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The Narrator’s Presentation of the Source Material in Philostratus’ *Apollonius* (1)

Yasuhiro Katsumata

Introduction

Along with a growing scholarly interest in prose narrative works produced in the so-called Second Sophistic(2), more and more critics have begun to view the *Apollonius* (3) by Flavius Philostratus (c. 170-250 CE) (4) as a literary masterpiece. The work has no longer been regarded as a mere biographical account of the eponymous sage, but as a calculated artefact comparable, for example, to contemporary Greek romances (5). One of the most important factors responsible for its literariness is Philostratus’ employment of the first-person narrator; the story is presented through the vision of ‘I’ (6). As we shall see presently, the ego-narrator is alleged to ‘rewrite’ the seemingly reliable document on the Tyanean hero. We have thus a good reason to say that what he offers to us is an ‘edited’ narrative, not an impartial report of the fact. In several ways the narrator can be seen as highly self-conscious about his act of ‘rewriting’. In this paper, I will explore one of these, i.e. the narrator’s presentation of the source material. In many places of his account, our narrator mentions, or just implies, his full use of the source material for informing us of individual events happening around the protagonist. I would argue that the foregrounding of his command of the source material itself plays an important role in Philostratus’ literary strategy. In what follows, I will examine the passages
in which the narrator talks about the source material and try to find their narrative functions. After a brief look at the narrator’s general aim for his task, I will first discuss the ‘Damis document’, the primary source for the entire story, and then focus on the narrator’s treatment of the document. These analyses will lead to the conclusion that Philostratus, through the exhibition of the first-person narrator’s information management, playfully draws the reader’s attention to the difficulty, or even impossibility, of attaining the truth.

**The Aim of the Narrator**

Before discussing the passages concerning the narrator’s treatment of the source material, it is necessary to grasp his aim with which he presents his own Apollonius. At 1.2, he complains of some people’s misunderstanding about Apollonius, saying that they see Apollonius as a ‘magician’ (μάγος)\(^7\), not a man of ‘wisdom’ (σοφία)\(^8\). With this in mind, he then makes explicit what he intends to do in the subsequent accounts:

Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι μὴ περιϊδεῖν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ’ ἐξακριβῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς τε χρόνοις, καθ’ οὗς εἶπε τι ή ἐπραξέ, τοῖς τε τῆς σοφίας τρόποις, ὑφ’ οὗν ἔγαυσε τοῦ δαίμονις τε καὶ θείος νομισθῆναι.

Therefore, what I think has to be done is not to look over the ignorance of many people but to describe the man accurately, with regard to the time when he said or did something, and the uses of his wisdom by which he came close to being thought godlike and divine.\(^9\)

It does not matter whether such misunderstanding was really rampant among the people interested in Apollonius. The important point is rather that the narrator tries to present his work as a sort of reaction against other discourses about the sage. This way of presenting one’s own work is often employed by historians. What motivates them to write is, to some extent, the need to provide their own original ideas, different from those...
held by other historians. In this sense, ancient historical writings are agonistic in nature. In the above citation, it would not be hard to notice such kind of agonisticity, because the narrator thinks it not good to look over the ‘ignorance’ (ἄγνοιαν) of other Apollonius writers and announces his aim to ‘describe’ Apollonius ‘accurately’ (ἐξακριβῶσαι). Assuming a highly agonistic attitude, our narrator presents himself as a historian.

A few more words should be added with regard to the word ἐξακριβῶσαι because, as we shall see in more detail below, the notion of ἀκρίβεια plays a key role in the narrator’s stance in presenting the biography. The idea of ἀκρίβεια must have reminded ancient readers of the name of a famous historian and thus helped connect our narrator to the title of the ‘historian’. The man in question is Thucydides. In the famous ‘methodology section’ (1.20-22) in his History of the Peloponnesian War, the fifth-century historian uses the word ἀκρίβεια twice: in writing speeches, he found it difficult to remember the words and phrases ‘accurately’ (ἀκρίβειαν); avoiding both blind copy-making from other people’s accounts and subjective impression, he detailed each event as ‘accurately’ (ἀκριβείᾳ) as possible (both from 1.22). In addition, in the so-called ‘Second Preface’ (5.26) too, the historian tells us that during the war he took great care so that he would get ‘accurate’ (ἀκριβές) information. These remarks offer us every reason to believe that Thucydides struggled to give his readers an ‘accurate’ account of his subject matter. Given Thucydides’ popularity as a writer of ‘accurate’ history in the Imperial Greek world, it is highly likely that Philostratus makes his narrator use the word ἐξακριβῶσαι to show him as a follower of the fifth-century great historian.

