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A COGNITIVE GRAMMAR ACCOUNT OF METONYMY
AND ITS RELATION TO METAPHOR[*]

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper considers metonymy from the perspective of Cognitive Grammar, especially focusing on analyses employing Langacker's (1993, 1995) *reference-point model*. Metonymy has been characterized as a rhetorical expression based on a "contiguity" relation between an overtly expressed entity and the actually intended referent. This paper emphasizes that metonymy is more than a specialized rhetorical trope, being instead a quite natural situation in ordinary language, since most linguistic expressions display the same gap as is seen in metonymy, which Langacker (1995) calls the *active-zone/profile discrepancy*.

Special attention is paid in this paper to the interface between metonymy and metaphor. While recent works in cognitive linguistics have revealed that metaphor and metonymy constitute one of the bases of our system of thought and play a significant role in language, it seems that they have been treated as two distinct categories of figurative expressions. However, there are some cases which can be interpreted either as metaphor or as metonymy, a fact to which little attention has been paid. This indicates that metaphor and metonymy form a continuum, and an integrated view of these interrelated phenomena will also be given through the reference-point model.

2 METONYMY AND REFERENCE POINT

2.1 Metonymy

According to the traditional definition (Jakobson 1957), metonymy may be viewed as a sort of figurative expression based on some "contiguity" relation between two entities, as exemplified below:

(1) a. She bought *Lakoff and Johnson*, used in paper, for just $1.50.
      b. I ate *an apple*.
      c. They ran out *the clock*.
      d. *That car* doesn't know where he's going.

(Langacker 1995: 28)

Let us look at what kind of proximity is involved in each of the examples. In (1a), *Lakoff and Johnson* is a pair of human names, but what "she" really bought is not humans of course, but a book they wrote. In this case, there is a certain close relation between authors and their writings, and thereby one understands what (1a) is really intended to mean. Sentence (1b) is so commonplace as to go virtually unperceived as an instance of metonymy; however, it exhibits a part-whole contiguity relation, since one almost invariably eats not an entire apple, including its stem and core, but rather only the fleshy parts of the fruit.[1] Similarly, in (1c) a contiguity relation holds between a concrete object, i.e., a clock, and an abstract notion to which it is related, i.e., time. Finally, in (1d), one finds a contiguity relation between a container, which is in plain view, and its content, which is invisible to the speaker.

A large portion of the studies on metonymy have examined the range of possible contiguity relations, and some have attempted to subcategorize metonymy according to the type of contiguity involved. Truly, such research is significant, but I believe the investigation of the interface of metonymy and other linguistic phenomena (especially metaphor), which has been of little interest hitherto, is also required in order to articulate the nature of metonymy. For this reason, I will rather focus on a holistic analysis of metonymy, and on cognitive processing in creating and understanding metonymic relations. The most relevant cognitive ability is that of evoking an entity as a conceptual *reference point* in order to make mental contact with another (Langacker 1984, 1993, 1995). In what follows, we will briefly review the cognitive structure underlying the use of reference points.

2.2 Reference-point Model

First, consider a situation where we (the conceptualizer) are going to make mental contact with an entity (hence the *target* of mental contact), but for some reason the target is not salient enough for us to access it directly, as diagrammed in Figure 1 (a). In such a case, we evoke the conception of another entity as a reference point, by means of which we can successfully establish mental contact with the target, as shown in Figure 1 (b) below:[2]

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[1] Note that metonymy based on a part-whole relation is classified as synecdoche, though I regard it as a subcategory of metonymy in this paper.

[2] Figure 1(b) is due to Langacker (1993: 6).

