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Abstract

Policy makers in Japan and The Netherlands have always looked abroad to learn lessons about how to shape the university as a tool for nation-building across the 19th and 20th centuries. In the latter half of the 20th century, this process ran in parallel with the introduction of economic liberalism and globalization. As liberal, and later neo-liberal principles seeped into university education, national policies of “internationalization” were introduced. Now, over the course of the last two decades of the 21st century, these policies have had a great effect on the country’s national systems of education.

This dissertation shows that Japan has reached its main policy targets concerning receiving foreign students, but has neglected to focus on the exchange of Japanese students. This is the result of policy priorities. I argue that this is largely due to a continuation of the nationalist discourses through which political actors communicate this new form of “internationalization”. Moreover, it seems that policy makers are satisfied with the current policy trajectory, and are likely to accept new policies in the same format if they were to be introduced.

Like in Japan, both proponents and opponents of these policies in The Netherlands utilize nationalist arguments to formulate their positions. Unlike Japan, Dutch politicians on the critical side of the debate seem to be gaining the upper hand, especially in the last few years. There are fears concerning the effects of internationalization that have translated into politics. The combination of these concerns has emboldened the nationalist rhetoric of critics, leading to the current situation in which the government has shown signs of shifting its position vis-à-vis uncontrolled internationalization.

In The Netherlands, the political discourse has shifted in the other direction, as opponents of internationalization have successfully used nationalist rhetoric in their attack of internationalization policies. This is the result of a number of factors that have influenced the course of the debate, as the analysis shows.

This dissertation argues the following: that 1) internationalization is not new to the university, as is often assumed in public and academic discourses. In fact, the international element has always been part and parcel of higher education since its inception, as the two historical case studies combined with the analysis show. And, 2) political actors in Japan and in The Netherlands on both sides of the debate have utilized nationalist arguments in their defense or attack of current internationalization policies. In Japan, this has had little effect on the course of these policies, as defendants have successfully coated their position in a layer of national interest rhetoric. Critics, in turn, have been forced to adopt the same language, making it difficult to critique the neo-liberal assumptions that are inherent in these policies.

In short, it can be said that Japan is more likely to adopt more internationalization policies, while The Netherlands is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Contents

Abstract.....	2
Chapter 1 – Introduction: The Modern University and Internationalizing Higher Education in Japan and The Netherlands	8
Introduction to the introduction	8
Background.....	10
Research Questions.....	15
Overview.....	15
Chapter 2 – The Role of Education and the Nation-state	29
Introduction.....	29
The Nation, State, and Society.....	29
The Functions of the State: Education, Socialization, and Policy	45
The State and Government.....	48
Liberalism and Neo-liberalism	53
The New Economy: Globalization and Internationalization	59
What is Globalization?.....	64
What is Internationalization?	69
Chapter 3 – The Development of Higher Education and the Modern University in Japan	74

Introduction.....	74
The Nation and The State: The Onset of Modern Education in Japan	74
Japanese Post-war Education.....	87
The Modern University from the 1970s and the Global Economy.....	94
Coda	101
Chapter 4 - The Development of Higher Education and the Modern University in The	
Netherlands	103
Introduction.....	103
The Beginnings of Modern Higher Education:.....	104
From the <i>Organiek Besluit</i> to the <i>Wet tot Regeling van het Hooger Onderwijs</i>	104
Higher Education after World War II: The Massification of the University	116
The Modern University from the 1970s: School or Company?.....	122
Coda	129
Chapter 5 – Theories and Methodology.....	
Introduction.....	131
What is <i>Discourse</i> ?	131
Understanding (Con)text.....	136
Power and Truth in Discourse.....	139

Political Rhetoric	141
Political Discourse Analysis	145
Attributes of a Text	148
Analyzing the Language	152
Outline of the Research Method	155
Gathering the data	156
Pilot analysis	166
Text analysis software.....	171
Limitations	172
Chapter 6 – A Comparative Analysis of the ‘International’ University	174
Introduction.....	174
Major Themes	175
An Analysis of the “International” University in Japan and The Netherlands	183
Global Human Resources: Fuel for the Economy	190
Foreign Students: The Solution or the Problem?	194
Conclusion	243
Chapter 7 – Conclusion.....	248
Bibliography	251

Appendix I – Excerpts and Translations	272
Appendix II – Frequency Charts Japan.....	291
Appendix III – Frequency Charts The Netherlands	306

Chapter 1 – Introduction: The Modern University and Internationalizing Higher Education in Japan and The Netherlands

Introduction to the introduction

The origins of the university-system in Japan and The Netherlands can be found internationally. From student exchange, to copying foreign models, elite policy makers have always looked abroad to learn lessons about how to shape the university as a tool for nation-building. This process was continuous throughout the 19th and early-20th centuries. Following the end of World War II, however, both Japan and The Netherlands underwent strong economic growth. This placed a new burden on the university, as they were forced to endure massification.

This development ran in parallel with the introduction of economic liberalism and globalization. As liberal, and later neo-liberal principles seeped into university education, national policies of “internationalization” were introduced. Now, over the course of the last two decades of the 21st century, these policies have had a strong effect on the country’s national systems of education.

This dissertation shows that Japan has reached its main policy targets concerning receiving foreign students, but has neglected to focus on the exchange of Japanese students. This is the result of policy priorities, as is showcased in the political rhetoric used in official discourses as analyzed through National Diet discussions, official MEXT publications, and official university-association documents. I argue that this is largely due to a continuation of the nationalist rhetoric through which political actors communicate this new form of “internationalization”. Moreover, it seems

that policy makers are satisfied with the current policy trajectory, have identified themselves as successful, and are, as a consequence, likely to accept new policies in the same format if they were introduced.

This dissertation compares the case of Japan with a study of The Netherlands, where this new form of internationalization has taken on a different form. There are similarities. Like in Japan, both proponents and opponents of these policies utilize nationalist rhetoric to formulate their positions. Unlike Japan, Dutch politicians on the critical side of the debate seem to be gaining the upper hand, especially in the last few years.

There are fears concerning the over-abundance of English-language programs, leading to a crowding out of Dutch students and the Dutch language. Moreover, the topic of information security concerning China is gaining traction, as several independent reports have been published that discuss the risk of attracting large numbers of Chinese students and staff. The combination of these concerns has emboldened the nationalist rhetoric of critics, leading to the current situation in which the government has shown signs of shifting its position vis-à-vis internationalization.

This dissertation then concludes with the following two arguments: 1) internationalization is not new to the university, as is often assumed in public and academic discourses. In fact, the international element has always been part and parcel of higher education since its inception, as the two historical case studies combined with the analysis show. And, 2) political actors in Japan and in The Netherlands, on both sides of the debate, have utilized nationalist arguments in their defense or attack of current internationalization policies. In Japan, this has had little effect on the

course of these policies, as defendants have successfully coated their position in a layer of nationalist rhetoric. Critics, in turn, have been forced to adopt the same language, making it difficult to critique the neo-liberal assumptions that are inherent in these policies.

In The Netherlands, the political discourse has shifted in the other direction, as opponents of internationalization have successfully used nationalist rhetoric in their attack of internationalization policies. This is the result of a number of factors that have influenced the direction of the discourse, as the analysis shows.

In short, it can be said that Japan is more likely to adopt more internationalization policies, while The Netherlands is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Background

The modern university in Japan and The Netherlands finds its origins in the 19th century. As both countries introduced national systems of higher education in response to global developments, policy makers looked both inside and outside of their countries for models to emulate. In Japan, a small group of elites traveled abroad to become students at institutions of higher learning in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, taking lessons learned home with them. In The Netherlands, a period of French occupation had led to attempts to implement an imperial style system of higher education, to no avail. In the end, under order of the crown, Dutch elites looked at already existing institutions, and combined them with knowledge from surrounding countries, such as Germany. Clearly, the modern university in both countries has international origins.

With the birth of the modern university, also came the birth of a national system of higher education. Although governments might pretend their countries are old, their political systems are not. Japan only began modernizing after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and immediately went full throttle on inventing, organizing, borrowing, and copying political systems from abroad. This gave birth to the first national policy for education, the *Gakusei*.¹ This document, albeit short, rang in a new era of schooling for Japan. One that was coupled with the most important of state enterprises: the nation-building process. Schools and universities functioned exceptionally well in introducing the idea of the nation to a newly formed national citizenry.

In The Netherlands the same process took place following the departure of French occupiers in 1813. Immediately, the freshly crowned king gave orders to venture into the realm of national education, in a country where the university had long been part of the regional order, not the national order.

Nevertheless, The Netherlands had already possessed institutions of higher education, of high repute among the European nations even. This came in handy for the administrative elites who wanted to further consolidate The Netherlands, and the university as an institution of national education was born through the publication of the *Organiek Besluit*. With this document, all of a sudden, universities had a role to play in building a national community, through the education of national elites who would go on to work in a developing state apparatus.

¹ Names of documents, laws, policies, and key concepts in either Japanese or Dutch are italicized only the first time they are mentioned.

This process continued over the 19th century and into the early 20th century, as universities adopted the scientific method as well and started competing for international prizes. International comparisons became important in national policy making, while international student exchanges made their first, structured, appearance. Consequently, science, as conducted at the university, became an international enterprise.

Over the course of World War II Japan and The Netherlands suffered heavy losses, both human and infrastructural. Nevertheless, the post-war era gave a boost that would swing the countries in the direction of previously unfathomable economic growth. This, in turn, gave rise to the massification of higher education. A bigger economy, after all, requires more workers. As more students started pouring into universities, university administrators had to adapt quickly, and looked to the government for help. This help came in the form of increasingly liberal policies.

The massification of the university, and the scaling up of these institutions from hundreds, to tens of thousands of students, came at this cost. National education policies were revised and re-implemented to match the new economic circumstances, allowing more and more students to enroll and become skilled workers. This, in the end, gave birth to the modern liberal economy.

Simultaneously, as both countries' national economies grew, the university grew alongside it. Strained with an ever-growing population, national governments, which had decided to pursue national education strategies in the 19th century and early 20th century, suddenly decided that the university should become economically competitive. In gradual steps, budget cuts and

restructuring policies were implemented, and universities were introduced to the global market economy.

In Japan, this was part of an already relatively autonomous university culture, as the American post-war occupation had cut loose the education system from central government control (in fear of a resurgence of ultranationalism). This, in turn, had laid fertile ground for a strong Teacher's Union, that would oppose many of the centralizing policies the ruling Liberal Democratic Party threw their way. It was only through decades, and in piecemeal fashion, that the government was able to somewhat reattach itself as the central organ in education policy making.

In The Netherlands, the post-war era similarly saw a step-by-step induction into global market competition. Although the university survived its massification between the 1950s and 1970s, stringent budget cuts in the 1980s led to a new financial struggle. Over the course of the 1990s, however, a new movement was set in motion: the university as a company.

Universities started competing for students, using marketing and promotion campaigns, and steering the content of their programs in the direction of labor market needs. It was in this context that European Union integration came into the picture, which led to the introduction of a standardized education area in 1999 following the so-called Bologna Process. This, in turn, opened the door for international students to flood into the country at the start of the 21st century.

It is over this period that it seemed as though the university became detached from the nation, and became part of the market, as though functioning as a company. The student became not a disciple of science, but a human resource ready to be transmitted into the labor force.

Education became something necessary for work, not just for the pursuit of knowledge, nor just for the pursuit of nation-building. This hold true to a large extent, with the notable exception of the last part, as I argue in this dissertation.

Internationalization programs blossomed in the 21st century. Japan had reached its set target of 100,000 foreign students, as introduced under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, a controversial figure that has reshaped the world of higher education in the country. In The Netherlands, the opening up of universities to citizens from other countries within the European Union led to a sharp increase in foreign exchange students.

As this dissertation shows, however, this did not only result in benefits. The neo-liberal ideals of untethered economic growth and the economic human being, or “human resources”, had seeped into every level of university administration, meaning that the university was no longer a ground for only nationalist policies to thrive. They were no longer just places focused on nation-building and contributing to national society alone. No, they had to make money to survive. As a result, they started to actively recruit students from abroad.

At the same time, however, policy makers needed to frame education as a necessary tool for nation-building. In Japan, where demographic change had exacerbated an already decreasing student population, the plan to recruit 300,000 foreign students was introduced in 2008 to counter some of the social ails that Japan faced. In The Netherlands, one after the other English-language program was implemented in a bid to attract more foreign students as well. Again, these issues were, and still are being framed by policy makers as necessary for the nation.

Research Questions

In this dissertation, I analyze how this process has taken place. The main research question, therefore is the following: “How have policies, aimed at internationalizing the university, evolved over the course of the 21st century in Japan and The Netherlands?” In order to answer this question, I have additionally formulated the following sub-questions:

1. What is the relation between the nation and the modern university?
2. How has the modern university developed in relation to the international world in both Japan and The Netherlands?
3. How has (neo-)liberalism affected the modern university in the post-war period?
4. What are the discursive strategies adopted by political actors in defense, or as critique, of (national) internationalization policies?
5. What are the similarities and differences between Japan and The Netherlands?

In order to answer these questions, I have separated this dissertation into seven chapters.

Overview

In the first chapter, this chapter, I give a brief overview of the various topics that will be explored in this work. I introduce the main premise of my research, and introduce to the reader my main thesis, research questions, and sub-questions, as given above.

In the second chapter, titled “The Role of Education and the Nation-state”, I discuss the role of education in relation to the process of nation-building. I explore the major theories of nationalism, showing that it is quite a recent phenomenon that coincides with the time frame included in the following chapters. I continue by showcasing how education has played an

important role in the formation of a national community by socializing a newly formed group of national citizens into their role as participants in a national society.

This was done using, for example, national symbols, and the creation of a national history and national myths. This includes the use of languages, cultures, and ethnic identities. The process of nation-building was set in motion by elites who partook in state-making, themselves taking on leading roles in the establishment of the institutions that eventually made up a nation's state apparatus. I also show that, according to theorists of nationalism, this would not have been possible without the formation of so-called *imagined communities*: groups of people who believe they share similar attributes that together make up a nation and a nationality.

The chapter continues by exploring the modern functions of the state and the role of education. The consolidation of the state in a government allowed the formation of a bureaucratic elite who started formulating national policies. Government, in this sense, refers to the act of governing through these formalized institutions. Policy, in turn, is formulated to reach specific political goals. Using particular methods of governing, policy makers attempt to shape national societies in the way they so politically desire (Dean, 2012, p. 12).

In the post-war era, this has led to the introduction of liberalism, and later neo-liberalism. These ideologies, albeit slightly different, are based on the idea of the optimalization of social functions through market mechanisms, which are assumed to be natural and spontaneous (Foucault, 2008, p. 31). In doing so, the state has deregulated markets and pushed institutions away from the governance, and responsibility, of the state. This is relevant because this development took place

during the same period as globalization and internationalization took root. And, in fact, these processes can be traced back to liberal and neo-liberal principles as well.

In this chapter, I also explain why I have chosen the term “internationalization” over “globalization” in this work. I argue that bundling these terms, as is apt to happen in public discourses, can be detrimental for our understanding of the different process that underlie each concept, respectively. Specifically, I argue that governments are increasingly using education to steer national economies, a process that is actively pursued. Hence, the choice of internationalization over globalization, the latter of which assumes a certain passivity that is not the case when it comes to official government policies.

Chapter 3, titled “The Development of Higher Education and the Modern University in Japan”, explores the birth and evolution of the modern university in Japan, in relation to the introduction of modern education. Specifically, I focus in this chapter on this development in relation to the “international”, as this is the focus of this study. I must add a disclaimer that this chapter, and the following chapter, are historical studies based on existing literature, but do not purport to be comprehensive.

The chapter follows the initial beginnings of education of Japan, starting with the transformation of feudal Japan into a modernized nation. This process of nation-building takes the chapter from the initial document from which modern education was born, the Gakusei, to the end of the 20th century.

The onset of modern education, according to Nakayama, consist of two phases: 1) the window-shopping face where Japan took lessons from different Western models, and 2) the involvement phase, in which policy makers adopted specific ideals of Western education and localized them to fit the domestic context, creating a system that was particular to Japan (Nakayama, 1989, p. 97).

This resulted in Japan adopting an educational system in which foreign staff were recruited and Western knowledge became a central component. However, at the same time, the elites in charge of creating this system were aware of the need for education to strengthen the nation as a whole. As a consequence, the establishment of a Ministry of Education, and the creation of a network of schools throughout the country became a major priority, resulting in various university-districts, in which national universities were essential.

As this system progressed, gradually more institutions of higher education were recognized as universities. A set of standards was formulated in the *University Ordinance*, meaning universities were required to have a minimum number of students, endowments, a library, and qualified staff, among other requisites (Nakai, 2017, p. 103). The system that was built became increasingly centralized, and ended up being a conduit for the ultranationalism in the run-up to World War II.

This centralization became a major factor in the post-war re-evaluation of higher education over the course of the American Occupation (1945-1952). The education system became decentralized, and universities became more autonomous, although they were comparatively autonomous prior to the war. Nevertheless, this resulted in a strong Teacher's Union, giving

Japanese education more balance between the political aspirations of politicians, and that of teachers.

The post-war reforms provided Japan with a more egalitarian and democratic system of education, which was exactly what the country needed as it headed into the post-war decades of economic recovery (Schoppa, 1993, p. 1). Universities took on a leading role in the education of skilled workers, of which increasingly more were needed to support the fast-growing economy. This period saw the introduction of structured degree programs and specialized education curriculums (Yamamoto, 2004, p. 112).

At the same time, the ruling Liberal Democrat Party introduced liberal principles into higher education in piecemeal fashion. With success. Although much of their rationale was based on nationalist ideas, as shown by the re-introduction of post-war moral education. As this process progressed, business interest started gaining more leverage on how education was conducted in Japan, further augmenting the liberal ideas that were seeping into university education.

As the university faced increasing liberalization, it was also facing a boom in student numbers. They were forced to massify and produce more human resources as fuel for the economy. Financial costs for higher education were increasingly shifted to the students themselves, making universities more reliant on student numbers. As the economy globalized, and internationalization became a hot topic in political circles, then-Prime Minister Nakasone introduced new reforms that would focus on foreign student exchange.

Starting his tenure in 1983, it was under his administration that the government proposed the 100,000 foreign students' plan. Part of Nakasone's idea to create a "healthy nationalism", the government saw this plan as a chance to push universities further on the path towards internationalization. Japanese students had to be educated to become more "cosmopolitan", while more foreign students were needed as economic resources. Combined with the university's growing need for more students, this plan received wide support and took off in the mid-1980s. Business stakeholders were in agreement, and the push towards internationalization seemed to proceed successfully throughout the 1990s.

Nevertheless, as I point out on the basis of Rose and McKinley (2018) study, "It was a pragmatic combination of a neo-liberal economic doctrine and the wish by a conservative political elite to cultivate a sense of patriotism and a strong national identity among Japanese students". The chapter concludes at the end of the 20th century, arguing that this newly established form of internationalization of higher education was well underway during the century's last two decades.

Chapter 4, titled "The Development of Higher Education and the Modern University in The Netherlands", follows a similar historical narrative as the previous chapter, but focused on the case of The Netherlands. It starts with an explanation of the first phase of modern education, beginning at the departure of the French from The Netherlands in the early 19th century and the publication of the *Organiek Besluit* in 1815. This is the first document in which a national system of higher education was formulated.

The publication of this document also signified the beginning of the nation-building process in The Netherlands. Elites, and the crown, recognized the importance of education in educating state administrators. Although the country already had a range of institutions of higher education, these were by and large regionally-based, and at the time did not function well for the purpose of creating a new nation-state.

In this period Dutch citizens remained sorely divided, and the prestige of The Netherlands had declined significantly over the previous century as a result of the Napoleonic interventions. Although the previous, French, king had attempted to emulate the imperial system of higher education of his home country, this had not succeeded before the end of his tenure.

Many of the institutions that were present also lacked basic capacities for the pursuit of science, nor were they particularly well-established internationally, with a few notable examples such as Leiden University. Willem Bilderdijk, one of the foundational authors of the modern Dutch education system, had earlier concluded that universities lacked funds and national support. He argued for a radical modernization.

Problematically, the French occupation had meant 18 years of continuous strife over how the country should be organized. As a result, the Dutch population was tired of new reforms, limiting the possibilities for elites following the inauguration of William Frederik of Orange as the first king. The introduction of the *Organiek Besluit* was therefore a compromise between maintaining the old system and modernization, and ended up introducing elements borrowed from other countries, to further the mission of national higher education.

This situation continued over the course of a large part of the 19th century. At the same time, however, the process of nation-building consolidated and Dutch nationalism came to the fore. It was therefore in the latter half of the 19th century that we see a new attempt at reforming Dutch universities, with relative success. The *Wet tot Regeling van het Hooger Onderwijs*, or the Law for the Facilitation of Higher Education was implemented in 1876, eight years after its initial introduction.

This resulted in what some have called “The Second Golden Age” of The Netherlands. Universities became places of science, and the pursuit of science became the central characteristic of higher education right up until World War II. The success of this policy had translated itself into a slew of Nobel Prizes for Dutch scientists, and Dutch institutions of higher education started attracting more people from abroad. Over the same time period, foreign student exchanges became more frequent, and the universities of The Netherlands became increasingly international.

Nevertheless, with the new law, a new element was introduced to the university function. Namely, the education of students in preparation for the job market. As World War II ended, and politicians started reflecting on the cause of the war, they concluded that the singular focus on scientific advancement was at fault. Consequently, university reforms were placed high on the agenda in the post-war period.

The post-war period also saw the massification of the university in The Netherlands. Student numbers went up by the tens of thousands. The university had to cope with this new development as the demands of a growing national economy included a legion of skilled workers.

New reforms were gradually introduced to shorten the years spent at university, so that companies could employ younger workers. The study programs were adjusted to better match the demands of the labor market, and in piecemeal fashion liberal ideas permeated Dutch higher education as a whole.

The Netherlands saw years of stringent political protest of the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the installation of a progressive administration. This administration saw the role of the university as paramount to reaching its political goals, and announced a range of interventions. University administrators were displeased and banded together against possible interventions, leading to the progressives' failing badly in reaching their goals.

When a new liberal elite took control of the national government, universities warmly embraced the neo-liberal principles that accompanied them. As a result, however, budget cuts and stringent restructurings were introduced, making the university more dependent on student numbers. As the 1980s and 1990s progressed, the university transformed itself into company-like enterprises, complete with marketing and promotion campaigns.

When European Union integration progressed, resulting in the Bologna Process in 1999, universities all of a sudden had easy access to foreign markets. This meant that they were no longer only competing for domestic students, but also competing with foreign universities for international students. The chapter ends here, on the brink of the 21st century.

In Chapter 5, titled "Theories and Methodology", I explain the various theories that are applicable to this study, and my choice for methodology and its specific components. As I have

chosen to do a discourse analysis, my first matter at hand is to explain what exactly “discourse” means. The term can be difficult to grasp, as it has multiple, often deeply theoretical uses. It can mean anything from personal conversation, to a complete breakdown of communication, depending on the context.

In this work I use Lemke’s definition, as he argues that “discourse is the social activity of making meaning with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting” (Lemke, 1995, p. 7). I also explain that a discourse is made up of statements that are related to each other, but that there are at the same time methodological limits to what we can include in our analyses.

These statements are then best understood within a specific context. This often entails groups of people that interact with each other, who together make up a discourse community. In this work, I have chosen to focus on two specific discourse communities: Japan and The Netherlands. I have done so for several reasons: 1) they are both bicameral democratic monarchies, 2) they are both late-capitalist economies, and methodologically, 3) I have access to resources in both languages.

The chapter continues by explaining the role of power in discourse, and the importance of that in analyzing official government statements. These statements are often expressed in terms of political rhetoric, by political actors, in a political field. For this reason, I have chosen to use a political discourse analysis for this study. The rest of the chapter continues with exploring the necessary concepts that are required to do such an analysis, such as understanding the attributes of

a text and certain linguistic features of political rhetoric such as the use of lexis (vocabulary), transitivity, modality, and argumentative devices.

This section is followed by an explanation of the concrete steps I have taken in collecting and analyzing the data, using text analysis software. Next, I list the various databases from which I have gathered my sources, and explain how, exactly, I have selected the statements that have been included in the final data set. I have also included a preliminary pilot study for demonstration purposes. Furthermore, I have described the limits of the methodology used, including the limit on my time frame to the 21st century, from 2000-2020, ending at the COVID-19 pandemic.

In Chapter 6, titled “A Comparative Analysis of the ‘International’ University”, I delve into the main analysis of this work, a political discourse analysis of internationalization in the 21st century in Japan and The Netherlands.

The chapter starts with a case analysis of the data set included in this research. In it, I show some of the main themes that recurred in the statements examined, and provide an example of both The Netherlands and Japan. The texts included in the case analysis were manually coded using a text-analysis software called MAXQDA. After coding the themes and creating a list, I isolated the coded segments and used frequency analyses to provide a list of the most common keywords within that theme. These have been used to choose the excerpts presented in this chapter. By providing a case analysis, I show the reader how I have used the previously described methodology.

The chapter then continues with a description of the limitations of the study. A comprehensive analysis of the complete political discourse in Japan and The Netherlands is outside of the scope

of this dissertation, so I have chosen specific themes to highlight. I address this point in the “Limitations” section of this chapter.

The chapter then continues with the main part in the section titled: “An Analysis of the “International” University in Japan and The Netherlands. In this part, I focus specifically on the theme of foreign student exchange, as this topic has proven to be the most salient in terms of political discourse in both countries. Doing so enables me to make a comparison between the discursive strategies used by political actors.

The chapter uses several excerpts to represent the overall discourse, taken predominantly from official documents published by each respective government. These include National Diet proceedings, Parliamentary proceedings, White Papers, and other policy documents.

First, the analysis addresses the background in which these problems have been situated politically. For Japan, for example, this includes the development of “human resources” in response to a neo-liberal market strategy in national policy, and a declining domestic student population. This has led the Japanese government to aggressively pursue the acceptance of foreign students into the country.

In The Netherlands, the same process is underway. Although this can be largely attributed to the same neo-liberal principles, the additional factor of inter-European integration has contributed to a strong increase in the foreign student population as well, especially in recent years. In both cases, the national policies in place are aimed at acquiring so-called “global human resources” to fuel the national economy.

The chapter then continues to analyze the issue of foreign students in particular, questioning whether they are considered assets or problems for the national interest. In the analysis, I use different issues to create a comparison, or a contrast, between the two countries. These include the need for English programs at universities, retention rates of students for becoming workers after graduation, information safety, and university rankings.

I do so by showcasing the discursive and communication strategies of political actors, including politicians, but also official institutions such as the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and The Netherlands Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences (MOCW). Through this analysis, I show how most political actors involved have approached internationalization: by using nationalist rhetoric.

As I have described above, this has resulted in two different paths for Japan and The Netherlands, respectively. I argue that in Japan there is less acrimonious debate concerning internationalization at universities, due to its perceived policy success and the adoption of nationalist rhetoric by critics that is similar to that of proponents of these policies. As a result, I posit that Japan is more likely to continue pursuing internationalization strategies in higher education in the future.

In contrast, a number of issues have skewed the Dutch political discourse in another direction. Although it seems the government is still maintaining its course towards internationalization, political actors on the proponent side of the spectrum have shown signs of retreat. This is because critics have successfully utilized nationalist rhetoric in their critique of internationalization at

Dutch universities. As a result, I posit that The Netherlands is less likely to pursue further internationalization policies in the near future.

Chapter 2 – The Role of Education and the Nation-state

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the emergence of the nation-state and the role that education has played in this process. Specifically, the chapter starts with an overview of essential terms, starting with nationalism. It proceeds to discuss the emergence of the state apparatus in modern history, and how this led to the creation of national communities and societies. The chapter continues with an overview of the terms “state” and “government”, and proceeds to explain what exactly is meant when we talk about “policies”.

In the next section, I talk about the process of liberalization, and later the introduction of neo-liberalism into the global economic system. This has affected how we conceive education: as the institutionalization of the production of human resources as fuel for national economies. In this new economy, terms such as “globalization” and “internationalization” start appearing. In order to explain what these terms mean, the chapter describes the most common conceptualizations as used in, for example, the media and academia. The chapter ends with two sections that detail more specifically what the two terms mean, and how they are defined, ending with an explanation of why this work uses the term “internationalization” over “globalization”.

The Nation, State, and Society

Understanding the role of education in the making of the nation-state, we need to first digress a bit, and explore the concept of “nationalism”. Hobsbawm has argued that the idea of nationalism is not a natural artefact, but rather an invented tradition, a “set of practices” that inculcate in people a range of values and norms of behavior, instilled through repetition, i.e., “socialization”. This, in

turn, requires narrative continuity of the concept of a nation. In other words, a “national history” (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1). The practice of constructing a historical narrative for the purpose of creating continuation, is what Hobsbawm refers to as “historical innovation”, and this is consequently the primary building block of nationalism.

Understanding the importance of socialization is a key to understanding what nationalism entails. In his description of nationalism as an invented tradition, Hobsbawm continues explaining that there are three types of socialization processes that eventually constitute the existence of contemporary nationalism:

1. Those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities,
2. those establishing and legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and
3. those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 9).

Hobsbawm argues that socialization is part of historical innovation, and that this is a relatively recent phenomenon. In other words: the creation of a national history through the idea of a nation-state, national symbols (e.g., flags, anthems, colors, and visualized borders), histories – and other facets we can include and exclude based on the level of dedication to a specific political ideology – has only emerged in recent centuries through the invention of such traditions and their subsequent inculcation into a group of people through education. These, succinctly, have been the practices of social engineering undertaken by growing state apparatuses: a deliberate and innovative politics through which historical novelty, and thus the nation as an ontological entity, is established (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 13).

This can seem like quite a leap to make, and for the unfamiliar a difficult train of thought to follow, at least in theoretical terms. Therefore, I will provide a simple example: the flag. This symbol of nationhood has become so ubiquitous in our understanding of what a nation-state should be that it has come to represent it *an sich*. A quick glance at, for example, a list of United Nations member states, and thus those officially recognized as a country – a semantic difference, although with grave political consequences – shows us not only a list of names, but the addition of a flag that represents each one, respectively (United Nations, n.d.).

The waving of flags at football matches, in parades, or even on one's doorstep, carries with it a specific meaning that expresses the set of values that Hobsbawm alludes to in his work. Although the actual set of values might differ by person, political affiliation, or any other wide range of possible factors, the flag carries with it a general, intersubjective meaning: it represents a community of people under the banner of nationalism, whether this is formal or informal. The flag, therefore, has the potential to represent a national history, and thus a nation.²

The “making of history” remains an acrimonious debate, to put it mildly. Or to state it more accurately: a titanium-grade historicist teleological stiffness, among those with vested interest in the construction of national histories (e.g., politicians, bureaucrats, and educators), is at the center of many, if not all, international disputes. To contest the many positions in these debates is beyond

² It is important to note here that not every flag represents a nation-state: it has the potential of doing so. A certain level of intersubjective cognition, or popular recognition, remains the basis of broad acceptance. Otherwise, I could, myself, take a pen and paper and establish the national history of the Country of Anoma, and draw myself a flag that will, by default, represent it. This is, of course, a ridiculous premise. It is important to note, however, that the theories of the meaning of national symbols remains a relevant subject, one that is explored in a variety of works. Hobsbawm and Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition* cited earlier is an excellent introduction to this topic.

the scope of this study, as it would require an uncountable number of digressions into a similar number of contemporary political discourses on official histories. However, I do need to acknowledge the importance of the meaning and construction of history. Especially in the context of the creation of nation-states, and importantly: the communities that constitute them.

The most important element to this construction of history is also an important term that is used repeatedly in this work: “nationalist rhetoric”. As rhetoric is explained more thoroughly in chapter 5, I will focus on the function of nationalist rhetoric in political debates. First, nationalist rhetoric takes place within specific political discourses, in the case of this study: the discourse pertaining to internationalization in education in two case studies. It functions through the expressions of statements that contribute to the overall discourse, and are related to each other in their reference to the nation. And, as Levinger and Lytle argue, it is triadic; meaning that it consists of three elements (2001, p. 178).

The first element is the discursive construction of a “glorious past”. Political actors create an idealized nation-state that has passed, and present this as national history. This is followed by the second element, the “shattering” of this unity through the “identification of [...] sources of [a] nation’s decay, or as Levinger and Lytle call it: arguing that there is a “degraded present”. This present, in turn, can return to its past national glory through collective action by the population (at least, rhetorically it can). As Levinger and Lytle posit, “the nation will reverse the conditions that have caused its present degradation and recover its original harmonious essence” (2001, p. 178). This continuous process of referencing national history, pointing to a degraded presence, and the

promise of a utopian-like future, using rhetoric, is what defines nationalist rhetoric. And it is this exact process that gives rise to the constant re-invention of the idea of what constitutes the nation.

According to Smith, the idea of the nation as a modern, natural community, gained traction in the nineteenth century when it was propounded by nationalists across Europe. Similar to Hobsbawm's theory, therefore, he attempts to show us that the nation-state is a modern phenomenon. It was the result of an increasing need for unified legal codes, economies, and the establishment of borders for the creation of a geo-body: a national territory. These elements of the nation-state were, consequently, inculcated into a newly formed citizenry through a system of education. He continues, arguing that a nation-state, requires a single political culture. The introduction public mass education, and media, so that generations of people can be socialized into national citizens, was a crucial process in establishing this political culture (Smith, 1991, p. 69). Smith uses these features to provide his own definition of what a nation is. Namely,

a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, 1991, p. 14).

Notably, Smith distinguishes between a Western and non-Western conceptualization. He argues that the Western model is based on the idea of individual belonging, meaning that one "had to belong to some nation but could choose to which he or she belonged." In contrast, he posits that the non-Western model has a specific distinguishing feature, namely an "emphasis on a community of birth and native culture" (Smith, 1991, p. 11). This distinction nevertheless means that Smith sees the essence of nationalism as a sense of community belonging, inculcated through education,

regardless of how this is situated within a specific realm; Smith fails to specify what he means with “Western” and “non-Western”, making this particular conclusion ambiguous, and quite hard to substantiate.

I want to temporarily return to the idea of the nation as a modern invention, before I attempt to contextualize the idea of national communities, and look at Gellner’s argument that the nation-state has “obliterated pre-existing cultures.” In arguing this point, he takes a utilitarian position: any artefacts from the pre-nationalist world, as Gellner dubs them, are simply tools in the production of legitimate political units in a modern world. He refers here to cultures, histories, and “other inheritances” (Gellner, (1983) 2006, pp. 47-48).

There are a number of problematic assumptions in Gellner’s seminal work, among them the idea that nationalism is congruent with a demand for homogenization through industrialization – although it is important to note that nationalists do argue, at times, that they are protecting cultural traits and diversity, rather than eliminating them, as Gellner shows in his work – and that his theory is barely applicable, if not wholly unsuitable, for explaining surges and resurgences of virulent nationalism in post-industrial societies.³ Although the theory as a whole has not withstood the test of time, it nevertheless touches upon an important factor in the development of nationalisms across the globe: the *use* of, for example, cultures, languages, ethnic identities, and

³ Studies detailing this incompatibility can be traced back to already just a few years following the publication of Gellner’s original work. See for example (Studler & McAllister, 1988). Gellner does attempt to assuage his readers by suggesting different ‘varieties’ of nationalism, e.g. satisfied, classical, ethnic, and diaspora nationalism. However, these still rely on the same base assumption, as explored above, and therefore do not offer a convincing counterpoint to the criticisms lodged at the theory as a whole.

importantly, modes of production, in the creation of the nation-state, and the role of education in socializing peoples into recognizing these “national” attributes.

Anderson has argued that our national communities are the result of the onset of “print-capitalism”.⁴ This is quite close to Gellner’s proposed political utilitarianism. However, Anderson lays his emphasis on the materialist aspect of how nationalism formed, and consequently spread. Famously coining the term, the “imagined community”, Anderson describes the rolling out of historical events into narrative structures as part of the construction of “languages-of-power” that became the vehicles of state apparatuses, and the administrative processes that were developed in unison ((1983) 2006, p. 45).

Importantly, he explains, certain languages were formalized and became dominant within newly constructed national communities, taking up a hegemonic position in public discourses, frequently in the form of “official” languages. This process Anderson has called the elevation of a language to a “new politico-cultural eminence,” suggesting he saw the role of dominant languages as oppressive towards minority languages, especially in the realms of a newly imagined national politics and national culture ((1983) 2006, p. 45).

These languages, in turn, were promulgated through a national system of education. As elites started homogenizing languages for common usage, and printed materials became cheaper and easier to reproduce, text books could also be produced. The “nationals” of newly imagined

⁴ A short note on the usage of the past versus the present tense in references: if the author has survived the various calamities of the previous decades and graced us with their presence in this day and age, I refer to them in the present tense. In other cases, I use the past tense.

national communities were taught to understand a standardized vernacular, through which they could now communicate with other members of what they perceived to be their own community. The role of education in facilitating this process was critical, as it essentially formed the main vehicle through which such standardized vernaculars were spread across a population.

To an extent, this line of reasoning remains convincing. Languages became mediums of nationalism as states actively discouraged the use of smaller, tribal, community, or other minority languages and publications, thus marginalizing their presence in what Anderson dubs the “national consciousness”. The creation of “unified fields of exchange and communication” made it feasible for states to disseminate the previously considered “high” languages of elites to large masses of potential citizens. The printed word facilitated this new level of accessibility, as mutual intelligibility did not have to rely as much on the spoken word, making physical language barriers relatively easier to avoid (Anderson, (1983) 2006, p. 44).

The printed word, and its spread through the invention of the printing press, consequently, became a fixed vehicle through which states could lay the bases for a national consciousness, according to Anderson. People became aware of others who shared the same language, even if they were physically separated. It became possible, in essence, to imagine a community of people to which one belonged, as everyone in it shared a common attribute: a means of mutually intelligible communication, a common vernacular (Anderson, (1983) 2006, p. 44). However, as he himself also points out, languages were primarily the vehicle through which this unification of an imagined community could take place. The introduction of a national consensus, museums, and importantly, borders, were just as essential to building the nation-state.

Winichakul uses the concept of the “geo-body” of a nation to describe how our ideas of national borders became part of our national consciousness. Using his study of Thailand, previously Siam, he shows how national maps are imagined using scientific methods. This imagining of a national space is just as novel as historical innovation, if not part of the same process. As Thailand experienced increasing pressure of encroaching colonial powers, the state, with the king at its center, adopted the same scientific methods used by colonial administrations to map out, and cut up, its geographical realm.

King Chulalongkorn, the incumbent regent, went on several expeditions to “map the nation” with his entourage of vessels of scientific advisors. The king was, of course, literate, foreign-educated, and quite versed in the scientific discourses weaponized by colonial powers, thus making it easier to use the same language of nationalism in cutting out Thailand’s own part of Southeast Asia, despite the historical fact that most of the region previously consisted of tributary kingdoms with porous border arrangements (Winichakul, 1994, pp. 3, 101, 113). This example shows the importance of science, and consequently education, in the initial stages of visualizing the body of a nation and the construction of the nation-state.

Although Winichakul positions the state and the king at the center of the scientific discourses that culminated in the making of the national map of modern Thailand, he warns that the geo-body that was imagined as the national realm is a mere effect “of modern geographical discourse whose prime technology is a map” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 17). In other words, he suggests that, although the state is a central component in the creation of the imagined community, it is only

one of its components.⁵ This is a salient point, mostly because we would otherwise fall into the trap of assuming that only traditional institutions hold power in the nation-building process. Here, Winichakul diverges from Anderson's more materialist point, but also Smith's and Gellner's instrumentalist approaches, arguing that the creation of the modern nation-state is the result of an amalgamation of interacting factors.

Despite imagining the national borders of Thailand through the creation of a visual map, Winichakul shows that the government was unable to “achieve modern national political integration of minorities of all sorts” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 13). In other words, even the national imagination that came along with modern technologies like the printing press and the onset of modern national education – and in this case through both of these the introduction of a visual representation of the geo-body of a nation – were unable to wholly erase the existence of (political) minority groups. It is important to remind ourselves of this particular point for one simple reason: the creation, formation, and consolidation of the nation-state by formalized means remains a continuous work-in-progress. This is a point that readers might overlook, were they to assume that the nation-state is currently a *fait accompli*, meaning we are nowadays only looking back in history to look at how this was accomplished.

Nevertheless, even with the consolidation of the nation-state remaining an incomplete process, all authors above would agree that the state played a significant role in the formation of a national consciousness. At this point, I need to make a clear distinction between the state and the

⁵ See the below chapters for a more technical discussion of the creation of discourse communities and political actors.

nation, or the imagined national community. The state, in contrast to this imagined community, is a more concrete, formalized mechanism: the nuts and bolts of realizing a nation's potential as a nation-state.

According to Smith, the state and its apparatus are occupied primarily by the elite stratum of a society. He dubs them the “educator-intellectuals”, and sees them as playing a grand role in creating the symbols and traditions that form the basis of a national consciousness which are then taught to a “national” citizenry. He continues explaining that these elites laid the foundation for communities by mapping out their historical narrative structures and thus creating a set of “moralities” that would guide a people towards a strong national identity (Smith, 1991, p. 60).

The traditions Smith references, find their echo in Hobsbawm's invention of traditions, who agrees that it was the elites who legitimized their leading roles in the state apparatuses that came to govern nations, by constructing the newly imagined nations as a “historic home of the people” in which they themselves occupied high social positions.⁶ Again, the national map of Thailand that Winichakul offers us in his case-study is an excellent example of this: who other than the elites, the educators, the well-to-do and their primly filled coffers that facilitated narrative-constructing adventures (e.g., going out and literally “drawing” national boundaries in the case of

⁶ Hobsbawm refers to this group in Marxist fashion as the ‘bourgeoisie’ while Smith calls them ‘educator-intellectuals’. In some works, the ‘upper social class’, as these elites are then called, is derived from the historical classes of ‘nobility’ and ‘royalty’ (or the *literati*, literates) and are in this manner dissimilar to the ‘middle classes and lower classes’ of a nation. See for example Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen & Co, 1977), 423-425.

the Thai king), could take the time to bring the imagination from an idea to a formalized function? Very few.

Domestically this meant that certain elites took their place within the state as educators who, through the institutionalization of education, taught a newly formed community the means through which they could recognize their belonging to a nation. The historical narrative, after all, was reproduced through print materials, spread through a common vernacular, and adopted by educators who in turn socialized peoples into becoming members of national communities.

According to Habermas, we need to identify states as the executive branch of the nation. Together with an embodied territory, they make up the imagined nation, and together construct what we now understand to be “political autonomy”: the shape of the nation-state. As Habermas explains, the bounded state, as part of system of competing states is a central feature of the modern political unit, which is in itself a recent innovation, as the above authors would agree. Importantly, he adds, the state as an apparatus of governance takes form by concentrating major social functions into specialized institutions, e.g., ministries, agencies, and courts (Habermas, 1996, p. 281).

The formalization of these social functions, in turn, became the basis for modern nation-states. They turned an imagined community into a practical reality. Social mechanisms have become increasingly formalized, with, for example, the introduction of the tax system, army conscription, and other administrative procedures such as passport requirements. These all became formal processes through which the national community found its expression. As a consequence, the functions of the state became identifiable for citizens: particular agencies were reflections of

particular aspects of their place in a nation, in their own societies and communities. The state, therefore, is a “necessary condition and matrix” in making the nation (Smith, 1991, p. 59), and for consolidating the imagined community into daily lived reality.

A critical function in this process is the formalization of education. In his famous treatise, *The Social Contract*, Rousseau provides us with an early conceptualization of the role of education in creating a society out of individuals. To be precise, in creating a “good” society, a functional society that bears a strong resemblance to what we would now consider the imagined community. To quote him in length:

Individuals see the good and reject it; the public desires the good but does not see it. Both equally need guidance. Individuals must be obliged to subordinate their will to their reason; the public must be taught to recognize what it desires. Such public enlightenment would produce a union of understanding and will in the social body, bring parts into perfect harmony and lift the whole to its fullest strength. Hence the necessity of a lawgiver (Rousseau, (1968) 2004, p. 43).

The highest point a society can reach, according to Rousseau, is when individuals come together, and rely on each other in their practices as citizens (Rousseau, (1968) 2004, p. 45). In other words, people need to be assimilated, homogenized, speak the same language, and act in the same ways, ethically and morally (to an extent, so as not to stifle). This, in turn, is the role of the state: to inculcate such moralities into members of a social community, or society. In other words: state-regulated education is the foundation of a good society, according to Rousseau.

One might agree or disagree with this premise, or with envisaging the role of education as a mechanism for society-building, as Rousseau does. It remains, however, the principal philosophy on which modern education has been formed, as I will explore below using Japan and The

Netherlands as examples. Here, however, I need to digress a bit and explain how we went from the imagined national community and the state, to society; a concept that enjoys a variety of interpretations and definitions in scholarly literature.

