India in the Formation of Japanese Terrorism

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1. Introduction

This essay explores the following claim: that India abetted the formation of the culture of Japanese terrorism. My concern is not with India itself as a political or cultural actor but with "India" as a Japanese political and cultural idea. And even then, I am interested less in how India as an idea was formed than in what the idea lets us see about other implicit parts of my claim: that terrorism originated at a specific moment in Japanese history; that it was a cultural phenomenon; that it, like all cultural phenomena, formed or indeed was formed through a fitful, desultory, and contingent process; that it was paradoxically constituted as a national form through supranational and extranational forces. In the spirit of this journal, *Cultural Formation Studies*, which functions as the mouthpiece of a collaborative research group and enables experimental and exploratory work, I will write on these themes freely without being overly concerned with depth of substantiation, cogency of argument, or due justice to received literature; I will take the liberty of making some tentative conjectures, of writing in a vein more preliminary than conclusive, and of suggesting rather than resolving topics for investigation.

My purpose here is primarily expository: to present a series of sources from the newspaper *Jiyū no tomoshibi*, or *Light of Liberty*, from around the spring of 1885; through those sources, I hope to demonstrate an empirical link between India as a Japanese idea and the formation of terrorism as a Japanese cultural category of action. To achieve this purpose, I seek tentatively to situate these sources in historical context and make a foray into interpreting and evaluating their historical meaning. My suggestion is that the sources prompt or at least enable this reading: that "terrorism," a discrete, coherent, and above all self-conscious cultural category, emerged in mid-1880s Japan, right around 1884 and 1885, as a global category of political violence. It was at this point, amid what scholars working on Europe and America have identified as the "first wave" of global terrorism, that people in Japan began to perpetrate, deliberately, a violence that they themselves understood as *terrorism*, a new form of revolutionary activity intelligible only within a new global system of signification and symbolism.[1] This global category relied, the terrorists themselves well knew, on

[1] Rapoport, *Waves of Global Terrorism*, from 2022, though he originally, and influentially, set forth the

the existence of the public sphere: it derived from globally flowing information deployed in a national field of journalism, and its purpose was to manipulate and act upon that sphere. The idea of a colonial "India" developed by writers in the Japanese public sphere, the notion of a great colonized Asian nation "enslaved," as they put it, under imperial oppression and lacking the intellectual wherewithal to assert its independence, became a means by which they developed and justified, obliquely but definitively, their methods of terrorism and in fact urged terroristic action: India showed both the dire imperialist threat encroaching on Japan from Russia and signaled the extraordinary potential of explosive political terrorism to help defend and expand national autonomy during the new global imperial struggle of the 1880s.

Inasmuch as my purpose here is not to develop this argument systematically but to lay out the sources that prompt this line of thinking, the structure of this investigation foregrounds the sources themselves over the analysis, unfolding the case through empirical evidence rather than developing the case by marshaling evidence behind it. Without much background on what we are reading and why, let us go ahead and start by looking at a collection of editorials and articles in *Jiyū no tomoshibi*, and let us deconstruct and then reconstruct the "India," the idea of India in the spring of 1885, that the newspaper constructed. Once we have grasped what the newspaper said, let us then consider, cursorily, what the newspaper itself was: who was writing these articles or what organizational milieu he was operating in, why it makes sense to focus on this one paper, and how to position these articles in the political and intellectual culture of the time. And then let us conclude with some adumbrated thoughts on the formation of the culture of Japanese terrorism.

2. India in the *Light of Liberty*

On April 2, 1885, a journalist for *Light of Liberty* writing under the pseudonym "Chiyoda-sei" editorialized on rumors of a confrontation between Russia and Britain in Afghanistan.[2] A Russian general had earlier proclaimed his empire's intention to seize India, "the treasure-chest of Britain," as Chiyoda-sei put it, drawing the ire of the British. And now the intent was becoming manifest in action. "There was word," Chiyoda-sei wrote, "that the Russian tsar Alexander III had ascended as emperor of Tashkent, in Central Asia, and is dispatching troops to Afghanistan, the outer edge of the British treasure chest. The British were preparing their battleships in response. Afghan leaders have sought aid from the British." Russian encroachment into Central Asia created a new front in a new imperial rivalry.