To sum up, in the opening section of his biography, our narrator declares his goal to be to sweep away the ‘ignorance’ of many people by ‘describing’ Apollonius ‘accurately’, showing himself as a historian, especially Thucydides, whose working motto is ἀκρίβεια, ‘accuracy’. It is against this basic stance that we should see the narrator’s ways of presenting his source material, to which I now turn.
The Damis Document

After setting forth his aim, the narrator introduces the source material he uses for his job: testimonies found in the places that are strongly connected to Apollonius, reports by other writers and letters written by Apollonius himself (1.2). These sources are relatively unimportant, however. Much more important than these, and therefore worthy to be examined here, is the document written by a man named Damis, about which the narrator tells us as follows (1.3):

Τὰ δὲ ἀκριβέστερα ὄντα συνελεξάμην. ἐγένετο Δάμις ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄσοφος τὴν ἀρχαίαν ποτὲ οἶκον Νῖνον. οὗτος τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ προσφιλοσοφήσας ἀποδημίας τε αὐτοῦ ἀναγέγραφεν, ὅν κοινονήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς φησί, καὶ γνώμας καὶ λόγους καὶ ὁπόσα ἐς πρόγνωσιν εἶπε. καὶ προσήκων τις τῷ Δάμιῳ τὰς δέλτους τῶν ύπομνημάτων τούτων ὑπογεγραμμένας ἐς γνώσιν ἦγαγεν Ἰουλία τῇ βασιλίδι. μετέχοντι δὲ μοι τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν κύκλου, καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς πάντας λόγους ἐπῄνει καὶ ἠσπάζετο, μεταγράψαι τε προσέταξε τὰς διατριβὰς ταύτας καὶ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι, τῷ γὰρ Νινίῳ σαφῶς μέν, οὐ μὴν δεξίως γε ἀπηγγέλλετο.

I collected more accurate sources as follows: there was a very wise man called Damis, who once lived in Old Ninus. This man, having studied philosophy with Apollonius, recorded Apollonius’ travels, which, according to him, he himself took part in. He recorded Apollonius’ sayings, lectures and prophecies, too. And a man who belonged to Damis’ family carried to the empress Julia the tablets containing these memoranda which had never been known, and thus she knew their existence. She ordered me—I was a member of her circle and she praised and welcomed all sorts of rhetorical expressions—to rewrite the discourses and to pay attention to the way of reporting them. For the man of Ninus reported clearly but not skillfully.

This is the passage inextricably linked to the core question of how one
should interpret the *Apollonius* as a whole\(^{(16)}\). Though it contains dozens of important remarks that are to be investigated in their own right, suffice it here to focus on the underlined words only. The narrator introduces the document with the word *ἀκριβέστερα*. The document is presented as being ‘more accurate’ than the other sources. In the following accounts, the narrator gives us the reason for its conspicuous ‘accuracy’: a man called Damis accompanied Apollonius all along during the sage’s worldwide travels and recorded what the man said and did. Damis is thus alleged to be an eyewitness of this mysterious figure. It should be noticed that the narrator emphasises Damis’ act of ‘witnessing’; as is well known, autopsy was thought to be a very important factor for ancient historians to confirm the veracity of what they recounted \(^{(17)}\). We can easily find references to autopsy in e.g. Herodotus\(^{(18)}\) and of course in Thucydides, who is contemporary with the Peloponnesian War\(^{(19)}\). Our narrator claims that he possesses a document written by a man who saw and heard with his own eyes and ears Apollonius’ deeds and sayings during his travels, and in this way, as we saw above, the narrator again tries to present himself as a historian. The narrator has every reason to put an emphasis on the ‘accuracy’ of the document.

Let us turn to the other underlined word. We are told that the document Damis had written was left to his anonymous family member and was then given by the figure to ‘the empress Julia’, who thus learned about the hidden document, and that she ordered the narrator to ‘rewrite’ (μεταγράψαι) what Damis had recorded. The exact meaning of the verb is tantalisingly unclear \(^{(20)}\), but at least it seems certain that the narrator expects us to think of his present work as a factually reliable record, whose contents are basically the same as those found in Damis’ document.

We can find more detailed explanation about the document at 1.19, which helps us have better understanding of its nature:

... διατριβήν δὲ ἀναγράψαι καὶ συνουσίαν, καὶ ὃ τι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἀνατυπῶσαι, καὶ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τοιούτων ξυνθεῖναι σφόδρα Ἰκανός ἦν, καὶ ἐπετήδευε τοῦτο
He [sc. Damis] was very able to record the discourse and the meeting, to describe what he heard or saw, and to put these together as a memorandum. He did this better than any other person. Concerning the writing-tablet made of the manger, Damis planned as follows: he wished to leave nothing about Apollonius unknown, and, if Apollonius said or uttered something even in a casual way, to record this as well.

