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Elizabeth Camp's Misreading of Davidson's Theory of Metaphor

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Abstract

There is a radical interpretation of Donald Davidson's theory of metaphor which seems to be viewed as the orthodox or textbook reading of his theory. It is claimed that Davidson's theory is a noncognitivist theory of metaphor. The authors who make this claim offer criteria by which to classify theories of metaphor into cognitivist and noncognitivist schools. Applying the criteria to the radical interpretation of Davidson's theory helps to make sense of their claim. But there are two problems. First, the criteria fail. Second, the radical noncognitivist interpretation of Davidson's theory cannot be supported by the evidence that is adduced for it. This paper aims to highlight these issues by focusing on Elizabeth Camp's (2013) article "Varieties of Metaphor."

Introduction

There is a textbook interpretation of Donald Davidson's theory of metaphor. Textbook because it appears in the philosophical textbooks on metaphor (Camp and Reimer 2006). Advocates of this interpretation, in whole or part, include Elizabeth Camp (2006a, 2006b, 2013), Chris Genovesi (2020), Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone (2010, 2014), Jakub Matcha (2019), Marga Reimer (2006, 2007), and Richard Rorty (1987). Based on the textbook interpretation of Davidson's theory, these authors classify it as a noncognitivist theory of metaphor. Camp (2006a, 2006b, 2013) provides much of the impetus for the reading in question. But it can be shown that Camp's reading of Davidson does not find support in his writings. In fact, at times, Camp seems to misrepresent Davidson's writings by quoting him out of context or splicing together a single passage from two disparate paragraphs. It is my intention to provide evidence for this claim. My focus falls on Camp 2013 paper, Varieties of Metaphors. I conclude by providing a simple criterion for distinguishing cognitivist theories of metaphor from noncognitivist theories of metaphor.

Elizabeth Camp on Davidson's Theory of Metaphor

In the first third of her 2013 paper "Varieties of Metaphors," Camp argues that Davidson's paper on metaphor is inconsistent. She tells us that there is no consistent reading of Davidson's view. The most plausible reading, she concludes, is the one that interprets Davidson's theory as a noncognitivist theory of metaphor.

> I note that it doesn't appear possible to render all of Davidson's claims about metaphors and meaning in "What Metaphors Mean" consistent: in particular, the claim that metaphors can be assertions (WWM 43) appears to conflict directly with [his] central negative thesis. The most plausible overall reading, though, is *a radically noncognitivist one, on which metaphorical utterances fail to have or otherwise express any (nonliteral) propositional, cognitive contents* (Camp 2013, 365, my italics).

This passage tells us that noncognitivist theories of metaphor deny that metaphorical content is propositional (if such propositionality is nonliteral) and cognitive. However, we should suppose that noncognitivist theories can allow that metaphorical utterances have or express (nonliteral) propositional content, or meanings, or cognitive content, but not both. But this supposition causes its own problems. First, let me say why we must make the assumption.

Positivist theories of metaphor need not deny nonliteral meaning or propositionality to metaphorical utterances. Positivists take up many noncognitivist positions. There are noncognitivist theories of aesthetics,

ethics, evaluative statements, metaphysics, religion, and so on. But positivists still talk about aesthetic, ethical, metaphysical, and religious propositions (Ayer 1936, Carnap 1935, Stevenson, 1937). These are not propositions with literal, truth conditional content and, for this reason, they are deemed to lack cognitive content. It is in this sense that these theories are noncognitivist. Based on this, we can suppose that, similarly, a positivist theory of metaphor can (a) allow metaphorical propositional content, whilst (b) denying that such content is literal or cognitive. Thus, the theory will allow for metaphorical propositionality whilst taking up a classic noncognitivist stance.

Second, C L Stevenson's emotivist theory of ethics is, perhaps, the most (in)famous noncognitivist theory of ethics. Stevenson (1937) clearly associates ethical statements with emotivist meanings, but, again, denies that they are literally meaningful. By analogy, we can suppose that metaphorical statements may have metaphorical or emotivist meanings which are not literal. In fact, the metaphorical expression "old maid" is an example that Stevenson explicitly associates with an emotivist meaning (Stevenson 1937, 23) pointing us to a emotivist theory and, therefore, noncognitivist theory of metaphor.

Last, Rudolf Carnap's theory of evaluative statements (actually labelled "non-cognitivism" by Carnap (Schilpp 1963)) associates evaluative statements with pure optatives. These express noncognitive attitudes to propositions and formally reduce to an optative or wish sign (akin to Frege's assertion sign and a proposition, $\vdash p$). An optative is thus analysed thus: "utinam p," with utinam being the optative or wish sign, and p the proposition. In such a theory evaluative statements entail propositions. These take the form of declarative sentences. But these sentences need not be literal. For example, consider "Go to hell." Following Carnap, this is associated with an optative: "Would it be that you go to hell," or, more formally, "Utinam *you go to hell*." The proposition associated with the interpretation is "you go to hell." It is not literal on a positivist reading since "hell" makes no literal contribution to the proposition. If we treat metaphorical statements similarly, as evaluative statements, or optatives, this suggests that metaphorical statements may be associated with nonliteral propositional content in a noncognitivist theory of metaphor.

I conclude, therefore, that positivist statements and theories suggest that a positivist consideration of metaphor may be noncognitivist but allow that metaphorical statements or utterances express, have, or imply nonliteral meanings or nonliteral propositional content.

At the same time, Davidson's theory of metaphor implies, at least, two kinds of cognitive content: content associated with literal propositions and imagistic content (Davis 1983). For Davidson, metaphorical utterances have or express literal propositions, which are cognized and cognitively active in metaphorical interpretation (e.g. Davidson 2001, 261; Johnson 2008, 46[1]; Lepore and Stone 2010, 174[2]; Stern 2008, 263[3]). This process leads to cognitive effects, which are mental images, imaginings, or picturings. Davison even speaks of visions (Davidson 2001, 257, 264). This is what a metaphorical speaker is trying to cause to occur in the mind of an interlocutor when speaking metaphorically. Thus, if Davidson's theory is noncognitivist, at least one noncognitivist theory implies that metaphorical utterances come with cognitive content: literal propositional content and images. It may be argued that the images in question are effects and not expressed by the utterances in question, but, rather, caused. Indeed, as we shall see, Camp (2013) argues that Davidson's theory is a causal theory of metaphor. But even if we allow this, metaphorical utterances, according to Davidson, *have to* express literal content that is cognized and cognitively active in causing the aforementioned effects. Such content *is* cognitive content. In fact, this speaks to a contradiction at the heart of the criteria that Camp offers for classifying noncognitivist theories above.

