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# External Policy of the European Economic Community during the Association Negotiations with Turkey(1959–63)

—Reconsidering the origin of EU-Turkey relations—

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## Refereed Article

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### Abstract

This article mainly analyzes primary documents of the French Foreign Ministry and the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission to examine the process through which Turkey became a second associate country of the EEC in 1963. In considering the origins of the problem of Turkish accession to the EU, the association between Turkey and the EEC has interested not a few scholars; however, its establishing process has not been sufficiently examined. This study focuses on, 1) the differentiation of Turkey from Greece, which was a first associate member of the EEC, and, 2) the linkages between the process and the EEC's parallel negotiations concerning accessions or associations with Western European countries and sub-Saharan African countries. In conclusion, the article clarifies Turkey's position in the EEC's external relations at the time.

**Keywords:** European Union, Turkey, European Economic Community, EU-Turkey relations

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## 1. Introduction

It must not be forgotten that, as far as the Europeanness of Turkey is concerned, the answer has been “Yes” since 1949! [...] And it was in 1963, when there was talk of an Association Agreement between Turkey and the Community, 1963, that it was implied that this Association Agreement was the precursor to possible accession to the Community. [...] [I]f accession to the Community was being discussed as early as 1963, it is a little difficult to back-pedal now, saying: “We’ve suddenly realised that you are not European.” “Oh really? Very well. But, in that case, what were you doing in 1949?”<sup>1</sup>

—Catherine Lalumière

It needs to be clear whether or not the EU will accept Turkey. [...] Turkey has been stalled since 1963. No EU member state was treated in such a way.<sup>2</sup>

—Recep Erdoğan

On September 12, 1963, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Turkish government signed an association agreement, known as the Ankara Agreement, which included a provision for Turkey’s future accession to the Community.<sup>3</sup> This agreement has been one of the primary grounds on which Turkey’s accession has been promoted. Previous studies dealing with the issue of Turkey’s accession have therefore invariably referred to the Ankara Agreement and asked why Turkey’s accession has not been realized despite its conclusion.<sup>4</sup> However, assuming that Turkey was eligible for membership and regarded as a part of Europe in 1963, such studies have been less interested in exploring why and how the association agreement was established.<sup>5</sup> Hence, the problem is that the assumption that the EEC accepted Turkey’s membership when it signed the association agreement has been supported without much consideration about the making process of the agreement. Analyzing the complexity of the process of establishing the Ankara Agreement, this article will reveal that the EEC did not necessarily recognize Turkey as a firm candidate for membership in establishing the association. This study could eventually lead to a reconsideration of the origin of today’s EU-Turkey relations.

Studies of Turkey’s association with the EEC have examined the reasons why Turkey pursued it and emphasized that Turkey’s main concern was its Westernization through the association.<sup>6</sup> However, as they have considered the

<sup>1</sup> Interview with Catherine Lalumière: Turkey and the European Union (Paris, 17 May 2006), [https://www.cvce.eu/obj/interview\\_with\\_catherine\\_lalumiere\\_turkey\\_and\\_the\\_european\\_union\\_paris\\_17\\_may\\_2006-en-1c1f7e35-4412-4b47-bdf2-af43ba0059c5.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/interview_with_catherine_lalumiere_turkey_and_the_european_union_paris_17_may_2006-en-1c1f7e35-4412-4b47-bdf2-af43ba0059c5.html) (accessed March 23, 2020).

<sup>2</sup> “Erdoğan urges EU to be ‘sincere’ about Turkish accession”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, October 9, 2018, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-eu-to-be-sincere-about-turkish-accession-137674> (accessed March 23, 2020).

<sup>3</sup> Article 28, “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.” The full text of the agreement, see, [https://www.cvce.eu/obj/agreement\\_establishing\\_an\\_association\\_between\\_the\\_eec\\_and\\_turkey\\_ankara\\_12\\_september\\_1963-en-4a2e37da-9c31-4909-a45d-de6a751091f7.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/agreement_establishing_an_association_between_the_eec_and_turkey_ankara_12_september_1963-en-4a2e37da-9c31-4909-a45d-de6a751091f7.html) (accessed March 23, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> For example, Tozun S. Bahcheli, “Turkey and the EC: The Strains of Association”, *Revue d’intégration européenne*, 3:2 (1980), 221–237; Selim Ilkin, “A History of Turkey’s Association with the European Community”, in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton, eds., *Turkey and the European Community*, (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1990), 35–49; Christopher Brewin, “Association status and the path to membership”, in Armand Clesse and Seyfi Tashan, eds., *Turkey and the European Union: 2004 and beyond* (Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2004), 149–174.

<sup>5</sup> As a typical example, see Mletem Müftüler-Bac, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34:4 (1998), 242.

<sup>6</sup> Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Mehmet Dösemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Yonca Özer, “Association relationship with full membership in perspective: The ongoing significance of the Ankara Agreement”, in Çigdem Nas and Yonca Özer, eds., *Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 12–32; Id., “Relations between Turkey and the European Economic Community: An Association with a Full Membership

EEC had few difficulties in accepting its association with Turkey, there have been few studies that have focused on the attitudes of the EEC's side. Another reason may be that Greece established its association with the EEC before Turkey did. Since both Greece and Turkey were not only co-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe, but also regarded as less developed countries in these organizations, it has been assumed that, after establishing its association with Greece, the EEC naturally established a similar linkage with Turkey.<sup>7</sup>

However, several scholars have highlighted the differences between the Greek and Turkish associations and the challenges of the latter. Focusing on the EEC's attitudes, they have explained that the association with Greece did not automatically serve as a precedent for Turkey's status and it was rather difficult for the EEC to accept the association with Turkey.<sup>8</sup> For example, Sena Ceylanoglu has stressed the different economic conditions of the two countries: whereas Greece experienced rapid economic growth during the 1950s, as its annual growth rate reached 7% and its national income increased by 63.2%, the Turkish economy was aggravated by severe inflation, for which annual rate rose to 15% until 1959. Thus, Turkey ended up relying on the stabilization program of the OEEC and obtained a loan of 225 million dollars.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, Eugen Krieger has pointed out that Charles de Gaulle's security concerns made the association with Turkey more difficult than that with Greece because the aim of the former's association was considered to be incorporated in NATO's security policy, and more specifically in the United States' strategy in the Mediterranean region.<sup>10</sup>

Such studies have certainly been very valuable in terms of explaining the uniqueness of Turkey's association with the EEC; however, by highlighting the differences between Greece and Turkey, they tended to overemphasize the peculiarity of the latter's position. Although there were several different characteristics between the Greece's association and the Turkey's association with the EEC, we should not ignore certain similarities between them, namely in terms of targeting accession. The problem is that scholars have largely ignored that Turkey's association was profoundly influenced by the parallel negotiations in which the Community was engaged, namely negotiations involving the accession of or association with Western European and sub-Saharan African countries. This article will explain how such questions interacted with the problem of the association between Turkey and the EEC. Specifically, it is argued that the Turkey's association was distinct from the Greece's association owing not only to the differences of their economic and political situations but also to changes in the EEC's external conditions as a whole. As such, this article will clarify that the complicated relations between Turkey and the EU were grounded in the historical situation of the EEC during the 1950s–1960s.

Objective”, in Sasha Toperich and Aylin Ünver Noi, eds., *Turkey and Transatlantic Relations*, (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2017), 57–68.

<sup>7</sup> Representatively, Elena Calandri, who has studied the establishment of the association between Greece and the EEC ( « La CEE et les relations extérieures 1958–1960 », in Antonio Varzori, ed., *Inside the European Community: Actors and Politics in European Integration 1957–1972* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 399–431), has analyzed not the process of the establishment but the implementation of Turkey's association. Elena Calandri, “A Special Relationship under Strain: Turkey and the EEC, 1963–1976”, *Journal of European Integration History*, 15:1 (2009), 57–75.