The matter bore directly on Japan, Chiyoda-sei suggested. Japan and Russia had a long history

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idea in 2001; critique: Parker and Sitter, "The Four Horsemen of Terrorism." I have made this argument about Japan in Ghadimi, "Arai Shōgo"; here, I deploy a new set of sources and a new focus on India. The literature on terrorism is gargantuan, though much (certainly not all) of it tends to be mostly from a strategy or political-science point of view. Three notable works on history: Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*; Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism*; Miller, *Foundations of Modern Terrorism*.

[2] Chiyoda-sei, "Ro-Ei ryōkoku ga Ajia ni okeru no kankei," *Jiyū no tomoshibi*, M18/4/2.

of acrimony, he noted, and "in recent times, the possibility has emerged that Russia will take advantage of the opening of hostilities between the Qing and the French to pluck up Korea." The reference was to the Sino-French War, which had erupted the previous year over Vietnam and which had garnered relentless, obsessive coverage in *Light of Liberty* and across the Japanese journalistic sphere. Europe slid into a new crisis: "The circumstances of nineteenth-century Europe are again showing signs of being revolutionized," Chiyoda-sei wrote. "But the relations in Europe are not only something between the two countries of Russia and Britain." They mattered at home: "Will my 35-million brethren be able, between these countries, to assert national power to remain standing independent?

The crisis in Afghanistan came at a particularly loaded moment in Japanese international and domestic politics. Just months earlier, in December 1884, pro-Japanese revolutionaries in Korea had attempted to overthrow the Korean monarchy and install a so-called enlightened regime there in an incident known as the Kapsin Coup. That rebellion led to a violent confrontation between the Qing and Japanese stationed in Korea; the Japanese embassy was attacked in what was widely deemed in Japan as humiliation at the hands of China. Now Russia seemed poised to enter the scene and assert itself more aggressively in Korea. Meanwhile, at home, political violence was tearing through the Japanese countryside. In the Incident on Mount Kaba of September 1884, revolutionaries associated with the defunct Liberal Party seeking to overthrow the Japanese government planned but failed to detonate explosives and assassinate state officials at the new capitol (and capital) inauguration in Utsunomiya, Tochigi prefecture. After a trial explosives run went awry and security forces learned of the plan, the terrorists resorted to an ineffectual but culturally resonant rebellion in neighboring Ibaraki, to which they had retreated.

The Anglo-Russian clash to which Chiyoda-sei referred in his editorial became known across the Japanese public sphere as the "Afghan Incident," or *Afugan jiken*; today, it is often known as the Panjdeh Incident in English, taking the name of the place in present-day Turkmenistan where the military confrontation occurred in March 1885. As historian Yu Suzuki suggests, the Panjdeh Incident marked a stunning development in global affairs: it ignited widespread fears in Britain that war was imminent; it prompted the British to occupy the islands it called Port Hamilton, located roughly between Cheju and the Korean mainland, in mid-April 1885, after decades of relative British uninterest in the imperial rivalry over Korea; and it marked a troubling imperial clash in Asia during a decade generally known for imperial aggression in Africa. In short, the concern that Russia would seize Korea prompted Britain to dispatch its military forces there, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: the precipitation of an imperial clash over Afghanistan, which was not primarily about Afghanistan but about India, ignited fears of and then therefore actualized an imperial clash over Korea.[3]

Light of Liberty was neither alone nor wrong, then, in its worries of the threat of the Afghan

[3] Suzuki, "Anglo-Russian War-Scare"; see also Sangpil Jin, "The Port Hamilton (Geomundo) Incident)."