The underlined phrase, ‘leave nothing about Apollonius unknown’, is to be noted. Damis is said to have aspired to record ‘everything’ about his beloved friend (21). His document is thus supposed to contain ‘all’ about the sage, with nothing omitted.

The thoroughness of Damis is mentioned also at 7.28, where the narrator informs us of what happened to Apollonius when he was in prison at the command of the Roman Emperor Domitian:

There were other episodes in this prison. Some were contrived, some were accidental—neither important nor worth my seriousness, which, however, Damis mentioned probably for the purpose of omitting nothing—and others were to be told.

In this way, the narrator presents the ‘Damis document’ as ‘more accurate’ than any other material: Damis the ‘eyewitness’ took pains to record ‘everything’ that Apollonius did and said.
As we saw above, the narrator seems to suggest that the Damis document contains ‘all’ the information about Apollonius, but are the readers meant to believe it? They are not. The reason for this can be found at 4.19, where the narrator tells us that Apollonius, so says Damis (ὁ Δάμις ... φησὶ) (22), gave a large number of lectures in Athens and Damis wrote down ‘not all of them’ (οὐ πάσας) but the ones that were ‘indispensable’ (ἀναγκαίας) and were ‘on important matters’ (περὶ μεγάλων). This comment is a clear indicator of Damis’ selection of information in his note-taking. The narrator, though indirectly, discloses the fact that Damis did not record all of Apollonius’ deeds and sayings. The document made by Damis is presented as perfect in the opening section, but as we read on, we learn that the document is never free from defects.

Another signal of Damis’ information manipulation can be found at 5.7. Before describing Apollonius’ discourses in Gadeira, the narrator says that, again ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις ... φησίν), there were many discourses by Apollonius, but what he is going to tell next are ‘worth recording’ (ἀξίας ... τοῦ ἀναγράψαι). The last phrase is important because it shows Damis’ selective attitude against his master’s discourses; if, as the narrator says here, Damis took one discourse as ‘worth recording’, then there must have been also the one(s) that was/were discarded by Damis as not ‘worth recording’. The passage thus implicitly reveals that Damis the note-taker omitted some words uttered by Apollonius.

The above examples show that the Damis document is never flawless as the narrator seems to suggest when he talks about the nature of this material. How, then, should we understand this contradiction? To answer the question, it would be helpful to remember the common idea that recording ‘all’ the information about a subject is impossible after all (23). No one could deny this, including the ancients who read the Apollonius. In fact, the narrator himself seems aware of this undeniable fact. Let us return to the narrator’s comment at 1.19. There, the narrator says that Damis ‘wished’ (ἐβούλετο) to leave nothing about Apollonius unknown. Possibly, the implication here is that Damis just ‘wished’ and therefore could not achieve
the goal. The narrator’s language at 7.28 is more suggestive. When the narrator refers to those events in the prison which seem unimportant to him but are nevertheless recorded by Damis, he says that, ‘to his mind’ (οἶμαι), Damis mentioned them so as to omit nothing about Apollonius. The verb οἶμαι (24) suggests that the narrator is just inferring, not taking as sure, Damis’ effort to leave nothing out. To put it another way, he is cold against, or disrespectful to, Damis’ method: he shows himself as thinking that Damis’ plan will result in failure. Such ironical language as this, I argue, indicates the narrator’s awareness of the fact that the ‘perfect document’ never exists.

**Damis’ Absence and Apollonius’ Later Supplementation**

Let us look at another important aspect of the Damis document. As we are told at 1.3, Damis is alleged to have accompanied Apollonius during his travels (25), but we should not be unaware that Damis was not always with Apollonius; sometimes in his narrative, the narrator informs us of the fact that Damis was made to separate from his beloved master for various reasons (26). In what ways, then, did Damis, who is said to have wanted to record ‘all’ the details about Apollonius, get information about the deeds and sayings of the man that he failed to write down on the spot?