A quick glance would suggest that there is not much difference between a national community and a society, as they are often used interchangeably. However, there is a distinct theoretical difference. The nation needs to be understood as a coin with two sides, or a box with two faces: inside and outside. The idea of a nation is inherently based on the positionality of a potential national community. There cannot be a nation, nor a nation-state, without the international community in which it is placed, from which it is bordered off, as is clear from the explorations of nationalism above. In contrast, a society can also be defined from within, from the “inside” (Chernilo, 2007, pp. 145-146).

Similar to the nation, a society is a narrative construct that is imagined to be continuous in time. If a society would be based on strictly individual entrepreneurship, individual actions or presence, a society would cease to exist, following the demise of the individuals in question. This is not the case for those communities of people we now identify as societies. By extension, therefore, a society exists regardless of political actors’ intentions: it is the result of “importable social coordination” through which the existence of a community of people is levied. In contrast to a nation, therefore, societies have an “endless horizon of meaning”. In other words, they are not reliant on a geo-body, a geographic space demarcated by national borders. A society will not cease to exist if part of it is extended or lost. This means that it can only be defined as a community of

people in which social relations determine its ontology. Or, as Chernilo argues, its existence can only be explained from within (2007, p. 146).

According to Luhmann, the only practical definition of society, for the aforementioned reason, is that of a “world society”. A global community of people who enjoy social relations. This is an undeniable reality, that humans interact (Chernilo, 2007, p. 147). However, Luhmann’s definition is, regrettably, unusable, as it turns humanity into a total abstraction. To avoid generalizations of humanity as a whole, which would in any case be untenable, we need to look at the fundamental properties of the make-up of a society.

Bourdieu argues that a society is constructed through outside observation. This seemingly contradicts the idea that societies are defined from within. The operation word here would be “seemingly”, as Bourdieu shows us that within the confines of the “within” there is still a level of externality, one that is reciprocal and done within a space “which allows us to explain and to predict the largest possible number of differences observed between individuals, or, what is the same, to determine the main principles of differentiation necessary or sufficient to explain or predict the totality of the characteristics observed in a given set of individuals” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 3). In other words, although individuals remain individual, and thus uniquely themselves, similarities among certain individuals may be observed in such a way as to allow us to identify them as groups, as a given set of individuals. Ergo, we can define societies as such; and from within.

Bourdieu warns us, however, that even the most consistent similarities are subject to change. They are simply “statistical connections and are subject to variations in time” (1987, p. 12). As we define societies from within, it is, essential that we keep in mind that these groups of people are not ontologically static, or stuck in time. There is a continuously changing dynamic inherent to social relations: societies are relational and temporal. Simply stated, groups of people can be said to have a “set of constant relationships” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 3). In essence, what we define as societies can come into being through the observations of similarities acquired through the prism of social interaction, inculcated through education, but can similarly cease to be once these interactions, and by consequence shared characteristics, cease to be.

Herein lies the difference between a society and a national community. A society, as it is defined from within, are the observed similarities that come into being through social interactions of individuals. In other words, societies are groups of people as observed from within. The national community, in contrast, is by and large defined from without. Similar to a society, there is an “inside” perspective: members of a national community share similar characteristics, whether these are vernaculars, passports, or other traits. Moreover, it is important to note that the imagined communities that led to contemporary nation-states are the result of individuals imagining social relations with others “inside” the same group, even when these similarities were not initially present but passed along through social practices and institutions, such as modern education. There is, therefore, a strong overlap in how we define either nation or society.

However, the nation as a whole is part of a group of nations that are external to its existence. When we talk about how a nation is developing, we talk about its development in contrast to how

other nations are developing; a narrative from without. When we speak of how a society is developing, we plot its course internally; a narrative from within. Despite the overlaps between the “nation” and “society”, to the extent that it would be hard to separate them practically, this is an important theoretical distinction, and one that I maintain throughout this dissertation in my usage of either term.

The Functions of the State: Education, Socialization, and Policy

Among the many social functions formalized by the state we can find the educational institution. Integrally linked to notions of nation, state, and society, the formalization of education was a process that coincided with the rise of the modern nation-state. This is not to say that no institutions of education existed prior to the industrial revolution. This would be an incorrect statement and would diminish the many centuries of knowledge-building we have relied upon to build our societies. However, the formal institute of education, and the creation of dedicated ministries, public school systems, and institutes of higher education for educating bureaucrats, technicians, chefs, and more, for the sole purpose of nation-building is recent; only dating back a few centuries and running in tandem with the onset of the industrial revolution.

It was our need for governing institutes and regulating societies, and by consequence consolidating our imagined national communities into nation-states, from which formal education was born. In most, if not all cases, the state either gave birth to it, or intervened in the regulation and governance of pre-existing institutes of knowledge. Frequently both. According to Gellner, this process emerged during the industrial revolution as “a society has emerged based on a high-powered technology and the expectancy of sustained growth, which requires both a mobile

division of labour, and sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required” (Gellner, (1983) 2006, p. 33).

In a similar vein, Smith argues formal education was introduced to socialize citizens. With this he means the creation of similarities among individuals by establishing a common public, mass culture. Or as he states it, the “task of ensuring a common public, mass culture has been handed over to the agencies of popular socialization, notably the public system of education and the mass media” (Smith, 1991, p. 11). When we speak of mass culture, it is easy to digress into common and popular notions of culture as intangible national myths. Practically, however, it also encompasses skills. Basic language skills are a prime example: in order to function in society communication is essential, without this skill you are impeded from functioning as a productive citizen.

Other, maybe less mundane skills are also part of this process. General professional skills and more specialized skills needed for different roles in society also became part of the formalized educational system. Switching from what Gellner would dub the feudal or agrarian society, to the industrial society, required a level of mass socialization that the traditional father-son, mother-daughter relationship could no longer adequately bear, as the costs and infrastructure overburdened these old, informal systems beyond their payload. Consequently, the state took on the responsibility of teaching citizens the professional skills needed for living within the newly industrialized societies to which they now, willingly or unwillingly, belonged, while also inculcating them through the same means – using a (standardized) vernacular – with the national

myths and traditions needed to create a popular national consciousness. Gellner refers to this process as “exo-socialization”, or “education proper”: a process in which the standards of education are formalized, regulated, and governed by a state’s mechanisms, ensuring that a “literate and unified culture is indeed being effectively produced” (Gellner, (1983) 2006, pp. 35-37).

For Gellner, therefore, successful nationalism can be understood as homogenization and assimilation of individuals into citizens of a national community, or productive members of a society, and education is the “generic training” one must undergo to transform into this citizen-being. This means the acquirement of “skills and sensibilities which make them acceptable to their fellow, which fit them to assume places in society” (Gellner, (1983) 2006, pp. 31-32, 36). Smith uses the same logic, calling these groups “culture communities” in which members are united through “common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions” inculcated through means of formal education (Smith, 1991, p. 11).

Education, in this sense, has taken over the role of religions. Before the onset of the industrial revolution, religious institutions were the administrative and cultural regulators of many, if not most communities of people (Smith, 1991, p. 58). However, as the nation-state developed alongside industrialism, religion lost its monopoly on knowledge, on “cultural wisdom enshrined in scripture”. Religiosity was increasingly replaced with professional skills and training (Gellner, (1983) 2006, p. 36).

In order to be able to do this, the state needed to set up a formalized system of education that could supersede the functions that churches, monasteries, and other similar institutions previously took up in local communities. The state, consisting of particular agencies, each with their own set of functions, needed to deploy a complex apparatus of systematic regulation of social functions, including that of educating the public. These regulations are what we now understand as (public) policy (Ball, 1990, p. 19).

At this point it is necessary to deviate from Smith's and Gellner's vision on the state as simply a homogenizing force for a national community, as it is deficient in its portrayal of the complexities of the state apparatus. According to Ball, there is no single entity which we can identify as the state. Rather, as described above, it is a set of functions. Policy, therefore, needs to be understood as formal and official statements that are the result of debate and contesting political interests (Ball, 1990, p. 20). This is also the definition of policy I use throughout this work.

The State and Government

In order to understand how policy comes into being, I need to differentiate between the state and government. The state, as we can glean from the above works, encompasses the whole political body of a national community. In contrast, the government is the set of formalized institutions that *governs* the nation-state. Dean provides us with a very concise, but accurate definition of government when he says that it is

any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (2010, wh. 18).

Dean continues by positing that an analysis of government in any form needs to be

concerned with the means of calculation, both qualitative and quantitative, the type of governing authority or agency, the forms of knowledge, techniques and other means employed, the entity to be governed and how it is conceived, the ends sought and the outcomes and consequences (2010, p. 18).

A study of government is therefore not necessarily a study of the political contest itself; it entails the process from ideas to policies, and the subsequent implementation, consequences, and effects of these policies. Succinctly, the analysis of how a government governs is that of how a policy functions within a society. These we can call “techniques of government”, and they are established through the utilization of specific forms of knowledge that fulfill political desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs (Dean, 2010, p. 18). Government, in short, is then *how* a people are governed using policy by those with certain political goals, and how, and to what effect, this takes place.

Through this understanding we can establish that a government is a set of functions that have a specific political aim: the governance of people. Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” finds its use here. As he dubs it, this is “a conceptual architecture of the modern liberal state and all its strategies, techniques and procedures as they act upon the human body and social behaviour through the many and varied capillaries of power” (Ball, 1990, p. 60).

Here, I need to focus on the functions of *political* government, as Dean dubs it. As he argues, this “is only one possible means or dimension of regulating or directing what is done, and that its intelligibility is given in relation to other such means or dimensions” (2012, p. 11). Dean explains to us how he has interpreted the Foucauldian term governmentality using this point: it is not a passive technology or strategy. Instead, it is a calculated practice directed specifically at any

social agents (e.g., groups of people) using particular methods to achieve specific goals and ends (Dean, 2012, p. 12). However, this is not limited to the intended consequences of governance, but extends beyond these formalized intentions. As Ball adds, governmentality is “something broader and more varied than those powers that might be said to be held by the state” (2013, pp. 120-121).

In other words, we need to understand governance as more than just an expression of power resulting in forms of domination and oppression. Persons or citizens subjected to governance are not sub-altern by definition. Certain techniques of governance might lead to a state of domination (Ball, 2013, p. 121), think of the citizenship in totalitarian states (and even in the case of total state power, conspicuous exceptions might preclude a generalization of this sort), but this is not always their essence. This is why Foucault’s concept of governmentality can be helpful to understand: this is about understanding the position of the *subject* in relation to the power structures of government, the governance enacted upon them, and how these form into what Foucault dubs “technologies of the self”.

First, however, I need to explain what we speak of, when we use the term “subject”. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow there are two definitions of the concept: 1) a person who is subject to someone else through means of control and dependence, and 2) a person who is tied to oneself as they are conscious of their own being, and thus has a level of self-knowledge that they are subjected to ((1982) 1983, p. 212).

An example of the first would be a citizen of a nation-state, subjected to the governance of a government (e.g., requiring a passport to travel, or a license to drive). A policy of mandatory education, for example, is common among nation-states that have successfully institutionalized certain social functions, and the individuals – or nationals – who participate in this system are thus identifiable as subjects.

The second would be a person who is aware of their ethnicity, gender, race, occupation, level of education, and acts upon these forms of self-knowledge as though they are subject to them. Both of these meanings, argue Dreyfus and Rabinow, are forms of power that subjugates the person, turning them into a subject. Ball adds that what we view as personal qualities, such as “self-esteem and empowerment, as well as our hopes and dreams, fantasies and desires” are part of how we become subject to certain forms of knowledge, and certain strategies of (self-)governance (2013, p. 125).

Foucault adds that we need to understand power as a “mode of action upon the action of others”, although this extends to modes of action upon oneself as the other. An important point, he argues, is that this power can only be exercised over free subjects, and that there is “a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realised” (Foucault, 1983, p. 221). In other words, there are various consequences to the governance of subjects. The self, for example, is an essential factor in the realization of power: the self becomes a subject through an “active process of becoming” (Ball, 2013, p. 125). We establish a relationship to our environments, and importantly to how we learn to know our ourselves, how

we perceive ourselves, and by establishing a set of practices through which we live and interact with the governance enacted upon us as subjects, we create our own technologies of living.

This active process of becoming is how Foucault understands subjectivity: the realization of self-examination and the consequences of understanding ourselves (Ball, 2013, p. 125). The interaction between the subject and the strategies and techniques of government designed to make them behave in certain ways, is also where we find the locus of power. As Foucault continues to explain, “freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised” (1983, p. 221). Simply stated, where power is exercised, the subject comes into existence.

In terms of education this is expressed in the historical narratives, social practices, and other forms of practice that are inculcated in us as we pass through years of training. Where a subject is confronted with, for example, a national history, the subject engages with it through a process of socialization. One is taught a narrative of the nation as though it is part of one’s own personal narrative, and thus the freedom to *become* through other narratives is taken away, and one is socialized step-by-step into identifying as a member of a specific national community. Education, therefore, is essential in creating subjects that can be transformed into members of national communities.

This is an important point, as the onset of the nation-state, and consequently governments and their technologies of governance constituted the gradual receding of individual freedoms. Social mechanisms became formalized, and were institutionalized as the nation-state gradually consolidated. Moreover, the role of the national economy became increasingly present in the

governance of newly formed societies, and the citizens that made them up. In Japan and The Netherlands, both capitalist nations, this entailed the introduction of liberal political ideologies, and the eventual evolution of the individual into what Foucault dubs the *homo oeconomicus*, the economic man. In order to understand how this process has taken place, I need to start with explaining what we mean when we talk about “liberalism”.

Liberalism and Neo-liberalism

Liberalism is a political philosophy that belies many of the world’s nation-states’ economic systems, and is in principle the idea that there is a natural market that consists of supply and demand, and through this the economy finds a balance that is the most suitable for any given time and place. As Dean defines it, liberalism

is usually presented as a doctrine concerned with the optimisation of the sphere of individual freedom and rights, and the preservation by any arbitrary encroachment by the state. It thus posits a sphere of autonomy which is opposed to a domain of public intervention. The term ‘liberal mode of government’ does not so much deny as contextualise this opposition. In this regard, the term implies two postulates. The first is that the private sphere, far from being inviolate, is already the effect of a multitude of state and governmental interventions which loosely cohere around the objective of the promotion of a specific *form of life*. Second, it is argued that [...] the private sphere is not so much one of personal freedoms and rights but of the economic responsibilities of a certain category of social agent” (2012, p. 13).

In this definition, Dean alludes to the role of the individual in relation to the state, and the paradox of their being. According to the liberalists’ ideology there is the idea that the individual bears an economic responsibility, and this is part of their individual freedom and rights. However, at the same time, these responsibilities are directly related to the functioning of the society in which they are enmeshed, and as a consequence to the nation-state and its mechanisms of governance.

The liberal ideology is thus already a contradiction. It postulates freedoms and rights for members of a nation-state, while at the same time the state bears upon the same members a plethora of economic responsibilities. These are, in turn, supposedly formed naturally and spontaneously through the mechanisms of the market economy (Foucault, 2008, p. 31).

Risking repetition, we need to understand that the freedom that proponents of the liberal ideology ascribe to it, is simultaneously entangled with the power needed to exert upon people their economic responsibilities towards the nation-state and its society. The “freedom” gained by liberalism, therefore, can only be achieved within the confines of the liberal system and its economical mechanics. To simplify it, the freedom one achieves in the liberal system is the freedom to choose between different individual economic responsibilities (e.g., salaries, commodity prices, real estate purchases, and welfare), not the freedom to ween oneself from the institutions of the nation-state.

Education is an excellent example of this. As liberalism progressed, so did the various forms of education that the state institutionalized, and subsequently made mandatory. In most developed nation-states, there is a certain level of mandatory education through which citizens must pass in order to qualify as productive members of society. The “freedom” therefore, is not with choosing not to participate, which in many cases is illegal and will result in forceful education or the punishment of responsible authorities (e.g., parents or care takers). It is in fact in the choice of a *level* of education. Whether one chooses to end their education at the mandatory age, proceed to technical schools to learn specific practical skill based, colleges to be trained for blue- and white-

collar jobs, or university education to attain a white-collar job. Those who choose none of these options are likely to be excluded from society, or live on its fringes.

But how do we determine what the economic values of liberalism are? According to Foucault, the prices of commodities and labor in the liberal economy “express the relationship, a definite, adequate relationship between the cost of production and the extent of demand”, or as he terms it a “true” and “just” price in accordance to the workings of the natural market and its spontaneous mechanisms (2008, p. 31). There is a *naturalness* that we must assume to be part of the market economy, and how it this connects to how a society is governed by a government. As Foucault argues, the idea of natural, true, and just economic outcomes is,

in governmental practice and in reflection on this governmental practice, [...] inasmuch as prices [...] determined in accordance with the natural mechanisms of the market [,] they constitute a standard of truth which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous (2008, p. 32).

It is precisely the last part of this argument that essentializes the relationship between the liberal ideologist and government: how the market behaves indicates how well a government functions. This has become a normalized truth, or a “regime of truth” (see chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of this concept). How we judge the effectiveness of a government is thus intrinsically linked to how well our national economies are performing. Simply put, more economic growth equals good governance. Or as Foucault states, “the market determines that good government is no longer [...] quite simply one that is just” (2008, p. 32).

The liberal ideology centralizes the economy and its mechanisms in the ontology of the nation-state, and consequently its government and the governance of its society. However, in

recent decades we have shifted towards a new form of liberalism. This is what we now call *neo-liberalism* (lit. new liberalism). It is worth exploring this topic by quoting Foucault's interpretation of this new ideology

as a politics of 'not governing too much' but which at the same time has been able to extend the economic form of the market 'to the entire social body and to generalise it inside the whole system that, normally, does not pass through or is not authorised by the market' (Foucault, 2008, p. 248; Ball, 1990, pp. 128-129).

It seems slightly paradoxical to call judge the act of governance by the performance of a national economy, if the new expectation is that good government in actuality refrains from governing too much. This is, however, exactly what neo-liberalism entails, and it is an extension of the idea that the natural market establishes what we call good governance through a true market. Thus, we enter into a phase of frugality in governance (Foucault, 2008, pp. 28-29).

Neo-liberalism and nationalism as understood from the above seem to be contradictory forces. This is in the sense that a government that does not "govern too much" and therefore does not direct or *govern* a society inasmuch as it would were it to steer a national society into a nationalistic direction. In addition, the neo-liberal idea of the natural market is frequently argued to be inherently internationalist, as the ideological is for the global, true, market to transcend the economic limitations of national borders. Nevertheless, as Hooghe and Marks argue in, for example, the case of Europe: "Neoliberals have skillfully combined economic internationalism and political nationalism in an effort to create national governance and international market competition" (Hooghe & Marks, 1999, p. 84).

Moreover, as Harmes observes, “certain nationalist policies are not only compatible with neoliberal values, but [...] these values may actually be dependent on certain nationalist policies” (2012, p. 59). As this study shows below, internationalization in higher education is one of such policies. The link between neo-liberalism and nationalism is therefore not as contradictory as it might seem at first. Over the post-war period, in fact, the two ideologies have become increasingly intertwined in the policy-making process in Japan and The Netherlands.

As a result of the shift towards neo-liberalism, the judgement on the effectiveness of governance internally places the economic burden increasingly on those participating, as explained earlier. In essence, human beings are increasingly viewed through an economic lens; they, or we, are quantified, using our economic performance as the measuring stick. This is what we call the individualization of the economic burden, and it is what Foucault quite accurately surmised to be “the analysis of non-economic behavior through a grid of economic intelligibility” (2008, p. 248).

The extension, or more possibly more accurate would be the *intrusion* of economic calculation into those fields of social practice that were not economic in the first place, is symbolic for this development. Rather than liberating by the act of less government – from which we could have expected less governance of the individual body, less power enacted on the individual, and consequently more freedom – the neo-liberal economic apparatus infringes upon the previously private spheres of social practice, and economizes the individual by ascribing the judgement of their performance as citizens of a nation-state, and members of a society, by quantifying increasingly more aspects of their existence.

Previously non-economic activities, such as education, are now placed into an economic framework. In Japan and The Netherlands, pre-modern education was frequently the domain of religious practice, through churches and temples (*terakoya*). This has been replaced by a system of education that has been professionalized and now requires tuition fees. This process is connected to other facets of social practice as well. Education is, for example, also connected to the economization of labor. Prior to the industrial revolution work-related education was often a family practice, with parents passing along skills to their children, without the need for a school that required tuition fees. With the onset of liberalism, and later neo-liberalism, this practice was largely eradicated and replaced with institutionalized versions that were tied to economic practices. School produced human resources, and labor produced economic benefits, although both became increasingly individualized practices and responsibilities in the post-war period.

Burdened with these new responsibilities, we thus see the evolution of the individual citizen into the homo oeconomicus; the economic man.⁷ Important to note here is that the economization of man is not complete, it is an evolutionary process that makes persons and their bodies governable (or “governmentalizable”) by economic means. Power gradually retreats from its more violent tendencies, into an exercise of economic pragmatism and individual (economic) responsibility towards their societies and their national economies (Foucault, 2008, pp. 252-253). Simply put, the success of a government in governing is measured by the success of the national economy, for which the responsibility is increasingly placed upon national subjects through the individualization of social functions, such as educational attainment. The national community is

⁷ Man as in human. I do not use the gendered form of the term here.

largely replaced with the national economy, and the success of governance is simply measured by how it directs its human resources towards more economic growth, and thus the national economy's place in an international neo-liberal order based "spontaneous" and "natural" market mechanisms.

Notably, this is not an ideology limited to one nation-state, or one particular region of the world, as I allude to in the previous paragraph. It has evolved into a global phenomenon, in which nation-states have become members of what some dub the "international community".⁸ One of the prerequisites of both the liberal and neo-liberal economic ideologies is that a truthful and just market requires openness and transparency within this community. This means that economic mechanisms need to cross borders, trade needs to flow freely from one place on the globe to another, in order to respond to economic demands. This is the phase that we now find ourselves in: the "globalized" world with its "international" institutions.

The New Economy: Globalization and Internationalization

Scholars, journalists and pundits often rely on the words "globalization" and "internationalization" to describe the economic and social realities of the world in the 20th and 21st centuries. They are frequently used interchangeably, with little consideration for the subtle differences that belie these key concepts. In this section, I explore the two terms conceptually, placing an emphasis on their differences. While globalization is primarily a descriptive idea of a shrinking world in which the

⁸ This term is quite contested, as it is frequently used simply as a rhetorical device that supposes the support of the majority of nations across the world for a certain contemporary issue. It is an ambiguous concept at best. However, it more commonly stands for the will of a select group of nations that hold sway in supranational organizations such as the United Nations. Nevertheless, as Hernández for example puts it, the term is "invoked ad nauseum in international law: it is invoked in almost every context" (2014, p. 194).

planet is turning into a “global village”, internationalization encompasses an active process of cross-border interaction: interactions through which peoples, representing their respective national communities, communicate their national myths. Although the two concepts are not diametrically opposed – they are in fact both key concepts in the imaginings of a liberal world economy – there are fundamental differences that make it hard for them to be lumped together.

In October 1987, The New York Times published a front-page article titled “Onstage in the Global Village”, exhorting the onset of the age “where nearly anyone [...] is affected by everyone else”. The article describes how an English-born French-based director has used a French author’s translation of the ancient Indian epic the Mahabharata to create a new theatrical spectacle. Now that the world has become globalized, everyone and everything will become accessible, or so the writer promises (Rockwell, 1987).

The “global village” is a term popularized in the 1960s and 1970s. Coined by McLuhan, it is commonly interpreted as the world having shrunk in on itself, as we see above. Peoples are increasingly connected, and the once exotic has become the everyday. Technology especially has made the world smaller than it has ever been (McLuhan, 1962, p. 31). As the creator of the term explains: “Today, electronics and automation make mandatory that everybody adjust to the vast global environment as if it were his little home town” (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968, p. 11).

When the famous journalist Thomas Friedman later boasted about the flattening of the earth, he meant the world would be more connected, trade would be easier, and political barriers would dissipate. The last stage of globalization will lead to a “newfound power for individuals to

collaborate and compete globally” (Friedman, 2005, p. 10). The idea of globalization was thus that the world would melt into one. Instead of national and cultural borders separating us and them, we would find our way, gradually, to a global village where the individual would matter more than the groups to which we initially belonged.

In a much-quoted book, Fukuyama famously stated that we are heading towards the “end of history” as he argued that pessimists of globalization did not understand properly the “empirical flow of events in the second half of the century” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 70). It cannot be denied that globalization has improved trade and connectivity. The internet and our digital technologies are direct proofs of this. Even in education, this process can be felt, with the onset of a global lingua franca in academia, the rise of international staff and student exchange, and the growing interaction of scholars at conferences. Here, however, we need return to the idea of the global village, because the concept is frequently misinterpreted.

As a matter of fact, McLuhan himself gives us a better example. He describes the global village in terms of a global artist: a person with more delicate sensitivities, who has the capacity to engage with the world without losing their mind to the overwhelming overflow of information that accompanies it. He continues explaining: “he [the artist] glories in the invention of new identities, corporate and private, that for the political and educational establishments, as for domestic life, bring *anarchy* and *despair*” (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968, p. 12).⁹

⁹ Emphasis added by the author.

We do not encounter the words “anarchy” and “despair” in the global village proffered up to us in The New York Times article. This is likely because the two words quite violently contradict the optimism with which the article expresses its globalist bias. It is no surprise then that Friedman, an American journalist and weekly columnist for The New York Times, published his book about the “flattening of the earth” as an auto-ethnography, a description of his own world centered on his own experiences. Similarly, Fukuyama takes his own historical interpretation for theory by describing the onset of a universal history for the world from the perspective of a Western-centric liberalist ideologue.

Fukuyama does not hide his predilections, and his whole argument is a historicism without precedence: he takes globalization as the triumph of Western liberalism, specifically of American liberalism, and now neo-liberalism. In short, he sees globalization as nothing more than a smoothie made out of the histories of the world, with the notable exception of what he views as the West, which retains its unique flavor through its domination of history. In fact, if we look at *how* education has globalized this particular view expresses itself quite naturally through real-world mechanisms.

Because of the dominance of English in international education, globalization in education has benefitted Anglophone countries more than it has non-Anglophone countries. Low- to middle-income countries are also, by and large, sending students abroad, rather than receiving students, creating an unbalanced system of student exchange. Although this is slowly changing, as economies grow and non-Western countries have started to emerge as key players in the education industry (Jones & de Wit, 2012, p. 46), the system of global education remains a prime example

of the excruciating exceptionalism of a Western-centric (neo-)liberalism, akin to the logic used by supremacist ideologues in the early twentieth century. It is a false prophecy at best.

Moreover, McLuhan himself counter-prophesized decades earlier that the onset of globalization would lead to humanity retreating into a tribal, collective mind, lacking any individual consciousness, and that there was no evidence in any situation of people coming together with the mechanical friendliness that an optimistic globalist would promise (TVO Docs, 2010). With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that it is not Fukuyama's, but McLuhan's prophecy that has been echoed by history. It is, nevertheless, undeniable that the onset of liberalism, and the creation of liberal economies, has affected our lived realities.

As our personal lives have become the subject of a global economy, our individual patterns of consumption are increasingly intertwined with international and intercontinental supply chains. Some have described this process quite succinctly as the "integration of labor, goods and capital markets on a global scale" (Cappelli & Mitch, 2019, p. 3). In other words, national economies have left their previously remote islands and connected with each other, integrated and homogenized institutions, thereby creating one large global economy in which everything and everyone is increasingly connected. In one word: globalization.

The brevity and versatility of this definition is laudable, as it allows a broad interpretation that can span the breadth of all human knowledge from the beginning of history, or facilitate the specificity needed for an auto-ethnography of a single journalist attempting to boil the world down to a single thought. Yet it is only a veneer of simplicity that offers us a way out of the complexity

of globalization, presenting the transformation of the world into a global village as a natural process.

What is Globalization?

Globalization, in fact, treads a fine line between contradiction and paradox. While the concept builds on nation-states as the central actors in a global economy, it simultaneously offers a promise of the increased meshing of societies. If we strip down the term to its bare essentials, we can see that the free and open trade that it requires, also requires the active participation of state mechanisms that govern national economies. Free trade and commercial enterprise in liberal markets are essential in state policies. There are no examples of liberal markets coming into existence “organically or independently” from the state (Burchill, 2013, p. 74). Nevertheless, even now neo-liberals continue to emphasize the relevance of free trade, and by extension the free exchange of capital, e.g., money and goods, with as few hindrances as possible. This, in essence, is what globalization symbolizes.

In fact, national borders need to be made irrelevant if free trade is totalized. As Burchill quite accurately explains, contemporary neo-liberal ideology requires “few legal constraints on international commerce, and no artificial protection or subsidies constraining the freedom to exchange.” He continues, the liberal economy needs an

open global market, where goods and services can pass freely across national boundaries, [this] should be the objective of policy makers in all nation-states. Only free trade will maximize economic growth and generate the competition that will promote the most efficient use of resources, people and capital (Burchill, 2013, p. 76).

This is, however, also where the paradox of globalization lies. Although it requires the erosion of national borders and the supremacy of global market forces, there have been no examples of countries emerging as economic and “industrial powerhouses by initially adopting a policy of free trade.” In fact, economic success of national economies has, historically, been largely determined by national policies, state-coordinated economic efforts, and varying levels of protectionism (Burchill, 2013, pp. 74-75).

When we look at the globalized economy that developed out of this liberal thinking, we need to keep in mind that these ideologies are centered on the idea of capitalist modes of production. This means that states that engaged in liberalism expanded their economic activities, while promoting growth of trade among sovereign nation-states. This is, in turn, how states governed their societies as well, with economic growth as the prime indicator of good governance, as we have seen above. In neo-liberalism, however, states and their government apparatuses – in their governance of national economies – became less and less concerned with welfare programs, social justice, and other such human-centered initiatives. Instead, we can see the gradual implementation of capitalist ideas of efficiency and productivity in policy-making in those societies that followed a path of neo-liberal policy-making.

In the case of democratic societies, such as The Netherlands and Japan, the main case-studies presented in this work, we can already see in the 1960’s and ’70’s how much these ideas of market mechanics penetrated the workings of society. It is worth quoting Macpherson in length here when he states:

I would argue that the reason ‘liberal’ did mean acceptance of the capitalist market society, during the formative century of liberal democracy, does not apply any longer. Liberalism had always meant freeing the individual from the outdated restraints of old established institutions. [...]. But so long as there was an economy of scarcity, it still seemed to the liberal democrat that the only way to that goal was through the productivity of free-enterprise capitalism (Macpherson, 1977, pp. 21-22).

As capital mobilized, it became the moving force behind the allocation of global resources. As a consequence, economic globalization, and the subsequent deregulation of financial markets by economies moving away from state-control, meant increased international competition.

This was also the case for universities, as chapters 3 and 4 will show in the cases of Japan and The Netherlands. Institutions of higher education, already increasingly subject to market mechanisms, had to adjust to the liberal idea of constant growth. Part of this was placing education as a product on the global marketplace. As a consequence, universities started competing with each other both domestically and internationally. Over the course of the post-war decades, this process intensified, leading to a variety of new factors influencing the overall direction of this newly formed “global” system of education, such as student and staff exchanges, cross-border scientific collaboration, but importantly, inter-academic competition in the form of citation rates, international university rankings, and, for example, the growing importance of placing students in high tier white collar jobs.

As the (neo-)liberal global economy developed, blue collar labor moved to places where it was cheap (e.g., factory work), while developed economies started focusing on service- and knowledge-based work. Cheap labor thus moved most frequently to economically developing societies. This happened while workers in industrialized, and later post-industrial nations, lost their

organized bargaining power in piecemeal fashion, augmenting the social inequalities already present in those societies, and between societies, before the onset of the liberal capitalist economy (Burchill, 2013, p. 75). As Brown explains, one of the assumptions

of neo-liberal thought, and liberalism in general, is that free trade will benefit the poor [...]. The central point is that poor countries, precisely because they are poor, by definition have lower labour costs; [...], the international division of labour will work to channel capital in their direction and, in the medium-to-long run, this will work to equalize wages and general levels of development. The result will be to transfer some kinds of production from the rich world to the poorer world; metal-bashing workers in the advanced industrial world will have to retrain and it may be difficult for them to find work (Brown C. , 2003, p. 571).

Eventually, it was not the freedom of the individual that became the primary force for liberalism, and thus globalization, but capitalist market incentives.

The original idea of several sovereign nation-states trading with each other as though they are consolidated economic blocks, as expounded in liberalism, has, as a consequence, become rare and infrequent. Meanwhile the power of businesses that control large flows of capital, as we now see in neo-liberal economies, has grown. Herein we find that elusive paradox of globalization: it attempts to circumvent the agency of nation-states, but it is a system that cannot live without the presence of the state.

In fact, although the global economy is increasingly connected, and societies and their consumption are in the process of usurping global resources, the feedback to globalization on a national level has been fierce. Globalization has not erased the imaginary borders that distinguish one imaginary (national) community from another. To the contrary, the process has led to an aggressive, often violent, backlash to a perceived erasure of these borders. As Burchill argues,

liberal ideologues believed that the spread of a globalized economic world order in tandem with democracy would precipitate a peaceful international society. This idea is based on a liberal explanation that says that liberal-democratic states do not solve conflicts through violence but through diplomacy and trade (Burchill, 2013, p. 63).

Although it has held true to an extent, mostly through the optimism of liberal policy makers, recent developments have broken tradition. Specifically, the idea of open-trade has suffered several blows over the last few years by a variety of crises, including quite recently Brexit, and a Trump-induced backing out by the United States from several free trade agreements, which by and large were nationalist retreats from an increasing “globalized” open and free trading system.

The term globalization thus denotes something ideological, but inherently paradoxical. Moreover, as Giddens describes it, globalization is the “interlacing of social events and social relationships ‘at distance’ with local contextualities” (1991, p. 21). It is thus the distant idea of a globalized world and a globalized economy that stands in stark contrast with the local realities of imagined communities that frequently have strong communal (national) narratives. Held and McGrew therefore offer a more accurate picture of globalization when they define it as:

Simply put, globalization denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world’s major regions and continents (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 4).

In education this globalization is visible in, for example, the exploding number of foreign students enrolling abroad. In Japan the number of (non-citizen) students rose from a little over 125,000 in 2007, to over 150,000 only five years later. In The Netherlands, similar growth took place, with a

little under 37,000 (non-citizen) students om 2007 to around 62,000 in 2012. In Canada it rose from around 132,000 in 2007 to around 221,000 in 2012, and the United States saw a similar level of explosive growth, from approximately 595,000 (non-resident) students in 2007 to more than 740,000 in 2012 (OECD, 2012). These students came from all across the world. In China alone, for example, almost 400,000 students decided to enroll at a foreign university (Textor, 2021). This shows the high degree of influence globalization has had on education as a whole. However, as Held and McGrew continue to explain,

it should not be read as prefiguring the emergence of a harmonious world society or as a universal process of global integration in which there is a growing convergence of cultures and civilizations. Not only does the awareness of growing interconnectedness create new animosities and conflicts, it can fuel reactionary politics and deep-seated xenophobia. Since a significant segment of the world's population is either untouched directly by globalization or remains largely excluded from its benefits, it is arguably a deeply divisive and, consequently, vigorously contested process (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 4).

Although globalization has its uses in the study of liberal and neo-liberal economies, therefore, it is because of the (political and) ideological ambiguity that I argue that the term has limited use in the study of interactions between nations where national narratives remain conspicuously present, as we see in education. This is why I turn to internationalization.

What is Internationalization?

In scholarly work on the internationalization of economies, the term is quite frequently bundled together with globalization. For example, in a book chapter called “Globalization and Internationalization: The Dynamics of the Emerging World Order,” the author has included the

term internationalization quite prominently in his title. This supposes some kind of importance of the term. Yet, beyond a brief definition on the first page of the chapter as an “ensemble of flows and exchanges ... between two or more nation-states”, the author immediately starts using the term globalization as a replacement. Surprisingly, only the first three pages include the word internationalization, and variations of the “global”-word immediately take over afterwards (Petrella, 1996, p. 45). The conflation of these two terms, however, undermines a proper understanding of the differences they entail. In contrast to globalization, internationalization retains the idea of national communities, and by consequence the role of the nation-state in the process of growing global inter-connectedness:

In contrast to the globalists, the sceptics interpret current trends as evidence of a significant, but not historically unprecedented, internationalization of economic activity, that is, an intensification of linkages between separate national economies. Internationalization complements, rather than displaces, the predominantly national organization and regulation of contemporary economic and financial activity, conducted by national or local public and private entities. All economics is considered principally national or local (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 20).

We have, however, already established that the global economic system has affected the level of control states have over their national economies. Although the performance of governance and the state apparatus is judged within the national community by the levels of economic growth they accomplish, while simultaneously having let go the controls of said economy, this does not mean that states have completely foregone their activities in economic governance.

Using various methods, such as valuta control, consumption and income taxes, export and import embargoes, bilateral trade agreements, supranational association memberships, and through

steering national education, governments remain active participants in their national economies, even while external global forces grow in strength. As Held and McGrew argue, “[r]ather than conceiving of national governments as simply captives of external economic forces, the sceptical position acknowledges their critical role [and sees] states [as] both the architects and the subjects of the world economy” (2003, p. 23).

This dual role of the nation-state and their governments is a more accurate depiction of the realities of the progressing global economic entanglement espoused by liberal and neo-liberal proponents. It is necessary to not fall into the methodological trap of defining the role of the state on one extreme end or the other, as completely passive, or completely in control. Rather, it is important to focus on the specific processes that governments have to exert power over the societies they govern.

This active position is still inherent in the processes that decide the direction of national education systems, and in terms of internationalization this role is even more important. Consequently, in this work I use Knight’s definition of internationalization as specifically pertaining to education, which is the following:

Internationalization at the national, sector, and institutional levels is defined as the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary education (Knight, 2003, p. 2).

The internationalization of education, in turn, is deeply connected to domestic labor practices, as national education systems, under liberal planning, have started to gear towards the production of human resources as fuel for national economies. As a result, with the global economy opening up,

domestic labor policies have become increasingly important. As Betcherman argues, “competitive global markets place a premium on human resource development,” meaning that “education and training is increasingly seen as one of the most important, if not the most important, sources of national competitive advantage in the global economy” (1996, p. 186).

The growing importance of national labor power also means that education has taken up a prominent position in the governance of national economies. Already during the start of the liberal economies in the mid-20th century do we see the first movements from education as a nation-building instrument, to a human labor producing instrument. In Germany, for example, the production of high-quality manufactured goods, one of the country’s prime exports, was sustained by a diverse system of educational and vocational training, “consensual industrial relations system, industry-finance linkages, and a framework of supportive state policies” (Swank, 2003, p. 413).

This focus on industry-human labor relations is not unique to Germany, but as I have explained earlier, is part of the neo-liberal economy, and the transformation of the individual into the economic man, the homo oeconomicus. It is, again, worth quoting Held and McGrew in length here when they show us that:

Contemporary political strategies involve easing adaptation to world markets and transnational economic flows. Adjustment to the international economy - above all, to global financial markets - becomes a fixed point of orientation in economic and social policy. [...] This position is linked, moreover, to the pursuit of distinctive supply-side measures - above all, to the use of education and training as tools of economic policy. Individual citizens must be empowered with cultural and educational capital to meet the challenges of increased (local, national, regional, global) competition and the greater mobility of industrial and financial capital. States no longer have the capacity and policy instruments they require to contest the imperatives of global economic change; instead, they must help

individual citizens to go where they want to go via provision of social, cultural and educational resources. The terms of reference of public policy are set by global markets and corporate enterprise. The pursuit of the public good becomes synonymous with enhancing adaptation to this private end (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 35).

In short, governments, in their application of public policy, are increasingly focusing on education to shape their national economies. As the neo-liberal economy progresses globally, this is one of the few means through which external global forces can be counteracted, or controlled. By educating the citizens of a nation-state for competitiveness, a nation's complete state apparatus, including its government, can focus its efforts and "good" and "just" government through improving the national economy by improving the nation's human resources. Nevertheless, here, again, we see the transfer of the economic burden onto the individual.

Although governments attempt to govern education in a way that best suits the human resource needs of the national economy, the individual is still tasked with choosing between educational options that best fits the economic needs of the nation-state. A nation-state based in an international community and connected through the global forces of a liberal and neo-liberal capitalist market. As mobility of capital increases, so thus the need for competitiveness. This is why, together with the spread of neo-liberal thinking, we have seen the entrée and spread of internationalization in higher education in countries like The Netherlands and Japan over the last decades, as I discuss in the next chapters.

Chapter 3 – The Development of Higher Education and the Modern University in Japan

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the development of higher education in Japan, and focus on the beginnings of modern education while tracing the dynamics that have influenced Japan's national system of education up until the end of the 20th century through, for example, the nation-building process and the onset of economic liberalism. The chapter starts in the late 19th century, and describes how education was envisaged by the Japanese elites who were responsible for the implementation of national education, and how their ideas have international origins.

The chapter continues with a description of the factors that have led to a change in how national education was structured in the post-war era, over the course of the American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952). Finally, the chapter ends with the modern university as we now know it, and its liberal foundations as set forth from the 1970s, ending with the introduction of internationalization efforts in the 1980s, and the development of student exchange programs in the 1990s.

The Nation and The State: The Onset of Modern Education in Japan

Japan was not colonized by foreign powers over the course of the great colonial race leading up to the 20th century. This resulted in the country creating its own particular academic system, and reshaping its economy in a localized way, while still adjusting to initial onset of globalism. Starting with the industrial revolution, large parts of the world raced towards creating “modern” societies

in which the mechanics of the market reigned supreme. For Japan, which until the late 19th century had remained relatively inward-looking, this meant that opening up to global sources of economic power also entailed a sort of catch-up game in which it had to puzzle together a new national being, leading to a “cadre of reformists” looking to “transform feudal Japan into a fast-growing modern nation state by directing all of the nation’s energies toward the goal of catching up with ‘the west’”, thereby reshaping its own nation-state and government apparatuses (Schoppa, 1993, p. 1). This happened during the period that is historically known as the Meiji Era starting in 1868. This is also the point in time where Japanese policy makers started looking at education.

Just like there was no consolidated idea of a “Japanese nation” prior to the 19th century – there was only a collection of domains that were fairly autonomous in its rule-making systems and together consisted of a loosely federalized system – there was also no consolidated education system. When Perry’s infamous black ship entered Japanese waters, unleashing a civil war that would determine Japan’s future, Japanese elites started reconsidering their position in the world. There came a need for a stronger consolidation of the nation, and many pioneering samurai-elites agreed that education was an essential tool in doing so. Interestingly, the recognition of the importance of education was already clear in the early 1860s. Although covertly, several young elites from the Japanese highest class, the samurai, took the opportunity to study abroad before the country officially “opened” and despite strong restrictions on foreign travel.

Two key figures in the development of the national public school system, Hirobumi Itō and Arinori Mori “launched their careers as members of covert student missions to the West during

the 1860s, the last decade of the Tokugawa era” (Duke, 2009, p. 28).¹⁰ It took them a long time to bring their lessons back home, but both of them took up leading positions that would have them transform the country. As Duke neatly summarizes:

Their careers reached fulfillment nearly thirty years later with the completion of a public school system for a modern state in the Meiji era through the initiative of Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi and his minister of education, Mori Arinori. Although many other people made significant contributions to modern education, these two figures deserve special recognition. Itō Hirobumi, father of Japanese constitutional government, served as the first prime minister under a western-style cabinet when a modern school system was ultimately put in place. Mori Arinori, the minister of education often recognized as the father of modern Japanese education, was specifically chosen by Itō for his first cabinet to design and implement that system (Duke, 2009, p. 28).

For both Itō and Mori, their study abroad experiences became the bedrock on which they built their legacies. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the foundational work laid for Japan’s modern education was the result of an effort to gain knowledge from abroad, and apply it at home. Simply stated, modern Japanese education is the result of the internationalization of the Japanese knowledge economy. Of course, as Duke notes, there were many figures that played an important role in this educational transformation. It is therefore important to see whether this statement holds true across the board.

According to Nakayama, the development of Japan’s modern academic system can be roughly divided into two phases. The first is the window-shopping period, “in which many Western models were explored and some partially adopted.” The second phase consisted of a more

¹⁰ In this paper I use the first name, family name order for Japanese names. Name order as given in quotations will remain as they are given in the original text.

full-fledged adoption of education models, which Nakayama calls the “involvement” mode of adopting Western ideas into national education (Nakayama, 1989, p. 97).¹¹

The first phase of window-shopping already made its start in the late 1850s and 1860s. Foreign nations from predominantly Western countries were invited to come to Japan for employment in a variety of fields. Having held a long-standing trading post in the south of Japan, in Nagasaki, the government tried to invite Dutch nationals first. Establishing a school of naval studies in Nagasaki, quite a few samurai traveled from different parts of the country to participate in a two-year programme given in Dutch. Nevertheless, the Dutch were increasingly replaced by teachers from Great Britain, as British merchants were proactively engaging with different parts of Japanese society, and it gradually became clear for the Tokugawa government that they held a stronger position globally than the Dutch. Slowly but surely, the population of French also increased, leading to a sizeable European presence even before the Meiji Era started (Duke, 2009, p. 26).