Incident to imperial geopolitics in Asia. And thus, the matter descended from high diplomacy and geopolitics to a cultural and intellectual problem within Japan, one played out in the public. On April 15, Chiyoda-sei returned to the issue, identifying the significance of the Afghan Incident in the prospect of what he construed essentially as a slave rebellion by Indians, aided by Russia, against Britain.[4] The British claim that the sun never sets on their dominion, Chiyoda-sei wrote, but there were signs that the sun might, in fact, set. France was regaining power, Russia was gaining power, and it even seemed that the British parliament might be toppled as it became bogged down in the debilitating Mahdi Rebellion in Egypt and Sudan. Facing the loss of supremacy in the Mediterranean and the surging of rival powers, the British would be wrong to back away from "expansionism," Chiyoda-sei wrote: "Now, because of the matter at the Afghan border, Britain and Russia are now staring at each other bearing arms." And "after all, the people of India, which is an outer province of Britain, don't admire the British government," he continued. "If the Cossack battalions cross over the Turkmen desert and invade toward the south, there's no knowing yet if the Indians, who have long suffered under the yoke of slavery, might take this chance to raise the banner of independence." A potentially recalcitrant India posed an existential threat to the British parliament, already tottering, Chiyoda-sei intimated. And the British ills were compounded by a domestic problem: If the Irish independence party seized on Russian military action in Central Asia to lead their own rebellion, then what options would be left to the British government? Chiyoda-sei asked. "We must say that today truly is a time of urgency, of life and death, for the British government." And so he concluded, of Britain, "It is not the Liberal Party, which is in power today and which seeks to avert war, but the invasionist Conservative Party, which seeks expansionism, that can ensure the survival of the government."

We encounter here a particular constellation of ideas that, as we will see, *Light of Liberty* developed across its editions: that imperialist rivalry and domestic revolution, when combined, threatened the very existence of a government unless that government took active steps to fight abroad and expand; or, in other words, that the cases of India and Ireland demonstrated that imperial encroachment by foreign powers created a domestic situation wherein a possible rebellion would potentially bring about the collapse of a government. And these were not independent processes: The Russians could help the Indians declare independence.

We have a bit more work to do to show empirically what any of this has to do with terrorism, even if we can already start to fill in the blanks mentally. But let us take a moment quickly to spell out an important point: what Chiyoda-sei wrote about Britain was the exact situation that Japan faced as well, as *Light of Liberty* hinted in other articles: it faced Russian aggression abroad; it faced growing revolutionary violence at home; it saw the possibility of a rebellion for "independence"

[4] Chiyoda-sei, "Eikoku no seisui" (since dates are provided in text, I will refrain from adding them hereafter).

from Chinese meddling in Korea; and it had a government widely disdained for its alleged refusal to engage more aggressively in foreign expansionism. What Chiyoda-sei suggested about India was precisely, as we will see, what terrorists sought to do in Japan: to seize on the opportunity generated by imperial clashes abroad to overthrow the government within Japan, or within Korea, and promote a more aggressive foreign policy. That is what terrorism could achieve.

On April 25, Chiyoda-sei pressed this idea of Indian independence and mobilized aggressively behind, citing precedent in other places—citing a global culture of revolution, we might even say.[5] "That two-headed eagle," as Chiyoda-sei said in reference to Russia, had long hoped to chase "that old lion," Britain, out of "the great peninsula of Asia," and the time had now come for the achievement of that objective, he proclaimed: to oppose Britain's naval dominance, Russia could now encroach by land. The implications of this clash lay, Chiyoda-sei repeated, in the "spirit" of India, a spirit of "enslavement" (*doeki seraruru*) under the "lion." Russia was, he proclaimed—weirdly, by his own seeming admission—the savior of the Indian spirit. "The situation of Indians suffering under the cruel taxes of the British government compares to the situation before the independence of North America, or it is who knows how many times greater than that situation," he stated. But the Indians were oblivious, he continued, and none had dared raise the standard of rebellion ever since the Sepoy Mutiny (*Shīhoi hei no ikki*, as if it were self-evident to all readers what the Sepoy Mutiny was). There was an absence of a leader to seize on the moment. Now the time was ripe, with Britain caught up in Sudan, for a nationwide rebellion across India. The Indians could take Russian generals to lead their army, just as the Chinese called on the Germans, and channel "anger and resentment pent up over the years toward the British government" to "drive out" British officers and civilians alike.

