus, TE is not entirely limited to such kind of literary works.

In section 2 we will survey the properties and the stylistic effects of TE which have been traditionally described in the literature. Section 3 reviews the previous analyses and points out problems. In section 4 I will offer a classification of TE for further discussion. After introducing our theoretical framework, we will analyze TE data with

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<sup>1</sup> The word *epithet* refers in this paper both to the linguistic form used to characterize a person or thing and to the phenomenon involving these forms.

<sup>2</sup> Italics in examples henceforth are all mine.

emphasis on the following three points: i) the TE mechanism, ii) its derivation and effects, and iii) its motivation. A close look at these points will reveal that it is not a pathological but a cognitively natural modification. I finish with some concluding remarks.

## 2 TRANSFERRED EPITHET

TE has been treated as a kind of rhetorical expression that occurs frequently in poetry. Here are a few random examples:

- (2) Come, I will sing you some slow, *sleepy* tune. (P. B. Shelley, "Cenci")
- (3) A *willing* ear We lent him. (A. Tennyson, "In Memoriam")
- (4) *Sad* hours seem long. (W. Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* 1.3.167)

In this section, we will present an overview of the traditional definitions of TE. We will give a natural explanation from a cognitive point of view in section 5 below.

### 2.1 Traditional Definitions of TE

As Jespersen (1909-49, II: 283) points out, "the relation between an adjunct (attributive adjective) and its principal (generally a substantive) is not always so easy and simple." There are, however, some descriptive definitions of TE which have been proposed so far.

Jespersen (1909-49, II) himself does not comment specifically on TE, but provides a rough classification of relations between adjunct and principal, that is, of Adj + N constitutions. First, he divides them into two main groups: (a) Direct Adjuncts and (b) Indirect Adjuncts. For (a), he takes as an example *a young lady*, and explains that it may be substituted by *a lady who is young*. Then, he subclassifies (b) into the following four groups: i) Shifted Subjunct-Adjuncts, ii) Partial Adjuncts, iii) Compositional Adjuncts, and iv) Other Indirect Adjuncts. In this classification, TE seems to belong to group (b) i) Shifted Subjunct-Adjuncts, since the group includes such examples as *an early riser*. Following his statement, "it is quite impossible to turn it into *a riser who is early*" and "the adjunct is a shifted subjunct of the verb contained in the substantive *riser*: *he rises*(vb) *early*(adv) = *he is an early*(adj) *riser*(sb)." (Jespersen 1909-49, II: 283) But, in fact, (as he points out) these relations cannot be sharply divided, and there are some cases of TE that seem to belong to group (b) iv), in which he includes such examples as *his lazy time* and *happier chance*.

Traditionally, there is an almost general agreement among many scholars like Bain (1871),<sup>3</sup> Otsuka, *et al.* (1959), Isshiki (1968), Yasui, *et al.* (1976), etc. that TE can be defined as follows:

- (5) The traditional definition of TE:

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<sup>3</sup> Bain, Alexander (1871) *English Composition and Rhetoric* 1st ed.; enlarged ed. Appleton, New York, 1887-1888: 193-194, qtd. in Nobuo Sato 1987: 74.

An adjective is called TE when it is transferred to another word from the original word to which the adjective should be attributed.

But there are slight differences between the various commentators.

First of all, Otsuka, *et al.* (1959), who gives the most reliable account of TE, classifies into the following five types:

- (6) Otsuka, *et al.*'s (1959) classification of TE:
  - a. The formal head is a temporal noun.
  - b. The formal head is a positional noun.
  - c. An adjective for a person (or an animal) takes a noun of thing which belongs to or is associated with him/her as the formal head.
  - d. An adjective for a thing which belongs to or is associated with a person (or an animal) takes a noun for him/her as the formal head.
  - e. An adjective for a thing takes a noun which is associated with or comprises another thing as the formal head.

For (6a), Otsuka, *et al.* gives no particular explanations, except to provide the examples as follows:

- (7) It was a *melancholy*, rather *ill-tempered* evening, for they were all tired.  
(J. Galsworthy, *The Apple Tree*)
- (8) All those were *happy* hours.  
(L. Hearn, *Kokoro*)

As in the following examples for (6b), the adjectives often describe people in general, and express their emotions.

- (9) the *merry* greenwood (T. Hardy, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*)
- (10) a wide and *melancholy* waste (P. B. Shelley, "Alastor")

For (6c), taking *the sad letter* (N. Hawthorne, *The Scarlet Letter*) for the example, Otsuka, *et al.* explains that *sad* depicts not the letter itself but the emotion of the heroine, Hester Prynne. There are several other examples cited for the class:

- (11) hedgehogs which / Lie tumbling in my *barefoot* way  
(W. Shakespeare, *Tempest* 2.2.10-11)
- (12) The cowboy sat in *wide-mouthed* amazement. (S. Crane, *The Blue Hotel*)

Otsuka, *et al.* points out that there are two special groups in this class. On the one hand, the adjective is comprehended as making (the person) bring to the state which the adjective expresses. This use of the adjective is relatively free in poetry, but in prose it seems to be limited to the emotional adjectives

- (13) a high and *giddy* mast
- (14) the *drowsy* warmth of the afternoon  
(G. Gissing, *The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*)

On the other hand, the head nouns are personified, as in the following examples:

- (15) He cross'd the threshold ... and a clang of *angry* steel that instant rang.  
(W. Scott, *The Lady of the Lake*)
- (16) What *early* tongue so sweet saluteth me?  
(W. Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* 2.3.32)

For (6d), where an adjective for a thing which belongs to or is associated with a person takes a noun for him/her as the formal head, Otsuka, *et al.* simply explains that this is the reverse of class (6e):

- (17) the *bald* men (cf. a bald head) (L. Hearn, *Kokoro*)
- (18) *hyphenated* Americans (cf. a hyphenated name)

In (17), *ivory* means the Captain's artificial leg of ivory, and the adjective is transferred to his stride. Class (6e) also includes the following examples.

- (19) Soon his steady, *ivory* stride was heard. (H. Melville, *Moby Dick*)
- (20) He recalled the clear friendliness of her blue eyes, the *soft* droop of her mouth.  
(A. Christie, *The Labours of Hercules*)

Otsuka, *et al.* also points out that TEs are often seen particularly in poetry, and that they can be found in prose as well.

Second, we review here Isshiki (1968). She defines TE rather broadly and includes such complex words as *a lunatic asylum* and *a criminal court*. She also treats as TE the following examples of hypallage:

- (21) a. Her cheeks are *streaming* with tears.  
b. The floor is *piled* with books.

These sentences are, as she explains, expressed in current common speech as follows:

- (22) a. Tears are streaming down her cheeks.  
b. Books are piled on the floor.

As Otsuka, *et al.* (1959) and Sato (1987) point out, TE is considered as a subset of hypallage. We should restrict it here, however, to adjectives for the discussion below.

Third, Yasui, *et al.* (1976) classifies TE with respect to the semantic principal of the adjective roughly into the following three types:

- (23) Yasui, *et al.*'s (1976) classification of TE:
- a. Subject-Oriented TE
  - b. Speaker-Oriented TE
  - c. Generic-Reading TE

The Subject-Oriented TE can depict the state or attitude of the agent who engages in some action.

- (24) a. He was waving a *genial* hand.
- b. Mary prodded John with an *uncouth* forefinger.

Yasui, *et al.* explains that these examples are equivalent to the following sentences, respectively:

- (25) a. He was genially waving a hand.
- b. Mary prodded John uncouthly with a forefinger.

