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Examining West African Regional Security through Relationships between States and Armed Groups: A Study of Regime Change Dynamics in Liberia

Tatsuo YAMANE*

Abstract

This paper seeks to address the following question, while referring to the case of regime change dynamics in Liberia 2003: how have armed groups, the states in West Africa and international security forces influenced the state governance of Liberia in terms of the regional security of West Africa? Firstly, this paper explains the brief history of the Liberian civil wars toward regime change of 2003. And then, it presents the dynamic composition of relationships between the states and armed groups in Liberia, which influenced the regional security by mobilizing the international community to initiate regime change.

**Keywords**: West Africa, regional security, ECOWAS, armed groups, regime change

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* Assistant Professor, Graduate School for International Development & Cooperation, Hiroshima University
1. Introduction

How do armed groups as non-state actors influence regional security among states? Failed states create a fertile soil for acts of violence and drive a part of marginalized people to mobilize armed groups for their own profits. These armed groups often collude regionally and globally with each other across the state borders in terms of resources through personnel, substances, and information. In this context, regional security is likely to be deteriorated or threatened by armed groups as non-states actor, as well as states.

In some cases, armed groups which antagonize domestic governments receive resources from the neighboring countries as well. These kinds of armed conflict show a characteristic of “proxy war” among states implicitly, although “internal war” or “civil war” between government and anti-government armed groups is more explicitly seen. On the other hand, rivalry among armed groups over their own profits repeatedly threatens regional security, adding to complex issues of governance between “state” and “non-state” actors. Complex governance is derived from the “failure”¹ of the state which cannot provide the common goods for their stakeholders including armed groups.

Especially, in cases of armed conflicts in West Africa, for example, in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, the above-mentioned phenomena are easily found. Therefore, for understanding the structure of armed conflict in the region, work to investigate the relationships between states and armed groups across borders is indispensable. This work is also related to seeking a structure in terms of the regional security between the states.

In the spectrum of the cases, Liberia influenced regional security remarkably. That is, Charles Taylor, ex-Leader of National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) won the election 1997 after the 1st Liberian civil war (1989-1995) and was installed as the President up to 2003 which was the time for the end of the 2nd Liberian civil war (1999-2003). As the consequence of the 2nd civil war, the President Taylor was criticized by the UN Security Council on suspicion of war crimes in Sierra Leone, because of his support for the armed group in Sierra Leone (Revolutionary United Front: RUF), and economic sanctions were imposed on Liberia. In this process, finally, international military intervention was conducted on the ground that it was focal reason for threatening “international peace and security.” Taylor was forced to give up power.

However, when we see the situation from the other point of view, we could recognize

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that armed groups against Taylor regime also helped the overthrow. Specifically, the two major armed groups in the 2nd Liberian civil war, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), were supported in acquiring resources for their activities by neighboring countries. The actions by neighboring countries could be regarded as a measure for securing the regional security as well as the national security.

In addition, the fact that multinational forces, including the United States (the US) and the regional security organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), intervened in Liberia under the authorization of the UN Security Council, notifies us of its intention instigating the overthrow. These also show that multiple stakeholders including armed groups, the states and the regional organization should be investigated from the aspect of regional security as well.

How is a mechanism of “the overthrow” investigated from the viewpoint of interaction among the stakeholders? Although a mechanism of the overthrow of a political regime is mainly discussed regarding transformation of internal political systems within sovereign states, otherwise regarding transformation of international regime in the given areas, a perspective of “regime change” is also seen in the domain of International Relations (IR) recently. Relative arguments are reflected cases of the military intervention, especially like Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11 terrorist attacks. Such “regime change” sees international actors outside the state forcibly transforming political regimes through war or military intervention. This paper discusses the case of Liberia from the perspective of regime change by military intervention.

I would perceive the case of Liberia from the viewpoint of regime change in the following sequence. The 1997 national elections were followed by a “failed” transition with armed insurgencies, then forced “regime change” as a result of sanctions and forcible intervention by the international community in an attempt to reduce regional insecurity in 2003, followed by the firm “establishment” of democratic governance in 2006 with the new president, along with an indictment of the ex-president Taylor for war crimes. Major

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2) For example, see Andreas Hassencler, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (eds.), *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
4) Kiichi Fujiwara, “How International Conflict have been treated? (Kokusai Hunsou ha dou traurarete kitanoka),” Ryo Oshiba, Kiichi Fujiwara and Tetsuya Yamada (eds.), *Building Peace (Heiryou Setsaku)*, Yuushikaku (Tokyo), 2007, p.27. (in Japanese)
armed groups, the neighboring countries and the international community played a role in advancing regime change.