<Figure 1>

What Figure 1 (b) depicts is called the *reference-point model*, in which the conceptualizer (C) initially makes mental contact with a reference point (R), and this subsequently enables him or her to access the intended target (T). Also important in this model is the notion of *dominion* (D) indicated by the ellipse in the diagram. The dominion is a region constituted by a set of entities that potentially stand in various contiguity relations to the reference point; this implies that the target is supposed to be in the neighborhood of the reference point, otherwise the conceptualizer could not make the second step of mental contact from the reference point to the target. Also, notice that what is needed on the part of the reference point is simply that it should be a prominent entity in order to function as a landmark with regard to the target, as indicated by the bold line in the diagram.

The ability to create a conceptual reference point (henceforth *reference-point ability*) is quite fundamental in cognition, and one frequently makes use of it in everyday life. This is shown clearly by a familiar example from Langacker (1993): one usually locates the North Star by mentally tracing a path along the end of the Big Dipper. In this case, although the intended target is the North Star, it is not a bright star that one can find easily. Thus, one relies on a more salient entity like the Big Dipper as a reference point, and thereby determines where the North Star is. This example also suggests two important aspects of the reference-point function. One is the close relation between the target and reference point; one cannot locate the North Star if one employs as reference point some constellation lying too far away from it. The other important aspect is the requirement of cognitive salience on the part of the reference point; it is obvious that the Big Dipper would not be chosen as a reference point to locate the North Star, if this constellation itself were non-salient and thus difficult to find.

Actually, this basic mental ability of making use of reference points has an array of linguistic ramifications; it manifests itself in a broad range of linguistic phenomena,[3] one of which is metonymy, the topic of the present discussion. In order to show that metonymic expressions correspond exactly to the reference-point model, let us reconsider *Lakoff and Johnson* in (1a) for instance. Since the names *Lakoff and Johnson* refer not to humans but to their book *Metaphors We Live by*, we can regard

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[3] See Langacker (1993) for more extensive discussion, especially on possessives in English. Also based on the reference-point model are van Hoek's (1995) analysis of pronouns and Takagi's (this volume) work on the distribution of anaphors.

Lakoff and Johnson as a reference point to make mental contact with the real target, *Metaphors We Live by*. This reasonably matches the reference-point model sketched in Figure 1 (b), in that the more salient entity serves as reference point to access the intended target due to our natural inclination to perceive humans (*Lakoff and Johnson*) as being more salient than non-human objects (*Metaphors We Live by*) .

Moreover, the reference-point model is able to explain an essential asymmetry found in metonymy; when an explicit reference to an entity A is metonymically interpretable as referring to another entity B, it is rarely if ever the case that an explicit reference to B metonymically describes A. For example, while it is conventional that authors' names stand for their writings as in *Lakoff and Johnson*, the reverse would rarely occur; it seems fairly unnatural to use *Metaphors We Live by* to designate not the book itself but its authors (Can one say "Here comes *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*" when George Lakoff enters a room?). Furthermore, while "I drank three bottles" is unproblematically interpreted as an instance of metonymy, an expression along the lines of "I broke the wine" seems positively unacceptable as a means of announcing the destruction of a bottle. This kind of asymmetry between the overtly mentioned entity and the actual referent cannot be accounted for, as long as metonymy is characterized just in terms of contiguity relationships; the concept "contiguity" itself covers just proximity of two entities, which is a reciprocal relation. What is needed is a means of capturing the difference in degree of mental accessibility, which determines that one entity rather than the other is a usable reference point.[4]

However, one should note that the determination of what is more outstanding and therefore more suitable as a reference point greatly depends on discourse context, in addition to inherent prominence. In fact, whereas humans are generally more prominent than non-human or inanimate objects, as pointed out above, one also finds an array of examples of metonymy where non-human objects stand for humans, such as *a redcap* referring to a porter for instance. In this regard, another systematic theory will be needed in order to predict what becomes salient in the interaction of general cognitive principles and contextual factors, though I shall not pursue this issue in the present study.