I also want to note that, Davidson's theory of language implies that language, its interpretation, and the differentiation of linguistic activities and behaviours require the communication and recognition of beliefs and intentions in a *holistic* manner. (Davidson 2001, 143, 144, 147, 155, 186, 195, 280; see also Wheeler 2003, 189).

Davidson also speaks of distinguishing metaphorical uses from other uses of language through recognising the intention with which a sentence is uttered (Davidson 2001, 258). Lepore and Stone, in interpreting

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[1] Cited below.
[2] Cited below.
[3] Cited below.

Davidson, speak about a "metaphorist's intention." The intention to speak metaphorically is conveyed by understanding the literal propositional content of the metaphor in its context of use:

> The metaphorist's intention needn't be to communicate a proposition affirming noticed similarities, but rather for his hearer to understand the *proposition literally expressed*; and then, through that understanding perhaps be prompted (contingent on his background information) to look for certain similarities (Lepore and Stone 2010, 174).

The above evidence, therefore, suggests that Davidson's general theory of language and his theory of metaphor imply that metaphorical utterances express cognitive attitudes, not only their literal content, as Lepore and Stone note above, but beliefs and attitudes that entail beliefs. This can only be done linguistically, which suggests even metaphorical utterances express cognitive content to some extent.

Thus, it seems that noncognitivist theories are consistent with allowing metaphorical utterances to express, have, or imply (nonliteral) propositional content or meaning, or express, have, or imply other kinds of cognitive content: images, literal propositional content, or cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivist theories do not need to deny both. Therefore, we need to think of noncognitivist theories as implying the failure of either nonliteral propositionality or cognitive content altogether. But this leads to another problem. *Cognitivist* theories are consistent with allowing metaphorical utterances *only* literal propositional content. That is, denying nonliteral content to metaphorical utterances, as Davidson does, is not sufficient for noncognitivism. To see this consider the theories below.

Conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is, perhaps, the most famous cognitivist theory of metaphor. But CMT is compatible with metaphorical sentences and utterances having only literal propositional content. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the pertinent linguistic distinction is between the literal and the figurative. Metaphor is conceptual and structures both. For example, talk of arguments is structured by the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, but this does not mean that talk of arguments, thus structured, is not literal. This is what Lakoff and Johnson say:

> Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. The metaphor is not merely in the words we use—it is in our very concept of an argument. The *language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 5, my italics).

The sentences in question are literal with respect to semantic content. But, following CMT, such sentences are metaphorical with respect to their conceptual mappings. Consider the sentence "Kaline is in Texas." Heim and Kratzer provide the tools for a semantic reduction (Heim and Kratzer 2000, 65). But the sentence incorporates an ontological metaphor (PLACES ARE CONTAINERS) using "in" to make Texas into a container (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 29-30). Thus, it is consistent to think that an utterance of a sentence like "Kaline is in Texas" expresses literal truth conditions and, therefore, literal propositional content (and no more), whilst being structured or organised metaphorically. But CMT is obviously not a noncognitivist theory of metaphor.

Another theorist to consider is Francois Recanati. Recanati (2004) implies that utterances that are identified as metaphorical are literal in what he calls a *primary literal sense* (abbreviated to "p-literal meaning" by Recanati (2004)). Their metaphorical character comes to the fore when the type meaning (abbreviated to "t-literal meaning" by Recanati (2204)) of the words uttered and the utterance's primary literal meaning give rise to a certain tension. This is accompanied by an awareness of the subpersonal *cognitive* processes that generate the utterance meaning. Consider, then, an utterance of the following sentence:

(1) The ATM swallowed my card

The utterance has truth conditions or propositional content. This is determined by various pragmatic processes. Saturation is one, it selects content for indexicals, here "my;" enrichment is another, it restricts the

scope of expressions, here "the;" and loosening is another, the meaning or concept associated with "swallow" is derestricted to allow ATMs to swallow. Recanati writes:

> There can be no real swallowing on the part of an ATM, since ATMs are not living organisms with the right bodily equipment for swallowing. By relaxing the conditions of application for 'swallow', we construct an ad hoc concept with wider application. (Recanati 2004, 26).

Putting saturation to one side, the pragmatic processes in question are not inferential (i.e. not processes that produce implicatures) and they are not above the level of awareness. But they produce propositions. These propositions can be evaluated for truth and they are associated with literal meaningfulness. Thus (1) is not only true or false but literally true or false. These points are made in the following passage:

> The paradigm case of nonliteral meaning is metaphor. *Now metaphor, in its most central varieties, I count as p-literal*. To re-use an example from chapter 2, if I say that the ATM swallowed my credit card, I speak metaphorically; there can be no real 'swallowing' on the part of an ATM, but merely something that resembles swallowing. Still, an ordinary hearer readily understands what is said by such an utterance, without going through a two-step procedure involving the prior computation of the 'literal' meaning of the utterance (whatever that may be) and a secondary inference to the actual meaning. Knowing the linguistic meaning of 'swallow', and knowing what sometimes happens with ATMs, the hearer unreflectively constructs the sense in which the ATM can be said to 'swallow' the card by adjusting the meaning of the word to the situation talked about. (Recanati 2004, 76, my italics).

The adjustment of the word to the context means a sentence like (8) involves "sense extension" (Recanati 2004, 77). The sense extension of some utterances is more easily recognised than others: "there is a continuum between ordinary cases of sense extension that we don't even perceive (the ATM swallowing the credit card) and more dramatic cases of metaphor whose nonliteral character cannot be ignored." (Recanati 2004, 77).

Consider the following sentence:

(2) A fisherman is a spider (Glucksberg 2008, 76)

According to Sam Glucksberg (2008), this is an example of a bad metaphor. It may help to exemplify the point that Recanati is making. With an utterance of (1), we don't perceive the sense extension with "swallow," but with an utterance of (2), we notice the sense extension with "spider." We might, for example, stop and think what aspect of the meaning of "spider" allows it to be extended such that it incorporates fishermen. It is this kind of noticing that brings to our attention the metaphorical nature of an utterance. And under these circumstances we are apt to consider such utterances as nonliteral, *despite their primary literal sense*:

> The more noticeable the conflict, the more transparent the departure from t-literal meaning will be to the language users. Beyond a certain threshold, cases of sense extension will therefore count as special and nonliteral in the ordinary sense, *despite their p-literal character*. (Recanati 2004, 77, my italics).

The main point for us is that metaphorical utterances have literal truth conditions. That is, following Recanati, metaphorical utterances have literal, propositional content. Such content is determined pragmatically. This means it is not determined semantically *but is determined cognitively*. Yet, if we hold that a theory of metaphor that denies nonliteral meaning to metaphorical utterances is noncognitivist, we must conclude that Recanati's theory is noncognitivist. This seems absurd given the cognitive grounds and cognitive determination of the propositional content associated with metaphorical utterances and their meaning by Recanati.