And the critical point, for us at least, was here: How could the Indians achieve this revolution for independence given the alleged "spirit of enslavement" that characterized their complacency toward British rule? "If the Russian government were to give the Muslims freedom of belief and broadcast a manifesto allowing for the making of India as a single independent state," Chiyoda-sei continued, "no matter how crafty the British government might be, would it continue to be able to ensnare the Indians?" Enabling Indian independence would permit Russia to cut off Britain's financial wellspring and allow Russia to seize Turkey. And Britain and Russia would then go to war. It was essentially an intellectual and cultural matter: a need to use text, a "manifesto," to rile up the Indian public and lead a rebellion against an occupying power.

The winner would be Japan if this were to happen. "China and Japan," the editorial concluded, "which are located in East Asia, will have the leeway to put our hands in our pockets and sit and watch the war in Europe." It would be a decisive turning point in the global race war: "It would be at this point, would it not, that the erstwhile situation in which that White race (*hakujinshu*) dominates

[5] Chiyoda-sei, "Indo no dokuritsu."

the Yellow race (*kōjinshu*) would be revolutionized (*ippen*).” The conclusion: “Wouldn’t that be wonderful? Wouldn’t that be wonderful?”

Chiyoda-sei returned to this question of the revolutionary potential of text—of “spreading a manifesto”—on May 14, when he again expatiated on the problem of India’s “spirit of slavery.”[6] This time, the comparison to the actual institution of slavery itself was more explicit. “That such an extraordinary moment in the history of the nineteenth century as the Great North-South War of America was precipitated by a proposal for the emancipation of Black-race slaves (*tojinshu no dorei kaihō*) is a fact that I call continually to mind,” he wrote. He went on, articulating what is today recognized as a racist trope: “Yet there were those among the Black race who did not assist the government of the North, the protecting god of their own benighted, ignorant selves”: Chiyoda-sei claimed that some Black people had “contented themselves” with becoming conscripted in the Southern army, leading Europeans to ridicule the Northern government. “But is this despicable, deplorable spirit of slavery (*doreishin*) something pertaining only to the Black race of America?” It was evident in China, he said, where the Ming succumbed to the Qing and, while reciting the verses of the Analects praising past leaders for saving the country from foreigners, continued to live under the dominion of barbarians from the north (*kozoku*)—itself “a form of the spirit of slavery.” And it was visible in Christian Indians who, according to a report from a newspaper in Bombay [*sic*], were ready to form a standing army for the British in India. “The Indian people have their sweat and blood sucked out of them and their hands and feet tied up and yet they give not a single thought to recovering their right to an autonomous homeland (*kyōkoku jishu no kenri*).” “What a spirit of slavery is this!”

Chiyoda-sei contrasted this “spirit of slavery” in India with the actions of the “Ireland Independence Party,” whose conduct “traversed every form of radicalism and ferocity.” “In beholding the spirit of slavery among the Indian people,” he said, he chose the ways of the Irish and denounced the ways of the Indians. The Irish independence activists, the Fenians, were of course, pioneers of explosive terrorism. The Indians had to learn from the Irish to break away from Britain. Was the implication that the Koreans needed to do the same against the Chinese?

Chiyoda-sei pushed hard for independence. Today the Indians were under the control of the British; tomorrow it would be the Russians, he said. India, he noted, was a large country, second to China. “If we reach a point of seeing the Indian people progressing to the state of freeing themselves of this spirit of slavery, they will be able to turn around this great degradation of the Orient”: he hoped that the “Afghan incident” would be a “positive stimulus” for the Indian people, and he closed with this supplication: “O my fair and just Lord! Hasten to guide the hearts of the Indian people and thus enable them to establish in the eastern hemisphere a second America (*daini no beikoku*).”

The elements, we see, have started to come together: the idea of “using a manifesto” as a

[6] Chiyoda-sei, “Indo jinmin no doreishin.”

stimulus to ignite a mass movement; the importance of the help of a foreign imperial rival to rile up the general population to change the affairs of high-end geopolitics to which ordinary people otherwise had no access; the singling out of Irish precedent to guide the way for India to become independent from Britain; the concept of "independence" itself.