2.3 Active-zone/profile Discrepancies

Even if metonymy can be precisely described on the basis of the reference-point model, the idea that metonymy is strictly a kind of figurative trope has not hitherto been challenged. However, in fact, the gap observable in metonymy between the overtly mentioned entity and the actual referent is quite commonplace, and Langacker (1995) analyzes this gap as an active-zone/profile discrepancy. By definition, the *profile* is the actual designatum of an expression, and the *active zone* (az) is a region which is associated with the nominal profile and participates directly

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[4] Note that the asymmetry between two elements of a possessive expression (e.g., *the boy's watch* versus **the watch's boy*) is well described in terms of the reference-point model, if we assume that the possessors serve as reference points and the possessed entities as their targets. See Langacker (1993) for details.

in the relationship represented by verbs, adjectives, prepositions and so on. The discrepancy between the profile and the active zone is shown clearly by the examples below, where the profiled relationship is expressed by the preposition *in*:

(2)   a. the arrow in the tree
        b. the cigarette in his mouth

(Langacker 1995: 25)

<Figure 2>

For the moment, let us simply regard the semantic value of *in* as denoting spatial inclusion. On hearing the expression in (2a), one generally imagines the situation sketched in Figure 2, where not the whole arrow but just its tip is embedded in the tree. This is also true of the example (2b); what the referent of *his* has in his mouth is just the tip of the cigarette. It is also an intriguing fact that one generally would not say "the tip of the arrow in the tree" (in the absence of a special context) looking at the situation in Figure 2. Thus, one perceives in these ordinary expressions a gap between the profile (e.g., the arrow) and the active zone (the tip of the arrow). Furthermore, active zones are not limited to portions of profiles as in (2). Consider the following examples:

(3)   a. She heard the trombone.
        b. I'm in the phone book.

(Langacker 1995: 27)

It is quite apparent that what the referent of *she* in (3a) heard is not the trombone itself, but the sound it produces; in the same way, what is in the phone book in (3b) is not a human being but just a name. In these cases, the active zones consist of entities affiliated with the profiles by means of various associations not limited to part-whole relations.

The observation above indicates that there *is* a gap between the overtly expressed entity (profile) and its actual target (active zone), even in non-figurative, normal expressions like (2) and (3), not just in metonymy. The discrepancy of profiles and active zones in general can be captured by the reference-point model as well, as

shown in Figure 3, where the profile and the active zone serve as reference point and target respectively.

< Figure 3: adapted from Langacker (1993: 33) >

Since the gap between the overtly expressed entity and its actual target is commonplace, there is no reason to regard metonymy as specialized linguistic usage; in fact, I assume that it is an extended version of the active-zone/profile discrepancy. Indeed, one may even feel hard-pressed to distinguish metonymies on the one hand from non-figurative expressions on the other, if one looks more closely and strictly at the situations they describe. The boundary between metonymy and other usages seems to be arbitrary, depending on the extent to which one is aware of the gap involved in an expression.[5]

As for the reason why such discrepancies are allowed and frequently made use of in ordinary language, Langacker (1995: 30) observes that metonymy is able to reconcile two conflicting factors: *(i)* the need to be accurate, i.e., of being sure that the addressee's attention is directed to the intended target, and *(ii)* one's natural inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have greater cognitive salience. Thus, active-zone/profile discrepancies are utilized for communicative purposes when the target is not a prominent entity, or when there is another entity which attracts one's attention more than the intended target. Furthermore, as we have seen so far, what makes it possible for the addressee to understand such discrepancies can be attributed to reference-point ability, which is assumed to be a basic mental capacity.