<sup>8</sup> Matthias M. Mayer, “Germany's Preferences on the Ankara Agreement: Ministerial Actors between Cold War Security Concerns, Turkish European Ambitions and the *Wirtschaftswunder*”, Paper to be given at Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics of the ECPR, 25 to 27 September 2008, University of Latvia, Riga, <http://citeserex.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.11.1598.4821&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (accessed June 3, 2020); Francesca Capoluongo, “La Turquie fait partie de l'Europe” The Ankara Agreement: the path towards, the reasons behind”, Conference paper at Going Global. The History of EC/EU External Relations. A Jean Monnet Module on the History of European Integration, University of Trento, 2015,

[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Francesca\\_Capoluongo/publication/284027922\\_La\\_Turquie\\_fait\\_partie\\_de\\_l'Europe\\_The\\_Ankara\\_Agreement\\_the\\_path\\_towards\\_the\\_reasons\\_behind/links/564b125608ae295f64512d95/La-Turquie-fait-partie-de-lEurope-The-Ankara-Agreement-the-path-towards-the-reasons-behind.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Francesca_Capoluongo/publication/284027922_La_Turquie_fait_partie_de_l'Europe_The_Ankara_Agreement_the_path_towards_the_reasons_behind/links/564b125608ae295f64512d95/La-Turquie-fait-partie-de-lEurope-The-Ankara-Agreement-the-path-towards-the-reasons-behind.pdf) (accessed June 3, 2020).

<sup>9</sup> Sena Ceylanoglu, *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei; Die Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich(1959–1963)* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 72–87.

<sup>10</sup> Eugen Krieger, *Die Europakandidatur der Türkei; Der Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft während der Assoziierungsverhandlungen mit der Türkei 1959–1963* (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2006), 88–108.

In order to understand how the EEC's policy towards Turkey was established, it is indispensable to analyze not only the relations between the member states but also their interplay with the EEC's institutions. From this perspective, documents from the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France, the Archives Nationales Française, and the Historical Archives of the EEC Commission are consulted in this article. It is also grounded on the published official documents, the *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik des Bundesrepublik* and the *Documents Diplomatiques Français*. Different from the previous studies, this article analyzes not only the primary documents concerning the relations between Turkey and the EEC but also those concerning the Community's external relations as a whole. As a result, it will become apparent for the first time that the EEC's attitudes towards Turkey were not solely determined by their bilateral relations but rather elaborated in a broader context.

## 2. Pursuit of Association by Greece and Turkey and Conclusion of the Association with Greece (1959–1961)

### 2.1: Applications for association by Greece and Turkey in 1959

In June of 1959, the Greek government applied to the EEC Commission and the member states for an association according to the article 238 of the Treaty of Rome,<sup>11</sup> and the Turkish government did the same in July of the same year. Since November 1958, when the French government refused the establishment of the Free Trade Area (FTA), which was to be constituted by the OEEC's 17 members, the two countries had been concerned both with their relations with the EEC member states and their exclusion from the movement to create the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).<sup>12</sup> For these reasons, when Greece was forced to approach the EEC independently, Turkey decided to follow Greece.<sup>13</sup> In addition to the similar situations of the two countries, Turkey, which had a long-standing rivalry with Greece, could not allow Greece to approach the EEC on its own. Therefore, from the beginning to the end of the negotiations, Turkey's main interest was to obtain an equal status with Greece.<sup>14</sup>

The EEC member states and the Commission did not agree on a response to Greece's and Turkey's applications for association because there were two conflicting policy directions in the Community, namely "the European approach," which aimed at resuming FTA negotiations with European non-member states, particularly with the seven members of the later-formed EFTA, and "the global approach," which focused on the interests of non-European countries.<sup>15</sup> Pursuing the "European approach," the Benelux countries were opposed to establishing individual association with Greece and Turkey because they considered that doing so would hinder the construction of the European-wide FTA.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, the EEC Commission, which pursued the "global approach," emphasized the need to begin negotiations with Greece and Turkey as soon as possible. The Commission regarded the two countries belonging not only to

<sup>11</sup> "The Community may conclude with a third country, a union of States or an international organization agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures." The full text of the treaty of Rome, see, [https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty\\_establishing\\_the\\_european\\_economic\\_community\\_rome\\_25\\_march\\_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html) (accessed March 23, 2020).

<sup>12</sup> Roland Maurhofer, "Revisiting the Creation of EFTA: the British and the Swiss Case", *Journal of European Integration History*, 7:2 (2001), 71.

<sup>13</sup> Lorenz Plassmann, *Comme dans une nuit de Pâques?: Les relations franco-grecques, 1944-1981* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012), 138–140; Heinz Kramer und Maurus Reinkowski, *Die Türkei und Europa : Eine wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), 155–156.

<sup>14</sup> Arikān, *op.cit.*, 53; Özer, *op.cit.*, 57–59.

<sup>15</sup> For detail, see Kazuhiro Nose, "The "Acceleration" Decision in the EEC and the Development of European Integration: With Particular Reference to the French Position in the Negotiations (1959–1960)," *The Shirin of the Journal of History*, 96:5 (2013), 78–81 [in Japanese].

<sup>16</sup> Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, La Courneuve (hereafter, AMAE), DE-CE, no.692, télégramme de Carbonnel, 19 juin 1959.

Western Europe but also to the “Mediterranean-type developing countries,” which had economic characteristics similar to Tunisia.<sup>17</sup> Thus, from the viewpoint of assistance to developing countries, it argued that “it is impossible to take a negative or hesitant attitude” towards Greece and Turkey.<sup>18</sup> Owing to this disagreement, the Council of Ministers of the EEC decided to only open exploratory talks between the EEC Commission and the two countries.<sup>19</sup>

However, when the exploratory talks opened in September and October, the EEC Commission had to recognize its difficulties in accepting Greece’s and Turkey’s demands. On the one hand, both countries had set their accession to the Community as their ultimate goal and proposed to establish a customs union with the EEC member states within the framework of the association in order to realize that aim as soon as possible. On the other hand, considering the differences of the economic conditions, they stressed the need for distinctions to be made between their obligations and those of EEC members in establishing the customs union, such that the six member states would be obliged to remove their trade restrictions against Greece and Turkey at the same pace as they did between themselves (i.e., 12 years), whereas Greece requested the right to abolish its own restrictions in 24 years, and Turkey proposed to set a “preparatory period” of 10 or 12 years before it began removing its trade barriers. Thus, even while demanding to open the common market for their exportation, Greece and Turkey intended to maintain their own protective measures against the six countries. Both countries also requested to participate in discussions in the Council of Ministers and the Commission when the Community examined measures that could influence their economy, such as agricultural policy or associations with third parties. Furthermore, they each required financial assistance from the EEC; Greece requested 300 million dollars over a period of five years, and Turkey sought aid in the form of an annual disbursement of 100 million dollars.<sup>20</sup>

The Commission determined that “even if concluded with a developing country, these proposals cannot constitute a rational basis for an association agreement” because they would create a clear imbalance between the commitments of Greece and Turkey and those of the Community. This imbalance was not negligible, as the EEC’s association with the two countries would set a precedent that could be extended to every candidate for association.<sup>21</sup> For example, Robert Lemaignen, the Commissioner for the overseas territories, pointed out that acceding to the demands of Greece and Turkey could trigger similar demands in the African territories.<sup>22</sup> From this perspective, in order to reduce the Community’s burden and maintain its freedom of action, the Commission saw the need not only to refuse Greece’s and Turkey’s involvement in the decision-making process but also to strengthen their obligations in connection with the establishment of the customs union.<sup>23</sup> Although the Commission stressed the importance of relations with developing countries, it did not dare to permit the establishment of an association that would endanger the future of the Community.