On this context, this paper seeks to address the following question, while referring to the case of regime change dynamics in Liberia 2003: how have armed groups, the states in West Africa and international intervention influenced the state governance of Liberia in terms of the regional security of West Africa?

In replying to this question, first of all, this paper explains the brief history of the Liberian civil war toward regime change of 2003. Then, this article illustrates a composition of the 2nd Liberian civil war from a viewpoint of relationships between states and armed groups. Finally, it presents the dynamic composition of relationships between the states and armed groups in Liberia, which influenced the regional security by mobilizing the international community to initiate regime change.

2. Brief History of the 1st Liberian Civil War Leading up to the 2nd Liberian Civil War

This chapter surveys characteristics of armed conflict from the 1st Liberian civil war (1989-1995) to 2nd Liberian civil war for investigating the background of regime change in 2003. This preliminary and preparatory work does not ignore the complexity of factors in the Liberian political context: the difficulties about political rivalry among ethnicities and religions, scrambles over natural resources, the achievement of profits among armed groups, political trends among West African countries, etc., but grasps the framework of the conflict in the light of the relations between states and armed groups.5)

Liberia was established in 1847 as a state. This nation-building was initiated by immigrants who were freed slaves from the US guided by the US Colonialism Association. The immigrants who were called “Americo-Liberian” occupied the center of politics in the government of Liberia from its establishment.6)

However, reaching the year of 1980, an incident occurred that marked the end of the continuous history of Americo-Liberian political regimes. Samuel Doe (Master Sergeant), who was from the Krahn ethnic group, staged a military coup against William R. Tolbert’s regime, and won the regime. However, Doe’s regime experienced problems because it excluded the America-Liberians who had access to resources through the historical ties

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6) In Liberia, 17 ethnic groups, including Americo-Liberian, present generally.
with the US. On 24 December of 1989, after some 10 years in power, an armed group, NPFL which Charles Taylor united, launched to attack to the regime.

In February 1990, Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) was newly organized by Prince Yedo Johnson (ethnic group: Gio) who had been a key member of the NPFL and then left there because of discord with Taylor. President Doe was killed by factions belonging to the INPFL in August 1990. Doe’s death meant the dawn of the age of civil war and armed groups were organized one after another by the absence of state governance.

For its response, ECOWAS, which is the main regional organization in West Africa, decided to send peacekeeping forces, ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Yet, ECOMOG did not take the necessary procedures under the ECOWAS Charter, but sent forces based on the consent of Standing Mediation Committee (SMC),\(^7\) committee in ECOWAS which was established by ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on 30 May 1990, just for taking the role of mediation on concern over the incident of disputes and conflicts among the members.\(^8\) This was a result of Doe requesting the SMC,\(^9\) which was led by Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida, with the close cooperation with Doe.\(^10\) And furthermore, ECOMOG allied with some armed groups against the NPFL with no neutrality.

The 1st Liberian civil war, as we can find the nature of conflict in the other cases, was a struggle for natural resources buried in the territory. One reason why the major armed groups in Liberia fought was directly connected with scrambling for resources like diamond. The armed groups were absorbed in enhancing their power by selling the natural resources. As of 1995, it is reported that at least the following exports were made by the major armed groups for the markets of Asia, Europe and America, i.e., approximately, diamond and gold of 3-5 hundred million US Dollars, timber of 53 million US Dollars and rubber of 27 million US dollars.\(^11\) It is said that Taylor received financial resources from a large quantity of diamonds during the Liberian civil war in return for military support against Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which acted as an armed group in Sierra Leo-

\(^7\) Mourtada Deme, *Law, Morality and International Armed Intervention: The United Nations and ECOWAS in Liberia*, Routledge, 2005, p.12. SMC was organized by the Charman of ECOWAS Authority and four members (reviewed every three years), Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Togo as of 1990.


\(^9\) Ibid., pp.60-61.


ne through the 1990s.12

Because of these complexities during the 1st Liberian civil war, peace agreements adopted among the parties to the conflict frequently broke down. In September 1990, an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was established with Doe’s death, through it had not worked well because of the insecurity during the early 1990s. In that period, as the NPFL gradually positioned itself centrally in terms of military strength during the 1st Liberian civil war, the number of armed groups also had been reduced.