Given this point of view, it is not surprising that active-zone/profile discrepancies including metonymy are quite natural and prevalent; hence, a linguistic theory should take this situation into consideration, not relegating it to the status of figurative expressions or tropes. In fact, Langacker (1995) incorporates the notion of reference point and the metonymic relationship it bears into his grammatical theory, successfully analyzing so-called "raising" constructions in semantic terms. According to Langacker's account, what motivates the existence of "raising" constructions like *Don is likely to leave* or *We expect Don to leave* is the same reference-point effect as was discussed above in reference to metonymy. As shown by their non-raising

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[5] Langacker (1995: 27) comments that active-zone/profile discrepancies represent a special case of metonymy, while I interpret their relationship conversely here. If active-zone/profile discrepancy is a phenomenon ubiquitous in ordinary language, and metonymy refers to a particular kind of linguistic expression, I feel it more appropriate to describe the latter as a subset of the former.

counterparts *That Don will leave is likely* and *We expect that Don will leave*, "raising" predicates (e.g., *likely* and *expect*) basically take "events", not "participants", to be their trajector and landmark. However, since super-ordinate conceptions like events tend to be less salient than basic-level objects like event-participants, it is reasonable to shift prominence from an event (as in non-raising constructions) to a single event-participant (as in raising). Thus, the "raised" NPs actually stand for the events they participate in, and we find there a metonymic relationship between the events and their participants. The efficiency of Langacker's treatment of raising constructions also emphasizes the significance of metonymy, as well as cognitive factors like reference points, in the theory of grammar.

3   REFERENCE POINTS IN METAPHOR

So far, we have reviewed reference-point ability and its effects in metonymy. Since reference-point ability is basic and indispensable to cognition, its manifestations can be seen in a broad range of linguistic phenomena. In this section, I would like to move on to a consideration of how this ability pertains to metaphors.

One widely accepted view (Jakobson 1957) posits a fundamental complementarity between relations of similarity and contiguity, asserting that metaphor results from the former and metonymy from the latter. Although metaphor and metonymy have been treated as two distinctive rhetorical categories in this way, I would like to maintain that there is a certain commonality across the two phenomena, since conceptual similarity, i.e., some property shared by two entities, can be regarded as a special case of contiguity. If so, it will be plausible to assume that reference-point ability pertains to metaphor as well as metonymy. This assumption is motivated by the observation that various linguistic expressions are ambiguous between metaphor and metonymy, and that both metaphor and metonymy simultaneously play integral roles in the production of certain commonplace expressions.

3.1 Metaphor in Cognitive Grammar

3.1.1 Lexical Network Model   Cognitive Grammar provides a model to capture the relationship between metaphoric and "prototypical" or literal meanings of a given expression. This theory assumes that any symbolic unit is polysemous in nature, and represents this state of affairs by relating various senses to each other in a *lexical network model*.

The lexical network model is a development from the *semantic network model*, which has been established in the field of cognitive science. According to Oshima (1986), the semantic network model represents the mental organization of knowledge in an idealized way, and it can account for the efficiency with which humans retrieve pieces of information most relevant to any situation. As an illustration, let us examine how several conceptions related to *animal* can be organized via the semantic network illustrated in Figure 4, where the main conceptions enclosed by squares are linked to each other in descending order of abstractness or schematicity in the terminology of

Cognitive Grammar, i.e., the arcs in the graph lead downward from schematic conceptions to more elaborate ones. Thus, in Figure 4, the concept *animal* at the top of the network is most schematic; *animal* is then instantiated or elaborated as *bird* and *fish*, to which many more categories like *mammal, reptile* etc. could be added in a more complete model. Likewise, among the further instantiations of *bird* are *robin* and *swan*. Moreover, beside selected conceptions are listed the prototypical properties of the designated categories; in the case of *swan*, its color (white) and place of habitation (around water) are regarded as properties distinctive from those of other kinds of birds. This representation suggests that the conception or semantics of an entity involves a broad range of encyclopedic knowledge.

