

Title	Imagination and Humans : Critique of the Political Economy of Memory and Imagination Part II
Author(s)	Nojiri, Eiichi
Citation	Osaka Human Sciences. 2023, 9, p. 25-44
Version Type	VoR
URL	https://doi.org/10.18910/90708
rights	
Note	

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Imagination and Humans: Critique of the Political Economy of Memory and Imagination Part II¹⁾

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Abstract

This article is the second (Part II) of a series comprising six to eight parts. Alloying philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural studies, this series seeks to articulate a relationship between the essential nature of Western philosophy's metaphysical method of dialectics and the structure of memory in human beings. It covers Western philosophers from the ancient to modern era, such as Plato, Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Hegel, Lacan, Derrida, and Jakobson, and quotes social, cultural, and psychopathological materials such as *Sarashina Diary* (the daughter of Sugawara no Takasue in 11c Japan), *Funes the Memorious* (Jorge Luis Borges), *Norwegian Wood* (Haruki Murakami), *1984* (Apple Computer television commercial), autism spectrum disorder, late capitalism, and even the Quest Atlantis boom. This series endeavors to elucidate the nature of memory in the neurotypical (NT), that is, the so-called "normal" and majority of human beings. It is only in comparison with the so-called "abnormal" that the so-called "normal" can be defined. As a conclusion, the author elucidates that it is the being of "the otherness" which always and already permeates the normal and stable working of memory, and it is that which frames the structure and content of the ego. In other words, this article depicts the heteronomous nature of the capability of memory and imagination of typically developed individuals.

In Part I, I discussed the concepts of memory and imagination from Augustine to Descartes. In this part, I discuss the difference between Kant's and Hegel's theories of imagination using Foucault's critique of philosophical anthropology and closely examine Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* to discuss the relationship between imagination and time. A limitation of Heidegger's theory of imagination—the source of time is imagination and, at the same time, the source of imagination is temporality—is that it is trapped in a sort of circular logic.

This article is the English translation of the original one "Nojiri, E. (2022). Imagination and Humans: Critique of the political economy of memory and imagination, part II". Bulletin of the Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, 48, 67-88 (in Japanese).

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Consequently, Heidegger does not reach a primordial dimension of imagination before the “self” that catalyzes temporality but only achieves a secular form of temporality as a triune structure of past, present, and future. Heidegger agreed with Kant that the establishment of the ego and that of temporality are the same; however, he could not analyze the structure of this argument. In Part III, the establishment of the “I” as a dialectical structure, a structure of the identity of difference and identity, will be clarified by discussing the semiotics of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit*.

Key words: imagination; memory; temporality; Kant; Hegel; Heidegger; Foucault

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From the time of René Descartes in the 16th century to Immanuel Kant in the 18th century, imagination was nothing more than a power to organize knowledge. However, things began to change around the time Kant wrote *Critique of Judgment* (1790). The idea of imagination as a force built into the structure of humans' subjectivity reaches its zenith in Kant but, simultaneously, a certain distortion began to emerge. In the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), Kant evaluated imagination as one of the three main forces (perception, understanding, and imagination) that compose human knowledge, but in the second edition (1787), he lowered the status of imagination, making it an ancillary property of understanding. This is a well-known fact, which was noted and discussed by Martin Heidegger and Japanese philosopher Kiyoshi Miki (1897–1945). Perhaps Kant was reluctant to isolate imagination, the third faculty of the human mind as an independent power. The independence of imagination as an ability may lead to the recognition of the uniqueness of the world it constitutes. In that case, it will be necessary to explain the *meaning* of the fantasy created through imagination, that is, to defend the significance of the world created by *images* and *schemas* that are separate from reality, even though they are based on reality.