I conclude that there are severe problems with Camp's criteria. Let us, next, consider another claim that Camp

makes in the passage cited above. If you recall, Camp claims that Davidson's writings on metaphor are inconsistent. But I do not believe that she provides compelling evidence for this claim. Let me try to demonstrate this.

I start by noting that there do seem to be inconsistent elements in Davidson's writings on metaphor. This seems to be one of the most egregious:

> The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for *conveying ideas*, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning (Davidson 2001, 246, my italics).

But later, we get this:

> We say Mr S. is like a pig because we know he isn't one. If we had used a metaphor and said he was a pig, this would not be because we changed our mind about the facts but because we chose to *get the idea across* a different way (Davidson 2001, 257, my italics).

But how can we get an idea across in another way by changing from the simile to the metaphor if metaphors are not a vehicle for conveying ideas? The two passages seem to conflict. However, there may be no inconsistency. The simile conveys or expresses the idea (of a likeness), the metaphor gets the idea (of a likeness) across in another way. Camp interprets Davidson as arguing that metaphors *cause* psychological effects (Camp 2001, 364). Thus we might say the simile *conveys* the idea, but the metaphor *causes* the idea. This difference between conveying and causing may resolve the contradiction. Importantly, the passages are also compatible with saying metaphors *convey* literal meanings which work their magic by *causing* (or producing by some cognitive mechanism) further cognitive effects (e.g. seeing a similarity, etc.). Let's next think about some inconsistencies that Camp finds in Davidson's paper on metaphor.

As we saw above, Camp presents us with an example of inconsistency. Davidson says metaphors can be assertions. She claims this is inconsistent with his negative claim. The negative claim is this: metaphors do not have cognitive content over and above their literal content. Is there really an inconsistency here? Let's take a careful look at three passages where Davidson speaks about assertion in his paper on metaphor. Here is the first:

> We can learn much about what metaphors mean by comparing them with similes, for a simile tells us, in part, what a metaphor merely nudges us into noting. Suppose Goneril had said, thinking of Lear, 'Old fools are like babes again'; then she would have used the words to assert a similarity between old fools and babes. What she did say, of course, was 'Old fools are babes again', thus using the words to intimate what the simile declared (Davidson 2001, 253)

In this passage, simile is contrasted with metaphor. Simile is said to assert, but metaphor is said to *intimate what the simile asserts*. There is no inconsistency here and this interpretation does not contradict the negative claim, for the metaphor need only possess its literal meaning to intimate what the simile asserts. What is intimated may go beyond the literal meaning in question, but, as Davidson says, this does not entail meaning (Davidson 2001, 256). An analogy may be made to hints. A hint may be given using a sentence with a literal meaning. What the hint leads us to discover is not part of the meaning of the sentence in question (Lepore and Stone 2010, 171). The same may be true for metaphors. A metaphor may lead us to discover a similarity, but it is not part of the metaphor's meaning. Let's look at a second passage:

> The simile says there is a likeness and leaves it to us to pick out some common feature or features; *the metaphor does not explicitly assert a likeness*, but if we accept it as a metaphor, we are again led to seek common features (not necessarily the same features the associated simile suggests, but that is another matter) (Davidson 2001, 255, my italics).

Again, simile and metaphor are contrasted. The former asserts a likeness. The metaphor, it is said, does not assert *the likeness*. Again, there is no reason to think that there is anything here that contradicts the negative claim. Here is a third passage.

In lying, one must make an assertion so as to represent oneself as believing what one does not; in acting, assertion is excluded. Metaphor is careless of the difference. It *can be an insult, and so be an assertion*, to say to a man 'You are a pig'. But no metaphor was involved when (let us suppose) Odysseus addressed the same words to his companions in Circe's palace; a story, to be sure, and so no assertion—but the word, for once, was used literally of men (Davidson 2001, 259, my italics).

In this passage, assertion is introduced to us in the way that Davidson often talks of it. *An assertion is an act of representing oneself as believing something.* For Davidson, assertion is an act that involves representing oneself as believing something and intending to represent oneself as believing it (Engel 2008, Kölbel 2013, Pagin and Neri 2021). Evidence for the conclusion is easily found in Davidson's work:

[I]t is clear that speech requires a multitude of finely discriminated intentions and beliefs. A person who *asserts* that perseverance keeps honour bright must, for example, *represent himself as believing* that perseverance keeps honour bright, and he must *intend to represent himself as believing it* (Davidson 2001, 186, my italics).

It is worth pointing out that the utterance of the sentence "perseverance keeps honour bright" *is* metaphorical. Davidson uses it as an example of an assertion, which is defined as an act with certain properties. These properties help make sense of the metaphor from the previous passage and in no way requires us to deny the negative thesis.

In the previous passage, "He is a pig" is taken metaphorically. It is also said to be an insult and, therefore, an assertion. Thus, though the sentence is spoken metaphorically, it makes an assertion. This simply means that uttering the sentence involves an act of representing oneself as believing that someone is a pig and intending to represent oneself as believing that someone is a pig. Doing this does not contradict the so-called negative thesis. What the speaker is representing herself as believing and intending to represent herself as believing need entail nothing over and above the literal content of the sentence that is uttered. That is, no secondary meaning is implied. Thus, the negative thesis is not contradicted.

Indeed, making an assertion suggests a way to get the metaphorical use of a sentence across to one's target audience. The absurdity of making an assertion like "He is a pig" is what leads us to take the utterance of the sentence metaphorically. Consider the following passages:

The argument so far has led to the conclusion that as much of metaphor as can be explained in terms of meaning may, and indeed must, be explained by appeal to the literal meanings of words. A consequence is that *the sentences in which metaphors occur are true or false in a normal, literal way* (Davidson 2001, 256-257, my italics)

And next:

Patent falsity is the usual case with metaphor, but on occasion patent truth will do as well. 'Business is business' is too obvious in its literal meaning to be taken as having been uttered to convey information, so we look for another use; Ted Cohen reminds us, in the same connection, that no man is an island. The point is the same. *The ordinary meaning in the context of use is odd enough to prompt us to disregard the question of literal truth* (Davidson 2001, 258, my italics).

Metaphors are true or false in the *normal, literal way*. It is the uninformative truth or blatant falsity of an utterance which leads us to take it metaphorically. In the context of use, the literal meaning of the sentence is so odd that it prompts us to put the literal truth or falsity of the sentence to one side and think of the sentence metaphorically. This is not at odds with what has been said. A user uses a sentence to make an assertion, representing themselves as believing and intending to represent themselves as believing what is said, yet with the additional intention that her audience take what was said metaphorically. The outright weirdness of the assertion (in the context of use) nudges us to do just that. That is, we recognise the metaphorical intention and take the utterance metaphorically. In doing so, one puts the literal truth and falsity of the uttered sentence to one side and lets it work its cognitive magic.