< Figure 4: adapted from Oshima (1986:63) >

The network model introduced above also applies to the linguistic analysis of polysemy. For example, Langacker (1988a) proposes the following lexical network model to represent the semantic structure of *ring*:[6]

< Figure 5: adapted from Langacker (1988a:52) >

At the top line of this network is the most schematic characterization of *ring*, [CIRCULAR ENTITY/ring], and all the other nodes are linked to this schema in one

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[6] The bracket represents a symbolic unit which consists of a semantic pole (in the left) and a phonological pole (in the right).

of two ways. Solid arrows connect concepts with more elaborated instantiations, while dotted arrows lead to extensions from the basic meaning. When *ring* refers to [ARENA], this sense seems to be irrelevant to the schematic characterization of *ring* since it does not necessarily have a circular shape (most arenas might be square in fact). However, if arenas were originally circular in ancient times and thus called *rings*, we can conclude that the schema for *ring* is indirectly relevant to [ARENA/ring]. We shall adopt "extension" as a technical term to refer to an indirect relation such as found between the schema and [ARENA/ring].

3.1.2 Metaphorical Meaning in Lexical Network Model   In fact, one of the most important and pervasive factors in extension from a basic sense is metaphor. Langacker offers the following brief comment, using *pig* designating a big-eater for illustration:

> Metaphorical expressions are simply more extreme instances of semantic extension. For instance, the conventional usage of pig to designate a glutton implies the semantic variant [GLUTTON/pig], which is categorized as an extension from the basic variant [PIG/pig] and evokes its secondary activation. ....
> [T]he extended or "figurative" sense functions as the active node —it represents the actual notion to be conveyed —while the basic or "literal" sense is activated secondarily.
>
> (Langacker 1988a: 69)

The characterization of a metaphorical sense in terms of a lexical network is able to capture an essential insight about the phenomenon, i.e., the intuition that metaphors evoke literal meanings in the course of their interpretation. Especially crucial is the notion of "secondary activation" of the most basic node, e.g., [PIG/pig], co-occurring with the primary activation of the intended sense, i.e., [GLUTTON/pig] in the present example. As a result, [GLUTTON/pig] invokes not only the property of eating a lot but also a certain image associated with the animal *pig*. This is exactly the effect we expect in employing metaphor, and it never arises when we use [GLUTTON/glutton] literally to refer to someone who eats a lot.

Furthermore, I would like to propose that reference-point ability also pertains to activation of a metaphorical sense in this lexical network, and that active-zone/profile discrepancies mentioned earlier can be found also in metaphor. Recall that the profile, the designatum of an overt linguistic expression, functions as a reference point for the target which corresponds to the active zone. This also applies to [GLUTTON/pig], since *pig* itself typically designates an animal [PIG], and we make use of this basic sense as a reference point in order to acquire [GLUTTON] as one of the properties of [PIG]. In this case, moreover, the contiguity relation between [PIG/pig] and [GLUTTON/pig] is accurately reflected in the model sketched below, where these nodes are linked to each other:

[PIG/pig] ------------▶ [GLUTTON/pig]

<Figure 6>

Note that properties obtained via the reference point [PIG] are conventionally determined by and large, while others associated with [PIG] are not so easy to activate in usual situations. Furthermore, the probability of the activation of a node might differ from individual to individual; for example, if someone uses *pig* to refer to a person who is hygienically-challenged, the intended metaphorical meaning would not be understood by people more knowledgeable about pigs, who know that they are in fact clean. Although we are forced to admit that the metaphorical meanings available to us are determined conventionally, it is worth observing that metaphorical senses of an expression are never acquired without recourse to the basic sense functioning as a reference point.[7] Also, notice that this analysis does not support a view that the metaphorical sense is always understood after the interpretation of the literal meaning, even if the literal or basic node is accessed in the first place as a reference point in the diagram. The mental access involved in the reference-point structure is made instantaneously, and the interpretation of the metaphorical sense via the basic one should be understood holistically.

3.1.3 Flexibility in Interpretation of Metaphor   Someone might be dubious as to the extent to which an expression can be polysemous, as represented by the range of senses subsumed by its lexical network. Indeed, this network can spread into quite a broad range if our knowledge of the properties of the designated entity are regarded as part of its meanings, as indicated in the semantic network model in 3.1.1. Hence, if typical properties of an entity evoked by a linguistic expression are not so strictly determined by convention, as in [GLUTTON/pig], we can use the expression more freely to refer to a variety of designata. Consider the expression below:

(4)   Your eyes are *diamonds*.