But even if the idea of a revolution for independence is clear, were the journalists of *Light of Liberty* really endorsing "terrorism" in India to this end, and were they doing it knowingly? Almost a week earlier, on May 9, a journalist writing under the penname Toridori Dōjin 鳥々道人 (who could conceivably have been the same Chiyoda-sei, though it is unclear) reflected on the "audacity of the Russians."[7] The French were audacious in waging war "here in the far Orient" even while their own state of affairs in France remained unsettled, he said, referring to the Sino-French War. "But that's nothing impressive compared to the audacity of the Russians," he explained. Despite the military preparedness and strength of Britain, the Russians had "without reservation or compunction stepped into the outer ramparts, which is to say Afghanistan, of that crucial, crucial money box that is India." The British could block Russian ships leaving the Baltic or through the Dardanelles, and yet the Russians had shown no fear in taking the British on at Port Hamilton and Cheju. A war of land, too, would be costly for Russia, as it would have trouble sending troops in, whereas the British could use their railways and their troops in India to fight in Afghanistan. But the Russians fought anyway. And that is not where Russian audacity ended. It could be that the Russians were distracting the British, getting them to concentrate their troops in India, then moving their capital to Constantinople and fulfilling the wish of Tsar Peter. And the Russians were meanwhile slowly biting away at China, particularly during the Sino-French War. If all this exploded into war with Britain, the author stated, then "Russia might start gulping down Korea before breakfast." That, of course, would be a geopolitical threat to Japan.

"But there is something in Russia called the Nihilist Party," the author continued, "and they are like parasites in the body of the lion, or no, the eagle." They were well known, he said. They had assassinated the emperor not long ago. They had emerged of the exhaustion and impoverishment engendered by the Crimean War, and the seeds of these parasites still endured. To go to war with Britain while these parasites were still there, and even to seek out to capture Turkey, was not even audacity. It was "madness." But even if it was madness, there was a lesson to be learned: "War-averse Asian countries" could prepare their armies as much as they would, but there was no guarantee they could withstand a Russian onslaught. The author wanted to take the anger of these Russians and feed it to his 37 million compatriots, he said.

What did this rather oblique final line, to take the anger of the Russian Nihilists, who had led assassinations throughout Russia, and feed it to the Japanese population, mean? On June 4, Chiyoda-sei came out in a triumphant defense of these same Russian Nihilists, those "parasites" in

[7] Toridori Dōjin, "Rojin no daitan."

the body of the eagle. “Are the Nihilists patriots?” he asked.[8] The answer was a resounding yes.

Chiyoda-sei introduced the Nihilists as, literally, terrorists: they were those in Russia who used “so-called terror methods” (*iwayuru kyōkaku shudan* 恐嚇手段)—setting fire to cities, poisoning ministers, even throwing explosives in the light of day—to achieve their ends. The Irish had learned these “terror tactics” from the Russian Nihilists to resist the British government.[9] And now the Nihilists intended to exploit the “Afghan Incident” and seize the moment when the Russians and the British went to war to fly their flag over Saint Petersburg. The only reason, Chiyoda-sei explained, that the party still had not led a revolution (*kakumei no kyo*) akin to the French Revolution was that Saint Petersburg was too small: any attempt at a conventional revolution would be quashed by the army. And that is why, he said, the Nihilists had no choice but to use “chemical mechanisms” (*kagakuteki no sayō*) for their “terror tactics.”

The Nihilists were patriots, Chiyoda-sei said: they took decisive action; they did not stick their hands in their sleeves, in his formulation, and sit around waiting when a good opportunity appeared. They were rich in intent to reform their country. Their radicalism was a venerable patriotism.

We could go on, but since we now have come full circle, let us wrap up our rather baggy, plodding reading of *Light of Liberty* here. We have witnessed a progression of a particular series of ideas with regard to India. We have seen how the clash of the Russian and British empires in what was called the “Afghan Incident” of March 1885 created an expectation of impending war between the two sides, a war that would engulf East Asia and particularly Korea. The incident was both a crisis for Japan, insamuch as it foreboded new entrants into the imperial struggle over Korea, and an opportunity to lead a anti-British revolution of independence in India. We have seen, next, how *Light of Liberty* construed Indians, as colonized subjects of the British empire, as groaning not only under the cruel tyranny of the British but also under their own “spirit of slavery”; to win independence required a foreign power, in this case Russia, to stir up, through a “manifesto,” public sentiment among the Indians and ignite the desire to oust the British. Revolutionaries in Ireland, who showed the way to Indians, demonstrated that having this sort of revolutionary ferment within the empire, when combined with inter-imperial tensions, posed an existential threat to a government. And Nihilist revolutionaries in Russia from whom the Irish learned their terror tactics, which were identified precisely as such, showed that using new chemical methods of warfare, or explosives, could be precisely the most patriotic means of spurring internal reform and meddling in international affairs when people could not triumph by conventional means of warfare.