When looking at the second phase, we see the emergence of what we can dub Meiji Era schooling: an emphasis on educating the nation’s elites and (a newly formed) general public by emphasizing the dissemination of knowledge. For the general public, this consisted first and foremost of basic knowledge required for someone to become an active participant in the newly formed nation-state. Children, regardless of their background, were increasingly taught the skills (or; “enlightened”) that were needed to facilitate the larger movement of modernization of the

¹¹ This idea of splitting the development of Japan’s educational growth into phases is helpful, but we need to realize that they overlap chronologically at some points.

country as a whole.¹² I use the term modernization here in the same fashion as was used in the decades following this initial transformation: a national movement towards industrial society and the adoption of mass governance techniques.¹³

Moreover, a select group of elites were exposed to Western knowledge, including but not exclusively law, economics, and engineering. A number of these elites were, in turn, shaped into “the select few who were to lead the state as the core members of the central government.” In essence, “Meiji schooling’s foremost goal was to create human resources for the state” (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, pp. 47-48).

The international aspect of the development of education during the Meiji Era cannot be understated. When Japan repositioned itself in order to revolutionize its current system, and switched from the shogunate-system led by elite samurai-warriors, to the imperial system where the emperor stood at the top of the national government, the so-called Charter Oath was promulgated under the banner of Emperor Meiji, at the time only sixteen years old. Symbolizing his direct participation in national politics, these five articles contained in the Oath were to chart the new direction Japan should head towards as a nation-state. For education, the fifth article became immensely important:

¹² Enrollment numbers remained low during the initial stages of setting up the public school system for a variety of reasons, despite these efforts. It was not until later decades that mass education picked up and mandatory schooling became a part of the lived realities of citizens.

¹³ There is a long and valid discussion on whether or not “modernization” is conflated with “Westernization”, which to a large extent holds true, especially in the case of Japan. Japanese law makers and policy makers mostly looked to Western models of education in constructing their own ideal system. Nevertheless, they maintained local practices, often the result of earlier practices imported from China. The whole discussion on the conflation of these two terms, however, falls outside the scope of this work.

Among the five so-called oaths or declarations of intent of the new government, number five ultimately became the most important. It symbolically marked the end of three hundred years of isolation and the opening of the country (*kaikoku*) to the international community: “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, so as to strengthen the foundation of Imperial rule” (Duke, 2009, p. 47).

The inclusion of “throughout the world” would mean that practices of government of governance would be gleaned from outside of the country. This article became the motor for the country’s interaction with foreigners and foreign countries.

Although the modernization of Japan itself can be dated to the restoration of imperial rule in 1868, as the Meiji Restoration denotes, historians of education have widely argued that the start of modern education began with the issuance of the country’s first national education plan, the *Gakusei*, in 1872. This was the first document to address the need for educating the public using a formalized system of educational institutions, with a newly formed Ministry of Education at its center. According to Duke, the *Gakusei* can be appropriately read as the First National Plan for Education, and is by far “the single most important document in modern Japanese educational history” (2009, p. 1).

The Ministry of Education was established on 18 July 1871, and was the generative force behind the 214 chapters that made up the complete *Gakusei*. The document itself was quite detailed, with goals that included one university in each of Japan’s eight university districts, 256 secondary schools, and 53,760 elementary schools to be established throughout the country. The document covered everything from student numbers, examinations, to school fees (Yamamura, 1978, pp. 1-2). An interesting inclusion were study abroad opportunities for Japanese students. The idea of international exchange, as we can see, was part of the early development of modern education.

Thus, sending students for the purpose of foreign exchange not only became a principal practice, it was highly encouraged. Several missions abroad were organized in order to learn how other, mostly Western, countries operated. Studying abroad, however, was not the only means through which internationalization took place. Engineers, experts, and teachers from different fields were invited to come to Japan and work there, and several notable people accepted the invitation.

Among them we can find Guido Verbeck, a Dutch-American educator from Rutgers College in the United States. His presence as an educator in Nagasaki became significant, as his students included prominent future leaders. As Duke explains:

They include Etō Shimpei and Ōki Takatō, who founded the Ministry of Education [...] and served as the first and second directors, essentially ministers of education, setting the initial direction toward a modern school system; Katō Hiroyuki, first president of Tokyo University; and Ōkuma Shigenobu, powerful government leader as minister of finance and later prime minister who founded the first liberal political party as well as the distinguished Waseda University (Duke, 2009, p. 44).

In his position as a foreign educator and representing the internationalist policy adopted by the Meiji government, Verbeck became a prominent figure in the establishment of the modern educational system. His own classes went beyond simply teaching English. Teaching economics and politics, he was considered “a virtual encyclopedia of western knowledge” by his students (Duke, 2009, p. 44). Moreover, as an avid proponent of studying abroad, while remaining true to his Christian missionary ideals and hoping to proselytize students while making his imprint on Japanese society, Verbeck

took advantage of his unique position in Japan and his institutional contacts in the United States to make his second important contribution to modern Japan. He established a channel, a pipeline as it were, for Japanese students to study in America. His pivotal role in arranging for over three hundred young Japanese samurai, many from his classroom, to study at Rutgers College and a preparatory school in New Brunswick, New Jersey, from 1866 on rivals in importance his many other contributions to the modernization of Japan (Duke, 2009, p. 44).

It can be argued that Verbeck, in fact, by offering the opportunity for his students to study abroad, incidentally created the first large scale foreign exchange program for Japanese citizens. Many of those who participated later became key figures in the country's modernization (Duke, 2009, p. 46).

An example is Yoshinari Hatakeyama, who became the president of the famous Kaisei Gakkō in 1873 following Verbeck's retirement from the same position. This was to become Verbeck's most prestigious, but also final position charged to him by the Japanese government, and he returned to his missionary life after retiring (Duke, 2009, p. 46). The Kaisei Gakkō is, incidentally, where we find the origins of Japan's system of higher education. This was the first university in Japan. It was the first university accredited under the Gakusei in 1877, and was the leading educational institution in the country as it turned into what is now known as Tokyo University (Yamamura, 1978, p. 3); a university that still maintains its position as the most prestigious national institution of higher education today.

Another one of Verbeck's students, Hiroyuki Katō, not inconsequentially, became the first president of the university, showcasing the international ingredients present in the formation of modern education.

Right before the Meiji Restoration, the start of the Meiji Era, which officially took place in 1868, another prominent scholar was attempting to revolutionize education in Japan, albeit from a position outside of government. Yukichi Fukuzawa is still recognized today as the most influential non-official in the development of the country's modern system of education. Initially educated as a Dutch scholar, Fukuzawa traveled extensively to the United States in 1860, England in 1862, and back to the United States a few years later in 1867. Over the course of his travels, he picked up hundreds of English-language books that he took home to Japan.

Unsurprisingly, Fukuzawa saw English as the most important language globally, and his collection of literature greatly affected how he thought of education as a general means of steering his country towards modernization. These books, in turn, became part of the curriculum Fukuzawa offered at his private institute of education, Keio Gijuku, now known as Keio Gijuku University. His book selection became an influential factor in the education of a whole generation of Japanese elites who later took up leadership positions in the newly formed Meiji government (Duke, 2009, p. 22).

Many of Fukuzawa's students became prominent bureaucrats and politicians. Moreover, as the focus on English took up such a central role in the education offered at Keio Gijuku, the school eventually started producing a small legion of teachers who were to spread across Japan and become language instructors, taking with them Fukuzawa's teachings on the importance of education (Duke, 2009, p. 24).

Similarly, Verbeck's students spread across Japan, taking with them the internationalism that was inherent in the teacher's presence as an educator in Japan. One of his most influential students while he was still in Nagasaki was Shigenobu Ōkuma, as mentioned earlier, who not only became the founder of Japan's first liberal political party, but also went on to found Waseda University, one of Japan's most prominent private universities. This remains a private university, and it was the first of its nature to seek recognition as a "university" (*daigaku*). Although several educational institutions were seeking this recognition at the time, Waseda took the lead in this endeavor and was the first to actually gain the title of university in September 1902, only months after the promulgation of the Specialized School Ordinance by the Ministry of Education, a document detailing, among other rules, the various conditions schools needed to meet in order to become officially recognized institutions of education (Nakai, 2017, p. 103).

An important feature of Waseda's recognition was that it established a preparatory course that focused on language training for potential students, similar to Keio Gijuku. This course consisted primarily of English training, as this was considered an essential skill for receiving a proper university education. As admission to a private institute initially only required middle-school level training, the equivalent of a three-year high school education was offered in the preparator course. This particular course was supposed to be on par with the basic level of knowledge that students who went to imperial universities had (Nakai, 2017, p. 103).

This condition is a good reflection of the importance "foreign" knowledge had in the recognition of the government's educational mission and ideals, and the focus on English proves to what extent internationalization was already part of the national mission when Japan took its

first steps in setting up a general education policy. Only a few years later, around 1905, sixteen educational institutes had successfully achieved university status. When the more specific University Ordinance was promulgated in 1918, universities were obligated to abide by a specific set of standards in order to maintain their higher education status. As Nakai summarizes:

In contrast to the far less specific Specialized School Ordinance, the University Ordinance stipulated various conditions for obtaining approval under it, including the deposit of a substantial endowment, having sufficient numbers of academically qualified faculty, and possessing an adequate library and other facilities. The hurdles were set at a high level, but the reward for overcoming them was certification as a full-fledged university, formally on a par with the imperial universities. By 1927 twenty-two private schools had met the requirements for approval as a university under the University Ordinance (Nakai, 2017, p. 103).

Importantly, part of this mission towards establishing fully-fledged universities was still the international competitive aspect. As Duke explains: “Key leaders realized early on that the nation could not advance without achieving a scientific level comparable to that in the West. In particular the need for advanced military technology to protect the country from potential foreign invaders during the period of colonialism haunted policy makers” (2009, p. 24).

The pursuit of national education, therefore, was not only for the purpose of educating a population as the country advanced towards modernization, it was for the protection of the national polity. In other words, education became necessary for the protection of the nation-state. Part of the new system of education was thus geared towards inculcating the knowledge necessary for

students to be transformed into citizens, and their acceptance of the idea of the Japanese nation-state. Consequently, the teaching of nationalist ideals became a corner-stone of modern education.

One of the ways this was done was through what the authorities dubbed “moral education” or *shūshin*, a curriculum designed to teach ethics and loyalty to the emperor under the slogan “Rich Country, Strong Military” (Roesgaard, 2017, p. 26). This form of nationalism, however, became increasingly virulent towards the early decades of the twentieth century. As Japan raced towards World War II, and policy makers turned away from the idea of defending Japan from the world, to the idea of Japan becoming an aggressively expanding imperial power, the content of moral education, for example, followed suit.¹⁴

As the Pacific War started in December 1941, the Japanese government announced the Education Policy for Greater East Asia. Okano and Tsuchiya summarize this move well, when they explain that this policy “aimed at turning the whole population into the loyal subjects who would lead the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”. This was a space in which Asia would be “freed” from Western powers and placed under the leadership of Japan. National defense and the education of manpower for the purpose of industry and production became a principal target, second only to the recruitment of active military personnel, which by 1943 was officially part of national education (1999, p. 28).

¹⁴ Important to note here is that Roesgaard argues that moral education is not by nature ultra-nationalist or militaristic. These elements were added to an already existing curriculum in the hope of creating loyalty towards the nation-state (2017, p. 31).

The effects of pre-war nationalism on education in later decades were complex. In his extensive work on Japan's education, Schoppa posits that on the one hand,

the system's excesses—the government's complete control over the training of teachers, textbooks and the philosophy of education and its manipulation of all of these powers to turn the education system into a militarist tool—served to provide those involved on the progressive side of the post-war education debate with a deep sense of distrust and antagonism toward central government attempts to control the education system. At the same time, the pre-war model provided a 'tradition' of central control over education which was not readily conceded by the ruling conservatives, despite their willingness to reject the excesses of the pre-war authorities (1993, p. 29).

He continues to explain that the "Meiji system did not start out with extreme central control and nationalism; it tended towards liberalism in the first decade after 1868," but that by the 1880s, in reaction to fast industrialization and a perceived competition with Western powers, government leaders wanted to take control into their own hands, steering education into a more centralized direction.

When Mori came into his position as first education minister, the idea of educating for national power became thoroughly entrenched, and over the course of his four-year career before his untimely demise at the hands of an extremist in 1889, he set in motion the trends that eventually came to produce the Imperial Rescript on Education (Schoppa, 1993, p. 29).

As Schoppa continues, the rescript "calls to civic service ('offer yourselves courageously to the state') and in its emphasis on the special virtue of the Japanese nation [...] it added a new, distinctly Japanese nationalist element" (1993, p. 29). This wave of nationalism proceeded to develop into its virulent form by the early 20th century, and reached its peak during the outbreak of World War II. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know Japan lost the war and was

subsequently occupied by Allied Forces (mostly US forces) after 1945 and right into the early 1950's, drastically changing the country's political and socio-economic constitution. Importantly, following the defeat of Japan, and fearing a resurgence of virulent ultra-nationalism, US occupiers attempted to wipe out any remnants of militarism in Japanese education. One of the ways they tried to do so was through the removal of moral education. Although this particular curriculum reappeared immediately following the departure of most US occupying forces in 1952, and still remains today, the immediate post-war period did see large changes taking place in education that are still present today.

Japanese Post-war Education

One of the first points on the agenda for the Allied Occupation forces was overhauling the ultra-nationalist institutions entrenched in Japanese society, and introducing democratic replacements, in essence attempting to establish a democratic society and state. With the introduction of the Fundamental Law of Education, “the fascist-tinged classroom policies of the Imperial era” (Lebowitz & McNeill, 2007) were swept away, and replaced with a more democratic system of education.

Education played a central role in radicalizing the Japanese populace leading up to the war, especially regarding the training and militarization of youths. Schools and universities were seen as agents of this process by the occupying forces, so a democratic society would require these institutions to radically change. This included the expansion of compulsory schooling to nine years, in order to educate Japanese citizens about what it meant to become a citizen of a democratic society (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p. 48). As Schoppa explains,

following the war, the reforms carried out under the Allied Occupation succeeded in creating a more egalitarian and democratic education system, making it even more efficiently meritocratic at a time when the nation needed skilled workers to power its post-war recovery (Schoppa, 1993, p. 1).

Importantly, as Schoppa continues, the post-war era saw the university in Japan take on a leading role in the development of the new economy through the education and training of masses of students. Before the war, universities, under education laws, were granted their status on the basis of specified educational missions, as the case of Waseda above shows.

In contrast, universities were categorized and accredited under a single policy following the war. The Fundamental Law on Education included the policy that universities served the purpose of researching and teaching, and this meant the introduction of four-year undergraduate programs, graduate and post-graduate degrees, and general and specialized education curriculums (Yamamoto, 2004, p. 112). In other words, a structured system of generalized education that focused on the education of human resources for a recovering economy.

For the Occupation Forces, the introduction of new structures of education were essential to separating the state from education. According to Nakayama, Japanese education underwent a process of internalization, in which the adopted American model became increasingly domesticated, and replaced the pre-war model (1989, p. 109). Many of the changes introduced in this period stuck. Government control of universities did gradually return in the post-war decades. However, universities in particular enjoyed a high level of autonomy from government interference, with general university funds provided by the government allowing them to determine their own methods of instructions, departments, and faculty, all protected under the

newly established Fundamental Law on Education. Yamamoto elaborates, arguing that the relation of, for example, national universities to the post-war government could be best described by the principle of “no control, but support” (2004, p. 113).

However, some pre-war facets of higher education were effectively erased. For example, as Larsson shows, the idea of a state religion that was prevalent before and during the war, albeit arguably ineffective, was removed from official policy (2017, p. 229). Written specifically to prevent the Shinto religion from returning as an official state-sponsored ideology, and as fuel for ultra-nationalist sentiments, the newly written Constitution of Japan included in Paragraph 3 of Article 20 the phrase: “the State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity” (Larsson, 2017, p. 229; The Constitution of Japan, 1947). State sponsored religion as part of public education thus became obsolete, and, in fact, unconstitutional.

This does not mean that the changes implemented in the aftermath of the war were accepted, implemented, and remained unchanged. In fact, the withdrawal of the Allied Occupation forces in 1952 meant that the Japanese government was once again in charge of its own affairs, and one of the first orders of business for the Ministry of Education, or MOE,¹⁵ was regaining control over the public education system. Gradually, the state managed to regain this control, meaning that step-by-step educational policy was determined by bureaucrats again, similar to the pre-war period. Nevertheless, following the radical changes to Japan’s educational model after World War II, a

¹⁵ The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) was first known as the Ministry of Education (MOE), and later changed its name to the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (n.d.). It officially merged with the Science and Technology Agency into its current form, abbreviated as MEXT, in 2001. For purposes of brevity, the ministry in charge of education will be referred to in the rest of the text as MOE prior to 2001, and MEXT after 2001. See, <https://www.mext.go.jp/en/about/mext/index.htm>.

complete return to centralized education proved near impossible. Although attempts were made, the seven years following Japan's defeat saw changes not only in the structure of education, but shifts in the power relations within that structure.

The main political party in control of government in Japan during most of the post-war era was, and remains, the Liberal Democratic Party, or the LDP. In their position as majority party, politicians belonging to the party have taken up a leading role in formulating education policy. An inherently conservative party, Japanese education was greatly affected by the party's basic aims for education reform, although as Schoppa notes, internal politics has meant that their education agenda has been anything but consistent (1993, p. 54).

Regardless, a few consistent factors can be found in the post-war reforms of education following the departure of the Allied Occupation forces. Namely, the drive towards a more nationalist and utilitarian education system. The party has, in fact, sought to create "an educational system which is 'more Japanese', more orientated towards moral training" (Schoppa, 1993, p. 54). For a long period of time, the party's main aim was to reverse and undo many of the changes the Occupation Forces implemented, not only in education but in general, as they were deemed too progressive and left-wing. In this respect, the party's conservatism bordered on the reactionary. The party's politicians were, therefore, mainly concerned "with the goal of restoring national values to a central place in the post-war system" (Schoppa, 1993, p. 57).

Interestingly, however, the changes to education in the immediate post-war period gave the national Teacher's Union a strong position in negotiating with the central government, and by

extension the LDP. Deemed too progressive by the LDP, this association stood in stark opposition to the government's attempts at centralizing education. As Schoppa denotes,

it is significant that the history of post-war education politics has made the progressive opposition one of the leading forces defending the status quo. The Occupation left Japan with an education system favoured by the progressives, creating a situation in which the progressives sought to defend that system from conservative camp attempts to reintroduce earlier specialization and nationalism (1993, p. 256).

In essence, two major actors were vying for control of education in Japan. On the one hand there was the conservative, frequently reactionary LDP attempting to change the Fundamental Law on Education to fit their nationalist and utilitarian ideas of education, and on the other hand there was the Teacher's Union which was more progressive, and continuously attempted to block radical changes and a reversion to pre-war conditions. Social changes and the development of the national economy eventually led to another major actor joining the fray, especially over the course of the 1960s; the industrial sector.

In the late 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960's, commercial enterprises and the industrial community gained a stronger position in setting public policy, and lobby groups started demanding that education change in order to alleviate a growing need for trained professionals. Specifically, external pressure mounted on policy makers from companies who required a growing number of workers specialized in science and technology (Nakayama, 1989, p. 111). Simultaneously, the LDP made attempts to change the Fundamental Law on Education to create a merit-based salary-scale for teachers, in order to introduce more competition into the hiring of faculty, and consequently to weaken the hold the teacher's union had over education (Schoppa, 1993, p. 63). Thwarted by internal party pressure, the introduction of a merit-based ideal did grab

hold of university education as a whole. With the growing influence of industry, the late 1950s and 1960s saw a strong shift towards the massification and capitalization of higher education.

The idea of including merit-based ideas into education symbolized the utilitarian approach LDP policy makers used when it came to crafting education policies. As Schoppa argues, the LDP “has always sought to pursue the education policies which would best help the nation continue its economic advancement” (Schoppa, 1993, p. 64). The double-digit growth of the Japanese economy forcibly changed the context of education, and the introduction of liberal economic ideals gradually turned the university from an elite-producing system, to a system in which citizens were educated *en masse* to work in specialized fields of labor, and in doing so advancing the national economic growth mission. As Nakayama explains,

The prototype of pre-war Japanese universities was established in the late nineteenth century and the minor changes that evolved were not enough to meet the new demands of the mid-twentieth century. The American model was not necessarily new but the newer elements were taken up by the Japanese: one of these was mass higher education. If the elitism of the Imperial University and the Higher School still remained, it might appear to be grotesquely obsolete now. Other elements which were incompatible with Japanese culture were, for the time being, excluded from the reform process. Hence, decentralization was discouraged in the period of internalization that followed and layman control was totally dismissed. In higher education, academic decision-making power which resided in the Faculty Conference of each school remained intact.

As a consequence of this institutionalized autonomy, reformers within the government focused their energy on introducing new elements into education, so to avoid conflict with vested interests. Nakayama provides a good example, when he shows that, for example, “the University of Tokyo created a new faculty in the College of General Education where a new program of general education was designed and new experimental interdisciplinary disciplines like area studies were

located” (1989, p. 110). Instead of a fundamental restructuring of higher education, changes were thus gradually introduced by the implementation of new elements of education over the course of the post-war decades.

Although the structural changes in higher education came about in piecemeal fashion, they did take place. Especially in the 1960s, education was increasingly seen by policy makers as the primary means of socializing the population as citizens, with the goal of creating the human resources required for sustained, and rapid, economic growth. National economic growth under the so-called National Income Doubling Plan – a plan that lived up to its name – was the impetus for higher education to massify, and external business lobbies such as the Japan Federation of Employers (*Nikkeiren*) took every means necessary to pressure universities into changing curriculum to serve their human resource needs. The rapid growth of heavy industry, for example, required an army of specialists, engineers, and other skilled workers. Effectively, higher education morphed into a human resource producing machinery for sustaining national economic growth. As Okano and Tsuchiya explain:

The plan was based on the then popular human capital theory, which assessed education in terms of its contribution to the economy, but which undervalued individual human development. The education budget was thus allocated to the areas that were considered to maximise economic output; and educational costs were borne by individuals (i.e. parents) who, the theory claimed, would receive due return from the education that they invested in (1999, p. 39)

With the movement towards the individualization of education costs, the introduction of education as a means for social mobility in a capitalist economy, and the socialization of citizens for national economic benefit, in other words: the focus on human resource development, it is clear that the

late 1950s, and especially the 1960s, saw the introduction of liberal economic ideals into higher education.

The main commission in charge of formulating education policy, the Central Education Council, working under the auspices of the MOE, was also on the receiving end of growing pressure from the powerful Economic Council. Consequently, the Central Education Council took up the mission of human resource production. Low skilled workers were to be developed into high skilled workers, or “high level human resources”, and education would be the main means to do so (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p. 39). The LDP’s role in this council was also significant, and its effects were felt in the Council’s attempt to introduce emperor worship and patriotism back into education by publishing a document titled “The Image of the Ideal Japanese Person,” detailing the attributes a Japanese citizen should strive towards (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p. 40). The progressive Teacher’s Union and other leftist intellectuals vigorously opposed it, fearing a return to pre-war ultranationalism, and the document failed to gain any traction. It was nevertheless clear that the Council was working under a nationalist and utilitarian ideology, ultimately finding its expression in the liberalization of education.

The Modern University from the 1970s and the Global Economy

Around the 1970’s, it became clear that Japan had successfully developed its economy to the point of saturation. Economic growth had led the country into a position of world leadership, having become one of the strongest in the world. As the world’s economy globalized, the economic needs of Japan also shifted towards more specialized, competitive demands. The heavy industries that propelled the economy to its contemporary position were increasingly less viable options for

maintaining growth, as labor costs increased and the domestic environmental impact became glaring. The Japanese government was thus forced to shift the country's industrial structure away from these industries, and focus on technological and scientific development. The domestic market also became a problem, as consumer goods were not only produced less, but consumed more. A large consumer market developed in Japan, meaning that companies from abroad started pressuring the country to open up its market for their goods. International competition became an increasingly important element in domestic consumption as well.

As a result, the government had to readjust the education system to meet these demands. The "catch up" phase was over, and Japan needed to be on the forefront of change, not chasing it. Universities still largely relied on a standardized means of education, however, with examinations and standardized education forming the pulp of their curricula. In other words, students were educated as workers, not as innovators. Several major education reforms were proposed to fix this. As Schoppa summarizes:

Twice in the twenty-year period between 1967 and 1987, it embarked on major education reform initiatives. The first reform campaign, culminating in the publication of a comprehensive programme for reform in 1971, sought to introduce a greater degree of diversity into the education system. The second, centred on the activities of a cabinet-level advisory body set up in 1984, similarly tried to achieve a freer and more flexible education system capable of producing the type of workers required for the next stage in Japan's economic advance (1993, p. 2).

During the 1970's we also see the introduction of an important concept: internationalization, or *kokusaika*. This term gained significant traction in the first half of the 1980s, largely due to the educational reforms proposed by then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. He served as Japan's

Prime Minister and President of the LDP between 1982-1987, and despite his impact on the internationalization of higher education in Japan, was a conservative, often reactionary, nationalist.

Under his leadership the government introduced the “Project on welcoming 100,000 students from overseas”, a project that, as its name suggests, focused on attracting foreign students to study in Japan. Although critics, including some members of the National Council on Education Reform established by Nakasone himself, saw this plan as a threat to “the preservation of Japanese identity, national unity, and economic power,” the plan found broad support as a means to do exactly that which it promised not to do, preserve the aforementioned by training future generations of Japanese citizens to become so-called “cosmopolitan Japanese” (Lincicome, 2005, p. 191). The plan was thus supported, and so popular, that even through the LDP agenda, it has significantly shaped educational policies ever since (Rose & McKinley, 2018, p. 115).

This seemingly contradictory notion of preserving a nationalist ideology while engaging in internationalism is likely facilitated by what we can now understand as the underpinnings of the project: the concept of “healthy nationalism” floated by Nakasone. Education, of course, was the vehicle through which this healthy nationalism needed to be spread. Hood uses Nakasone’s own words to explain what he meant with this:

It is important that we unite in peace and culture around the Emperor, that we contribute culturally, politically, and economically to the rest of the world, that we join together with other nations in seriously considering these issues, and that we share our prosperity with the rest of the global community. Yet we cannot do any of this unless we are also confident of our own identity. A nationalism that endeavours to foster self-identity in this sense is a completely justifiable nationalism. And we must teach this through education (Nakasone, 1987, as quoted by Hood, 2001, p. 48).

As Hood continues, “[i]n short, ‘healthy internationalism’ is not just concerned with Japan’s relations with other countries, it is ... concerned with Japanese identity.” According to Hood, Nakasone points towards a singular cultural identity. This is a form of ethnic nationalism that mimics the nationalism of the LDP throughout the post-war period. Internationalization of higher education, in fact, was part of this idea of establishing a “healthy” form of nationalism. Of course, this form of nationalism is just a banal and conservative nationalism covered with a veneer of liberal and neo-liberal semantics – being part of the advancement of the Japanese nation-state and its economy – that makes the international aspect digestible for the bulk of conservative politicians who made up the decision-making body of Nakasone’s base, cabinet, and party.

In August 1984 the National Council on Education Reform was established by Nakasone to investigate the current state of higher education in the context of a changing economic environment. The goal of the council was to “inquire into, and recommend on, the education reforms that Nakasone had envisioned” (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p. 211). The council itself was provisional in nature, and only reported back to the cabinet. It consisted mostly of business representatives, bureaucrats, and intellectuals loyal to Nakasone. In fact, business groups, including the Kyoto Group headed by National Panasonic, and Nakasone’s personal advisory council took up the bulk of the council’s membership.

Surprisingly, no education experts were invited to come on board. The council’s activities were separated from the MOE, and its target was to formulate large scale reforms that would lead to the further liberalization of education. The internationalization, as expressed in the 100,000 foreign students project, for example, was part of this process. As Okano and Tsuchiya explain:

“The proposed ‘internationalisation’ of education is problematic. It was interpreted only in terms of the global moves of private companies, contains elements of nationalism, and does not refer to education for world peace and disarmament” (1999, p. 212).

In fact, the reforms were mostly aimed at allowing industrial interests to move into higher education and increase their influence on the formation of future policy. Moreover, as Hood explains, “[w]hat Nakasone and others also wanted was a Japanese education system that had no part that was forced on it by foreign authorities, as many perceived to be the case with the education system established” (Hood, 2001, p. 51). The “internationalization” effort was thus simply an effort to reassert Japanese nationalism within an international context, and one that required a deeper engagement with the global economy without losing touch with a so-called Japanese identity.

A look at Nakasone’s personal views on education are enlightening if we want to figure out why higher education evolved towards a market-based, liberal structure. In the book, *A Theory of New Conservatism* (Atarashii Hoshu no Ronri), he lays out his five key educational principles: “‘*jinkaku-shugi*’ (individualism), ‘*kokumin-shugi*’ (nationalism), ‘*kokusai-shugi*’ (internationalism), ‘*jitsuryoku-shugi*’ (merit system), and ‘*chihō-shugi*’ (regionalism)”. In addition, Nakasone suggests reforming the eradication of the examination structure plaguing education, retraining teachers and reforming their unions, and investing in high level research (Hood, 2001, p. 33).

A common trend is visible here. Namely, the opposition to, and hope for reform of, the teacher's union; an organization standing in the way of strengthening nationalism as a primary means of education. Moreover, internationalism is introduced as one of the key principles of how Nakasone views education, but the concept is nevertheless preceded by nationalism, and likely his own ideal "healthy" nationalism; all conspicuously coupled with market-based, neo-liberal terminology, such as individualism and a merit-based system.

The policy makers at the MOE were quite accepting of the new policy direction as well (Schoppa, 1993, p. 38). When the National Council on Education Reform came back with a report on the state of education in 1987, it was clear that they, by and large, adopted Nakasone's view of a healthy nationalism, with all of its neo-liberal parts still intact:

From now on the Japanese must have a deep understanding, respect and affection for Japanese culture as well as be tolerant toward other cultures... It must be understood that a good world citizen [yoki kokusajin] is also a good Japanese [yoki nihonjin], and our education must teach people love for the country [kuni o aisuru kokoro] and a firm sense of the individuality of the Japanese culture as well as deepen the knowledge of the culture and traditions of all foreign countries (National Council on Education Reform, 1987, as quoted in Hood, 2001, pp. 51-52).

Implementing into higher education Nakasone's healthy internationalism as an ideological concept was not a passing stage either, as the following excerpt from this MOE white paper published in the mid-1990s shows:

We need to focus not only on the improvement of foreign language education but also on an approach that gives priority to the development of understanding and respect for the diversity of other cultures and lifestyles from the perspective of a thorough understanding of Japanese culture and traditions. It is vital that we strive to achieve further improvement on school education from this standpoint (MEXT 1995, as quoted in Hood, 2001, p. 52).

The eventual shift towards an “international education” as proposed by the council, and adopted into policy by the MOE, was not necessarily aimed at creating an open Japan, in which diversity and multiculturalism are the central tenets, nor the realization of the global village-idea expounded by, for example, American-centric neoliberal globalism. It was a pragmatic combination of a neo-liberal economic doctrine and the wish by a conservative political elite to cultivate a sense of patriotism and a strong national identity among Japanese students (Rose & McKinley, 2018, p. 115).

Internationalization, in essence, formed a vehicle through which Japanese students were able to assert their national belonging, and Japanese national identity could be exported abroad, or consumed by foreigners in Japan, for economic gain. Or, as the text itself says, internationalization needs to be seen “from the perspective of a thorough understanding of Japanese culture and traditions”.

At the same time, the internationalization of higher education, in particular, was considered through a market-based lens. Universities had to compete domestically, and reorient themselves to compete internationally as well. This had two aims: 1) improving the quality of education, in comparison to other countries’ universities, and 2) improve the position of Japanese universities in global rankings. It is important to note here that universities faced two hurdles in the implementation of the council’s recommendations: a decreasing and aging population, and the lack of English-language programs (Rose & McKinley, 2018, p. 115).

It is interesting to note the importance of English in this step. At the tail end of the 20th century, this remained one of the main impediments for the thorough implementation of many internationalization programs. Nevertheless, with foreign exchange policies set in motion, large numbers of international students started pouring into Japan, for better or worse. In order to address the issue that emerged, MEXT initiated the so-called Short-term Exchange Programs in English in 1995, in what according to Rose and McKinley was the ministry's first funding scheme for national universities to develop courses with English as the main language of instruction (2018, p. 115). Nakasone had already emphasized this aspect when he first floated the idea of educational reforms, although in his perception this was mostly to communicate to the world a positive perception of Japan, rather than the other way around (Ishii, 2003, p. 87); a one-way street of communication, would be an apt metaphor.

Coda

This, in the end, might be the best example of the state of higher education in Japan at the end of the 20th century. Japan had, over the last two centuries, developed a consolidated system of higher education for the benefit of national interests. In doing so, policy makers looked at the examples of other countries as they developed their own system. By inviting foreign teachers, and sending students abroad to learn about how education was structured abroad, predominantly looking at America and Europe, early modern Japanese elites were able to fashion their own form of higher education based off of existing models. The international aspect of modern universities can, therefore, not be understated.

At the same time, we see a development towards a more insular, inward-looking system of higher education as we pass through the early 20th century. Although the initial birth of the modern university was an inherently international business, with the state taking the lead, the nationalism of the early modern university transformed into an ultranationalist machine by the 1930s. This was to have surprisingly little effect, however, on how universities developed in the post-war era. The centralized system of higher education in pre-war Japan was gone, although the government, through decades of efforts, has managed to gain back some control. This, however, is not a reflection of a pre-war ultranationalist mission, but rather of the university undergoing a process of massification, with student numbers rising significantly as the economy boomed in the post-war decades.

Nevertheless, the university, an increasingly neo-liberal institute, faced internal issues that a conservative and nationalist political elite wanted to address. When Prime Minister Nakasone came into power, this mission finally, but only partially, came into fruition. The new mission of higher education: set yourself apart on the international stage by producing efficient, effective human resources that would be cosmopolitan in training, but patriotic by heart. Nakasone's nationalist internationalism took root, and the MOE, later MEXT, developed its policies alongside it. This is where we stand in this chapter, at the end of the 20th century, and the start of the 21st. A further analysis of how the “international” university developed in the latter century, up until now, will be done in the analysis chapter further down. First however: the next chapter details the development of the modern university in The Netherlands, and will show, just like in the case of Japan, that the “international” is part and parcel of its existence.

Chapter 4 - The Development of Higher Education and the Modern University in The Netherlands

Introduction

This chapter describes the evolution of modern higher education in The Netherlands as it developed alongside the nation-building process. As a direct result of foreign occupation and the need to establish a functioning state apparatus, the beginnings of Dutch modern education can be found internationally. The main documents establishing a framework for universities, for example, find parts of their origins in higher education models from abroad. This process of building education alongside the nation-state lasted throughout the 19th century, and into the 20th century.

Following the early 20th century, higher education in The Netherlands became increasingly scientific, leading to several Nobel Prize wins, that in turn led to a further internationalization of Dutch science, and thus universities (as the main place for conducting science). Following the war, The Netherlands, like Japan, underwent a long period of liberalization of higher education, with universities massifying, student numbers exploding, and universities attempting to become more autonomous under neo-liberal principles, but nevertheless adhering to nation-based policies. This process led up to the integration of European education under the Bologna Process, furthering competition among universities across borders.

The Beginnings of Modern Higher Education:

From the *Organiek Besluit* to the *Wet tot Regeling van het Hooger Onderwijs*

In order to understand the origins of higher education in The Netherlands, we need to look back at the late 18th century, and the developments that took place as the country was ruled by the French. Before this period, in fact, it is hard to speak of a country to begin with, let alone a consolidated nation-state. The seven provinces that made up the union that was later to form what we now know as The Netherlands, or during some periods as Holland, was simply an amalgamation of a divided people, with little in common other than their struggles against common enemies, whether they were the Spanish or the French. It was, however, rule under the French that set the stage for early Dutch nationalism and the beginning of a national system of education.

The start of higher education can be traced back to the first document outlining a national system of education, titled the *Organiek Besluit*, or the Organizational Decision (OB), introduced in 1815, two years after the French left. Importantly, over the course of the 19th century, Dutch nationalism gradually came to the fore. The elites in charge of consolidating the country under French rule, and subsequently in charge of forming higher education when they left, were acutely aware of the difficulties with establishing a functioning education system under a dysfunctional state. Nevertheless, they considered it a necessary step, and their first choice for modeling a new system came, almost naturally, from France.

The context in which these initiatives took place might be elucidating. Over the course of the 18th century, the international status of The Dutch Republic declined dramatically, and citizens were increasingly divided amongst themselves over a number of issues. After a revolution in 1795

and a series of French interventions, the Dutch community, as fragile as it was, underwent radical changes. A union of seven provinces that acted mostly in autonomous fashion transformed into one nation-state, and structures of governance transformed accordingly. Provinces lost their autonomy as a central state authority was built. Higher education, previously the domain of provinces, came under the purview of the state (van der Burg, 2012, p. 13).

Until the Napoleonic interventions, and the subjugation of The Netherlands under French rule, the governance of higher education was splintered not only among the provinces, but the balance of where these institutions were located was highly skewed. This is an important factor, because with the exception of the university in Utrecht, which was a city-based institution, all the rest were based in the provinces, often far from population centers. Leiden and Groningen were province-based universities, while Franeker and Harderwijk were based in rural areas (van der Burg, 2012, p. 15).

Consequently, when Louis Napoléon Bonaparte (Lodewijk Napoleon, for the Dutch) was installed as the King of Holland on 6 June 1806, one of his first orders of business was to reconsider the contemporary structure of higher education in the country. Several Dutch elites were tasked with doing an exploratory study of the situation, and were asked to produce short notes. One of the main actors in this process was Willem Bilderdijk, who concluded that the sciences in the kingdom had become deprioritized, resulting in a very singularly focused education system. The only two institutions of higher education that had enough prestige to attract enough students, in order to be able to afford offering a sciences curriculum, were the universities in Leiden and Utrecht. Scientists and experts were expensive at the time, and attracting them therefore required

a substantial income from student fees. According to Bilderdijk, other universities, such as Franeker in the north of the country, lacked these funds, and were therefore impeded from pursuing institutional growth, even if they were well-established institutions.

As an extension of this problem, universities lacked international exchange, according to Bilderdijk's notes. He argued that Franeker, for example, was considered a great institution within Europe, with universities in other countries modelled after it. However, communication with foreign institutions remained difficult. The British, for example, used a different version of Latin and Greek, making academic exchange difficult, and in Germany education was slowly moving towards the German (or versions of it) as the main language of instruction. The French, including the recently installed king, Bilderdijk concluded, saw the Dutch not so much as an educated people, but as a folk excelling in industry and trade. In short, he concluded, the system of higher education in The Netherlands was in dire need of a fundamental and thorough modernization (van der Burg, 2012, pp. 17-18).

Consequently, the Van Swinden Commission was established to investigate how higher education could be reformed. The now famous report, *Vertoog over de Universiteiten*, or Discourse of the Universities, was the final result, and was offered to the king on 24 June 1809, only a few years after Bilderdijk's scathing assessment. The king had instructed the commission to look at universities in other countries as examples for reformation. They did, and, unsurprisingly, they used the French Imperial University as their main source of inspiration. However, they also looked towards Germany, and the University of Göttingen. The chair of the commission, Jean Henri van Swinden (it was indeed named after him), was an admirer of the German system.

Nevertheless, he was not wholly convinced of the German model, as he concluded that the education on offer was too broad. A small country like Holland would not benefit from such a wide selection of courses and studies, and should be more modest in its aims. Before concluding that Dutch universities were, in fact, internationally renowned, and the model for many institutions of higher education outside of the country (van der Burg, 2012, pp. 19-20), the report fashioned itself as a recommendation towards centralizing education along the lines of the French Imperial University, a plan that was doomed to fail (van der Burg, 2012, pp. 25-26).

The failure of an Imperial-style university, and the departure of the French in 1813, meant that The Netherlands had to, for the first time, take complete responsibility for its own national system of education. Freshly off an occupation, and in the mood for reforms, Dutch policy makers, under leadership of king Willem Frederik of Orange, wanted to set right 18 years of continuous restructuring and political polarization done at the costs of a tremendous number of human lives and sums of money.

Although the king had a sovereign right to dictate new laws, he was still very much reliant on his advisors. And because of the constant renewals over the course of the French occupation, the public was not willing to accept radical renewals, forcing these elites to reintroduce a plethora of older traditional laws and customs. As a consequence, a strongly reactionary discourse ran through the establishment of the new kingdom. The design of the new state was, therefore, subject to two compromising but opposing forces: conservatism and progressivism. The new governing power, in their quest to find a balance between the two, tried to reform higher education in this context. The king, however, having only enjoyed nine months of higher education, could not be

pushed into deciding by himself the future of universities in the country. Instead, a commission was set up to inform him of what options he had. The commission received the royal decree to “hold on to the view, firstly, that the spirit of The Netherlands’ character and the attachment to old institutions must advance, while also considering the advantages of the partial imposition of measures that would be beneficial at a later time”¹⁶ (Slaman, 2015, p. 20).

Accordingly, many of the changes made during 1810-1813 under French rule were cancelled, and policy makers and governing elites were asked to reverse changes made under the direction of the *Verloof over de Universiteiten*. The governing elites now responsible for creating a new system did however rely on the same premise in their vision for national education; namely, a centralized structure, albeit without the presence of a centralized institution such as the Imperial University. A new commission was established, the Van der Duyn van Maasdam Commission, who were once again tasked with figuring out how higher education needed to be configured (van der Burg, 2012, p. 27).

This, eventually, led to what was to become The Netherlands’ most important document in the history of the country’s higher education, the *Organiek Besluit (OB)*. The OB was implemented on 2 August 1815, and was to stay in force until 1876, shaping the Dutch education system for years to come. Concretely, it institutionalized higher education as separate from other forms of education. It would, from 1815 onwards, consist primarily of so-called Latin schools, municipal

¹⁶ Translation by the author: ““(…) bestendig in het oog te houden, eensdeels, wat de geest van den Nederlandschen landaard en deszelfs gehechtheid aan alle oude instellingen vorderden, maar ook ten anderen, welk voordeel in de gedeeltelijke navolging van maatregelen van lateren tijden gelegen zou zijn.” (Slaman, 2015, p. 20).

athenea in Amsterdam and Deventer, state athenea in Franeker and Harderwijk, and through royal decree the state universities, or *rijksuniversiteiten*, in Leiden, Groningen, and Utrecht. Technical courses and studies were explicitly excluded from higher education. The whole policy was, although new, by and large a compromise between the old system and its conservative values, and demands for a new, reformed higher education system (van der Burg, 2012, p. 27).

The OB also formalized the so-called “propedeuse”, a preparatory study that was meant to generally “form”, or socialize, the student. The content was usually classic in nature, and included, for example, Latin classes, the language through which many subjects were taught at universities. The propedeuse was then followed by the main course, or “broodstudie” (lit. bread study, a metaphor in which bread replaces the main meal, thus representing the main curriculum in this case). This consisted of theology, law, or medicine studies.

Importantly, as Dorsman and Kneegmans show, this did not mean that students were enrolled at university so they could prepare for a job, or prepare for a practical application of their knowledge in their respective fields. In fact, the studies that students underwent were mostly theoretical, taught in Latin, and thus disconnected from actual practice. It was only halfway through the nineteenth century that Latin came to be considered archaic, and was gradually replaced with Dutch, a symbol of a slow, but steady, progression towards practical training becoming important in higher education (2011, p. 7).

The OB, however, did not emphasize this particular point. More than practical education, the decision was made that, for example, athenea, the pre-cursor or pre-enrollment version of

education (depending on the time period), were predominantly designed to instill a sense of taste, civilization, and learnedness. Not scientific knowledge, per se. These *athenea*, which were in part designed to include students who were not able to become full time university students (Knegtmans, 2011, p. 11), functioned as a more accessible form of education, thereby applying more practical skills within their curricula. This was a stark contrast with the “scientific base” (which was mostly theoretical) that universities offered.

In fact, universities were expected to prepare students for a position in the so-called *geleerde stand*, or learned elites. This was more or less a humanistic ideal through which mostly preachers, lawyers, and medical experts were trained, and it was mostly focused on inculcating encyclopedic knowledge, including that of recent developments. The role of professors was broad, according to Knegtmans: “they were responsible for the classical and general socialization of students. Moreover, they saw themselves as moral leaders of students, who were tasked with their personal development” (2011, p. 11).

The OB thus comprised quite a confusing concoction of rules and laws that dictated higher education. In the end this did not help much in centralizing education, nor did it progress much beyond the previously existing, older, more conservative methods of education (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 120), as is evident in the presence of Latin as a language of instruction. Nevertheless, in a roundabout way, the OB shows a clear distinction visible between the university as a scientific institution, albeit mostly theoretical, and other institutions which focused on more practical knowledge. It also paved the way for a more progressive nationalism in The Netherlands. Latin, although essential to higher education at the time, was to be slowly replaced by Dutch. According

to van der Burg, the period following the introduction of the OB can thus be understood as the final piece in the state-making puzzle following a long period of foreign occupation (van der Burg, 2012, pp. 45-46).