And the following examples are also included in this class:

- (26) He passed *idle* hours.
- (27) It was the hottest day of the summer, and though somebody opened a *tentative* window or two, the atmosphere remained distinctive and individual.

Speaker-Oriented TE can depict the judgment or emotion of the speaker:

- (28) She gave a *sardonic* laugh.
- (29) all these twenty *long* years

And Generic-Reading TE can relate to generic people (or animals), who are not explicitly expressed but can be inferred from the context.

- (30) a long and *tedious* way
- (31) a *howling* wilderness

Yasui, *et al.* concludes the observation by pointing out that the range of variety of examples of TE are difficult to describe.<sup>4</sup>

Matsunami, *et al.* (1983) does not provide a definition of TE, but only describe it as the combination of an adjective and a noun observed frequently in poetry. Taking (1) (recited here as (32)) as an example, Matsunami, *et al.* explains that *weary* is modifying *way* syntactically but semantically it relates to *plowman*.

- (32) The plowman homeward plods his *weary* way. (= 1)

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, Yasui, *et al.* (1976) suggests that the adjectives in the following sentences semantically modify not the head nouns but the verbs.

- i) a. He has never earned an *honest* dollar.
- b. He has never earned a dollar honestly.
- ii) a. He took a *quick* shower.
- b. He took a shower quickly.
- iii) a. He wrote a *hasty* letter.
- b. He wrote a letter hastily.

(Yasui, *et al.* 1976: 179n.)

Then Matsunami, *et al.* concludes that it is natural to consider that the adjective *weary* has been transferred from the original position as in *The weary plowman plods his way*. They suggest the following example can be treated in the same way:

- (33) Let us speak / Our *free* hearts each to other.  
(W. Shakespeare, *Macbeth* 1.3.153-154)

In summary, we can simply provide a general description of TE. That is, it is a 'shifted' modifier, more precisely an adjective, which is a kind of hypallage in rhetoric. However, this description is not a sufficient one, because the relation of adjective and the principal is complex.

## 2.2 Characterization of TE

In previous section, we have reviewed the general description of TE in the literature so far, and in this section we go on to summarize its characteristics.

Let us consider its syntactic facets first. This seems reasonable to suppose that TE should be restricted to pre-adjunct adjectives. This is because there are no post-adjunct adjectives in TE as far as our data are concerned, and because for predicative adjectives, examples of metonymy (or personification) in rhetoric can be included as TE. Consider the following sentences:

- (34) a. Her smile was so *eager* and *happy* that her friend chuckled softly.  
(W. Cather, *Shadows of the Rock*)  
b. She was so *eager* and *happy* that her friend chuckled softly.  
(35) a. The plowman homeward plods his *weary* way. (= 1)  
b. \* The plowman homeward plods him/himself.

In (34a) *her smile* is a metonymic expression and it can be replaced by *she*, as in (34b), while in (35) the TE *his weary way* cannot be replaced by *him/himself*.

And almost all TEs fall into Class B adjective in Nakamura's (1974) classification,<sup>5</sup> because the adjectives cited above do not take negative prefix *non-* (e.g. \**nonweary*, *unweary*), which Class C adjectives can take, and because they can be qualified by the degree adverb *very* (e.g. *very weary*) while most Class A adjectives are non-gradable (e.g. \**a very same book*).<sup>6</sup> Modifying relation of the adjectives also show this, because they can be a *referent modification* in the sense of Bolinger (1967),

<sup>5</sup> Following the Farsi's (1968) classification, Nakamura (1974) has developed a closer subclassification as follows:

i) the/	same/	handsome	old/	American	rural/	policeman	
		B1	B2	C1	C2		
Class A		Class B		Class C		N	(Nakamura 1974: 22)

See Nakamura (1974) for a detailed discussion.

<sup>6</sup> This is judged not as an emphazier but as a booster, of course.

while Class A and C adjectives are *reference*-only adjectives, although it is said to be difficult to distinguish referent modification from reference modification clearly.

Second, let us consider its semantic facets. As Otsuka, *et al.* (1959: 873) and Yasui, *et al.* (1976: 176) observe, almost all the adjectives in TE express such internal states as emotions, senses, and attitudes. Ikegami (1978: 204) also points out that TE has a thick meaning in the short form. Taking a similar view, Yasui, *et al.* (1976: 176) reports that when we try to paraphrase a TE so as to modify the original word to which it should be attributed, it is very complex or almost impossible to do so. They also point out that TE cannot be simply put back to the original position that it should be.

Third, we should review the stylistic effects of TE. Sasaki (1980: 176) provides an accurate description of them by giving the following example:

- (36) If she heard of a theft, a divorce, even worse things, she would knit *puzzled* brows and think how utterly wretched the offenders must have been before they could do so dreadful a thing.

(D. L. Sayers, *Gaudy Night*)

Taking a closer look at “she would knit *puzzled brows*,” he explains that *puzzled* is said about a part of the body, *brows*, for fear that the impression should be broken up as in “*she* would look *puzzled*, knitting her brows.” Needless to say, *brows* themselves cannot be *puzzled* but *she*, of course, the person who owns the *brows*, can. Nevertheless, as he goes on to say, putting *puzzled* on *brows* surprises the readers and catches their attention. Then they will get a unified impression and a vivid depiction.

In this section we have considered the unique characteristics of TE. This leads us to the question where those syntactic and semantic properties and stylistic effects come from. Now we will review the antecedent studies on TE.

### 3 PREVIOUS ANALYSES

As Yamanashi (1995) points out, only few attempts have so far been made to explain some peculiar kinds of adnominal modifiers in the light of rhetoric and grammar. TE is no exception. In this section, we will review previous analyses of TE: Hall (1973), Sato (1986, 1987), Shibahara (1995), Yamanashi (1995), and Shinohara (1997). Then we will point out their problems and proceed with a cognitive analysis.

#### 3.1 Hall (1973)

Hall (1973) has cited several examples of TE from P. G. Wodehouse only and makes rather superficial comments on them.

Along with the traditional rhetorical observations, he explains that “we might interpret the adjective, in the construction Adjective + Noun, as equivalent to an adverb transferred from its position modifying the verb of the clause” (Hall 1973: 93).



- i) As I sat in the bathtub, soaping a *meditative* foot . . . .  
(P. G. Wodehouse, *Jeeves and the Feudal Spirit*)
- ii) \* As I sat in the bathtub, soaping my *meditative* left foot . . . .

- (41) Tsugi-no nichiyoubi-ga mata saiwaina atatakai hiyori-wo subete-no  
(next Sunday-NON again happy warm fine-weather-ACC all  
tsutomenin-ni megunda-node, ....

workers-DAT bless-with)

Gross: As the following Sunday blessed with another happy and warm  
weather for all the workers, ....

(S. Natsume, *Higansugi-made*)

And he proposes that several variant sentences can be derived by changing only the syntactic status of the word *saiwai* 'happy,' referring to an almost similar event, although he admits the semantic difference between them is precise. So, *saiwai* can actually be placed almost anywhere in the sentence, without crucial change to the meaning of the event that the sentence refers to. Sato (1986) thus shows that *saiwai* can relate to almost all the words in the sentence, in other words, the meaning is flexible.

Then Sato goes on to explain that TE is flexible by degrees, that is, the relation of modifier and modifiee metonymically fluctuates. Here is his example:

- (42) Wahuku-ni gaitou-no ekichou-wa samui

(Japanese-clothes-in overcoat stationmaster-NOM chilly

tachibanashi-wo satsusa-to kiriage-tai-rashiku, ....

stand-chatting-ACC quickly quit-want-appear)

Gross: The stationmaster, only wearing a coat over Japanese clothes,  
appears to want to stop standing and chatting in the cold  
immediately, ....