In short, then, India presented several points: first, a problem: the lack of consciousness and wherewithal among ordinary people; second, an opportunity: the urgency on the global imperial stage, derived from an impending imperial war, of engaging in direct action by ordinary people to

[8] Chiyoda-sei, “Kyomutō mo mata aikokushin aru ka.”
[9] See, e.g., Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism.”

oust a foreign imperial power, to win autonomy, and to intervene in state-led diplomatic and military affairs; and third, the tactics, the expedient means of terrorism and "manifestos," to lead that revolutionary violence in the absence of the possibility of leading a French-style revolution.

All this applied directly to Japan.

3. The Home Front

In late 1885, extremists associated with the defunct Liberal Party (*Jiyūtō*) tried to recreate in Korea, in real life, the entire Indian scenario presented in the pages of *Jiyū no tomoshibi*. The episode is known as the Osaka Incident of 1885. Under the leadership of Ōi Kentarō, who would stay in Japan, and amid the ongoing clash between the Chinese and Japanese governments in Korea, a band of terrorists plotted to go to Korea, detonate explosives, topple the Korean government, ignite war with China, and ultimately topple the government back in Japan to help spur democratic reform at home.[10] They would seize on the ferment sparked by their terrorist activity to spread a manifesto proclaiming their democratic principles in foreign newspapers.

In isolation, it is an entirely strange idea: how could the so-called activists of the Osaka Incident think that this could possibly work? Where did they get these strange ideas? The case of India in *Jiyū no tomoshibi* reveals that it was hardly strange at all: they were partaking in an emergent global culture of terrorism. Their tactics, their codes, their strategies: all were riffs on what they regarded as a new form of terrorist activity. Korea, like India, was subject to a foreign power; its people were allegedly floundering under occupation by a foreign government, the Qing, without the will to rise up and overthrow them; Japanese intervention could stir up the Korean will for a supposed slave rebellion and instigate war between China and Japan, just as the Indians could instigate war between Russia and Britain now that global imperial trends had aligned in their favor. And just as Fenians and Nihilists could use the ferment of an imperial war to topple the government from within, the terrorists of the defunct Liberal Party could do the same in Japan, against the government that they reviled and that had crushed their earlier attempts at revolution within Japan. Even the idea of using Russian generals to promote Indian independence was akin to what Korean revolutionaries were doing with Japanese leadership against China.

The link between the two, between the editorializing on India and the rise of actual international terrorist activity in Korea from Japan, is not merely theoretical or ideational, not just a matter of resemblance. It is empirical. To take just one example: the April 2 editorial on the Panjdeh Incident described above appeared on the front page of *Light of Liberty*. Turn the page, and we see at least two striking things. First, we witness the spectacular spread of explosives technology in Japan publicly trumpeted for all to hear and see. In Yokohama, *Tomoshibi* reported, the Rhenish Dynamite Company of Opladen, Cologne, had carried out a test for government officials and civilians alike to

