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On the Semantic Development of *Get*[*]

0   INTRODUCTION

The question of how linguistic change occurs provokes a great deal of controversy. Admittedly, a theory that could predict all linguistic change would be impossible, since the interpenetration of extra- and intra-linguistic factors is largely a matter of chance. The characterized tendencies of linguistic change are possible and not necessary (Traugott 1989: 33). However, it may be possible to form a theory which will suggest to us how change is to be interpreted.

The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the development of the verb *get* in order to show how complex linguistic change takes place. In Present-day English the verb *get* has various meanings. Not enough attention has, however, been paid to the semantic development of the diverse uses of this verb.

It is true that Visser (1973) deals with the rise and development of the *get*-causative construction (p.2259 and pp.2384-2385) and the *get*-passive construction (pp.2031-2033), but his investigation is mainly descriptive. He pays little attention to the question of how and why both the *get*-causative construction and the *get*-passive construction came into being. Nonetheless, our research owes a great deal to Visser. His data tell us when the various *get* constructions occurred for the first time. Another important study of the semantic development of *get* is the examination of the rise of the *get*-passive construction offered by Givón and Yang (1994). We cannot, however, go along with all of Givón and Yang's argument, and they omit to discuss various important aspects. Although their study is significant, they fail to give a proper account.[1]

In the present paper, we discuss historical data to elucidate the semantic change of *get* up to the rise of the *get*-passive. We will begin by reviewing four factors of linguistic change. We will then investigate the semantic development of *get* and the factors that bring about semantic change. Finally, the synchronic phenomena of the verb are discussed in Section 4. Cognitive grammar, which has developed over a number of years, and the theoretical framework of grammaticalization will be made used of. In cognitive grammar there is a serious interest in examining the relationships which hold between different senses of a morpheme. At least some polysemous lexical items seem to be structured in terms of a network of interrelated senses. For example, Lakoff

[1] See also Yonekura (1997).

(1987) analyzes the semantic network of *over*. Norvig and Lakoff's (1987) work on *take* shows that the lexicon is governed by explanatory principles. More recently, Lee (1996) applies the theory of cognitive grammar developed by Langacker to explicating the semantics of *make*. It will be observed that cognitive ability may play an crucial role in the semantic development of the verb *get*.

1   MECHANISMS OF LINGUISTIC CHANGE

The present section discusses four factors of linguistic extension or change, i.e. analogy, reanalysis, metaphor, and metonymy. In this paper we distinguish the syntactic factors promoting change (i.e. analogy and reanalysis) from the pragmatic or semantic ones (i.e. metaphor and metonymy). It should be noticed, however, that such a distinction does not imply an exclusive relationship between these factors. Linguistic change is complex and comprises many small steps.

Of course, language may be influenced by various other factors, like the contact between languages, the socio-cultural context, or overall typological developments. In the present paper, however, all these factors will be placed aside, since we will restrict ourselves to the most essential structures of the linguistic change.[2]

1.1 Syntactic Factors Promoting Change

1.1.1 Analogy   Analogy or analogical extension has been widely recognized as significant for linguistic change, most especially for morphosyntactic change. But in spite of that it remains an elusive notion. In some research on linguistics one finds such different definitions of analogy as "the generalizing of patterns which at one stage have limited use to more and more contexts" (Traugott 1972: 14), or "certain historical changes which have had the effect of creating like forms for like function" (Bynon 1977: 20), and "copying of a proportional model and its application to a context in which it has not hitherto occurred" (Samuels 1972: 55). Each of these definitions captures one aspect of analogy. The definitions mentioned above are best summarized in the phrase "the attraction of extant forms to already existing constructions" (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 56).

There seems to have been a rather narrow and local interpretation of analogy, which was defined as a process whereby irregularities in grammar, particularly at the morphological level, were regularized. Thus, the singular-plural alternation *cat-cats* being given, one can conceive of analogizing *child-children* as *child-childs* (as indeed occurs in child language). But analogy should not be restricted to the morphological level. There is another kind of analogy at the construction level. For example, the shift from purposive *be going (to ...)* to auxiliary *be going to* involves the analogical extension of the verb following *be going to* (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 61).

Why does analogy take place? Hopper and Traugott (1993: 61) suggest that analogy essentially involves paradigmatic organization, change in surface collocations,

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[2] For a few examples of work in these areas see Samuels (1972: 88-176) and Milroy (1993).

and modification in patterns of use. It seems reasonable to say that change through analogy is associated with the notion of similarity. In this respect, analogy is linked with the cognitive process of metaphor (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 87).

Apart from the fact that the concept of analogy is difficult to grasp, there is a problem with regard to the status of analogy. Can it serve an explanatory function in linguistic change (i.e. can it be regarded by the linguist as a cause for change) or is it no more than a type of change (i.e. does the term characterize the form the change takes without explaining it) or can it be both? Fischer (1989: 163-166) devotes some space to the status of analogy.[3] She argues that analogy may be a cause as well as a type of change. According to Fischer (1989), as far as change is concerned, analogy stands on a par with foreign influence. Her example of this is the introduction into English of the Old Norse-derived pronouns, *they*, *their*, and *them* (to give them their Modern English spellings) in the pronoun system. It is not Old Norse that has initiated the change, but rather the confusing situation within the paradigm of the personal pronouns, caused by phonological changes in late Old English. In other cases, especially when the contact between two languages is long and close, the language contact itself may be a trigger for linguistic change. The enormous transference of lexis which followed the Norman Conquest in 1066 may be a good example.

What has been mentioned above seems to be true of other types of factors, such as reanalysis, metaphor, and metonymy. Sweetser (1988: 390-392) argues, for example, that a metaphorical transfer is involved in deriving the future meaning of the English *go*-future (i.e. *be going to* / *be gonna*). According to her, the schema abstracted from the morpheme's meaning is mapped onto other domains of meaning. She claims that the semantic domain of space is metaphorically mapped onto the domain of time. On the other hand, Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994: 269) point out that there is no need to invoke a metaphorical mechanism in this case. They suggest that the temporal meaning which comes to dominate the semantics of the construction is already present as an inference from the spatial meaning. When one moves along a path in space, one also moves in time.[4] If their remarks are correct, metaphorical extension may characterize the form the change takes, but may not be an explanatory factor.

However we should also notice that both an explanatory factor promoting change and a type of change are present in linguistic change; they comprise a complex network , and are by no means exclusive.