(Y. Kawabata, *Yukiguni*)

He explicates that the chilliness can be attributed to all of the entities in the event, that is, not only to the stationmaster but also to other persons there, to the chatting, to the snow country as a whole. And he regards TE as a hypallage in a broad sense and regards TE as a good example of a form that fluctuates in meaning. And he concludes that a semantic relation cannot be subject to regulations of a syntactic relation.

The foregoing argument may be acceptable, but there still remain some questions unanswered. For one thing, it leaves the matter of the gradience in TE. In other words, the argument above states that the modifier of TE is unstable,<sup>8</sup> but in practice there are various relations between the modifier and the modifiee. Additionally, his

<sup>8</sup> Sato (1986, 1987) is in agreement with Tokieda (1941), who has argued this without discussing TE. Tokieda (1941: 298) cites the following examples:

- i) Ame-wa sabishii.  
(rain-NOM lonely)
- ii) Sabishii moyou  
(lonely scene)
- iii) Watashi-wa sabishii.  
(I-NOM lonely)

He explains that ii) expresses only a objective, attributive concept, while iii) expresses only a subjective, emotional concept. In his account, i) expresses both of the two concepts synthetically.

argument cannot explain the motivation of TE, that is, the reason why it is the conversation among other things that is described as chilly.

### 3.3 Shibahara (1995)

Shibahara (1995) develops his theory by arguing against Richards' (1936) interaction theory, Black's (1962) creation of similarity, and the developers of the creation theory, Lakoff and Johnson (1980). The point of his argument is that none of the previous theories of metaphor, more precisely of similarity, can answer the question how people can recognize the similarity which they cannot recognize in the first place (See Shibahara 1995: 9ff.).

He advances a relational cognitive semantics that deals with similarity in terms of "the illusion of relations." To give an account of the essence of the similarity, he assumes two kinds of psychological force which impels a person to shift some relation between two things to the relation of similarity. Let us consider the following example (43) of a metaphor:

- (43) a. You are the cream in my coffee.
- b. You are my pride and joy.

According to him, (43a) is usually interpreted as (43b). The antecedent theories of metaphor, as he points out, cannot explain how people can recognize the similarity between *you* and *the cream in my coffee*, although the following two relations can be recognized:

- (44) a. you : I = the cream in my coffee : my coffee
- b. the pride and joy of you = the pride and joy of the cream

Shibahara explains this such that, once the chain of relations in (44) is recognized, the compulsory force works and *you* and *the cream in my coffee* will be regarded as similar to each other by the illusion of the relations.

Along the same lines, he explains TE using examples such as *a sleepless pillow* and *majimena megane* 'a serious pair of glasses.' For the latter example, a serious person and a pair of glasses which a serious person wears are clearly in the relation of contiguity, then, according to the hypothesis, the compulsory force works. Thus, the serious person and the glasses can be regarded as similar to each other.

This hypothesis could deal with such phenomena as metaphor, metonymy, and other figurative languages uniformly. As far as TE is concerned, however, we should say that this view is unsatisfactory, because it cannot account for the modifying relation in TE, that is, the direction of the epithet 'transferred', and because it cannot deal with the motivation of TE, either.

### 3.4 Yamanashi (1995)

In his observations on adnominal modifiers, Yamanashi (1995) points out that TE is a form which manifests the peculiarity in them. The important point to note is that he examines TE in Japanese not only in such literary works as poetry but also in our ordinary linguistic expressions.

- (45) a. natsukashii kokyōu  
(dear-old hometown)  
b. kanashii kekka  
(sad result)  
c. yuutsuna nichiyoubi  
(dismal Sunday) (Yamanashi 1995: 180)

He also points out the possibility that TE can be treated as a derivative expression from a prototypical adnominal modification in which the adjective literally depicts the emotions of the principal head noun.

Observing other peculiarities of adnominal modification like internal vs. external modification and partial ellipsis, he suggests that they can involve the following three forms of metonymic supplementation:

- (46) a. Supplementation of the propositional modifier content  
b. Supplementation of the modifiee, that is, the head  
c. Supplementation of the modifier (Yamanashi 1995: 180ff.)

He proposes these to explain the following examples, respectively.

- (47) a. samma-ga yakeru nioi  
(saury-NOM grill smell) (Yamanashi 1995: 181)  
b. Denwa-wo totta.  
(phone-ACC took-up) (Yamanashi 1995: 183)  
c. atama-ga yokunaru hon  
(brain-NOM improve book) (Yamanashi 1995: 183)

In (47a) there is no pivot, that is, a noun in common which combines the head and the modifier, while there is a pivotal noun *mother* in the relative clause such as *the mother who is grilling a saury*.<sup>9</sup> This pivot can be supplemented as a typical or default value in the propositional content of the modifier clause. In (47b) only its modifier is shown, instead of *Denwa-no juwaki-wo totta*. In this case the head *juwaki* 'receiver'

<sup>9</sup> Yamanashi (1995) also provides the following evidence for the distinction:

- i) Hahaoya-ga samma-wo yaku.  
(mother-NOM saury-ACC bake)  
ii) \* Nioi-ga samma-wo yaku.  
(smell-NOM saury-ACC bake) (Yamanashi 1995: 181)


In i) *hahaoya* can serve as a pivot, while *nioi* in ii) cannot.

can be conventionally supplemented as a typical or default value by the metonymic process based on the cognition of contiguity. In the last case, (47c) can be interpreted with the supplementation of the phrase *if you read the book, then*. This additional meaning can be inferred as a typical or default value of the modifier.<sup>10</sup>

As far as TE is concerned, this view seems to approximate to the cognitive process for interpreting the ‘shifted’ adjective of TE. However, this view is not yet sufficient, because it leaves out the modifying relation between the adjective and the head noun, and the motivation of the occurrence of TE.

### 3.5 Shinohara (1997)

Finally, let us consider Shinohara (1997). He proposes the classification of predicative adjective sentences, that is, subject-complement adjectives, in English, and also provides the following gradation of adjectives in terms of the distinction whether the adjective in question modifies process or entity.



He states that adjectives in the process/entity indistinguishable group can take several kinds of substantives. Especially, he points out that, following Langacker’s analysis, *tough* type adjectives as in (48) can be analyzed in terms of the *profile shift* from the process (action) to the entity (object). (See Langacker 1991b, 1995)

- (48) a. To read this book is tough<sub>1</sub>.  
b. This book is tough<sub>2</sub> to read.

The profile shift is based on the metonymic cognition that an action or an event (*to read this book* in (48a)) is metonymically substituted for by the object (*the book* in (48b)). Then he suggests that the cognitive shift can account for the “attributivization” of those adjectives in the process/entity indistinguishable group, that is, the phenomenon that an adjective is becoming more attributive, as in the following examples cited from Sato (1987: 74-75):

- (49) Kare-wa {nagai michi/ kurai michi/ sabishii michi/ kodokuna michi/  
(he-NOM {long way/ dark way/ deserted way/ lonely way/  
kanashii michi}-wo aruite-itta.  
sad way }-ACC walk-PAST) (Shinohara 1997: 6)

<sup>10</sup> Matsumoto (1988) calls this type of construction in Japanese “gapless,” and discusses the interpretation of such relative clause-like constructions, and concludes that what is crucial for it is the semantic and pragmatic association between the clause and the noun.