The first example is from 1.26, where Apollonius’ visit to the Magi in Babylon is described in a summary form. The narrator tells us that Apollonius spent time with the priests in teaching and learning. And then comes a striking remark that ‘Damis does not know (οὐκ οἶδεν) what kind of conversation Apollonius had with the Magi’, the reason for which, according to the narrator, is that Apollonius forbade Damis from visiting the priests. We readers may well feel uneasy when faced with this situation, since we expect Damis to have recorded ‘all’ the deeds and sayings of the sage. The narrator, however, tries to remove the readers’ confusion right away by adding that Damis asked Apollonius ‘later’ (ὑστερον) what the Magi were like. At first glance, we are meant to accept Damis’ ‘later’ obtainment of the
information as unproblematic in terms of veracity, but this is too simple an interpretation. The response Apollonius made to Damis’ question provides us with an interpretative clue. The sage, so recounts the narrator, said to the questioner merely that ‘They are wise, but not in every respect’. It is clear that Apollonius is unwilling to give information about the Magi to Damis, who is eager to know ‘all’ the details of the Babylonian priests, with whom his beloved master spent a certain span of time.

A similar information supplementation can be found at 3.27. Before he describes the conversation among Apollonius, Indian king Iarchas and another unnamed Indian king, the narrator informs us of Damis’ absence from the spot and his belated knowledge with the help of Apollonius, saying that ‘according to Damis, he himself was not there because of his stay in the village, but, having heard Apollonius’ story, he recorded their conversation in his notebook’. In this case, unlike the one discussed just above, the narrator does not tell us about how Apollonius replied to Damis the questioner.

Having seen these two examples about Damis’ indirect method of recording, we should consider it important that not all accounts in Damis’ document are based on the recorder’s autopsy and that the document contains secondhand information from the mouth of Apollonius as well. This causes a serious problem when we remember the narrator’s explanation that the Damis document is ‘accurate’; when Damis asked Apollonius for the information that had been inaccessible to him, it is highly likely that Apollonius did not provide Damis with ‘accurate’ accounts but distorted what he had really experienced. In fact, in either of the above examples, it is suggested that Apollonius, when asked by Damis, gave him an ‘edited’ version of the real story, because what Apollonius had experienced in Damis’ absence must have been secret and is not to be leaked to the people who were not present. Apollonius’ laconism in the first example clearly indicates this. So in these cases Damis seems to have written down Apollonius’ ‘edited’ versions. Are these accounts meant to be ‘accurate’? The narrator, I believe, will answer ‘no’ tongue-in-cheek (27).
The Narrator and the ‘Truth’

Thus far we have focused on the making of the Damis’ record and found that it is never a perfect document but is subject to the recorder’s or Apollonius’ information manipulation. With this observation in mind, the next thing I would like to do is take a look at the narrator’s ways of making use of the Damis document.

Before examining the direct relation between the narrator and the document, it is necessary to grasp the narrator’s basic attitude about writing a ‘historical’ work, because it will help us gain a better understanding of the narrator’s use of the material available to him. As we saw earlier, our narrator aims to ‘describe’ Apollonius ‘accurately’ (ἐξακριβῶσαι) and his self-presentation reminds us of Thucydides’ famous comments on his working principle, in which we can find the word ἀκρίβεια (28). This is, however, not all that connects the narrator of the Apollonius with the fifth-century historian. Again in Thucydides’ methodology section, we can see another important element that proves the link between the two: ἀλήθεια, the ‘truth’. At the end of 1.20, the historian laments that ‘seeking the truth (ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας) is not painstaking for many people and they rather turn to ready-made discourses’. The phrase ‘seeking the truth’ can be taken as the historian’s overall programme for his massive work especially because just after this he criticises poets and logographers for their incredible stories and tries to distance himself from these unreliable authors. He thus establishes himself as a man who seeks ἀλήθεια.

What, then, can be said of the relationship between the narrator of the Apollonius and ἀλήθεια? The answer would be found at 2.9, where the narrator talks about a controversial action by Alexander the Great during his eastward expedition. Though some people say, recounts the narrator,
that Alexander held revel at a mountain in Nysa, the locals deny this. The narrator anticipates the possibility of making some people angry by introducing the locals’ opinion, but he then makes an excuse with some confidence, saying that he cannot do without the ‘truth’ (δεῖ ... ἀληθείας ἐμοὶ).

Just like Thucydides, our narrator presents himself as an adherent of ἀλήθεια. Taking into consideration the juxtaposition of ἀκρίβεια and ἀλήθεια in Thucydides’ methodology, we can safely state that in the Apollonius too the notions of ἀκρίβεια and ἀλήθεια are closely linked to each other. Placing an emphasis on these two, our narrator expects his readers to take his story as ‘true’, immune from any kind of forgery.