1.1.2 Reanalysis   The term 'reanalysis' has been discussed quite extensively in the literature (e.g. Langacker 1977: 58, Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer 1991b: 215-220, and Hopper and Traugott 1993: 40-48). Langacker (1977: 58) defines reanalysis as "change in the structure of an expression or class of expressions that does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of its surface manifestation."

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[3] Notice, however, that Fischer's definition of analogy is not exactly the same as Hopper and Traugott's (1993). She claims that there are two main types of analogy. They are: (i) "analogy as a result of paradigmatic pressure, often referred to as *overgeneralization*" and (ii) analogy as a result of "misassignment of constituent structure or metanalysis" (Fischer 1989: 163-164). The second type seems to be similar to Langacker's (1977) definition of reanalysis.

[4] Compare Traugott (1995: 35-36), who claims that an account in terms of metonymy, or association in linguistic context can explain the development of *be going to*.

When a linguistic unit enters the process of reanalysis, this is likely to cause various syntactic changes. Such changes may have relation to only the relevant unit, but they may also relate to the entire sentence structure. It seems that reanalysis causes the syntactic structure to become ambiguous. Consider the following sentence:

(1) He is going to climb the mountain.

This sentence may have the two syntactic structures below.

(2) a. [He is going [to climb the mountain]]
    b. [He is going to climb the mountain]

(2a) is a progressive sentence with a directional verb and a purposive clause. In (2b), however, *is going to* functions as the future auxiliary.

By what factor is reanalysis caused? Andersen (1973) argues that abduction is crucial for linguistic change. The following explanation is based on Andersen's view (1973: 774-786).

Types of reasoning are exemplified by three propositions that constitute a syllogism:

(3) The law (e.g., *All men are mortal*)
    The case (e.g., *Socrates is a man*)
    The result (e.g., *Socrates is mortal*)

Deductive reasoning applies a law to a case and predicts a result (e.g. *All men are mortal*, *Socrates is a man*, therefore *Socrates is mortal*). Inductive reasoning proceeds from observed cases and results to establish a law (e.g. *Socrates is a man*, *Socrates is mortal*, therefore *All men are mortal*). Abduction proceeds from an observed result, invokes a law, and infers that something may be the case. For example, given the fact that *Socrates is dead*, we may relate this fact to the general law that *All men are mortal*, and guess that *Socrates was a man*. That is, abductive reasoning involves after-the-fact inference to determine why a given sequence of events should have occurred as it did. The given sequence of events is not, however, a priori predictable.

Hopper and Traugott (1993: 40-42) regard reanalysis as the result of abduction. Take (2) for example. A hearer has heard the output, i.e. (2a). But he assigns to it a different structure (2b), where the combination *is going to* functions as the future auxiliary. The reanalyzed structure is not identical with the original structure but is nonetheless compatible with (2a) in that the surface string is the same. In this respect, reanalysis is "accompanied by metonymic strategies" (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 87). Just as metonymic change involves specifying one meaning in terms of another that is present, even if covertly, in the context, so reanalysis entails deriving a novel structure from the present one.

1.2 Pragmatic or Semantic Factors Causing Change

Many linguists working in the tradition of formal grammar have excluded pragmatics

from consideration in accounting for semantic change. For example, Lightfoot (1991) argues that semantic changes are derived from structural changes, not vice versa. He says: "Any significant change in meaning is generally a by-product of a new parameter setting" (Lightfoot 1991: 168).

This approach, based on the viewpoint of autonomous syntax, has been called into question by many linguists. Semantic change and pragmatic or cognitive strategies are crucially related. Among the pragmatic motivations for linguistic change, metaphor and metonymy, are of use in explaining linguistic change.

1.2.1 Metaphor   Metaphor or metaphorical extension is one of the most widely recognized processes in semantic change. Although definitions of metaphor are different, most of them have certain concepts in common. The common concepts are understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another, and directionality of transfer from a basic, usually concrete meaning to a more abstract one. Metaphorical processes are processes of inference across conceptual boundaries, and are typically described in terms of 'mapping' from one domain to another. However, the mapping is not random. It is usually directed from a more concrete domain to a less concrete one.

Most examples of metaphor have been discussed at the level of the lexicon. Standard examples of lexical metaphor include such sentences as (4a) and (4d) cited from Lakoff (1990: 60):

(4) a.   He flew through his work.
    b.   The end is in sight.
    c.   We've made it this far!
    d.   I am stagnating.

However, there is another kind of metaphor which concerns more abstract relations. Our example is related to 'metaphors of grammar.'[5] In some languages, the morphological elements used to introduce nominal complements have been extended to mark subordinate clauses as well. That is, subordinate clauses are treated like nouns. One of these languages is Newari, a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in Nepal (Genetti 1991). In the Dolakhali dialect of Newari, the ergative / instrumental postposition *na* in (5a) has developed into the subordinator in (5b) (Genetti 1991: 227):[6]

(5) a.   cotan-na   pol-ju
         spoon-INSTR strike-3SG:PAST
         "He hit it with a spoon."
    b.   che-ku   yer-na   wa   am-e   naku   moŋ -an
         house-LOC come-when EMPH he-GEN cheek swell-PART
         coŋ-gu
         stay-3SG:PASTHAB.
         "When he came to the house his cheek was swollen."

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[5] The term "metaphors of grammar" is taken from Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991b).
[6] For the abbreviations in (5), see Traugott and Heine (1991).

Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991b: 207-208) remark that it is justifiable to describe such a transfer from noun to clause as a metaphorical extension.[7] Their main reasons are:

(i)   As in common in metaphorical transfers, an entity of one domain (in this case the domain of the noun) is used as a vehicle for an entity of another domain (the domain of the clause structure), which forms the topic.

(ii)   Assuming that nouns are less abstract and less complex than clauses, we may say that the vehicle is less abstract than the topic. This is characteristic of metaphor.

Example (5) and its explanation given above suggest that metaphor is not confined to the domain of concrete lexical meaning. To put it otherwise, it has also a more abstract component.

1.2.2 Metonymy   Metonymy is another of the basic characteristics of our cognitive ability. It is common for us to take one well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspect of something and use it to stand for the thing as a whole or for some other aspects of it. The best known cases are exemplified by the following:

(6) a.   Tokyo isn't saying anything.
    b.   I don't like Shakespeare.

In (6a), *Tokyo* stands for an institution located there, i.e. the Japanese government. In (6b), *Shakespeare* may be interpreted as the plays written by Shakespeare.