This phenomenon is treated in Sato (1987) as a “hypallagation” of adjectives, which means that adjectives in (49) show a degree of hypallagation. Shinohara (1997) suggests that this phenomenon, including TE, can be dealt with uniformly as a metonymic profile shift as proposed above.

I agree with him in thinking that TE may involve a profile shift. We should say, however, that his explanation for TE is not satisfactory. It is not only because Shinohara (1997) fails to examine concrete examples of TE closely, but also because he leaves the central problem untouched: its motivation.

### 3.6 Summary

Let us close this section by summarizing the problems of these previous analyses of TE. From what we have pointed out above, the problems of TE that have been left unexplored so far may be put briefly in the following way:

- (50) a. What is the mechanism of the modification of TE? In other words, where will the modifier in question ‘shift’ to, and how can the adjective modify its substantive?
- b. What is the motivation of the ‘shift’? That is, why does the apparent discrepancy between the form and the meaning in TE come into being?
- c. Where do the unique figurative properties and effects of TE come from?

We will explore much further into these matters in section 5 below.

## 4 ANALYSIS

In this section, we will investigate the characteristics of TE closely from a cognitive perspective, in order to answer the questions in (50) that have been unsolved in the previous analyses so far. To begin with, we will provide a classification of TE. Then, we will introduce basic cognitive phenomena: *active-zone/profile discrepancy*, which involves *reference point construction*, *subjectification*, and *mental space blending*. Finally, in the light of these concepts we will consider those problems by examining actual data and try to give detailed explanations of TE.

### 4.1 Classification of TE

First of all, I will provide a classification of TE based on the prose examples. In this classification, examples in poetry are excluded, for the purpose of removing the influence of form and diction, and especially from restrictions of rhythm and meter. For the purpose of a close analysis of the connection between the ‘transferred’ modifier and the modifiee, TE will be divided into four classes below according to the

relationship between the principal and the substantive of TE in question,<sup>11</sup> or, to put it another way, according to the 'distance' or 'gap' between them.

**4.1.1 Class 1 TE** This class includes examples where the superficial substantive is part of the principal.

- (51) "Yes, ma'am," Homer said as if he were speaking to a school teacher who had just corrected him. He opened the telegram with *nervous* fingers.  
(W. Saroyan, *The Human Comedy*)
- (52) "And does Miss Linton turn a *cold* shoulder on him?" was the doctor's next question.<sup>12</sup> (E. Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*)
- (53) She gave him a look—and there were those eyes again, squinched up but startlingly green just the same. And that *pugnacious* yet delicate chin, lifted. (H. B. Gilmour, *One Fine Day*)
- (54) ... he saw among the foot-passengers the first admirers of his splendour: an old man and a young boy, gazing up and following his carriage with *eager* eyes .... (W. Cather, *Shadows on the Rock*)

This type of TE seems to have been regarded as the most typical since the 'shift' of modifier from the principal to the substantive appears to be evident.

**4.1.2 Class 2 TE** In this class the substantives of TE are the acts, voice, or manner of the principal.

- (55) The Professor walked away across the snowy park with a *tired* step.  
(W. Cather, *The Professor's House*)
- (56) "George gonna come back," Lennie reassured himself in a *frightened* voice. (J. Steinbeck, *Of Mice and Men*)
- (57) He gave an *apologetic* little shrug.  
(I. Shaw, *God Was Here But He Left Early*)
- (58) He shimmered out, and I took another *listless* stab at the e. and bacon.  
(P. G. Wodehouse, "Jeeves and the Impending Doom")

As far as my observation goes, examples in this class are the most frequent and ubiquitous of the four, especially when the substantive is the principal's voice, though we cannot provide the relative ratio of the frequency here.

**4.1.3 Class 3 TE** Those expressions which are things connected with the principal belong to this class, where the substantives are separate from the principal.

<sup>11</sup> These terms are from Jespersen (1909-49, II). In this paper, *principal* means the entity which the adjective of TE should originally modify, and *substantive* means the entity which the adjective of TE modifies formally.

<sup>12</sup> This expression may be treated as a set phrase or an idiom. Our concern here is to consider the cognitive process in conceptualization of the event.

- (59) And there the crowd hammered *cruel* nails through his hands and feet, and nailed him on the cross. (Sasaki 1980: 178)
- (60) Poor boys were paid a *pitiful* pittance in Austria, despite their great skills, .... (I. Shaw, *Small Saturday*)
- (61) Such, then, is the sequence of events which led up to Bertram Wooster ... standing at the door ... surveying the scene before him through the aromatic smoke of a *meditative* cigarette.  
(P. G. Wodehouse, *Thank You, Jeeves*)
- (62) Out of the corner of her eye, she thought she saw Sammy's apparently indestructible red car again, heading into the conference room .... The *unrepentant* car continued to move toward her.  
(H. B. Gilmour, *One Fine Day*)

The degree of vagueness of the principal that the adjective in question seems to take is proportional to the distance between the substantive and the principal.

**4.1.4 Class 4 TE** This class of TE includes expressions where the substantive is time or space in which the principal is placed.

- (63) The eight hard *hopeless* years seemed to him to be only a caricature of service: a few communions, a few confessions, and an endless bad example. (G. Green, *The Power and The Glory*)
- (64) Thank you to Mrs. Rich, who on a *terrible* November day in 1963 tried to explain the inexplicable to fourth-graders. (*LIFE*, Sept., 1998)
- (65) But it is a *busy* time for us when the last ships sail.  
(W. Cather, *Shadows on the Rock*)
- (66) "... The people watch you, and when you have a *discouraged* air, they all become discouraged."  
(W. Cather, *Shadows on the Rock*)

Also *happy/sad hours* and *the busy/lonesome street* may belong to this class. It must be noted that these principal can be people in general.

## 4.2 Theoretical Framework

In order to examine the mechanism of TE in depth, we adopt a cognitive linguistic approach in this paper. In traditional linguistic theories, figurative language, such as TE, has been generally ignored and treated by ad hoc devices at best. As Langacker claims:

We ... need a way of conceiving and describing grammatical structure that accommodates figurative language as a natural, expected phenomenon rather than a special, problematic one. An adequate conceptual framework for linguistic analysis should view figurative language not as a problem, but as *part of the solution*.  
(Langacker 1987: 1, italics mine)



Accordingly, we adopt here the cognitive linguistic approach, where the importance of cognitive factors in language are taken crucially. We regard TE as a linguistic expression that reflects fundamental aspects of cognition, so that we will examine it by introducing the basic notions and devices of cognitive linguistics: *active-zone/profile discrepancy*, *reference point construction*, *subjectification*, and *mental space blending*.


#### 4.3 Analysis of TE

To begin with, we have to show that Hall's (1973) formulation, which regards the adjective of TE as equivalent to the adverb that can modify the verb of the clause, is not adequate. In previous analyses of TE, it has been widely accepted. Viewed from the cognitive standpoint, however, there is a crucial difference between adjective and adverb, as in the following Langacker's definitions:

- (67) a. Adjective: an atemporal relation with a *thing* as trajector.<sup>13</sup>  
 b. Adverb: an atemporal relation with a *relation* as trajector.  
 (Langacker 1987: 242, italics mine)

where *thing* is a region in some domain of conceptual space, i.e. every nominal predication designates a region, and *relation* is defined by interconnections between conceived entities. For instance, taking the following examples, Langacker expresses both the similarities and the differences between the two constructions as in the sketch in Figure 1.<sup>14</sup>

- (68) a. He drives the car *carefully*.  
 b. his *careful* driving of the car  
 (Langacker 1991a: 43)



(Langacker 1991a: 43)

<Figure 2> Adverb and Adjective

<sup>13</sup> *Trajector* and *landmark* are abbreviated to *tr* and *lm* in the diagrams, respectively. See Langacker (1987) for the definitions.