The second half of the 18th century saw the first signs of a consolidating imagined community called The Netherlands, or as van der Burg calls it, a “consciousness of a fatherland”, and this was carried to the public in part by professors. This became an increasingly conspicuous movement during the 1830s and 1840s, when a more explicit form of patriotism took a hold of the region. This, in turn, was to become to forebearer of the ideological Dutch nationalism of the late 19th century (van der Burg, 2012, pp. 45-46).

Higher education, already from its beginnings, can nevertheless be understood as part of a process of nation-building and state-making. It was part of the French attempt to consolidate the Kingdom of Holland, and after the French left, it became part of the mission of consolidating education under a national umbrella by governing elites. Moreover, the position of the university was consistently considered in light of its international standing; comparisons were made between models, and the reputation of educational institutions played a large part in how the national system of education was to be shaped. It is without a doubt that internationalism was a critical factor in the development of modern higher education in The Netherlands, as both the OB and the *Verhoogde Universiteit* exemplify. It is important to note that this was part of a developing process of building a functional state mechanism, in the context of a gradually developing imagined community, and national consciousness.

In contrast to the importance of the international standing of Dutch universities, or the role foreign universities played in modelling a new domestic system of higher education, there is little known about the practice of foreign exchange in the form of student mobility in the early modern period. Very little is known prior to the 19th century, with only a few individual cases having come to light via autobiographies. According to Dorsman, a systematic analysis of the student registries of foreign universities remains to be done (2009, p. 22). Among the few of whom we do know, several important figures make their appearance.

For example, professor Christiaan Bernhard Tilanus, who finished his doctoral program in Utrecht, made several study trips with fellow students to France and Germany, reporting back his findings (Dorsman L. , 2009, p. 22). Although this group consisted of only three members, and others attempting the same were scarce and far between, they did start to form a core group of future professors and medical experts that became influential in the design of their own institutions, and the advancement of their respective fields. Dorsman assumes the group of students coming from abroad to study in The Netherlands must have been even smaller. In addition, there must have been quite a variation in quality of education, resulting in the more prominent universities attracting more students (2009, p. 22).

Although not at the scale of the modern age, therefore, international exchange was present. Together with the importance of the international world in the determination of higher education, as we see above, we can argue that there was a level of internationalism already present in the late 18th to early 19th century. According to Dorsman and Knegtman, this form of “academic internationalism” used to be the most normal practice imaginable (2009, p. 7). As they argue:

From the 12th century up until today the university has been an international matter. In search of knowledge and insight students and scholars traveled across borders. Those who did not think or work internationally, did not actually participate in the world of the university (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2009, p. 7).¹⁷

This did evolve into a more tense situation as Dutch nationalism took shape over the 19th and into the 20th century, however. When the liberal political class took power in 1848, a new wave of modernization was set in motion. This included the renewal of educational policies, which by then were considered to be outdated. Discussions suddenly emerged that went beyond the more humanist focused university of the early 19th century. Nevertheless, the university, as organized along the lines of the *Organiek Besluit*, proved resilient for years to come (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 120).

When, in 1868, the Minister of Education, J. Heemskerk, proposed a new law for national higher education, he attempted to redefine it as such: “Higher education constitutes the formation and preparation of the independent practice of the sciences and the fulfillment of social endeavors, of which a scientific education is required” (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 121).¹⁸ Although this definition does clearly steer away from early 19th century ideas, we can also spot the clear articulation of 1) the focus on scientific education, and thus a shift in the primary goal of higher education, and 2) the introduction of society, in which the scientific education enjoyed by students

¹⁷ Author translation.

¹⁸ As quoted by Dorsman, translated by the author: “Hooger onderwijs omvat de vorming en voorbereiding tot zelfstandige beoefening der wetenschappen en tot het bekleeden van maatschappelijke betrekkingen, waarvan eene wetenschappelijke opleiding vereischt wordt.”

must find its use. It is a first glimpse into the liberal university, introduced by, unsurprisingly, an increasingly liberal government.

It would take another 8 years before this definition was implemented, in 1876. However, it has come to define how higher education came to be envisaged in national policy making henceforth. The idea of the university as a place for scientific education was thoroughly established, and with it came the introduction of the various disciplines that were part of the scientific field. Students, as a consequence, became the practitioners of science for the benefit of society (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 121; Knegtman, 2011, pp. 11-12).

In fact, 1876 was a pivotal year in the future organization of higher education in The Netherlands. It saw the introduction of the *Wet tot Regeling van het Hooger Onderwijs*, or the Law for the Facilitation of Higher Education. One major change this law enacted was regarding the role of the professor and educational staff. No longer were they simply beacons of knowledge: their role was to be determined through a redefinition of their place in the university. In fact, it is known now that most of the professors, who engaged in teaching at the university, were barely engaged in science, let alone the practice of scientific research; or what we would start calling scientific research in the latter half of the 19th century (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 115).

The 1876 Law for the Facilitation of Higher Education narrowed the role of the professor at the university significantly, as the new mission of these educational institutions was “the independent practice of the sciences and the fulfillment of social endeavors”, neither of which they were trained to do, let alone able to fulfill themselves. In practice, it meant that professors, and by

extension the universities, were now specifically tasked with preparing students for jobs, not simply a position in the upper echelons of Dutch society (Knegtmans, 2011, pp. 11-12). Although, it needs to be mentioned that enjoying higher education during this time still meant someone was well off, even if they were not directly part of the landed nobility or the patriciate. Nevertheless, it meant that students and their education, at their respective institutions of higher education, were measured by the value of their future jobs, and their contribution to the nation.

The 1876 Law ended up being quite beneficial for the development of the sciences in The Netherlands, as the early 20th century proved: the period was later dubbed the “Second Golden Age of The Netherlands”, following the first Golden Age, one that saw the subjugation of large parts of the world under Dutch colonial rule, the accumulation of wealth from trade and slavery from these regions, and the flourishing of Dutch arts and culture. As Dorsman quite succinctly states about the effectiveness of the 1876 Law, “if we would determine [its success] from the large number of Nobel prizes around 1900, and the great [international] prestige of Dutch natural sciences, we can say that is correct” (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 121).

In fact, only three laws can be categorized as having been pivotal for the recalibration of national education policy in The Netherlands. And it would be years after World War II until this took place; in an era in which the university and high educational policy would have no choice but to change and adapt to a growing economy, an increasingly globalized world, and importantly, the massification of high education itself. For this, I turn to the post-war era in the next section.

Higher Education after World War II: The Massification of the University

Higher education up until the war saw changes mainly in its constitution. The focus on the sciences had produced a range of successes, as described above, and had given The Netherlands a place among a global elite of countries that became increasingly invested in a technocratic form of governance. Despite this development, the Dutch university *an sich* did not massify as it did in other, mostly surrounding, countries. This process came in later, and followed the economic boom of the post-war era.

Following World War II, the Dutch economy underwent a resurgence of sorts, in which a flurry of new policies aimed at liberalizing the national economy started affecting every aspect of society. For the university, this meant a growing pressure to produce students who matched the needs of companies. Large company-based associations grew alongside the economy, especially in the 1950s, and started complaining relatively early on about how students who graduated university were too old and specialized, and thus less malleable, less flexible. The courses given at universities took too long, and focused too much on a specific subject. In contrast, companies required broadly shaped academics who had a skill set that could change according to economic needs. Instead, they received scientific researchers (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2011, p. 8).

Students also started applying to university *en masse*, even though the institutions were not built for such growth. This started even before the post-war birth wave, or baby boom, reached university-going age. The Dutch parliament was holding acrimonious discussions about subjects pertaining to this bottle-neck on the economy. For example, shortening the years required to graduate came under review. Even governing members of universities started actively participating

in these public debates, and as the former president of the University of Amsterdam, Martinus Woerdeman predicted in 1956, the government would want to take an increasingly active role in the return on investment of universities, university courses, which would result in the limitation of the freedom of students within higher education as a whole (Dorsman & Knegtman, 2011, p. 8).

Another factor in this shift in higher education policy can be found in the preamble to World War II. This happened as policy makers and politicians, especially, searched for the reason and meaning of the war, and the devastating effects it had. As Dorsman argues, “some started arguing this was the direct result of the strong focus on *scientification* [verwetenschappelijking], a disciplinary focus, and on the other side the loss of the general socializing function of the university as a result of a [creating] technocratic-nihilistic humanoids, [a system] that was not armed against the allure of undemocratic ideologies like fascism and communism” (Dorsman L. J., 2011, pp. 121-122).

Simultaneously, there was a general consensus that the attempt at an independent, autarchic even, national course before and throughout the war leading up to German occupation, had failed the country. Politicians, therefore, started looking not only at the reasons behind the war, but started looking at how to prevent a future recurrence. This meant that one of the highest priorities on the national agenda was international cooperation, as the fault of the last war was determined to be a global trend of national isolationism.

As a result, “In the years following liberation, The Netherlands started concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements with many countries, in the military, economic, scientific and cultural

sectors” (Slaman, 2015, p. 171). Universities started playing a pivotal role in the international exchange of scientific knowledge. As Slaman shows, this started with the exchange of students, with a start made with Belgium on 16 May 1946. This was followed by treaties with more countries, which included providing scholarships for students from, for example, West-Germany, Yugoslavia, Israel, Spain, and Iceland (Slaman, 2015, p. 171). The international aspect of the university grew in importance.

However, this form of internationalism was seen through a very specific political lens. Policy makers saw the creation of an international environment in which achieving harmony as a matter of national security. A sentiment strengthened by decades of economic slumps and catastrophic wars. This was the reason that The Netherlands also concluded the 1948 Brussels Treaty for student exchange – with knowledge exchange a central component of the plan – which was to form the basis of military cooperation between Great Britain, The Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. A move that was, in part, also made in reaction to the communist takeover in Prague (Slaman, 2015, p. 171).

As Slaman shows, the social sciences became increasingly important, internationally relevant, fields of knowledge during this period. For example, the liberation from Dutch rule and independence of Indonesia left The Netherlands with a field of knowledge production that needed to find new applications, but that required an international outlet. Hence, the founding of The Netherlands Universities’ Foundation for International Cooperation (Nuffic) in 1952. Their most important task: transforming the inward-looking Dutch education system into one that was accessible for foreign students and staff (Slaman, 2015, p. 172). This institute remains important in the formation of internationalization policy in education in The Netherlands to this day.

Similarly, the newly established Institute for Social Studies (ISS) started offering English-language-based courses, focused on contemporary social and economic issues (Slaman, 2015, p. 172). This shows that the dominance of English as the language of the “international” was already established in the early post-war period. As increasingly more institutions of education started receiving students from developing countries, the Dutch government started developing more programs for scholarships as well (Slaman, 2015, p. 172), showcasing the need for metropolitan status (that started waning after the loss of the country’s main colony). The national political aversion to being relegated to an internationally peripheral status – truly indicative of a colonial power – had not changed. This affected domestic politics to the extent that the gradually modernizing postwar higher education system adopted a form of internationalism on the basis of it.

Ironically, the 1960s and 1970s simultaneously saw a rise of political protest, especially by students (Dorsman & Knegtman, 2011, p. 8). University buildings were occupied, students refused to attend classes, and professors refused to give them. All the while student marches and protests were held frequently. Nevertheless, this was the same period in which major changes were made to public education, despite a consistent public backlash to any and all forms of governance. Mainly, the Law of Scientific Education of 1960 was implemented. This, according to Dorsman, must be seen a sort of “transitory law, one that tried to overcome a number of organizational governance issues stemming from the 1876 Law” (2011, p. 125). He continues to explain that “the real revisions came after the implementation of this law, and was processed through big debates, reports, and commissions [...]” In fact, the actual 1960 Law, although seen as transformative, was important not because of its content, but because of the governmental transition that overtook the national system of higher education in the years that followed.

This was not a process that was purely political or governmental (let alone bureaucratic) in nature. Demographic changes, especially population growth, spurred on by economic welfare, came to be the defining factor of the development of the post-war university. As students started enrolling *en masse*, higher education had to brace itself for an inevitable scale enlargement. One that eventually led to the political process described above, as a result of a need to evaluate the quality of education as it proceeded to massify (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2011, p. 8).

The international aspect of higher education became increasingly important over this period. As Slaman shows, several scholarship programs were brought under the same umbrella, The Netherlands Fellowship program (2015, p. 172). This happened in 1966, even though throughout these years there were protests against this form of centralized education, with students often returning to their homeland without any means of putting into practice their studies.

This, in turn, resulted in the Dutch government funding students who were already enrolled in programs in their own countries, of which a steady rise throughout the years is visible; 281 students in 1964, to 750 students in 1966 (Slaman, 2015, p. 172). In the same period, The Netherlands started contributing to the European Development Fund, from which other scholarship programs developed (Slaman, 2015, p. 172). One major concern at the time, however, was that students would “stick around”. In some cases, therefore, the scholarship programs were designed to have students return to their home countries “to work on a better future there”, as was the case, for example, for students from The Netherlands Antilles (Slaman, 2015, p. 172). Here, again and quite clearly, we see an expression of the political workings as described above; a developing internationalism, but as seen through a lens of national interests.

The 1960s also saw the introduction of more scientific employees on permanent contracts. This made it possible for policy makers and universities to start experimenting with more labor-intensive ways of providing education (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2011, pp. 8-9). For example, working groups of students had been introduced at a small scale in the 19th century. However, they now became part of the regular curriculum of higher education, making students active participants in their own education. This was largely contrasted by the attitudes of professors who, up until this point, had been invested in a lecture-based system in which students were passive listeners. Curricula, in this form, were formalized and structured; this was, surprisingly, an innovative development.

Moreover, universities were fairly autonomous in how they structured their courses before the war, leaving a lot of room for diversity in study, but at the same time creating large gaps in quality of education between different universities, and even different faculties within the same university (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2011, pp. 8-9).

This was a necessary development, according to education policy makers and the business community at large. The massification of higher education, especially in the 1970s, not only saw larger student numbers, but issues developing in the labor market. Companies required more skilled laborers, meaning that the education system had to adapt their specialized focus into a more general training, as described earlier. Dorsman showcases this when he writes about how this was expressed in, for example, university magazines:

This [development] was well illustrated by a university administrator in 1972 in [the magazine] *University and Applied University* [Universiteit en Hogeschool]: “Something that was completely passed by ... up until now ... is the fact that our society now needs more persons of academic level, who do not necessarily have to be educated as specialists in a specific area of expertise. People who can

see through the problems in their work environment, analyze and offer a solution... The more complicated our society becomes, the more people we shall need that can function at an academic level and can solve issues, people who can quickly understand the nature of their education and apply their knowledge and skills, which are often different per function, and quickly make this their own” (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 125).

In this statement, by someone working at a university and deeply involved in the educational process, we can see several factors coming to the fore. The most important one is the emphasis on the needs of society. As the economy liberalized, the connection between education and work skills increasingly becomes the main impetus for change. The university, and higher education in general, are no longer a pursuit of purely scientific purpose. Instead, the economic needs of society, and by extension the national economy, are placed at the forefront.

Students are no longer required to become thusly specialized that they will contribute to the advancement of science, but they need to be skilled to the extent that they can provide labor for the advancement of the economy. The university, by consequence, is no longer purely a place of science, but now has the additional burden of producing human resources. Science-based skills, in short, are replaced by work skills.

The Modern University from the 1970s: School or Company?

This development towards creating skilled workers runs in tandem with the massification of education, as I have explained earlier. To exemplify: while there were on average around 30,000 university students enrolled in the 1950s, there were more than 100,000 students enrolled in 1970 alone. This demographic upheaval, as a result of the war ending and the economy booming, created

large problems for universities, where scientific researchers and university administrators suddenly had to expand their work beyond what they had originally signed up for.

The disconnect between the number of staff, and importantly, scientific staff that was educated well enough to teach classes, and the high number of students, became a growing problem. The quality of education dropped, and the focus on scientific research, which before this development was the main aim of the university, was downgraded in terms of importance on the educational agenda, both within and without the university setting. Many of those working at universities were now tasked with new goals, and new ways of working, leading to the job being done too little, too much, or quality-wise very poorly (Smit, 2017, p. 48).

At the same time there was an international trend towards disciplinary specialization. This is in contrast to scientific specialization, in which students were trained in one specific field and sub-field. Instead of focusing on a very specific corner of physics, for example, students were now trained in the entire field. Although the 1960 Law on Scientific Education attempted to address this issue and anticipate these changes, the law did not offer any structural solutions. Bureaucratic, organizational, or governmental restructuring was not part of it. The only part that did resonate with these newly developed social needs was the idea that education needed to inculcate in students, through their education, a “social sense of responsibility” (Smit, 2017, p. 48).

The incumbent Minister of Education, G.H. Veringa, according to Smit, just “let it happen for a long time, hoping that universities would create their own new structures of governance” (2017, p. 49) However, when this did not seem to happen, he decided to involve himself. In June

1969, he published a policy brief that was to radically change how universities were organized. This brief formed the basis of a new law, implemented a year later, in 1970, as *The Law on University Governance Reform* [Wet Universitaire Berstuurs hervorming], or WUB. The law was also a response to the many student protests that took place during the same period, but was, according to Smit, “simply a necessary step for structural reforms” (2017, p. 49). As he elaborates:

The most important facts of this [new law] were that the institution [of education] now required a full time and professional board of governance, and the institutionalization of the participation of staff and students in the organization of education and research, which was to be established by expert groups, faculty-, and university councils. This broke the traditional almighty powers of the professors within the university (Smit, 2017, p. 49).

This law, therefore, revolutionized the system of higher education in The Netherlands far more than the 1960 Law did, although it was formed on the basis of this previously established law. In fact, without the WUB, it would have been impossible to reorient Dutch higher education towards the liberal economic objectives that had become critical to the post-war economy. Breaking the power of the old university was therefore a necessary prerequisite, one quite effectively done when the WUB was ratified.

Interestingly, part of the WUB required the university to become more democratic in nature. Staff and students were mobilized to ween the governance structure away from the professors. This, of course, can be better understood if we remember the context in which this took place; one of student protests and the massification of education. Despite this democratization, the state took a larger share in the governance of universities simply by ratifying the WUB, and showcasing their authority over higher education. It set a precedent for government intervention, and a precedent for the further liberalization of higher education as a whole.

The massive protests of the 1960s resulted in other political changes as well. Following years of liberal, mostly conservative party-rule, the national elections of 1973 resulted in a big win for the social-democrats under the leadership of the newly elected Prime Minister Joop den Uyl. He established a socially progressive cabinet that looked to address issues of inequality. As he himself stated, he wanted to have a more equitable balance of “knowledge, power, and income” and reshape a country in which a mentality of industry had led to a “stingy society in which ‘having’ had become more important than being” (Smit, 2017, p. 53). For the university this also meant change, as he determined them to have led an isolationist existence, in which the main agenda had become to fulfill the needs of the national economy. Instead, he argued, they should be “in service of society and subject to its new values and norms” (Smit, 2017, p. 53).

Following the inauguration of Boy Trip as the minister in charge of education, the 1970s saw the universities become increasingly careful in their dealings with the government. The cabinet started demanding that research should benefit society in a social manner, rather than in an economic manner. Trip acted upon the cabinet’s wishes, but after years of struggling with reluctant universities, failed to conclude his mission with concrete results. Universities, in reaction to this development, started forming a more consolidated front. They started organizing, mostly to protect themselves from the interventions of the social-progressive government. This, ironically, created an environment in which universities did exactly what the social-progressives wanted, albeit in limited fashion: connect better to their own regions and re-evaluate the social role they played for the country. An example Smit gives of this can be found in the annals of Leiden University, which saw the implementation of further democratization of its system of governance,

and the creation of a university identity that was based on “openness and objectivity” (2017, p. 68), replacing the isolationist university-image with one in which, at least rhetorically, the institute was open to the people, and open to the world.

The WUB and the university protests, in this way, had a revolutionary effect on higher education as a whole, as universities gradually accepted their role as social agents, and their function in forming students in such a way that they connected to the needs of Dutch society and the national economy upon graduation (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2010, p. 9). For The Netherlands, and Dutch society, therefore, the homo oeconomicus was effectively born in this period. The university came to function not as an elite institution of education for a landed elite – and thus the education of elites for the functioning of the state and by extension the governmental body of the nation – but as a company that produced students fit for a growing, liberal economy.

In fact, Dorsman and Knegtmans make an excellent comparison of the development of the university into a sort of liberal economic machinery, when they argue the following:

A cookie factory. There is no better way to get an academic riled up than to compare the governance of a university to managing a cookie factory. Still, we talk often about the ‘scientific company’. The use of this terminology would then be explained away as transitory language use, but it is conspicuous how in the last few decades the term company is used when we talk about science and the university. Many practitioners of science have the feeling that they have become part of a system that is aimed at producing knowledge as efficiently as possible, and even make money doing so. And indeed, university policy documents are rife with terms like efficiency, excellence, professionalization, and improving return on investment. There is continuous talk about money, and organization restructuring and budget crunches follow each other in quick tempo (Dorsman & Knegtmans, 2010, p. 7).

“Efficiency, excellence, professionalization,” are the key terms in this argument. The university as a company. However, the reorganization of higher education did not stop here. The entire structure of a university education was still seen as outdated, taking too long to graduate, or focusing on the wrong things, at least from a liberal perspective.

To fix this, a new system was introduced in 1981, based on the international Bachelor-Master system. Called the *Law Two-phases Structure* [Wet Tweefasenstructuur], this law compressed the existing candidate exam [kandidaatsexamen] that took around two to three years to complete into a propaedeutic exam of one year. In addition, the doctoral exam was shortened to three years, effectively shortening a university education by years and making it possible to produce graduates more efficiently; solving the perceived problem of students being too old to enter the job market at a malleable age. The inherent goals of a scientific education, as they were established earlier, however, remained somewhat intact (Dorsman & Kneegtmans, 2011, p. 9).

At the same time, outside the university, the idea of a broad academic education gained traction. Although the trend towards discipline-based education had found fertile ground in The Netherlands, with the entire university-system now based on this idea, (over-)specialization was let go. The number of students had grown too much to keep this feasible, and the need to produce more and more skilled workers had put continuous pressure on universities. By introducing the two-phased system, this pressure was relieved. However, the idea that students needed to be autonomous practitioners of science had to be let go (Dorsman & Kneegtmans, 2011, p. 9), for the sake of efficiency. Rounds upon rounds of budget cuts and restructuring of universities followed suit (Dorsman L. J., 2011, p. 125), by and large for the sake of efficient human resource production.

Interestingly, the aversion of universities to the interventions of the socially-progressive cabinets in the 1970s resulted in them adopting increasingly liberal, and later in the 1990s, neo-liberal policies. While the progressives saw universities as too important to be left to their own devices, and universities banded together to resist their interventions, neo-liberal cabinets made their return to the power. The 1980s saw universities and other institutions of higher education praised for their autonomy, as it meant higher competition in the education-market place. This new doctrine, as Dorsman argues, was received by administrators “as a manna from heaven” (2011, pp. 125-126). This eventually led to a diminished importance of the older systems of university administration, and a chance for other ideas, including a less discipline-bound form of higher education, to take root (Dorsman L. J., 2011, pp. 125-126).

The formation of the university as a competitive company on an educational market also gave birth to university-based commercials and marketing-campaigns of the 1990s. Large budget cuts and the embracing of neo-liberal ideas a decade earlier had resulted in universities needing to attract more students to fund their activities. This was exacerbated by the onset of European Union integration and the introduction of the free movement of people.

As Europe increasingly integrated, and borders opened, mobility for students and researchers increased accordingly. It suddenly became possible to move across borders without visas or passports, but simply a car, bike, train, or even a walk was needed. When the European Union members started the Bologna Process in 1999, the final brick in the metaphorical international university of the 20th century was laid.

A good summary of what this moment entailed can be found on the website of the European Commission itself: “Under the Bologna Process, European governments engage in discussions regarding higher education policy reforms and strive to overcome obstacles to create a European Higher Education Area” (European Commission, n.d.). Simply stated, the process consisted of fully integrating the European education market under the befitting moniker of an “education area”, which meant that universities had to start standardizing courses and degrees, making it easier for students and researchers to move to universities in other countries.

What it also meant was that universities started competing for the same batch of students; the European student, hence the beginning of the university’s advertising campaigns and promotional activities. Although choices for educational content and the creation of new curricula were sometimes still based on quality choices, more frequently they were now based on marketing choices and economic attractiveness. University departments involved in matching market demands started growing, and have now influenced administrative choices on every level of higher education (Flipse, 2017, p. 71). This is where the university stood at the end of the 20th century.

Coda

In essence, Dutch universities have very little with which to differentiate from each other, with the notable exception of the technical universities that focus solely on so-called *beta*-studies: studies that are primarily hard sciences-based, in English better known as the STEM fields. Nevertheless, each university in The Netherlands can be qualified as a middle to large-sized university, which enroll several thousand up to tens of thousands of students. The private university market barely exists, with so few exceptions that they have little influence on national policy making decisions. The large national

universities have autonomized to the extent that they can be categorized as private universities in some cases, with some even shedding their original state-based nomenclature and titles, switching from, for example, State University [Rijksuniversiteit] to simply University (the only notable exception being the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, the lonely survivor of this name). The 1960 Law, in fact, forcibly changed universities to become legal entities, making them not only autonomous in name, but legally as well.

In addition, many of the universities offer a similar package of courses. Law faculties are abundant, as are medicine, social sciences, and a plethora of other disciplines. They profile themselves similarly, and coalesce in various fields of research. However, what remains important to note in the period leading up to the 21st century is that universities, over the course of the post-war decades especially, were never placed outside of the scope of national interest, whether in terms of the governance of education, or more broadly in the context of national economic development. Internationalism has been, and remains, part of this development: from looking inward and determining the quality of universities in comparison to other countries, modelling policy on the basis of other countries' national policies or systems of education, to student exchanges and human resource production in a standardized (European) area of education. How these developments connect to the international university of the 21st century is then important to understand, and is therefore the main focus of the chapter 6.

Chapter 5 – Theories and Methodology

Introduction

In this chapter I introduce the concepts needed to conduct the main analysis. First, I discuss discourse, and its multiple interpretations. Following a definition of discourse, I discuss the importance of contexts. As discourses are made up of statements that relate to each other, the context in which these statements are uttered is important for understanding how meaning is constructed. In turn, I talk about how power is utilized to construct certain truths within discourses.

Next, I explain what discourse communities are, and explain that the two case studies treated here, Japan and The Netherlands, are the two communities on which I focus in this work. In order to understand how the analysis works, I also explain the concept of political rhetoric, and give an overview of what a political discourse analysis is.

In the next section, this chapter provides an overview of the attributes of specific texts, concepts for analyzing language, and an outline of the research method. Here, I explain what kind of data I have collected and how this data set has been analyzed. Lastly, I discuss the methodological limitation of this study, before I proceed to the main analysis in the following chapter.

What is *Discourse*?

The concept of *discourse* can be confusing. According to the Cambridge Dictionary it simply means “communication in speech or writing” or “a speech or piece of writing about a particular,

usually serious, subject” (Cambridge University Press, n.d.). Necessarily, dictionaries are bound to provide definitions that are concise and easy to comprehend: they function as explainers for this exact reason. Nevertheless, scholars have taken the term “discourse” and expanded on it for centuries, even before the internet allowed us to search for definitions at a moment’s notice.

When Descartes published his famous work *Discours de la methode* in 1637, he meant to establish a new field on how to investigate knowledge (1978).¹⁹ He used the term *discourse* to symbolize his expression of ideas to a broader audience. Throughout the centuries following this publication, the concept has undergone several transformations.

Terms like “medical discourse”, “environmental discourse”, “social discourse”, and “visual discourse” all give back hundreds, if not thousands, of results when queried in online scholarly search engines. Similarly, the media has increasingly appropriated the term to encompass the general act of communication. This can mean communication between people’s, organizations, institutions, and more abstractly within specific realms (or “genres” as I explain below). To provide an example:

The discourse over artistic freedom reached fever pitch this year when the Aichi Triennale art festival pulled a statue symbolising so-called comfort women - girls and women forced to work in Japanese military brothels - after organisers received threats (Reuters News, 2019).

Discourse, here, does not specifically refer to an actor that communicates. Rather, it is about communication taking place concerning a specific topic, comfort women, within the context of

¹⁹ More concretely, of doubt and reason, culminating in the famous words “Je pense, donc je suis”.

artistic freedom in Japan. The term, therefore, functions more broadly than singular speech acts, or speech or writing between two or more actors, it points towards the comprehensive act of communication within a set field (artistic freedom). “Flexibility of definition”, might be an accurate description of how “discourse” is used by journalists.

In fact, the word discourse has even functioned to express the antithesis of communication: a breakdown of connectivity. For example, The New York Times’ publication of a series of letters under the title “Threats of Violence in Today’s Political Discourse” has come to stand for an increasing lack of inter-ideological communication in the United States. Although there are scholars who would argue that even the lack of communication is, within certain contexts, an expression, this does not undermine the fact that discourse has become a chimera, a symbol of potential meaning, rather than what the Cambridge Dictionary suggests: “communication in speech or writing”.

What then *is* discourse, if not the act of communication? It is worth quoting Wodak in length here when she explains that

[...] *discourse* means anything from a historical moment, a *lieu de mémoire*, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language *per se*. We find notions such as racist discourse, gendered discourse, discourses on un/employment, media discourse, populist discourse, discourses of the past, and many more – thus stretching the meaning of *discourse* from a genre to a register or style, from a building to a political programme. This causes and must cause confusion – which leads to much criticism and many misunderstandings (2008, p. 1).

Operationalizing the term as a methodological concept proves difficult. This makes doing an analysis of discourse less a practice – like communicating – and more a discussion about which came first, the chicken or the egg? The reality, of course, is complicated, and we know discourse is a multi-layered concept that involves complex semiotic, intertextual, intersubjective, and interdependent meanings. To make matters even more complicated, discourse is inherently about power (see below).

However, exploring the many complexities of discourse and its plural, discourses, is outside of the scope of this dissertation. To avoid the pitfalls of inoperability, specifically, the inoperability of definitions on which the methodologies used in my research rely, I suggest the following definition of discourse, before going into the more nuanced definitions of key concepts and terminology below. Following Jay Lemke’s definition, discourse here means:

[...] the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting [and] when the particular characteristics of these discourses is being made, a specific text is produced. Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings (Lemke, 1995, p. 7).

Moreover, according to Fairclough, a discourse is an “ordered set of discursive practices associated with a particular social domain or institution” and these share certain boundaries and relationships (1995, p. 12).

However, according to Foucault, there are methodological considerations we need to consider if we are going to analyze any texts, so that we may not fall into the trap of over-inclusion, and the pitfalls that come along with such a step. “Specificity”, according to Foucault, is needed

to determine the relations of statements as they are uttered within certain discourses, in certain settings. It is, namely, an impossible task to relate every statement to every other statement, or as per Lemke's preference: text, with every other statement or text. With the birth of new statements at each given moment makes the analysis of each single one an exercise *ad infinitum*. Foucault therefore continues by explaining that we need to establish an initial region of analysis, a region that might in practice be demolished or reorganized when this is necessary ((1969) 1989, p. 32):

[W]e must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it excludes. [...] we must show why it could not be other than it was, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of others and in relation to them, a place that no other could occupy (Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, (1969) 1989, p. 31).

Commenting on Foucault's point, Hall, furthermore, explains that discourses are produced in different institutional settings by many separate individuals, yet they are not "closed systems". He continues, "statements within a discursive formation need not all be the same." However, this does not mean any statement can be randomly assigned to a particular discourse. The relationships and differences between statements need to be regular and systematic (Hall, 1992, p. 292). In other words, there needs to be coherence. The next section explores how this is established through understanding texts, by placing these in their relevant contexts.

Understanding (Con)text

Text, as Lemke uses it, is not limited to letters on paper. If this were true, it would mean that a purely random sequence of letters would constitute meaning. A text is, in fact, “a monological stretch of written language that shows coherence”. This coherence, in turn, is “considered a mental phenomenon; it is not an inherent property of a text under consideration. Language users establish coherence by relating different information units in the text.” Texts are therefore a medium that provide a coherent sense of meanings. These can include informative texts, expressive texts, and persuasive texts, each conveying a different meaning through its structure (Sanders & Sanders, 2006, pp. 598-599, 605).

In order to understand what a text says we need to look at it in its context. This means we need to comprehend to which – other – texts it relates (*intertextuality*), what purpose it has (*intentionality*), whether a consumer of the text can understand it (*acceptability, conventionality*), what it contains (*informativity*), and its time and place (*situationality*), as explored in more detail below. In contrast to the coherence of a text, which is part of its constitution, these factors are external to it: they are part of the context (Wodak, 2008, p. 9). Meaning is not created or understood in isolation: context is an integral part of analyzing texts.

At the same time, establishing the limits of context is necessary, as the inclusion of an infinite set of texts into one’s analysis results, logically, in unending research. Even if this were possible, there are clear delineations that allow us to establish rules concerning which texts need

to be included, and which texts need to be excluded, in order to analyze a specific discourse. These are called “discourse communities”, and according to Barton, this is

[...] a group of people who have texts and practices in common [and] can refer to several overlapping groups of people: It can refer to the people a text is aimed at; it can be the people who read a text; or it can refer to the people who participate in a set of discourse practices both by reading and writing (1994, p. 57).

The concept is originally derived from the idea of “speech communities” in which members share certain linguistic rules. According to Swales, these groups are “composed of those who share functional rules that determine the appropriacy of utterances”. However, he continues to explain that a speech community and a discourse community can be differentiated by their focus, or goal.

In a speech community, linguistic accuracy, or rules and appropriacy, serve the need of members to communicate. In contrast, in a discourse community, communication serves the purpose of reaching certain goals, and language is used in a utilitarian fashion in the process. Membership to a speech community, Swales argues, are accidental, they are the consequence of “birth, accident or adoption”, while membership to a discourse community is gained through “persuasion, training, or relevant qualification” (1990, pp. 23-24).

Wodak gives as an easy example when she shows us that that, as an example, “a policy paper on combating unemployment, is a manifestation of certain rules and expectations according to social conventions.” A specific political group has a specific political goal, and uses texts and language to put forward their ideological concepts.

This political group, in turn, can be understood as a discourse community, but not as a speech community, as they share goals that they do not share with others, but share a language that they do share with others outside of their discourse community. Each discourse community, Wodak continues, “will develop their own goals, their own styles, their own genres and their own values” (2008, pp. 15, 17).

The world is not neatly divided into these communities, however, and it is therefore important to note that a discourse community can be “perceived as a diffuse group of individuals with different levels of expertise and changing social relations, whose communicative needs more or less coincide at different points of time” (Corbett, 2006, p. 31). More concretely, they can be identified using the following characteristics: 1) an agreed set of common goals, 2) mechanisms of communication that 3) provide information and feedback, 4) uses and possesses one or more “genres” (see below) in its communication, 5) has acquired a specific lexis, and lastly 6) has a significant number of members knowledgeable of the aforementioned (Swales, 1990).

It would be remiss, and methodologically disastrous, to skip over the concept of “genre”, as it is critical to explore this concept if we are to understand Swales’ six characteristics of a discourse community as given above, as he views discourse communities as groups that share linguistic rules, or functional rules (i.e., conventionality), that allow members of discourse communities to judge if an utterance is comprehensible (i.e., acceptability) (1990, pp. 23-34).

A genre, in its simplified form, are then the “particular categories of activity in particular types of social situations” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 14). They can be described as categories or

configurations (see, for example, Fairclough, 1995), or in intelligible terms: a genre is multitude of texts that share (linguistics) commonalities in meaning, such as policy documents, media texts, and parliamentary proceedings.

Power and Truth in Discourse

Now that we have established what a discourse is, how they exist in discourse communities, and how they are constituted by different genres, it is essential to explore what power is, how it plays a role in the dynamics of discourse creation, and how “truth” is established. First, however, there remains the question of how people located in specific discourse communities are able to understand meaning in discourses. For this I turn next to the concepts of “intertextuality” and “intersubjectivity”.

According to Halliday, “language is a product of the social process” and it has the potential to contain meaning that can be shared among its users. He continues, “language is a shared meaning potential, at once both a part of experience and an intersubjective interpretation of experience” (1978, pp. 1-2). What Halliday is attempting to convey is the shared nature of language: meaning is exchanged through the social aspects of our daily lived realities.

This, in short, is where intersubjectivity comes into play, as individuals have their own interpretation of meanings as expressed in language. There must always be a minimum of understanding, however, otherwise meaning is lost and language becomes dysfunctional:

Language is as it is because of the functions it has evolved to serve in people’s lives; it is to be expected that linguistic structures could be understood in functional terms. But in order to understand them in

this way, we have to proceed from the outside inwards, interpreting language by reference to its place in the social process (Halliday, 1978, p. 4).

This process is now termed “intersubjectivity”: the sharing of meaning via language with a basic understanding among its users.²⁰ If we then broaden this concept to the existence of texts, it becomes easier to understand intertextuality as well, as all texts are linked through the same process.

Moreover, discourses are linked through social processes, and the texts these produce. The interaction between discourses, whether community-, topic-, or genre-based, is subsequently called “interdiscursivity” (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008, p. 205). Simply stated: there is no such thing as isolated texts, statements, social processes, or discourses, as societies and their contexts constitute their continuous interplay. This is an important point to grasp if we want to understand how people come to believe in specific truths.

Fairclough explains that social situations have their own hierarchies, or orders of discourses, within their own social settings. This means that there are dominant and marginalized discourses, those that are considered normal and natural, and those that are considered fringe or alternative (Fairclough, 1995, p. 12) by the majority of language users in a given discourse community. This is also how “truth” is established; through regular practice and normalization.

²⁰ In linguistic terms, this is more fundamentally complex, as it requires a deeper understanding of the structures of language and their respective grammars. However, these broader discussions fall outside of the scope of this dissertation. For further reading, see (Fairclough, 1995).

For this I refer back to Hall's work, and his exploration of relationships within and without discourses. The dominant discourse, expressed through social practices, is what Hall reads as a "regime of truth". This is, simply put, an expression of power. The most important implication for this is that truth no longer is a series of facts that cannot be debated or twisted into one position or ideology, or another. Truth becomes, through practice, that which is considered *normal*.

There is no longer a sense of true or false, or any equivalence with scientific objectivity (Hall, 1992, p. 299). The series of discourse statements and texts to which one ascribes the measure of truth, and that in turn become the normal state of social practice for the majority in a discourse community, is simply labelled and packed as the truth:

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (1980, p. 131).

In order to understand how truth is established in discourse, I turn to "political rhetoric" and politolinguistics in the following section.

Political Rhetoric

If we know that the ontology of discourse communities is based on the reaching of specific goals, and consequently establishing a regime of truth, we also know that language performs the role of medium. This regime of truth, or as Foucault calls it: "general politics", is inherently based on the

sharing of texts and statements through language as a medium of communication. In order to understand, specifically, how this is done, we need to look at politolinguistics and specifically, the use of rhetoric.

There is a sharp semantic line between the aforementioned concepts. The first, politolinguistics, refers to a field of study; a theoretical framework through which scholars, assuming a transdisciplinary perspective, look at the interaction between rhetoric, political science, and linguistics (Reisigl, 2008, p. 97). According to Meyer, we need to also separate the political into the polity, policy, and politics, as quoted in (Reisigl, 2008, p. 97), which I describe below. Rhetoric, and more specifically, “political rhetoric”, falls into this field of politolinguistics. Although the field itself is broader, and scholars working in it concern themselves with various issues, I have limited this study specifically to political rhetoric.

Rhetoric is a more concrete term that can be defined as the “art of speaking and writing well in public spheres” (Reisigl, 2008, p. 96). This can be done in many different genres. A few conspicuous examples would include policy speeches, presidential addresses, interviews, tweets, talk shows, and white papers. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of rhetoric is not about the medium, but about the power a text has within a discourse community. It crosses many communicative genres, and aims to be legible, grammatically correct, understandable, evidential (albeit not necessarily truthful), vivid, and adequately communicated by the maker for it to reach its goal of persuasion.

This, in turn, leads to members of a discourse community to engage with it in such a way that the rhetoric is consumed as though it is the logical consequence of a rational conviction, the result of sound argumentation or factual information, or a convincing admonition or exhortation. According to Reisigl, this culminates in a shared “consent through forms of non-argumentative *linguistic force*” (original emphasis). Concretely, the more effective the rhetoric, the more linguistic force it carries: it is the art of persuasive language use. Moreover, he continues, this is done through creating an emotional, suggestive language, a language of demagoguery and propaganda, often imbued with threats (Reisigl, 2008, pp. 96-98).

Rhetoric of this nature is essential to politics, and is designed to achieve the political goals of a discourse community. To provide an example, following a decision by the Museum of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, to remove the words “Golden Century” from their exhibitions, sitting Prime Minister Mark Rutte publicly stated during a press conference that “This is nonsense, and I will keep calling it the Golden Century” (NU.nl, 2019). The removal of these words by the museum was a response to growing calls by historians and activists to stop using “flowery” language to cover up the slave trade, war, and colonialism on which the Golden Century (17th century) was built, and from which The Netherlands established its position as a global center of arts and culture.

Right-wing pundits called the move another attack by the “woke-brigade”, and a move to erase national history. PM Rutte is the leader of the right-wing majority party the VVD, and with this public statement, he attempted to voice his disagreement with the decision to reassure conservative voters in the country, on whom he relies for the maintenance of his majority.

Nevertheless, the use of persuasive language is not limited to the field of politics, and is often deployed in subtle ways. Advertising is a salient example. Let us take an example from Japan, a commercial by Donnatokimo WiFi, a company that rents out WiFi-boxes with unlimited internet access. In their commercials – several have been released – a couple portrayed to be police officers defuse a dangerous situation in which a criminal is acting up because he has limited internet access. They quip back and forth, and hold conversations unrelated to the product.

The “criminal” eventually intervenes in the conversation to remind them of the problem at hand, that he does not have Wifi, and the couple simply say that the criminal should rent a WiFi-box at the company. This will solve his problems. The funny conversations and the attractive women are thus connected, through intervention, to the product. In this example, aesthetic pleasure and entertainment value are proposed to consumers as beneficial, and consequentially the product is ascribed the same values through linguistic proximity. This is an example of how language can be used to persuade people that certain values belong to specific products, although no logical or causal relation exists. Using this kind of persuasive language in their communicative methods, companies attempt to achieve higher sales, customer loyalty, or other similarly commercial goals: in this case renting a WiFi-box, presented with values such as humor and attractiveness (oricon, 2019).

The two above examples are targeted forms of communication that rely on persuasive language. One is to assure voters, and the other is to sell more products. Both share one thing in common: they have a specific goal, and they use rhetoric to achieve it. However, the audiences

differ. In terms of speech communities, for example, we can quickly deduce one is meant for a Dutch audience, and the other for a Japanese audience.

A deeper look also shows that the first is meant to express a political ideology, and therefore communicates with a specific target audience: conservative voters in The Netherlands. The second example attempts to target a very different audience: potential consumers in Japan. We can therefore see that both forms of rhetoric have a goal, albeit situated in different contexts. Each statement, moreover, functions to augment an existing regime of truth: a right-wing political ideology, and a need for unlimited internet access, respectively.

These examples might be somewhat simplified, and the second example is actually not one that is political, although it might be nevertheless situated within a specific discourse community that can act politically (i.e., internet users in Japan). However, as van Dijk points out,

in order to avoid the extension of politics and political discourse to a domain that is so large that it would coincide with the study of public discourse in general we [should] not treat such forms of discourse-with-possible-political-effects as political discourse (van Dijk, 1997).

So, to delve a bit deeper into the functionality of political rhetoric in political discourse, and to facilitate an analysis of it, we need to look at the specific characteristics it has.

Political Discourse Analysis

Now that we know what political rhetoric is, we need to figure out how to analyze it. This is the domain of discourse studies, and more specifically, its sub-field of political discourse analysis. To

do so, I first want to look at the specific genres through which political discourses are expressed, and for that we need to separate political rhetoric into three domains: the polity, policy, and politics.

Polity, here, means the “formal and structural framework” that constitutes the basis of political action. This form of rhetoric does not originate from a single author, but is produced by various authors with varying political leanings, and is the result of political compromises, being a “generally consensus-oriented” language. These include, more practically, “norms, principles, rules and values of a political culture, as well as the [...] legal procedures and political institutions of a political system designed to found political order” (Reisigl, 2008, p. 98). Genres that are produced in this domain are institutional rules, laws, and other formalized documentation of political norms and actions.

Policy is a domain in which we have more concrete articulations of political rhetoric, as it involves the “content-related dimension of political action that aims at shaping the various political areas and is performed primarily by members of the government and civil servants of respective political institutions” (Reisigl, 2008, p. 98). Genres that appear from this domain include white papers and policy documents published by ministries and government agencies, among other official institutions.