In the second round of talks in November and December 1959, the Commission asked the Greeks and Turkish to remove their trade restrictions sooner than they had expected and offered to admit other requests such as financial assistance in return for their liberalization efforts.<sup>24</sup> The differences between Greece and Turkey became

<sup>17</sup> European Commission Historical Archives, Bruxelles (hereafter, ECHA), BAC 1/1971, no.27, note sur l’association de la Grèce à la Communauté, 4 septembre 1959.

<sup>18</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.27, Assozierung von Entwicklungsländern mit der Gemeinschaft, 4 September 1959.

<sup>19</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.27, procès-verbal du débat intervenu lors de la réunion du Comité des représentants permanents du 16 juillet 1959, 21 juillet 1959; ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.285, note du Conseil, 9 septembre 1959.

<sup>20</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.27 compte-rendu des conversations exploratoires entre les délégations de la Grèce et de la Commission (10–12 septembre 1959), 21 septembre 1959; ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.285, compte-rendu des conversations exploratoires entre les délégations de la Turquie et de la Commission (28–30 septembre 1959), 3 octobre 1959.

<sup>21</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28, note de la Direction de l’Association avec les Pays Tiers, 31 octobre 1959.

<sup>22</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28 observations présentées par Lemaignen, 13 novembre 1959.

<sup>23</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28, note de la Direction de l’Association avec les Pays Tiers, 31 octobre 1959.

<sup>24</sup> ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28, compte-rendu de la deuxième phase des conversations exploratoires entre les délégations de la Grèce

recognizable through their distinct responses to these requests; whereas Greece accepted the principle of reducing its trade barriers at the same pace as the EEC members, Turkey continued to seek the introduction of the preparatory period and unilateral liberalization by the Six.<sup>25</sup>

In comparing these attitudes, the Commission concluded that the Greeks had adopted a more positive stance towards its requests than that of the Turkish.<sup>26</sup> At the Council of Ministers, Jean Rey, then Commissioner for external relations, reported the progress of the exploratory talks and explained that Greece's demands had become apparent and there was no need to continue the exploratory talks. However, Rey proposed that "concerning Turkey, although the need for a certain parallelism between the two series of exploratory talks is desired by the Council and always present in the spirit of the Commission, it has become necessary to proceed separately with them in practice."<sup>27</sup> Based on Rey's assessment, the member states decided to open official negotiations with Greece; however, they did not make any decision in relation to Turkey. Thus, Greece began to be privileged than Turkey owing to its commitments to trade liberalization, i.e., the presence or absence of a preparatory period. This differentiation would facilitate the establishment of Greece's association while making it more difficult to reach an agreement with Turkey.

## 2.2: Conclusion of the association agreement with Greece and tough negotiations with Turkey

The EEC's decision to separate its negotiations with Greece and Turkey raised a new problem. Although the Commission had assumed that the association with Greece and Turkey would set a precedent for other associations, it could no longer depend on this assumption by allowing for the gap between the statuses of the two countries. Instead, the Commission introduced a new concept of association with Greece that "the objective is to promote the integration of the Greek economy to the Community [...] thus not within mere general assistance for developing countries."<sup>28</sup> That is, the Commission began to regard the association with Greece as an exceptional case that differed from those with other countries, including Turkey.

This idea was not unanimously agreed by the member states; however, they were persuaded to establish the association with Greece in an exceptional manner through several incidents in May 1960. First, the "acceleration" of the construction of the common market determined by the EEC reduced the risks of establishing individual association with Greece; by introducing the common external tariff earlier than planned, this decision sought to equalize the treatment of all non-member states and thus set back efforts to establish preferential relations between EEC and EFTA members.<sup>29</sup> Under these conditions, it became difficult for the Benelux countries to resist bilateral negotiations with Greece based on the idea of "the European approach."

Second, the occurrence of a military coup d'état in Turkey at the end of the month revealed that country's unstable political conditions. Before the coup, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu had protested against the delay in the country's negotiations compared with the evolution of Greece's negotiations.<sup>30</sup> However, Zorlu was arrested along with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and set to be executed by military officers. Amidst this internal disorder, the talks between the EEC and Turkey could not help suspending until the restoration of civilian control. From the

et la Commission, 20 novembre 1959.

<sup>25</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.696, télex de Représentation Permanente de la France à Bruxelles, 9 décembre 1959.

<sup>26</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.286, note sur l'ouverture de négociations avec la Turquie pour la conclusion d'un accord d'association, 4 mars 1960.

<sup>27</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.692, procès-verbal de la session restreinte du Conseil de la CEE tenue à Strasbourg les 23 et 24 novembre 1959, 2 décembre 1959.

<sup>28</sup> ECHA, BAC1/1971, no.29, commentaires sur le chapitre V (problèmes financiers) du schéma d'un accord d'association, 26 janvier 1960.

<sup>29</sup> For detail, see Nose, *op.cit.*, 70–104.

<sup>30</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.286, note à l'attention de Monsieur le Président, 17 mars 1960.

viewpoint of the association's formative process, the military coup was an event that justified the differentiation of Turkey from Greece. The EEC member states and the Commission had to recognize that, although the situations of the two countries had appeared to be similar, they were in effect highly distinct and thus required different solutions.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, in the same month, tensions between the East and West intensified in the aftermath of the U-2 incident and the failure of the Four Power Paris summit. Prior to these events, the Greek government had repeatedly alerted the Western countries to the increasing pressure being exerted upon the region from the Soviet Union.<sup>32</sup> Situated at the forefront of the Cold War, Greece had been heretofore supported by the United States; however, the U.S. had little sympathy for Greece's sense of urgency.<sup>33</sup> In contrast, West Germany considered the maintenance of the government led by Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, which held a strong anti-communist policy, to be critical not only for the defense of Greece but also for the whole of Western Europe.<sup>34</sup> The crisis provoked in May 1960 made other countries reconsider the political importance of the association with Greece. Particularly, together with West Germany, the French government began to pursue actively the EEC's association with Greece, which was to be an important step for its conclusion. In July 1960, when Karamanlis visited Paris for a meeting with de Gaulle, the French President ensured the doubling of its import of tobacco and a loan of 100 million dollars in the framework of the association.<sup>35</sup> The Greek press accordingly reported that "France was [...] the most conciliatory toward the Greece's demands among the Six and most conscious of the political interest of the association between Greece and the Common Market."<sup>36</sup>

Under these circumstances, the Community was reaching a consensus on the exceptional nature and the outline of the association with Greece; to establish the customs union in a reciprocal manner, the Community ensured financial assistance through a special loan program and introduced exceptional measures to promote the export of vital products for the Greek economy, such as tobacco or citrus fruits. Meanwhile, its relations with Turkey remained ambiguous. In October 1960, the EEC Commission opened a preparatory meeting with the new Turkish government in order to restore the talks that had been interrupted by the coup. Emphasizing the economic similarities between Greece and its own country, the Turkish delegation clarified its intention to seek an analogous association. Moreover, based on the plan to re-establish its customs duty from January 1961, Turkey hoped to conclude an agreement within three months and effectuate it beginning on January 1, 1961.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the new Turkish government intended to accelerate its stagnant talks with the Community and reach an agreement similar to that achieved for Greece in terms of both scheduling and the economic characteristics.

The EEC Commission could not unconditionally accept the Turkish demands; it asked the Turkish to accept the same obligations as Greece if they sought to receive the same treatment. The most unacceptable element of the proposal for the Commission was the concept of the preparatory period during which the EEC member states would unilaterally reduce their tariff and increase their quotas even while Turkey maintained its own barriers. Therefore, the Commission confirmed that a similar association to Greece's could not be realizable unless Turkey relented on its demand for the preparatory period. Eventually, the Turkish delegation abandoned the proposal for the preparatory

<sup>31</sup> Archives national de la France, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (hereafter, AN), 19840343, no.96, L'ambassadeur représentant permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes à M. Maurice Couve de Murville, 5 juillet 1963.