The Narrator’s Loyalty to the Damis Document

It is in the Damis document that one can find the ‘accurate’ information, or the ‘truth’, about Apollonius. So the narrator frequently emphasises that what he is telling to the reader is based on the document. A fine example is found at 2.28, where the narrator begins to talk about the banquet that the Indian king Phraotes held for Apollonius and his followers. There the narrator says that it is ‘not right to omit’ (Ἄξιον ... μηδὲ ... παραλιπεῖν) the banquet as ‘it is recorded clearly by Damis’ (σαφῶς ... ἀναγεγραμμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ Δάμιδος). His language suggests that it is his duty not to overlook what Damis recorded. It seems safe to say that our narrator is very careful about the task of ‘rewriting’ (μεταγράψαι) the Damis document that the empress Julia entrusted to him.

Another example comes from 3.45, where the narrator tells us that he ‘must not omit’ (μηδ’ ... παραλειπέσθω) the discussion about the beasts, springs and humans in India as ‘it is recorded by Damis’ (ἀναγέγραπται τῷ Δάμιδι). This too indicates that the narrator carefully follows the accounts he found in the Damis document.

Just after this, we can find a more interesting comment made by the narrator, which will become important if we try to assess his basic stance to the Damis document: ‘there will be profit by neither believing nor
disbelieving all the things’ (κέρδος εἴη μὴ πιστεύειν, μὴ ἐπιστεῖν πᾶσιν). This, like Herodotus’ similar statement (29), makes it clear that the narrator does not force his readers to believe all of his accounts (30). Furthermore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the narrator does not seem to take all of what Damis recorded as true. An important point is that our narrator appears literally to ‘rewrite’ (‘write again’) the contents of the Damis document and to be hardly interested in its historical veracity. The corollary of this is that he tells us a deed or a saying of Apollonius just because it is recorded in the Damis document.

The clearest signal of the narrator’s debt to Damis is his formulaic phrase ‘Damis says’ or ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις φησί(ν)). For instance, at 2.10, the narrator tells us that ‘Damis says’ (φησιν ὁ Δάμις) he did not see the crag called Aornos. At 3.36, the narrator depicts the Damis’ reaction to the speech given by Iarchas, saying ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις … φησιν) he was beside himself with amazement. At 6.22, the narrator closes the description of the discussion between Apollonius and the leader of the Ethiopian Gymnosophists Thespasion, by saying that ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις … φησιν) the two talked about the just man as described in the previous sections and Apollonius approved the sound argument. This phrase (31) is the narrator’s favourite way to show that he always consults the document composed by Damis. When the readers light upon the phrase, they are expected to think of the narrator as being loyal to the record of Apollonius’ disciple.

It is in the very final stage of the work that we can find the most conspicuous expression indicating the narrator draws heavily on the Damis document. Having depicted the last brief exchange between Apollonius and Damis, the narrator says that ‘the things concerning Apollonius of Tyana (32) recorded by Damis the Assyrian ends with this story’ (Τ ὰ μὲν δ ὴ ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Τυανέα Δάμιδι τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ ἀναγεγραμμένα ἐς τόνδε τὸν λόγον τελευτᾷ, 8.29). This closing remark leads the readers to think that what they have read until this point is all based on Damis’ record: they are made to feel as if they had long followed the Damis document itself with the help of
the narrator. This feeling would further be strengthened by the fact that
the narrator just after the above remark informs us of the lack of
information about Apollonius’ death in the Damis document and sets out to
fill the gap with other sources. By thus distinguishing what he could find in
Damis’ record from the information based on other sources, the narrator
again emphasises that almost all of his accounts derive from the document
composed by Damis the eyewitness.

The Narrator’s Selection

In this way, the narrator presents himself as loyal to the Damis document.
It is wrong, however, to believe that the narrator’s story is a perfect revised
version of the document without any flaw concerning the veracity of the
Apollonius’ deeds and sayings. For in some places the narrator confesses
that he does not always follow the accounts given in the document. For
example, at 1.20, while he is well aware of the importance of ‘accurate
account’ (Ἀκριβολογίας) and of his ‘omitting none of what was written by
Damis’ (τοῦ μηδὲν παραλειπόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Δάμιδος), λόγος
forces him to offer things ‘more important’ (τὰ μεῖζον) and ‘more marvelous’
(τὰ θαυμασιώτερα). As we saw above, in the introductory section the narrator
declares that he ‘describes’ Apollonius ‘accurately’ (ἐξακριβῶσαι), but here he
admits his abandonment of ἀκρίβεια and the alternative method of selection.
Despite his confident self-presentation as a devotee of ἀκρίβεια, he does not
conceal the possibility of his information manipulation, adopting some and
discarding others, in the writing process.