On the other hand, a UN peacekeeping operation, United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (from September 1993 to September 1997), operated beside ECOMOG with the recognition by the UN Security Council. The engagement including these operations mobilized the peace process, and then finally parties to the conflict concluded an agreement (the Abuja II Agreement) on 19 August 1996. With this event, the National Liberia Transitional Government (NLTG) was launched to act practically by the leaders of armed groups who signed the agreement.

According to the mandate of the agreement, after three months “disarmament and demobilization,” the 1st Liberian civil war finished with elections which were held in July 1997, and Charles Taylor, who changed the NPFL to the National Patriotic Party (NPP) as a political party, won as the Presidency with 75% of votes.

3. States and Armed Groups in the 2nd Liberian Civil War

Taylor’s regime was not necessarily stable in spite of a landslide victory through the elections. President Taylor did not promote national reconciliation but intensified human rights abuse and political oppression. With no unified work in the Congress, Taylor informally mobilized his “Taylor’s Force” which was a powerful force for supporting his political ambition, by advancing the “national army” ostensibly.13

Early in 1998, under the dual existence of “Taylor’s Force” and the “national army,” the Taylor regime received attacks from its inside. Roosevelt Johnson (ethnic group: Krahn) who was Minister of Local Development in Liberia under the Taylor regime but independent from any political party, revolted against the regime. However, the revolt was suppressed and Johnson died. He was the leader of a major armed group in the 1st Liberian civil war, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for democracy Johnson Fac-

tion (ULIMO-J). The revolt was planned by re-mobilizing the ex-combatants who were apparently demobilized once before the election in 1997.

Once they had been destroyed from the inner circle, armed groups were newly constructed against the regime form the outside. Civil militia supported by Guinea, invaded from the border area between Liberia and Guinea against Taylor’s regime, and LURD was established, and joined by many militias. It is not irrelevant in terms of the internal politics of Liberia that LURD occurred after the termination of the 1st Liberian Civil War. This is related to that United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy Kromah Faction (ULIMO-K) which was the faction of radical Muslims, and a major armed group next to NPFL during the 1st Liberian civil war, but it had been marginalized in Liberian politics under Taylor’s regime in the background of the relation of rivalry between ULIMO-K and NPFL.

Alhaji Kromah who had been the leader of ULIMO-K, ran against Taylor as the political leader of the All Liberian Party (ALCOP) in the elections of 1997. As ALCOP antagonized Taylor from its beginning, Taylor marginalized them. Under this situation, LURD was organized mainly by ethnic groups like Mandingo and Krahn. A number of militias joining LURD was remaining ULIMO-K factions.

After the elections in 1997, as international peacekeeping operations withdrew in succession (UNOMIL in 1997 and ECOMOG in 1999), society in Liberia began to fall into disorder and destruction in the 2nd Liberian Civil War. In April of 2003, MODEL was newly split from LURD, with support from Cote d’Ivoire. And, LURD, MODEL and “Taylor’s force” mutually fought, so that the war became more intractable.

So far, this article has explained the composition of the 1st and 2nd Liberian civil wars with attention to the relationships between states and armed groups. From the brief explanation of the relationships, at least, we can view the conflicts from the perspectives of regional and national aspects. Regionally, we can find not only international relationships between Liberia and the regional states like the ECOMOG deployment, but also the relationships between armed groups and outside states through the cooperation between them. Nationally, it is realized through the relationship between Liberia and anti-government armed groups that armed groups attacked the government which was very weak and fought each other in the absence of firm governance. On the basis of this preliminary work, the next chapter investigates why Taylor’s regime was forcibly changed.

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14] Johnson-Sirleaf (incumbent President of Liberia) also ran in the election 1997 as the leader of Unity Party (UP), so that UP was to be the 1st opposition party.
4. Taylor’s Regime Regarded as Fertile Soil for Conflict

As of 2001, the personal funds of Taylor amounted to approximately 250 million US dollars, which corresponded to 25 times of the then national budget of Liberia. As this paper mentioned above, the “conflict diamond” factor which Taylor acquired from Sierra Leone enabled the Taylor’s funding mechanism to continue the war through the 1990s. Taylor was involved in a number of firms and he built a political network to expand his own profits through the firms which included illicit trade and smuggling.

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution requesting Taylor to cease his support to armed groups in West Africa including the RUF in Sierra Leone, for the purpose of blocking the expansion of Taylor’s force. The resolution also decided to prohibit the export of arms and diamond from Liberia, the movement of high-ranking personnel and their spouses from Liberia, the establishment of a Sanctions Committee for Liberia and so on.