I just said that individuals that use metaphor have the intention to speak metaphorically and implied it is something that they wish to convey by using a sentence. This, too, is entirely consistent with Davidson's writings. For example, it is implied by passages like the following:

> [A] woman who believed in witches but did not think her neighbour a witch might say, 'She's a witch', *meaning* it metaphorically; the same woman, still believing the same of witches and her neighbour but intending to deceive, might use the same words to very different effect. Since sentence and meaning are the same in both cases, it is sometimes hard to prove which *intention* lay behind the saying of it; thus a man who says 'Lattimore's a Communist' and means to lie can always try to beg off by pleading a metaphor (Davidson 2001, 258, my italics)

Someone might *say* "she is a witch." She may be lying or speaking metaphorically. (She may be speaking truthfully.) Intentions divide the saying between these possibilities. Having intentions to speak metaphorically are, therefore, consistent with Davidson's theory and there is nothing in Davidson's work which suggests that the speaker does not intend to convey metaphorical intentions by the words they use. In fact, to the contrary. Using a sentence that is *odd enough so that the hearer takes the sentence metaphorically* suggests a way of sharing the intention to speak metaphorically. And none of this contradicts the thesis that the sentence used metaphorically lacks a special metaphorical sense. Talk of intentions is also consistent with other interpreters of Davidson. As we have seen, Lepore and Stone (2010) talk about a "metaphorist's intention" when introducing Davidson's theory.

So, we have seen passages on assertion in Davidson's work do not imply inconsistency. Metaphor involves the assertion of literal content and assertion involves positioning oneself relative to such content, i.e. representing oneself in a certain way. We have also seen that making such assertions help convey intentions that identify one's linguistic activity as metaphorical activity. I want now to point out some further problems with Camp's reading of Davidson.

Camp claims that Davidson believes that metaphor is not an ordinary part of language. But we have seen a passage above where he says the metaphorical sentence is true or false in the normal, literal way. Of course, it is. The meaning of a sentence in which a metaphor occurs is literal and, therefore, has truth conditions. Here are further passages from Davidson's text that demonstrate in what sense he thinks metaphor is ordinary:

> [U]nderstanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules...These remarks *do not, except in matters of degree, distinguish metaphor from more routine linguistic transactions*: all communication by speech assumes the interplay of inventive construction and inventive construal. What metaphor adds to the ordinary is an achievement that uses no semantic resources beyond the resources on which the ordinary depends. There are no instructions for devising metaphors; there is no manual for determining what a metaphor 'means' or 'says'; there is no test for metaphor that does not call for taste (Davidson 2001, 245, my italics)

Metaphors are not different in *kind* from routine linguistic communication. Nevertheless, there *is* something special about them. What is special about them is not linguistic, it is psychological. To spell it out:

1. Metaphor results in a *psychological* achievement that ordinary language does not, but
2. Metaphor does this by relying on the very same semantic resources that ordinary language does

Thus, there are no *special* rules, principles, maxims, manuals, etc. that give rise to the metaphorical achievement (e.g., its cognitive effects). But the passage doesn't say there are *absolutely no rules*, etc. that contribute to the metaphorical achievement. There are; *they are the ordinary, boring (semantic) ones*.

Let's take a look at how that may work. Ordinary semantic resources determine literal content and in the literal context, the literal content is conveyed. But the same *has* to be true of the metaphorical context given the necessity of literal meaning to metaphorical effect. We have seen the literal meaning conveys the intention to speak metaphorically and the understanding of the literal meaning was said to prompt the metaphorical effect. Critics and advocates of Davidson's theory concur on this. For example, Mark Johnson, a prominent

critic of Davidson, writes:

> Metaphor is only a pragmatic effect achieved by using a certain literal utterance to induce the hearer to notice something. Davidson says that *a metaphorical utterance uses its literal meaning* to "intimate" or "suggest" some nonpropositional insight: (Johnson 2008, 46, my italics)

Moreover, Davidson is clear on this, writing: "an adequate account of metaphor must allow that the primary or original meanings of words remain active in their metaphorical setting" (Davidson 2001, 249). Thus, discussing Davidson, Josef Stern writes: "Even while used or interpreted metaphorically, the literal meaning of [the metaphorical expression] is active" (Stern 2008, 263). Thus, literal meaning not only conveys the intention to speak metaphorically, and not only prompts or induces the metaphorical effect, but remains active in the processes and mechanisms associated with the metaphorical effect.

The essential point is this: ordinary semantic resources determine the literal meaning of a sentence, which *is conveyed, conveys intentions,* and *remains active* in the metaphorical context. The difference between the literal context and the metaphorical context is that something else is achieved in the latter, this is the metaphorical effect. *It is psychological, it is not linguistic.* Metaphor, therefore, does not add a new kind of communicative act to the set of ordinary communicative acts. Nor does metaphor add any new kind of meaning to the set of ordinary linguistic meanings associated with the sentence spoken metaphorically. If metaphor adds anything at all to the world, it is a psychological event.

But surely the following passage is inconsistent with what has just been said. If so, it will support Camp's inconsistency claim.

> Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and *the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination* (Davidson 2001, 245, my italics)

This passage introduces Davidson's paper on metaphor. It may seem to suggest that the ordinary semantic rules *don't* apply to the interpretation of metaphor. Davidson says the metaphorical interpretation is the work of the imagination. For the sake of argument, I assume that the imagination is not governed by the ordinary semantic resources of language. Thus, this passage seems to be inconsistent with what was said above.   But it is not. It does not imply the metaphorical interpretation is not reliant on the ordinary semantic resources we have been talking about. There is a logical chain of dependency and it can be spelt out like this.

1. Metaphorical interpretation relies on metaphorical effect.
2. Metaphorical effect relies on literal language.
3. Literal language relies on the ordinary semantic resources of language.
4. Therefore, metaphorical interpretation relies on the ordinary rules of language.

The thing to take away is this: The metaphorical interpretation may not be determined by ordinary semantic resources, but it is dependent on them (for putting together the metaphor's literal content).

It is interesting to consider further the passage under discussion. Davidson implies that the interpretation of metaphor is a collaborative act of communication. This implies that beliefs and intentions are shared. For example, the intention to represent oneself as believing what one has said *and* the intention to speak metaphorically. And, of course, because intentions imply beliefs and desires for Davidson, beliefs are shared too. As Samuel Wheeler says of Davidson: "intentions are ascribed along with beliefs, desires, and meanings of utterances, in a holistic way" (Wheeler 2003, 189). In other words, both noncognitive and cognitive attitudes are shared.

