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On the “I” as a Vessel of Memories or the “I” as Ideational Representative (Vorstellungsrepräsentanz): A treatise of memory, autism, and nation [Series of Philosophical Psychology of Reconciliation, Part I] ¹⁾

Eiichi NOJIRI¹

Abstract

This article is the first (Part I) of a series comprising two parts. In this series, the author aim to examine how to address the challenges associated with memory and historical cognition through the lens of philosophical anthropology or philosophical psychology. Furthermore, I will evaluate whether such research can contribute to the vision of a new academic field, “reconciliation studies.” Emphasis is placed on interdisciplinary approaches in the humanities and social sciences. This will involve reinterpretation of Western classical philosophical theories of memory, introduction of recent findings in psychopathology, and decoding problematic constructs on memory present in contemporary representational culture such as literature, film, manga, and anime.

The genealogy the author suppose with the term “philosophical anthropology/psychology” includes the theories of imagination and memory included in “Anthropologie” developed by German idealists of the 18th and 19th centuries, such as Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, the psychoanalysis of symptoms and unconscious memory undertaken by Sigmund Freud from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the philosophical memory theory of Henri Bergson, the collective memory theory of Maurice Halbwachs, the Frankfurt School’s critical theory, a fusion of psychology (Freud) and social theory (Karl Marx) since the middle of the 20th century, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Walter Benjamin, which dealt with the mechanisms of imagination, memory, and generation of history in popular culture and commodity space, the relationship between representation and structural causality as conceived by Louis Althusser, and Jacques Derrida’s problem of Western metaphysics as blank memory, Fredric Jameson’s theory of daydreaming, representational culture, and utopianism in contemporary society, Slavoj Žižek’s discussion

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of politics and culture as general psychoses or “symptoms” using Hegel and Lacan, Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of memory, history, and forgetting, and Anne Whitehead’s humanities of memory, which summarizes them from a twenty-first century perspective. Here, we trace the ideas we have identified as important milestones, forming a set of interconnected interpretations and hypotheses, and testing what practical visions philosophical psychology can offer for reconciliation.

The group of hypotheses presented in this discussion covers the following points: (1) the linkage between memory and empathy, (2) the structural equivalence between memory, representation, and symptom, (3) the historicity of the fact that memory became the basis of personal identity after the 19th century, and (4) the structural causality between personal memory representation and the state-capitalist (multilateralist) social construction from the late 19th century to the late 20th century. Each of these is a new hypothesis, but all of them are theoretically possible in the thought of the thinkers listed above. What we attempt here is their extraction and synthesis. To conclude, we consolidate all of the results obtained from this process into the term (5) “Poetics and Micropolitics for Reconciliation Studies”. In this Part I, points (1) through (3) are primarily discussed; in Part II points (4) and (5) are discussed.

While taking on the challenges of the new discipline of “reconciliation studies,” the series brought innovative reinterpretations of existing theories. Its achievement is the application of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to elucidate the structure of people’s imagined identities (especially memory and nationalism) in the context of historical structural changes in society. At the same time, the series has complemented Lacanian theory, which lacks a theory of historical social change and the formation of collective memory and collective images, with Maurice Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory, Ian Hacking’s work on false memory, and more recent research on developmental disorders and autism. In particular, the upgrading of the theory of “object *a*” into the theory of “*object-a-structure*” and its opening to the field of history and collectivity is regarded as a major achievement of this series.

Key words: autism, collective memory; empathy; Hacking; Halbwachs; Lacan; nationalism

1. PHANTASY Post-war Japan as a fantasy space

This study explores ways of approaching issues of memories and historical perception from the perspectives of social theory and philosophical psychology. This article primarily explores interdisciplinary thinking in the humanities and social sciences and reinterprets the memory theory of classical Western philosophy. It tries to introduce the latest findings in the field of psychopathology and further even to decipher problematic constructions of memory found in contemporary representational culture.

Japanese society has shown certain trends since 2000. Changes in the economic structure to cope with globalization occurred gradually from around 2000 and more rapidly from the 2010s. For example, domestic companies established overseas bases, foreign workers poured in, and the organic composition of capital (the combination of human labor and production facilities) began to outstrip Japan's closed national economic networks. Despite these developments, the fantasy of a homogeneous space, "Japan," persisted, especially among people of Japanese ethnicity who had traditionally lived in Japan. If you go overseas, you can see that the nation of "Japan" is a closed space. It is covered with fantasies. From a foreign perspective, there is an awareness of such an image as well. For example, the generations influenced by popular cultures such as Japanese manga and anime, known as "Cool Japan," may choose such an image in a transferential way; people with neo-nationalist ideologies in Europe even may admire the socio-cultural unity and homogeneity in Japan²⁾.