There are many metonimic mechanisms which relate to linguistic change. We will here consider inference or conventionalized implicature and profile shift.

1.2.2.1 Inference or Conventionalization of Implicature   We can, and usually do, imply something other than what we actually say. For example, when one is asked to give an opinion about a person's character, one might say:

(7) He has run a clinic in the ghetto and examined many poor people without charging them.

Obviously, it has not actually been said that the person in question is kind and charitable, but one might reasonably be held to have implied this.

Here we should note that inference and implicature are two sides of the same coin. The speaker implies more than he asserts, and the hearer infers more than what is asserted. This suggests that inference (or implicature) depends strongly on the context

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[7] Genetti (1991: 228) describes this development as follows: "The development of postpositions into subordinators occurred repeatedly over the last several centuries .... the morphosyntactic mechanism by which the development occurred was nominalization, followed by a reanalysis of originally nominal morphology as verbal morphology, via the reanalysis of unmarked deverbal nominals as erstwhile finite verbs."

and is in nature metonimic. In their study of grammaticalization, Traugott and König (1991) consider that implicature as well as metaphorical process is very important for linguistic change. They claim that conversational implicature arises because the speaker attempts to be as informative and expressive as possible. When the implicature is conventionalized, it becomes part of the polysemy of the word.

Before we proceed, a brief consideration of the relationship between homonymy and polysemy may be helpful for our study. Frequently homonymy and polysemy are distinguished, whereby homonymy refers to two different words having the same form with unrelated meaning, while polysemy refers to one word with two (or more) related senses. However, there is little agreement on how to characterize the relationship between the various senses of one form. For example, Lehrer (1990: 207-208) suggests that the method mentioned above for distinction between homonymy and polysemy leaves out the cases where we would want to say that there is more than one word, but where the meanings are related, for example, where words are distinguished syntactically. In general, from the perspective of semantic change, it is morphologically essential to assume polysemy when there is a plausible semantic relationship, whether or not the forms belong to the same syntactic category. It seems to be quite all right to consider that metaphor or inference may constitute a 'plausible semantic relationship.'

From the viewpoint of pragmatics, conversational implicature plays a crucial role in linguistic change. Hopper and Traugott (1993: 72) remark that conversational implicature is essentially abductive (given an utterance, the hearer may consider it most informative and expressive and guess the speaker's intent). The crucial difference between conventional implicature and conversational implicature is that conventional implicatures are context-independent. They must be learned as part of the polysemies of the word. In contrast, conversational implicatures are context-dependent. Consider the following example. If someone says (8a), the hearer is invited to infer that the speaker intends to go now. (8b) sounds contradictory, which suggests that the intended meaning is already conventionalized with *hafta* (Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 287).

>   (8) a.   I hafta go now.
>   b.   I hafta go now, but I'm not going to.

However, the change from conversational implicatures to conventional implicatures is not abrupt. In fact, it is very gradual.

1.2.2.2 Profile Shift   In the theoretical framework of the cognitive grammar developed by Langacker, an expression's grammatical class can be determined by the nature of what it profiles.[8] Expressions can profile either things or relationships

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[8] A semantic structure can derive its value through the imposition of a 'profile' on a base. Some substructure within the base is foregrounded to the rest of the substructures. The base refers to a specific cognitive domain which is the context that is needed for defining the concept in question. According to Langacker (1991: 5), for example, the base for the hypotenuse is a triangle, and the side opposite to the right angle is profiled. Note that both base and profile are essential to the meaning of the word. Without the concept of a triangle, the side opposite of the right angle is nothing but a line segment.

(abstractly defined). A prepositional expression is supposed to profile an atemporal relationship, and a nominal expression is expected to profile a thing. However there are cases where a prepositional phrase seems to profile a spatial region. Consider the sentences in (9), cited from Langacker (1993:335).

> (9) a.   ? Near the fire is warmer.
>   b.   ? Under the bed is all dusty.

Although marginal for some, expressions like these do occur. *Near the fire* and *under the bed* may be analyzed as designating regions in space, to which warmth and dustiness are ascribable. Therefore these prepositional expressions are best interpreted as nouns and can appear in subject position.

The crucial observation about the expressions in (9) is that the prepositional phrases are construed as naming a spatial region, but not as naming a locative relationship. That is, the prepositional phrases evoke the same conceptual content as a locative relationship but profile a spatial region. It can be considered metonimic in that different parts of the same conceptual content become focal.

2   HISTORICAL TRENDS WITH RESPECT TO *GET*

In order to trace the historical development of *get*, the data are collected from the works of Geoffrey Chaucer (the second part of the 14th century), Thomas Malory (the second part of the 15th century), William Shakespeare (from the second part of the 16th century to the first part of the 17th century), and Lawrence Sterne (the 18th century).[9] The distribution of the usages of *get* is shown in the following table.

Table[10]

	Chaucer	Malory	Shakespeare	Sterne
(TRANSITIVE)				
'obtain'	56(89.9%)	46(79.3%)	31(50%)	28(21.9%)
'beget'	3(4.8%)	4(6.9%)	3(4.8%)	
'move'-Loc.	2(3.2%)	4(6.9%)	1(1.6%)	1(0.8%)
'move'-Loc./Bene.	2(3.2%)			
'move'-Loc./Ref.		2(3.4%)	11(17.8%)	1(0.8%)
Causative-Inf.			2(3.2%)	
Cause-*Gone*/Ref.			9(14.5%)	
Causative-P.P.				2(1.6%)
Causative-P.P./Ref.				1(0.8%)

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[9] The works we examined in the present paper and the date when the works were written are identified in References.

[10] Loc. stands for locative, Bene. = benefactive object, Ref. = reflexive pronoun, Inf. = infinitive clause, P.P. = past participle, Adj. = adjective. We do not make any distinction between prose and verse because we assume that in tracing the approximate historical trend, there is no problem raised by the method. Differences between the prose and the verse will be discussed on other occasions.

Causative-Adj.			2(1.6%)
(INTRANSITIVE)			
'move'-Loc.	1(1.7%)	2(3.2%)	77(60.2%)
'become'		1(1.6%)	8(6.3%)
Get-Passive			6(4.7%)
Idiom	1(1.7%)	2(3.2%)	2(1.6%)
Total	63	58	62	128

What the table tells us is summarized as follows. Both in Chaucer and in Malory, it is the meaning of 'to obtain' that predominates. Few other meanings are observed in their works. On the other hand, some examples taken from Shakespeare and Sterne show the other usages of *get*. Especially, in Sterne the intransitive usage increases much more in number than in Shakespeare. All these things make it clear that the meaning and usage of *get* are gradually extended through time.