<sup>14</sup> Figures or diagrams show the semantic value of the linguistic expression in question and we will commonly use a circle to indicate a *thing*, a box for an *entity*, a line connecting two entities for a *relation* between them, and an arrow for *conceived time*. The heavy line means that the entity or relation is *profiled* (See Langacker 1987: 220).

In the figure above, the adverb takes a *relation* as a trajector, while the adjective takes a *thing*, and they are located on the scale that lies beyond the neighborhood of the norm (n). Although this contrast is subtle, it constitutes a difference in meaning and is responsible for the difference in grammatical category. From this point of view, therefore, I cannot bring myself to accept the traditional formulation where the adjective is treated as equal to the adverb.


In order to analyze this in TE, we will introduce the concept *active-zone/profile discrepancy* in the following sub-subsection.

**4.3.1 Active-Zone/Profile Discrepancy in TE** We will introduce here a basic cognitive concept *active-zone/profile discrepancy* so as to explore the question (50a), developing Shinohara's (1997) suggestion about the profile shift in TE.

There is usually some discrepancy between the entities that participate most directly in a relation and the entities profiled by the linguistic expressions.<sup>15</sup> Langacker (1991b, 1995) calls this phenomenon *active-zone/profile discrepancy*. Let us consider the following examples:

- (69) a. the spoon in the cup  
       b. the cigarette in her mouth  
       c. the arrow in this tree
- (Langacker 1995: 25)

We can observe that only portions of the entities designated in (69) are directly involved in each relationship profiled by the preposition *in*. In (69a), for example, the portion of the spoon that falls within the confines of the cup is its *active zone* with respect to the *in* relation.<sup>16</sup> But the portion is, of course, not the spoon itself. Namely, "when an entity is conceived as participating in a given relationship, there is usually some discrepancy between its profile and its active zone for that relation" (Langacker 1995: 25). And the situation of this discrepancy is sketched abstractly in Figure 2 as follows:



<Figure 3> Active-Zone/Profile Discrepancy

Figure 3(a) depicts expressions such as in (69), and expressions lacking such


<sup>15</sup> *Profile* means a substructure within the base that is obligatorily accessed, it functions as the focal point within the objective scene, and it achieves a special degree of prominence (Langacker 1987: 487).

<sup>16</sup> Active zone is defined as those facets of an entity capable of interacting directly with a given domain or relation (Langacker 1987: 485).

discrepancies, like *The spacecraft is now approaching Uranus*, is illustrated in Figure 3(b). The configurations in Figure 3(a) and (b) are special cases of the general scheme depicted in Figure 3(c). And Langacker concludes that these discrepancies “manifest some very basic conceptual and linguistic phenomena and serve an important cognitive and communicative function” (Langacker 1995: 25).<sup>17</sup>

Now then, in view of this cognitive notion, we will analyze the actual TE data to give a convincing answer to (50a). In the first place, we will demonstrate in detail the metonymic profile shift in conceptualization of TE, showing the active-zone/profile discrepancy. Let us take an example of Class 1 TE:

- (70) a. He opened the telegram *nervously*.  
 b. He opened the telegram with *nervous* fingers. (= 51)




(70a) is a corresponding adverbial expression, which has been regarded as being the same as the TE adjective in traditional studies. As we touched on earlier, there is a clear difference between them, which is illustrated in Figure 1 above. The adverbial predication of (70a) is sketched in Figure 4(a), where the whole temporal relation ‘he opened the telegram’ (shown as a bald rectangle) is profiled and situated on the scale of nervousness that functions as the primary landmark. Thus, there is no active-zone/profile discrepancy in the atemporal relation expressed by the adverb *nervously*.

On the other hand, the adjectival predication of the TE in (70b) is rather complicated. We can see that it involves twofold discrepancies. First, one of them is concerned in the atemporal relation *nervous*. To understand this, let us consider the contrast between the following sentences, especially between (72a) and (72b):

<sup>17</sup> Citing the following examples, Langacker also points out that if it were not for active-zone discrepancy, a sentence like i) would have to be avoided in favor of a cumbersome alternative like ii), which is not fully accurate in any case.

i) The dog bit the cat.  
 ii) The dog's teeth, jaws, jaw muscles, and volition bit that portion of the cat's tail extending from 6 to 12 centimeters from the tip.  
 (Langacker 1993: 32)

- (71) He was a quiet and *nervous* man.  
 (72) a. He was *nervous*.  
 b. He was *nervous* about driving again after the accident.



<Figure 5> Attributive and Predicative Function

In (71) there is no such discrepancy, since in Figure 5(a) *man* (a bald circle) is situated on the scale as the trajector of the predication of the adjective. We should notice that the adjective functions almost unambiguously as an attributive modifier expressing a customary and characteristic property of the trajector.<sup>18</sup> The function of (72a), on the other hand, is ambiguous between attributive and predicative. For the former function, Figure 5(a) can depict the adjective predication. For the latter, Figure 5(b) can do it, where the temporariness of the property may be shown. As Langacker explains, “when the active zone of a predication diverges from its profile the former can be spelled out periphrastically if there is communicative motivation for so doing” (Langacker 1991b: 197).<sup>19</sup> This is true for the implicit process that functions as the active zone of the adjective *nervous*, as is shown in (72b).

Second, the other discrepancy in (70b) is concerned with the temporal relation *open*. For the process *open the telegram*, *fingers* works as the active zone of the relation. As far as the atemporal relation *nervous* is concerned, however, it is not the *fingers* but *he* that functions as the active zone of the adjective, simply because a part of the body like *fingers* cannot, per se, interact with the scale of nervousness. Therefore, two types of active-zone/profile discrepancy happen at the same time.

Viewed in this light, we can conclude as a tentative answer to (50a) that the ‘shift’ of the modifying relation in TE can be treated apparently as a metonymic shift from a *relation* to a *thing*, that is, a metonymic shift of profiling.

<sup>18</sup> See Otsuka, *et al.* (1959), Yasui, *et al.* (1976), and other studies for detailed discussion.


<sup>19</sup> Langacker explains this by citing the following examples:

- i) That surgeon is fast.  
 ii) That surgeon is fast at solving a Rubik’s Cube. (Langacker 1991b: 197)

When the modified noun strongly implies a particular type of process, as he goes on to explain, specifying this process periphrastically is superfluous, as in i). However, as in ii), periphrasis becomes necessary, when the process that functions as the active zone is not the one canonically associated with the modified noun.

Now, there arises a further question which needs to be clarified: what is the cognitive factor of the discrepancy? We will analyze this in the succeeding sections from two basic cognitive viewpoints: *reference point ability* and *subjectification*.