G.W.F. Hegel later evaluated this world of imagination—which is independent of reality—as the world of the spirit (*Geist*). German idealists such as J.G. Fichte and Friedrich Schelling, as well as romantic thinkers, ascribed a more active role to imagination [Reference: Tadaaki Yamada (2011)]. However, for Kant, the road to the world of imagination is ascetically closed. Kant's philosophy is rather characterized by a structure that avoids leading humanity into that world. However, in *Critique of Judgment*, Kant upgraded the faculty of *judgment* to the ability that functions in relation of understanding to perception, or reason and identified it as the ability to find *beauty* and *life* in the world. When it operates, aesthetic judgment catalyzes a psychological effect that arouses pleasant or unpleasant feelings about nature or works of art in the human subject. Similarly, when teleological judgment operates, it motivates human exploration of nature and awakens morality as the ultimate purpose of the world by sensing the natural system's uniformity as if it was created by an omnipotent designer based on the principle of purposive functional relation. Judgment only has a regulative effect (leading humans to become moral) and is not a constitutive faculty, so it does not leave any product. The effect can be likened to that of sound. When perception interacts with understanding and understanding interacts with reason, judgment rings through the air like music, filling the space with its effects and then disappearing. Thus, judgment no longer constituted a schema like the independent power of imagination described in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Beauty and *life*, that Kant advocates, are to be enjoyed only to the extent that humans remain in a healthy state of humanity. In other words, we see a self-referential structure of

human nature, wherein people project themselves into the world and love and rejoice their projections as the beauty and life of nature. Therefore, judgment is a regulative force that leads humans into the world of morality. There, a human is not already listening to the voice of the “Holy Spirit”; they only hear their own voice. If critical philosophy establishes in principle the formation of a space in which a human hear the sound of their own voice, then according to Michel Foucault, Kant’s *Anthropology* embodies the formation of that space as an academic domain.

It is in this way that, from a structural point of view, the anthropological illusion looks like the reverse, the mirror image of the transcendental illusion. The latter consisted in the application of the principles of understanding beyond the limits of experience, and thus in admitting an actual infinite to the field of possible knowledge through a kind of spontaneous transgression. The anthropological illusion resides in a reflexive regression which has to answer for that transgression. Finitude is only gone beyond if it is something other than itself, if it rests on a shortfall in which it finds its source; it falls short, it is itself, but withdrawn from the field of experience where it is encountered and introduced into the realm of the originary in which it is grounded. The problem of finitude goes from interrogating the limit and transgression to interrogating the return to the self; from a problematic of truth to a problematic of the same and other [Kant & Foucault (2009) 77, English translation 122-123, Japanese translation 158-159]

Earlier we noted that we are not already listening to the voice of the “Holy Spirit.” However, to be more precise, we are still continuing to listen to the voice of the “Holy Spirit.” We listen to it while transforming it into human voice. In other words, we listen to the voice while transforming it in real-time. While we listen to the voice of things that are not human, we perceive them as human voices, and hear them as voices of the self, questioning the self. That is why we continue to ask, “What is a human being?” We try to remember what we are, forming a closed space of phenomenological consciousness. The problem of phenomenology as a “metaphysics of representation,” as Foucault and Jacques Derrida put it, lies in the formation of this closed circuit, that is, a space in which only one’s own voice resonates. Further, Foucault continues:

And the paradox is this: freeing itself from a preliminary critique of knowledge and an initial interrogation of the relationship to the object, philosophy did not manage to free itself from subjectivity as the fundamental thesis and starting point of its enquiry. On the contrary, it locked itself into subjectivity by conceiving of it as thickened, essentialized, enclosed in the impassable structure of “*menschliches Wesen*,” in which

that extenuated truth which is the truth of truth keeps vigil and gathers itself.

We can now see why, in a single movement, characteristic of the thinking of our time, all knowledge of man is presented as either dialecticized from the start or fully dialecticizable—as always invested with a meaning which has to do with the return to the origin, to the authentic, to the founding activity, to the reason why there is meaning in the world. We can also see why all philosophy presents itself as capable of communicating directly with the sciences of man or empirical studies of man without having to take a detour through a critique, an epistemology, or a theory of knowledge. Anthropology is the secret path which, orientated toward the foundations of our knowledge, connects, in the form of an unthought mediation, man's experience with philosophy. The values implicit in the question *Was ist der Mensch?* are responsible for this homogenous, de-structured, and infinitely reversible field in which man presents his truth as the soul of truth [Ibid. 78, Eng. 123-124, Jp. 159-160; underlines added]