But, perhaps, the passages implies other inconsistencies. In Freud (1989), dreamwork is the logic that translates latent content (i.e. subconscious content) into manifest content (i.e. dream content). In interpreting the dream, one moves from the manifest content to the latent content. The interpretative act, Davidson suggests, is creative and imaginative.   Now, Davidson says metaphor is the dreamwork of metaphor and

intimates that metaphorical interpretation is like the interpretation of the dreamwork. Taking the analogy seriously, this implies metaphor translates latent content into manifest content and it is the work of the interpreter to work backwards from the manifest content to the latent content. This is the creative work of the imagination. This may suggest an inconsistency. For it seems that content different to the literal content is being shared by a metaphor. However, I think it is still possible to read Davidson consistently. For example, we can say: All the speaker conveys to the hearer is a literal sentence meaning (linguistically encoded content), no more, no less.   If anything else is shared, it is non-propositional content, which by its very nature cannot be conveyed by a propositional vehicle like a sentence or utterance.

But what about the talk of "metaphorical interpretation," doesn't this entail metaphorical meaning? No. Metaphorical interpretations are psychological events which are ways to make sense of metaphorical effects. To confuse a metaphorical interpretation with the meaning of the sentence used metaphorically is simply wrong and unnecessary. To this end, Davidson writes:

> The theorist who tries to explain a metaphor by appealing to a hidden message, like the critic who attempts to state the message, is then fundamentally confused. No such explanation or statement can be forthcoming because *no such message exists* (Davidson 2001, 263, my italics).

Continuing:

> *Not, of course, that interpretation and elucidation of a metaphor are not in order*. Many of us need help if we are to see what the author of a metaphor wanted us to see and what a more sensitive or educated reader grasps. The legitimate function of so-called paraphrase is to make the lazy or ignorant reader have a vision like that of the skilled critic. The critic is, so to speak, in benign competition with the metaphor maker. The critic tries to make his own art easier or more transparent in some respects than the original, but at the same time he tries to reproduce in others some of the effects the original had on him. In doing this the critic also, and perhaps by the best method at his command, calls attention to the beauty or aptness, the hidden power, of the metaphor itself (Davidson 2001, 263-264, my italics).

This is how Davidson ends his paper. Again, he makes sure to make the point that a metaphor has no hidden meaning. But it does not follow that metaphorical interpretation or elucidation does not occur, nor that it is not useful. Interpretation and elucidation are useful because they aid the vision, picture, image, or imagining that the metaphor effects. They, however, must not be confused for what the metaphor means, for that is simply the literal meaning of the sentence used metaphorically.

The view presented thus far contrasts with Camp's view. I have argued that Davidson sees metaphor as linguistically ordinary, but Camp argues differently.   One passage that is cited by Camp in the attempt to show that metaphor is not an ordinary aspect of language for Davidson is this:

> Similarly, he says, "metaphor" is not "a form of communication alongside ordinary communication [which] conveys truths or falsehoods about the world much as plainer language does" (Camp 2013, 363).

But this is not quite what Davidson says! The full passage from which the above citation is taken is this:

> The central mistake against which I shall be inveighing is the idea that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning. This idea is common to many who have written about metaphor: it is found in the works of literary critics like Richards, Empson, and Winters; philosophers from. Aristotle to Max Black; psychologists from Freud and earlier to Skinner and later; and linguists from Plato to Uriel Weinreich and George Lakoff. The idea takes many forms, from the relatively simple in Aristotle to the relatively complex in Black. The idea appears in writings which maintain that a literal paraphrase of a metaphor can be produced, but it is also shared by those who hold that typically no literal paraphrase can be found. Some stress the special insight metaphor can inspire and make much of the fact that ordinary language, in its usual functioning, yields no such insight. *Yet this view too sees metaphor as a form of communication alongside ordinary*

communication; metaphor conveys truths or falsehoods about the world much as plainer language does, though the message may be considered more exotic, profound, or cunningly garbed (Davidson 2001, 246, my italics).

Let's pick out the key points here. First, Davidson is rebelling against the view that metaphor has an additional meaning to its literal meaning. Second, Davidson points out that some theorists have held this view. Third, he says these theorists are of two kinds, those who think metaphor can be literally paraphrased and those who think it cannot be literally paraphrased, yet, he claims, both may have held the view that metaphor has an additional meaning. Fourth, he tells us these thinkers cite the special insights that metaphor gives us and it is contrasted with what ordinary language provides. In this way, *the thinkers in question* contrast metaphorical language with ordinary language. At the same time, however, *those* very same *theorists* think metaphorical communication is ordinary communication in doing many of the things that ordinary language does (like conveying truths). The implication is that there is some tension here. The tension does not lie with Davidson. Rather, *Davidson is associating the tension with the theorists in question*. Davidson is not rejecting the idea that metaphor is linguistically ordinary, *he is pointing out a tension in the opposing views*, a view that treats metaphor as both linguistically ordinary and linguistically extraordinary.

To sum up, I think I am right in arguing that Davidson thinks of metaphor as an ordinary part of language and special only in its psychological effects. I want, next, to turn to a compelling aspect of Camp's interpretation of Davidson. It is also common amongst interpreters of Davidson (e.g. Rorty 1987). The problem is the evidence that Camp adduces for it isn't very strong.

In interpreting Davidson, Camp argues that Davidson implies that metaphor does not work its magic rationally, but rather works causatively, *merely causing* a metaphorical effect. Camp is aiming to buttress her "strong" (Camp 2013, 363) and "radical" (Camp 2013, 361) noncognitivist reading of Davidson. To make her point, she writes:

> To put the point in Gricean terms, it is generally assumed that in order to count as nonnatural meaning, an utterance's effects must be connected to the utterance in a rational way: that is, as Grice says, the production of the intended effect "must be something which in some sense is *within the control of the audience, or [such] that in some sense of 'reason' the recognition of the intention behind x is for the audience a reason and not merely a cause*". But with metaphor, Davidson seems to claim, the requisite rational structure is absent. Thus, at various points, he speaks of metaphors (along with similes and other analogical devices) as "inspiring" or "prompting" recognition of some fact or similarity, or as "inviting" or "bullying" hearers into drawing a comparison – all verbs that suggest a causal rather than a rational mechanism of production. Similarly, he says that "Joke or dream or metaphor can, like a picture or a bump on the head, make us appreciate some fact – but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact" (Camp 2013, 364, my italics).