**4.3.2 Reference Point Construction in TE** The reference-point phenomenon, as Langacker (1993) says, is so fundamental and ubiquitous in our moment-to-moment experience that we are largely unaware of it. It is best described as the ability to invoke the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with another, i.e. to single it out for individual conscious awareness. This image-schematic ability is proposed as the abstract basis for possessives, topic constructions, pronoun-antecedent relationships, and metonymy. Especially, metonymy, which instantiates our reference-point ability, largely overlaps with the active-zone phenomenon discussed above.<sup>20</sup> The basic components of a reference-point construction and the active-zone/profile discrepancy are sketched in Figure 6:



<Figure 6>

A conceptualizer (C) invokes a reference point (R) to establish mental contact with a target (T), and the set of entities accessible via a given reference point constitute its dominion (D), i.e. the class of potential targets. By virtue of our reference-point ability, a well-chosen R will be one entity that is salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name. In Figure 6(b), then, the T is overlapped with Az and related to the scale, which depicts the adjective in question here. As Langacker (1993) points out, there are certain principles of cognitive salience that generally hold. Some of these are listed in (73):

- (73) Other things being equal, various principles of relative salience generally hold: human > non-human; whole > part; concrete > abstract; visible > non-visible; etc. (Langacker 1993: 30)

In view of this cognitive notion, we can clearly explain the motivation of occurrence of TE (50b) and the cause of its unique properties. Let us start by examining the modifying relationship of TE with actual examples in each class which

<sup>20</sup> "Active-zone/profile discrepancy," Langacker also says, "can now be recognized as METONYMY IN THE LINGUISTIC CODING OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN A RELATIONSHIP" (Langacker 1995: 28).

we provided earlier in 4.1. Here are the representative examples of the four classes to be analyzed:

- (74) Class 1 TE:  
He opened the telegram with *nervous* fingers. (= 51)
- (75) Class 2 TE:  
The Professor walked away across the snowy park with a *tired* step. (= 55)
- (76) Class 3 TE:  
And there the crowd hammered *cruel* nails through his hands and feet, and nailed him on the cross. (= 59)
- (77) Class 4 TE:  
The eight hard *hopeless* years seemed to him to be only a caricature of service. (= 63)

Based on this abstract diagram, we can point out that there is a gradience in the choice of the superficial substantive. In (74), *fingers*, which is a part of the principal, is adopted as the reference point, from which the conceptualizer's mental path reaches the target *he* and it is situated on the nervousness scale. Since we cannot discern the mental or emotional state of the conceptual object such as being nervous directly or objectively,<sup>21</sup> it is quite natural for us to use the reference point which is the most salient participant in the event of opening the telegram, namely, his fingers, in order to refer to the target, that is, his nervousness. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that we *have to* do so. We have to judge or recognize the principal's internal state in terms of the reference point as the crucial clue, and will naturally put the conceptualization into linguistic expression as if the nervousness exists exactly at the place of the fingers among other entities.

In (75), *steps*, which is an act of the principal, is adopted as the reference point, from which the conceptualizer's mental path reaches the target *the professor* and it is situated on the tiredness scale. Our recognition that the steps tell us eloquently of the professor's tiredness is coded.

In Class 3 TE, the gap between the substantive and the principal becomes wider: the reference point is what is close to the principal. In (76), it is *nails*, from which the

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<sup>21</sup> This matter may be related to Wittgenstein's investigation on private language. Concerning the question whether there is no pain without pain-behavior, he comments that "only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious" (Wittgenstein 1953, 281: 97). The word "behaves like a human being" is important in this context, because he claims at first (if I interpret the author correctly) that one cannot understand another's pain itself directly. However, he goes on to investigate further and writes as follows:

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I *do not feel* on the model of the pain which I *do feel*. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body. (Which would also be possible.)


Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place—but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression.  
(Wittgenstein 1953, 302: 101)

He goes on to conclude in the end that one cannot understand another's pain either directly or indirectly.

conceptualizer makes mental contact with the target, i.e. the crowd, or the scene as a whole. As far as the cruelty is concerned, it is the nails that have the most cognitive salience in the event of crucifixion. This recognition projects straight onto the linguistic expression (see Kawakami 1986) and naturally allows the *nails* to take the attributive adjective *cruel* to form the TE.

Finally, the gap seems to be maximum. In (77), the reference point is the *years* and its target is *him*, or every entity in that period, so that the conceptualizer makes mental access to the target's hopelessness. The principal is, in a metaphorical sense, put within a time span or in space, so that it is associated with time or space by contingency. The mental state of the target is expressed by depicting the time or the space where he is placed. To put it another way, the internal state of the target pervades the whole time or the whole space he is in.

As a brief summary of this, let us provide the following diagrams to show schematically the gradual change of discrepancy, in other words, of the relationship between the principal and the substantive, from Class 1 TE to Class 4 TE:



<Figure 7> Reference Point Construction in TE

Class 1 TE takes a part of the target as a reference point, Class 2 an act or manner of the target, Class 3 a thing close to the target, and Class 4 the time or space the target is in. Considering an asymmetry in the part-whole relationship, we can suggest the difference in referring to the target especially between Class 1 and Class 4. In a part-whole relation, we can exclusively refer to the whole by one of its parts, while we cannot to a part by the whole which includes it. Thus, we can access exclusively only one target (whole) in Class 1 TE, while we cannot do so in Class 4 TE. In addition, as the gap between principal and substantive becomes wider from Class 1 to 4, we can tell less clearly the transportation of the modifier between them and we can allow generic reading for the principal. We will consider this matter again in the following section in the light of *subjectification*.

Let us summarize the main points that have been discussed so far. In the view of reference point construction, we can explain the following three characteristics of TE which have been unexplored by traditional studies as in (50): i) the reason why most


TE are adjectives of sense or emotion; ii) one of the motivations of TE; iii) the reason why TE has a unique ‘anchoring’ effect. Since we cannot directly nor objectively discern the principal’s internal state such as emotional one, we have to judge it via a reference point which is concrete and salient participant in the cognitive event. It is necessary for us to adopt the outer state as the reference point in order to understand the internal state of the target. And when we use an adverbial modification, the impression may be broken up, since the modifier takes the whole relation as the trajector. On the other hand, we can get a unified impression and a vivid depiction by adopting TE, because the mental state of the principal which is in nature impossible to grasp directly is tied down to the concrete clue of the reference point.

**4.3.3 Subjectification in TE** We will introduce another basic cognitive concept, *subjectification*, so as to explain the unique property of generic reading for the principal of TE, and to answer the question which arose in 4.3.2 about the cognitive factor of the active-zone/profile discrepancy.

Let us outline subjectification in accordance with Langacker (1997a, 1997b). Conceptual structure, as he says, involves a subject and an object of conception. To the extent that an entity functions as a conceptual subject or object, respectively, it is said to be subjectively or objectively construed. A subjectively construed entity is therefore part of the conceptualizing process or apparatus itself but excluded from the content of the conceptualization. The subject of conceptualization comes to be integrated implicitly into the meaning of an utterance. He characterizes subjectification as follows:

(78) Subjectification:

An *objective* relationship fades away, leaving behind a *subjective* relationship that was originally *immanent* in it (i.e., inherent in its conceptualization).  
(Langacker 1997b: 5)



<Figure 8>

This is sketched in Figure 8, where an objective relationship (the bold arrow) fades away and a subjective relationship, i.e., the mental scan of the conceptualizer (the dashed arrows) has left to be foregrounded.

Langacker explains that the distinction between subjective and objective construal is clearly a matter of degree. Consider the following examples of *across*:



- (79) a. The child hurried *across* the busy street.  
[profiled objective movement by trajector]  
b. The child is safely *across* the street.  
[static location resulting from unprofiled, past, actual movement of trajector]  
c. You need to mail a letter? There's a mailbox just *across* the street.  
[static location as goal of unprofiled, potential, future movement of addressee]  
d. A number of shops are conveniently located just *across* the street.  
[static location as goal of potential movement by a generalized or generic individual]  
e. Last night there was a fire *across* the street.  
[static location, no physical movement necessarily envisaged at all]  
(Langacker 1997a: 3)

In these examples, the conceptualizer necessarily scans mentally along the same path as an inherent aspect of tracking the subject's motion. It is not that this is added to the conceptualization of the derived sense of *across*, but rather that it stands alone and is consequently more visible when the objective motion is stripped away.