Why is Foucault talking about *dialectics* here? Regarding dialectics, we must discuss Hegel and not Kant. It can be assumed that Foucault probably referred to Hegel, in the context of the quotation above. Nevertheless, Foucault is still speaking about Kant. What does it mean to observe the formation of a circuit called *dialectics* in Kant's philosophy, that characterizes the epistemology of our age, modernity, or its very structure? The question "what exactly does dialectics refer to?" has some weight in the first place. Here we assume that it is the formation of a structure of "an identity of differences and identity." Anthropology, then, can be understood as a movement of knowledge that determines the human through the inhuman. In Kant's case, the line between humanity and inhumanity is static. For example, Kant's writings in *Anthropology* indicate that mental illness is caused by a hereditary disposition [ApH, A217, V135-36. Japanese translation 155]. Surrounded by the inhumanity thus excluded, a space of humanity is secured. Foucault notes that human beings have the power to transcend humanity within this space but always end up to listen to the effect of that power as a call from the primordial to be human and are haunted by the question "what does it mean to be human?" However, the voice of the call resonates from outside of human subjectivity. The whole endeavor of Kant's critical philosophy is an effort to form and close this human space as static. With the end of the Age of Enlightenment and the ushering in of Romanticism, it became clear that despite Kant's efforts, humans could not maintain this static enclosed space. It turned out that all Kantian efforts to create a closed circuit had made it a dynamic rather than a static state, with a topological structure and self-referentiality. This problem manifests itself in the three-dimensional space of anthropology as the issue of *time*, that is, as a problem of four-dimensionality that leaks into the three-dimensional space. After that, grasping this "leakage" becomes a challenge. To understand this problem, Hegel used the word *spirit*. The following

quotation from Foucault is an excellent description of the transition from Kant's *Anthropology* to Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*.

[W]e are justified in asking whether the *Geist*, which emerges within the confines of anthropological reflection, is in fact secretly indispensable to the structure of Kantian thought; something like the seed of pure reason, the deep-rooted origin of its transcendental illusions, the infallible judge of its return to its legitimate domain, the principle of its movement within the empirical field where the faces of truth ceaselessly appear one after another. The *Geist* would be that ordinary fact which, in its transcendental version, implies that the infinite is never present, but always in an essential retreat; and, in its empirical version, that the infinite is what animates the movement toward truth and as the endless succession of its forms. The *Geist* is at the root of the possibility of knowledge. And, because of this, it is indissociably present and absent in the figures of knowledge: it is this retreat, this invisible and “visible reserve”.... [Ibid. 40-41, Eng. 65-66, Jp. 76-77; underlines added].

In other words, the infinite and the negative always leak into our reality and are already a part of it. They rather lay the foundation of our “reality.” This issue must be understood. This is the meaning of the appearance of the term “*Geist (spirit)*” in German idealism after Kant’s critical philosophy, which has a wider extension than reason. It was the beginning of an attempt to grasp the topological structure of human rational subjectivity. Interestingly, Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit* discusses things such as “daydreaming,” “listening to the voices of the guardian spirit,” and “predicting the future.” It discusses various occult phenomena, the supernatural and mental illness. Unlike Kant, Hegel saw these anomalous events in a dynamic structure and considered how they could be “cured.” Simply put, according to Hegel, they can be cured when the spirit fully recognizes itself. Supernatural phenomena occur when the spirit perceives the self as something that is not the self. Hegel believes that to regain itself, the spirit requires the formation of physical memory in the form of habits and creation of mental memory in the form of the *sign (Zeichen)*.

We will discuss the structure of the *Philosophy of Spirit* later, but the fact that Hegel regards occult experience and mental illness as deviations from the healthy and understands them as things that can be cured is, of course, remarkable modernity in his philosophy. By overcoming supernatural phenomena and mental illness, human consciousness is perfected as a subjective spirit that grows into an objective spirit, that is, a self-consciousness that finds itself within laws and social systems. Simply put in modern terms, this is the process of social adaptation. If this is the process of the Hegelian dialectics, it is the perfection of the philosophy of modernity. In Hegel, however, dialectics as the process of modernization is made *conscious* and *objectified*. This is the most remarkable difference between Hegel and Kant. Kant also