However, in spite of much effort to the observation by the Sanctions Committee for Liberia, Taylor’s illicit trade against the resolution was continued. According to research by William Reno, Taylor managed a telephone company and used this secret cell phone line to enable contact with partners in terms of illegal trade even during the sanctions by the UN. With mediation by Nigeria and South Africa, the Accra Peace Conference was held on 17 June 2003. In that conference, the Liberian government, LURD and MODEL agreed on a ceasefire. Right after the agreement, LURD and MODEL recognized that Taylor would resign around 17 July 2003 (expiration date of the agreement), through he did not formally at that time.

Although the peace negotiations after the agreement had made little progress, the threat of military intervention by the UN Security Council served to induce Taylor to resign. On 30 June 2003, the US delegation to the United Nations expressed the possibility of intervention on the condition of a political agreement among the parties, the resignation of Taylor by himself, and international support for promoting above two. Respond-

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16) “Conflict diamond” was understood by UN to be “rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military achievements, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate government” in fuelling conflict. UN Doc. A/RES/55/56.
18) UN Doc. S/RES/1343.
ing to this, Taylor mentioned his will to resign through media with following remark; “I don’t understand why the United States Government insist that I be absent before its soldier arrived.”

Shortly afterward, on the basis of a resolution when the African Union (AU) Summit was held during 9-10 July 2003, the AU formally requested ECOWAS to send regional peacekeepers, and then ECOWAS decided to form the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in response to the request. Meanwhile, US President Bush visited five African countries (Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda) from 7-12 July 2003, with the US presidential election near at hand. Grasping the opportunity that Bush administration saw as one of its strategies for winning the coming election through an “Africa Visit” as well, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General and leaders of African states including Nigeria strongly requested Bush to send US troops to stabilize the situation in Liberia. Returning to the US, Bush suggested a high possibility of sending US troop to Liberia with the condition of Taylor’s resignation and detachment from ECOMIL, and then conducted.

On 1 August 2003, the US submitted a draft resolution on sending multinational forces including ECOMIL as the central part, followed by stabilization forces (UNPKO) to the UN Security Council, and the UN Security Council approved this as resolution 1497. In this resolution, the importance of the fulfillment of Taylor’s pledge to go into exile was stressed. This sentence demonstrated the strong will of international community to remove him from power in Liberia.

According to the resolution, on 4 August 2003, the US Navy deployed forces off the coast of Monrovia (the capital of Liberia) totaling 2,300 military personnel. The US army logistically supported ECOMIL’s deployment in that month. Substantial occupation by LURD and MODEL in Monrovia as well as the employment of the force, made Taylor resign on 11 August 2003. Both internally and externally, Taylor was regarded as a source of conflict, and the threats of decisive force by the US led to his release of power.

In this chapter, we have seen the international aspects of regime change. However, we should not ignore the influence on regime change in terms of internal and regional aspects as mentioned in previous chapter. The following chapter investigates the structure of these complex factors on regime change and sets up a conceptual diagram of these dy-

23) UN Doc. S/RES/1497.
24) Ibid., para.12.
5. “Regime Change” Dynamics in Liberia?

Why did Liberia in 2003 experience regime change with the exile of the incumbent President? Why did the peace agreement among parties to the conflict including the government request the exile of President Taylor as a condition for international intervention? Otherwise, would the international community itself have sought to use stronger measures for establishing new democratic governance in Liberia? It is not easy to understand the mechanism of regime change considering these complex dynamics.

Therefore, this chapter investigates a mechanism of regime change dynamics which is led by states and armed groups in West African region through the relationships between states and armed groups, as of the termination of 2nd Liberian civil war, by using “figure 1” below.

Fig.1 Dual Aspects of Regional Security and Dynamics of Regime Change

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25) By author
(1) Overview

This figure shows the overview of the dual aspects on regional security and the dynamics of regime change in the Liberian case. The outline of this framework shows international security forces like UNPKO and multinational forces, which are authorized by the UN Security Council. The smaller two boxes in the figure show the dual aspects on regional security in West Africa in the Liberian case through the structure of the relationships among Liberia, the neighboring countries as the member states (ECOWAS), and armed groups. Each aspect of the composition of the relationship among them shows a mutual influence and/or indication of threat against the regional security. Defining threats against the regional security would influence actions by the UN Security Council in terms of maintaining international peace and security as well. Each letter of the alphabet (a, b, c and d) shows the main characteristic of the relationship among stakeholders in the figure with following meaning: a. Subject of threat/ b. Request for intervention/ c. Intervention as requested/ d. Cooperation.