An interesting passage in connection to this is found at 6.35. There
the narrator confesses the fear of his offering ‘a long story’ (λόγην ... μῆκος)
by introducing Apollonius’ philosophy ‘accurately’ (ἀκριβῶς), and so tells us
that of sage’s many philosophical activities he will talk about things ‘more
serious’ (τὰ σπουδαστέρα) and ‘more worthy of memory’ (ὅπωσα μνήμης
ἀξιώτερα). Striking is the narrator’s idea that ‘accurate’ accounts cause
‘tediousness’. It seems unnecessary for the narrator to mention the
negative aspect of ἀκρίβεια, because the concept is his principle, his motto in writing the biography, but despite the disadvantage the narrator shows us his intention of abandoning ἀκρίβεια and instead selecting only some events. Here too the reader, who is promised ‘accurate’ accounts in the opening section, has no choice but recognise the information manipulation on the part of the narrator.

A similar association of ‘accuracy’ and ‘tediousness’ can be found toward the beginning of Book 7, the book in which is presented the conflict between Apollonius and the emperor Domitian. The narrator opens the book with enumerating the famous historical figures who resisted against tyrants, such as Zeno of Elea and Diogenes of Sinope, with a view to exalting Apollonius, who in like manner battled the Roman Emperor. Worth noting is the narrator’s conviction that the ‘truth’ (τἀληθὲς, 7.1) about Apollonius is attained only in this way. At one place in these accounts, the narrator tells us that even though many stories could be given about courageous resistance, λόγος (34) does not allow him to make his story ‘long’ (μῆκος, 7.2), suggesting that he is compelled to omit the behaviour of the figures that would be included in the accounts if λόγος permitted. This statement is surprising especially because it is for the obtainment of the ‘truth’ about the sage that the narrator adopts such a comparative method, a roundabout, thus ‘long’, way. Clearly, our narrator is well aware of the fact that in order to show the ‘truth’ to the reader, a narrator cannot avoid making his story ‘long’. As ἀκρίβεια is connected to ‘tediousness’, there is a strong link between τἀληθὲς and ‘length’, which our narrator wants to escape, and to do so he adopts and discards pieces of information as he wants.

The passages discussed in this section suggest that the narrator aims to offer only important things about Apollonius, abandoning what seems to him unimportant. This means that he engages in information manipulation work. The task of the narrator, so we are told, is to ‘rewrite’ the Damis document, to tell ‘accurately’, to offer the ‘truth’, but we must conclude that the narrator has no intention to achieve the goal.
Conclusion

We have seen that the narrator’s accounts about the source material contain many contradictions and obscurities. The biggest factor that makes us think his explanation unclear is the ‘information manipulation’ by the people involved, i.e., Damis, Apollonius and the narrator. Damis seems to have wanted to record ‘all’ deeds and sayings of Apollonius, but he had to give it up since he could not always accompany Apollonius. This means that the Damis document is a far from perfect testimony. When Damis was made to leave Apollonius, he seems to have asked Apollonius himself for information after their reunion, but we are never certain what information Apollonius gave to his disciple and what information he omitted. Also, we know that the narrator does not offer all the information contained in the Damis document. Though the reader is supposed to be given the ‘truth’ (ἀλήθεια) about the protagonist, the ways in which these three people transmit their information remain unclear. We cannot say for certain which information should be trusted and which information should not.

Is it then appropriate to label the narrator as being ‘unreliable’ (35)? The answer is certainly no (36). It is wrong to attribute the narrator’s confusing management of the source material to his carelessness. Rather, we should notice the subtlety of Philostratus as a skilled author; the narrator, by Philostratus, is made to appear ‘serious’ (37) in presenting his source material. We readers, however, having signed the fictional contract (38) with Philostratus, are expected to know well that the narrator is controlled in such a way without his knowledge. One must not, therefore, regard the narrator as a teller of the ‘truth’ even though his overall stance to his source material is serious. Remember the narrator’s statement that ‘there will be profit by neither believing nor disbelieving all the things’ (39). We can see in it the playfulness on the part of the sophistic (40) writer.
Philostratus. Our author does not intend to have the narrator offer the ‘true’ story of Apollonius all the readers are expected to believe. Philostratus seems to have been aware that information is distorted in the process of transmission. His foregrounding of the verb μεταγράψαι in the introductory section indicates the awareness. μεταγράψαι is the act which does not allow its agent to attain its principal aim, i.e. to ‘make exactly the same copy as the original’. As long as one engages in the act of ‘narration’, he cannot transmit the original data, the ‘truth’, to the narratee, because he is destined to distort it in spite of himself. Philostratus encourages us to participate in his metafictional game (41); he invites us to play with the instability and inconsistency that no information management can escape. It is in this self-consciousness concerning information transmission that the charm of the Apollonius lies.

Bibliography

Texts, Commentaries and Translations

Jones, Christopher P. ed. (2005) Philostratus The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, I and II (Cambridge (Mass.)).