This cliché is a kind of metaphor, based on similarity between eyes and diamonds. What they share is supposed to be a property of being beautiful, shining bright and so on. In this case, what is accessed via the conception of *diamond* is one of its property that could also be attributed to human eyes. On the other hand, we can invoke another aspect of *diamond* metaphorically, as in (5):

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[7] Langacker (1988b) observes that the following schema models extensions of this kind: [ANIMAL] -- > [ANIMAL-LIKE PERSON]. This allows one to refer to someone as an *ostrich*, a *fennec*, or *veritable brontosaurus*, even if these have never been applied to people. This schema accounts for the considerable productivity of this kind of expression, but what aspect of these animals are evoked is determined conventionally on the basis of one's knowledge of the animal.

(5) I wish he would give me a *diamond*.

If (5) is uttered by an unmarried woman, the most likely interpretation of this expression is that *diamond* stands for an engagement ring. In this case, the typical function of *diamond* as an engagement ring is activated, and the property invoked in (4) does not arise here. Hence, the speaker of (5) does not want something beautiful, nor does she desire just a diamond without an accompanying ring. Such alternate activations of properties in *diamond* is depicted below:

<Figure 7>

As one may have noticed already, *diamond* in (5) can be seen as metonymy rather than metaphor, since it stands for one of its functions as an engagement ring. This also constitutes evidence of the interrelation between metaphor and metonymy, since both are accessible via the basic and literal meaning, which serves as reference point.

3.1.4 Convergence of Metaphor and Metonymy   Given such a view, it would not be surprising if an expression can be construed either as metaphor or as metonymy depending on the context in which it is used. Consider the following example:

(6) You should avoid marrying a *sheep* at all costs.   (Papafragou 1995)

Under a usual interpretation, a *sheep* in (6) metaphorically refers to someone who has some property typical of sheep, e.g., being obedient, cowardly etc. However, a *sheep* in (6) could mean a person who was born in the year of the sheep, according to Papafragou. This example can be regarded as a complicated type of metonymy, since it actually refers to the name of a year in the Chinese zodiac, which in turn stands for people who were born in that year.[8] Thus, the metonymic interpretation of a *sheep* involves two reference-point structures: an animal *sheep* serves as reference point for the year of the *sheep*, which subsequently becomes a reference point for the real target, i.e., a person who was born in that year. In this case, the intended interpretation would not be obtained if the addressee does not know that *sheep* is

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[8] At least in Japan, it is quite conventional to refer to a person by mentioning the animal of the year in which (s)he was born (*Ano hito wa uma da,* "he is a horse" for example).

included among the twelve animals used to refer to years in the zodiac cycle. The determination of whether a *sheep* in (6) is interpreted as metaphor or metonymy depends on which node is activated in the semantic network of *sheep*. Although the likelihood of activation of a node may be determined conventionally, the relatively flexible interpretation of this example leads to the assumption that we are essentially allowed to access any node, either metaphorical or metonymic, via the reference point *sheep*.

Furthermore, consider the next example:

(7)   She *did an Elizabeth Taylor* when she was in the café.

The expression *doing an Elizabeth Taylor* might be analyzed as metonymy, since it refers to a particular, habitual action characteristic of Elizabeth Taylor, as Higashimori (1996) claims. Moreover, this expression involves metaphor in that it actually conveys the fact that the behavior of the referent of *she* is similar to that of Elizabeth Taylor. We shall reconsider the issue of the interpretation of expressions like (7) in 3.2.