<sup>32</sup> AMAE, Europe, Grèce, no.159, Bernard Durand à Monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères, 8 avril 1960; Mogens Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949–1974*, (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006), 189.

<sup>33</sup> Pelt, *op.cit.*, 153

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 191–192.

<sup>35</sup> More particular importance of this meeting for the conclusion of the association, see Plassmann, *op.cit.*, 138–151 and Pelt, *op.cit.*, 201–205.

<sup>36</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.694, Bernard Durand à Monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères, 22 juillet 1960.

<sup>37</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.286, compte-rendu sommaire de la réunion avec la délégation de la Turquie du 14 octobre 1960, 18 octobre 1960.

period and agreed to reduce its trade barriers at the same pace as the EEC member states.<sup>38</sup> Hence, in its pursuit of the same status as that achieved for Greece, the new government showed more positive attitudes towards trade liberalization than the former government had demonstrated.

Despite this adjustment, the Commission was inclined to maintain the distinctions between Greece and Turkey. When the meeting was reported to other Commissioners, some questioned the need to force the Turkish to compromise to the same degree as Greece, as they regretted that the principle of the association with Greece, i.e., the establishment of a customs union, had been established without sufficient consideration. Based on that decision, the Commission had to face criticism not only from Greece but also from the EEC member states because the negotiating principle turned out to be inappropriate and excessive.<sup>39</sup> Thus, although the Commission had criticized the concept of the preparatory period and forced the Turkish to abandon it at the last meeting, it began to reconsider its decision.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the Commission recognized the experimental character of the association with Greece and sought to determine a different model of association with Turkey rather than holding that country to the same strict conditions. As a further consequence, it determined to prioritize concluding the negotiations with Greece and postpone those with Turkey for some time.<sup>41</sup>

In March of that year, as the negotiations with Greece were concluding, the Commission made a report in which it reconfirmed the differentiation between Greece and Turkey. Specifically, Commissioner Rey indicated that the Community should consider “the difficulties to conclude a customs union with a developing country [that] the difficult negotiation with Greece highlighted, Turkey’s financial situation [...], which has proved to be more serious than was thought [, and] the new association regime of overseas territories [...] under discussion.” According to Rey, it was inappropriate for the Community to pursue an association with Turkey similar to that established with Greece because of the overall difficulty of the objective and the more serious economic conditions in the former, as well as the precedent that would be set for future associations. Rather, the Commissioner argued that associations involving the establishment of a customs union were useful only to countries that had “sufficient prospects for the possibility of real integration into the Community and [...] a very clear political will for the approximation to the Common Market.” In line with these assumptions, he concluded in cases when countries (such as Turkey) could not fulfill the conditions mentioned above, the Community’s action should be limited to measures compatible with the general most-favored-nation treatment, which meant the reduction of the common external tariff that influenced all non-member states in an indiscriminate manner and providing loans based on the idea of assistance.<sup>42</sup>

The EEC member governments were generally more cautious than the Commission because they doubted the Turkish would accept these conditions. Mainly, West Germany expected to conclude the association with Turkey as soon as possible because, like Greece, Turkey was experiencing pressure from the Soviet Union and its political situation had to be improved following the coup.<sup>43</sup> As a result, the Council of Ministers was only able to decide to resume negotiations with Turkey on the condition that the Commission would not represent the Community’s perspective.<sup>44</sup> Although the member states questioned the Commission’s approach, they were not yet prepared to define an adequate form of association with Turkey and needed to buy some time. Thus, after the Greek government and the EEC Commission signed an association agreement on March 30, 1961, the negotiations with Turkey were

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.286, note de Jean Rey, 6 décembre 1960.

<sup>40</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.286, note de J. F. Deniau, 3 février 1961.

<sup>41</sup> Ceylanoglu, *op.cit.*, 246–247.

<sup>42</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1353, communication de M. Rey, 7 mars 1961.

<sup>43</sup> Krieger, *op.cit.*, 73–76.

<sup>44</sup> AN, 19840343, no.95, procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l’occasion de la 44<sup>ème</sup> session du Conseil, 7 avril 1961.

reopened the next month (nearly a year after the coup); however, this entailed no more than an exchange of opinions and closed without programming a subsequent meeting.<sup>45</sup>

As shown in this section, although Greece and Turkey had both applied for an association with the EEC in the summer of 1959, at the point that the former had concluded its agreement, the latter had not even defined the principles of its association and had far to go in its negotiations. This consequence was inevitable owing to the justification of the association with Greece based on its exceptional status and the discrimination applied in distinguishing Turkey from Greece. In order to overcome the standstill, the Turkish government would make the crucial decision to accept the introduction of the preparatory period, which meant that Turkey no longer pursued the same status as that of Greece.

### 3. From Comparisons with Greece to a Precedent of Association for Western European Countries (1961–1962)

#### 3.1: Turkish concession in the turbulent days of the EEC's external relations

The different situations between Greece and Turkey provoked discontent in public opinions in the latter country, and some publications attributed the unenthusiastic stance of the EEC to cultural prejudice against Turkey. For example, the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet (The Republic)* charged that “the Europeans demonstrated that they considered the Turkish as Orientals.” Similarly, *Milliyet (The Nationality)* identified “the spirit of Christian solidarity” as a barrier to Turkey’s association with the Community.<sup>46</sup> Nonetheless, at the end of August 1961, the Turkish government notified the EEC Commission and the member governments of its acceptance of the preparatory period.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, it did not renounce the ultimate goal of establishing a customs union with the EEC members; however, it had determined to accept a different approach than that adopted by Greece.

This compromise was one of the most significant turning points in the process of establishing an agreement between Turkey and the Community. Although it noted a number of points for improvement, the EEC Commission underlined the importance of the concession through which Turkey came close to the Commission’s preference and, more essentially, withdrew its demand to obtain equal status with Greece.<sup>48</sup> Thanks to this compromise, the EEC member states and the Commission were able to agree to the basic framework of the association with Turkey, the first step of which was the preparatory period to prepare Turkey’s economy for the establishment of a customs union.<sup>49</sup> Thus, the outline of the association between Turkey and the EEC was finally established two years after the former’s application.

One of the reasons why the Turkish government conceded was that the post-coup government perceived greater political importance from the association than the former government had considered. The new government was conscious of its undemocratic origins and, therefore, enthusiastic about approaching the Western civilization through an association with the EEC. Thus, Cihan İren, trade minister under the military government and new delegate in the negotiations with the EEC, dropped most of Turkey’s previous demands in order to conclude an agreement immediately

<sup>45</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.287, note d’information concernant l’association de la Turquie à la Communauté (Conversations des 10–20 avril), 27 avril 1961.

<sup>46</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1353, télégramme de Spitzmuller, 17 juillet 1961.

<sup>47</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1354, mémorandum turc sur les principes généraux et le contenu de l’accord d’association entre la Turquie et la Communauté économique européenne, 24 août 1961.

<sup>48</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.287, note sur l’association de la Turquie à la Communauté, 31 août 1961.

<sup>49</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1354, projet de rapport du Conseil, 14 septembre 1961.

by arguing that “[r]ather than thinking in terms of a few exportable goods, we should approach the negotiations from a much broader perspective.”<sup>50</sup>

In addition to this change in Turkey’s approach, it is indispensable to remember that the month of August 1961 marked a crucial moment for the EEC. On August 1, 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan applied for accession to the EEC. The British application had the potential to change not only its own bilateral relations with the Community but also would impact multilateral relations within the whole of Western Europe. Following the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland also applied for accession to the EEC. At the end of that year, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, the three neutral countries within the EFTA, did not seek accession, but rather applied for association with the EEC. In February 1962, Spain also requested an association with the Community.