This perspective of subjectification deals with fictive (or also called subjective) motion comprehensively. Let us take the examples:


- (80) a. The balloon *rose* slowly.  
b. The hill gently *rises* from the bank of the river.  
(Langacker 1991a: 218)

In (80a), the trajector moves objectively through physical space. In (80b), on the other hand, it is the conceptualizer who moves subjectively through the scene and mentally traces an upward path along the hill. Therefore, we may say that subjectification can play a significant role in semantic extension as in the case above: *hill* can be the subject of a motion verb *rise*.

Viewing from this cognitive notion, we can clearly explain the gradual change of the adjective from usual attributive function to TE. Along the same line as Langacker's explanation of the semantic extension of *across*, let us consider that of the adjective *sad*:

- (81) a. I'd be a mighty *sad* man if we never met again.  
b. "You must be a very *sad* people."  
c. I shall come to say my *sad* good-bye.  
d. She smiled at me, but it was an awfully *sad* smile.  
e. That was a very *sad* book/story/film.

These examples show the gradual change of the adjective in attributive function into TE in this order, where we can observe that the objective relationship between trajector and landmark fades away, leaving the subjective relationship and the latter comes to be foregrounded. This can be illustrated schematically as follows:



(Cf. Langacker 1997a: 3)

&lt;Figure 9&gt; Subjectification in Adjective

Viewed in the light that TE can involve several degrees of subjectification in its conceptualization, we can easily explain the gradual change of the adjective in attributive function into TE.

We should not overlook here that TE can have a generic reading of its subject in interpretation, as was pointed out earlier. This is in agreement with Langacker's observation on subjective construal of an event. Let us survey here his analysis once again on *have*:

- (82) a. The robber *has* a gun in his hand.  
 b. Brygida *has* a new chainsaw.  
 c. Sally *has* a dog.  
 d. We *have* a lot of skunks around here. (Langacker 1991: 212-213)

In (82a), the robber exerts physical force to control the position of the gun. The focus in (82b) is more on ownership, but the notion of direct physical control remains salient. In (82c), the concept of physical force may still be present to some extent, but such abstract relationship as ownership, care, and authority assume greater prominence. In (82d), there is no energetic interaction. *We* refers not just to the speaker and hearer but to all the people in the geographical area, namely, the subject functions as a spatial reference point for locating the object and it is construed generically.

Let us return to our main subject. What we want to show here is that we can analyze TE with the same kind of analysis as above. Consider (81) once again. In (81a), it is exclusively the man who is sad. What about (81c)? It is either the speaker or the hearer who feels the sadness, or it is gathering a status of an attribute of the parting expression *good-bye*. These phenomena are more noticeable in (81e), where we cannot identify the principal of *sad* specifically, that is, the principal may be people in general who read it including the speaker and the hearer. Since there is little objective relation left between the trajector (book/story/film) and the landmark (a certain region on the sadness scale), the conceptualizer's subjective construal comes to be foregrounded, that is, a 'fictive relation' is brought into relief. This stems from a basic cognitive principle: other things being equal, specific and concrete entities stand out more readily than general and abstract ones. Thus, the cause of a stimulus or the

stimulus itself is the most salient participant in the cognitive event.<sup>22</sup> We will consider this fictive relation again from a different angle, i.e., *mental space blending*, in the following section.

Now we can also explain the gradual change in the selection of the possible principal from Class 1 to 4 above. The degree of genericity of the reading for the principal is proportional to the magnitude of the gap between the principal and the substantive. This is because the gap must be compensated for by the conceptualizer's subjective construal.<sup>23</sup> The following example in an article about the assassination of J. F. Kennedy is also a good illustration of this analysis:

- (83) The *sad* truth is that we will never know with absolute certainty what happened that day in Dallas. (LIFE, Sept., 1998)

We can also deal with the phenomenon which is treated in Sato (1987) as a "hypallagation" of adjectives uniformly. Here we cite (49) again as (84):

- (84) Kare-wa {nagai michi/ kurai michi/ sabishii michi/ kodokuna michi/  
(he-NOM {long way/ dark way/ deserted way/ lonely way/  
kanashii michi}-wo aruite-itta.  
sad way }-ACC walk-PAST) (Sato 1987: 74-75)

This gradual change of hypallagation can be treated as a degree of subjectification, as is discussed above. We can provide the same kind of examples with English adjectives:

- (85) a. "Excuse me!" said a *loud* voice far behind him.  
b. I could hear a *hoarse* voice from inside the room.  
c. "I don't know what you mean," said Fran in a *quavering* voice.  
d. She has a gentle and *kind* voice.  
e. Leota went on in a *despondent* voice, "they called up the cops ...."  
(E. Welty, *Petrified Man*)  
f. "Listen, Oliver," said Jenny, and it was in her *angry* voice, albeit soft.  
(E. Segal, *Love Story*)  
g. An *anxious, sleepy* voice would reply:  
"Papa, j'ai peur pour le persil." (W. Cather, *Shadows on the Rock*)

<sup>22</sup> Kemmer (1993) divides perception verbs into two types: Experiencer-based (e.g. *I smell garlic*) and Stimulus-based (e.g. *Garlic smells good*) perception verb. And she points out as follows:

In the Stimulus-based type, the experiencer is generic and hence has a low degree of saliency; the most salient participant, given the semantics of the construction, is the Stimulus itself.  
(Kemmer 1993: 136)

She suggests that this type of perception verb is relevant to the middle construction, which expresses a situation with a pragmatically deemphasized agent. It will not be discussed further here.


<sup>23</sup> I understand tentatively that this view has much in common with that of Yamanashi (1995), where a conventional default value can be supplemented from the event scheme.

Here we can observe the gradience of subjectification. (See also 4.4.)

**4.3.4 Mental Space Blending in TE** Lastly, we will introduce another cognitive concept, *mental space blending*, so that we can give an answer to (50), especially to the question why TE takes not post-adjunct but pre-adjunct adjectives, and it will also show the nature of the ‘fictive relation’ in TE.

Let us consider fictive motion in terms of the *blending* of mental spaces. Fauconnier (1997) studies it as a consequence of conceptual blending. Blending, as he explains, is a simple operation “on two Input mental spaces to yield a third space, the *blend*” (Fauconnier 1997: 149). When two Input spaces  $I_1$  and  $I_2$  are blended, he proposes the following conditions that are satisfied:

- (86) a. **CROSS-SPACE MAPPING:** There is a *partial* mapping of counterparts between the input spaces  $I_1$  and  $I_2$ .
- b. **GENERIC SPACE:** There is a *generic space*, which maps onto each of the inputs. This generic space reflects some common, usually more abstract, structure and organization shared by the inputs and defines the core cross-space mapping between them.
- c. **BLEND:** The inputs  $I_1$  and  $I_2$  are partially projected onto a fourth space, the blend.
- d. **EMERGENT STRUCTURE:** The blend has emergent structure not provided by the inputs. This happens in three (interrelated) ways: Composition, Completion, and Elaboration.



(Fauconnier 1997: 149-151)


<Figure 10> Mental Space Blending

Figure 10 is diagrammed schematically, where the square stands for the emergent structure in the blend. The diagram is meant to indicate that when counterparts are projected into the blend, they may be fused into a single element or projected separately. And Fauconnier claims that blends abound in several kinds of cases that go largely unnoticed, such as riddles, counterfactual statements, reductios, metaphors, etc., and that conceptual blending is not specifically linked to language use, like

design and action.