Secondary Sources


**Notes**

(1) This article is based on the paper given at the 13th Colloquium of the Society for Greco-Roman Mythology held on 1 August 2015. I would like to express my gratitude to all the attendants of the meeting for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Prof. Martin Ciesko, who not only
corrected my English but also continued to encourage me to make my argument stronger throughout the writing process. I also wish to thank the anonymous referee for the valuable advice.


(3) I prefer the title Apollonius to the one most scholars adopt, The Life of Apollonius. The biggest, and to my mind strongest, reason for this is that we can find in the work itself the self-defining phrase ‘the things concerning Apollonius of Tyana’ (Τὰ … ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Τυανέα (8.29)). In addition, in the same author’s Lives of the Sophists the work is referred to as ‘the things concerning Apollonius’ (τοῖς ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον (570)). As Robiano (2001), 637-8 emphasises, the preposition ἐς may mean ‘in honour of’, but what is presented in our work seems to suggest that Philostratus’ main focus is not necessarily on praising the protagonist. Cf. Hägg (2012), 319-320 and Flinterman (2009), 155 n. 1.

(4) Scholars agree that the work is immune from the notorious question of the ‘Philostrati’ and attribution. For this, see de Lannoy (1997), Solmsen (1940), Anderson (1986), 1-22, Billault (2000), 5-31, Flinterman (1995), 5-51 and Bowie (2009).


(6) Knoles (1981), 25-62 paved the splendid way for the subject. Whitmarsh (2004), Gyselinck and Demoen (2009) and Kemezis (2014), 63-78 are the most important recent contributions. My argument owes much to these studies. Schmitz (2009) shares the same concern in discussing the Lives of the Sophists.

(7) Moeragenes, whose four books on Apollonius the narrator disparages (1.3), is said to have called Apollonius μάγος καὶ φιλόσοφος (Origen. Cels. 6.41). For Moeragenes, see Raynor (1984), Bowie (1978), 1673-9 and Flinterman (1995), 69-70. In Cassius Dio, Apollonius is mentioned as καὶ γόης καὶ μάγος ἀκριβῆς (77.18.4). In Lucian’s Alexander the False Prophet, a follower of Apollonius is called γόης (5) (cf. Dzielska (1986), 86-9). A passage from Eusebius’ Reply to
Hierocles testifies to people’s deep-seated conception of Apollonius as a γόης (μόνον γόης πάλαι τε καὶ εἰσέπι νῦν νενομίσθαι, 44.2 Jones). Francis (1995), 90-7 discusses the meanings of these appellations to Apollonius. For the ancients’ representations of Apollonius in general, see Speyer (1974) and Jones (2006).

(8) For this thematically important concept, see Belloni (1980).

(9) The Greek texts of the Apollonius are from the Loeb editions (Jones ed. 2005) and the translations are all mine.


(11) It should also be noted that the narrator begins to talk about Apollonius with the words ‘people do not know [sc. Apollonius] at all (οὔπω … γιγνώσκουσιν)’ (1.2), and closes the prefatory section of the work with the words ‘May lovers of learning learn about the things of which they have no knowledge (μήπω γιγνώσκουσιν)’ (1.3). Also noticeable is the reason why the narrator rejects using the work on Apollonius written by Moeragenes. According to the narrator, Moeragenes ‘is ignorant (ἀγνοήσαντι) about the man [sc. Apollonius] in many respects’ (1.3).

(12) A similar statement is found at 5.39 (‘… my object is not to slander him [sc. Apollonius] but to offer the life of Apollonius to those who have no knowledge of it’ (οὐ … ἐκεῖνον διαμαλεῖν προφθήμην, άλλα παραδοῦναι τὸν Ἀπολλωνίου βίον τοῖς μήπω εἰδόσι)). Cf. 6.35: ‘… the story, which I take huge pains to offer to those who are unfamiliar with the man [sc. Apollonius] (… λόγον, ὃν οὐκ ἀπόνως παραδίδομεν τοῖς ἀπείροις τοῦ ἄνδρός)’.


(14) A more thorough analysis than the present discussion is found at Kuhn (2014), 134-9. See also Marincola (1997), 86 with other studies cited there.