The wave of change was not confined to Europe; Israel requested the establishment of some kind of special relations with the EEC in July 1961, followed by Iran in June 1962. In June 1961, the European Parliamentary Assembly invited parliamentary members from the African countries that had become independent from France and Belgium to participate in “Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference” to prepare negotiations to update the association, which had been stipulated in the colonial era. Thus, the British application for accession triggered a series of requests, and a number of countries began to revise their relations with the EEC.

Underlying the Turkish compromise on the preparatory period were signs of change in the external relations of the EEC as a whole. Under these conditions, Turkey would deepen its isolation in Western Europe if it persisted in the demand for equal status with Greece and could not advance the negotiations with the Community. However, the Turkish concession did not completely remove the obstacles to an agreement. In particular, although the introduction of the preparatory period had been approved, there remained the question of whether or not a customs union should ultimately be established between Turkey and the EEC members.

### 3.2: France’s reluctance to establish a customs union with Turkey

The Turkish government certainly accepted the introduction of the preparatory period; however, it continued to pursue the establishment of a customs union with the EEC members as its ultimate goal. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the EEC Commission considered that the establishment of a customs union was an exceptional objective of association limited to the Greek case. The Commission aimed to reach an agreement with Turkey only on the preparatory period and viewed the Turkish association in the form of “a convention of economic, financial and commercial cooperation,” valid only for five to seven years.<sup>51</sup> Thus, despite the Turkish concession, there remained the question of whether or not Turkey and the Community would establish a customs union after the preparatory period. In other words, the Community had to decide if it would ultimately guarantee Turkey equal status with Greece, even if each association took different courses.

Among the EEC member states, West Germany and France took contrasting attitudes.<sup>52</sup> On the one hand, the former, accommodating the Turkish demand, suggested that the preparatory period should be automatically transferred to the transitional period during which the establishment of a customs union was undertaken. By fixing the schedule to establish the customs union from the beginning, Germany sought to reduce the differences between

<sup>50</sup> Mehmet Dösemeci, “Associating Turkey with Europe: Civilization, Nationalism and the EEC, 1959-1980”, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University (2009), 33-86.

<sup>51</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no. 1354, Communication de la Commission au Conseil, 16 octobre 1961.

<sup>52</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1354, rapport au Conseil, 22 septembre 1961.

Greece and Turkey within each association because of its political idea that Turkey had to be anchored to the Western Alliance in a similar manner that Greece did.<sup>53</sup>

On the other hand, although France had also recognized the geopolitical importance of the association with Greece, it did not adopt that viewpoint in relation to the association with Turkey. France emphasized the economic differences between Greece and Turkey and doubted the possibility of establishing a customs union with the latter, proposing that the regime should be left vacant after the preparatory period. Whereas they regarded Greece as a future member state, the French argued that Turkey's accession to or close association with the EEC would destroy the homogeneity of the Community.<sup>54</sup>

Why was France so negative about associating with Turkey? According to the review of the country's permanent representative of the EEC after finishing the negotiations, France did not overestimate Turkey's geopolitical importance and took into account its backward economy and unstable financial condition; thus, France took a realistic perspective in considering the association with Turkey.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, according to Francis Huré, the French Chargé d'Affaire in Turkey, "the political and military status of Greece is not naturally judged superior or equal compared to that of Turkey: Greece's economic and financial situation does not seem better or more worthy than Turkey's."<sup>56</sup> Considering these views, we cannot say that the backwardness of the Turkish economy was the decisive factor influencing France's position.

To understand the French attitude, we cannot ignore that the Turkish government had aggravated its relation with France following the coup when Turkish President Cemal Gürsel expressed positive support for the independence movement in Algeria. Gürsel permitted the "Front de libération nationale" to open an office in Ankara, and, in December 1960, the Turkish government first voted in favor of the United Nations resolution recognizing the Algerian's self-determination and independence, thus clarifying its critical stance towards France.<sup>57</sup> Not hiding his anger at the Turkish, de Gaulle ordered the withdrawal of the ambassador from the country.<sup>58</sup>

In contrast, even after the coup, relations between West Germany and Turkey were close as the recruitment agreement was signed between the two countries in October 1961.<sup>59</sup> Were the contrasting attitudes of France and Germany due to differing political relations between the two countries and Turkey? We cannot say yes, as the two countries were also conflicted with regard to the association with sub-Saharan African and other Western European countries. Therefore, to understand the attitudes of France and Germany, it is crucial to consider the Turkish case in the context of the EEC's overall external relations.

### 3.3: Association with Turkey as a precedent for association with other European countries

After the negotiations with Turkey resumed in April 1961, they were suspended again for over a year. During this period of interruption, the EEC rather engaged in negotiations with the EFTA members and sub-Saharan African countries.

<sup>53</sup> Ceylanoglu, *op.cit.*, 192–197; Krieger, *op.cit.*, 82.

<sup>54</sup> AMAE, Europe, Turquie, no. 121, note de M. Ulrich, 22 septembre 1961.

<sup>55</sup> AN, 19840343, no.96, l'ambassadeur représentant permanent de la France auprès des Communautés européennes à Couve de Murville, 5 juillet 1963.

<sup>56</sup> AMAE, Europe, Turquie, no.121, Francis Huré à Couve de Murville, 28 juin 1962.

<sup>57</sup> Eyüp Ersoy, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62)', *Turkish Studies*, 13:4, 2012, 689–690; Tancrède Josseran, « La Turquie et la Guerre d'Algérie, un tiers-mondisme atlantique? », *Les clés du Moyen-Orient*, 2012, <https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/La-Turquie-et-la-Guerre-d-Algerie.html> (accessed March 23, 2020).

<sup>58</sup> Ceylanoglu, *op.cit.*, 201.

<sup>59</sup> Günal Incesu, *Ankara-Bonn-Brüssel: Die deutsche-türkischen Beziehungen und die Beitrittsbemühungen der Türkei in die Europäische Gemeinschaft, 1959–1987*, (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014), 127–128.

From April 1960, when the French territories and Belgian Congo successively attained independence, the future relations between the EEC and the independent African countries became controversial. A significant point of controversy was whether the EEC should maintain its special relations with the region defined by the Treaty of Rome. Backed by Italy and Belgium, France argued that the Community was responsible for sub-Saharan Africa and should give priority to providing assistance to that region. In contrast, the Netherlands and West Germany stressed the need for assistance towards all developing countries.<sup>60</sup>

Under these circumstances, at the Council of Ministers in July 1961, West Germany suggested abolishing specific tariff preferences for the ex-colonial African countries and instead reducing the common external tariff.<sup>61</sup> It should be noted that this proposition was similar to what the Commission had suggested in relation to the association with Turkey. According to the German idea, true economic independence of the African countries, which was a primary objective of their association with the Community, could be achieved not through tariff preferences but rather by strengthening financial assistance to improve African infrastructures and to enable those countries to diversify their production.

The French government insisted on the maintenance of the tariff preference because it would be impossible to convince the Africans to accept seemingly more disadvantageous conditions than those of the existing association. Thus, leaving aside their economic effectiveness, the French saw a need to maintain the tariff preferences based on political considerations. In this sense, the attitudes of France and West Germany regarding the association with the sub-Saharan African countries were opposite of those concerning the association with Turkey. Léopold Senghor, Senegal's first president, argued that the German attitude would force the African countries to approach the Communist bloc.<sup>62</sup> This criticism was based on the same logic used by West Germany to advocate the association with Turkey.