Now let us return to fictive motion. Consider the following example:

- (87) The blackboard goes all the way to the wall. (Fauconnier 1997: 177)



(Fauconnier 1997: 178)


<Figure 11>

(87) conveys motion and immobility at the same time. Objective immobility is expressed along with the conceptualizer's subjective mental scanning. Providing the diagram above, Fauconnier explains that this apparent contradiction is a consequence of conceptual blending. In this way we can see that fictive motion involves mental space blending in its conceptualization.

Now, let us consider the 'fictive relation' in TE in terms of mental space blending, aiming at a description of its nature. As we saw above, Fauconnier claims that fictive (subjective) motion involves mental space blending. Take the Class 1 TE as an example once again:

- (88) He opened the telegram with *nervous* fingers. (= 74)

It conveys the subject's inner state and the fingers' attribute at the same time. The objective attribute of the fingers is expressed with conceptual connection (a kind of mental scanning) between the internal state of the principal and his fingers. This apparent contradiction is a consequence of conceptual blending. The two spaces to blend are the space with a predicative adjective expressing a mental state of a human noun, and the space with a pre-adjunct adjective expressing an attribute of a noun. In each of these spaces the adjective is used, so called, 'properly.' This is described in Figure 12 below:



(Cf. Fauconnier 1997: 178)

&lt;Figure 12&gt; Mental Space Blending in TE

The predicative adjective in Input 1 is mapped onto the attributive adjective in Input 2. The human noun has no counterpart. In the blend, the two partial input structures are projected, as in the figure above. Note that English adjectives has a general tendency according to the position: pre-adjunct adjectives tend to function as attributive modifiers, which show the customary, classifying, and characteristic properties of the head noun.<sup>24</sup> By Completion, the Emergent Structure is set up in the blend. In TE this structure is the additional attribute that the noun is the central participant or the trigger which represents the inner state expressed by the adjective. Such a view is supported by the following remarks by Omori (1976):

Why is it that sadness cannot exist outside the body? Doesn't the gloominess of the seashore in winter exist in the seascape itself? Just as the lead-gray of the sea is the color of it and exists in it. One would say, however, that it is oneself that "feels" the gloominess, thus, the "feeling" must be in the inside of oneself. Even if it is I myself that feel it, nevertheless, the gloominess which I feel exists exactly in the seascape itself spreading out in front of me. Just as the color of the sea which I sense is an intrinsic part of it.

(Omori 1976: 58, translation mine)

What has to be noted here is the way we recognize an emotional event. Especially when a central participant or the trigger of an emotional event has saliency, we can subjectively conceptualize that the participant might have an attribute that causes the emotion.

Viewed in this light, we may explain that TE will occur in the pre-adjunct position. Although the TE adjective may depict a temporal mental state of the principal as a predicative adjective originally, i.e., in Input 1, according to the subjective conceptualization proposed above, the adjective is superimposed in the form of Adj + N, which has a general tendency to depict the classifying and characteristic properties of the head noun as an attributive of the noun.


<sup>24</sup> See footnote 19.

#### 4.4 Summary

Before closing this section, let us consider the active-zone/profile discrepancy of TE once again in the light of both the reference point construction and subjectification at the same time. Examples in (85) are cited again here as (89):

- (89) a. "Excuse me!" said a *loud* voice far behind him.  
 b. I could hear a *hoarse* voice from inside the room.  
 c. "I don't know what you mean," said Fran in a *quavering* voice.  
 d. She has a gentle and *kind* voice.  
 e. Leota went on in a *despondent* voice, "they called up the cops ...."  
 f. "Listen, Oliver," said Jenny, and it was in her *angry* voice, albeit soft.  
 g. An *anxious, sleepy* voice would reply:  
 "Papa, j'ai peur pour le persil."

Along with the discussion above, we can provide the following diagram for the final explanation:



<Figure 13> Reference Point Construction and Subjectification in TE

In (89a), the relation between the trajector and the landmark is depicted objectively as in Figure 13(a), where the objective relation is foregrounded. As the hypallagation proceeds, the reference point begins to work, where the objective relationship is attenuating and the subjective one is becoming foregrounded in order to compensate for the gap, as in Figure 13(b). Accordingly, in (89d), we cannot determine unambiguously whether it is the principal *she* or the voice itself that is kind. Then, in (89g), the objective relationship between the trajector (voice) and the landmark (anxiousness scale) can almost not be seen. Thus, the relation between them is construed subjectively by the conceptualizer as in Figure 13(c).

It follows from what we have seen that the degree of subjectification may be in proportion to the gap between the reference point and the target in TE. This view is in agreement with the discussion above in that the possibility of the generic reading of the principal is likely to be in proportion to the gap.

Now, finally let us consider the necessity of the reference point in conceptualization. Why is it that we are ready to use it in the first place? It is expressed best by Langacker (1993) when he says:

[T]here is a tension between the need to be accurate and our inclination to focus explicit attention on those entities that most concern us and have the greatest cognitive salience. The reference-point ability allows us to have it both ways: by profiling the salient entity we are interested in, we focus attention on it; and by using that entity as a reference point to evoke the proper active zone (as suggested by general knowledge and contextual frames), the demand for reasonable accuracy is also satisfied. The resulting expressions are communicatively efficient by virtue of brevity, and cognitively natural by virtue of what they explicitly mention.

(Langacker 1993: 30)

What is immediately apparent from this extract is that the TE is not simply a figurative language but also an efficient reconciliation of the two conflicting factors above, that is, our need to be accurate in communication and our natural inclination to be explicit about the cognitive saliency in a given event. From this viewpoint we can safely say that TE is a quite *natural* expression for our cognition, although it has often been regarded as an infelicitous one. (Masa-aki Yamanashi p.c.)

In this section, we have tried to give answers to the following questions on TE which previous studies have left unsolved:

- (90) a. What is the mechanism of the modification of TE? In other words, where will the modifier in question 'shift' to, and how can the adjective modify its substantive?
- b. What is the motivation of the 'shift'? That is, why does the apparent discrepancy between the form and the meaning in TE come into being?
- c. Where do the unique figurative properties and effects of TE come from?

(= 50)

Our conclusions are summarized as follows: TE involves the active-zone/profile discrepancy in its conceptualization, where three cognitive factors, i.e., reference-point ability, subjectification, and mental space blending are deeply concerned. More precisely, as an answer to (90a), the 'shift' of modifier in TE is likely to occur in the direction from the whole relation or event to the most salient thing in it to the conceptualizer. And the reason why almost all the adjectives of TE are of emotion or of sense lies in the fact that since we cannot directly discern internal states, we have to infer them from outer behavior. This is followed by such an answer to the question about the motivation of TE in (90b) that in order to apprehend an inner state we need to access an outer facet or aspect associated with it and regard the more concrete outer thing as the place where it might exist. In this way, our recognition of a cognitive event is directly expressed in the linguistic form. This is also closely related to an answer for (90c). Our impression of the linguistic expression of an event can be unified by anchoring it to a relatively concrete thing as the reference point which is salient to the conceptualizer. We can also answer the difficulty of paraphrasing TE. It expresses an internal state which is impossible to grasp directly in nature by adopting



<sup>25</sup> See Lakoff (1987) for a detail discussion.

vividness. It follows from what has been said that the term *transferred* epithet for this linguistic phenomenon does not seem to be appropriate. These results drawn so far, finally, lead the conclusion that TE, which has been simply treated as peculiar, has a quite natural cognitive mechanism behind it.

Along the same lines, there is room for research in the future on such other incongruous adnominal modifications as synaesthesia.

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