(2) Aspect 1 on Regional Security

"Aspect 1" simply shows that "armed groups" are regarded as the subject of threat by the other stakeholders in the figure. The state (Liberia) and the neighboring countries (some of ECOWAS members) recognized the threat of armed groups in Liberia, so they independently or collectively requested regional security forces (ECOMOG/ECOMIL) to intervene militarily to resolve the insecurity.

Yet, this is a political model for oppressing anti-government armed groups through excising regional security system. After the end of Cold War, as most internal conflicts were terminated by mean of peace agreement, especially in cases in Africa, it is also applicable in the case of Liberia. Therefore, military intervention by ECOMOG/ECOMIL was practiced according to the peace agreements, and did not suppress the armed groups (LURD and MODEL) but just stabilized the situation where there was insecurity. In that context, it is conceivable that "the neighboring countries" did not exactly regard the armed groups as a direct and unique threat.

(3) Aspect 2 on Regional Security

"Aspect 2" designates precondition of regime change that all stakeholders other than state as the party (Liberia) intend to remove the government in the figure. Specifically, the neighboring countries (especially, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire) sought the exile of Tay-
lor’s regime by cooperating and supporting the armed groups (LURD and MODEL). The states in African countries, through the resolution of the AU, requested the military intervention of ECOWAS to remove Taylor. Interestingly, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire also pushed for intervention by ECOMIL as members of ECOWAS. The regional security force (ECOMIL) was provided by Nigerian-led troops for stabilizing the situation in Liberia under the resolution of the UN Security Council and the peace agreement (CPA) which was united “after the decision of its military intervention.”

(4) Regime Change Dynamics by International Security Forces

Finally, the definite promise of international security forces (multinational forces led by ECOMIL with the logistical support of the US navy) and UNPKO (UNMIL) determined regime change. The UN Security Council recognized the “Taylor regime” as a threat against international peace and security and applied sanction as of 2001, and then intervened militarily which gave the arbitrary pressure to Taylor from July to August 2003. The decisive “regime change” by international pressure was clearly linked with the regional and national aspects.

The point is that the system of the regional security and international security realized the framework of “Aspect 2 on regional security” in this case. Therefore, regime change targeting Taylor’s regime was realized under the legitimacy by the UN Security Council for the main reason that Taylor should be prosecuted for war crimes in the case of “Sierra Leone.”

6. Conclusion: New Challenges for Peacebuilding after Regime Change

This paper sought to address the following question, while referring to the case of regime change dynamics in Liberia 2003: how did armed groups, the states in West Africa and international intervention influence the state governance of Liberia in terms of the regional security of West Africa?

Replying this question, the article took the following steps. First of all, this paper explained the brief history of the Liberian civil war toward regime change in 2003. Then, this article illustrated a composition of the 2nd Liberian civil war from the viewpoint of the relationship between states and armed groups. Finally, it presented the dynamic composition of a relationship between the state and armed groups in Liberia, which influenced regional security by mobilizing international community to initiate regime change.
On the basis of this process, especially through an analysis in figure 1, this suggested that the dynamics of regime change in Liberia was made up not only by international and regional security forces under the authorization of the UN Security Council but also by the cooperation among the neighboring countries and armed groups against Taylor’s regime with rivalry in the background.

Through this analysis, I also realized the necessity of further investigation on regime change. Though this article focused on the situation of Liberian civil war from the viewpoint of the objective of regime change by using military elements, we also see what kind of “change” would be achieved before and after. Certainly, the removal of Taylor’s regime led to his prosecution in the Sierra Leone case. In that sense, it may be that the protracted nature of the Liberian civil war was terminated by regime change.

However we should also recognize again that insufficient peacebuilding right after the 1st Liberian civil war contributed to the instabilities of the weak state under Taylor’s regime.\(^\text{26}\) Now, the most important thing in Liberia is to promote peacebuilding for concrete nation-building, preventing a relapse into conflict again. On the other hand, when we investigate cases like Afghanistan or Iraq in which “multinational forces” or “(forces of) coalition of the willing” have been conducted with the objective of regime change, stability can be very elusive, with new dynamics of conflict evolving after regime change. In the spectrum of the Liberia case, peacebuilders should pay attention to that kind of dilemma with the transition of governance itself through work on democratic change after regime change.

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\(^{26}\) Regarding peacebuilding practice and analytical research, see Yamane, *op.cit.*