Camp highlights verbs like "inspiring," "prompting," "inviting," and "bullying" from Davidson's text. These verbs are meant to be verbs that suggest *mere causes* rather than reasons. Below are passages from Davidson's paper on metaphor that employ those verbs. Unfortunately, I do not think that they support Camp's conclusions. Consider first the relevant passages in which the verbs "inspire" and "prompt" occur. Here is one such passage:

> Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that *inspires* or *prompts* the insight. Since in most cases what the metaphor *prompts* or *inspires* is not entirely, or even at all, recognition of some truth or fact, the attempt to give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is simply misguided (Davidson 2001, 263, my italics)

Presumably, in interpreting this passage, we should read "inspire" and "prompt," as synonymous with "merely cause." With this in mind let us interpret the passage. Metaphors involve making literal statements. The literal statements, or their contents, *merely cause* someone to see one thing as another. This effect, the seeing of one thing as another, is something that cannot itself be given literal expression. The relationship between the literal statements, or their contents, and the seeing of one thing as another is not rational. The literal statements, or their contents, do not give us *reasons* to see one thing as another; they *merely cause* us

to see one thing as another. The problem is interpreting "inspire" and "prompt" to be synonymous with "merely cause" doesn't entail noncognitivism because the interpretation is consistent with cognitivism. Thus, the interpretation cannot support Camp's noncognitivist conclusions. Let me demonstrate.

Davidson argues that there are two kinds of simile theory. There is the elliptical simile theory, which says that a metaphor is an elliptical simile. The theory, according to Davidson, "makes no distinction in meaning between a metaphor and some related simile and does not provide any ground for speaking of figurative, metaphorical, or special meanings." (Davidson 2001, 254). This is in contrast to a more "sophisticated" version of the simile theory. This theory too identifies a metaphor with a simile. But in this case, the simile is treated as the figurative, metaphorical, or special meaning of the metaphor (Davidson 2001, 253-254). Davidson says there is a "difficulty of identifying the simile that corresponds to a given metaphor." (Davidson 2001, 253). This suggests that the simile the metaphor is associated with is something that is worked out (as in a Gricean theory (see Grice 1975)). This second theory is, therefore, I presume, cognitivist: The metaphorical meaning is an extra meaning and this meaning is cognitively assigned to the utterance in question. But this theory may be given a causal reading too.

To see this, let us suppose that we are advocates of the sophisticated simile theory of metaphor. We propose that the utterance of a sentence 'X is Y', in the appropriate context of use, leads us to grasp the intention to speak metaphorically. This, in turn, leads us to work out the metaphorical meaning, which is a simile. This involves a cognitive process. This simile, we may legitimately say, "prompts" or "inspires" the seeing of one thing as another. Following Camp, we may interpret "prompt" and "inspire" as causal verbs. We conclude the theory suggests metaphorical meanings *merely cause* the seeing of one thing as another. Since the sophisticated simile theory is a cognitivist theory, but we interpret the metaphorical meaning as merely causing a metaphorical effect rather than providing a reason for it, we can conclude that interpreting "prompt" and "inspire" causally does not support noncognitivism. A response might be that the whole process is not merely causal because grasping the intention to speak metaphorically leads to the metaphorical meaning which causes the effect. It might also be said that the intention can be used as a reason for why we ultimately come to think of one thing as another. *But exactly the same can be said of Davidson's theory.*

If we accept the response noted, we need not be convinced that the words in question really imply mere causality when reading Davidson's theory. Davidson says metaphor involves making a literal statement that "prompts" and inspires" the metaphorical effect. We have argued that the literal meaning of such a statement conveys the intention to speak metaphorically, and induces and is active in the process of metaphorical interpretation. Understanding the literal meaning of the statement, in the context in which it is made, leads us to grasp the intention to speak metaphorically. On grasping the metaphorical intention, the literal meaning of the statement "prompts" or "inspires" the metaphorical effect. We can rationalise our understanding of the use of the sentence in question (to ourselves or others) by pointing to the "metaphorist's intention" and justify our grasping of the intention by pointing to the odd nature of the sentence's occurrence in the context of use. That is the literal statement being made (in the particular context of use) and the grasping of the metaphorist's intention is a reason for why we have come to see one thing as another. In effect, the causal reading of "prompt" and "inspire" does not indicate noncognitivism, and, in fact, there are reasons not to read "prompt" and "inspire" causally when interpreting Davidson.

Next, let's look at the three passages containing the verb "invite" and attempt to interpret them in line with Camp's claim that the verb implies mere causation, not reason. Here is the first:

> Metaphor and simile are merely two among endless devices that serve to alert us to aspects of the world by *inviting* us to make comparisons. (Davidson 2001, 256, my italics).

Following Camp, this passage says that linguistic devices like metaphors and similes merely cause us to make comparisons. But, as Davidson says, they are just two of the endless devices that *invite* us to make comparisons. Other examples of these endless devices might be comparatives, juxtapositions, parallel structures, superlatives, etc. Interpreting "invite" unequivocally in the passage above means these must be devices that *merely cause* comparison too. It seems Davidson must be saying that *all* linguistic comparison devices, literal or not, merely cause us to make comparisons. There is no recognition of the intention behind the use of linguistic comparison devices that is a reason to make a comparison. This wouldn't fit with the

general picture of language that Davidson gives us, especially with respect to linguistic activity. I cite the following passage (referred to above):

> [I]t is not reasonable to suppose we can interpret verbal behaviour without fine-grained information about beliefs and intentions (Davidson 2001, 147).

The fine-grained nature of the information about beliefs and intentions suggests that such beliefs and intentions are reasons to think that so and so is behaving linguistically in such and such a way as opposed to another. This does not speak to a merely causal process.

Here is the second passage of interest:

> Absurdity or contradiction in a metaphorical sentence guarantees we won't believe it and *invites* us, under proper circumstances, to take the sentence metaphorically (Davidson 2001, 258, my italics)

The second passage, following Camp, should be interpreted as saying absurdity and contradiction in a metaphorical sentence *merely cause* us to take the sentence metaphorically. But we can interpret Davidson differently and consistently with what has been said already. A sentence is used to communicate literal content, it is taken to be absurd or contradictory, this leads to the belief that the sentence cannot be true, and this causes us to take the sentence metaphorically. Taking a sentence to be absurd or contradictory implies a belief; believing a sentence cannot be true is a belief; and taking a sentence to be metaphorical suggests a belief. Each belief leads to the next. This is not a *mere* causal process. It is a rational one since it involves a chain of beliefs. To be consistent with what Davidson and his interpreters say, this chain of beliefs may be thought of as following from the *recognition of the metaphorist's intention.*

Here is a third passage:

> It may be remarked with justice that the claim that a metaphor *provokes* or *invites* a certain view of its subject rather than saying it straight out is a commonplace; so it is. Thus Aristotle says metaphor leads to a 'perception of resemblances'. Black, following Richards, says a metaphor 'evokes' a certain response: 'a suitable hearer will be led by a metaphor to construct a . . . system.' This view is *neatly summed up by what Heracleitus said of the Delphic oracle: 'It does not say and it does not hide, it intimates* (Davidson 2001, 261-262, my italics).