3   SEMANTIC DEVELOPMENT OF *GET*

The present chapter identifies the factors bringing about the semantic development of *get*. In addition to our collected data, we discuss the process of development with the aid of the *OED* and the *MED*. It should be mentioned, however, that several problems arise in connection with our diachronic investigation. Grammatical change is a process predominantly associated with spoken language. Unfortunately, we have no direct access to speech from the past times. The methodological problems posed by this situation must be acknowledged. And we need to keep in mind that our research is based on the production of written texts.

3.1 The Shift from the 'Obtain' to the 'Move'-locative

3.1.1 From the 'Obtain' to the Transitive 'Move'-locative   The verb *get* probably entered English from Old Norse with an active-transitive sense.[11] Through the process of generalization, it may be considered that *get* came to take abstract or less concrete matters as its object.

Although most of the examples may be interpreted as 'to obtain' in a wide sense, *get* is already polysemous in Chaucer.[12] The verb in question may be used in numerous phraseological expressions and we make various interpretations on the basis of the

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[11] Old English has -*ʒietan* which roughly corresponds to *get*. It can be used only in compounds. Of the compounds of -*ʒietan* which existed in Old English, only *beʒietan* and *forʒietan* survive in the modern language, and the normal equivalents *beyet* and *foryet* were displaced in later Middle English in favor of *beget* and *forget* (*OED* s.v. *get* v.).

[12] *Get* seems to have the sense of 'to receive.' However, it is often difficult to distinguish the 'obtain' usage from the 'receive' usage. So in this paper we basically deal with the sense of 'to receive' as the 'obtain' usage.

things it takes as an object. For example, *get* in (10a) may be best interpreted in the sense of 'to beget.' On the other hand, the verb in (10b) can be understood as in the sense of 'to earn':

> (10) a.   On hire he *gat* a knave child anon,   (Chaucer, B.ML 715)[13]
>   "On her he begot a boy child right away"
>   b.   Upon a day he *gat* hym moore moneye
>   Than that the person gat in monthes tweye; (Chaucer, A.GP 703-704)[14]
>   "He'd make more money in one day alone than the person would in two months"

The following example is cited from Lydgate's *Troy Book*. The *MED* (s.v. *geten* v. 2b(a)) describes *get* in Example (11) in the sense of 'to conquer.'

> (11)   And sixe monþes þe my3ti sege laste,
>   Or it was *gete*,   (a1420 Lydgate's *Troy Book*, V. 3354-3355)
>   "And the mighty siege lasted for six months, then it (the city) was obtained"

We point out that *get* acquires the sense of 'to conquer' by taking a place noun as its direct object. The problem of how the 'beget' usage and the 'conquer' usage rise indicates that what is at issue is not the lexical items themselves (in this case, *get*) but rather the whole construction that is often reported in semantic-pragmatic change. That is to say, it is important to pay attention to the context in which the change occurs.

Special attention must be paid to the fact that example (10a) contains locative adjuncts (i.e. *on hire*). The following expressions in (12) show that the prepositional phrases function as the thematic role of source.

> (12) a.   Of thise two folk ye *gete of me* namoore.   (Chaucer, F.FK 1556)
>   "About these two folks you'll get no more from me"
>   b.   ye *gete* namoore *of me*.   (Chaucer, E.MC 1945)
>   "you'll get no more from me"

What differences are there between the prepositional phrase in (10a) and the ones in (12)? The most important difference may be that the prepositions in (12) imply to a certain degree a dynamic sense, whereas the preposition in (10a) implies a stative sense. It is widely known that a prepositional phrase like 'out of' can indicate movement from

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[13] For the abbreviations of Chaucer, see Oizumi (1991).

[14] *Get* in (10b) appears with a benefactive object. In this construction, an agent intends that a benefactive receives a patient. Ditransitive expressions in English typically imply that the agent argument acts to cause the transfer of an object to a benefactive. However, we can find many ditransitive expressions which do not strictly imply that the patient is successfully transferred to the benefactive. In terms of construction grammar, Goldberg (1995: 31-39) shows that ditransitive constructions are typically associated with a family of closely related senses. The central sense of the ditransitive can be regarded as a sense involving the successful transfer of an object to a benefactive. Ditransitive expressions involving the verb of obtaining like *get* are metaphorical extensional expressions that have as their source domain this central sense.

one location to another with the help of a verb. Consider the following examples :

(13) a.   He is standing *out of* the court.
     b.   He ran *out of* the room.

Fig. 1(a) sketches the prepositional expression in (13a): no concept of a path is evoked, and the trajector (tr, i.e. the primary figure *he*) is confined to the interior of the search domain (SD). By contrast, in the case of (13b) the trajector's path reaches and traverses the boundary between the landmark (lm) and the search domain, as seen in Fig. 1 (b).[15] The search domain is equivalent to the exterior area of lm, and represented here by shading.

(a)   (b)

<Fig. 1>

The implicature of the movement is clearly indicated in (14), cited from Chaucer. The meaning of 'to obtain' is attenuated here.

(14)   "Hast nat herd," quad Nicholas, "also
        The sorwe of Noe with his felaweshipe,
        Er that he myghte *gete his wyf* to shipe ?   (Chaucer, A.MI 3538-40)
        " 'Have you not heard,' said Nicholas, 'also of Noah's troubles until he
        could finally get his wife on board the ship ?'"

Now the notion of physical activity becomes more and more attenuated. The direct object of *get* does not necessarily travel in a spatial path, as in the following instance:

(15)   And in the town manere tho forth ay
        So goodly was, and *gat* him so *in grace*,
        That ecch hym loued that loked on his face.   (Chaucer, Tr I 1076-78)
        "And then in the town his manner was always so pleasant, and got himself
        in so full of grace that whoever looked at his face loved him."

Givón and Yang (1994:142) propose that the following chain of steps of gradual development was involved in the rise of the transitive 'move'-locative usage:[16]

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[15] See Langacker (1991, 1993) for technical terms.

[16] Givón and Yang (1994) do not use the term "transitive 'move'-locative construction." They refer to the construction in question as a 'bitransitive-locative' construction.

(16) a.   He got a horse for her ⟹
     b.   He got the horse to her ⟹
     c.   He got the horse to the barn

But we cannot agree with them for the following reasons.