discusses dialectics. In fact, *transzendente Dialektik* is the essence of Kant's critical philosophy. In non-Kantian terms, it is a method of eliminating from within the world the four-dimensionality (Hegel would refer to it as *negativity*) that leaks into the three-dimensional world but maintaining it as the structural tension that underlies the intellectual perception of the world. A sort of philosophy which stays within this sphere repeatedly searches for the basis and originality of the world and enters a loop of repeating actions that only trace the tension that supports the structure of the world. In contrast, Hegel begins with the fact that our reality is already permeated with four-dimensionality and is a three-dimensional structure with a dynamic form, that is, a structure as a system that has internalized the externality. Therefore, in Hegelian philosophy, dialectics is not a task that must be realized; it is something that has already been done. Our task is to recognize it. Paradoxically, unlike Kant, whose interaction with the text and the reader repeatedly generates the same loop, Hegelian philosophy—targeting the generative structure of dialectical loops in its narrative—rather brings the reader closer to dismantling the dialectics. Theodor Adorno highlighted this in *Negative Dialectics*, and Derrida in the following excerpt: “It is often said that Hegelianism represents the fulfilment of metaphysics, its end and accomplishment. Thus, it is to be expected that Hegelianism would give to these constraints [of the metaphysical system as the creation of a dialectical circle] their most systematic and powerful form, taken to their limits” [Derrida (1972) 83, Eng. 73, Jp. (vol.1) 142. Supplemental text within the brackets added by author].

Turning now to the question of imagination, what seems decisive in Hegel is that his philosophy was initiated by a method that reduces imagination to the non-personal.

The American thinker Fredric Jameson (1934–) describes Hegel's imagination and its picture-representations as follows:

As for picture-thinking, it is certainly noteworthy to what degree that popular German-idealist or romantic concept called Imagination plays so little a part in Hegel's writing or system; and one is tempted to conjecture that it is precisely the omnipresence of the role of so-called picture-thinking (*Vorstellung*) in Hegel that leaves so little place for it. Picture-thinking would seem for Hegel to have a strong kinship with *Verstand* [Understanding], or in other words with the common-sense empirical thinking of externality, formed in the experience of solid objects and obedient to the law of non-contradiction. But where Reason (*Vernunft*)—what we may often simply call the dialectic—has the task of transforming the necessary errors of *Verstand* [understanding] into new and dialectical kinds of truths, its vocation when faced with picture-thinking is somewhat different. If *Verstand* brings with it the errors of empiricism, picture-thinking on the other hand is already an experience of truth, albeit a distorted and preconceptual one. Reason must transcend and transform the errors of *Verstand*, but it must hermeneutically recover the truths of *Vorstellung*, even

though the latter have also been formed into images in accordance with the logic of the senses and of externality. [Jameson (2010) 119. Jp. 214–215. Supplemental text within the brackets added by author]

Products of imagination, which Jameson calls picture-thinking, this is rather a starting point for Hegel. Hegel's method of dialectics is to decipher an ideological scheme (schematic thought) and grasp the structure that produces these representations as the "truth" of the situation.

In this case, *dialects is the method of unpacking/deconstructing schemas as representations*. In other words, *dialectics is the destruction of the schema*. Dialectics is not what produces the schema. From this perspective, Miki's method (*Logic of the Imagination*) can be considered an inversion of the Jameson = Hegel's method, since he claims that dialectics is a form of creativity that ultimately produces the Schema. It is even backward. Consider the following excerpt by Miki.

Identity between the subjective and the objective is fundamental to the logic of imagination. However, identity between the subjective and the objective is also the basis of dialectics as a identity of opposites. In this sense, the logic of imagination may be called dialectical. However, the logic of imagination is a creative dialectic, whereas the dialectic usually referred to is Hegel's so-called *Nachdenken* logic, which should be considered a dialectic of reflection. [Miki (1967) 209]

Jameson's contemporary interpretation, which even identifies the possibility of dismantling dialectics (= modernity) in Hegel's philosophy, might be one that goes beyond Hegel's intentions. However, in Miki's case, the principle of human history is the creation of *forms* using technology based on productive imagination. He advocates a philosophy that can boot up dialectics. Whereas for Hegel, dialectics have already been established as a fact, and his focus is its analysis.

In the quotation above, Jameson identifies the generation of antinomies through the transcendent use of understanding with the creation of *schemas* through imagination (especially when done outside of the empirical circumstances). If, as Kant said in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, imagination is a part of the ability to understand, then Jameson's claim is valid. Thus, Jameson's interpretation is itself a challenge, but if one presupposes this, then to say that Hegel's dialectic is a critical deconstruction of schematic thought is to understand Hegel as the legitimate successor to Kant's critique of antinomies. However, here, the difference between Kant and Hegel is whether to find the substance of the thing in itself beyond or at the root of the fallacious reasoning produced as an error of understanding (+ imagination). In Hegel's case, there is nothing at its root.