Although it might seem odd, the final domain of political rhetoric is *politics*. Nevertheless important, politics not as a whole – van Dijk warns us that there is no such thing as “a single and unambiguous definition of what ‘politics’ is” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 15) – but as viewed through the lens of political rhetoric, concerns the conflicts and negotiations between political actors. These

are single actors, such as politicians, or collectives, such as political parties. Genres in this category include election campaign speeches, party manifestos, public expressions and debates, and political advertising in alternative forms (Reisigl, 2008, p. 98).

As we can see, actors and institutions in each of the above domains produce their own specific type of genres through a political power struggle to establish their own regimes of truth. The analysis of the political discourses expressed through these genres is what van Dijk would term “political discourse analysis” (1997). Moreover, this form of analysis is meant to show us how political discourse, as politics, function in action:

That is, the study of these and other structures must show, additionally, that these structures *as such* play a role in the political event and in the political process of which it is part. In other words, to assess the political relevance of discourse analysis we need to examine in some more detail the *contextual functions* of various structures and strategies of text and talk (van Dijk, 1997, p. 38).

To relay a bit more of what van Dijk’s describes as political action in discourse, it is worth quoting the following passage:

Accomplishing political action, or simply ‘doing politics’ by text and talk is obviously more than producing or perceiving discourse in political contexts and by political actors. [...] The point of this (partial) analysis is especially that political talk and text, at least in similar cases, is such only when constitutive part of the political process of e.g. governing, legislating, election campaigns, party propaganda, and so on (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 20-21).

This is limited to political rhetoric expressed in official government functions, although we still have informal political discourses which would include texts and statements that become part of

political debates through such genres as media interviews, television performances, and opinion editorials. However, these would, under the circumstances described here, be attributed to media discourses *on* politics, rather than political discourses *per se*. Again, however, we need to avoid including any and all discourses into our analysis for practical purposes:

Since practically all text and talk indirectly has socio-political conditions and consequences, we therefore again require a more or less arbitrary set of criteria according to which discourse may be categorized as (mainly) political, viz., when it has a direct functional role as a form of political action in the political process (van Dijk, 1997, p. 23).

The “more or less arbitrary set of criteria” van Dijk alludes to here are those stipulated above: statements and texts that count as political discourse are those affiliated, connected, or produced by political actors, whether these are individuals or organizations.

Coincidentally, this is also the definition of political discourse utilized in this dissertation, and the study of the genres that flows forth from the domains as described earlier are, consequently, what this study uses to define political discourse analysis. Now, to take more concrete steps into the *how*, *time* and *place* of performing this analysis, I proceed to the more intricate details of studying texts and statements in the following section.

Attributes of a Text

Practically, a political discourse analysis requires us to look at the various linguistic features that make up a text or statement. As this study focuses primarily on text-based documentation, I will proceed to explore the aspects specific to this method.

The first matter of importance is to look at a text's attributes: intertextuality, intentionality, acceptability and conventionality, informativity, and situationality (Wodak, 2008, p. 9). These make up the text's inherent context and purpose, and are therefore essential to understanding why and how a text has been produced, and to which genre it belongs. To provide a clear example, the following excerpt is taken from the *Rijksverslag 2014* published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sciences of The Netherlands (MOCW):

Aan de voorzitters van de Eerste en Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Hierbij bied ik, mede namens Staatssecretaris Sander Dekker, het departementale jaarverslag van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap over het jaar 2014 aan (MOCW, 2015, p. 5).

In its translated form, this is:

To the chairpersons of the First and Second Chambers of the States General. Herewith I submit to you, on behalf of State Secretary Sander Dekker, the departmental yearly report of the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sciences of the year 2014.

So, let's take a look at the various functions of this particular text, starting with intertextuality.

The first aspect we can take note of is that this excerpt is part of a larger document, a report that is published each year. This is the 2014 version, which at the time of publication would cover the most recent calendar year. We can therefore assume that this report is part of a continued series that are published annually, and that these texts will refer back to one another, or to an extent have a continued structure to them, giving them meaning in the context of political discourses in The Netherlands. Of course, more texts could relate to this report, including but not exclusively: yearly

reports published by other ministries, referenced documents and studies, public speeches, and debates. These also provide a larger framework of meaning for the produced text.

Next, if we look at the text's "intentionality", the quoted excerpt provides an excellent explanation: the report describes the activities in 2014 of the Ministry for review by the two parliamentary chambers of The Netherlands. The intention, therefore, is quite simple: for the MOCW, the producer of the text, to convey upon their readers (among others, members of the First and Second Chambers of the States General) how, why, and for which purposes the MOCW have used their resources.

The fact that the report was published in public, furthermore, suggests that it also functions as a justification of the MOCW's activities to the general public, and possibly the media if they find occasion to report on its contents to their readers. Most importantly, however, the report's intentionality is to provide justification for the MOCW's political action, and thereby relieve the ministry of further responsibility by gaining approval from the country's highest functioning political institution: parliament.

When we look at the "acceptability" and "conventionality" of the report, we can detect a certain level of predetermined structure and language, or the text's macro- and mesostructure (Reisigl, 2008, wh. 106): e.g., a text can comprise three paragraphs, of which the first functions as the introduction (introducing a problem), the second provides an example, and the third concludes the main point of the text. In terms of language: the quoted excerpt uses formal Dutch language to express its intent, and thus places it in the realm of formalized political proceedings, as this is one

of the few, and apart from the judiciary possibly the only, context in which kind of language use is found. Because this is a formal text, published officially under the auspices of the MOCW, readers should expect this kind of formal language use.

Furthermore, although obviated in the above quote for practical purposes, the rest of the report follows a structured narrative that explains in detail each of the activities of the MOCW, in a less formalized, legible form, making it more accessible to members of parliament and the public at large. Following this structure, the report maintains a level of “conventionality” that makes its content accessible, and thus acceptable for this audience. As a consequence, the text becomes part of the larger national political discourse.

The “informativity” of the report connects to the above attributes.²¹ It contains the details of the MOCW’s activities, including time frames of plans, budgets, goals, methods, etcetera. Starting with the main policy priorities, the report follows a thematic and chronological structure, which on top of the report’s informativity contributes to its conventionality.

Consequently, the information it attempts to convey contains the MOCW’s main tasks as an official government institution: education, sciences, culture, media, emancipation, and the ministry’s activities in the Caribbean islands, which are still officially part of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The following section describes the management and budgeting of the MOCW, and refers back to the activities described earlier (MOCW, 2015, p. 126). The content is assumed to be

²¹ None of the described attributes can be fully separated from the others, as much as discourses cannot be fully isolated from each other, as explained above. Consequently, we are forced to abide by a certain level of arbitrariness, as van Dijk argues.

cohesive on the basis of its publication by a single governmental institute, in this case the ministry; and the information, contained here thus constitutes the “informativity” of the text.

Lastly, “situationality”, describes the place of the text in a broader constellation of statements and texts that relate to it, similar to the intertextuality described above. However, where it differs is the focus on the constitution of the text, its placement in a specific culture, speech community, and speech situation (e.g., its timing), and the relation of these factors to how the text is produced. This report, for example, was produced under the management of State Secretary Sander Dekker, who might have a specific political agenda, related to his party, possibly further influenced by his voter block. These factors contribute to a constellation of texts and statements that specifically relate to how the text was produced. This is what is called the “situationality” of the text, and results in its particularity, variety, form, and style.

To conclude, in this dissertation, the first methodological step I take in this analysis is determining the textual attributes of each genre, and if necessary, of each text in their respective contexts. To reiterate, these are a text’s intertextuality, intentionality, acceptability and conventionality, informativity, and situationality, as propounded by Wodak (2008, p. 9). Next, I look at the linguistic features of a text.

Analyzing the Language

Although the attributes of a text are important, the linguistic features or use of language, in the text are just as essential to understanding what a political actor is trying to convey through their text.

In order to do this, we need to look at specific linguistic features, also called the language of the text or its linguistic resources. In doing so, we can look at how political rhetoric is constructed.

A text utilizes certain structures and mechanisms that can be identified. Think for example of word groupings, grammatical features, rhetorical devices, and literary figures. Arguments, in turn, are constructed through the use of these features, and can be further categorized according to theme, topic, or even time frame. Referencing back to the explanation of rhetoric above, we see the need for coherence in a text in order to be build comprehensible and legible texts. A text, as such, is constructed using a certain lexis and grammar; e.g., nouns, verbs, and adjectives.²² To make train of thought a bit more accessible, it is worth quoting in length Mautner's summary of linguistic resources used in a qualitative discourse analysis:

- Lexis (evaluative meaning; [political] actor labels; rhetorical use of figures; metaphors).
- Transitivity ('who does what to whom'; types of verbal processes, for example 'doing' versus 'happening').
- Modality (expressing certainty vs. vagueness; 'high' vs 'low' commitment to propositions on the part of the speaker [or author] as expressed for example through modal verbs and modal adverbials).
- Source attribution and presence of different 'voices' in the text.
- Textual coherence and cohesion.
- Argumentative devices establishing rapport between author and reader (for example rhetorical questions; appeals to common sense; discursive construction of 'we' groups).
- Nonverbal message components (for example photographs, charts, page layout, frames, boxed inserts, font size and style) (2008, p. 44).

²² See for example: Florian Schneider, May 13, 2013 (10:00 AM), blog entry, "How to Do a Discourse Analysis," *PoliticsEastAsia*, <http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/>.

Lexis, as Mautner shows, also includes the broad category of rhetorical and literary figures (e.g., the allegory, metaphor, simile, idioms, and the proverb). How these are deployed by political actors, in turn, constitutes political rhetoric. And, as explained earlier in chapter 2, when used in its triadic form of glorious past, degraded present, and utopian future, constitutes nationalist rhetoric.

The definition of “transivity” that Mautner speaks of might, instead of a detailed theoretical exploration, benefit from a simple example: “I will beat the other presidential candidate by proposing better policies to voters so we can restore this country!” Three subjects appear here: the speaker, the opponent, and the voters. The leading figure here, the candidate, asserts their “doing” the latter two: “beating” and convincing. It is an active statement, not a passive retreat.

This example also shows us how modality works: the candidate, using a strong statement, provides their reader or listener with certainty using specific verbiage. If we rephrase the sentence as such: “I might beat the other presidential candidate...” the reader is presented with a lower level of modality, simply by replacing “will” with “might”. The force of the statement decreases dramatically.

Continuing with this example, we also know this statement was made by a specific political actor: a presidential candidate. We can recognize the source to which the text can be attributed. It includes no other voices: the opponent and the public (voters) are rendered passive participants in the actions of the speaker. The statement is nevertheless coherent for a reader: it is likely to have taken place during a presidential campaign race and this becomes clear from the “beating” of one’s opposing candidate.

Here, moreover, the speaker is attempting to address his target audience: “we can restore this country!” This is an argumentative device that constructs a group to which the speaker and his political adherents belong. It ascribes agency to these actors by stating “we can”, in contrast to a possible *they* who *cannot*.

Although this example does not include a non-verbal message, this can be present if the speech is printed in, for example, a newspaper or a parliamentary record. A graph depicting expected economic growth on the basis of a promised policy, for example, can be a strong visual support of the speaker’s statements, regardless if the graph is based on reality or fiction. These need to be taken into account as well. Naturally, in a more thorough analysis, the explanations above of the various linguistic resources of a text require a bit more investigation. However, for the purposes of this example, it shows us how much meaning we can glean from a short statement like the one given here.

In the following sections, I take a deeper look into how these linguistic resources contribute to the research method I use in this dissertation, starting with an outline of the main research method.

Outline of the Research Method

The above section describes the concept of political discourse analysis. This section turns towards the more concrete steps that are required to do the analysis. For this, I make use of Reisigl’s eight steps, which are as follows:

1. Determining the social and political problem and its linguistic aspects
2. Gathering data and describing the context

3. Preparing and selecting the data
4. Specifying the main research question and formulating hypotheses
5. Pilot analysis
6. Main analysis: detailed case-studies
7. Formulating a critique of the discursive strategies found
8. Conclusion: determining the social application of results (Reisigl, 2008, pp. 98-117).

Before starting an analysis, it is necessary for researchers to identify a political problem. In this dissertation this is “the internationalization of higher education in Japan and The Netherlands.” Identifying this issue allows me to analyze it using a consistent methodological framework, starting by defining “internationalization” and other relevant keywords, and by identifying the relevant discourse communities (see above).

Gathering the data

Gathering the data for analysis – step two – requires triangulation. This requires me to collect a variety of empirical data that are relevant to the topic. These are, within the confines of this study, texts taken from the different genres given below. Triangulation means, specifically choosing a specific period of time, specific political actors, specific discourses (communities), specific fields of political action, and specific semiotic media, or genres in this instance (Reisigl, 2008, pp. 103-104).

Furthermore, the data corpus, hereafter referred to as the data set, needs to be manageable (see the exploration of van Dijk’s arguments concerning this above). Therefore, the researcher

needs to “order and select concrete discourse fragments” – step three – that accurately represent the political discourses analyzed, that are representative, salient and non-redundant (Reisigl, 2008, p. 104), e.g., repetitive statements such as “I hereby open the meeting” are obviated.

The data set included here consists of two separate discourse communities, each further separated into their own specific genres. These communities are the Dutch and Japanese political discourse communities, respectively. Japan and The Netherlands are both democratic dual chamber parliamentary monarchies. However, there are slight differences in the institutional organization of higher education, leading to differences in the choice for genres for analysis.

Continuing from the scholarly foundation constructed in the background chapters, the main analysis in this dissertation builds on existing literature taken from multiple disciplines and fields, and thus relies on these to sketch the broader context on the history of internationalization and the university in both countries up until the 21st century.

Nevertheless, it offers a different perspective, of which the explanation I leave to the preceding and following chapters, for fear of repetition. The focus of the analysis provided here, however, is on the changing nature of internationalization in higher education in the 21st century—this is the original contribution the research makes – and thus the time scale of the analytical section is limited to: from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2020.²³

²³ As mentioned earlier, but for emphasis I reiterate: I do this while relying on existing scholarly work for the broader history of the phenomenon.

Although 2020 has been taken into consideration in the analysis, various notes need made pertaining to the anomaly this year constitutes (for this, see “Limitations” below in this chapter, and Chapter 7, “Conclusion”). Moreover, 2021 has not been included in the data set for one simple reason: to limit the time frame of the research to a manageable number of data points.

For the main analysis I rely on texts in their original languages. However, for practical purposes I will include mostly the English translated excerpts, with the exception being the pilot analysis in this chapter, the case analysis in chapter 6, and the additional data in the appendices, which are given in their original languages.²⁴ I do this to avoid the need to translate the complete texts from Dutch and Japanese into English, while still being able to rely in the study’s conclusions on the analysis of the texts in their original languages. Moreover, although the data analysis itself includes excerpts from the various texts, the analysis below focuses on their genre-specific structural attributes.²⁵ English translations are either based off the official translations or provided by the author.

The genres taken from the Japanese discourse community include the following:

- National Diet records, which include Upper and Lower House meetings, and committee meetings. These were taken from the National Diet record inquiry system [*Kokkai kaigiroku kensaku shisutemu*], which has a publicly accessible online portal.²⁶

²⁴ For explanatory purposes – i.e., to analyze the structure of the text in its original version in order to provide the reader with an example of the methodology proposed in this chapter, and to offer the conclusions in English, the main language of this text – I have relied on the original Dutch text in the ‘Pilot analysis’ section below.

²⁵ Similar to van Dijk’s argument about the inclusion of *all* general discourses, the inclusion of all the texts included in the data set would turn this dissertation into an anthology, which for practical purposes is not feasible.

²⁶ The data set, in effect, spans the National Diets 146 to 203. The database itself extends back to National Diet assembly records starting in Shōwa 22 (May 1949). See here: <https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

- Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) white papers. These were taken from the website of the MEXT,²⁷ and the archives of the National Diet Library.²⁸
- The Japan Association of National Universities (JANU) [*Kokuritsu daigaku kyōkai*] publications. These were collected from the organization’s website.²⁹
- The Japan Association of Private Universities and Colleges (Shidairen) [*Nihon shiritsu daigaku renmei*] publications. These were collected from the organization’s website.³⁰

The search functions of multiple databases utilized here rely on keywords (e.g., key terms and concepts related to the topic at hand), albeit with the functionalities slightly differing between resources. I conducted a pilot experiment in collecting data from the National Diet records system using the keyword *daigaku* (大学), lit. “university”. The search resulted in an unmanageable number of records (several thousand). Next, I attempted the keyword *kokusaika* (国際化), lit. “internationalization”, which also produced a bewildering number of National Diet records: 4,477 hits in 2,801 records.³¹

²⁷ See here: https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/b005.htm.

²⁸ For the main references Japanese-language publications between 2000 and 2020 were used. English-language white papers were only selectively available, for the period between 2003 and 2017. Any translations given here are official translations or those offered by the author. Although somewhat scattered throughout the archives, most publications are freely accessible here: https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11509864/www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/hakusho.htm.

²⁹ See here: <https://www.janu.jp/janu/report/>.

³⁰ <https://www.shidairen.or.jp/publications/>.

³¹ One hit translates into a recurrence of a particular keyword, while one record refers to the National Diet assembly that was recorded in total as one written record.

For this reason, I chose to narrow the scope of the search further, combining several terms into one query. When combined, *daigaku* and *kokusaika* gave 20,593 hits in 2,090 records from the complete records. Additional queries were attempted to narrow down the results. However, this also proved untenable. The combination of *kokusaika* and *kyōiku* (教育), lit. “education”, for example, provided 36,530 hits in 2,314 records. In another attempt, following these pilot queries, the single concept *daigaku no kokusaika* (大学の国際化) provided 86 hits and 65 records. A qualitative survey proved that this query was most effective. Consequently, this data set was used as the primary data for analysis. Any duplicate records were removed.

MEXT white papers included in the data set were taken from two sources, the online publications available on the MEXT’s website, and the publications that have been archived via the online retrieval website maintained by the National Diet library. The subgenres included are the following: Education White Paper Heisei 12 [*Kyōiku hakusho Heisei 12-nendo*, 教育白書平成12年度] (MEXT, 2019);³² Education White Paper (English) 2000 [*Kyōiku hakusho eibun 2000-nen* 教育白書 英文 2000年] (MEXT, 2019); MEXT White Papers Heisei 13-30 (published yearly, 2001-2018) [*Monbukagaku hakusho*, 文部科学白書 平成13年～平成30年度];³³ MEXT White Papers (English; published yearly 2001-2017 [*Monbukagaku hakusho eibun*, 文部

³² Heisei 12 denotes the year in Japanese eras, with year 12 corresponding to 2000, 13 to 2001, etcetera. The era ends in 2018, and proceeds with the Reiwa era, with Reiwa 1 (or: *Reiwa gannen* 令和元年) starting in 2019, Reiwa 2 in 2020, etcetera.

³³ For a complete overview of this period, see:
https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11509864/www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/monbu.htm.

科学白書 英文 2018 年～2001 年);³⁴ MEXT Statistical handbook Heisei 12-31³⁵ (published yearly, 2000-2019) [*Monbukagaku tōkei yōran*, 文部科学統計要覧 平成 12 年～平成 31 年度];³⁶ and the MEXT Statistical handbook Heisei 30-Reiwa 2 (published yearly, 2018-2020) [*Monbukagaku tōkei yōran*, 文部科学統計要覧 平成 30 年～令和 2 年度].³⁷

JANU publications were retrieved from their website.³⁸ Only publications that have been made available online have been included in the data set. Subgenres include the following: JANU Quarterly Reports no. 1-29, and the Public Relations Magazine of National Universities [*Kokudaikyō kōhōshi “Kokuritsu Daigaku”*, 国大協広報誌「国立大学」] no. 30-62, including extra issues of both magazine titles;³⁹ JANU Outline Reports 2003-2020 (English, Japanese) [*Kokuritsu daigaku kyōkai gaiyō*, 国立大学協会概要];⁴⁰ Commemorative Publications of the Founding of JANU, the 30th, 50th and 70th history editions [*Sōritsu kinenshi; kokuritsu daigaku kyōkai sanjū-nenshi, gojū-nenshi, nanajū-nenshi*, 創立記念誌・国立大学協会三十年史・五十年史・七十年史];⁴¹ and other reports published on various occasions between 2000-2020.⁴² Of the latter subgenre, only publications that directly reference “internationalization” [*kokusaika*, 国

³⁴ For a complete overview of this period, see: https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/monbu_e.htm.

³⁵ Heisei 31 refers to 2019, as the publication of the handbook in this instance preceded the change of era to Reiwa.

³⁶ For a complete overview of this period, see:

https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11293659/www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/002/002b/koumoku.html.

³⁷ For a complete overview of this period, see: https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/002/002b/koumoku.html.

³⁸ A complete overview of their publications by subgenre can be viewed here: <https://www.janu.jp/janu/report/>.

³⁹ For a complete overview of all the editions, see here: <https://www.janu.jp/janu/report/koho/>.

⁴⁰ For a complete overview of this period, see: <https://www.janu.jp/janu/report/report1/>.

⁴¹ Although only the last two editions published in 2000 and 2020, respectively, have been included in the analysis. All three editions are available here: <https://www.janu.jp/janu/report/memorial/>.

⁴² Publications and reports that have been published separately from the other subgenres have been collected and published chronologically here: <https://www.janu.jp/janu/report/report2/>.

際化], “exchange” [*ryūgaku*, 留学], “international cooperation” or “exchange” [*kokusai kōryū*, 国際交流], and “foreign countries” or “overseas” [*kaigai*, 海外] have been included.

Shidairen’s main publications are publicly accessible via their online search engine, located on their website.⁴³ Although I refer to it here as a search engine, it has limited capabilities and only allow searches based on year and specific categories, the relevant one for the data included here being the International Exchange [*kokusai kōryū*] category,⁴⁴ containing nine publications between 2000-2018. In addition, Shidairen publishes a magazine titled University Current Review [*Daigaku Jihō*, 大学時報]. In contrast to JANU’s publication database, which only publishes whole numbers, this database allows for a keyword-based search in individual articles (and their complete text), across editions 212-402. Based on the same triangulating approach utilized with the National Diet records, limiting search results to articles published between 2000-2020 using the key term *daigaku no kokusaika*, 68 mentions were found. After duplicates were removed, 43 articles remained. These two subgenres consist the bulk of the Shidairen publications that were included in the data set.

⁴³ See here:

https://www.shidairen.or.jp/publications/?topics_group_id=8&topics_ext_options_search=1&season=&search_ext_col_01%5B%5D=.

⁴⁴ Although other categories have been excluded here, they are, for reference: “education research” [*kyōiku kenkyū*, 教育研究], “student support” [*gakusei shien*, 学生支援], “university management” [*daigaku keiei*, 大学経営], “training” [*kenshū*, 研修], “budget allocation and taxes” [*yosan/zeisei*, 予算・税制], “policy research” [*seisaku kenkyū*, 政策研究], and “regional revitalization” [*chihō sōusei/chiiki kassei*, 地方創生・地域活性], see: https://www.shidairen.or.jp/publications/?topics_group_id=8&topics_ext_options_search=1&season=&search_ext_col_01%5B%5D=5.

The main genres included from the Dutch (The Netherlands) discourse community are the following:

- National Parliament proceedings (questions, motions, and plenary reports). These *Kamerstukken* [Parliamentary documents] are available via public databases facilitated by the Government of Kingdom of The Netherlands, and contain proceedings from the First Chamber, or Senate [*Eerste Kamer*], the Second Chamber, or Lower House [*Tweede Kamer*], and the United Sessions [*Verenigde Vergadering*], both also include proceedings for commissions and committees under the auspices of the aforementioned bodies.⁴⁵
- White papers and other official publications of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science Documents [*Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap*, or MOCW]. These are publicly available documents published on the MOCW's website.⁴⁶
- The Dutch organisation for internationalisation in education [*De Nederlandse organisatie voor internationalisering in het onderwijs*], abbreviated as Nuffic. These were collected from the organization's website.⁴⁷
- Association of Dutch Universities (VSNU) [*Vereniging voor Nederlandse Universiteiten*] publications. These were collected from the organization's website.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ See here: <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken>; and <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/parlementair>.

⁴⁶ See here: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-onderwijs-cultuur-en-wetenschap/documenten>.

⁴⁷ See here: <https://www.nuffic.nl/publicaties>.

⁴⁸ The VSNU has recently changed its name to “Universiteiten van Nederland” [Universities of The Netherlands] (UVN), 7 January 2022. However, previous publications remain accessible as per January 2022, see here: https://www.universiteitenvannederland.nl/nl_NL/publicaties.html.

Similar to the Japanese National Diet records, the database for National Parliament proceedings relies on keywords.⁴⁹ Triangulating in a similar fashion led to the use of the combination of two keywords: “internationalization” [*internationalisering*] and “tertiary (higher) education” [*hoger onderwijs*], which gave 787 search results. A qualitative survey showed that the key phrase “internationalization of higher education” [*internationalisering van het hoger onderwijs*] gave more specific results (186 mentions).⁵⁰ As the two main databases used different query methods, I opted to use the database hosted by Overheid.nl, the main website for the Government, which allowed for this query.⁵¹

Proceedings are further subcategorized by “Meeting Year” [*vergaderjaar*], and “topic” [*onderwerp*]. Publications pertaining to “international” [*internationaal*], “migration and integration” [*migratie en integratie*], and “education and science” [*onderwijs en wetenschap*], were included.⁵² The query gave back 146 documents. These were included in the data set.

⁴⁹ Another separate database contains the majority of proceedings from 1814 up until 1995, see: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/parlementair>. This research relies mostly on publications retrieved from the *Recente Kamerstukken* database, which contains more recent proceedings, available here: <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken>.

⁵⁰ For an overview of the initial results, see: https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken?fromdate=01-01-2000&todate=31-12-2020&search_str=%22internationalisering+van+het+hoger+onderwijs%22.

⁵¹ Publications were categorized by the Second Chamber as following, for example: amendments [*amendementen*], decision lists [*besluitenlijsten*], government letters [*brieven regering*], commission reports [*commissieverlagen*], parliamentary inquiries [*kamervragen*], motions [*moties*], additional parliamentary publications [*overage Kamerstukken*], plenary records [*plenaire verslagen*], votes [*stemmingsuitslagen*], reports [*verslagen*], and legislative propositions [*wetsvoorstellen*]; while the Overheid.nl database consisted of the following categories: agenda’s [*agenda’s*], actions [*handelingen*], parliamentary proceedings [*Kamerstukken*], parliamentary inquiries [*Kamervragen*], motions [*moties*], and non-dossier documents [*niet-dossierstukken*], see <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/parlementair>.

⁵² Many other topics were available, for which repetition here might prove too lengthy, but these were excluded simply because they bear no relation to the topic at hand.

MOCW white papers [*Rijksverslagen*], or yearly reports, are available through the government's website.⁵³ Only the white papers of 2012, 2014-2020 are available, with previous versions not being accessible via the online database. Other publications are available through the government's central website under the topic "Education and internationalization" [*Onderwijs en internationalisering*].⁵⁴ Additional publications were also collected here. However, this was done within the time frame for which queries were allowed in the database.⁵⁵ The implementing body of the MOCW, the Service for Implementing Education [*Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs*, or DUO], has also recently (2019) published a long-term status report on the internationalization of higher education, which has been included in the data set.⁵⁶

Nuffic's publications were retrieved from their website.⁵⁷ The publications page has a limited search function through which queries can be made on the basis of key words, publication type, language, and education sector.⁵⁸ Publications from 2014 to 2020 are available, with previous publications either covered in summaries in newly published reports, or excluded from the publications list. Filtering for education sector, without using keywords, resulted in 35 publications. These consist by and large of status reports on internationalization efforts, yearly and topic-based

⁵³ See: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/verantwoordingsdag/documenten>.

⁵⁴ The dedicated page for this topic can be viewed here: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/onderwijs-en-internationalisering>.

⁵⁵ Documents sorted under this topic, in total 85 at the time of writing, can be viewed here: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/onderwijs-en-internationalisering/documenten>.

⁵⁶ Available for download here: https://duo.nl/open_onderwijsdata/hoger-onderwijs/publicaties/internationalisering-in-het-ho.jsp.

⁵⁷ See the dedicated publications page here: <https://www.nuffic.nl/publicaties>.

⁵⁸ Publication types are: reports and studies [*verslagen en studies*], professional magazines [*vakbladen*], PR-materials [*PR-materiaal*], pamphlets [*brochures*], and 'About Nuffic' [*Over Nuffic*]; languages include Dutch and English; and education sectors are categorized as such: higher education [*hoger onderwijs*], vocational and/or technical education [*middelbaar beroepsonderwijs*], secondary education [*voortgezet onderwijs*], and primary education [*primair onderwijs*].

reports, and editions of the magazine *Transfer* (seven editions). Four publications were further excluded, with three publications falling outside the 2000-2020 timeframe, and one publication being an image, meaning 31 publications were included in the final data set.

VSNU has rebranded to UVN (see footnote above), however, publications between 2000-2020 are still branded under VSNU, and as such I will remain consistent with this abbreviation. The organization's publications are available via their website.⁵⁹ These have been categorized by publication type (subgenre), and the following categories have been included in the data set: “factsheets, reports” [*rapporten*] 2000-2020, “yearly agenda’s” [*jaaragenda's*] 2014-2020, “yearly reports” [*jaarverslagen*] 2008, 2010, 2013-2020, “language policy” [*taalbeleid*] 2017, and the “toolkit for international positioning” [*toolkit internationale positionering*].⁶⁰

The above genres and subgenres (otherwise referred to as publication type, in accordance with the terminology used by the organizations in question), constitute the body of texts that make up the data set used for the analysis section.

Pilot analysis

A detailed pilot study is given in the analysis as well, but for explanatory purposes I will include an example here. This step means providing an analysis of a single text, exploring its structure and language. For this I refer back to the text from which the earlier quote is taken, however repetitious

⁵⁹ For the dedicated publications page, see: https://www.universiteitenvannederland.nl/nl_NL/publicaties.html.

⁶⁰ Other categories include: infographics, interactive factsheets [*interactieve factsheets*], online magazines, video reports [*videoverslagen*], yearly overviews [*jaaroverzichten*], and the blog section, which is currently unavailable.

the original text may be, and let an analysis of this particular section of the report function as the main data point for the pilot analysis below.

In following Reisigl’s framework, I also need to acknowledge his differentiation of *political fields* first, which includes the law-making procedure; public, party-internal, and inter-party formation of attitudes, opinions, and will; international and interstate relations; political advertising; political administration; and political control (2008, wh. 98-99). These fields are relevant for the study of how different political discourses come into being through political action.

However, in this dissertation I maintain van Dijk’s more general definitions, as described above. Hence, although I acknowledge Reisigl’s different political fields, I posit here that these, together, constitute the broader field of political discourse, which here will be the main subject of analysis, and therefore I eschew the field-specific differentiations. Having clarified this, I continue below with the pilot analysis.

A. ALGEMEEN	Structural marker (A) for report’s section allowing the reader to determine the conventionality of the text
AANBIEDING EN DECHARGEVERLENING	Title indicating the intention of the text
Aan de voorzitters van de Eerste en Tweede kamer der Staten-Generaal.	<u>Section 1: Introducing the text’s intention</u>

<p>Hierbij bied ik, mede namens staatssecretaris Sander Dekker, het departementale jaarverslag van het van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap over het jaar 2014 aan.</p>	<p>This section consists of three short paragraphs. These contain, in order, 1) the addressee, the chairpersons of the First and</p>
<p>Onder verwijzing naar de artikelen 63 en 64 van de Comptabiliteitswet 2001 verzoek ik de beide kamers van de Staten-Generaal de Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap decharge te verlenen over het in het jaar 2014 gevoerde financiële beheer.</p>	<p>Second Chambers of Parliament; 2) the author and their “group”: the minister, the state-secretary, and the ministry; and 3) the situationality of the text: addressing the report’s function, basis in law, and request for discharge (absolving responsibility by gaining parliamentary approval).</p> <p><i>Text attributes:</i> this section provides a sense of intentionality: parliamentary approval; situationality: end of year report of official activities; conventionality: basis of the report in law and its <i>raison d’être</i>; and intertextuality: it is part of a string of yearly reports by other ministries, and part of a longer tradition of yearly reports from the MOCW itself.</p> <p><i>Language attributes:</i> the lexis this section uses is reflective of legislative language. Political institutions are referred to by their official nomenclature, political actors are</p>

	<p>referred to by their name and function/title, and the informativity of the section relies little on metaphors etc. Furthermore, the verbiage of the text suggests high modality, and the MOCW is presented as the main, and active speaker. In this sense, the reader is assumed to be familiar with the processes and laws referenced, meaning that this section of likely written for mostly internal use for the government, despite its public nature.</p>
<p>Ten behoeve van de oordeelsvorming van de Staten-Generaal over dit verzoek tot dechargeverlening is door de Algemene Rekenkamer als externe controleur op grond van artikel 82 van de Comptabiliteitswet 2001 een rapport opgesteld. Dit rapport wordt separaat door de Algemene Rekenkamer aan de Staten-Generaal aangeboden. Het rapport bevat de bevindingen en het oordeel van de Rekenkamer met betrekking tot:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) het gevoerde financieel en materieel beheer; b) de ten behoeve van dat beheer bijgehouden administraties; c) de financiële informatie in het jaarverslag; d) de betrokken saldibalans; e) de totstandkoming van de informatie over het gevoerde beleid en de bedrijfsvoering; 	<p><u>Section 2: Description of the context and main political problems</u></p> <p>This section consists of two paragraphs with two summaries provided in bullet point format.</p> <p><i>Text attributes:</i> the first paragraph concerns the situationality of the text and a more concrete description of its intention: the report was written by the MOCW under external guidance of the Court of Audit [<i>Algemene Rekenkamer</i>] for “approval” [<i>Het rapport bevat de bevindingen en het oordeel van de Rekenkamer</i>]. It also contains a summary of</p>

<p>f) de in het jaarverslag opgenomen informatie over het gevoerde beleid en de bedrijfsvoering.</p>	<p>the contents of the report, the report’s main structure, and how it was written, conveying</p>
<p>Bij het besluit tot dechargeverlening dienen verder de volgende, wettelijk voorgeschreven, stukken te worden betrokken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) het Financieel jaarverslag van het Rijk over 2014; b) het voorstel van de slotwet over het jaar 2014 die het onderhavige jaarverslag samenhangt; c) het rapport van de Algemene Rekenkamer met betrekking tot het onderzoek van de centrale administratie van ’s Rijks schatkist en van het financieel jaarverslag van het Rijk; d) de verklaring van goedkeuring van de algemene rekenkamer met betrekking tot de in het Financieel jaarverslag van het Rijk over 2014 opgenomen rekening van uitgaven en ontvangsten van het rijk over 2014, alsmede met betrekking tot de saldibalans van het rijk over 2014 (de verklaring van goedkeuring, bedoeld in artikel 83, derde lid, van de Comptabiliteitswet 2001). 	<p>on the reader its conventionality and informativity: “the information concerning the policy and management [...]” [<i>de informatie over het gevoerde beleid en de bedrijfsvoering</i>]. The second concerns the text’s intertextuality, and provides a summary of the different texts that need to be included in the judgement of the report (e.g. National Budget 2014, relevant legislation, Court of Audit General Report, etcetera): “documents that need to be included” [<i>dienen verder de volgende [...] stukken te worden betrokken</i>].</p> <p><i>Language attributes:</i> The language in this section is similar, if not identical, to the language used in the previous section, with one conspicuous difference: the use of bullet point summaries. Each bullet point is a succinct topical description of the report’s contents. Furthermore, it is clear that the source and other referenced texts are attributed to government institutions and/or political actors acting on behalf of the</p>

	ministry and government: the “we-group”, in this case.
Het besluit tot dechargeverlening kan niet worden genomen, voordat de betrokken slotwet is aangenomen en voordat de verklaring van goedkeuring van de Algemene Rekenkamer is ontvangen.	Section 3: Conclusion This section consists of a single paragraph that references back to earlier paragraphs and establishes the next course of action, approval, with the additional disclaimer that “approval cannot be granted without permission of the Court of Audit”, thus presenting us with a high modality text, i.e., “cannot” [<i>kan niet</i>] vs. “may not” or “should not”.
De Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, M. Bussemaker	Signatory (approval for submission of the report on behalf of the Minister of the MOCW)
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 34 200 viii, nr. 1	Publication source, year of publication, and report number.

Text analysis software

In the above pilot analysis, I relied on a manual reading of the text. This process is time-consuming, and when involving multiple texts might lead to a process that might be too similar to a grounded analysis approach. Instead, I have chosen to rely on text analysis software to order the texts according to genre. The software I have used in the main analysis is MAXQDA 2020. This is paid software created for the analysis of large bodies of texts, multiple texts, and facilitates for

multiple research methodologies, including the political discourse analysis approach explored above.⁶¹

It is important to note that this is not automated analysis software, but rather gives researchers the opportunity to code texts by manually creating categories, sub-categories, and other topical markers, and thereby allowing them to go through each text, ascribing relevant markers to specific sections as they go. Users can also annotate texts, and thus group texts according to specific coded themes and topics. The software also has a search and filter function that the researcher can use in accordance to their own coded key words and categories (e.g., time, place, and author).

Limitations

This study has several limitations. These are primarily due to two reasons: the choice of sources and the limited time frame. By relying on primarily government sources, the analysis risks overemphasizing official political rhetoric versus more general political narratives that are part of the public debates in each respective discourse community. Furthermore, there choice for genres, which roughly correspond to specific national political institutions, also risks overemphasizing the official narratives presented to us by each respective national government. Although I address the definition of government in an earlier chapter, showing that decisions and publications are part of a wider decision-making process, I nonetheless have actively decided to leave out non-official political narratives for practical purposes, and because official policy outweighs non-official

⁶¹ MAXQDA is a qualitative data analysis tool used for research, see: <https://www.maxqda.com/>.

political rhetoric in political decision-making and legislative processes. In this study I nevertheless attempt to overcome these impediments by addressing earlier case studies from academic literature, and thereby creating a broader context in which the political rhetoric analyzed below can be placed. I have taken a similar approach to the problem of a limited time frame.

Focusing on the 21st century, between 2000-2020, this study leaves out large swaths of official data. Again, this is mostly a pragmatic choice, as the inclusion of a study of a longer time frame would lead to 1) a repetition of conclusions already presented to us in other studies, and 2) would make the process of delimiting the study difficult. This also applies to the choice of representative texts and excerpts. The inclusion of the complete texts from the data set would lead to an over-repetitive study, that would border more on an anthology of official texts, rather than a dissertation. I have therefore limited the inclusion of texts from the data set to specific excerpts, which I have concluded to be a proper thematic representation of the political rhetoric explored.

Lastly, by focusing primarily on a text-based approach, I am actively excluding other political statements that have been made through other mediums, e.g., radio and television interviews, addresses, and speeches. By taking this into consideration, and by acknowledging the previously mentioned limitations, the analysis presented here does not purport to be a comprehensive one, nor does this study present to its readers a complete picture of the political rhetoric on education and internationalization in higher education in each respective discourse community.

Chapter 6 – A Comparative Analysis of the ‘International’ University

Introduction

This chapter starts with a case analysis through which the main themes prevalent in the internationalization discourses in Japan and The Netherlands – the two discourse communities analyzed – are given by prevalence. The chapter starts with an overview of these themes, and explains which themes are most salient. These I identify as the “major themes” used in the further analysis.

In the main analysis section, I focus on several issues. These include the “global human resources” discussion, foreign student exchange, information safety, and international university rankings. These themes are interconnected, as they all pertain to internationalization. I further explain that in both Japan and The Netherlands nationalist rhetoric has been used to both support and attack internationalization policies in higher education.

Finally, the chapter ends with the conclusion that Japan is more likely to adopt new internationalization policies due to, among other factors, self-perceived success, and critics being forced to adopt the same language as proponents. In The Netherlands several issues have been successfully used by critics in their nationalist rhetoric to attack internationalization, and proponents have shown sign of retreating from their defensive positions. In The Netherlands, therefore, I argue that new national policies for the further internationalization of higher education are unlikely to be adopted in the near future.

Major Themes

The Netherlands

The first step was to triangulate the data, and subsequently order the documents chronologically. The next step was to manually code the texts in order to determine the most prevalent themes related to the internationalization of the university. From the total 16 themes that were coded and commonly present in the texts initially included in the case analysis, which included predominantly debate proceedings and white papers, I have focused on the nine most frequently recurring themes, as shown in figure 1.⁶² The total count given reflects the number of documents that contain the coded theme, not the number of mentions per document, nor the number of mentions in total.

I subsequently used common keywords from each theme to further analyze the rest of the texts in the data set. This was done using word frequency analyses per theme, and narrowing the included data to the top 20 nouns, excluding verbs, and pronouns. Common words that are part of the structure of the documents were also excluded if I judged them to be irrelevant to the study (e.g., ministry, year). An example of the theme “Information safety” can be seen in figure 2.

These keywords I then used to query the complete data set and view the list of mentions, from which I gleaned representative excerpts. To use the above data as an example, a few keywords stand out. “Nederland” (The Netherlands) and the its possessive form “Nederlandse” (of The Netherlands) are similar, but have nevertheless both been included as leaving out one or the other would mean excluding half of the results for this particular theme. Moreover, its consistent

⁶² The number of themes included in figure 1 and figure 3 below were chosen on basis of relevance (meaning the saliency of the theme with the discourse, which was determined by the number of recurrences in the data set) and (partial) inclusion in the main analysis.

inclusion can also indicate the constant comparison to other countries, as there is otherwise little need to mention the name of the country for which the document was published in the first place, another reason for both versions to remain part of the list of relevant keywords.

Another few words that stand out are “Confucius” (Confucius), “instituten” (institutes), “chinese” (Chinese), “China” (China), “beïnvloeding” (foreign influence), “europese” (European), and “samenwerking” (cooperation). Each of these words indicate a specific focus within the theme. In this example, this could be how the issue of information safety is linked to China (and likely the existence of Confucius Institutes, Chinese government-affiliated research institutes), and European cooperation. However, these words do not necessarily mean much on their own, and require a broader context.

This is offered below in the qualitative analysis section, where relevant excerpts are taken from the texts, translated, and contextualized within their specific discourses using the data and relevant literature. As this process is repetitive in nature, and the visualization of each theme and their specific keywords would take up quite a bit of space, I have chosen to leave out some of the quantitative results for the aforementioned themes unless relevant for further contextualization.⁶³

⁶³ Frequency queries of the themes given below have, however, been included in the appendices.




Figure 1: Discourse themes The Netherlands by recurrence.




Figure 2: Common keywords by frequency for "Information safety".

Japan

The case analysis for the data set collected from Japanese sources has proceeded in the same manner as described above. I conducted the case study on two genres of documents: National Diet proceedings and MEXT white papers. The National Diet proceedings include commission records that in the case of The Netherlands have been categorized under MOCW documents (a methodological choice made by each respective government, not myself).⁶⁴ From the total 29 themes that were coded and commonly present in the texts, I have focused on the 16 most frequently recurring themes, as shown in figure 3.

Like above, I used common keywords from each theme for the rest of the analysis, excluding verbs, particles, and common nouns. Common words that are part of the structure of the documents were also excluded if I judged them to be irrelevant to the study (e.g., ministry, year, etcetera). An example of the theme “University rankings” can be seen in figure 4. In this example, we can already see a few things standing out: “国際” (international), “世界” (world), “評価” (evaluation), and “指標” (index) are all indicators that statements of the theme “university rankings” were correctly selected and filtered from the texts.

⁶⁴ A total of 62 proceedings and 21 white papers have been included.




Figure 3: Discourse themes Japan by recurrence.




Figure 4: Common keywords by frequency for "University rankings".

Moreover, the other terms in the frequency list indicate that the government is formulating a strategy to reach the top ranks in these rankings, with indications as to how they plan to do so: by “推進” (promoting) specific policies related to “留學生” (student exchange), “研究” (research). A specific “戰略” (strategy) by the “政府” (government), if you will. Of course, without the right context and just quantitative data, this would largely fall under the category of conjecture. A qualitative approach is therefore necessary in exploring the theme in depth. First, however, I need to explain the limitations of the described approach.

Limitations

As any study that is not endless in nature or purports to be comprehensive and wholly objective, there are limitations that I need to address before proceeding to the main analysis. These limitations are primarily a matter of choice in scope and topic.

For example, it is important to note here, that the data set consists mainly of official documents. This has resulted in an over-presentation of official discourses. Nevertheless, as the purpose of this study is to present to the reader exactly these discourses within the context of each respective discourse community this limitation does not affect the results of the main analysis.

In addition, the number of themes that could have been included in the main analysis are quite a few. For reasons of space, brevity, and time, I have chosen to focus on the themes that have discursive salience in both case studies; The Netherlands and Japan. This means that I have chosen the themes that either overlap in terms of discursive development, are similar in nature in terms of content, or are similar in terms of topic but are divergent in content.

Logically, several themes can overlap, so a complete exclusion of one or another theme can also not be guaranteed. For example, the idea of gaining a competitive position for one's country can overlap with diplomatic goals. A complete bordering off of any theme is thus not possible, and in this study, I do not claim to do so. The selection of themes to analyze is therefore a methodological choice.