Firstly, a benefactive object marked by a preposition is not attested in Chaucer. Although Givón and Yang admit this fact, they suspect that a benefactive object marked by a preposition is possible, and consider it "a crucial step for the main early development attested in Chaucer" (Givón and Yang 1994: 123-124). However, they do not give any solid reason for this, and we cannot help concluding that their argument is very weak.[17]

Secondly, even if we hypothesize that such a benefactive object came to be possible in the Middle English period, it is still very difficult to consider that the benefactive case develops into the locative case. This statement can be inferred from the theory of grammaticalization. A number of criteria are suggested for asserting the relative degrees of grammaticalization within the domain of case marking. A category with a spatial function is regarded as less grammaticalized than one without. A category that implies some human participants is less grammaticalized than one that implies an inanimate participant. A category governing noun phrases is less grammaticalized than one governing clause as well.[18] Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991b: 156) show that if two case functions differ from one another only in the fact that one has a spatial function whereas the other does not, then the latter is more grammaticalized. So we can safely infer from the unidirectionality principle that the latter develops later than the former. Therefore, as the development of the locative case from the benefactive case described by Givón and Yang (1994) is theoretically impossible, we must find another approach for explaining the rise of the transitive 'move'-locative usage.

When our attention is directed to examples like (17), where a benefactive object and a predicative object coexist within a sentence, there seems to be a metaphorical extension (i.e. what Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991b) call 'metaphor of grammar') from noun to something like a predicative, as showed in (18):[19]

(17)   Anon go *gete* us faste *into this in*
       A knedyng trogh, or ellis a kymelyn,   (Chaucer, A.MI 3547-48)

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[17] On the basis of the *OED* (s.v. *get* v. I 18b), the first example of *get* with a benefactive object marked by a preposition appears in 1596.

[18] On the basis of these and other criteria, Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer (1991b: 159) propose a scale of relative grammaticalization of some case-functions:

ABLATIVE >	AGENT >	PURPOSE >	TIME >	CONDITION >	MANNER
ALLATIVE	COMITATIVE	INSTRUMENT		CAUSE	
LOCATIVE	BENEFACTIVE	DATIVE			
PATH		POSSESSIVE			

[19] Givón and Yang (1994: 124) cite the same example as (17). Although they do not explain the example extensively, they may regard *us* in (17) as the direct object of *gete*. From a close examination of the text, however, it becomes clear that *us* is the benefactive object and that the direct object of *gete* is *a knedyng trogh* or *a kymelyn*.

"At once go and fetch into this inn three kneading troughs or tubs"
(18) a. Subject + *get* + Benefactive + Noun ⇒
      b. Subject + *get* + Benefactive + Predicative

Is it true that metaphorical extension is an explanatory factor in the rise of the transitive 'move'-locative usage? The sentences in (12) make it clear that *get* with the meaning 'to obtain' may take a prepositional phrase as locative source. It is quite natural to conclude that through the process of analogy, *get* came to take other locative phrases.

However, analogy forms but one of the processes involved in the development of the transitive 'move'-locative usage. Rather, the process of analogy is a side-effect of the conventionalization of implicature. If someone says "I got A from B," it can be inferred that he or she removed A from B. This implicature presumably came through time to gain weight. Out of repeated use, the implicature (i.e. the meaning of 'to move something') was eventually semanticized as one of the meanings which the verb *get* expresses. In this case it can be said that the conventionalization of implicature is the cause of change, while the analogy or the metaphor is the form which change takes.

Jespersen (1940: 19-22) states that a certain number of verbs including *get* come to take a 'nexus' as their object with the original physical meaning more or less effaced. But he pays very little attention to the question of how the change occurs. We consider that reanalysis takes place in this development. One has heard (19a), but assigns to it a different structure (19b).

(19) a.   [*get*-object-[locative phrase]]   I got the puppy [out of the place] ⇒
     b.   [*get*-[object-locative phrase]]   I got [the puppy out of the place]

This is how the verb *get* comes to take what Jespersen calls 'nexus' as its object. It goes without saying that the process of conventionalization of implicature leads to reanalysis in this case.

What takes place in the development in question may be summarized as follows: originally, the landmark of *get* is not associated by any other process and the prepositional phrase is a mere adjunct. The adjunct phrase comes to be considered indicating another process in a gradual sort of way, which leads to the constructional extension of *get*.

3.1.2 From the 'Obtain' to the 'Reach'   In Present-day English, Example (20) is not ambiguous; it usually means something like (21). In Middle English, however, this is not the case. From the fact that the *MED* (s.v. *geten* v. 4(b)) regards *get* in (23) as a transitive verb in the meaning of 'to reach, arrive at,' follows that in Middle English Example (20) may also be similar in meaning to (22).

(20)   I *got* the harbor.
(21)   I conquered the harbor.
(22)   I reached the harbor.
(23)   Þouȝ þe see were rouh or elles dimuir, Gode hauenes þat Schip wolde *gete*.

(c1390(c1377) *Death Edw. III* (Vrn) 38)[20]

"Though the sea was rough or else calm, that Ship would reach God's haven"

Example (23) implies that the subject of *get* (in this case, *Schip*) may have some difficulty to 'reach' its destination. It is possible to understand that the 'reach' usage is derived from the 'conquer' usage. We should notice that the meaning of 'to conquer' more or less implies difficulty in accomplishing the task. Indeed, the *OED* (s.v. *get* v. II. 25) does not distinguish *get* with the meaning 'to reach' from *get* with the meaning 'to conquer.'[21] In fact, the notion of conquering is often used to represent the arrival concept. For instance, the noun phrase (24a) usually means something like (24b).

(24) a.   the conquerors of the world's highest peak
     b.   those who successfully reached the world's highest peak

Here we should pay attention to the fact that the direct object of (23) is a location which is irrelevant to the notion of movement. The motion concept is prototypically attributed to a mobile participant. To conquer a location, we usually have to go to the place. When the possessive notion becomes weak and the motion concept is foregrounded, the 'reach' usage can come into being. There are some relations which deviate from prototypical transitive relations. For instance, in the relation between Figure and Ground, no transmission of force is observed. We can safely say that the location noun which occurs in the 'reach' usage is equivalent to Ground and that the conception of Figure is inherent in a participant that can move. There are some examples which are non-transitive even when their form is not. The intransitivity observed in (23) is one such example.