Jameson is not a Hegelian scholar, so he cannot be blamed for this, and it is not as if Hegel did not consider imagination. In a relatively early paper titled “Faith and Knowledge,” Hegel discusses Kant’s productive imagination (an imagination that connects understanding and perception) and says that imagination is “the first and fundamental” thing from which the separation between the ego and the world, that is, diversity arises:

We must not take the faculty of [productive] imagination as the middle term that gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world. The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary and original, as that out of which subjective Ego and objective world first sunder themselves into the necessarily bipartite appearance and product, and as the sole In-itself. [Hegel (GW) 308, Eng. 73. Jp. 28].²⁾

Under the *Philosophy of Spirit* in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia*, he discusses the ego-psychology of imagination and classifies the functional structure of the theoretical spirit (the ego’s mode of intelligent function) into three stages: intuition (perception), representation (imagination), and thinking (understanding/reason). According to the dictionary explanation, this extends beyond the dualism of perception and reason, and is considered as a recognition and establishment of the unique significance of the third dimension of representation (product of imagination) [*Hegel Cyclopedia* (1992) Imagination Section]. However, this dictionary definition is still Kantian and does not completely capture the Hegelian position of imagination. We will discuss the position of imagination in Hegel’s later work titled *Philosophy of Spirit* later again.

Hegel sought the origins of a work of art in the spiritual and religious characteristics of the people of a country instead of the poetic divine intuition of the *genius artist*, as was often the case with Romanticism. Therefore, Jameson’s method of analyzing representations in modern and contemporary literature and identifying their underlying desire for wholeness (utopia as the thing in itself)—which he calls *dialectical criticism*—is also a continuation of the Hegelian method.

Jameson is partly correct. While Hegel does address imagination in his early article *Faith and Knowledge* and the development of his academic theory in *Encyclopedia*, his major works *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Greater Logic*, which define the essence of his philosophy, do not directly address imagination. For early Hegel, imagination was “the first and fundamental thing.” The foundation of Hegel’s philosophy, from the early to middle periods, was to not view imagination as a function of the ego, but something that has been working before the ego was born. In other words, *to think of the ego as nothing more than the product of imagination*. More precisely, *imagination—as a faculty of the ego—is a pre-egoic pre-imagination captured within the ego after it is constituted*.

If this is the case, then imagination is always already working in the movement of the spirit

or logic in his later works, and we can consider imagination as omnipresent. Further, in the precise sense of the word, it is impersonal. This omnipresence is referred to as *negativity* in his later work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In Hegel's texts, this negativity plays different roles in different situations, depending on the occasion, and it is unclear whether it corresponds to the thing in itself, imagination or the concepts of understanding (corresponding to Kant's epistemology).³⁾ Rather, we can say that it refers to all of them—the source of imagination is the imaginative that precedes its objectification as imagination. Here, let us assume that pre-imagination is trapped in a certain structure (which is probably a collective process) and that this is how thing in itself, imagination and the concepts of understanding emerge. Incidentally, Hegel also said,

This power of imagination is the original two-sided identity. The identity becomes subject in general on one side, and object on the other; but originally it is both. And the imagination is nothing but Reason itself, the Idea of which was determined above. But it is only Reason as it appears in the sphere of empirical consciousness. [...] the In-itself of the empirical consciousness is Reason itself; that productive imagination as intuition, and productive imagination as experience are not particular faculties quite sundered from Reason. They must grasp that this productive imagination is only called intellect because the categories, as the determinate forms of the experiential imagination, are posited under the form of the infinite, and fixated as concepts which, also, form a complete system within their [or its] own sphere. [Hegel (GW) 308, Eng. 73, Jp. 28; underlines added].