3.1.5 Where do Metaphor and Metonymy diverge?   Although we have stressed the commonality of metonymy and metaphor in terms of reference-point structure, this does not imply that they are perfectly identical in nature. The crucial difference between metaphor and metonymy with respect to reference-point structures lies in the "secondary activation" of a reference point. In metaphor, as we mentioned earlier, the node of the most basic sense serving as reference point for the metaphorical meaning is activated secondarily. However, such secondary activation of a reference-point node is not found in metonymy, where one may interpret the intended target directly, and a reference point itself is construed transparently in the overall structure. The difference in resulting effects will also be seen in data to be handled in the next subsection, though I will not focus on this issue in more detail. Rather, I will call more attention to the intersection of metaphor and metonymy in what follows.

3.2 Parallelism between Metaphor and Metonymy

As we have seen so far, reference-point structure is relevant to both metonymy and metaphor. The parallelism between them is explicit especially when they are employed as significant factors in the production of certain linguistic expressions. First, let us look at an observation on Japanese nicknames in Kawakami (1996), which categorizes an array of practical data and analyzes them in terms of reference-point structure. As one may suppose, most nicknames are based on metaphor or metonymy, but Kawakami points out the existence of the complicated naming convention exemplified below:

(8)   a.   Iwanofu (Russian name) [a person who looks like a Russian]
      b.   oushou   (a song of Murata Hideo)
                          [a person who resembles Murata Hideo]

One finds that these examples consist of two types of association: one is based on metaphor, and the other on metonymy. Consider (8b) for example; the first step of the naming is metaphorical in that the person who is given the nickname resembles a Japanese singer *Murata Hideo*. Thus, the person could be called simply *Murata Hideo* metaphorically, but the second step in the naming process affords him the nickname *oushou*, which was a big-hit of the actual Murata Hideo. The relation between *Murata Hideo* and *oushou* is metonymic, based on contiguity between artistic productions and their creators. This pattern of naming is characterized precisely by the reference-point model, as Kawakami suggests:

[oushou] : target of reference point''

[Murata Hideo]: target of reference point'

reference point''

[named person]: reference point'

Ⓒ

<Figure 8>

In the first step of the process above, the relation of the named person and the actual Murata Hideo is established by some similarity between them, but it can be a contiguity relation at the same time, since the similarity relation "A resembles B" actually implies the conceptual contiguity relation "A is close to B". It is thus reasonable to apply the reference-point model to the step based on metaphor, as well as the second step involving a metonymic relation.[9]

The observation above shows that metaphor also involves reference-point structure, and can be used to create a linguistic expression where metonymy can also apply. However, as Kawakami indicates, the order of the application of metaphor and metonymy is somehow determined when both of them occur in a single nickname. Actually, one cannot find an example in which metonymy occurs first and metaphor follows it. I speculate that this phenomenon pertains to the function of nicknames; among the reasons for employing nicknames are the desire for secrecy, and the attraction of word-game-like indirectness etc. If a nickname involves metaphor alone, the reference might be identified too readily, due to the effect of "secondary activation" in metaphor, invoking the basic and literal sense. Thus, the second step of naming based on metonymy detaches one's attention further from the reference, and thereby enhances the covertness or indirectness of the expression. On the other hand,

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[9] Note that the metaphorical interpretation in this case is treated somehow differently from that in (4) or (6), where one seems to access just a subset of the properties possessed by the target. In (8), on the other hand, the similarity between the target (the named person) and the overtly expressed entity (the nickname) is rather backgrounded.

there is another requirement that a nickname should not be too covert for the addressee to infer who is actually referred to. Suppose that we create a nickname first by metonymy, and next by metaphor; what is secondarily activated by the nickname is not the named person himself, but some other entity metonymically associated with him. Thus, a nickname formed in order of metonymy and metaphor would appear to be unfavorable, invoking an entity which is too detached from the intended target.

Another example of the parallelism between metaphor and metonymy is to be found in the formation of denominal verbs in Japanese. Higashimori (1995) suggests that the English verb *father* is an instance of verbal metonymy in which *father* stands for part of the activities of a father; it might mean to become a male parent of a child, to behave like a father, to have a certain type of relation with children, and so on. The actual interpretation of *father* is determined according to the discourse context of the utterance.