3.1.3 From the 'Reach' to the Intransitive 'Move'-locative   In principle all the usages of *get* observed in Chaucer are also found in Malory. The following example (25) illustrates an transitive 'move'-locative. Notice that the direct object of the verb (i.e. *me*) is coreferential with the subject.

(25)   and than, as I am avysed, to *gete* me over the salte see with good men of armys to deme for His deth that for us all on the roode dyed.
                                                      (Malory, 245.1-3)[22]
       "and then, as I am advised, (I assent) to get myself over the salt sea with a good army to compensate Christ for his death for us all on the rood."

There is one further development that we should notice in Malory. The following example taken from Malory may be interpreted as on intransitive usage of *get*.

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[20] Furnivall, F., ed., (1901) *The Minor Poems of the Vernon MS, pt.2.* (EETS 117), Clarendon Press, Oxford. [Death Edw. III (Vrn)]

[21] The *OED* does not use the word 'to conquer' but describes *get* in question as 'to gain.'

[22] Kato (1974) helps us to gather examples of *get* from Malory.

(26)   and so with grete payne he *gate* oute of the pres,   (Malory, 351.27)
       "and so with great difficulty he got out of the place"

Furthermore the *MED* (s.v. *geten* v. 4(a)) shows that some of the intransitive 'move'-locative constructions of *get* are already available in Middle English.[23]

The metaphor of grammar is responsible for the shift from the 'reach' usage to the intransitive 'move'-locative usage. That is, the intransitive 'move'-locative usage develops from the locative phrase's being treated like a place noun. This change may be as illustrated in (27):

(27) a.   ['reach': *get* + place noun]
          I *got* the city (= I arrived at the city) ⇒
     b.   [intransitive 'move'-locative: *get* + locative phrase]
          I *got* out of the place.

Another theoretical support from cognitive grammar is applied here. As shown in 1.2.2.2, Langacker (1993: 335) claims that a prepositional phrase may be construed as naming a spatial region, but not as naming a locative relationship by means of a profile shift. Therefore it is possible for a prepositional phrase to be interpreted as a kind of nominal expression.

However, the number of the intransitive 'move'-locative constructions of *get* illustrated in the *MED* is very small. According to the *OED* (s.v. *get* v. VI 35-80), most of the intransitive 'move'-locative constructions of *get* have been observed to have occurred since the inception of Modern English.

3.2 The Development of the 'Move'-locative

3.2.1 From the Transitive 'Move'-locative to the Intransitive 'Move'-locative   In addition to the patterns used in Chaucer and Malory, various new usages of *get* are to be observed in Shakespeare. The examples of the transitive 'move'-locative usage that is observed in Malory are also abundant, and most of them occur in the reflexive form. All the examples of this construction are used in the imperative mood, as in (28a). (28b) is one of the intransitive 'move'-locative examples found in Shakespeare.

(28) a.   *Get* thee *to a nunn'ry*, farewell.   (Shakespeare, HAM. 3.1.136-137)[24]
     b.   but if I had wit enough to *get* out of this wood, I have enough to serve
          mine own turn.   (Shakespeare, MND 3.1.149-151)

In (28a) the logical subject is identical with the object. The logical subject of (28a) not only moves through space but also makes some exertions to propel herself along the path. Thus the subject is both an energy source and an energy sink. Therefore we can

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[23] The intransitive 'move'-locative constructions that the *MED* (s.v. geten v. 4(a)) illustrates are: *geten awei, geten in, geten nere, geten out (of), geten over the se, geten to, geten up*, and *geten upon height*.

[24] For the abbreviations of Shakespeare's works used in this paper, see Spevack (1973).

say that the semantic interpretation of (28a) is close to intransitive.

The transitive 'move'-locative construction in its reflexive form contributes to the rise of the intransitive 'move'-locative usage.[25] When the reflexive object is not made explicit as in (28b), the intransitive construction comes into being. This step may be illustrated as in the following:

> (29) a.   ['move': transitive-locative] *Get* yourself into the house !   ⇒
>   b.   ['move': intransitive-locative] *Get* into the house!

3.2.2   From the Transitive 'Move'-locative to the Get-*causative*   The causative-infinitive construction is observed in Shakespeare, as in the following examples:

> (30) a.   I will *get* Peter Quince *to write* a ballet of this dream.
>   (Shakespeare, MND 4.1.214-215)
>   b.   Our youth *got* me *to play* the women's part,
>   (Shakespeare, TGV 4.4.160)

Visser (1973: 2259) claims that the *get*-causative rises in the late Middle English period.[26]

The rise of the transitive 'move'-locative usage seems to have given birth to the *get*-causative construction with an infinitive complement. The locative phrases implying the dynamic sense make it possible for a non-stative verb to appear in the position. The following examples taken from Quirk et al. (1985: 843) may support our hypothesis.

> (31) a. Forward!
>   b. To the left!

Quirk et al. (1985: 842) suggest that adverbials may have the illocutionary force of commands, and that a verb of motion is generally understood. The same implicature seems to be involved in the development of the causative usage. This implicature presumably came through time to gain weight and eventually led to the rise of non-stative verbs in place of the locative phrase. As is pointed out in Givón and Yang (1994: 143), moreover, the transitive 'move'-locative construction represents a semantically-causative event, in which the agent causes the direct object to change location. This step may be illustrated as in (32) (cf. Givón & Yang 1994: 143):

> (32) a.   [transitive 'move'-locative: *get* + object + locative]
>   I got A into B   ⇒

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[25] The same remark is also found in Givón and Yang (1994: 127). Compare Goldberg (1995: 78), who claims that the intransitive motion construction is related to the caused-motion construction by a 'subpart link.' Needless to say, the fact that many compound verbs in Old English or Middle English became obsolete may be relevant to the rise of the intransitive usages of *get*.

[26] While the *MED* illustrates the *get*-causative constructions with infinitival complements, it does not refer to the *get*-causative with any other complements. According to the *OED* (s.v. *get* v. IV 28-29), the date of the first example of the causative with adjectival complements is 1590, and that of the causative with past participle complements is 1500-20.

b.   [causative: *get* + object + non-stative verb]
      I got A to do something

What is crucial here is the semantic schematizing of the transitive 'move'-locative. It is not until the locative meaning represented by a prepositional or adverbial phrase is reduced to the schematic general relationship that an infinitival complement can occur.