In short, the main criteria for selecting the themes as explored below can be summarized as the following: the theme and/or topic are relevant in both discourse communities analyzed here. As a consequence, this study cannot claim to cover the whole of the history, nor the complete development, of the university, nor of the internationalization phenomenon in either country. Nevertheless, this study is an attempt at comparing the development of internationalization and the university in the two countries, and in one specific era; post-19th century, for which the choice has been explained in the chapters above. Let me therefore proceed with the analysis below.

An Analysis of the “International” University in Japan and The Netherlands

This analysis starts at the beginning of the 21st century, with a slight nod to earlier years when necessary. For both Japan and The Netherlands, this means that the new wave of internationalization in higher education had already begun a little over a decade ago. In Japan it began in 1983, with the Nakasone Plan, after decades of increasing liberal and neo-liberal policy making. In The Netherlands, the real start of a new wave can be traced back to the Bologna Process, where European integration of higher education became the standard, and student mobility within the Union began to take off. In both cases, internationalization had been part of a longer process.

A good starting point for this analysis might be a longer excerpt from a 2008 MEXT White Paper, the year in which several new policies aimed at internationalizing the university were introduced in Japan. In it, we found a list of issues that the Japanese government is trying to solve by introducing these new policies, of which several we can also find in The Netherlands, as I explain below. To begin, it starts with the “promise” of the university:

Universities, through advanced education and research, fulfill various functions in their search for the truth, among them the development of talented human resources who will be contribute to society and be responsible for the future of Japan. In recent years, as we move towards a full-fledged knowledge-based society while the environment surrounding universities changes, society’s expectations of universities are growing, while the needs of society and students are diversifying (MEXT, 2008, p. 19).

The university is a place of education and research, but that is simply a repetition of the above. It is nevertheless important to emphasize this ideal, as the text immediately detracts from this mission by stating this as a device for different aims; namely the development of human resources for the future of Japan. And not just any human resources, they need to be talented. A premise is constructed, and we have to continue reading the text to find out how these talents are imbued; we have to keep reading for the problem to be solved in the future.

Interestingly, within the span of a few sentences, the university is connected to the fate of the country, reminiscent of the nation-building endeavors of the 19th century. We continue with the following sentence: “society’s expectations of universities are growing”. Again, we find a reiteration of the responsibility of the university to contribute to the needs of society. The changing environment of the university, and the diversifying needs of society are presented to us as problems to be solved in a degraded present for a better future, much like the development of talented human

resources. However, it is clear what the Japanese government wants us to know first and foremost: the university is a tool for the sake of society, and by extension the nation of Japan. Keep in mind that this is a government produced document, so we can expect the order to follow consequentially. We have a problem, and the state will offer a solution in the form of policy.

There is a yet another problem, however, that we first need to deal with, and it takes the shape of demographic change, as the following sentence, in the same paragraph, continues:

On the other hand, as Japan's population is entering a phase of decline due to the falling birthrate and ageing population, universities are required to further distinguish their individuality and characteristics.

In particular, as globalization is rapidly progressing in university education, there is a growing mobility of students and faculty members and active efforts for international competition and cooperation, mainly in Europe, the USA and Asia (MEXT, 2008, p. 19).

There is a structural element to this section that cannot be glossed over, but that my explanation of this text might hide; namely that the first sentence in this excerpt immediately follows the first excerpt given above. It is therefore a direct continuation, and to an extent an explanation, of the previous text.


The structure of the text emphasizes the idea that the “the needs of society and students are diversifying” and that there is a changing environment to which the university, being indirectly made responsible for the future of the nation, is explained. Namely, by the fact that “Japan's population is entering a phase of decline due to the falling birthrate and ageing population”. The structure of the texts suggests a simple cause and effect, and the rest of the white paper is designed to continue the reader along this line of thought, and even gives visual aids to help prove this point, see figure 5.

This graph (figure 5), included in the same white paper, not only gives us the measured total number and proportional percentage of students enrolling in, or advancing to higher education (as visualized in both the bars and lines), it provides a prediction: that the number of Japanese students enrolling will decline in total numbers. This does not mean that the share of students will decline, as the lines indicate, but that demographic shifts have led to an inevitable loss of student population. Interestingly, the sentence right below this figure states the following:

In addition, with the rapid globalization of society and the economy, and the increasing cross-border collaboration and competition between universities, it is essential for university quality assurance to consider not only domestic trends, but also international perspectives, taking into account trends in other countries (MEXT, 2008, p. 143).

The decline of Japan's university-going population, largely the result of demographic shifts, is directly linked to international trends; they are part of the same clause. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the text offers us the solution to this problem in the form of education policies designed to "take into account" the international perspective: cross-border collaboration and competition between universities. It is a reminder of the introductory text, which states: "there is a growing mobility of students and faculty members and active efforts for international competition and cooperation".

図表 2-3-1 18歳人口及び高等教育機関への入学者数・進学率等の推移



(出典) 文部科学省「学校基本調査」, 総務省統計局「人口推計」より文部科学省作成

Figure 5: A graph from 2008 showing the number of students advancing to higher education in Japan.

In this case, we can better understand the text by focusing on what it is *not* telling the reader. By rendering the international world, and the problems it poses for Japan, a passive voice in the text, and accordingly only granting the text itself an active voice, as a proxy for the Japanese government and MEXT (in turn a proxy for the nation), it avoids challenging the problems it poses in a more fundamental fashion. The system itself, which produces the international competition between universities and the on-set of cross-border collaboration, is not challenged, nor are the neo-liberal economic policies that underpin it challenged. They are given to us as passively the fault of an international world imposed upon Japan, for which MEXT is simply offering a solution. A present problem presented to us with a future solution.

As the graph shows, the reader is assumed to believe the growing lines are positive, and the declining lines are negative: a market rule presented to us as a force of nature, a simple truth that is unavoidable. The declining population is presented as a problem, while a growing one is assumed not to be. The reader is taken along in a text that assumes the fundamental market principles that underpin the ideas expounded in the white paper will be accepted as passively as the world is rendered.

Here, I would like to briefly come back to the original excerpt, and pay attention to the following clause: “universities are required to further distinguish their individuality and characteristics”. Again, we see the fundamental market principles remain unchallenged. However, interestingly, the implication begs the question: “required by whom?” Asking this allows us to distill the from this particular sentence that there is only a single, authoritative voice that the white paper as a whole relies on: that of the author itself; in this case the MEXT.

The use of a high level of modality, e.g., “universities are required” in contrast to “universities may choose to” or “universities are made to”, also renders the reader passive, and the university as an institution passive as well. The only active voice, MEXT, thus places itself conveniently as the only active voice in the text through this form of textual grammar. One might argue that “society” is the one that “requires”, but as we have seen from the dull acceptance of the market truths that underpin the problems Japan faces, it is the voice that offers “society” solutions that grants us a way out of the problems posed by the text. MEXT takes on the role of an active participant, not society itself.

The reason I have chosen this particular excerpt to start the analysis with is to establish this particular aspect of the textual grammar used in official discourses on education, one that is unambivalent throughout the Japanese texts, and as we shall see below of the Dutch texts as well. Namely, that there is a national past that has been degraded by contemporary social ills, for which a collective solution must be formulated so that the nation can build towards a better, utopian, future. In short, the text makes use of nationalist rhetoric to make its point.

In addition, the text touches upon the main relevant topics and themes that I want to highlight. Namely, that of the production of human resources; the competitive position of nations; the prioritization of student exchange, and the problems that, as I will explain, beget them; and less directly the promotional activities by universities in facilitating the aforementioned, showing the business-like neo-liberal approaches that institutions of higher education have had to adopt in the 21st century. It might be appropriate to start with the first theme I listed, and the main aim of the university according to official discourses: the production of human resources.

Global Human Resources: Fuel for the Economy

As briefly addressed above, population growth and demographic change can be a challenge for sustaining a country's national system of higher education. As figure 6 below shows, both Japan and The Netherlands, up until the year 2000, still enjoyed a relative level of population growth up until the mid-20th century, after which the population stabilized. However, as universities were forced to adapt to an increasingly neo-liberal environment, university administrators had to assume a position of growth in accordance to the global market, as policy makers in both Japan and The Netherlands designed national education policy to develop in a similar fashion.

Accordingly, the need for a growing number of students developed at the university level. In order to sustain this growth, while facing a stabilizing, and in Japan a declining population of possible university-going age persons, these institutions had to resort to other means of gaining students. One demographic, specifically, became interesting in this enterprise: foreign students.

First, however, in order to understand how this need for foreign students developed, it is important to look at how governments have equated university students with the (global) economy.

We can already see this taking place in 2001, in an education white paper by MEXT:

As society and the economy become more sophisticated, complex and internationalized, universities and other higher education institutions are required to improve the quality of their education and research, and further respond to diverse social demands for human resource development. In addition, with the increase in the share of people enjoying higher education and the growing demand for lifelong learning, it is important to provide diverse and fulfilling educational opportunities so that people can fully develop their abilities in accordance with their own interests and ambitions (MEXT, 2001).


Again, as addressed above, we see how universities are “required” to adapt to a globalized economy. Several aspects of this text deserve highlighting, starting with the following: “As society and the economy become more sophisticated, complex and internationalized”.

Here we see a successive iteration of several terms, that by proximity in the text are suggestively linked: “society and the economy” being the most conspicuous one. Both of these words point to the adjectives that follow: “sophisticated, complex and internationalized”. Again, grammatical proximity and the inclusion of the three adjectives in the same clause suggest that they are causally linked. Effectively, the text convinces the reader that 1) society and economy are equal terms, referring to the same sign; in this case symbolizing the nation, and that 2) they are both undergoing a similar revolution, as described by the successive adjectives.

The proposition provided to us by this text is thus as follows: our nation is facing these changes, and universities are required to solve them. The solution, unsurprisingly, is attached to the same sentence, but in a succedent clause: “human resource development”. In The Netherlands we find a similar succession of proposition; problem and then solution, as the following excerpt shows:

The system of higher education and research makes sure that students and (scientific) personnel are able to maximally develop their talents and research capabilities. It educates them for positions in the national and international labor market in a way that optimally connects to their talents (MOCW, 2014, p. 58).

Population by country, 1900 to 2000



Source: Clio Infra (2016) OurWorldInData.org/world-population-growth/ • CC BY

Figure 6: Population growth in Japan and The Netherlands between 1900 and 2000. Our World in Data, 2022.

Interestingly, this text is shown to the reader under the heading of “General goal” [*Algemene doelstelling*], meaning that it is presented as the main goal of higher education. A subsequent elaboration of this position is given in the description of the role and responsibility of the MOCW in achieving this:

The minister [of the MOCW] is responsible for facilitating a system of education that functions in such a manner that it connects to the talents and ambitions of individual students and (scientific) personnel, and the needs of society (MOCW, 2014, p. 58).

The same goal is apparent in both texts, namely that the university should function to connect students to the needs of society, the economy, and the labor market. Another similarity is the ascription of the passive voice given to universities. In both cases, the university is rendered simply as a part of the education system, which in turn is rendered as a tool that needs to adapt to function for the benefit of the nation in a volatile, increasingly international environment. The voicelessness of the universities themselves makes it easier to project this mission unto them, and makes it simultaneously easier for the text to present the lone active voice as the government in charge, or responsible, for administering national policy that will steer these institutions in the right direction.

Importantly, we can see that in Japan, the nation and its society are aligned with the economy. This makes sure the reader knows these are equal terms that symbolize national welfare. In The Netherlands, the individual stands central in the problem: higher education should develop their talents and ambitions. In Japan students are lumped together into a single mass of human resources that should be able to develop their abilities, interests, and ambitions. The lexis used, therefore, is quite similar.

However, if we juxtapose the texts, we can see that there is a noticeable difference in the use of transitivity, source attribution, and in some cases, lexis. In terms of lexis, for example, the MOCW has chosen specifically to focus on the term “labor market”, ascribing the adjectives national and international to make a clear distinction between the nation and the rest of the world. In Japan, the choice has fallen on “economy”.

This difference is subtle, but grants agency (i.e., source attribution) to different political actors: the economy, which is inherent to the nation, or the labor market, which is inherent to the market economy. Hence, in the Dutch case, the need to distinguish between the national and the international. The “economy” signified in the Japanese text is automatically assumed to be the national economy, not the global economy, from which a certain level of textual space is created. In the Dutch case, the labor market is already an attribute of a globalized economy, while in the Japanese case, this distinction still needs to be made.

In other words, human resources need to be educated to *become* part of the global economy in Japan, while in The Netherlands human resources are part of the global economy already, and simply need to be developed accordingly. They indicate different stages in which the discourse is taking place, in terms of globalization and the internationalization of education. This particular difference becomes even more pronounced if we look into a specific symptom of this issue: international student exchange.

Foreign Students: The Solution or the Problem?

The number of international students in both Japan and The Netherlands has risen significantly over the last decades. In Japan, for example, the first target was set in the early 1980s: attracting

100,000 foreign exchange students. Another target was set at a later stage of this process, with the government aiming to send out 120,000 Japanese students by the year 2020. In The Netherlands, the number of universities and the population as a whole is only a fraction of Japan's numbers. Nevertheless, the number of international students has risen along similar lines, especially post-1999 after the introduction of the Bologna Process. The importance of international experience has become a central component of the "global human resources" rhetoric that permeates higher education discourse in both countries.

A good example of this we can find in the so-called 300,000 foreign students project, introduced by the government in Japan in 2008, under the leadership of Prime Minister Fukuda, as part of a national undertaking to reform higher education. Tamotsu Tokunaga, then head of the Department of Education, explained the purpose of the plan, during a questioning of the responsible committee during an Upper House session, as the following:

[...] its purpose is to make Japan a country open to the world, as part of the development of a global strategy to expand the flow of people, goods, money and information between Japan and Asia and the rest of the world. The aim is to increase the number of foreign students accepted to 300,000 by the year 2020 (National Diet, 2008).

There is a purposefulness to the statement made by Tokunaga: Japan needs to be remade into an "open country". When taking a look at the textual grammar of the statement, however, it becomes clear that this openness is inherently neo-liberal, as the mission is stated in economic terms: Japan needs to be opened so it can "expand the flow of people, goods, money and information". Again, as in earlier excerpts, there is a clear communication strategy at play: Japan is currently facing a problem and this needs to be solved. In other words: nationalist rhetoric. Moreover, the

internationalization of the university is deeply engrained in the mechanics of the market economy, as the successive use of related adjectives shows. There is, again, a textual space between Japan and the rest of the world, with a particular mention of Asia.

This space needs to be closed, and that can be done by “opening” up the country. The solution is given in immediate succession, the acceptance of 300,000 foreign students. Although the English translation, for readability purposes, does not show this, the solution is given in a clause of the summary preceding it. It is, in fact, the same sentence, emphasizing the proposition of the problem. Stated with a high level of modality, its immediate solution is also given causality: accepting more students will result in more people, goods, money and information flowing in and out of Japan. And in fact, by 2020, the government claimed that these goals have been reached:

In an international society where globalization is accelerating, and for the purpose of the progress of our country’s universities’ internationalization and the cultivation of human resources that can flourish on the world stage, the policy of “300,000 foreign students”, in which the goal was to accept foreign students, was established in July 2008. [...]. In 2019, the number of foreign students studying at Japanese universities exceeded 310,000, and in addition to this, in March 2021, a review was conducted of the progress made in achieving the objectives set out in the “300,000 foreign students plan,”, including improving the international competitiveness of university education and research, and making an intellectual international contribution for other countries, and it was verified that these goals have been met (MEXT, 2020, p. 314).⁶⁵

A visual aid will help the reader along with this claim, see figure 7 below. Although there is a slightly painful drop in 2020, likely caused by the global outbreak of a pandemic, took the

⁶⁵ I regret to inform the reader that the use of commas in Japanese text is not discouraged, and in official texts will often be worse than the reader will encounter in this work. Translations, therefore, might be somewhat awkward at times. Please refer to the original texts in the appendix for clarification whenever necessary.


government below its targeted goal, this particular fact is not addressed in the text. An obviation that the reader might easily gloss over.

The figure also shows how the government started counting students enrolled in “language schools” (see the orange line on the bottom) as the number of foreign students started decreasing in 2010 (see the green line in the middle). The red line on top is the accumulative number of foreign students.

In The Netherlands, a similar growth is visible, although with a steadier rise, see figure 8 below. The total numbers start in 2006, with 31,492 students, reaching up to 84,139 students by 2018, and 115,068 students by 2020 according to Nuffic (2021), although the last two years have not yet been included in the latest evaluation report. Similar to Japan, this is the result of an increasing neo-liberal environment, fueled by policies aimed at increasing internationalization in higher education. The rationale behind this development, promulgated in official policy, can be found in a 2018 evaluation of Nuffic, that summarizes the purpose of internationalization as pursued by the MOCW in three points, namely:

- Creating an *international classroom* in which Dutch students can gain international contacts and skills;
- Stimulating the international mobility of Dutch students, in order that these students gain skills that fit the international (labor) environment;
- Attracting talented international students that can be bound to The Netherlands, which will result in a strengthening of the Dutch education system and the Dutch knowledge economy (MOCW, 2018)

図表 2-10-1 外国人留学生数の推移



(出典) 日本学生支援機構「外国人留学生在籍状況調査」

Figure 7: An overview of the number of foreign students in Japan by year. MEXT, 2020.




Figure 8: An overview of the number of foreign students in The Netherlands by year. Nuffic, 2018.

Again, similar reasons as in Japan can be seen: attracting foreign students to complement the Dutch economy, for one. Secondly, the creating of human resources that can function in an international environment. The neo-liberal ideas that form the undercurrent of these policies are thus similar in both countries, and the growth strategy of universities is a symptom of the market-based national policies formulated as a result. The explanation, of course, is repeatedly qualified by representatives of the government, as the following text shows:

The spillovers and benefits of the EU agreements on free movement of goods, services and people (including students), are substantial for our open knowledge economy (estimated at €100 billion by CPB). The labour market demands graduates with international baggage. Allowing students to study abroad, in part or in full, or creating an international learning environment in The Netherlands by attracting foreign students who can enrich Dutch higher education (Tweede Kamer, 2011, p. 2).

The rationale for the acceptance of an increasing number of foreign students, as given by state secretary of the MOCW Halbe Zijlstra, in response to an official inquiry by the Lower House member of the Socialist Party (SP) Jasper van Dijk, rings familiar. The textual grammar employed in the communication strategy of the incumbent Dutch government, as represented by Zijlstra, matches the official rationale given by the MEXT in Japan; the economic benefits stand central in the argument structure as evidenced by the proximity of “free movement of goods, services and people”, and the bracketed “including students”, after which a successive summation of the benefits for foreign exchange is given. The benefits are even quantified at €100 billion.

Even though it is clear that this number indicates the economic benefits of the whole EU integration process, the addition of it as a clause that includes foreign students, the immediate succession of a sentence that focuses on the benefits of foreign exchange, provides the reader, in

the predicate of the sentence, with a proposition of logic that affirms the argument of the speaker repeatedly. Similarly, the high modality of the text supposes the authority of the speaker in the matter.

Interestingly, Zijlstra concludes this particular argument by arguing that “foreign students can enrich Dutch higher education”, a reference to the so-called creation of the international classroom strategy we see articulated in, for example, the MOCW goals for internationalization as well. There is a level of consistency to the main arguments employed. The argument itself starts by employing the market rationale of internationalization, and ends on a note that supposes benefits to the nation; using nationalist rhetoric. The national interest, therefore, is given form in multiple ways, by multiple speakers in multiple settings, similar to what we seen happening in Japan. If we look at the following text, from a more recent document, we can see that the same communication strategies are still employed:

The importance of internationalization is increasingly expressed in terms of preparing pupils and students to function in an intercultural society and on an internationally oriented labour market. [...]. In secondary and higher vocational education, the connection to an international and rapidly changing labour market is important (employability). In scientific education, the exchange of knowledge and researchers is originally a main reason for internationalization. [...] And although you need more than intercultural competences to be ‘employable’, you do learn to cooperate in international environments. Thus, the learning outcomes of internationalization are at the same time narrower and broader than terms such as global citizen, intercultural competences and 21st century skills (Nuffic, 2019, p. 4).

The references in this text are similar as to the above excerpts, as is the textual grammar. The only difference might the choice of lexis, as instead of “flow” of information, as in Japan, we find the “exchange”, or earlier the “free movement” of knowledge.

It is important to note that throughout the text the internationalized world looms in the background as a passive, but effective, motor for implementing internationalization strategies. The proximity of the economized student finds its recurrence as well, as we see in the sentence “preparing pupils and students to function in an intercultural society and on an internationally oriented labour market”. International, as a concept, is simply used as a substitute for a global market economy, and this is peppered with terms like “global citizen” and “intercultural competences”, all semantically similar in meaning, yet buzzy enough to avoid the repetition of “globalized human resources”.

An interesting attribute of the text is that it explicitly utilizes two languages, Dutch and English, even if the translation might not make this clear. Specifically, the terms “employable” and “employability” are both given in English, despite it being a Dutch-language text. This, again, is a symptom of internationalization seeping into the economic strategy that is employed in policy making for higher education. English, as this text shows, has become synonymous with internationalization. And this is, in fact, one of the problems that policy makers encounter when implementing internationalization policies, and one that has led acrimonious political debates.

In both countries, several problems have arisen alongside this growth of foreign students. In Japan, language issues and a decreasing population of students going abroad has formed an impediment for the government to reach its goals, especially when considering the retention rate of foreign students as foreign workers. In The Netherlands the same problem has arisen in terms of language, but the other way around: the unspurred growth of English-language studies has resulted in a backlash from politicians who, for example, are now arguing that international

students are crowding out Dutch students, and the Dutch language, and that universities have gone too far to attract internationals simply for financial gains. Already in the early stages of internationalization in The Netherlands, do we hear critical voices arguing that a focus on growth might affect the quality of education in the long-term, as the exchange between Van Dijk and Zijlstra shows:

Van Dijk: Do you share the view that the growth of the number of foreign students should not lead to a decrease in the quality and accessibility of higher education? If so, how will you guarantee this?

Zijlstra: I share the view that growth must not be at the expense of quality. On the contrary, the aim is to increase quality. I also believe that this growth should not be at the expense of accessibility at system level. If there are indications that the quality of programs is at risk due to the growth of the number of foreign students, I will discuss this with the educational institutions concerned. The basic principle must be that, when recruiting and selecting students, universities of applied sciences are guided by quality and not by financial motives - whether this concerns Dutch students or students from other EU countries (Tweede Kamer, 2011, pp. 2-3).

A politically savvy reader might notice the contradiction immediately, as Zijlstra argues that “when recruiting and selecting students, universities of applied sciences are guided by quality and not by financial motives”, speaking on behalf of universities that are increasingly pursuing internationalization strategies, while a few questions earlier, he rationalized internationalization on the basis of a financial quantification of the process (at €100 billion, to be exact). Linguistically, there are some interesting features as well. For example, the abundant use of dependent clauses. This is actually a common theme throughout both countries’ political discourses: the use of such clauses and textual proximity to persuade readers that there is causality between unrelated clauses.

The first response to the previous inquiry is enlightening: “I share the view that growth must not be at the expense of quality. On the contrary, the aim is to increase quality.” This is the initial response by Zijlstra, with which the speaker primes the reader for the rest of the text. A problem is given, the danger to the quality of education because of untethered growth, and the problem is immediately dismissed, in its entirety, by inverting the relationship of the word “quality” to the rest of the text. This chiasmus is quite effective in pulling the reader back to a positive reading of the word quality.

In terms of content, Zijlstra offers assurances of steps to be taken *post-factum*, once the quality of education has already been affected, but does not engage with the question itself. This is, of course, a strategy of avoidance, and is employed so as to forego the discussion about the inherent problem itself: that the internationalization strategy of higher education is predicated on growth. Again, the market principle that is at work remains unchallenged. However, it is important to note here that, although a financial benefit is quantified (although it is a misplaced quantification), the growth itself is not. This point, left unaddressed, is what continues to cause political friction.

Take, for example, the following exchange between Harmen Beertema, a member of the right-wing party PVV, and Ingrid van Engelshoven, the Minister of the MOCW:

Beertema: Are you aware of the report that there is an explosive influx of first-year economics and business students from abroad?

Van Engelshoven: Yes.

Beertema: Do you share the view of the Director of Education, Mr. Praagman, of the University of Groningen, that Dutch students should not have an advantage over foreign students, even if this leads to displacement of Dutch students?

Van Engelshoven: [...] I have a responsibility for an accessible higher education system, with accessibility for Dutch students being of primary importance. I do not want the influx of international students to lead to displacement of Dutch students or for Dutch students to have less freedom of choice as a result. (Tweede Kamer, 2018, p. 1).

The use by Beertema of the word “explosive” indicates the liberal use of hyperbole, as though the growth itself now forms a physical threat to the nation. In reality, the growth of foreign students, especially after 2014 (see figure 6), has been an active government policy to incentivize universities to actively pursue internationalization strategies.

Universities are now embedded in a market-based system, in which competition over students has become the primary target, and as universities have had to suffer multiple rounds of budget cuts over the last decades of the 20th century (see chapter 4), the allure of international students in terms of growth and financial gains has led to them to actively pursue and compete over, not only domestic students, but international students as well. This has led to the aforementioned problems, among them the increasing importance of English in the “international classroom” and the problem of financing students (Funnekotter, 2011), as the following exchange shows:

Van den Hul and Westerveld: In your opinion, what role does internationalization, the increase in English-language education, and higher education funding play in the increase in students and the associated quality of universities?

Van Engelshoven: The strengthening of international dimensions in education has added value for the student, the educational institution and for the Dutch knowledge economy [...]. Especially in higher

education, and specifically in academic education, the increasing internationalization has its downsides and seems to have reached its limit in some places. I do not want to close my eyes to this, which is why I announced measures [...]. In essence, it is about a qualitative interpretation of the issues surrounding internationalization, in which the quality of education is paramount, language policy is consciously pursued and accessibility is guaranteed. At the moment, we are working hard on the bill [...] (Tweede Kamer, 2019, pp. 3-4).

These questions posed by Lower House Members Kirsten van den Hul (Labor Party; PVDA) and Lisa Westerveld (Groenlinks) to the MOCW minister Van Engelshoven about the state of education are revealing, and exposes the problem that lays at the root of the political strife surrounding internationalization in higher education in the country. Namely, that although official discourses as expressed in the MOCW publications still maintain the “benefits” of internationalization, as once again expressed by Van Engelshoven in her argument of “strengthening of international dimensions in education has added value for the student, the educational institution and for the Dutch knowledge economy”, again referencing in clause the national interest, the importance of English has created a dynamic shift in the offering of education as a whole, and this has resulted in problems for Dutch students.

In order to avoid repetition, I do want to emphasize that Van Engelshoven consistently uses the same nationalist rhetoric in her communication strategies as we have seen earlier. There is, however, one notable difference: the admission that “the increasing internationalization has its downsides and seems to have reached its limit in some places”, pointing towards a discursive shift. She actually uses a metaphor that invokes the physicality of her response: “I do not want to close my eyes to this”. This shows that she acknowledges the issues at hand, indicating a shift in her political rhetoric, and the discourse as a whole, as she does not speak as a single politician, but for

the entirety of the MOCW and as a representative of the incumbent cabinet. In order to understand why this has happened, some contextualization is needed.

Students from within the European Union are eligible for student loans provided by the Dutch government. This system was already in place before the onset of the Bologna Process in 1999, but was not reformed significantly post-EU education integration, meaning that EU citizens are eligible for these loans. Frequently, these loans are provided at zero-interest rates, and are partially or completely funded by the Dutch government, using public funds (Rijksoverheid, n.d.). On average, a foreign student will cost the Dutch government around 6,000 euros per year (Funnekotter, 2012), meaning that a strong increase in foreign students will significantly burden the national budget. According to a Council of State (Raad van State) review conducted in 2019, this has had significant effects on the state of education:⁶⁶

However, the following dilemma arises here: the way in which funding based on the number of students is organized and the level of funding, gives an incentive to recruit and admit many (foreign) students. An important and effective way of doing this is to offer study programs in English. However, an unlimited influx leads to capacity problems and is to the detriment of the quality of education and the effectiveness of central government spending on education by the state (Raad van State, 2019, p. 3).

Despite these facts, the national government aggressively pursued internationalization strategies over the course of the 21st century. Universities, facing budget crunches, were inclined to go along,

⁶⁶ The Council of State, or Raad van State, is a body organized to advise the King of The Netherlands on matters of government, but has no effective power in the policy making process, although it is able to review, and make a final judgement in, judiciary proceedings and conflicts of state. This means they cannot create policies, nor rewrite them, but only advice on their alteration. See, <https://www.raadvanstate.nl/talen/artikel/english-version/>.

as foreign students also brought in public funds, in turn leading to an overburdening of the national budget, as the Council of State points out.

As part of this larger strategy of internationalization, as the Council of State also alludes to, universities started implementing increasingly more English-language programs, and there is a legal complication that lays at the basis of this problem. Although the Dutch law only permits the introduction of English under specific circumstances, when the introduction of this language provides an “added value” to the content of the program, the law itself does not define these conditions to the extent in which they are enforceable. As the Council of State explains:

In applying the requirement of “added value”, the institution must weigh up the interests involved. Under the current Act, the institution justifies this consideration - on the basis of the stricter criterion of “necessity” - in a code of conduct. A study by the Education Inspectorate into language policy in higher education has shown that compliance by institutions with this obligation leaves much to be desired. In its study, the Inspectorate also concluded that the current Section 7.2 of the WHW and the explanatory notes to it do not provide any concrete verifiable elaboration as a guide: not for the institutions in complying with it and not for the Inspectorate in supervising it (Raad van State, 2019, p. 6).

This means that universities were able to introduce new programs in English without supervision, a phenomenon spurred on by a national policy of internationalization following the Bologna Process. This meant that, although only a handful of university programs in The Netherlands were given in English prior to 1999, in 2019, according to Nuffic, the tally stood at the following:

Of all unique (N=411) bachelor’s programmes in Dutch research universities in 2018-2019, approximately 58% were offered in Dutch exclusively. Some 28% were offered in English only, and another 15% were offered in multiple languages. Of the 702 master’s programmes at research universities, there were 14% offered in Dutch only, a majority of 76% offered in English only, and another 10% offered in multiple languages (2019, p. 8).

This development, called “verengelsing”, or Anglification, consequently evolved into public debates about the nature of the university (Vos, 2018), and the unspurred growth of internationalization processes in higher education as a whole.

Another issue that has gained traction in this debate is “information safety”, in particular in relation to China. The Dutch think tank Clingendael published a report on the role of Confucius Institutes in The Netherlands, specifically focusing on the possibility of state-sponsorship. In other words, the idea that the Chinese government was financially sponsoring the institutes, which themselves are semi-governmental organizations, and that this resulted in the influencing of teachers and students who work and study there.

Many of these institutes were established in partnership with Dutch universities as part of the internationalization process, and students who got involved were, for example, taken on state-sponsored tours of China. This, in turn, exacerbated the idea of Chinese influence in higher education in The Netherlands, with Lower House members directing questions, about why and how this could happen, at the minister of the MOCW. Several of the questions were directly related to the presence of Chinese students:

Is it possible that the Chinese government exerts political influence through its students? Does the research take into account that the Chinese are used to a certain degree of governmental interference, which is higher than for the Dutch, and that they may therefore be less able to determine where the boundaries are (Tweede Kamer, 2020, p. 2)?

Lower House members of three majority parties and one opposition party were involved in the inquiry, and most of the questions were related to national security issues, possible spying by students, and the safety of sensitive information in research and development taking place at

universities. The minister and the MOCW claimed, in turn, that the responsibility lies with the universities, as is evident from the following excerpt:

Dutch higher education institutions have committed themselves to the Dutch Code of Conduct for Scientific Integrity [...]. The values laid down in the code are not automatically adhered to by partners from other countries. However, when entering into a partnership, an institution can refer to this code in the partnership agreement. In practice, this also happens (Tweede Kamer, 2020, pp. 17-18).

This exchange, however, does not comprehensively cover the debate as it was on-going, as opposition members, unsatisfied with the state of affairs, started using nationalist rhetoric in questioning the current status quo of internationalization as it stands, as the following exchange between Lower House members Harry van der Molen, Joba van den Berg, Marijn van Helvert (all three CDA) and minister Van Engelshoven displays:

Van der Molen, Van den Berg, and van Helvert: Do you share the view that it is worrying that the Leiden Asia Centre concludes that universities give little insight into their partnerships with China and that there is a lack of transparency and mutual trust among Dutch universities? What do you intend to do about this?

Van Engelshoven: Our higher education sector benefits from mutual trust and transparency. Not only for constructive cooperation and increasing the quality of education and science, but also to ensure and increase knowledge security. The importance of good and constructive cooperation also applies between the institutions and the government. [...]. The universities are also in regular contact with each other about their cooperation with China.

Van der Molen, Van den Berg, and van Helvert: What do you think of the suggestion by China expert D'Hooghe of the Leiden Asia Centre to supplement the existing guidelines on integrity and knowledge sharing with specific "China rules" that would impose conditions and restrictions on cooperation with countries that do not share Dutch values and principles? Do you think that the security services should play a role in this?

Van Engelshoven: In the aforementioned parliamentary letter on knowledge security, the government presents a package of measures to better ensure knowledge security in higher education and (applied) science, including measures to prevent undesirable knowledge transfer. The aim of this package is to ensure that international cooperation takes place in a safe manner, with due consideration for both the opportunities and risks involved. The government has explicitly opted for a country-neutral approach in developing these instruments. In drafting and implementing these policy instruments, the government will work with all relevant branches of government, including the intelligence and security services.

The Leiden Asia Centre report that the three CDA politicians refer to concludes that the collaboration between China and The Netherlands in higher education needs to become more sustainable, as “serious worries exist with regard to the undermining of academic freedom through (self-)censorship practices and direct or indirect Chinese influence efforts at campuses abroad, especially at institutions that rely heavily on Chinese PhD researchers and/or the tuition fees of Chinese students” (d’Hooghe & Lammertink, 2020, pp. 3-4). The researchers also acknowledge that the issue has become highly politicized, as the above exchange is a prime example of.

If we look at the discursive strategies used in the above text by the political actors involved, a few features stand out. The first is the nationalization of the communication by the three Lower House members, as is evident in the phrase: “impose conditions and restrictions on cooperation with countries that do not share Dutch values and principles”. The “Dutch”, used as an adjective to augment the “values and principles”, essentially draws the issue into the realm of national interest and national identity.

Of course, there is no such thing as a consolidated code of Dutch values or principles, but the (nationalist) turn of phrase makes it difficult for Van Engelshoven to ignore the proposition as a whole, that there is a need to “increase knowledge security”. The lexis utilized in the

argumentative device indicates a consistent strategy. Terms as “trust”, “transparency”, and “good and constructive cooperation indicate a basis on which Dutch higher education is supposed to operate, but that is now endangered by this development.

In doing so, the three Lower House members speak through the text as though they are speaking on behalf of the nation. If we take a look at the formulation of the question, then, we can also spot the obviation of one of the subjects, namely the state. When asking the question, they include the following clause: “that universities give little insight into their partnerships with China”. It is indicated that universities “give” something, albeit a little of it, so there must also be an entity to which this is “given”, in this case either the state or the nation. It is an effective discursive strategy in which the issue is wholly nationalized, and to which Van Engelshoven can only reply in neutral terms, even deploying the term “neutral” itself when she chooses the word “country-neutral approach” to describe the policy-response by the government.

In fact, the nationalist rhetoric used in the communication strategy by the questioning side complicates the issue for Van Engelshoven, as it makes it difficult to use nationalist rhetoric in similar terms. This is visible in her retreat into utilizing the government, in place of the nation, in pleading her case: “In drafting and implementing these policy instruments, the government will work with all relevant branches of government, including the intelligence and security services”. She attempts to augment her position in her choice of lexis as well, choosing to use “better ensure”, “safe manner”, and balancing the negative terms used in the questions with positive words. For example, “risks” becomes both “opportunities and risks”. The issue, nevertheless, has left a dent in the course of national internationalization policy.

The amalgamation of the language problem, the national budget crisis and the idea that foreign students might not be “safe” have started to move the political discussions away from internationalization. The statements and subsequent admission of the negative effects of internationalization by Van Engelshoven quoted earlier, for example, are an indication of that. This discursive shift, however, has not yet translated to a reversal or retreat in terms of policy; it is very much a recent development, and one of politics-in-progress.

Similar to in The Netherlands, Japanese politicians have questioned the internationalization policies in place, although the problem focus is markedly different. This exchange between Upper House member Takumi Shibata of the now defunct Your Party, and the incumbent minister of the MEXT Takashi Kii (of the similarly defunct Democratic Party of Japan; DPJ) in 2012, four years after the introduction of the 300,000 foreign student policy, shows this quite accurately:

Shibata: Today, I would like to start by asking a question from the perspective of developing, securing, and acquiring global human resources. I think this will become an increasingly important issue in the future. In particular, in other countries, the competition to acquire high quality foreign students is becoming more and more fierce, and is intensifying. I cannot help but feel that Japan’s foreign student policy is very inadequate. [...] It has been several years since Japan set a plan to increase the number of foreign students in Japan to 300,000, but I think the number is still around 140,000. I would like to take this opportunity to discuss policies for receiving and sending out foreign students from Japan, if there is time, but I think that we must take firm steps to improve these policies.

So, first of all, how can we improve the system for receiving students? If the destination is not attractive, people will not come to study in Japan [...]. There are a number of things that need to be done [...], I would like to ask you first about what you would like to focus on in particular.

Kii: I feel that we share the same awareness of the problem. I believe that it is very important to improve the acceptance system at universities, including the enrichment of the so-called educational content and the development of English-language classes.

[...]. We are supporting the development of comprehensive systems, such as the establishment of courses that enable students to obtain degrees in English, support for international students in their daily lives and employment, and the enhancement of Japanese language education. In addition, from the current financial year, the Global Human Resource Development Promotion Project was launched to strengthen the efforts of universities to form hub universities for the internationalization of university education, and to support universities that improve the international acceptability of their curricula and establish overseas study programs with transferable credits. [...] (National Diet, 2012).

The first noticeable difference between The Netherlands and Japan is the adoption of the same lexis by the opposition party member. The initial policy was set up by the LDP, of which neither speaker are members of, meaning that in both cases the discourse surrounding internationalization in higher education in Japan has been saturated with a singular vocabulary.

In terms of transitivity, it is again, conspicuously, the government from which the process flows. The speakers both assume, already in their role as political actors, the importance in steering internationalization from the government's point of view, complete with the underlying, and unchallenged idea of increased growth in the student population as dictated by a global market economy.

In fact, both speakers agree that the growth of the student population, in terms of "human resources", will strengthen Japan's global competitiveness. Both speakers adopt nationalist rhetoric to make their points. The problem therefore, posed by opposition member Shibata, is not formulated as an attack on the inherent market-based ideology that grounds the policy, but the *effectiveness* of the policy in attracting students to Japan. In fact, the problem is stated as an issue of national interest, as the speaker indicates in his choice of words: "securing, and acquiring global human resources": it shows that the statement is formulated around the idea of Japan actively

partaking in this process out of self-interest, as it is positioned as the main voice, the primary political actor, actively securing, and actively acquiring human resources.

In addition, the importance of English is restated (and stated continuously throughout the entire debate, which can be generalized for the surrounding discourse as well). This shows the central position English has taken up in the internationalization process. This is interesting for several reasons. In contrast to The Netherlands, Japan actually lacked the capacity to fully accept the number of foreign students that is stated in the main policy's goal, because it lacked programs in English for which these students can enroll; thus, creating a bottleneck for the policy as a whole. This particular problem is addressed in this exchange as well, as the response by Kii indicates when he argues that the problem suggested by Shibata needs to be solved, by, for example: "the establishment of courses that enable students to obtain degrees in English."

Several projects along this line were created by the government in pursuit of this goal, including the most recent Super Global University Project: a policy designed to support certain universities in their pursuit of internationalization. In English it is also referred to as the Top Global University Project (MEXT, 2022), and it is a continuation of the Global 30 Project (which ended in 2014). The Global 30 Project is a passive funding project that focused on providing subsidies to 30 universities (although only 13 were eventually selected) that would help universities to develop their internationalization programs, predominantly through the attraction and enrollment of foreign students and building a like-minded university network (MEXT, n.d.). This, in turn, is a continuation of the Asian Gateway Initiative (2009-2014), which was a project aimed at developing more economic ties with surrounding Asian nations through the promotion of inter-

Asia student exchanges (The Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative, 2016). Sugimura explains the Top Global University Project as the following:

What characterizes this project is that while it serves as a guideline for internationalization and cultivation of global talent, it also calls for direct university reform in order to promote internationalization. By undertaking internationalization and reform of universities concurrently, the project aims to improve the universities' international validity and to formulate and implement overall and medium/long-term project plans to enhance international competitiveness. This point differs from past internationalization measures such as Global 30 that dealt mostly with tangible measures for internationalization, such as increasing the number of students going abroad or coming to Japan, and establishing new programs that use English for teaching. The new project instead focuses on the universities' decision-making mechanisms that allow implementation of measures for internationalization, and has a ten-year, long-term goal for governance reform that would enable internationalization to take place quickly and effectively (2015, p. 13).

As Sugimura explains, this project, that is still ongoing, does not only focus on numerical targets, like previous projects did, but also focuses on the structural changes needed to implement internationalization. In other words, the main policy goal shifted from quantitative goals to a qualitative goal. A total of 37 universities are now taking part in it, with the project mainly revolving around the introduction of English-language programs. For universities, this has given them more freedom to pursue internationalization in their own terms, allowing them to set up their own projects and initiatives (Rose & McKinley, 2018).

This has, however, also resulted in issues. Take, for example, the increasing importance of international university rankings, another symptom of internationalization on a global scale. The placement of one's university in the various rankings, the more famous ones being the Times

Higher Education and QS Top Universities Ranking,⁶⁷ has become increasingly important. Placement has become an issue of internationalization, and for university administrators proof of the excellence of one's institutions. These global rankings have also become important for policy makers, as evidenced, for example, by the inclusion of the results of the yearly rankings in official education white papers (MEXT, 2017, p. 83). Although the possibility of ranking universities based on certain, measurable, can sound promising, there is a flipside, as Yonezawa explains:

The development and growing influence of international university rankings will increase the potential for university education, research and other activities to transcend national borders, but on the other hand, the stakeholders in university rankings are not only universities, but also governments, international organizations, students and industries around the world (2018, p. 161).

Japan is no exception in this matter. MEXT officials have introduced a policy that aims to place more Japanese universities in the higher levels of these rankings, and uses them as an indication of the progress of internationalization in their policy making. As a consequence, politicians have questioned this particular method, as the following exchange between Yoshinori Hakui, the head of the department of higher education at MEXT, and Upper House member Ken'ichi Yamauchi (Your Party):

Hakui: [...]. As these [rankings] are based on evaluation indicators set independently by foreign private companies, the MEXT does not designate specific rankings as indicators in order to avoid bias in criteria and fields. However, by applying the rankings to each university, they can learn about international evaluations and use them as a reference for making improvements, and we are taking this approach in the hope that it will help each university to analyze their issues and improve their educational and research capabilities.

⁶⁷ See <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings> and <https://www.topuniversities.com/qs-world-university-rankings>.

Yamauchi: In order for Japanese universities to be included in the top 100 of this ranking, there were various initiatives such as Super Global Universities Project, but what kind of policies were adopted and were they effective? Looking back at the results, there has been no improvement even after seven years. I would like to ask you what your take on this is.

Hakui: [...]. The MEXT has been supporting the improvement of education and research capabilities, internationalization and governance reform through the Super Global University Creation Support Project, [...] in order to realize the development of world-class excellence in education and research activities and the enhancement of internationalization of universities.

Currently, although there are only two universities in the Times Higher Education [top rankings], there are various notable examples of university reform, such as initiatives to drive the internationalization of universities and to strengthen business management. According to the Times Higher Education, there are 1,526 universities ranked in the [complete] list, of which 116 are Japanese universities, which means that Japan ranks second in the world in terms of the number of universities ranked by country (National Diet, 2020).

In an attempt to derail the conversation from the lack of policy performance, Hakui uses a strategy of positive reinforcement, as evident in his choice of words. By focusing on the specific role of the government's "support" to universities, the responsibility for bad performance in these rankings is placed with the universities. He does this by obviating the government as the primary subject in the text, or the primary culprit in this case. Instead, he deploys adjectives such as "world-class", augmenting the noun "excellence", and substitutes what he considers the disagreeable conclusion with an agreeable one using a dialogism, which is then placed in close textual proximity to "education and research activities", to return to the issue of internationalization in the last clause of the same sentence; e.g., the "enhancement of internationalization of universities".

In doing so, he can return to the subject at hand from a more comfortable position, one in which he can once again deploy nationalist rhetoric. He does so in the last argumentative device

he uses in his retort, which is the following section: “Japan ranks second in the world in terms of the number of universities ranked by country”. This, again, complicates Yamauchi’s criticism, as he would not be able to deny this particular argument if he is to fall back on his own position that Japanese universities are not performing well. It is an interesting usage of such rhetoric, which at a first glance may seem logical. A quick glance back, however, shows the inherent contradiction in the statement. Namely, his first assertion that MEXT “does not designate specific rankings as indicators”.