[10] On the incident, Ōsaka jiken kenkyūkai, ed., *Osaka jiken no kenkyū.*

demonstrate the strength and power of its dynamite. “But [the explosion] reverberated unexpectedly, and throughout the city of Yokohama, people were for a time scared, unsure of what was going on.” Below this demonstration of the spectacular arrival of explosives technology was the seventy-second installment of *Kishūshū*, by the writer of political stories Miyazaki Muryū.[11] The history of *Kishūshū* requires far greater explication, but briefly: In 1878, the Russian terrorist Vera Zasulich assassinated the governor of St. Petersburg, triggering copycat assassinations and stirring public sentiment in Russia in her monumental, public trial. Soon thereafter, Sergei Kravchinskii, who later wrote under the name Sergei Stepniak, carried out an attempted assassination of Nikolai Meznetsev, head of Russia’s secret police. The entire assassination plot, as Lynn Ellen Patyk explains, was an act inspired by the terror of Robespierre, carried out in mimicry of Zasulich, and staged particularly to make it seem as if literary culture was being applied to lived experience. Stepniak fled Russia and entered the public sphere in Europe, which was mesmerized by fascinating tales of sensational violence in Russia. Stepniak profiled Russian terrorists for the Italian newspaper *Il Pungolo* in the early 1880s, leading to a book contract in early 1882. His published text *Underground Russia* was a multinational hit, being translated into Portuguese, German, French, Dutch, and English almost immediately—and, scholars fail to note, into Japanese.[12] The Japanese edition of *Underground Russia* was this same *Kishūshū*, published in *Light of Liberty*. And the specific installment on April 2 was part of a profile of Sophia Perovskaya, who was involved in the terrorist organization People’s Will and participated in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881.[13] Japanese journalistic coverage of terrorism in Russia was thus part of a growing European obsession with the matter, and it was *Jiyū no tomoshibi* that took the national lead in bringing hortatory stories of Russian terrorism to the Japanese public.[14] The introduction of “terror tactics” and their role in geopolitics and diplomacy on one page of *Jiyū no tomoshibi* went hand-in hand with their literary presentation on the next page—all to formulate a recognizable, self-conscious culture of terrorism.

This brings us to the question of authorship. It is not clear who Chiyoda-sei was, but we do know who “Toridori Dōjin” was, and we know much about the journalists at *Jiyū no tomoshibi.* Toridori Dōjin was a penname of Sakazaki Shiran.[15] There is much to say about Sakazaki, his immense role in *Jiyū no tomoshibi*, and the history of terrorism, but let us limit ourselves to one point here: his connection to Kageyama Hideko.[16] Kageyama, known also by her married name Fukuda Hideko, the leading Japanese women’s rights advocate of the early Meiji era after Kishida

[11] See Haruta Kunio, “Jiyū no tomoshibi to seiji shōsetsu,” in *Jiyū no tomoshibi no kenkyū*, pp. 95 – 100; on Miyazaki, Yanagida Izumi, *Seiji shōsetsu kenkyū*, pp. 161–216; for a reproduction of the text with annotations, Miyazaki Muryū, *Kyomutō jitsu den ki Kishūshū*, in *Meiji seiji shōsetsu shū*, pp. 50–160

[12] This account from Patyk, “Remembering ‘The Terrorism’” and introduction to Anemone, ed., *Just Assassins*; also see Peter Scott’s entry in *Just Assassins.*

[13] On Miyazaki and women, see Kurata, *Teroru no onnatachi.*

[14] Hughes, “British Opinion and Russian Terrorism”; also, Anemone, ed., *Just Assassins.*

[15] Matsuo, *Jiyū no tomoshibi no kenyū*, p. 7.

[16] On Sakazaki: Yanagida, *Seiji shōsetsu,* pp. 308 – 338.

Toshiko, was staying at the home of and taking lessons from Sakazaki at the introduction of Itagaki Taisuke, founder of the defunct Liberal Party, precisely around the time Sakazaki was writing for *Jiyū no tomoshibi*.[17] Just months later, Kageyama became the mule for explosives in the 1885 Osaka terror plot, recruited because she could help transport the goods without being caught by the police, the terrorists thought. Kageyama was best friends, she explained in her memoirs, with Tomii Oto, Japan's first female journalist. Tomii worked for *Light of Liberty*.[18] After Kageyama was arrested alongside the other Osaka Incident terrorists, Miyazaki Muryū published a book of profiles of Kageyama and her associates that was as if it were the Japanese real-life version of *Underground Russia*, as if Kageyama were a Japanese Perovskaya, perhaps.[19] The primary attorney for the terrorists on trial in Osaka after their arrest was Hoshi Tōru, chief editor of *Light of Liberty*.[20] It was not just that *Jiyū no tomoshibi* depicted acts of terrorism. Its associates actually became the terrorists, or the direct intellectual coaches of the terrorists, in the 1885 Osaka Incident.