In this third passage, expressions like "provokes," "invites," "leads to," and "evokes," are all associated with a metaphorical function that is summed up by drawing on Heracleitus. This associates the aforementioned words with another. The association is with the word "intimate." Intimation doesn't speak to a simple causal relation. Intimation implies implication or hinting. Both speak to cognitive relations that are not merely causal since both involve inferences. This passage, then, along with the others cited does not require us to take "inspire" as synonymous with mere causality. Moreover, the mentioned authors are cognitivists.

Let's think next about the time that Davidson uses the word "bully." He is discussing T. S. Eliot's "Hippopotamus."

> Metaphor and simile are merely two among endless devices that serve to alert us to aspects of the world by *inviting* us to make comparisons…Here we are neither told that the Church resembles a hippopotamus (as in simile) nor *bullied* into making this comparison (as in metaphor), but there can be no doubt the words are being used to direct our attention to similarities between the two. Nor should there be much inclination, in this case, to posit figurative meanings, for in what words or sentences would we lodge them? The hippopotamus really does rest on his belly in the mud; the True Church, the poem says literally, never can fail. The poem does, of course, intimate much that goes beyond the literal meaning of the words. But intimation is not meaning. (Davidson 2001, 256).

We have already considered the first part of this passage above. Davidson is referring to those endless devices that alert us to aspects of the world by *inviting* us to make comparisons. He contrasts some of those devices (which appear in the cited poem) with simile and metaphor. Similes tell of or assert a likeness. Metaphors

bully us into making a comparison. But the word "bully" is not synonymous with the word "cause." *It is being used metaphorically*. But if this is true, following Davidson, we must conclude the phrase or sentence in question *has no paraphrase*. We should not conclude that "metaphor bullies" means "metaphor merely causes" or provide it any other paraphrase in the context of use. The interpretation of "metaphor bullies" is like the dreamwork, a work of the imagination and *that work should not be read into the expression*. This is a deconstructive contact point in Davidson's work. The best we can do, here, following Camp, is to say Davidson wants us to see metaphors as bullies. Bullies interact with victims in complex ways, many of which do not suggest seeing metaphor's effect on us as a merely causal effect.

We have seen that when we consider the words that Camp highlights, we don't have strong reasons to think they are being used to express mere causality. But something else that we might have noticed is that Davidson uses the word "intimate." He does so on several occasions. This can suggest a second meaning (though Davidson rejects that implication, as he says: "intimation is not meaning" (Davidson 2001, 256)). This kind of thought brings us to another interpretation of Davidson's work that Camp offers; one she rejects. It would seem to identify inconsistency in Davidson's paper. But as we shall see, the interpretation is not supported by Davidson's writing.

Camp introduces two readings of Davidson. The noncognitivist reading and what she calls the weak reading. The weak reading acts as an alternative to her noncognitivist interpretation. She introduces the weak reading like so:

> The weakest reading of the central thesis is simply the denial of the view that words themselves change meanings when used metaphorically (Camp 2013, 362).

She thinks this view is consistent with a reading of Davidson's theory that allows for speaker's meaning:

> The weak interpretation of the central thesis is weak in the sense that it holds that this criterion for word or sentence meaning is compatible with allowing that metaphor exemplifies some other, more context-bound species of speaker's meaning (Camp 2013, 362).

She finds evidence for Davidson seeming to *accept* the view in question saying: "*Davidson does appear to embrace metaphorical speaker's meaning* at several points in "What Metaphors Mean"" (Camp 2013, 362, my italics). To support this claim, she writes: "he grants that metaphor "is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription"" (Camp 2013, 362).[4] And she states that Davidson thinks that metaphors can serve as assertions, lies, and promises, quoting him thus:

> What makes the difference between a lie and a metaphor is not a difference in the words used or what they mean (in any strict sense of meaning) but in how the words are used. Using a sentence to tell a lie and using it to make a metaphor are, of course, totally different uses, so different that they do not interfere with one another, as say, acting and lying do. . . . It can be an insult, and so an assertion, to say to a man "You are a pig". . . . What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use – in this it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticizing. (Camp 2013, 363)[5]

From this point forward, I will use the expression "weak reading" to refer to (a) the thesis that words do not change their meaning when used metaphorically, *and* (b) the thesis that words and sentences used metaphorically have metaphorical speaker's meaning. Ultimately, Camp rejects the weak reading for the strong or radical reading, her "noncognitivist" reading. The important point for us is that evidence for the weak reading and evidence for the strong reading are evidence for the inconsistent nature of Davidson's writing. The problem is that what Camp adduces as evidence for the weak reading is not evidence for it. Let's look at each of the quotes above in context.

Davidson is said to grant that metaphor is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription. This is supposed to be evidence for the weak reading. But it is difficult to understand why. We might say literal meaning is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and

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[4] This is the *first* quote of importance considered below. As we shall see, it is quoted out of context.
[5] This is the *second* quote of interest considered below. As we shall see, it is a mix of disparate paragraphs.

prescription. This does not imply literal meaning has a context-specific speaker's meaning. And if Davidson holds that the metaphorical meaning *is* nothing over and above the literal meaning of the sentence used metaphorically, he *is* just saying that literal meaning is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription.

Let's look at the quote in context:

> In the past those who have denied that metaphor has a cognitive content in addition to the literal have often been out to show that metaphor is confusing, merely emotive, unsuited to serious, scientific, or philosophic discourse. My views should not be associated with this tradition. Metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature but in science, philosophy, and the law; *it is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription*. For the most part I don't disagree with Max Black, Paul Henle, Nelson Goodman, Monroe Beardsley, and the rest in their accounts of what metaphor accomplishes, except that I think it accomplishes more and that what is additional is different in kind (Davidson 2001, 246-247, my italics).

Davidson has just denied that metaphor says anything beyond its literal meaning (Davidson 2001, 246). In this passage, he is contrasting his view with another set of theorists. According to Davidson, these theorists believe that:

A. Metaphor has no additional meaning except for its literal content, and
B. Metaphor should not be used in serious discourse because it is confusing or emotive

Davidson contrasts himself with thinkers who take up this view. He may believe A.   But he does not accept B. Davidson holds that metaphor is of use in literature, science, philosophy, and law, and is effective in doing a lot of other things (i.e., it can be useful in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription). I cannot see how this implies that metaphor has a speaker's meaning. It might be *compatible* with speaker's meaning, but Camp is arguing something different. She is arguing that Davidson *appears to embrace metaphorical speaker's meaning*. Yet, it is clear this is not the point he is making.