(16) Simply put, the central issue is whether the Apollonius is a history or a fiction. If Damis really existed and left the document, the work is historically true, but, on the other hand, if Damis was invented by Philostratus, the work is a fiction. The early twentieth-century Germany saw the first heated discussion (Reitzenstein (1906), 39-54, Miller (1907) and Mesk (1919)) and especially influential was Meyer (1917), who concluded that Damis was an invention. This idea had been dominant until Grosso (1954) offered the view that the work was historically valid. His study, however, caused Bowie (1978)
to reassert the fictionality of the work. Against his opinion, again, Anderson (1986), 155-73 argued for the possibility of Damis as a historical figure. Meanwhile, Dzielska (1986), 19-50 was in favour of the idea that Damis was fictional, and Flinterman (1995), 67-88 stated that Damis’ document should be taken seriously. Francis (1998), drawing on Morgan (1993), deconstructed the simplistic dichotomy of ‘history’ or ‘fiction’ and pointed out the similarity underlying these two categories. I do not intend to get involved in this debate too deeply. What my paper concerns itself with is rather how Philostratus makes the narrator present Damis’ document, whether it is real or fictional.

(17) Marincola (1997), 63-86.

(18) E.g. 2.29.1, 2.44.1-4, 4.81.1.

(19) 1.1.1: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εἰθύς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἠξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντες τε ἥσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευή τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὅρἀν ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἐκατέρως, τὸ μὲν εἰθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούμενον.

(20) The verb occurs also at 2.14 and this is the only example found in the Apollonius other than the one discussed here. After Apollonius’ presentation of several examples about an animal parent loving its children, Damis is reminded of a verse from Euripides’ Andromache, ‘So for all humans children are their life’ (418-9) and says that Apollonius seems to ‘rewrite’ (μεταγράφειν) it into ‘So for all animals children are their life’. An interesting parallel with Philostratus’ use of the verb is found in the preface of Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe, where the narrator (likewise ‘I’), having seen a beautiful painting in a forest, expresses his own attempt as ‘writing against(?) the painting’ (ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ, Praef. 3) For the expression, see Morgan (2004), 146.

(21) As Schirren (2005), 45 points out, it is strange that our narrator knows Damis’ intention to record everything about Apollonius. Where does his knowledge come from? Is it written in the Damis document itself, or did Juila tell it to him?

(22) This recurrent phrase will be discussed later (p. 75).


(24) For the narrator’s use of the verb, see Knoles (1981), 31-2.
(25) Damis’ first meeting with Apollonius and his assumption of the role as a faithful follower are fully described at 1.19-20.


(27) Interestingly, some accounts are said to come from Apollonius. See e.g. 3.2 (Ἀπολλώνιος ... τὸ ... θηρίον ἑωρακέναι ἐρείπια, ‘Apollonius says he saw the beast’) and 3.15 (Ὅποιοι ... οἱ ἄνδρες καὶ ὅπως οἴκοντες τὸν ὄχθον, οὕτως ὁ ἄνηρ δίαιταν, ‘The man [sc. Apollonius] himself recounts in detail what the men are like and how they lived on the hill’).


(29) 7. 152.3: ‘I have to tell what is told but at least I do not have to believe all the things, and this remark is to be applied to the whole work.’ (ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαι γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὑπερεῖλε, καὶ μοι τούτῳ τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα λόγον.)


(31) Other occurrences are e.g. 1.32, 3.17, 5.7, 6.12, 7.15.

(32) This sounds like the work’s title. See above n. 3.

(33) The word is difficult to translate into one simple English word. It would mean either ‘this book’ or ‘the logic of the story’. This is, however, not relevant to the following discussion.

(34) Cf. above n. 33.

(35) I use the term in the sense offered by Wayne C. Booth: when the narrator deviates from the norm set by the implied author, he is called ‘unreliable’ (Booth (1983), 158-9).

(36) Cf. Gyselinck and Demoen (2009), 125.

(37) The word σπουδάζω (‘serious’) and its cognates σπουδή (‘seriousness’) and σπουδάζω (‘be serious’) appear many times in the work, especially in the description of Apollonius (e.g. 2.23 (σπουδάζοντι), 3.41 (σπουδάς), 6.3 (ἐσπουδάσθη)). I would say their frequent appearance, paradoxically, strengthens the work’s playfulness: the more the work emphasises its protagonist’s seriousness, the more comical he looks to the reader. We can detect Philostratus’ awareness of the opposition of the ‘serious’ and the ‘light’, when Apollonius is described as ‘mixing the serious and the light’ (4.11: ἀναμὶξας παίξας τε καὶ σπουδάσας (see also 6.27)) in his conversation with his followers.

(39) Above pp. 74-5.

(40) The term ‘Second Sophistic’ was coined by Philostratus himself. Relevant passages are found at his *Lives of the Sophists* 481 and 507 (cf. Whitmarsh (2001), 41-5).

(41) Billault (2009), 19 argues that the *Apollonius* has a ‘metanarrative dimension’ as it includes in itself discourses about its composition.