Thus, Hegel describes imagination as the “original [= fundamental],” but simultaneously refers to it as something that “appears [= phenomenon].” What does it mean when the same thing is both the basis of a phenomenon and a phenomenon? However, this is not surprising if we understand that, unlike Kant, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* does not sharply distinguish between the sensible world and the intelligible world. It portrays the world of human experience as a mixture of the two. To strictly differentiate between the terms, imagination and its various forms emerge from pre-imagination. The important thing is that pre-imagination will probably persist even after imagination is born. This answers the question posed above. Thus, the movements of Hegel's *concept* or *spirit* occurs because of the interaction of pre-imagination and what is produced from it. In the *Philosophy of Spirit* in Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, the roles of the phenomena caused by pre-imagination before it is trapped in the construction of the self and that of imagination after the construction of the self are compartmentalized and described based on such a distinction. In other words, there is a more systematic description of imagination that only appeared as *negativity* in both *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Greater Logic*, though Hegel's description is difficult to follow.

From today's perspective, there are many aspects so far ahead of their time that rather require modern tools to properly read and interpret them. We shall return to this issue later.

§

Another issue for discussion is the relation of imagination and *time*. Heidegger said that for Kant, imagination is primordial time, but Derrida indirectly criticizes this by interrogating Hegel's theory of imagination in *Margins of Philosophy* [Derrida (1984)]. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), which is regarded as a continuation of *Being and Time*, Heidegger says, "time, as a pure intuition, springs forth from the transcendental power of imagination" [Heidegger (2010) 173, Eng. 121, Jp. 188], "the transcendental power of imagination, is in fact none other than original time" [Ibid. 196. Eng. 137, Jp. 213], and "[time] (...) as pure self-affection" [Ibid. 200, Eng. 140, Jp. 216]. In other words, imagination is the basis on which transcendence is possible, which causes the fundamental temporality as auto-affection. However, Heidegger's narrative is twisted, and it is not clear whether imagination is the source of temporality or temporality is the source of imagination. At first, he appears to mention the former, but at some point, it becomes the latter. This is a long quotation but let us follow the narrative of this section systematically:

In a laying of the ground for metaphysics, then, the "specific" finitude of human subjectivity is the problem. ... To human finitude belongs sensibility, meaning the intuition which takes things in stride. As pure intuition, i.e., pure sensibility, it is a necessary element in the structure of transcendence which distinguishes finitude. Human pure reason is necessarily a pure sensible reason. This pure reason must be sensible in itself. ... Now, if the transcendental power of imagination is to be the original ground for the possibility of human subjectivity, namely, in its unity and wholeness, then it must make possible something like a pure, sensible reason. Pure sensibility, however, namely, in the universal meaning according to which it must come to be grasped in the laying of the ground for metaphysics, is time... The transcendental power of imagination has been revealed as the origin of pure, sensible intuition. Thus, it has been proven in principle that time, as a pure intuition, springs forth from the transcendental power of imagination. ... Pure intuition, however, can only form the pure succession of the sequence of nows as such if in itself it is a likeness-forming, prefiguring, and reproducing power of imagination.... This sequence of nows, however, is in no way time in its originality. On the contrary, the transcendental power of imagination allows time as sequence of nows to spring forth, and as this letting-spring-forth it is therefore original time. [Ibid. 172-176, Eng. 121-123, Jp. 187-190]

Thus, as Heidegger says, pure reason, which realizes metaphysics in the existence of human beings, should be pure intuition/perception. Since pure intuition is time, the fundamental force underlying metaphysics is imagination. In other words, imagination is time. However, he is not referring to time as a series of nows in the ordinary sense, but the primordial time. Further, Heidegger describes the fundamental triune unity between the three factors of time:

Kant's laying of the ground for metaphysics asks about the grounds for the intrinsic possibility of the essential unity of ontological knowledge. The ground upon which it comes is the transcendental power of imagination. As opposed to the arrangement of two basic sources for the mind (sensibility and understanding), the transcendental power of imagination obtrudes as an intermediate faculty. The more original interpretation of this previously laid ground, however, unveils this intermediate faculty not just as original, unifying center, but rather it unveils this center as the root of both stems.

Thus the way is opened to the original ground for the source of both basic sources. The interpretation of the transcendental power of imagination as root, i.e., the elucidation of how the pure synthesis allows both stems to grow forth from out of it and how it maintains them, leads back from itself to that in which this root is rooted: to original time. As the original, threefold-unifying forming of future, past, and present in general, this is what first makes possible the "faculty" of pure synthesis, i.e., that which it is able to produce, namely, the unification of the three elements of ontological knowledge, in the unity of which transcendence is formed. [Ibid. 195-196, Eng. 137, Jp. 212].