Camp may think it is the use-based nature of Davidson's theory that implies the weak reading. Use-based theories of metaphor are usually pragmatic theories and pragmatic theories, like Searle's, do identify metaphor with speaker's meaning (Searle 1979). However, as we will see below, *when Davidson draws attention to metaphor's use-based nature, he explicitly denies metaphors have any special meaning, however indirect* (see Davidson 2001, 259[6]).

Let's turn to the second quote cited by Camp above. This quote is not from a single paragraph. It is from two different paragraphs. Below are those passages in full. This is the first:

> What makes the difference between a lie and a metaphor is not a difference in the words used or what they mean (in any strict sense of meaning) but in how the words are used. Using a sentence to tell a lie and using it to make a metaphor are, of course, totally different uses, so different that they do not interfere with one another, as say, acting and lying do. In lying, one must make an assertion so as to represent oneself as believing what one does not; in acting, assertion is excluded. Metaphor is careless of the difference. It can be an insult, and so be an assertion, to say to a man 'You are a pig'. But no metaphor was involved when (let us suppose) Odysseus addressed the same words to his companions in Circe's palace; a story, to be sure, and so no assertion—but the word, for once, was used literally of men (Davidson 2001, 259)

We have already analysed this passage. A metaphor like "he is a pig" can be an insult and, therefore, an assertion. Someone represents themselves as believing that he is a pig and intends to represent themselves as believing that he is a pig, and the sentence is true or false. (It's obviously false if "he" picks out a human, dog,

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[6] This passage is cited below.

robotic cleaner, etc.) Using the metaphor makes a literal assertion, which is true or false in an ordinary manner. Ordinary semantic resources are involved (in determining truth conditions and the relevant propositions). What is additional is the psychological effect triggered by understanding the intention behind the sentence, and working out an interpretation of how we are supposed to see the denoted individual. None of this requires a speaker's meaning and the passage is consistent with the rest of Davidson's text, which *tells us* that *there are no extra meanings when speaking metaphorically*.

Let's look at that second passage to see what is said in it:

> No theory of metaphorical meaning or metaphorical truth can help explain how metaphor works. *Metaphor runs on the same familiar linguistic tracks that the plainest sentences do*; this we saw from considering simile. *What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use—in this it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticizing. And the special use to which we put language in metaphor is not—cannot be—to 'say something' special, no matter how indirectly*. For a metaphor says only what shows on its face— usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth. And this plain truth or falsehood needs no paraphrase—its meaning is given in the literal meaning of the words (Davidson 2001, 259, my italics).

In this passage, Davidson starts by denying that theories of metaphorical meaning, *such as those that associate metaphorical meaning with speaker's meaning*, can tell us how metaphor works. Again, he says there are no special linguistic rules that govern metaphor; the only rules that matter are the ordinary, boring ones. Nothing in this suggests metaphors have a secondary meaning.

Davidson continues, arguing that metaphor is distinguished by use. It is *like* assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticising *in this respect*. They all are analysed in respect of use and this is the respect in which they are alike. And, most importantly, *he follows by clearly emphasising that analysing metaphor in terms of use cannot conclude in positing a second meaning, metaphor does not say anything over and above what it says ordinarily.* There is, therefore, no evidence for and a lot of evidence against Camp's weak reading.[7] Camp has put together two different paragraphs in order to associate Davidson with an idea that both paragraphs separately deny.

To summarise, no evidence supports the view that Davidson writes inconsistently about metaphor and there are no passages that we have found that cannot be read consistently. Further, there is little evidence for Camp's noncognitivist or cognitivist readings of Davidson. Camp's criterion for classifying noncognitivist theories of metaphor also seems to fail.

Conclusion

We have seen that Camp's (2013) reading of Davidson's theory of metaphor cannot be supported by the evidence that she adduces for it. We have also seen that the criteria she gives for distinguishing cognitivist theories of metaphor from noncognitivist theories of metaphor are problematic. In fact, this is something that philosophers have struggled to provide. For example, Camp and Reimer offer the following criteria:

> The central claim of [non-cognitivist] theorists is that a sentence used metaphorically has no distinctive cognitive content aside from its literal content. Non-cognitivists thus resemble Griceans

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[7] It is important to note at this point that there do seem to be thinkers that have interpreted Davidson or his supporters in the weak sense that Camp talks about. Perhaps, Camp has these authors in mind. For example, Lynne Tirrell (1991) tells us that Davidson actually accepts the simile theory of meaning and intimates that the simile is a secondary meaning of the sentence used metaphorically: "For Davidson, the literal semantic meaning of the simile is the basic pragmatic meaning of the metaphor." (Tirrell 1991, 339). Mark Johnson (2017) seems to associate a theory of metaphor that could be taken as exemplifying Camp's weak reading with Richard Rorty (who is a supporter of Davidson's view). Johnson tells us that Rorty believes that metaphors have no meaning (apart from their literal sense), but they attain another literal meaning through certain pragmatic processes: "[Rorty] merely asserts that the metaphor becomes the vehicle that motivates us imaginatively to construct a new language game within which the metaphor then becomes literal…When this process is complete, the original metaphor ceases to be a metaphor and is transformed into a literal expression or term that, miraculously, *does* have a meaning and truth conditions within the new language games" (Johnson 2017, 170).

in denying that the words uttered themselves have any special meaning. They depart from Griceans, though, in also denying that there is any determinate propositional thought which the speaker intends to communicate by means of those words. (Reimer-Camp 2006, 857).

Non-cognitivists about metaphor, then, are taken to hold that:

1. When a sentence is used metaphorically, it has no cognitive content apart from its literal content
2. When a sentence is used metaphorically, there is no determinate propositional thought that the speaker intends to communicate by using the words they use

There are problems with these conditions. One big problem is that they render Grice's cognitivist theory of metaphor noncognitivist. Grice, as acknowledged, accepts 1. But Gricean theory also entails 2 (Allot 2018; Grice 1975, 58; Martinich 1980, 44; Sperber and Wilson 2015, 120).

I suggest, as an alternative, that the simplest way to classify theories of metaphor as noncognitivist (in the way that philosophers want to) is to start by saying that a theory of metaphor is noncognitivist iff it implies that metaphorical sentences/utterances have no propositional content (literal or nonliteral, determinate or indeterminate) that is determined cognitively. This should, I believe, correctly classify theories of metaphor into noncognitivist/noncognitivist camps. For example, Davidson's theory is noncognitivist because it has no propositional content determined cognitively. Positivist theories of metaphor are noncognitivist because metaphorical propositions are not cognitively determined. CMT and Recanati's theories may associate metaphorical meanings with literal content alone, but, in each, literal content is determined cognitively. Thus, they are cognitivist theories of metaphor. Likewise, Grice's metaphorical meanings are determined (to the extent they are determined) cognitively. This criterion, therefore, looks promising avoiding the problems with the various criteria introduced by Camp.

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