3.2.3 From the Intransitive 'Move'-locative to the 'Become'   The intransitive 'move'-locative usage contributes to the rise of the 'become' usage. We should notice that a sentence like (27b) involves the notion of change; if someone gets somewhere, it means that he changes his location. On the other hand, the 'become' usage represents that someone changes his qualitative state. The *OED* (s.v. *get* v. V 33a) cites (33) from Shakespeare as the first record of *get* with the meaning of 'to become.'

(33) How to *get* cleere of all the debts I owe.   (Shakespeare, MV 1.1.134)

The logical subject of (33) does not in fact move. The notion of physical movement is attenuated and the change in quality attributed to the subject is emphasized.

Furthermore, the examples of the verb *go* in (34) may help us to discover how the shift in question occurs.

(34) a.   The milk *went* sour.
     b.   He was *going* blind.

The verb in each sentence of (34) indicates change in the abstract qualitative world, and can be interpreted as to 'become.' We can say that the meaning of the abstract qualitative movement is conceptualized in terms of the physical movement in this case.

Metaphorical transfer from concrete to abstract may appropriately account for the shift from the intransitive 'move'-locative usage to the 'become' usage. The development of the 'become' usage may then be said to be based on an fairly straightforward case of a conceptual category SPACE —— one person changing his physical location   —— being transferred metaphorically into the domain of QUALITY —— one person changing his qualitative state. Such change has been made explicit by the model of semantic-pragmatic change in grammatical items from lexical source concepts as following a unidirectional path (Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer 1991a: 157, 1991b: 48):

(35)   PERSON > OBJECT > ACTIVITY > SPACE > TIME > QUALITY

This path is unidirectional in that each category on the right is more abstract than the one to its left. Thus, an abstract category like QUALITY will be conceptualized in terms of a more concrete one like SPACE. Strictly speaking, the semantic development of the 'become' usage cannot be a case of grammaticalization.[27] However, the semantic

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[27] The concept of grammaticalization is often spoken of in reference to a linguistic unit shifts from a lexical item to a grammatical item. According to Samuels (1972: 58-60), Heine and Reh (1984: 15), Heine, Claudi,

change model suggested by Heine et al. is true of this case. What is evident from the present case is that the process of semantic change outlined for grammaticalization belongs to a larger set of the processes of semantic change. In other words, the process of grammaticalization can be considered as a subpart of processes of semantic change.

3.3 The Rise of the Get-*passive*

Another form makes its first appearance in Shakespeare. This new form involves only a single verb *go* in its perfect-participle form. All the examples of the construction are used in the imperative mood, as in:

(36) a.   *Get* thee *gone;* to-morrow
          We'll hear ourselves again.   (Shakespeare, MAC 3.4.30-31)
     b.   Worcester, *get* thee gone, for I do see
          Danger and disobedience in thine eye.   (Shakespeare, 1H4 1.3.15-16)

The *OED* (s.v. *get* v. IV 28c) cites an example from Shakespeare as the first record of the transitive verb *get* with *gone*. We agree with Givón and Yang (1994: 129) when they say that this construction develops partly through extension from the transitive 'move'-locative construction. This shift may be illustrated as in (37):

(37) a.   [transitive 'move'-locative: transitive-locative]
          Get yourself hence! ⇒
     b.   [causative: transitive-GONE]
          Get yourself gone!

The *get*-causative usage is observed in Sterne as well as in Shakespeare. The passive-form verbs are used in the following examples.

(38) a.   he had *got* himself so gallantly *arrayed,* I scarce knew him.
                                                         (Sterne, p.99)
     b.   ... and bid him fasten all upon the chaise ——— *get* the horses *put* to
          ——— and desire the landlord to come in with his bill.   (Sterne, p. 33)

Example (38a) illustrates the reflexive version of the *get*-causative. Here, we can observe a drastic syntactic change. It is the availability of a new pattern (*get* + reflexive

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and Hünnemeyer (1991b: 3-4), and Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994: 6-8), the process of grammaticalization tends to involve the following phenomena:
   (i)   Shift from lexical to grammatical (or from less grammatical to more grammatical) status.
   (ii)   Weakening of lexical meaning.
   (iii)   Phonological reduction.
   (iv)   Loss of syntactic freedom.
Our attention should be directed to the fact that neither syntactic status nor phonological length of *get* changes through the shift in question. Strictly speaking, therefore, the shift from the intransitive 'move'-locative to the 'become' is not an example of grammaticalization.

pronoun + past participles). According to Visser (1973: 2384) , the construction 'get + object + past-participle' has come to be extremely common since 1600, i.e. approximately the Shakespearean period.

Visser (1973: 2031) remarks that the *get*-passive construction is not found in writing before the middle of the 17th century. The following examples of the *get*-passive are taken from Sterne.

> (39) a.   I shall *get* clapp'd up into the Bastile,   (Sterne, p.70)
>   b.   A poor defenceless being of this order had *got* thrust some how or other into this luckless place ——   (Sterne, p.60)

In the rise of the *get*-passive, de-transitivization proceeds much like that of the transitive 'move'-locative construction, as in (40):[28]

> (40) a.   [causative: transitive-past participle]
>   You got yourself arrested ⇒
>   b.   [passive: intransitive-past participle]
>   You got arrested

The *OED* gives authenticity to our view about the shift in (40). According to the *OED* (s.v. *get* v. V 34b), the intransitive *get* with the past participle means to "cause or procure oneself to be treated in a certain way or to undergo a certain action; also, in a weaker sense, to come to be the object of a certain action."

It should be added that the *get*-passive also develops from the 'become' usage.[29] When the past participle is adapted as a complement, the passive interpretation arises. At the point when the 'become' usage is extended to the past participle, *get* becomes almost empty of lexical meaning. However, this shift is not abrupt but rather gradual. The transition from the 'become' usage to the *get*-passive involves an intermediate stage where both usages coexist side by side. This indicates a stage of ambiguity. For instance, though *get* is classified as the *get*-passive in the following example (41) taken from Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey*, it can be interpreted to be an example of the 'become' usage.

> (41)   and forming conjectures upon them, till my attention *got* fix'd upon a single object which confounded all kind of reasoning upon him.   (Sterne, p. 95)

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[28] Compare Givón and Yang (1994: 144-145), who claim the following chain of steps of syntactic (but not semantic) development.

(i)   She got him to be admitted ⇒
(ii)   She got herself to be admitted ⇒
(iii)   She got to be admitted ⇒
(iv)   She got admitted

However, they seem to consider that the rise of the 'become' usage follows that of the *get*-passive.

