A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyotaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Wakayama, Takuma

A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyotaka; Serizawa, Shigehiro et al.

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2019, 1048, 1-88

アクセス数:367件（2025-07-20 21:25 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/72992

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タイトル	A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
著者	NRID 1000080725060 1000080725060 著者名 Masuda, Takehito
	NRID 1000050404976 1000050404976 著者名 Sakai, Toyotaka
	NRID 1000090252717 1000090252717 researchmap permalink serizawa serizawa Scopus Author ID 56234421600 56234421600 著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
	NRID 1000080448654 1000080448654 著者名 Wakayama, Takuma
キーワード等	advice effect
	strategy-proofness
	Vickrey auction
	pay-your-bid auction
	market design
内容	January 2019. Revised November 2019.
抄録	We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave“correctly.”
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1048
ページ	1-88
刊行年月	2019-11
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/72992
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1048R.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
最終更新日	2019-11

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2019, 1048, p. 1-88
DC.title	A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
DC.creator	Masuda, Takehito
	Sakai, Toyotaka
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
	Wakayama, Takuma
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2019-11
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1048R.pdf
DC.subject	advice effect
	strategy-proofness
	Vickrey auction
	pay-your-bid auction
	market design
DC.description	January 2019. Revised November 2019.
DCTERMS.abstract	We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave“correctly.”
DC.format	72992
citation_title	A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
citation_author	Masuda, Takehito
	Sakai, Toyotaka
	Serizawa, Shigehiro
	Wakayama, Takuma
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2019-11
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1048
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	88
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/72992
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2019/DP1048R.pdf

A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction

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