We've moved quite briskly through this narrative, much of which remains, admittedly, quite tentative; it is the task for another time to slow down, substantiate, and document all this carefully. But it's clear, I think, that we've now come full circle back to India. The particular ideas that the journalists set forth in *Light of Liberty* through the case of India—not exclusively through India, but here we have focused on India—formed not only a strategy and a tactic but also a global cultural pattern of a particular kind of violence that had now arrived in Japan: terrorism.

4. Conclusion

What are the implications of this story for the study of cultural formations? Political violence has long been something cultural; perhaps it has never not been cultural. After all, what, if not the cultural dimension of political violence, is *Chūshingura,* or *The Tales of Heike*, or *The Iliad*? But quite unlike, say, political assassination in modern Japan, which descended from a deep indigenous Japanese cultural genealogy, what we find here in the pages of *Light of Liberty* and particularly in the link between India and the origins of Japanese terrorism is a new, perhaps unprecedented phenomenon, one arising right at the dawn of Japanese modernity: the rise of a *global* culture of political violence, a system of signs and symbols intelligible across the entire world that was appropriated, exploited, and modified by actors in local contexts to render meaningful and significant a particular form of political action. It was a global culture in which actors knowingly and conscientiously took part. Part of that culture emerged out of processes that unfolded simultaneously and relatively independently in different parts of the world: the rise of newspapers, public media,

[17] Fukuda, *Warawa no hanseigai,* pp. 19–20.
[18] Fukuda, *Warawa no hanseigai*, p. 28; on Tomii: Aoki Mitsuko, "Tomii Oto ni miru Meiji no joseizō" in *Okayama no rekishi to bunka.*
[19] Miyazaki Muryū, *Ōsaka jiken shishi retsu den*.
[20] Asō Saburō, "Daidō danketsu undō to Hoshi Tōru," in *Jiyū no tomoshibi*, pp. 190 – 196. I have not cited the individual chapters in the bibliography, only the entire edited volume.

and print capitalism; the emergence of party politics; the entry of women into the political and cultural sphere. But part of it also drew from the direct diffusion of both abstract and concrete means of political violence: the technology of dynamite; models that passed through newspaper reports; global imperial rivalry itself. The story has implications for the transmission of the very cultural concept of "revolution" and the "contagion" of revolution, a topic of recent interest to historians: revolutions are themselves mimetic, and in the nineteenth century, terrorism became a preferred means of revolution.[21] Of course, this global cultural form was being deployed for distinctly national purposes: to abet the independence of India, or of Korea, and to sustain the autonomy and dominance of Japan. What the role of India in the origins of Japanese terrorism demands, then, is that we reckon with the emergence of a genuinely global cultural form and the contradictions and confusion that that global form produces in its interactions with the nation. And it further prompts reflection on the problem of the agents of cultural formation: the rise of ordinary people in the public sphere who sought, violently, to gain access to realms of governance and diplomacy once reserved for a small, elite band of people; the interaction between state and society, and the role of individual agency, in forming culture; the role of ordinary people at the dawn of the modern in transmitting and molding global cultures in national forms.

I have written in the foregoing pages rather recklessly and rather indulgently, without adequate concern for the vast and deep body of scholarship on the history of terrorism, on the idea of terrorism in European and Russian culture and literature, on the rise of political stories as a genre, and on the specific context of what scholars call (I think rather erroneously, but that's an argument for another time) the radicalization of the Movement for Freedom and Popular Rights, or the *gekka jiken* of the *jiyū minken undō*. There is much more to be done to substantiate this story and to excavate its meaning. But perhaps the most basic observation suffices for now: that the globalization of culture, or the formation of culture at a global yet national scale, unfolding in the context of ferocious imperialism and what "Chiyoda-sei" construed as the enslavement of peoples, was shot through with violence, brutality, and all the ugliest dimensions of humanity. The implications for today are vast.

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[21] These points also in Patyk, "Remembering"; on global revolutions, Motadel, ed., *Revolutionary World.*

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