[29] In Old English three passive auxiliaries —— *beo-*, *wes-*, and *weorþ-* ——are observed. We should pay a special attention to *weorþ-*, which originally means 'to become.' Traugott (1972: 83) points out the similarity in usage between the *weorþ*-passive and the *get*-passive.

This ambiguity indicates the presence of an intermediate stage in the change.

4. SYNCHRONIC VIEWPOINT

Here our special attention is directed to the *get*-passive in Present-day English.

On the syntactic surface, the *get*-passive construction in English is very similar to the *be*-passive construction. However, there seem to be some differences between the *get*-passive and the *be*-passive. Lakoff (1971) states that one of the major differences between them involves the matter of control or purpose. In the following examples, the choice of *get* and *be* indicates whether the adverb is to be interpreted as referring to the logical subject or the superficial subject (Lakoff 1971: 156):

> (42) a. Mary *got* shot on purpose.
>   b. Mary *was* shot on purpose.

According to Lakoff, the most normal interpretation of (42a) is "Mary purposely got herself shot." On the other hand, that of (42b) is similar to "someone purposely shot Mary." The *get*-passive seems odd with the adverb which represents neither controllability nor a purposive sense, as in (Lakoff 1971: 156):

> (43) a. Radicals must *be* exterminated ruthlessly.
>   b. *Radicals must *get* exterminated ruthlessly.

Since the adverb *ruthlessly* in (43) must refer to the action of the persons doing the exterminating, it cannot be used with the *get*-passive.

Then Lakoff (1971: 155) concludes that "the *get* passive refers to the involvement of the superficial subject, while the *be* passive, if it is concerned with any actor in the sentence, is connected with the logical subject." A more elaborate consideration of Lakoff's conclusion about the *get*-passive is offered here.

Firstly, her remark seems to be limited to passive constructions with animate subjects, more precisely, human subjects. It is impossible for an inanimate thing to be associated with the notion of purpose or control. The following example (44) indicates that Lakoff's view is invalid when the subject is not a human. The normal interpretation of (44) is "someone purposely shot the bird," not "the bird purposely got itself shot."

> (44) The bird *got* shot on purpose.

Secondly, when the logical agent is explicitly expressed by prepositional phrase, Lakoff's remark does not seem to hold. The normal interpretation of (45) is "Tom purposely shot Mary," but not "Mary purposely got herself shot by Tom."

> (45) Mary *got* shot on purpose by Tom.

It is clear from the fact that the following example (46) is acceptable that without the modal auxiliary the *get*-passive does not imply the responsibility of the superficial

subject for the described event.

(46)   Tom *got* shot ruthlessly.

Reflection on the examples mentioned above makes clear that Lakoff's remark holds good only under certain conditions. The conditions are:

(i)   The subject of the *get*-construction is a human.
(ii)   The logical agent is not expressed explicitly.
(iii)   The word or phrase that represents the notion of responsibility or purpose is used with the *get*-construction.

Note that the notion of responsibility or purpose is typically associated with the notion of agentivity.

The subject of the *get*-causative is almost invariably animate. Therefore it is the rise of the *get*-passive with an animate subject that the *get*-causative construction is directly responsible for. On the other hand, the 'become' usage gives rise to the *get*-passive with either an animate subject or an inanimate subject. Since the *get*-passive with an animate subject is partly derived from the *get*-causative, it shows commonality with the *get*-causative under certain circumstances mentioned above.

We can characterize the list in (47) as the constituents of the base for *get* with the meaning of 'to obtain.' It is the context within the verb is defined.

(47)   Participants: A (agent), R (recipient), P (patient)
   Location: O (origin), D (destination)

The background condition is that a recipient is at a destination (i.e. the recipient's possessive domain) and that a patient is at an origin. The activity that takes place involves an agent who is identical to the recipient causing a patient to move along a path to the destination. As a result, the recipient comes to have a possessive relation with the patient. The causation can be either direct or indirect. In this sense, the recipient is restricted to animate individuals who can also play the role of agent. The agent-recipient exerts some force which causes the patient to be at the destination, and comes to have a possessive relationship with the patient. However, *get* may have the meaning of 'to receive something' which is not a strongly agentive verb. The degree of agentivity covers a wide range. It is possible that a recipient exerts little force on a patient to cause it to move to a destination. In such a case, the interpretation of the verb in question is vaguely similar to that of *receive*. Without reference to agentivity on the part of the subject, the identical relationship between an agent and a recipient fades away. The agent that is not identical with the recipient can be evoked to varying degrees, depending on the examples and the circumstances.

This lower-agentive sense seems to be related to the shift from the *get*-causative to the *get*-passive. The sense of 'to obtain' implies a certain kind of agentivity, and a higher degree of control is attributed to the grammatical subject. On the other hand, the sense of 'to receive' appears to manifest less agentivity on the part of the grammatical subject. Similarly, *get* in the causative construction implies a high degree of agentivity

of the grammatical subject, whereas *get* in the passive construction manifests a lower-agentive sense.

5.   CONCLUSION

The history of *get* is a case of linguistic change as a complex development rather than a lineal causal chain. The development of *get* is summarized as in the following figure:

<Fig. 2>   The development path of *get*

The semantic extension of *get* proposed in Givón and Yang (1994) may be summarized as in Figure 3.

<Fig. 3> The semantic extension of *get* in Givón and Yang (1994)

Let us make a comparison between Figure 2 and Figure 3. The shifts ②, ③, ⑥, and ⑦ in Figure 2 do not have their counterparts in Figure 3. Shift D   in Figure 3 does not its counterpart in Figure 2. What causes Shift ⑧ in Figure 2 is breaching of the lexical meaning of *get*, whereas Shift E in Figure 3 is ascribed to morphological simplification. Shift ④ and Shift ⑤ in Figure 2 are identical with Shift B and Shift C in Figure 3 respectively. As for the comparison between Shift ① and Shift A, see 3.1.1.

We should notice that some of the explanations of synchronic phenomena lie in diachronic processes. It is because the *get*-passive construction with an animate subject partly develops from the *get*-causative construction that the former shows semantic commonality with the latter under certain circumstances. On the other hand, synchronic factors like metaphor or profile shift are sometimes responsible for diachronic changes. That is, synchrony and diachrony are interrelated. Viewing the synchronic slice as simply one stage in a long process of development helps us explain the semantic characteristics of linguistic elements.

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