Only because these modes of pure synthesis [pure apprehension, pure reproduction, pure recognition] are originally unified in the threefold-unifying of time, is there also to be found in them the possibility for the original unification of the three elements of pure knowledge. For that reason, however, the original unifying which is apparently only the mediating, intermediate faculty of the transcendental power of imagination, is in fact none other than original time. This rootedness in time alone enables the transcendental power of imagination in general to be the root of transcendence.

Original time makes possible the transcendental power of imagination, which in itself is essentially spontaneous receptivity and receptive spontaneity. Only in this unity can pure sensibility as spontaneous receptivity and pure apperception as receptive spontaneity belong together and form the unified essence of a finite, pure, sensible reason. [Ibid. 196-197, Engl. 137, Jp. 212-213].

First, the root force that unifies perception ("sensibility" in this English translation) and understanding is imagination, which is said to be rooted in primordial time. The triple-

fold structure where the past, present, and future are unified is primordial time itself and transcendental imagination can take its root only when it originates from this ground of primordial time. And then the two branches of perception and understanding can grow from this trunk of transcendental imagination.

In other words, in Heidegger's case, the root is not imagination but temporality. At this point, it is difficult to determine whether transcendental imagination and primordial temporality are almost the same thing or that transcendental imagination has its roots in primordial temporality. However ultimately, according to Heidegger, primordial time makes transcendental imagination possible. This means that Heidegger believes that transcendental imagination arises from primordial time.

Immediately after this, Heidegger said that the first edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is superior to the second edition.

If, however, as occurs in the second edition, the transcendental power of imagination is deleted as a particular grounding faculty and if its function is taken over by the understanding as mere spontaneity, then the possibility of grasping pure sensibility and pure thinking with regard to their unity in a finite, human reason diminishes, as does even the possibility of making it into a problem. However, because the transcendental power of imagination, on the grounds of its indissoluble, original structure, opens up the possibility of the laying of a ground for ontological knowledge, and thereby for metaphysics, then for this reason the first edition remains closer to the innermost thrust of the problematic of a laying of the ground for metaphysics. With reference to this most central question of the whole work, therefore, it [the first edition] deserves a fundamental priority over the second. All reinterpretation [*Umdeutung*] of the pure power of imagination as a function of pure thinking—a re-interpretation which “German Idealism” even accentuated subsequent to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*—misunderstands its specific essence. [Ibid. 197, Engl. 137-138, Jp. 213].

For Heidegger, the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is superior because Kant shows that it is primordial temporality that makes human metaphysics possible through placing imagination at the root of human cognitive abilities. In any case, Heidegger ultimately settled on temporality being the root of human existence. This is the triple-fold structure of primordial time.

However, Heidegger's conception of primordial temporality as a trinity of the three temporal forms is not a primordial temporality at all, but rather an abstract formalization of modern temporality which has been returned to the root of subjectivity. In other words, it is an abstraction and generalization of the trinity of past, present, and future, which has been

established as the human perception of time in the Western modern form and embedded in the primordial nature of human subjectivity. The only way to avoid this abstraction of time is to explain the formation of time in terms of something before time, that is, without using the word “time.” When Heidegger mentioned that transcendental imagination was primordial temporality, he came as close as he could. However, Heidegger quickly moved away from that point. Pure intuition is experienced without any content. In other words, it is an experience of experiencing itself. Experiencing experience itself ultimately means experiencing the self. Time is extracted as an abstract form through the formation of a circle of experiencing the self as the self. The experience of experiencing the self as the self requires the formation of an identity circuit that recovers what is not the self as the self. This establishment of a structure which is referred to in terms of modern thought, such as an identity of difference and identity, or *différance* is nothing but the establishment of a “human” structure. Such “humans” experience themselves as temporality, that is, the trinity of the past, present, and future. Therefore, although it is said that the trinity structure of the three temporal forms (future, present, and past) is primordial time temporality, unless we can classify such a structure with historical, topographical, and psychopathological tendencies that coincide with the establishment of the ego, or “I,” as pure apperception, it is impossible to attain the truly primordial of time. Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, did not succeed in doing so. He did not relativize the “human.” It is this humanistic tendency of Heidegger that Derrida and Foucault criticize later. Heidegger criticizes Kant’s humanistic and anthropological approach to imagination, but Heidegger himself is humanistic/anthropological in his approach. Heidegger could not conceive of a human condition in which even temporality is different from the triple-fold structure of the past, present, and future.