Considering the strong ties linking France and sub-Saharan Africa from the colonial era and those between Germany and Turkey from the Ottoman era, it might seem inevitable that France and West Germany came into conflict over the EEC's respective relations with Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, trade between France and the sub-Saharan African countries and between West Germany and Turkey accounted for a large portion of the EEC's commercial relations.<sup>63</sup> Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the following statement by Rolf Lahr, secretary of state in the German Foreign Ministry, at the Council of Ministers in October 1961: "it will be difficult to make the public opinion of Turkey admit that this European country [i.e., Turkey], so important for Western Europe, must be treated more unfavorably than the African countries that recently achieved independence by the European Economic Community."<sup>64</sup> For West Germany, Turkey was not only a traditional partner but also an essential partner as a part of European countries.

In fact, West Germany actively sought to establish special relations with other European countries as well as Turkey. In the second half of 1960, Chancellor Adenauer, who was an active supporter of Franco-German entente, was

<sup>60</sup> Guia Migani, *La France et l'Afrique sub-saharienne 1957–1963; Histoire d'une décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance*, (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008). 206.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 222–223.

<sup>62</sup> Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, Mechthild Lindemann und Michael Mayer (Hrsg.), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1962* (hereafter, *AAPD 1962*) (München: Oldenbourg, 2010), no.287, Botshafter Reichhold (Dakar) an das Auswärtige Amt, 12 Juli 1962, 1284–1287.

<sup>63</sup> On the one hand, France's export to the sub-Saharan countries accounted for 67% of the EEC's total export to the countries, and France's import from them accounted for 63% of the EEC's total imports from them (in 1958). On the other hand, Germany's export to Turkey accounted for 58% of the EEC's total export to the country, and Germany's import from the country accounted for 44% of the EEC's total import from the country (in 1960). These figures are calculated from IMF, DOTS Direction of Trade Statistics, <http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85> (accessed June 6, 2019).

<sup>64</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1354, extrait du projet de procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 53<sup>e</sup> session du Conseil de la Communauté Européenne, 7 novembre 1961.

succeeded as the leader of Germany's European policy by Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard, who sought to build the special relations between the EEC and the EFTA.<sup>65</sup> Lahr explained the importance of the EEC's relations with European countries by arguing that “[c]ountries like Switzerland and Austria, which are historically, spiritually and economically regarded as the heartland of Europe [...] cannot be placed on the same level with Korea, Paraguay or Ethiopia.” Lahr was concerned about what he saw as the inadequate progress of the negotiations with European countries except for the United Kingdom compared with the negotiations with sub-Saharan Africa. To overcome this tendency, he placed great importance on the association with Turkey, which would give impetus to associations with Portugal, Island and Spain, accessions of Denmark and Norway, and establishing some sort of special relations with Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden. In that sense, Lahr proposed to avoid compromises on the association with sub-Saharan Africa as a negotiating tactic to establish the EEC's external policy with an emphasis on establishing relations with the Western European countries. Notably, he considered it indispensable to extract a compromise from France on Turkey in exchange for the conclusion of the association with the African countries.<sup>66</sup>

Meanwhile, France was opposed to association with the EFTA members.<sup>67</sup> As Maurice Ulrich, a specialist in the European integration in the French Foreign Ministry, reported, the French government recognized the risk that the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and Europe could be undermined if the EEC disregarded its relations with the non-member states in Western Europe. At the same time, however, it could not ignore certain disadvantages that accrue from their accession or association: 1) increased economic and financial costs due to more intensified competition among the agricultural producer countries and financial assistance to Europe's developing countries; 2) the deterioration of the economic model institutionalized by the Treaty of Rome through a number of exceptions; 3) delays in the Community's activity provoked by the increasing number of member states or associate states; and 4) difficulties in constructing a political Europe owing to the intervention of most European countries, which were unenthusiastic about the project.<sup>68</sup>

In this context, Jean-Marc Bogner, French permanent representative to the EEC, argued that “in view of [...] the negotiations that the Community is conducting with many European countries that demanded their accession to the Treaty of Rome, the Six should indicate that they think impossible at the moment to define the particular regime in the relations between Turkey and the Common Market.”<sup>69</sup> Considering the association with Turkey as “a new precedent cited by other countries that are under similar conditions,” he advocated “a non-discriminatory measure that can guarantee the freedom of the Community's future activities.”<sup>70</sup> Thus, the French government was afraid the EEC would establish similar privileged relations with the other European countries if Turkey was allowed to establish a customs union with the EEC member states.

Hence, the contrasting attitudes of France and West Germany were not solely determined by their bilateral relations with Turkey, but rather were largely influenced by the conflict over the fundamental objective of the Community's

<sup>65</sup> Ulrich Lappenküper, „„Europa aus der Lethargie herausreißen“: Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik 1949–1966”, in Mareike König und Matthias Shulz (Hg.), *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung 1949–2000: Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen*, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 107–108; Thomas Moser, *Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika: Eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der Eurafrikanischen Gemeinschaft von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Jaunde-Vertrag, 1929–1963*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 481.

<sup>66</sup> AAPD 1962, Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Lahr, 18 Juli 1962, 1295–1300.

<sup>67</sup> For example, at the conversation between Foreign Ministers of France and Austria, the French government showed its negative opinion about an association between Austria and the EEC. Commission pour la publication des documents diplomatiques français, *Documents diplomatiques français* (hereafter, *DDF*) 1961 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1998), tome.2, no.2, compte-rendu des conversations franco-autrichiennes, Vienne 30 juin–1er juillet 1961, 15–16.

<sup>68</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1377, note de M. Ulrich, 17 mars 1962.

<sup>69</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, télégramme de Boegner, 7 mai 1962.

<sup>70</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, télégramme de Boegner, 5 mai 1962.

external policy, i.e., whether or not the EEC should give preference to the non-member states in Western Europe. This perspective was shared by the EEC Commission, which feared that if the Community agreed on the establishment of customs unions with other European countries, then it would be difficult to reject the same for Turkey.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, to reach an agreement with Turkey, it was indispensable to determine the policy direction towards Western European countries as a whole.

## 4. Conclusion of the Ankara Agreement in 1963

### 4.1: Final phase of the negotiations: preferential treatment during the preparatory period

At the beginning in the latter half of 1962, compromises were reached on the external relations of the EEC; however, these concerned superficial rather than essential issues. With regard to the association with the sub-Saharan African countries, France accepted the reduction of the common external tariff, i.e., the reduction of the tariff preference, whereas West Germany accepted its maintenance.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, the Germans, together with the Dutch, continued to have concerns regarding an early conclusion of the agreement and sought to postpone it in some way or another.<sup>73</sup>

The negotiations with Turkey also made some progress. After being suspended for over a year, negotiations between the EEC Commission and the Turkish government resumed in June of 1962. The Turkish delegation continued to pursue the establishment of the customs union after the preparatory period, and, to attain this goal, it also requested preferential commercial policies applied during the preparatory period.<sup>74</sup> As opposed to the approach of France and the EEC Commission, which accepted only non-discriminatory measures within the framework of the association, Turkey demanded an arrangement for a preferential increase in its exports from the start of the preparatory period. As a consequence, the Commission reported to the member states that at least scheduling the establishment of the customs union after the preparatory period was indispensable for an agreement with Turkey.<sup>75</sup> At the Council of Ministers in July 1962, the six governments agreed to regard the establishment of the customs union as the ultimate goal of the association with Turkey.<sup>76</sup>

Krieger concluded that this was the moment when the dispute was practically put to an end because the EEC member states and the Commission had been conflicted about whether or not to establish a customs union with Turkey.<sup>77</sup> However, we must not overlook their reservations: 1) a schedule for the establishment of a customs union was not fixed, and a unanimous vote of contracting parties was needed to begin the process and 2) only non-discriminatory measures were adopted during the preparatory period.<sup>78</sup> The adoption of the non-discriminatory policy, i.e., the denial of preferential treatment, was particularly significant, because, in order to enable Turkey to establish the customs union, West Germany insisted on the need to adopt preferential policies ensuring the increase of Turkish exports during the preparatory period.<sup>79</sup> In contrast, France sought to demonstrate that “non-discriminatory

<sup>71</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, Communication de la Commission au Conseil, 11 juillet 1962.