The formation of denominal verbs, however, does include metaphor as well as metonymy. This is illustrated by some Japanese data below, where a contracted nominal is changed into a verb by adding a verbal suffix *-ru:*[10]

(9) a. looson   [nominal; Lawson's, a chain store]   >   looso-ru
     b. haagendattsu [nominal; Häagen-Dazs]   >   hage-ru
     c. makudonarudo [nominal; McDonald's]   >   makudo-ru

The verbs *looso-ru*, *hage-ru* and *makudo-ru* refer to activities relevant to the places designated by the root nominals. In the case of (9a), what people do in the convenience store is to purchase small daily necessities, or to hang around looking at magazines or chatting with friends in front of the store. The verb *looso-ru* is thus metonymic in nature, standing for a variety of activities invoked by the nominal *looson*. However, the same kind of denominal verb can denote activities that are metaphorically related to the root nominal. Consider the next example:

(10) Seiko [Seiko Matsuda, a famous female singer] > Seiko-ru

The denominal verb *Seiko-ru* means to behave like Seiko Matsuda: to be selfish, to have adulterous affairs, and so on. In this case, as with the previous examples in (9), the action described by *Seiko-ru* stands for one of various activities that are typical of Seiko Matsuda. Nevertheless, the meaning of *Seiko-ru* is derived by metaphor as well; this is reminiscent of *doing an Elizabeth Taylor* in (7), which also refers to a certain behavior characteristic of a famous public figure. In stricter terms, it is not Seiko Matsuda or Elizabeth Taylor who actually performs the activity designated by *Seiko-ru* or *doing an Elizabeth Taylor*; to define these expressions directly as metonymy is felt to be problematic, since the actual Seiko Matsuda or Elizabeth Taylor on the one hand and the performers of the activities *Seiko-ru* or *doing an Elizabeth Taylor* on the other do not stand in a contiguity relation. Rather, these expressions might be best described as involving metaphor, based on similarity

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[10] The data in (9) and (10) are cited from an article in the Asahi shinbun of October 13, 1996, written by Akihiko Yonekawa, who observed these denominal verbs in the speech of young people.

observable between one's behavior and that of Seiko Matsuda or Elizabeth Taylor. If so, the function of the suffix -*ru* pertains both to metonymy and to metaphor, emphasizing the parallelism that exists between these two phenomena.

4 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have shown how metonymic expressions are characterized in the framework of Cognitive Grammar, especially employing the reference-point model. The fundamental cognitive ability of establishing one entity as a reference point for another target captures the asymmetry and irreversibility of the relation between the overtly expressed entity and its actual referent. Additionally, by pointing out the continuum which connects metonymy with quite commonplace linguistic expressions exhibiting active-zone/profile discrepancies, we demonstrate that metonymy is not necessarily a specialized usage of language. Once Jakobson (1957) remarked as follows: "Consequently, when constructing a meta-language to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation. Therefore nothing comparable to the rich literature on metaphor can be cited for the theory of metonymy." (Jakobson 1957: 132) However, the importance of metonymy in natural language and in various aspects of grammar should not be ignored, and a systematic account for it is also possible as we have shown above.

Finally, we examined the parallelism between metonymy and metaphor in terms of reference-point structure. As for these two major categories of rhetoric, Jakobson (1957) characterizes them as representing two axes of language, i.e., syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations, assuming their complementarity. However, there should be an intersection of these two poles; otherwise, there could be no ambiguous expressions that are felt to be simultaneously metaphoric and metonymic. While most recent works on metonymy have focused on what kinds of "contiguity" relationships can be expressed, one must also look at the continuum between metonymy and other linguistic phenomena, as this paper has attempted to do, in order to find the proper characterization of metonymy and of the conceptual mechanism behind it.

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