Time and the “I think” no longer stand incompatibly and incomparably at odds; they are the same. With his laying of the ground for metaphysics, and through the radicalism with which, for the first time, he transcendently interpreted both time, always for itself, and the “I think,” always for itself, Kant brought both of them together in their original sameness—without, to be sure, expressly seeing this as such for himself. ...[T]his covering over of the essential predicates for time and the I is not surprising, for Kant only wants to say with this that neither the I nor time is “in time.” To be sure. But does it follow from this that the I is not temporal, or does it come about directly that the I is so “temporal” that it is time itself, and that only as time itself, according to its own most essence, does it become possible? [Ibid. 191-192, Eng. 134, Jp. 207-208].

Why is the “I” not in time? In other words, why does “I” exist beyond time, and why is

“I” itself time? Originally, the self is always new and unknown to the self, and “I” is always new and unknown to “me.” For example, certain autistic patients see their own face every morning as the face of another person [Shimizu (2016)]. However, the typically developed “I” always recognizes “myself” as “me.” *A typically developed mind experiences* that the first “I” recognizes the second “myself” as being the self, and both are being integrated as the third “me.”

This is the *différance* of “I,” or the identity of difference and identity. The feeling of being “I” is *experiencing* “I” as “me,” and to realize that “I” am “me” is, in fact, to experience the difference or division. Without the experience of this division, we would not gaze at our own faces in the mirror with such interest. The synthesis of division and unity in identification in the midst of experience of difference is a dialectical experience. In other words, “I” or “temporality” is the establishment of the dialectic. There is no experience of the other in this structure in the true sense of the word. The circuit of listening to the voice of the other as the voice of the self is formed as a closed circuit. From this perspective, the establishment of “I am what I am” and “temporality” are the same. *Solving the riddle of the establishment of temporality is the same as solving the riddle of my being what I am.* Thus we can finally understand the inevitable connection between Augustine’s questioning of the mystery of memory, the mystery of imagination, or what is in the inner sanctum of memory, and the mystery of my being me, and at the same time that he was a good thinker about time and its relation to human subjectivity. “My soul, in you I measure time” [*Confessions* 11.27]. Augustine is also well known as a pioneer in the philosophy of time. Interestingly, Augustine uses the example of vocal representation to approach the essence of time. Why sound, time, and I? This question was addressed by Hegel, attempted by Husserl, and discussed by Derrida.

The establishment of my being and the establishment of temporality are the same and solving the riddle of the establishment of temporality equates to solving the riddle of my being. Derrida finds solution of this riddle in the establishment of the “sign (*Zeichen*)” in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit*: “Hegel also recognizes an essential link between the imagination productive of signs and time” [Derrida (1972) 91, Eng. 79, Jp. (vol.1) 154.]. However, before we refer to Derrida, let us first examine Hegel’s theory of sign.

(To be continued in Part III)

Notes

- 1) This article is a revision of “Memories of the Future: An Essay on the Origin of Philosophy and Hegel’s imagination” in the book *Philosophical Battlefields (Tetsugaku no senjou)*, edited by Seigen Nasu and Eiichi Nojiri, Koujin-sha, 2018), reorganized into a series of

articles for publication in an academic journal.

- 2) According to the Japanese translator Tadashi Kouzuma's annotation, "the In-itself" (*das Ansich*) here must refer to Kant's "thing-in-itself" (*Ding an sich*). If that is the case, Hegel replaced Kant's "thing-in-itself" with "imagination." This is an earlier and more radical idea than Heidegger (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* 1929) or Kiyoshi Miki (*Logic of the Imagination* 1939, 1948).
- 3) In an earlier article [Nojiri (2014)], the author classified the negativity mentioned in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as "Negativity I," "Negativity II," and "Negativity III" in terms of their states of objectivity, consciousness, and self-consciousness, respectively.

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17H06336 and JP19K21612.

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* The list of references (selected bibliography) is shared in this series of articles.

* The original sources were referred to, if they were important to the discussion, and were listed in the order of source information, followed by information on the Japanese translation. Books where only the Japanese translation was referred to have been cited with information on the translated version first. Wherever the author has revised a translation, it is indicated.

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