<sup>72</sup> Migani, *op.cit.*, 234-236. Migani has stressed the intention of de Gaulle, who emphasized the relations with the Latin American countries as well as the African countries in reaching a compromise.

<sup>73</sup> DDF 1962, tome.2, no.180, Boegner, représentant permanent de la France auprès des Communautés européennes, à Couve de Murville, 6 décembre 1962, 473-474.

<sup>74</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.288, projet de note de la Commission au Conseil, 28 juin 1962.

<sup>75</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.288, note pour Rey, 19 juillet 1962.

<sup>76</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l'occasion de la 77<sup>ème</sup> session du Conseil de la Communauté Économique Européenne, 23 et 24 juillet 1962, 24 septembre 1962.

<sup>77</sup> Krieger, *op.cit.*, 55, 79-88.

<sup>78</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no. 1356, télégramme de Lacharrière, 23 juillet 1962.

<sup>79</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.288, note pour Rey, réunion des Représentants permanents, 4 mai 1962.

measures would be able to meet the main concern of Turkey, i.e., the parity with Greece" for the purpose of avoiding the preparatory period to be a practical first step towards the establishment of the customs union.<sup>80</sup> In light of these considerations, although the EEC member states had agreed to establish the customs union with Turkey, this was not a fixed plan but rather merely a vague expression of intention. As the association with Turkey would eventually include preferential measures, we should not regard this decision as the practical end of the negotiations.

For that reason, during the next negotiation round in October, expressing its satisfaction at the EEC's concession, the Turkish delegation persisted in demanding preferential measures during the preparatory period. As a result, "significant progress could not be made" in the negotiations.<sup>81</sup> Under these circumstances, the EEC Commission, which along with France had been unenthusiastic about the establishment of the customs union and insisted on the non-discriminatory policy, began to consider the necessity for the agreement to adopt preferential measures at least concerning tobacco and dried grapes, which were Turkey's major export products but also were subject to competition from other non-member states.<sup>82</sup> Considering the possibility of British accession and other western European countries' association with the Community, the Commission reached the conclusion that Turkey would lead to a disadvantageous situation unless preferential measures were adopted.<sup>83</sup>

The French government continued to oppose the preferential measures during the preparatory period;<sup>84</sup> however, the French delegation in Brussels found it was less difficult for the country to soften its attitude because the government had accepted the establishment of the customs union as a principle of the association.<sup>85</sup> Finally, it proposed to accept the Commission's idea as a working assumption despite recognizing "many difficulties must be resolved before we can give definitive approval."<sup>86</sup> This was not necessarily a radical change of position; however, it marked a crucial turning point for the conclusion of the association with Turkey. Although the French government agreed with the preferential measures on tobacco and dried grapes solely as a working assumption, it was eventually reluctant to express its own opinion. As a result, the implementation of the preferential measures was treated as a *fait accompli*. Why did the French become silent about the issue?<sup>87</sup> Answering this question is the final task in understanding the process of establishing the association with Turkey.

#### 4.2: France's isolation and the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement

During the negotiation round held in January 1963, the Turkish delegation requested the application of preferential measures not only for tobacco and dried grapes but also for eight additional products.<sup>88</sup> This demand was regarded as excessive by West Germany and the EEC Commission as well as France. Nevertheless, without protesting the Turkish demand, the French permanent representative observed that "[u]nder the circumstances, this question may acquire certain importance" because "the conclusion of an association agreement with a third country in the near future is indeed likely to demonstrate that the Community maintains undiminished vitality."<sup>89</sup> Thus, considering the current

<sup>80</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1355, télex par Boegner, 5 avril 1962.

<sup>81</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, télégramme de Boegner, 15 octobre 1962.

<sup>82</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.289, Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat, 31 Oktober 1962.

<sup>83</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.288, projet de note de la Commission au Conseil, 28 juin 1962.

<sup>84</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, télégramme de Wormser, 8 novembre 1962.

<sup>85</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, télégramme de Boegner, 29 octobre 1962.

<sup>86</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1356, note (sans nom, sans signature), 12 novembre 1962.

<sup>87</sup> As Calandri has indicated, we cannot ignore the impact of the Cuban Crisis on Turkey; however, as far as my investigation, there is no clear evidence that the association with Turkey and the Cuban Crisis interacted. Calandri, "A Special Relationship under Strain", 59.

<sup>88</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no. 1357, compte-rendu sommaire des conversations entre la délégation de la Commission et la délégation de la Turquie(14–20 janvier 1963), 30 janvier 1963. The eight additional products were namely hazelnut, dried fig, orange, lemon, grapefruit, peach, lentil, and bonito.

<sup>89</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no. 1357, télégramme de Boegner, 5 février 1963.

“circumstances,” France became an advocate of the association with Turkey. The “circumstances” were not identified in this document; however, this was almost certainly a reference to the crisis situation caused by the refusal of British accession to the EEC, which had been declared by de Gaulle on January 14, 1963.

The refusal of British accession affected not only bilateral relations with the United Kingdom but also damaged the EEC’s external relations as a whole. The Netherlands, which had been the most active supporter of British accession, did not conceal its discontent with the French unilateralism and even attempted to veto any decisions put to the vote at the Council. In addition, the Dutch again began to regard the association with the sub-Saharan African countries as a problem and demanded the participation of the ex-British colonies in the association as a condition for its agreement.<sup>90</sup>

Meanwhile, the association with Turkey gained momentum following the failure of British accession. As its anger against France subsided and was replaced by the view that “in any event, the restart is now a slogan,”<sup>91</sup> West Germany launched an initiative to conclude the association with Turkey. In April 1963, the German government published a new guideline for the EEC’s activities, the so-called Schröder plan,<sup>92</sup> which was named after Federal Minister of the Foreign Affairs Gerhard Schröder, and emphasized the need for the “synchronization” of the Community’s actions, which meant the balanced development of internal integration and external relations. Thus, West Germany sought to rebuild relations with Western European countries, including the United Kingdom, and to conclude the association with Turkey as a condition of the agreement on the process of internal integration, particularly regarding the common agricultural policy (CAP).<sup>93</sup> Ironically, France’s refusal of British accession led the other member states to put greater emphasis on relations with non-member states of Western Europe.

One of the most controversial points of the Schröder plan concerned the question of whether or not the EEC should resume contacts with the United Kingdom. With the exception of France, all of the member states insisted on on-going contacts in order not to eliminate the possibility of British accession. In the view of France, what was necessary for British accession was not a compromise between the country and the EEC, but rather the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the EEC’s policies and institution.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, the Schröder plan was unacceptable for France in the sense that it aimed at compensating the failure of the accession negotiations from the EEC’s side. However, if France rejected the plan, criticism towards the EEC would continue to increase, and probably more significantly for France, the realization of the CAP would be uncertain owing to the concept of “synchronization.”

Under these circumstances, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, the association with Turkey began to be regarded as a way to settle the crisis. Since the beginning of 1963, the negotiations had rapidly progressed, and the Turkey’s association had gotten close to the Greece’s association. Respecting Turkey’s intention, West Germany proposed to formulate regulations concerning the mobility of labor and capital and right of establishment during the preparatory period, and it sought to clarify that the period was an integral part of the establishment of the customs union.<sup>95</sup> The member states agreed to draft an article regarding the future accession of Turkey to the Community

<sup>90</sup> *DDF 1963*, tome.1, no.85, Boegner au Ministère des affaires étrangères, 26 février 1963, 241–243. Eventually, the Yaoundé convention was stipulated as a convention that was open to ‘countries which have a similar economic and productive structure’ to that of the ex-French and Belgian colonies. As a result, the EEC signed with Nigeria (not coming into effect because of the Biafran War), Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to permit their participation in the association.