Despite the latter argument, and glaring contradiction, rankings have been prominent within the discourse on internationalization since the inception of the Top Global University Project, as for example the following argument, by Upper House member Takeshi Ninoyu (LDP), from a 2014 debate, shows:

I also mentioned that, in terms of so-called international rankings, Japanese universities are indeed underperforming from a superficial point of view, but that it is necessary to take a closer look at these factors. In this context, for example, the number of foreign students, the number of foreign lecturers, the number of internationally cited papers, etc., Japanese universities may be slightly inferior in these areas of internationalization, and these factors may be pushing down the international reputation of Japanese universities (National Diet, 2014).

In his statement, Ninoyu, a member of the ruling LDP party, connects the international rankings to the underperformance of Japanese universities using an epistrophe: the *number* of foreign students, which he mentions first, the *number* of foreign staff, and the *number* of papers being cited internationally. This, in turn, he connects to the issue of internationalization in the same

sentence. Again, we see the deployment of national rhetoric in his use of the term “international reputation”. This, again, is a common theme throughout the discourse.

It is notable that throughout the whole discourse on international rankings, and Japan’s position in them, very little is questioned in terms of why universities need to internationalize and score better on these rankings; the assumption that there is a continuous need for growth, and thus raising Japan’s international competitiveness, remains intact and fairly undisputed.

Interestingly, opposition attacks on internationalization policy have not focused on these underlying neo-liberal principles either. In fact, counter-arguments are more likely clad in defense of a supposed Japanese national identity, often in the guise of protecting Japan’s reputation, language, or its culture. See for example the following argument, as given by LDP Upper House member Hiroshi Andō, in response to an explanation by a MEXT official of Top Global University Project:

[...] I think it is really important to have excellent people from various countries come to Japan to revitalize Japanese universities and to nurture excellent students. [...] This is a bit of a digression, but after the Meiji Restoration, Japan desperately tried to absorb the knowledge of advanced countries in order to catch up with the industries of the advanced Western countries. At that time, of course, there were no Japanese who could teach the knowledge of the advanced Western countries, so education was conducted in foreign languages by foreigners hired by the government. [...] However, later on in Japan, foreign students returned to home and the number of graduates of various Japanese schools increased, and Japanese people became able to teach Western knowledge in Japanese, making it possible for education to be conducted in Japanese.

I believe that the greatest reason for this, is the environment in which anyone can learn the world’s most advanced knowledge in Japanese. Anyone can go to a book store and easily obtain books in Japanese on a wide range of subjects, from the classics of many countries around the world to current trends in a

variety of fields. I believe that this is an infrastructure that we should be proud of, and the source of this infrastructure comes from the fact that education is conducted in Japanese at universities and graduate schools in Japan's top academic institutions. By domestically producing knowledge, we can think deeply in our native language, and the Japanese people can share this knowledge with the rest of the world whenever they want, which will create the basis for national power and make a significant contribution to the development of science and culture. I believe that this is the main reason why the Japanese people were able to continue to be an advanced country after the Meiji Restoration, when they switched from education in foreign languages to Japanese, and succeeded in doing so.

The Japanese Nobel laureate Toshihide Masukawa has said that he is not good at English, but he has said that there are various reasons why Japanese basic science is strong, but in my view, the fact that studies are conducted in Japanese is a major factor. The reason why Japanese people can win Nobel Prizes is because they can think deeply in Japanese. In fact, there are many Asian countries other than Japan that score higher on the TOEFL and TOEIC than Japan, but if you look at if they have a Nobel Prize, they do not.

The Super Global University Project includes the concept of expanding classes taught in English by foreign or Japanese teachers, but based on what I have just said, I believe that for the development of Japanese culture and science classes should always be taught in Japanese at Japan's highest academic institutions. (National Diet, 2014).⁶⁸

The main premise, that more foreign students need to be attracted to ensure the stability of the Japanese economy, is not challenged, rather the *modus operandi* of the project itself. In other words, not the mission but the method faces criticism. Andō employs an interesting rhetorical device, an analepsis, to make his point: he starts his argument in the current time, but interrupts it to construct a long historical narrative about how English used to be necessary, attempting to argue that Japan is now developed and no longer needs it. To strengthen his argument, he uses the past success of

⁶⁸ In the translation of the Japanese excerpts, I maintain the “Super Global University Plan”, while referring in the main text to the “Top Global University Plan.” This is because the English loanword “super”, or “sūpā” is used in Japanese, while in the main text I continue to refer to the official English name is given to the project by MEXT.

a Japanese scholar and a Nobel Prize winner, ironically using the *international* science prize to defend a more nationalistic stance; the defense of the Japanese language. Contrasting Japanese scientific success with that of other Asian countries, Andō isolates an argument made by Dr. Masukawa; namely that he does not speak English well.

There is a logical fallacy to be found here, of course, as such anecdotal evidence does not support a generalization of the benefit of Japanese in the pursuit of science. Nevertheless, he uses Dr. Masukawa as a voice of authority in his own text, constructing a high level of modality in doing so. The lexis he uses in the sketching of his own context, which he uses to introduce his main premise of Japanese being a language of science, also points to this, when he argues: “this is the main reason why the Japanese people were able to continue to be an advanced country after the Meiji Restoration, when they switched to Japanese rather than foreign languages for education.” The deployment of historical narrative reinforces his authority on the matter, as he suggests historical recurrence as evidence, as form of historicism that is employed frequently and erroneously in both political and scientific discourses in the past (Popper, 1957).

Nevertheless, the defense of Japanese language, as exemplified by Andō, immediately gained ground in the internationalization discourse in Japan, as the following excerpt from an official Upper House statement by MEXT official Futoshi Sano from the same session in 2014 also shows:

In the Super Global University Creation Support Project, which has just been pointed out, it is a matter of course for each of the universities that have been selected, and which will be selected from now on, to create an environment where students, the majority of whom are Japanese students, can receive the highest level of education in the Japanese language. [...] However, we also recognize the importance of

developing students' language skills, such as English, in the development of global human resources. [...]. However, even in these cases, we recognize that it is very important to have a well-developed Japanese language education system for foreign researchers and students. Therefore, we will be examining this project [...] (National Diet, 2014).

The deployment of nationalist rhetoric has effectively rendered any opposition naught, as is visible in Sano's statement: he simply copies the argument from Andō, lexis intact, and re-emphasizes the importance of English in addition. This strategy has proven quite effective over the last years. This can, to a large extent, be explained by looking at the discourse in which internationalization is embedded. In the following text, for example, we see that Japan's internationalization discourse is rife with national interest jargon:

At the same time, the aim is to internationalize Japan's universities and strengthen their international competitiveness, and at the same time, it is also highly significant for mutual understanding with other countries and the formation of human networks that will form the basis for Japan to build stable international relations (National Diet, 2008).

This text, from 2008, comes from a statement made in the same year as the 300,000 foreign student plan was introduced. In fact, it comes from the same National Diet discussions in which the policy itself was debated. Although the first part of the sentence is a repetition of the market-based argument, the second clause is based on the premise that internationalization will lead to more "stable international relations". Throughout the political discourse, the focus on foreign students becoming "ambassadors for Japan" while abroad is apparent, and is stronger in political debates concerning internationalization policies, than it is in official documentation.

To relate back to the case of The Netherlands, a similar argumentative device can be seen at play, MOCW Van Engelshoven was questioned in 2020 about the low retention rates of foreign

students as workers, following a widely debated newspaper article titled: “Less foreign students are staying: and that is going to cost money” (van Gaalen, 2020). Members of the ruling coalition’s parties and Lower House members Dennis Wiersma (VVD) and Harry van der Molen (CDA) asked the minister if she was aware of the decreasing retention rate, and the costs that this would entail, despite the MOCW’s aggressive internationalization strategy. She downplayed the decrease, stating it as “very small”, arguing that it was only a decrease of a few percent, from 57.3% to 53,5% of students willing to stay and work in The Netherlands, leading to the following exchange:

Wiersma and Van der Molen: Do you share the opinion that good international students are an added value for The Netherlands, but that it is important to have sufficient instruments at our disposal to attract the international students to The Netherlands who strengthen us and actually want to live and work in The Netherlands after their studies? If not, why not?

Van Engelshoven: [...] I do not think it is desirable that all international students who come to The Netherlands continue to live and work here. It is also important that knowledge circulates [...]. Moreover, students and researchers who return can be excellent ambassadors for The Netherlands, just as Dutch researchers and students can be showcases for The Netherlands abroad (Tweede Kamer, 2020, p. 3).

The argument used by Van Engelshoven is revealing, and the rhetoric she uses even more so. In Dutch, the term desirable, “wenselijk”, denotes a personal wish. In doing so, the minister decontextualizes the problem, as addressed by Wiersma and Van der Molen, and personalizes it. This enables her to resort to the argumentative device she employs in the sentence that follows, which, again, uses the same logic as deployed in official communication strategies concerning internationalization. Namely, that it is beneficial, for the national interest, that an undefined number of foreign students leave The Netherlands and return home to become “ambassadors” for the country.

Inherently, this is a contradictory statement, as the original mission of employing global human resources is not achieved if this development persists, especially in relation to the financial costs that are made for foreign students. In fact, the stay rate deployed by Van Engelshoven is cherry-picked, as the actual retention rate over a 5-year period is closer to around 25% (Nuffic, 2022). Interestingly, Japan seems to be facing the same problem, with MEXT stating that only around 30% of foreign students stay in the country to find employment. A number they want to raise to 50%, although no time frame is given for reaching this target (MEXT, 2018, p. 364).

If we go back to the previous point, the turn by Van Engelshoven towards using the national interest as her main argument in her exchange with Wiersma and Van der Molen is quite effective in shutting down the opposing argument. The argument itself is also revealing once deconstructed: it shows us that internationalization rhetoric is fundamentally nationalist, and that deploying this form of rhetoric makes it difficult for political actors to question the assumptions that lie at the foundation of the problems at hand. The political parrying, from both the opposition and the ruling party, are rife with these discursive strategies.

As has been established already, the same undercurrent of nationalism runs through the rationale of internationalization strategies in Japan. A statement by specially appointed Minister of Finance, Taro Asō, in 2013 makes this abundantly clear:

[W]e are talking about students from abroad and students from Japan, and although this is not generally a lower priority than support for Japanese students, the acceptance of so-called excellent foreign students

will contribute to the promotion of Japan's internationalization and the *improvement of its soft power*, as well as to the development of the country's economy (National Diet, 2013).⁶⁹

The idea of internationalization has remained embedded in a promotion of national interests. Statements such as the one by Asō make clear that policies aimed at internationalization are actually rife with nationalist rhetoric. To make the point even clearer, we can take a look at how the above statement is followed up in which he uses a litotes to highlight a difference in generational mindset to emphasize his nationalist rhetoric; literally stating "Japan is better":

In any case, [...] fewer [Japanese] students want to go abroad than in the past, when we were students. That is exactly what I think when I look at our sons, that generation. They say, "Dad, Japan is better". Our generation never thought that. We thought that it was definitely better abroad, and we wanted to go abroad, and we wanted to save money to go abroad, but I think that awareness has changed a little [...] (National Diet, 2013).

And it is not unsurprising, therefore, that the brunt of the oppositional attacks, aimed at the current path in which internationalization is taking place in higher education, also takes the form of nationalist rhetoric. See for example the following introduction to a statement by Ryōko Tani of the People's Life First Party, who launches a fairly innocuous critique of the government's foreign student policy, but nevertheless coats it in a figurative mountain of national symbolism:

First off, I am very happy to announce that on 5 May, Shigeo Nagashima, the greatest superhero of the post-war era, and Hideki Matsui, a baseball superstar, were awarded the National Honors Prize, which has given dreams, hopes and inspiration to the Japanese people for a long time. Fuji, the symbol of Japan, is on the verge of being registered as a World Heritage Site. In order to further deepen international exchange with overseas countries and international cultural exchange, I would like to ask

⁶⁹ Emphasis added by the author.

a question about the environment and current situation of foreign exchange students, who are similarly responsible for transmitting Japanese culture to the rest of the world [...] (National Diet, 2013).

In her critique that follows, she mostly questions the rising housing costs, comparing it to the level of the scholarships in place for foreign students. However, in order to get her point across, she has decided to utilize a variety of national symbols, from baseball players to Mt. Fuji. She even goes as far as to compare the registration of the volcano as a World Heritage Site to the ability of foreign students to transmit Japanese culture to their own home countries, before delving into her critique of current policies. The nation, through the nationalist rhetoric she has actively deployed, lies outside of the zone of critique, and is therefore a helpful tool in shaping her position.

The use of nationalist rhetoric is, however, not infallible. In fact, if we look back at Asō's in his defense of the government's internationalization policy while engaging in the same kind of rhetoric, we can see that he inadvertently touches upon a sensitive subject:⁷⁰ the issue of the decreasing number of Japanese students who study abroad. Although Japanese students are part of the education and production of "global human resources", as evidenced by a range of scholarship support programs, their numbers have not grown at the same rate as that of foreign students coming to Japan.

This does not mean the issue is completely neglected. The government has increasingly provided students with (both partial- and fully-) funded study opportunities, internship opportunities in international organization, such as the Young Professionals Program of the United Nations, and has promoted inter-university cooperation with foreign universities in setting up


⁷⁰ As the politician is prone to do, as readers who are familiar with Japanese domestic politics will likely know.

double degree programs. However, as Yonezawa points out, the number of people who can access these programs has been limited, as “established career patterns in the domestic labor market” reinforce career paths in which study abroad is discouraged (2014, p. 41). A look at the total number of students going abroad showcases this issue, see figure 9.

In fact, although de-emphasized in the official publication by the MEXT, the target for 2020 was not only to reach 300,000 foreign students in Japan, but also to send out 120,000 Japanese students to study outside of the country. This target, although not clear from figure 9, was not reached. In fact, only 58,720 students studied abroad in 2018, setting the policy only a bit over halfway ten years following the implementation of this aim. An attempt was made to broaden the way of calculating Japanese students going abroad, as is seen in figure 10 below. However, even this method did not result in reaching the set target. At least not by 2019, which saw a sharp drop. The goal was reset accordingly to 2022 (MEXT, 2020, p. 180), although with an on-going pandemic I anticipate another sharp drop.

There is, interestingly, also a discrepancy in the origin countries and destination countries chosen by exchange students coming to Japan, and leaving Japan. A look at where the students primarily come from also highlights this issue, see figures 11 and 12. In order, as given in figure 11, the main countries chosen by Japanese students in 2018 were the United States (18,105); China (14,320); Taiwan (9,196); Great Britain (2,670); Australia (2,429); Germany (1,916); Canada (1,783); South Korea (1,558); Brazil (1,273); France (1,195); and others (4,365), with the total (58,720) given in the bottom row.

図表 2-10-3 日本人の海外留学の状況




(出典及び留学生の定義)
 ・OECD「Education at a Glance」及びユネスコ統計局
 ・2013年統計より、高等教育機関に在籍する外国人留学生（勉学を目的として前居住国・出身国から他の国に移り住んだ学生）が対象
 2012年統計までは、外国人学生（受入れ国の国籍を持たない学生）が対象。
 ・IIE「Open Doors」アメリカの高等教育機関に在籍している、アメリカ市民（永住権を有する者を含む）以外の者。
 ・中国教育部 学生ビザ（Xビザ《留学期間が180日以上》）又は訪問ビザ（滞在180日未満）等で中国の大学に在学している者。
 ・台湾教育部 台湾の高等教育機関に在籍している者（短期留学生を含む）。
 ・マレーシア高等教育省 高等教育機関に在籍している外国人学生
 ・タイ高等教育・科学技術・イノベーション省 留学査証にて、高等教育機関に在籍している外国人学生

Figure 9: Number of Japanese students going abroad for studies by year.

図表 2-10-5

大学等が把握している日本人学生の留学状況



(出典) (独) 日本学生支援機構「日本人学生留学状況調査」

Figure 10: The situation as grasped by universities concerning the study abroad activities of Japanese students by total number.

In contrast, foreign students coming to Japan in 2020 originate mostly from China (121,436); Vietnam (62,233); Nepal (24,002); South Korea (15,785); Taiwan (7,088); Indonesia (6,199); Sri Lanka (5,238); Myanmar (4,211); Bangladesh (3,098); Mongolia (3,075); and others (26,823).

図表 2-10-4 日本人留学生数（上位10か国・地域）（平成30年）

国・地域名	留学生数（前年数）	対前年比
アメリカ合衆国	18,105（18,753）	△648
中国	14,230（14,717）	△487
台湾	9,196（8,413）	783
英国	2,670（2,846）	△176
オーストラリア	2,429（2,244）	185
ドイツ	1,916（1,816）	100
カナダ	1,783（1,665）	118
韓国	1,558（1,455）	103
ブラジル	1,273（1,111）	162
フランス	1,195（1,649）	△454
その他	4,365（3,739）	626
合計	58,720（58,408）	312

Figure 11: Countries chosen for study by Japanese students by year (previous year), and difference. Years given: 2018 and (2017). MEXT, 2020.

図表 2-10-2

**出身国・地域別外国人留学生数
(上位10か国・地域) (令和2年
5月1日現在)**

国・地域名	留学生数 (前年数)	対前年比
中 国	121,845 (124,436)	△2,591
ベ ト ナ ム	62,233 (73,389)	△11,156
ネ パ ー ル	24,002 (26,308)	△2,306
韓 国	15,785 (18,338)	△2,553
台 湾	7,088 (9,584)	△2,496
インドネシア	6,199 (6,756)	△557
ス リ ラ ン カ	5,238 (7,240)	△2,002
ミ ャ ン マ ー	4,211 (5,383)	△1,172
バングラデシュ	3,098 (3,527)	△429
モ ン ゴ ル	3,075 (3,396)	△321
そ の 他	26,823 (33,857)	△7,034
合 計	279,597 (312,214)	△32,617

(出典) 日本学生支援機構「外国人留学生在籍状況調査」

Figure 12: Origin countries of students studying in Japan by year (previous year), and difference.
Years given: 2020 and (2019), by 1 May 2020. MEXT, 2020.

For all intents and purposes, Japan proves itself to be a receiving country and not a sending country when it comes to international student exchange. This makes the internationalization set in motion in the last decades a lop-sided process, heavily favoring Japan. According to Yonezawa, this is largely the result of a “lack of policy initiatives and individual level incentives for studying and working outside of Japan” (2014, p. 40).

This is, in turn, exacerbated by what Ishikawa calls a “narrow set of representations of English” that coincides with a system of Japanese education that views the use of the language only through the lens of native norms. In addition, a nationalistic discourse runs through the teaching of English, and has normalized the current format of experiencing English in Japanese society as a whole. In other words, the English as Japanese students are currently taught focuses on correct usage, at a native level, instead of focusing on the “communicative needs outside the classroom, where students would most likely use English in a multilingual setting in the future” (Ishikawa, 2017, p. 256).

The particular issue highlights the weight given to different policy aims as articulated by policy makers, and the MEXT in their official documentation. It has also resulted in various encounters in Japan’s National Diet about the aggressive pursuit of foreign exchange students in contrast to the laxer approach in getting Japanese students to go abroad. This was already visible in this exchange from 2006 between LDP Upper House Member Yōji Mutō and the MEXT head of the department of education, Akira Ishikawa, in the run-up to the 300,000 foreign students plan:

Ishikawa: When we look at the share of privately-funded students, China, South Korea, and Taiwan together account for more than 80% of the total, but in view of the purpose of national scholarships, we

invite students from a variety of countries, and we do not give special consideration to China alone. But it is a fact that the percentage of Chinese students is among the highest in the world.

Mutō: In general, there are a lot of them, so the proportion of them will be larger as well. I understand. [...]. I feel like as internationalization progresses, we need to continue with student exchanges [...]. When I look at those international students who leave Japan and those students who come here from overseas, although this might be a common example, I feel a little sorry for the Japanese students, and I don't mean to say that they are being punished. But I feel that way about some aspects concerning the support provided to them. In terms of international exchange, this may be unavoidable, but I believe that children who go abroad from Japan also go through a great deal of hardship. I also think that there are many people who have already been abroad and have been heavily struggling for a long time to get a degree, so I would like to ask you to think a little bit deeper about that from now on. What do you think?

Mutō employs a number of communication strategies to get his main point across. For example, the use of adjectives and choice of lexis in, for example, a “great deal of hardship” and “heavily struggling”, and the proximity of this clause to the word “children”, infantilizing the students and thereby linguistically transforming the state-student relationship into a parent-child relationship. It is an argumentative device that works in his favor, as he is making his point quite clear: Japanese students lack support and have been abandoned by the state and its policies, in contrast to foreign students who come to Japan.

To this day, however, the policy focus remains stringently on the receiving side of international foreign exchange, despite the possible benefits the pursuit of sending Japanese students abroad might have in achieving the goal of establishing a work force in Japan consisting of “global human resources” (repetitively articulated in the national internationalization strategy). A look at the structure of the white papers that address the topic of internationalization showcases this, as the example below highlights.

図表 2-10-1 平成30年度文部科学大臣出張先

国・地域名	大臣名	期間	往來目的・主要日程
米国	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	4/29～5/2	5/1 コルドバ全米科学財団長官と会談 5/1 プライデンスティン米国航空宇宙局長官と会談 5/2 デボス連邦教育首長官と会談
中国	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	5/3～5/5	5/4 王志剛(ワン・ジーガン) 科学技術部長と会談
ハンガリー	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	7/5～7/6	7/6 日EU政策対話への出席 7/6 ティボル・ナブラチチ欧州委員との会談 7/6 ヒッレル・イシュトヴァーン ハンガリー国会副議長との会談
インドネシア	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	8/25～8/27	8/27 アジア競技大会視察 8/27 ムハジル・エフェンディ教育文化大臣と会談 8/27 イمام・ナフラウィ青年スポーツ大臣と会談
中国	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	8/29～8/31	8/29 日中大學生千人交流大会への出席 8/30 第10回日中韓文化大臣会合出席 8/30 誰樹剛(ルオ・シュガン) 中国文化・観光部長と会談 8/30 都鍾煥(ト・ジョンファン) 韓国文化体育観光部長官と会談
中国	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	9/19～9/20	9/19～20 世界経済フォーラムニュー・チャンピオンズ年次総会2018出席 9/20 クラウス・シュワブ 世界経済フォーラム会長と会談
チリ	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	9/4	9/4 マルセラ・クビージョス教育大臣と会談
アルゼンチン	林文部 科学大臣 (当時)	9/4～9/6	9/5～6 G20教育大臣会合及び同教育・雇用大臣合同会合への出席 9/4 イングリッド・キャサリーナ・ファン＝エンゲルスフォーフェン オランダ教育・文化・科学大臣と会談 9/5 アレハンドロ・フィノッキアロ アルゼンチン教育大臣と会談 9/5 サティヤ・バル・シン インド人的資源開発副大臣と会談 9/6 オン・イェクン シンガポール教育大臣と会談
ドイツ	柴山文部 科学大臣	10/25～10/27	10/26 第2回北極科学大臣会合への出席 10/26 アルフレズドツェル・アイスランド教育・科学・文化大臣との会談

第1節 教育・スポーツ・文化分野における国際交流・協力

1 外国人材の受入れ・共生のための施策の推進

人材確保が困難な産業分野において技能を有する外国人の受入れ等を図るため、改正出入国管理及び難民認定法が成立し、それに基づく政府方針や新たな在留資格の創設等を踏まえ、政府の「外国人材の受入れ・共生に関する関係閣僚会議」において、平成30年12月に「外国人材の受入れ・共生のための総合的対応策」が決定されました。

この総合的対応策において、文部科学省は、生活者としての外国人に対する日本語教育としては、外国人に日本語の学習機会が行き渡ることを目指した地域における日本語教育の総合的体制づくりへの支援や、日本語教室空白地域の解消支援等を行っていきます。また、外国人児童生徒等の教育としては、日本語指導に必要な教員定数の義務標準法の規定に基づいた改善の着実な推進や、日本語指導に係るきめ細かな支援の実施等を進めていきます。さらに、大学、専門学校等の留学生の就職支援にも取り組むとともに、留学生が学業に専念し、高度な専門性・技術や日本語能力を身に付けて適正に課程を修了することができるよう、関係機関と情報共有を図りつつ、各大学、高等専門学校等に対し、留学生の適切な受入れ及び在籍管理の徹底を求めています。これらの取組を通して、文部科学省は、共生社会の実現を図っていくこととしています。

2 留学生交流の推進

(1) 外国人留学生受入れの現状と施策


① 留学生受入れの現状

グローバル化が加速する国際社会の中で、我が国の大学等の国際化の推進や世界で活躍する人材の育成を図るため、平成20年7月に留学生受入れの拡大のための方策をまとめた「留学生30万人計画」骨子が策定されました。これに基づき、留学の動機付けから大学等や社会での受入れ、就職等卒業・修了後の進路に至るまで、体系的に関係府省等で連携して留学生の受入れを推進しています。

平成30年5月1日現在、我が国の大学等で学ぶ留学生の数は29万8,980人となっており、全体として増加傾向となっています（図表2-10-2、図表2-10-3）。

政府の方針としては、「日本再興戦略—JAPAN is BACK—」及び「第3期教育振興基本計画」では、2020（令和2）年までに留学生の受入れ30万人（「留学生30万人計画」）の実現を目指すとともに、より戦略的な留学生の受入れを推進することとしています。さらに、「日本再興戦略2016」（平成28年6月2日閣議決定）では、外国人留学生の日本国内での就職率を現状の3割から5割に向上させることを目指すこととしています。

図表2-10-2 外国人留学生数の推移



② 世界の成長を取り込むための外国人留学生の受入れ戦略

世界的な留学生獲得競争が加速化する中、教育研究の向上や国家間の友好関係の強化に継続して取り組むことに加え、諸外国の成長を我が国に取り込み、我が国の更なる発展を図る必要があります。このため、文部科学省は平成25年12月に「世界の成長を取り込むための外国人留学生の受入れ戦略」を取りまとめ、留学生の受入れに係る重点地域や重点分野等を設定しました。

③ 留学情報提供体制の整備

留学生の受入れを促進するため、日本学生支援機構は、海外において日本の大学等の参加

を得て「日本留学フェア」を実施し、現地の学生や進学指導担当者等に対して日本への留学に関する情報の提供を行っています。平成30年度は、台湾、ベトナム等10か国・地域の17都市で開催しました。また、関係機関との連携により日本留学希望者向けの日本留学情報サイト*1を構築し、情報提供を充実させています。

④日本留学のプラットフォームの構築

海外の重点地域において、現地の政府機関や教育機関とのネットワーク構築、留学情報の収集・提供等を実施する日本留学のプラットフォーム（拠点）を構築するため、「留学コーディネーター配置事業」を実施しています。平成26年度からミャンマー、アフリカ（サブサハラ）、インドの3拠点に、27年度からはブラジルの1拠点に留学コーディネーターを配置しています。30年度からは事業拡充に伴い名称を「日本留学海外拠点連携推進事業」に変更し、ロシア、中東・北アフリカにも拠点を整備しました。

⑤日本留学試験の実施

我が国の大学への留学希望者の入学選抜については、受験のために渡日する必要があるなど、欧米諸国の大学への留学に比べて手続が煩雑で、留学希望者にとって負担が大きいと指摘されてきました。このため、文部科学省は、日本学生支援機構と協力して、海外でも広く実施され、渡日前に入学許可を得ることができる、留学希望者が利用しやすい試験として「日本留学試験」を実施しています。

本試験は年2回（6月と11月）、国内では16都道府県で、海外ではアジア地域を中心に18都市で実施しています。平成30年度の実験者数の合計は、国内4万4,806人、海外1万1,818人の計5万6,624人でした。また、本試験を留学生の入学選抜に利用した大学等は820校、そのうち、本試験を利用した渡日前入学許可制度を導入している大学等は179校となっています。

⑥留学生に対する支援処置

(ア) 国費外国人留学生等の受入れ

国費外国人留学生制度は、文部省（当時）により、諸外国の次代を担う優れた若者を我が国の高等教育機関に招へいし、教育・研究を行わせる制度として昭和29年に創設されました。現在、研究留学生（大学院レベル）や学部留学生など7種類のプログラムを実施しています。これまでに約160か国・地域から10万人を超える国費外国人留学生を受け入れており、平成30年度は、9,423人の国費外国人留学生を受け入れています（30年5月1日現在）。なお、台湾については上記に準じる支援を、公益財団法人日本台湾交流協会を通じて実施しています。

(イ) その他の留学生への援助

日本学生支援機構は、優秀な外国人留学生の戦略的な受入れを促進するため、我が国の大学（大学院を含む）、短期大学、高等専門学校、専修学校（専門課程）、我が国の大学に入学するための準備教育を実施する教育施設及び法務大臣が告示をもって定める日本語教育機関

図表 2-10-3 出身国・地域別外国人留学生数（上位10か国・地域）（2018（平成30）年5月1日現在）

国・地域名	留学生数（前年数）	対前年比
中国	114,950（107,260）	7,690
ベトナム	72,354（61,671）	10,683
ネパール	24,331（21,500）	2,831
韓国	17,012（15,740）	1,272
台湾	9,524（8,947）	577
スリランカ	8,329（6,607）	1,722
インドネシア	6,277（5,495）	782
ミャンマー	5,928（4,816）	1,112
タイ	3,962（3,985）	△23
バングラデシュ	3,640（2,748）	892
その他	32,673（28,273）	4,400
合計	298,980（267,042）	31,938

（出典）日本学生支援機構「外国人留学生在籍状況調査」

*1 参照：<https://www.studyinjapan.go.jp/ja/>

に在籍する私費外国人留学生で、学業、人物ともに優れ、かつ、経済的理由により修学が困難である者に対して奨学金を給付しています。

(ウ) 留学生の就職支援

「日本再興戦略改訂2016」は、外国人留学生の日本国内での就職率を現状の3割から5割に向上させることを目指すこととしています。文部科学省は、各大学が地域の地方公共団体や産業界と連携し、就職に必要なスキルである「ビジネス日本語能力」「キャリア教育」「中長期インターンシップ」を一体として学ぶ環境を創設する取組を支援する委託事業「留学生就職促進プログラム」を平成29年度から12機関で実施しています。このほか、日本学生支援機構は、日本企業に就職を希望する留学生の就職・採用活動について有益な情報を提供するとともに、学校側・企業側が情報交換を行う「全国キャリア・就職ガイダンス」を実施しています。

⑦ 留学生のための教育プログラムの充実

我が国への留学形態が多様化する中、各大学は、留学生の需要に応じた魅力ある教育プログラムの充実に取り組んでいます。このような大学の取組を推進するため、文部科学省では、「国費外国人留学生の優先配置を行う特別プログラム」を選定し、国際的に魅力ある留学生受入れプログラムを実施する大学から、当該プログラムにより受け入れる留学生の一部を国費外国人留学生として優先的に採用しています。

⑧ 地域における留学生支援

留学生と地域住民との交流、留学生に対する奨学金や宿舍の提供等を積極的に推進するため、各都道府県では、大学、地方公共団体、経済団体、民間団体等によって構成される地域留学生交流推進会議が開催されています。

⑨ 帰国留学生に対する援助


帰国留学生が留学の成果を更に高め、母国において活躍できるように、日本学生支援機構は「短期研究のための帰国留学生招へい事業」の実施や研究支援のための指導教員の派遣等の援助を行っています。また「Japan Alumni eNews」(日本留学ネットワークマガジン)を発行し、帰国外国人留学生等に対し必要な情報を提供しています。

(2) 日本人学生等の海外留学の現状と施策

① 海外留学の現状

OECD、ユネスコ、米国国際教育研究所 (IIE) 等の統計による日本人の海外留学者数(原則として、交換留学等の短期留学は含まない)を集計したところ、平成28年に海外に留学した日本人学生等は5万5,969人でした。一方、日本学生支援機構の調べによると、大学等が把握している日本人学生の海外留学状況については、短期の留学を中心に留学生数が増加しており、29年度は前年比8,448人増の10万5,301人でした(図表 2-10-4、図表 2-10-5、図表 2-10-6)。

図表 2-10-4 日本人の海外留学の状況



(出典) OECD「Education at a Glance」、ユネスコ統計局、IIE「Open Doors」、中国教育部、台湾教育部

社会や経済のグローバル化が進む中、世界で活躍することができる人材の育成が急務となっています。「日本再興戦略—JAPAN is BACK—」では、海外留学する日本人学生等を2020（令和2）年までに6万人から12万人へ倍増させることとしています。文部科学省は、この目標の達成に向けて、日本人学生等の海外留学を促進しています。

②海外留学に関する施策

文部科学省は、日本人学生等の海外留学支援として、国費による海外派遣制度を設けています。平成21年度からは、日本人の学生などを最先端の教育研究活動を行っている海外の大学院に派遣し学位を取得させることにより、我が国のグローバル化や国際競争力の強化を促進する「海外留学支援制度（大学院学位取得型）」を開始しており、また29年度から海外の学部へ派遣する「海外留学支援制度（学部学位取得型）」を実施しています。

また、大学間交流の活性化や大学の国際化等に資する短期留学を推進するために、日本学生支援機構の奨学金制度として、平成21年度から「海外留学支援制度（協定受入型）」及び「海外留学支援制度（協定派遣型）」を設けています。この奨学金により、大学間交流協定等に基づき諸外国の大学から我が国の大学に受け入れる外国人留学生や諸外国の大学へ派遣される日本人学生を支援しています。

さらに、文部科学省は、外国政府等の奨学金により留学する日本人学生の募集・選考に協力しています。

海外留学の大半を占める私費留学については、日本学生支援機構を通じて、留学情報の収集・提供を行っています。また、平成30年度は、4都道府県において「海外留学説明会」を開催するとともに東京都において「海


図表 2-10-5 日本人留学生数（上位10か国・地域）(2016（平成28）年)

国・地域名	留学生数（前年数）	対前年比
米 国	18,780 (19,060)	△280
中 国	13,595 (14,085)	△490
台 湾	7,548 (6,319)	1,229
英 国	2,944 (3,098)	△154
ド イ ツ	1,797 (1,756)	41
オーストラリア	1,748 (1,672)	76
フ ラ ンス	1,659 (1,646)	13
カ ナ ダ	1,563 (1,479)	84
韓 国	1,416 (1,286)	130
ブ ラ ジ ル	935 (759)	176
そ の 他	3,984 (3,516)	468
合 計	55,969 (54,676)	1,293

(出典) OECD「Education at a Glance」、ユネスコ統計局、IIE「Open Doors」、中国教育部、台湾教育部

外留学フェア」を開催するなどし、留学希望者に対し必要な情報を提供しています。

図表 2-10-6 大学等が把握している日本人学生の留学状況



③官民協働海外留学支援制度「トビタテ！留学JAPAN日本代表プログラム」

平成26年度から、官民が協力した新たな仕組みとして、民間の協力を得た海外留学支援制度「トビタテ！留学JAPAN日本代表プログラム」を開始し、海外留学に係る経済的負担の軽減を図るなど、社会全体で若者の海外留学を促進しています。

「日本代表プログラム」では、平成26年度の第1期派遣留学生から30年度の第10期派遣留学生までに4,572人（うち、地域人材コース461人）を採用しました。採用された学生は順次海外留学を開始しています。

また、平成27年度からは高校生を対象とした高校生コースと、地域の活性化に貢献し、地域に定着するグローバル人材の育成を目的とした地域人材コースを開始しました。高校生コースでは27年度の第1期派遣留学生303人、28年度の第2期派遣留学生511人、29年度の第3期派遣留学生501人に引き続き、30年度の第4期派遣留学生として535人を採用しました。また、地域人材コースとして3名の高校生を採用しました。採用された高校生は、順次海外留学を開始しています。地域人材コースでは、27年度地域事業として11地域、28年度地域事業として4地域、29年度地域事業として5地域、そして30年度地域事業として3地域を採択しました。

(3) 高校生交流の現状と施策*2

3 教員・青少年などの国際交流

(1) 教員等の国際交流

文部科学省は、毎年中国と韓国に教職員を派遣（約75名）するとともに、これらの国から教職員を我が国に招へい（約150名）しています。また、タイ（平成27年度～）及びインド（28年度）からも教職員を招へい（約15名）しているほか、30年度からはタイへの我が

*2 参照：第2部第4章第4節③

Figure 13: Pages 363-368 from MEXT 2018.

The above six pages, figure 13, were taken from the 2018 edition of the MEXT White Paper on Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (2018, pp. 363-368). The section on student exchange starts on page 363, under the section under the large “1” heading, titled “International Exchange and Cooperation in the Educational, Sports, and Cultural Sectors”. The first section immediately starts off with the large heading “Accepting Foreign Human Resources and the Promotion of Measures for Coexistence”. The second section, on the following page, is listed under the heading “Promotion of Foreign Exchange”, and immediately starts with the sub-heading “Current status and measures for the acceptance of international students”. The entire section about foreign exchange students covers around four pages, down to page 366. The status of foreign exchange for Japanese students starts on the bottom of page 366 under the sub-heading “Current status and measures for Japanese students and etc. studying abroad”. This section covers around 2,5 pages, ending on page 368.

The structure of the text indicates the priority the MEXT attaches to each policy. Under the header “1”, further listed under the sub-heading “1”, we immediately find the foreign students, not the Japanese students. The headings immediately make it quite clear what the topic of the text is about: “International Exchange”. The choice for introducing this theme with the foreign students, and then expanding six pages, shows a high level of policy dedication. Very few topics within the white paper are given the same amount of space. The issue of Japanese students going abroad, for example, is given 2,5 pages, and is listed under sub-heading “2”, a lower priority.

The visual aids also enable the author to avoid expanding on a topic extensively, as is seen in the two parts of the texts. In the foreign student exchange section, two graphics are included, of

which one only partially takes up the space of the text. The line in the main graph is given in green, indicating positive growth, with only the total given in a red line. In contrast, the section on Japanese students is for a large part taken up by graphs, of which two are line graphs that contain strong red lines. Only the latter section of the first graph is tinted green, but this is then balanced against a large disclaimer within the graph providing the reader with a warning in bulky red letters. The color choice, again, indicates the priority level, and success level, given to the respective policies.

It can be concluded from the structure of the text, and the visual aids included, that the inflow of foreign students is a higher priority for policy makers than the outflow of Japanese students. This is also clear from the self-perceived success that the respective policies have booked.

This discursive strategy adopted by the Japanese government, complete with nationalist undertones as described above, has proven effective, and has now permeated the entirety of higher education internationalization discourse in Japan, finding its resonance in university level discourses as well, as this text from the quarterly Public Relations Magazine of National Universities reveals:

[I]n addition to the impact at the individual level of university faculty members, such as the revitalization of their international research, working on international cooperation activities [...] also has an impact at the organizational level of universities, such as the internationalization of educational content, *an increase in the number of foreign students* and the building of international networks between universities. Other effects include the individuality and attractiveness of universities and the

strengthening of their international competitiveness [...] (The Japan Association of National Universities, 2020, p. 8).⁷¹

In this text, from a special edition on the development of human resources and internationalization, the author provides a list of the main activities they perceive as inherent to the internationalization strategy of national universities in Japan, and lists among these “an increase in the number of foreign students,” yet foregoes mentioning the sending out of Japanese students. The other elements of internationalization also find their counterpart in this publication, often as part of the foreign student exchange initiative, yet the element of internationalization through Japanese students actually going abroad is conspicuously absent. This indicates how, at the university level, government level priorities have pervaded internationalization discourses.

In addition, we see a reutterance of the classic market-economy argumentative device, in which a growth strategy is assumed to be critical to the internationalization process, without the speaker challenging its fundamental basis. This seems to be the case within the private university industry as well, where internationalization is equated with requiring “measures to secure international students and the use of English in teaching”, a phrase frequently used in passing, denoting its normalization (The Japan Association of Private Universities and Colleges, 2020, p. 10).

Conclusion

All things considered; we can see that the official “internationalization in higher education in Japan discourse” has become highly homogenized. Political actors utilize nationalist rhetoric to explain

⁷¹ Italics added by the author.

their prioritization of attracting foreign exchange students to Japan, while making references to the economy, the looming demographic shift, the future of the nation, and therefore the need for more “global” human resources. A classic use of the triadic pattern of nationalist rhetoric.

The policy makers involved have adopted this nationalist rhetoric effectively, and the same discursive strategies they have employed are now spread across the entire discourse. This is especially visible on the critical side of the political spectrum, although the policy has received surprisingly little criticism and still seems to enjoy broad support, possibly a remnant of Nakasone’s legacy. Nevertheless, politicians who have addressed issues with internationalization policies coat their arguments and political rhetoric in nationalist symbols as well, whether these are Mt. Fuji and old baseball players, or agreeing to the premise that Japan is in dire need of global human resources before engaging with the topic at hand.

This has resulted in a general acceptance of these policies among the political actors involved. As a result, the underlying assumption, e.g., the neo-liberal ideal of market-based growth, remains unchallenged. Universities, therefore, are placed in a global competitive education market, while politicians do not engage with the premise of the problem, nor the fact that it has been made a problem in the first place. Rather, they have focused on the method in which the perceived problem should be solved. Whether this is through the introduction of more English-language programs, solving the high housing costs, or the retention rate of foreign students as workers in Japan.

In contrast, in The Netherlands, the discussion remains quite acrimonious. The public debate is still developing, with policy responses awaiting. However, a few points can be made already, and they are interesting comparisons of how internationalization policies have developed, and their effects, in light of how Japan's discourse has evolved.

There are several similarities between The Netherlands and Japan when it comes down to discursive strategies of policy makers. First, the basic neo-liberal ideas that underpin the internationalization strategies remain largely unchallenged in both countries. Second, the acquiring of global human resources is a repetitive theme, albeit while using a different lexis (e.g., "developing talent for an international labor market" or "global citizens"). Third, the focus is predominantly on the receiving side of foreign exchange, not the sending side. And lastly, nationalist rhetoric is utilized by both proponents and opponents of the current policies in place.

Where the discourse differs significantly, however, is in *how* nationalist rhetoric has been utilized, and at what cost to internationalization policies. While the national budget is still an important factor in the Japanese case, it has taken up a central role in the public debate in The Netherlands, largely due to how foreign students are funded, especially those coming in from other European Union member states. These students cost the state approximately 6,000 euros of public funds, which is paid out in lump sums to universities. This has taken a toll on the national budget, as student numbers have exploded over the 21st century. This is complicated by a decreasing retention rate of foreign students, making their presence costlier than the benefits they would otherwise entail.

This issue is further exacerbated by the untethered growth of English-language programs. The majority (76%) of graduate programs in The Netherlands are now taught in English, and the percentage of undergraduate programs is slowly inching towards almost half, with Dutch language programs standing at around 58% of the total. This has led to the idea that universities have gone too far in their mission to attract foreign students, as in The Netherlands, and the same goes for Japan, English has become synonymous with internationalization.

Opposing politicians have addressed this issue with the same nationalist rhetoric deployed by proponents of the policy. Although the defense of internationalization is rife with terminology reminiscent of a national interest strategies, opponents have utilized the “crowding out of Dutch students” and the Anglification of education as a whole, and thus crowding out of the Dutch language itself, more effectively. If we look at the case of Japan, we see the same discursive strategy at play, but for different ends. In the case of Japan, it is the Japanese language that needs to be promulgated and taught to foreign students, for their benefit of course. While in The Netherlands, the English language has become synonymous with foreign students and the disadvantages that this will lead to for Dutch students, e.g., their displacement within their own national system of education. The same strategy, but with different outcomes.

In the end, it seems that Japan’s policy for reaching 300,000 foreign students was deemed a success by the government itself, and it will be seen if the more qualitative changes that are part of the Top Global University program will be achieved. In terms of foreign exchange students and making Japan “more competitive” globally, the Japanese government seems to have been satisfied with reaching their goals. Whether a new policy will be established, or a new quantitative goal will

be set, remains to be seen. Although the on-going COVID-19 pandemic makes it unlikely that a new goal will be set soon. Nevertheless, the political debate, and its underlying assumptions, seems to have produced a quite homogenous, and less acrimonious discourse, in which political actors have adopted similar, nationalist, discursive strategies in their rhetoric. It seems unlikely, therefore, that new internationalization policies will face stiff opposition, although I need to add a very strong disclaimer: the effects of the pandemic have not been taken into account here.

In The Netherlands similar discursive strategies as in Japan can be seen. The discourse, however, is more acrimonious in nature. While both proponents and opponents have effectively utilized nationalist rhetoric in the defense of their political positions, it seems that the advantage in the public debate is currently swinging more towards the opponent's side. As the admission that internationalization might have reached its limits, by Van Engelshoven in her role as minister of the MOCW, indicates, there is a gradual acceptance that internationalization strategies as they are now are damaging the national interest. Damaging by burdening the national budget and crowding out Dutch students, whether in terms of admission policies or simply the availability of Dutch-language programs at universities. It is likely, therefore, that a new set of policies that would focus on the further internationalization of higher education would face stiff opposition in The Netherlands.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

Sixteen years ago, Labor Party politician Prof. Dr. Ir. Jo Ritzen became the acting Minister of Education. At the start of his term, he immediately caused an enormous commotion when he argued for the complete Anglification of higher education. Higher education was only to be taught in English, according to the minister. That would be the only way to ensure that The Netherlands would play any role of significance on the world stage. [...]. And yes. Now it has come (Janssen, 2006).