<sup>91</sup> *DDF 1963*, tome.1, no.123, Boegner à Couve de Murville, 3 avril 1963, 349–350.

<sup>92</sup> For detail of the Schröder Plan, see Oliver Bange, “Picking up the Pieces: Schröder’s working programme for the European Communities and the solution of the 1963 crisis”, Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics (1997).

<sup>93</sup> *DDF 1963*, tome.2, no.2, M. Roland Jacquin de Margerie, ambassadeur de France à Bonn, à M. Couve de Murville, 1 juillet 1963, 2–5.

<sup>94</sup> *DDF 1963*, tome.1, no.158, Bogner à Couve de Murville, 10 mai 1963, 472–473.

<sup>95</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.291, note de Matray, 20 février 1963.

without much discussion.<sup>96</sup> After the final phase of the negotiations with Turkey, the Commission suggested that the preferential commercial measures should target hazelnuts and dried figs in addition to tobacco and dried grapes.<sup>97</sup> France did not oppose these suggestions, and Italy instead became reluctant to form a close association with Turkey owing to concerns about market competition.<sup>98</sup> Italy dropped its opposition when the other member states offered to immediately remove their internal tariffs and introduce the common external tariff on hazelnuts and dried fig so as to provide facilities for Italian exports.<sup>99</sup>

The Community formed a consensus on these measures during the preparatory period and thus established the principles of the association. The only problem that remained to be solved was to reach an agreement with Turkey, which had requested the application of preferential measures towards a total of 10 products. During the negotiations of May 1963, when the Commission proposed to increase the tariff quotas for tobacco and dried grapes and committed to examining additional increases each year, Turkey accepted the preferential measures applied to only four products, namely tobacco, dried grapes, hazelnuts, and dried figs.<sup>100</sup> On June 25, 1963, the EEC Commission and the Turkish government agreed to sign the agreement, and, on September 12, the association agreement between Turkey and the EEC, the so-called Ankara Agreement, was concluded.

The main feature of this association was that it was completed through the two steps, namely the preparatory and transitional periods. During the preparatory period, the EEC member states applied preferential commercial policies towards Turkish tobacco, dried grapes, dried figs, and hazelnuts.<sup>101</sup> Besides, Turkey could receive 175 million units of account in loans over a period of five years without diminishing its trade barriers. Therefore, the association during the preparatory period was based on the unilateral commitments of the EEC's side. In contrast, during the transitional period, the association had the objective to "establish a customs union progressively on the basis of mutual and balanced obligations," which would be similar to the association with Greece. Most symbolically, "the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community" was expressed in the agreement.

Therefore, this agreement retained an ambiguous character: on the one hand, it maintained the concept of the preparatory period, the purpose of which was to discriminate Turkey from Greece; on the other hand, like the association with Greece, it set a goal of establishing a customs union and pursuing the future accession of Turkey. As a result, the EEC granted Turkey a more preferential status than that of Greece. It was reasonable that the Greek government protested the conclusion of the Turkey's association and could not "help but express the deep disappointment caused by the attitude of the European Economic Community member states."<sup>102</sup>

In Turkey, the signing of the Ankara Agreement had an almost festival-like quality. Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin said, "this agreement crowns the fundamental westernization revolutions of Atatürk by tightly binding Turkey to Western Europe." A Turkish newspaper, *Akşam (Evening)*, published an article entitled "Turkey Now an Inseparable Part of Europe."<sup>103</sup> Thus, from the Turkish viewpoint, the EEC countries finally accepted Turkey's Europeanness through the association agreement, which guaranteed Turkey's status equal to Greece.

<sup>96</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1357, télégramme de Boegner, 14 février 1963.

<sup>97</sup> ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.291, propositions pour une phase finale de négociations, 26 mars 1963

<sup>98</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1357, télégramme de Boegner, 30 mars 1963.

<sup>99</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1357, télégramme de Boegner, 4 mai 1963.

<sup>100</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1357, télégramme de Boegner, 25 mai 1963.

<sup>101</sup> Concerning tobacco and dried grapes, the same tariff rates with Greece were applied to Turkey as far as its export did not go beyond the tariff quotas; concerning hazelnuts and dried figs, average rates between the EEC's internal tariff and external tariff were applied.

<sup>102</sup> AMAE, DE-CE, no.1357, note du Gouvernement hellénique concernant les négociations de la CEE avec la Turquie, 16 mai 1963.

<sup>103</sup> Dösemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity*, 47-49.

However, as this article has clarified, these results did not imply the EEC placed Turkey above Greece. Rather, the differentiation of Turkey from Greece was an entrenched idea within the Community. When the association with Turkey was concluded in 1963, the Community was united not in responding to the Turkey's demand itself, but rather in demonstrating success through an agreement with non-member states. In this context, the speech by Walter Hallstein, then president of the EEC Commission, at the signing ceremony is rather interesting: "Turkey is a part of Europe. This is the deepest meaning of this operation. [...] Turkey is a part of Europe: this is above all the memory of the strong personality of Ataturk. [...] Turkey is a part of Europe: that is why, according to the standards in force today, it establishes the constitutional relations with the European Community."<sup>104</sup> The repetition of the phrase, "Turkey is a part of Europe," did not reflect an intrinsic aspect of the agreement. Rather, in concluding the association, Hallstein could not help reminding himself that "Turkey is a part of Europe."

## 5. Conclusion

This article has clarified that although the association with Greece and that with Turkey had similar characteristics, there were significant differences in the process to establish each association. Indeed, this has been pointed out in previous studies; however, this article has revealed the different attitudes towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the EEC's negotiations with other European countries and sub-Saharan African countries. From this perspective, the fundamental character of the association between Turkey and the EEC, particularly the establishment of the customs union, could not be easily established because the association was concerned not only with the Community's relations with Turkey and Greece but also its general external relations. Since August 1961, when the United Kingdom applied for its accession to the Community and other European countries also began pursuing accession or association, the association between Turkey and the EEC was considered to serve as a precedent for relations with other European countries. That is why West Germany pursued a close association with Turkey and stressed the need to establish special relations with the Western European countries, whereas France adopted a more negative attitude concerning the Turkey's capacity to associate with the Community and preferred to maintain the special relations with its ex-colonies.

In an exceptional situation, namely the crisis of early 1963, the nature of the association was determined, and the agreement was concluded. While France became isolated within the Community because of the rejection of British accession, the other member states, particularly West Germany, were able to make efforts to mend relations with Western European countries using the association with Turkey as a lever. It is for this reason that Turkey's special position was transient. Its particular position was not justified by Turkey's attitude *per se* but by the tactical value that Turkey possessed to strengthen relations between the EEC members and the other Western European countries. Although this aspect of the process of establishing the association has generally been forgotten, the provision that Turkey would be a full member of the Community and Hallstein's statement that "Turkey is a part of Europe" are still remembered. This is the misunderstanding that lies at the root of the problematic relation between Turkey and the EU.

<sup>104</sup> Discours de Walter Hallstein à l'occasion de la signature de l'accord d'association entre la CEE et la Turquie (Ankara, 12 septembre 1963) :

[https://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours\\_de\\_walter\\_hallstein\\_a\\_l\\_occasion\\_de\\_la\\_signature\\_de\\_l\\_accord\\_d\\_association\\_entre\\_la\\_cee\\_et\\_la\\_turquie\\_ankara\\_12\\_septembre\\_1963-fr-c79fccb6-6c2e-4d9d-86aa-5e830da3ac9e.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_walter_hallstein_a_l_occasion_de_la_signature_de_l_accord_d_association_entre_la_cee_et_la_turquie_ankara_12_septembre_1963-fr-c79fccb6-6c2e-4d9d-86aa-5e830da3ac9e.html) (accessed March 23, 2020).