There is a subtle irony to be found in the internationalization debate in The Netherlands. The above quote is taken from a 2006 article from right-leaning newspaper *De Telegraaf*, and its message is quite clear: we are losing the fight for the nation's education. Right-wing nationalist publications, like this example shows, have not shied away from denouncing internationalization as a threat. And herein lies the irony. The same political rhetoric used to “defend” the country against this threat, is used to promote it by proponents as well.

The struggle, however, seems to be shifting in favor of critics. The problems that internationalization has introduced for Dutch higher education have amalgamated, and together forced the incumbent government to admit that they exist. This debate is an excellent example of politics in progress, as it is still on-going. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the future of internationalization policies, especially those aimed at higher education. The last few years have seen this political discussion evolve into a public debate on the role of the university. Now, it seems, that the tide is turning. At least, in The Netherlands.

On the other side of the globe, in Japan, official discourses on internationalization seem to have been normalized. Similar to in The Netherlands, Japanese political actors have used nationalist rhetoric to state their cases. Defendants of internationalization have done so

successfully, and to that extent that critical voices, and counter-arguments, have adopted the same nationalist rhetoric almost *in toto*. In addition, with the goal of 300,000 students reached, the highest goal on the current internationalization agenda, it seems that the government has concluded for itself that the policy is a success. This combination of factors makes it likely that there will remain broad support for further internationalization efforts as enacted by the government.

An interesting reading of the analysis provided in this work might be that the main motor for internationalization has remained unchallenged. Namely, the neo-liberal principles that have informed modern education policies, especially in the realm of internationalization. It is not up to me to determine whether this for good, or for bad. It is, however, easy to see its limits.

During the decades following the post-war period, massification of higher education was propelled by a need for more workers. This development ran in tandem with population growth. As I have established earlier, this growth has subsided. The population of The Netherlands has stabilized, while that of Japan is shrinking. This will have, or already has had, significant effects on the way universities operate.

The on-set of the COVID-19 pandemic has given us a preview of things to come. Although international mobility might recover, student numbers might not. This is happening while universities are forced to expand their operations, as they are embedded in a neo-liberal system that demands constant growth. This is not sustainable. The solution, therefore, can only be found in moving away from this system. As long as the value of the university is based on a continuous improvement of efficiency, e.g., more citations, more projects, more students, more staff, budgets

crises will increase accordingly. One of the main problems, politically, is engaging with this crisis in a way that does not assume an economic imperative.

This, again, could happen within the same discursive framework as already exists, in which nationalist rhetoric holds sway. The university, recaptured by the nation, could be independently funded, while retaining its academic autonomy. However, under neo-liberal principles, this would be detrimental to the competitive edge universities, and by extension nations, might have in a globalizing world.

Although in The Netherlands, there is a movement against the over-internationalization of the university taking place, the neo-liberal imperative of good government equals economic growth remains unchallenged. The same can be said of Japanese political discourses. It is therefore unlikely that either country's government will introduce such direly needed reforms to higher education until the universities start collapsing, a crisis of education occurs, and the need becomes so urgent that steps need to be taken. And then, most likely, we will find a repeat of the nationalist rhetoric that this dissertation has showcased already.

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Appendix I – Excerpts and Translations

This appendix includes the original texts as quoted in the analysis chapter, including the texts in the original language. The translations are in the left column, in order of appearance, and the original texts are in the right column in the same order.

<p>Universities, through advanced education and research, fulfill various functions in their search for the truth, among them the development of talented human resources who will be contribute to society and be responsible for the future of Japan. In recent years, as we move towards a full-fledged knowledge-based society while the environment surrounding universities changes, society's expectations of universities are growing, while the needs of society and students are diversifying (MEXT, 2008, p. 19).</p>	<p>大学は、高度の教育や研究を行うことを通じて、真理の探究を行うとともに、我が国の将来を担う有為な人材の育成や社会への貢献など、様々な役割を果たしてきています。さらに近年では、本格的な知識基盤社会に向かい、大学を取り巻く環境も変化する中で、大学に対する社会からの期待はますます大きくなるとともに、社会や学生のニーズも多様化しています。</p>
<p>On the other hand, as Japan's population is entering a phase of decline due to the falling birthrate and ageing population, universities are required to further distinguish their individuality and characteristics.</p> <p>In particular, as globalization is rapidly progressing in university education, there is a growing mobility of students and faculty members and active efforts for international competition and cooperation, mainly in Europe, the USA and Asia (MEXT, 2008, p. 19).</p>	<p>一方、少子高齢化が進展し我が国の人口が減少局面に入りつつある中、各大学においては個性・特色を一層明確にしておくことが求められています。</p> <p>特に、グローバル化が大学教育においても急速に進展している中、欧米やアジアを中心に、学生や教員の流動性の高まりや、国際的な競争と協同に関する活発な取組がみられており、我が国の大学の国際化や国際競争力の向上が、極めて重要な課題となっています。</p>

<p>In addition, with the rapid globalization of society and the economy, and the increasing cross-border collaboration and competition between universities, it is essential for university quality assurance to consider not only domestic trends, but also international perspectives, taking into account trends in other countries (MEXT, 2008, p. 143).</p>	<p>また、社会経済のグローバル化が急速に進み、大学間の国境を越えた協働と競争が活発になっており、大学の質保証には、国内だけでなく、諸外国の動向を踏まえた国際的な視野からの検討も不可欠です。</p>
<p>As society and the economy become more sophisticated, complex and internationalized, universities and other higher education institutions are required to improve the quality of their education and research, and further respond to diverse social demands for human resource development. In addition, with the increase in the rate of higher education and the growing demand for lifelong learning, it is important to provide diverse and fulfilling educational opportunities so that people can fully develop their abilities in accordance with their own interests and ambitions (MEXT, 2001).</p>	<p>社会・経済の更なる高度化・複雑化や国際化の進展に伴い、大学などの高等教育機関は、教育研究の質の向上を図るとともに、人材養成に対する多様な社会的要請に一層対応していくことが求められています。また、進学率の上昇や生涯学習需要の高まりに伴い、人々が自らの関心や意欲に応じてその能力を十分に伸ばしていくことができるよう、多様かつ充実した教育機会を提供することが重要となっています。</p> <p>このような高等教育に対する期待にこたえとともに、長期的視点に立った教育研究の展開によって社会をリードしていくという役割を果たしていくため、各大学等は、それぞれの理念・目標を明確にしつつ、特色を生かして、個性豊かな活動を積極的に推進していく必要があります。</p>
<p>The system of higher education and research makes sure that students and (scientific) personnel are able to maximally develop their talents and research capabilities. It educates them for positions in the national and international labor market in</p>	<p>Het stelsel van hoger onderwijs en onderzoek zorgt dat studenten en (wetenschappelijk) personeel hun talenten en onderzoekend vermogen maximaal kunnen ontwikkelen. Het leidt hen op voor een positie op de nationale en internationale arbeidsmarkt die optimaal aansluit bij hun talenten.</p>

<p>a way that optimally connect to their talents (MOCW, 2014, p. 58).</p>	
<p>The minister [of the MOCW] is responsible for facilitating a system of education that functions in such a manner that it connects to the talents and ambitions of individual students and (scientific) personnel, and the needs of society (MOCW, 2014, p. 58).</p>	<p>De Minister is verantwoordelijk voor een stelsel van hoger onderwijs en wetenschappelijk onderzoek dat zodanig functioneert dat het onderwijs aansluit bij de talenten en ambities van individuele studenten en (wetenschappelijk) personeel, en bij de behoefte van de maatschappij.</p>
<p>The plan for 300,000 foreign students was proposed by former Prime Minister Fukuda, [...] and its purpose is to make Japan a country open to the world, as part of the development of a global strategy to expand the flow of people, goods, money and information between Japan and Asia and the rest of the world. The aim is to increase the number of foreign students accepted to 300,000 by the year 2020 (National Diet, 2008).</p>	<p>留学生三十万人計画は、先生が御指摘いただきましたように福田前総理が提唱されたものでございますが、その目的といたしましては、日本を世界に開かれた国とし、アジア、世界との間に人、物、金、情報の流れを拡大するグローバル戦略を展開する一環として、二〇二〇年を目途に留学生受入れ三十万人を目指すものでございます。</p>
<p>In an international society where globalization is accelerating, and for the purpose of the progress of our country's universities' internationalization and the cultivation of human resources that can flourish on the world stage, the policy of "300,000 foreign students", in which the goal was to accept foreign students, was established in July 2008. [...]. In 2019, the number of foreign students studying at Japanese universities exceeded 310,000, and in addition to this, in March 2021, a review was conducted of the progress made in achieving the objectives set out in the "300,000 foreign students plan," including improving the international competitiveness of university education and research, and making an intellectual international contribution for other</p>	<p>グローバル化が加速する国際社会の中で、我が国の大学等の国際化の推進や世界で活躍する人材の育成を図るため、平成20年7月に留学生受入れの拡大のための方策をまとめた「留学生30万人計画」の骨子が策定されました。[...] 令和元年には我が国の大学等で学ぶ留学生の数は31万人を超えましたが（図表2-10-1、図表2-10-2）、それに加え、令和3年3月には、大学の教育・研究の国際競争力の向上や諸外国に対する知的国際貢献を果たすことなどの「留学生30万人計画」が掲げている目的の達成状況について検証を行いました。</p>

<p>countries, and it was verified that these goals have been met (MEXT, 2020, p. 314).</p>	
<p>The importance of internationalization is increasingly expressed in terms of preparing pupils and students to function in an intercultural society and on an internationally oriented labour market. [...]. In secondary and higher vocational education, the connection to an international and rapidly changing labour market is important (employability). In scientific education, the exchange of knowledge and researchers is originally a main reason for internationalization. [...] And although you need more than intercultural competences to be ‘employable’, you do learn to cooperate in international environments. Thus, the learning outcomes of internationalization are at the same time narrower and broader than terms such as global citizen, intercultural competences and 21st century skills (Nuffic, 2019, p. 4).</p>	<p>Het belang van internationalisering wordt steeds vaker uitgedrukt in het voorbereiden van leerlingen en studenten op het functioneren in een interculturele samenleving en op een arbeidsmarkt die internationaal georiënteerd is. [...]. In het middelbaar-en hoger beroepsonderwijs is de aansluiting op een internationale en snel veranderende arbeidsmarkt belangrijk (employability). In wetenschappelijk onderwijs is de uitwisseling van kennis en onderzoekers van oorsprong een voornaamste reden om te internationaliseren. [...] En hoewel je meer nodig hebt dan interculturele competenties om ‘employable’ te zijn, leer je wel samenwerken in internationale omgevingen. Zo zijn de leeropbrengsten van internationalisering tegelijkertijd enger en breder dan termen als wereldburger, interculturele competenties en 21e-eeuwse vaardigheden.</p>
<p>Van Dijk: Do you share the view that the growth of the number of foreign students should not lead to a decrease in the quality and accessibility of higher education? If so, how will you guarantee this?</p> <p>Zijlstra: I share the view that growth must not be at the expense of quality. On the contrary, the aim is to increase quality. I also believe that this growth should not be at the expense of accessibility at system level. If there are indications that the quality of programs is at risk due to the growth of the number of foreign students, I will discuss this with the educational institutions concerned. The basic principle must be that, when</p>	<p>Vraag 5: Deelt u de mening dat de groei van het aantal buitenlandse studenten niet mag leiden tot een aantasting van de kwaliteit en toegankelijkheid van het hoger onderwijs? Zo ja, hoe gaat u dit waarborgen?</p> <p>Antwoord 5: Ik deel de mening dat de groei niet ten koste mag gaan van de kwaliteit. Het is juist de bedoeling dat de kwaliteit toeneemt. Ik vind ook dat deze groei niet ten koste mag gaan van de toegankelijkheid op stelselniveau. Wanneer er aanwijzingen zouden zijn dat de kwaliteit van opleidingen in het geding is door de groei van het aantal buitenlandse studenten, zal ik hierover het gesprek aangaan met betreffende onderwijsinstellingen. Uitgangspunt moet zijn dat universiteiten en hogescholen zich bij de werving en selectie van</p>

<p>recruiting and selecting students, universities of applied sciences are guided by quality and not by financial motives - whether this concerns Dutch students or students from other EU countries (Tweede Kamer, 2011, pp. 2-3).</p>	<p>studenten laten leiden door kwaliteit en niet door financiële motieven – of het nu gaat over Nederlandse studenten of studenten uit andere EU-landen.</p>
<p>Van den Hul and Westerveld: In your opinion, what role does internationalization, the increase in English-language education, and higher education funding play in the increase in students and the associated quality of universities?</p> <p>Van Engelshoven: The strengthening of international dimensions in education has added value for the student, the educational institution and for the Dutch knowledge economy [...]. Especially in higher education, and specifically in academic education, the increasing internationalization has its downsides and seems to have reached its limit in some places. I do not want to close my eyes to this, which is why I announced measures [...]. In essence, it is about a qualitative interpretation of the issues surrounding internationalization, in which the quality of education is paramount, language policy is consciously pursued and accessibility is guaranteed. At the moment, we are working hard on the bill [...] (Tweede Kamer, 2019, pp. 3-4).</p>	<p>Vraag 12: Welke rol speelt volgens u internationalisering, de toename van Engelstalig onderwijs en de bekostiging van het hoger onderwijs bij de toename van studenten en de daarmee gepaarde kwaliteit van universiteiten?</p> <p>Antwoord 12: De versterking van internationale dimensies in het onderwijs heeft toegevoegde waarde voor de student, de onderwijsinstelling en voor de Nederlandse kenniseconomie [...]. De snelheid waarmee de internationale dimensie een plek vindt in de verschillende onderwijssectoren verschilt. Met name in het hoger onderwijs, en specifiek in het wetenschappelijk onderwijs, kent de toenemende internationalisering ook keerzijden en lijkt op sommige plekken de grens te zijn bereikt. Daar wil ik mijn ogen niet voor sluiten en daarom heb ik in de Kamerbrief uit juni maatregelen aangekondigd gericht op het bewaken van de balans. In de kern gaat het om een kwalitatieve invulling van de vraagstukken rondom internationalisering, waarbij kwaliteit van het onderwijs voorop staat, taalbeleid bewust gevoerd wordt en toegankelijkheid gewaarborgd is. Momenteel wordt hard gewerkt aan het wetsvoorstel dat voortvloeit uit deze Kamerbrief</p>
<p>However, the following dilemma arises here: the way in which funding based on the number of students is organized and the level of funding, gives an incentive to recruit and admit many (foreign) students. An important and effective way of doing this is to offer study programs in English. However, an unlimited influx leads to capacity problems and is to the</p>	<p>Hierbij doet zich evenwel het volgende dilemma voor: de wijze waarop de op het aantal studenten gebaseerde bekostiging is ingericht en het niveau ervan geeft een prikkel tot het werven en toelaten van veel (buitenlandse) studenten.¹⁰ Een belangrijke, effectieve manier om dat te doen is het aanbieden van opleidingen in het Engels. Een onbegrensde grote toestroom leidt echter tot capaciteitsproblemen en</p>

<p>detriment of the quality of education and the effectiveness of central government spending on education by the state (Raad van State, 2019, p. 3).</p>	<p>gaat ten koste van de kwaliteit van het onderwijs en van de doelmatigheid van de onderwijsuitgaven door het Rijk.</p>
<p>In applying the requirement of ‘added value’, the institution must weigh up the interests involved. Under the current Act, the institution justifies this consideration - on the basis of the stricter criterion of “necessity” - in a code of conduct. A study by the Education Inspectorate into language policy in higher education has shown that compliance by institutions with this obligation leaves much to be desired. In its study, the Inspectorate also concluded that the current Section 7.2 of the WHW and the explanatory notes to it do not provide any concrete verifiable elaboration as a guide: not for the institutions in complying with it and not for the Inspectorate in supervising it (Raad van State, 2019, p. 6).</p>	<p>Bij de toepassing van het vereiste van ‘meerwaarde’ dient een belangenafweging door de instelling plaats te vinden. Op grond van de huidige wet verantwoordt de instelling deze afweging – op basis van het strengere criterium van ‘noodzakelijkheid’ - in een gedragscode. Uit onderzoek van de Inspectie van het onderwijs naar het taalbeleid in het hoger onderwijs is gebleken dat de naleving door instellingen van deze verplichting zeer te wensen overlaat. De Inspectie komt in haar onderzoek daarnaast tot de conclusie dat het huidige artikel 7.2 WHW en de toelichting daarop geen concrete toetsbare uitwerking als handreiking biedt: niet voor de instellingen bij de naleving en niet voor de Inspectie voor het toezicht daarop.</p>
<p>Is it possible that the Chinese government exerts political influence through its students? Does the research take into account that the Chinese are used to a certain degree of governmental interference, which is higher than for the Dutch, and that they may therefore be less able to determine where the boundaries are (Tweede Kamer, 2020, p. 2).</p>	<p>Is het mogelijk dat de Chinese overheid politieke beïnvloeding uitoefent via haar studenten? Is het in het onderzoek meegenomen dat Chinezen gewend zijn aan een bepaalde mate van overheidsbemoeienis, die hoger is dan voor Nederlanders, en zij daardoor wellicht minder goed kunnen bepalen waar de grens ligt?</p>
<p>Dutch higher education institutions have committed themselves to the Dutch Code of Conduct for Scientific Integrity [...]. The values laid down in the code are not automatically adhered to by partners from other countries. However, when entering into a partnership, an institution can refer to this code in the partnership agreement. In practice, this also happens (Tweede Kamer, 2020, pp. 17-18).</p>	<p>Nederlandse instellingen in het hoger onderwijs hebben zich geïnteresseerd aan de Nederlandse Gedragscode Wetenschappelijke Integriteit [...]. De waarden die in de code zijn vastgelegd worden niet automatisch aangehouden door partners uit andere landen. Echter, bij het aangaan van een samenwerking, kan een instelling wel in de samenwerkingsovereenkomst verwijzen naar deze code. In de praktijk gebeurt dit ook.</p>

<p>Van der Molen, Van den Berg, and van Helvert: Do you share the view that it is worrying that the Leiden Asia Centre concludes that universities give little insight into their partnerships with China and that there is a lack of transparency and mutual trust among Dutch universities? What do you intend to do about this?</p> <p>Van Engelshoven: Our higher education sector benefits from mutual trust and transparency. Not only for constructive cooperation and increasing the quality of education and science, but also to ensure and increase knowledge security. The importance of good and constructive cooperation also applies between the institutions and the government. [...]. The universities are also in regular contact with each other about their cooperation with China.</p> <p>Van der Molen, Van den Berg, and van Helvert: What do you think of the suggestion by China expert D’Hooghe of the Leiden Asia Centre to supplement the existing guidelines on integrity and knowledge sharing with specific “China rules” that would impose conditions and restrictions on cooperation with countries that do not share Dutch values and principles? Do you think that the security services should play a role in this?</p> <p>Van Engelshoven: In the aforementioned parliamentary letter on knowledge security, the government presents a package of measures to better ensure knowledge security in higher education and (applied) science, including measures to prevent undesirable knowledge transfer. The aim of this package is to ensure that international cooperation takes place in a safe</p>	<p>Vraag 5: Deelt u de mening dat het zorgelijk is dat het LeidenAsiaCentre concludeert dat universiteiten weinig inzicht geven in hun samenwerkingsverbanden met China en er sprake is van gebrek aan transparantie en onderling vertrouwen bij Nederlandse universiteiten? Wat wilt u hieraan doen?</p> <p>Antwoord 5: Onze hoger onderwijssector is gebaat bij onderling vertrouwen en transparantie. Niet alleen voor een constructieve samenwerking en het verhogen van de kwaliteit van het onderwijs en de wetenschap, maar ook om de kennisveiligheid te borgen en vergroten. Het belang van goede en constructieve samenwerking geldt ook tussen de instellingen en de overheid. [...]. Ook hebben de universiteiten regelmatig contact met elkaar over hun samenwerking met China.</p> <p>Vraag 6: Wat vindt u van de suggestie van China-expert D’Hooghe van het LeidenAsiaCentre om de bestaande richtlijnen voor integriteit en het delen van kennis aan te vullen met specifieke «Chinaregels» die voorwaarden en beperkingen stelt aan samenwerking met landen die niet de Nederlandse waarden en beginselen delen? Bent u van mening dat de veiligheidsdiensten hier een rol bij moeten spelen?</p> <p>Antwoord 6: In de eerdergenoemde Kamerbrief kennisveiligheid presenteert het kabinet een pakket aan maatregelen om de kennisveiligheid in het hoger onderwijs en de (toegepaste) wetenschap beter te borgen, zoals maatregelen om ongewenste kennisoverdracht tegen te gaan. Het doel van dit pakket is om internationale samenwerking op een veilige manier te laten plaatsvinden, met oog voor zowel de kansen als de risico’s die ermee samenhangen. Het kabinet kiest daarbij nadrukkelijk voor een landenneutrale aanpak bij het ontwikkelen van het instrumentarium. Bij het opstellen en het uitvoeren van deze beleidsinstrumenten, wordt samengewerkt met alle relevante onderdelen van de rijksoverheid, inclusief de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten.</p>
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<p>manner, with due consideration for both the opportunities and risks involved. The government has explicitly opted for a country-neutral approach in developing the instruments. In drafting and implementing these policy instruments, the government will work with all relevant branches of government, including the intelligence and security services.</p>	
<p>Shibata: Today, I would like to start by asking a question from the perspective of developing, securing, and acquiring global human resources. I think this will become an increasingly important issue in the future. In particular, in other countries, the competition to acquire high quality foreign students is becoming more and more fierce, and is intensifying. I cannot help but feel that Japan's foreign student policy is very inadequate. [...] It has been several years since Japan set a plan to increase the number of foreign students in Japan to 300,000, but I think the number is still around 140,000. I would like to take this opportunity to discuss policies for receiving and sending out foreign students from Japan, if there is time, but I think that we must take firm steps to improve these policies.</p> <p>So, first of all, how can we improve the system for receiving students? If the destination is not attractive, people will not come to study in Japan [...]. There are a number of things that need to be done [...], I would like to ask you first about what you would like to focus on in particular.</p>	<p>今日は、まずグローバル人材の育成、確保、獲得という観点からお聞きをしたいと思いますが、改めて言うまでもありませんが、グローバルあるいはボーダーレスな社会が進展していく中で、そういう中で活躍できる人材をいかに育成し、確保し、獲得していくかというのがこれから大きな課題にまますなってくるだろうと思います。特に、諸外国でも、いわゆる質の高い留学生をどのように獲得していくか、まさにその競争がだんだん激しくなっている、激化をしているわけでありまして、にもかかわらず、この問題はこの委員会でもあるいは決算委員会等々でも取り上げさせていただきましたが、どうも我が国の留学生政策といったものが大変心もとないという感じがしてならないわけではありますが。</p> <p>いずれにせよ、この留学生というのは言わば我が国にとって新たな戦略資源といいますか財産にもなるわけでありまして、この獲得、確保するということ、もっともっと重要度を高めてもいいんではないかと思っております。日本も留学生三十万人計画を立ててもう数年たっているわけですが、まだ</p>

	<p>十四万人ぐらいかと思います。まだまだの感があるわけで、この機会に、受入れ政策、日本からの送り出し政策も時間があれば取り上げたいと思いますが、この充実をしっかりとやっていかなきゃならぬと思います。</p> <p>そこで、まず初めに、この受入れ体制をどう整備するか。やはり魅力のある留学先でなければ人は来ないわけであって、その整備が待たれるところでもあります。幾つもあると思いますが、今日、私、十分しかないので、特にどういうところに力を入れていきたいか、この点をまずお聞きをしたいと思います。</p>
<p>Kii: I feel that we share the same awareness of the problem. I believe that it is very important to improve the acceptance system at universities, including the enrichment of the so-called educational content and the development of English language classes.</p> <p>[...]. We are supporting the development of comprehensive systems, such as the establishment of courses that enable students to obtain degrees in English, support for international students in their daily lives and employment, and the enhancement of Japanese language education. In addition, from the 24th year of the current financial year, the Global Human Resource Development Promotion Project was launched to strengthen the efforts of universities to form hub universities for the internationalization of university education, and to support universities that improve the</p>	<p>問題意識を同じくしていると感じております。その上で、いわゆる教育内容の充実あるいは英語による授業の整備を始めとした大学における受入れ体制の充実を図ることが大変重要だというふうに思っております。</p> <p>具体的に短く申し上げますと、一つは、大学の国際化のためのネットワーク形成推進事業を従来より行っております。英語での学位の取得可能なコースの整備、留学生の生活及び就職に関する支援、日本語教育の充実などの総合的な体制整備を支援していることでもあります。また、本年度、二十四年度からは、大学教育の国際化に向けた拠点大学を形成するための取組を強化をするため、グローバル人材育成推進事業を</p>

<p>international acceptability of their curricula and establish overseas study programs with transferable credits. [...] (National Diet, 2012).</p>	<p>開始をし、教育課程の国際通用性の向上、単位互換を伴う海外留学プログラムの開設などに取り組む大学を支援することといたしております。</p> <p>引き続き、こうした形で大学の国際化のための取組を推進してまいりたいと思っております。</p>
<p>Hakui: [...]. As these [rankings] are based on evaluation indicators set independently by foreign private companies, the MEXT does not designate specific rankings as indicators in order to avoid bias in criteria and fields. However, by applying the rankings to each university, they can learn about international evaluations and use them as a reference for making improvements, and we are taking this approach in the hope that it will help each university to analyze their issues and improve their educational and research capabilities.</p> <p>Yamauchi: In order for Japanese universities to be included in the top 100 of this ranking, there were various initiatives such as Super Global Universities Project, but what kind of policies were adopted and were they effective? Looking back at the results, there has been no improvement even after seven years. I would like to ask you what your take on this is.</p> <p>Hakui: [...]. The MEXT has been supporting the improvement of education and research capabilities, internationalization and governance reform through the Super Global University Creation Support Project, [...] in order to realize the development of world-class excellence in education and</p>	<p>伯井政府参考人 [...] 外国の民間企業等がそれぞれ独自に設定する評価指標に基づき作成しているものであるわけでございますので、文科省としては、基準や分野に偏りがないう、特定のランキングを指標として指定しているわけではございません。</p> <p>ただ、ランキングを各大学がそれぞれ当てはめていただくことによって、国際的評価を知り、改善する上での参考になるということで、各大学において、課題について分析の上、教育・研究力の向上に努めていただくための一助になるんじゃないかということで、こういう取組をしているわけでございます。</p> <p>山内委員 それでは、このランキングトップ百に日本の大学が入るために、スーパーグローバル大学とかいろんな構想があったと思いますけれども、どのような政策をとり、それが適切であったのか。結果を振り返ると、七年たっても改善が</p>

<p>research activities and the enhancement of internationalization of universities.</p> <p>Currently, although there are only two universities in the Times Higher Education, there are various notable examples of university reform, such as initiatives to drive the internationalization of universities and to strengthen business management. According to the Times Higher Education, there are 1,526 universities ranked in the list, of which 116 are Japanese universities, which means that Japan ranks second in the world in terms of the number of universities ranked by country (National Diet, 2020).</p>	<p>見られないわけですが、それについてどう認識されているのか、お尋ねしたいと思います。</p> <p>伯井政府参考人 [...] 文部科学省といたしましては、世界最高水準の卓越した教育・研究活動の展開、あるいは大学の国際力の向上の実現のために、スーパーグローバル大学創成支援事業であったり、[...] 教育・研究力の向上、国際化、ガバナンス改革等を後押ししてきたところでございます。</p> <p>現状、先ほど、タイムズ・ハイアー・エデュケーションは二校ということですが、大学の国際化を牽引する取組であったり、経営マネジメントの強化の取組であったり、さまざま大学改革の特筆すべき事例というのがあらわれてきておりますし、また、タイムズ・ハイアー・エデュケーションでいいますと、ランクインした大学というのが千五百二十六校ありまして、我が国の大学は其中で百十六校がランクインしているということですので、国別のランクイン数では世界第二位ということになっております。</p>
<p>I also mentioned that, in terms of so-called international rankings, Japanese universities are indeed underperforming from a superficial point of view, but that it is necessary to take a closer look at these factors. In this context, for example, the number of foreign students, the number of foreign lecturers,</p>	<p>また、いわゆる国際ランキングというものの中で、表面的に見ても日本の大学というのは確かに不振なんです、その要素を細かく見ていく必要があると、そういったお話もさせていただきます。そういった中で、例えば留学生の数である</p>

<p>the number of internationally cited papers, etc., Japanese universities may be slightly inferior in these areas of internationalization, and these factors may be pushing down the international reputation of Japanese universities (National Diet, 2014).</p>	<p>とか外国人の講師の数、若しくは国際的に引用される論文の数、こういった国際性という分野において日本の大学は若干見劣りするんじゃないかと、そういったものが日本の大学の国際的な評価を押し下げているのではないかと、こういったお話もございました。</p>
<p>[...] I think it is really important to have excellent people from various countries come to Japan to revitalize Japanese universities and to nurture excellent students. [...] This is a bit of a digression, but after the Meiji Restoration, Japan desperately tried to absorb the knowledge of advanced countries in order to catch up with the industries of the advanced Western countries. At that time, of course, there were no Japanese who could teach the knowledge of the advanced Western countries, so education was conducted in foreign languages by foreigners hired by the government. [...] However, later on in Japan, foreign students returned to home and the number of graduates of various Japanese schools increased, and Japanese people became able to teach Western knowledge in Japanese, making it possible for education to be conducted in Japanese.</p> <p>I believe that the greatest reason for this, is the environment in which anyone can learn the world's most advanced knowledge in Japanese. Anyone can go to a book store and easily obtain books in Japanese on a wide range of subjects, from the classics of many countries around the world to current trends in a variety of fields. I believe that this is an infrastructure that</p>	<p>安藤委員 [...]さまざまな国の優秀な人に来てもらって、日本の大学を活性化する、優秀な学生を育てていくというのは、本当にこれは大事なことだと思っております。 [...]</p> <p>ちょっと話が飛ぶんですけども、明治維新の後に、日本では、欧米先進国の産業に追いつくために、必死で先進国の知識の吸収に努めました。当時はもちろん、欧米先進国の知識を教えることができる日本人がいませんでしたから、お雇い外国人によって外国語で教育が行われておりました。 [...]</p> <p>でもしかし、その後日本では、留学生が帰国をしてきたり、またあるいは、そのような日本の各種の学校の卒業生などがふえていって、日本人が日本語で欧米の知識を教えることができるようになって、現在のように日本語で教育を行うことにかわっていったという歴史があるわけですね。</p> <p>私は、今の日本は世界の中で、国民全体の、国民一般の知識レベルは世界で一番高い水準にあると思っておりますけれども、その最大の理由は、何ととっても、世界最先端の知識</p>

<p>we should be proud of, and the source of this infrastructure comes from the fact that education is conducted in Japanese at universities and graduate schools in Japan's top academic institutions. By domestically producing knowledge, we can think deeply in our native language, and the Japanese people can share this knowledge with the rest of the world whenever they want, which will create the basis for national power and make a significant contribution to the development of science and culture. I believe that this is the main reason why the Japanese people were able to continue to be an advanced country after the Meiji Restoration, when they switched from education in foreign languages to Japanese, and succeeded in doing so.</p> <p>The Japanese Nobel laureate Toshihide Maskawa has said that he is not good at English, but he has said that there are various reasons why Japanese basic science is strong, but in my view, the fact that studies are conducted in Japanese is a major factor. The reason why Japanese people can win Nobel Prizes is because they can think deeply in Japanese. In fact, there are many Asian countries other than Japan that score higher on the TOEFL and TOEIC than Japan, but if you look at if they have a Nobel Prize, they do not.</p> <p>The Super Global University Project includes the concept of expanding classes taught in English by foreign or Japanese teachers, but based on what I have just said, I believe that for the development of Japanese culture and science classes should always be taught in Japanese at Japan's highest academic institutions. (National Diet, 2014).</p>	<p>を誰もが日本語で学ぶことができる、その環境にあるというふうに思っております。誰でも、本屋に行けば、いとも簡単に世界各国の古典から今トレンドになっているいろいろな分野の書物を日本語で手に入れることができ、思い立ったら、どんなに外国語を勉強しなくても、さまざまな知識や教養を日本語で習得することができる。私は、これは世界に誇るべきインフラだと思いますし、その源泉は、やはり大学や大学院で、日本の最高学府において日本語で教育を行っているところから発生をしているというふうに思います。</p> <p>知識の国産化をすることによって母国語で深い思考をすることができて、日本国民はあまねくその知識をその気になればいつでも共有することができる、それが国力の基盤をつかって、科学や文化の発展に大きく貢献をしていくと思います。これが、我々日本人が明治維新のときに、外国語で教育をするのではなくて、日本語にかえて行って成功していった、先進国になり続けることができた最大の要因ではないかというふうに思います。</p> <p>日本のノーベル賞受賞者の益川敏英先生は、英語が苦手であるということを言っておられますけれども、この方が、日本の基礎科学がどうして強いのかについてはさまざまな理由があるけれども、私が見るに、日本語で学問をするという点</p>
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	<p>が大きいようだ、日本人がノーベル賞をとれるのは日本語で深く思考できるからということをおっしゃっておられます。</p> <p>実際に、日本以外のアジアの国で、ほかの国でも、TOEFLやTOEICで日本よりも高い点をとっている国というのは数多くあると思いますけれども、ではそれらの国がノーベル賞をとっているのかと聞いたら、とっていないですね。</p> <p>今回のスーパーグローバル大学構想では、外国人教員あるいは日本人教員による英語の授業の拡大という構想も入っておりますけれども、今申し上げたようなことを踏まえて、日本の文化学術の発展のために、日本の最高学府においては授業は必ず日本語で行うべきというふうに思っておりますけれども、文部科学省のお考えをお聞かせいただきたいと思えます。</p>
<p>In the Super Global University Creation Support Project, which has just been pointed out, it is a matter of course for each of the universities that have been selected, and which will be selected from now on, to create an environment where students, the majority of whom are Japanese students, can receive the highest level of education in the Japanese language. [...] However, we also recognize the importance of developing students' language skills, such as English, in the development of global human resources. [...] However, even in these cases, we recognize that it is very important to have a well-developed Japanese language education system for foreign researchers</p>	<p>佐野政府参考人 お答えさせていただきます。</p> <p>今御指摘がございましたスーパーグローバル大学創成支援事業におきましては、採択される、これは今から採択がされます、それぞれの大学が、学生、多数を占めるのは日本人学生でございますので、日本語により最高レベルの教育を受けられる環境を整えることというのは、当然のこととして整備していくことにしております。</p>

<p>and students. Therefore, we will be examining this project [...] (National Diet, 2014).</p>	<p>ただ一方で、学生に英語などの語学力を身につけさせることもグローバル人材の育成においては重要であるというふうにも認識しております。</p> <p>さらに、外国から優秀な人材を招く上で、外国人の学生を招く上で、英語などの外国語による授業の実施や、外国語のみで卒業可能なコースを設定するというような、そういった取り組みも方策の一つとして有効だというふうに考えておりますが、各大学の判断で、今先生がおっしゃられたように、積極的に取り組むことが期待されているところでもあります。それがメニューの一つになってございます。</p> <p>ただし、それらの場合でも、外国人研究者や留学生に対して、充実した日本語教育の体制が構築されていることは非常に重要であるというふうに我々も認識しております。</p> <p>したがって、本事業について、今後審査することになるんですけども、その審査の際の観点というのを示しております。その審査の際の観点として、外国人留学生や外国人研究者に対する日本語教育の充実というものを明記しております。したがって、スーパーグローバル大学創成支援事業において、外国人研究者や留学生に対して、日本語による教育の展開をきちっと図るような形の制度としていきたいと思っております。</p>
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	以上でございます。
At the same time, the aim is to internationalize Japan's universities and strengthen their international competitiveness, and at the same time, it is also highly significant for mutual understanding with other countries and the formation of human networks that will form the basis for Japan to build stable international relations (National Diet, 2008).	同時に、我が国の大学の国際化、あるいはまた国際競争力の強化を図ることが目的でございますし、また、あわせて諸外国との相互理解や我が国が安定した国際関係を築く上での基礎となる人的ネットワークを形成することにも大いに意義があると考えております。
Wiersma and Van der Molen: Do you share the opinion that good international students are an added value for The Netherlands, but that it is important to have sufficient instruments at our disposal to attract the international students to The Netherlands who strengthen us and actually want to live and work in The Netherlands after their studies? If not, why not?	Deelt u de mening dat goede internationale studenten een meerwaarde zijn voor Nederland, maar dat het hierbij belangrijk is om voldoende instrumenten in handen te hebben om de internationale studenten naar Nederland te krijgen die ons versterken en ook daadwerkelijk na hun studie in Nederland willen wonen en werken? Zo nee, waarom niet?
Van Engelshoven: [...] I do not think it is desirable that all international students who come to The Netherlands continue to live and work here. It is also important that knowledge circulates [...]. Moreover, students and researchers who return can be excellent ambassadors for The Netherlands, just as Dutch researchers and students can be showcases for The Netherlands abroad (Tweede Kamer, 2020, p. 3).	Ik vind het niet wenselijk dat alle internationale studenten die naar Nederland komen hier blijven wonen en werken. Het is ook van belang dat kennis circuleert [...]. Bovendien kunnen studenten en onderzoekers die terugkeren excellente ambassadeurs voor Nederland zijn, net zo goed als Nederlandse onderzoekers en studenten een visitekaartje van Nederland in het buitenland zijn.
[W]e are talking about students from abroad and students from Japan, and although this is not generally a lower priority than support for Japanese students, the acceptance of so-called excellent foreign students will contribute to the promotion of Japan's internationalization and the improvement of its soft	今言われましたように、外国からの留学生というのと日本から行く留学生との間の話なんだと思いますけれども、これは一概に日本人学生への支援より優先度が、低いとは言えぬとは思いますが、いわゆる優秀な外国人留学生の受入れというものは、日本の国際化の推進とか、また、何でしょ

<p>power, as well as to the development of the country's economy (National Diet, 2013).</p>	<p>う、ソフトパワーの向上の観点からとか、日本にとっても利益をもたらしているという面もありますので、そういった意味では一概にはなかなか比較が難しいとは思いますがけれども。</p>
<p>In any case, [...] fewer [Japanese] students want to go abroad than in the past, when we were students. That is exactly what I think when I look at our sons, that generation. They say, "Dad, Japan is better". Our generation never thought that. We thought that it was definitely better abroad, and we wanted to go abroad, and we wanted to save money to go abroad, but I think that awareness has changed a little [...] (National Diet, 2013).</p>	<p>我々の学生のときほど海外に行きたいという学生が減りましたね。それは、私らの息子を見ていても全くそう思います、あの世代は。もう全然、だってお父さん、日本の方がいいものと。我々の世代はそんなこと思ったことはありません。海外の方が絶対いいなと思って、海外に行きたいなと思って、金ためて行きたいなと思っていたんですけども、そういうところの意識が少し変わってきたかなとは思いますがけれど[...]</p>
<p>First off, I am very happy to announce that on 5 May, Shigeo Nagashima, the greatest superhero of the post-war era, and Hideki Matsui, a baseball superstar, were awarded the National Honors Prize, which has given dreams, hopes and inspiration to the Japanese people for a long time. Fuji, the symbol of Japan, is on the verge of being registered as a World Heritage Site. In order to further deepen international exchange with overseas countries and international cultural exchange, I would like to ask a question about the environment and current situation of foreign exchange students, who are similarly responsible for transmitting Japanese culture to the rest of the world [...] (National Diet, 2013).</p>	<p>初めに、先日、五月五日に、長きにわたりまして日本の国民の皆様にも夢と希望とそして感動を与えていただきました戦後最大のスーパーヒーロー長嶋茂雄さんと、そして野球界のスター松井秀喜さんが国民栄誉賞をお受けになられまして、大変喜ばしいことでした。</p> <p>そしてまた、今まさに、日本の象徴とも言われております富士山が、これは世界文化遺産登録目前となっておりますけれども、このように、海外との国際交流、国際文化交流といったことを更に深めていくためにも、本日、私は日本の文化</p>

	<p>を世界へ発信する担い手となったださっている外国人留学生の環境と現状につきまして質問をいたしたいと思います。</p>
<p>Ishikawa: When we look at the share of privately-funded students, China, South Korea, and Taiwan together account for more than 80% of the total, but in view of the purpose of national scholarships, we invite students from a variety of countries, and we do not give special consideration to China alone. But it is a fact that the percentage of Chinese students is among the highest in the world.</p>	<p>石川政府参考人 私費等も全部交えましてシェアを見てみますと、中国、韓国そして台湾を合わせて八割を超えるというぐらいの状況でございますけれども、国費留学生につきましては、その趣旨等にかんがみまして、さまざまな国からお呼びをするというようなこととしておりまして、特別に中国だけを手厚くということにはしておりませんが、中国の割合が中でも高いことは事実でございます。</p>
<p>Mutō: In general, there are a lot of them, so the proportion of them will be larger as well. I understand. [...]. I feel like as internationalization progresses, we need to continue with student exchanges [...]. When I look at those international students who leave Japan and those students who come here from overseas, although this might be a common example, I feel a little sorry for the Japanese students, and I don't mean to say that they are being punished. But I feel that way about some aspects concerning the support provided to them. In terms of international exchange, this may be unavoidable, but I believe that children who go abroad from Japan also go through a great deal of hardship. I also think that there are many people who have already been abroad and have been heavily struggling for a long time to get a degree, so I would like to ask you to think a little bit deeper about that from now on. What do you think?</p>	<p>武藤分科員 全体的に多いので、その分の割合がシェアからすると大きくなるということですね。わかりました。</p> <p>[...] 国際交流の中で留学生の交換というのは進めなきゃいけないというふうに思いますが [...] 日本から出る留学生、海外から来る留学生、内容をちょっと見ると、卑近な例でございますけれども、若干日本の留学生の方がかわいそうな仕打ちを、仕打ちというんじゃないですね、支援の内容かなというふうに思うようなところもあります。国際交流という意味でいえば仕方がないところもあるかもしれませんけれども、日本から外へ出る子もやはりそれなりに大変苦労して出ているというふうに思っております。また、今既に海外にいて、ずっと長い間苦労しながら学位を取っている人たちも多いとい</p>

	<p>うふうにも思いますので、その辺については若干厚くこれから考えていただけたらなという思いがありますけれども、その辺はいかがですか。</p>
<p>[I]n addition to the impact at the individual level of university faculty members, such as the revitalization of their international research, working on international cooperation activities [...] also has an impact at the organizational level of universities, such as the internationalization of educational content, an increase in the number of foreign students and the building of international networks between universities. Other effects include the individuality and attractiveness of universities and the strengthening of their international competitiveness [...] (The Japan Association of National Universities, 2020, p. 8).</p>	<p>このように、[...]国際協力活動に取り組むことは、大学教員の国際的な研究の活性化といった教員の個人レベルのインパクトに加えて、教育内容の国際化、外国人留学生の増加、大学間の国際的ネットワークの構築などの大学の組織レベルでのインパクトにもつながる。このほか、大学の個性や魅力、国際競争力の強化なども効果として挙げられるが、それ以上に大事な視点があることを萱島氏は強調する。</p>

Appendix II – Frequency Charts Japan

In this appendix are included the frequency charts of the keywords of the most common themes as given in chapter 6. Below the frequency charts from the Japanese data set.




Figure 14: Common keywords by frequency for "Competitive position".




Figure 15: Common keywords by frequency for "Demographic change".




Figure 16: Common keywords by frequency for "Education quality".




Figure 17: Common keywords by frequency for "Foreign staff".




Figure 18: Common keywords by frequency for "Human resources ".




Figure 19: Common keywords by frequency for "Information technology".




Figure 20: Common keywords by frequency for "International position".




Figure 21: Common keywords by frequency for "International standards".




Figure 22: Common keywords by frequency for "Japanese identity".




Figure 23: Common keywords by frequency for "Language policy".




Figure 24: Common keywords by frequency for "National budget".




Figure 25: Common keywords by frequency for "Research output".




Figure 26: Common keywords by frequency for "Scholarships".




Figure 27: Common keywords by frequency for "Student exchange".




Figure 28: Common keywords by frequency for "University rankings".

Appendix III – Frequency Charts The Netherlands

In this appendix are included the frequency charts of the keywords of the most common themes as given in chapter 6. Below the frequency charts from The Netherlands data set.




Figure 29: Common keywords by frequency for "Admission policy".




Figure 30: Common keywords by frequency for "Budgets and scholarships".




Figure 31: Common keywords by frequency for "Competitive position".




Figure 32: Common keywords by frequency for "Human resources".




Figure 33: Common keywords by frequency for "Information safety".




Figure 34: Common keywords by frequency for "Language policy".




Figure 35: Common keywords by frequency for "Mental health".




Figure 36: Common keywords by frequency for "Student exchange".