To understand this trend, let us first look at the opening image of the NHK [Japan Broadcasting Corporation] documentary program *Shin Nihon Fudoki* [*New descriptions of regional climate, culture, and history in Japan*] (first aired in March 2011). This program, which began immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake, starts as follows. Along with the captions: "Memories of the Japanese", "A momentary dream", "The beauty of a millennium", "Journey", "Love", "Home", and "To the Future," the film shows beautiful landscapes of various regions of Japan, ordinary people, and cherry blossoms in full bloom. However, who do we refer to by "Japanese" when we talk about "the memory of the Japanese people?" The program series rarely depicts the lives of non-Japanese citizens, residents, or visitors to Japan³⁾. The Japanese try to live in a closed space of memory, as if a moment were an eternity. What is the origin of this desire to create a space for the memories of the Japanese people, inherited from ancient times and passed on to the future? Will this wish come true?

Meanwhile, NHK has produced a series of reports and documentaries on the influx of foreign workers and the changes they are bringing to modern Japanese society. Thus, the whole station is not biased toward the inward representation of Japan. The program began airing in March 2011, right after the Great East Japan Earthquake that shocked Japanese society, and the production system was withdrawn in 2020 when the domestic and international situation was rapidly changing due to the COVID-19 pandemic, although the timing of these situations seems coincidental. Nevertheless, Shinzo Abe's cabinet, with its conservative cultural and educational policies under the slogan "Toward a

A momentary dream



To the future



Memories of the Japanese



The beauty of a millennium




Japan has various customs, nature, architecture, crafts, and food cultures that have been passed down through the years. If you look at them carefully, you can see how the Japanese people have built up a deep culture over many years. Find the joy of rediscovering your culture that has been sleeping next to you. Meanwhile, these cultures are disappearing in the face of rapid modernization, prolonged recession, and aging populations. *Shin Nihon Fudoki* captures the culture, customs, and landscapes rooted in each region and transmits them to the future as visual heritage.

(*Shin Nihon Fudoki* website)

Beautiful Country,” maintained high approval ratings for ten years and the longest postwar government from its second to fourth terms. This social structural factor may have encouraged the production of more than 250 works of the program during this 10-year period.

Let us look at the manga *In This Corner of the World* by Fumiyo Kono as the second material. The work resonated with audiences for its detailed depiction of the daily lives and feelings of ordinary Japanese people during World War II. The original manga received an Excellence Award at the 2009 Japan Media Arts Festival, Manga Division, from the Agency for Cultural Affairs, and the animated film work also gained popularity, setting a record for the longest run in Japanese animated film history (Web article 1). Emperor Naruhito and his family (the Empress and Princess Aiko) attended the preview of the sequel in December 2019 (web article 2).

Fumiyo Kono, *In This Corner of the World*, 2009

Let us focus on the line in this work, “I have no choice but to continue to exist in this world as a vessel of memories.” This work depicts the lives of ordinary people living in Kure City, Hiroshima, during World War II. The movie delicately portrays the childhood memories, girlhood, marriage, love with her husband, and daily life and war damage of the main character, Suzu, who lives in a corner of the world in a gentle, poor, and modest way.

Suzu lost an arm, her family, and a friend in the Hiroshima bombing. Despite the psychological trauma of her wartime experiences and the physical trauma of losing her arm, Suzu accepts every memory, happy or tragic, as her own, embraces it, and resolves to live on. The author also wrote *Town of Evening Calm*, *Country of Cherry Blossoms*. The main character, who lives in present-day Tokyo, carries on the memories of her father, mother, and grandmother who were exposed to the atomic bomb and connects her identity in the space of inherited memories with the landscape of falling cherry blossoms. “I know this scene. Before I was born, yes, I looked at them then, and I decided to choose these two people when I was born. (Kono 2004: 93–95)” Here, the metonymic formation of memory (transforming sensory representations in front of the eyes into memory) shapes her intergenerational identity. It expresses the conviction that *through the transmission of memories, I can receive experiences of my family and relatives that I did not experience*.

Fumiyo Kono was born in Hiroshima City in 1968. Although the author’s generation did not directly experience the war and the atomic bombing, in the 2000s, the author worked to face the problems related to World War II, empathized with the nameless people, and tried to carry on their memories and pass them on. It is probably merely an attempt to pass on “pure” memories, free of

Fumiyo Kono, *In This Corner of the World*, 2009



politics and history; alternatively, it could be that politics in the mechanisms of memory is forgotten. It may be another reproduction of the usual picture of the lives of ordinary people who fell victim to the militaristic national policy of the Empire of Japan. Efforts to create such memories almost exclude the subjects of other ethnic groups in the same war, focusing instead on the inheritance of memories and sentiments of the "I" as a Japanese ethnicity. Contemporary Japan allows people to perceive that such an inheritance can be established through the representational culture of manga, or perhaps it is an example of an effort that can no longer hide the explicit maintenance of a fantasy space, which is still

barely possible at this point.

As a 20th century literary expression of individual existence, the statement: “Whether alive or dead, there are people and things I will never see again. As long as I have memories of them that only I have, I have no choice but to continue to exist in this world as a vessel for those memories” (Kono 2009–9 [II]: 126) seems to be a completely inviolable human figure that can only be respected, affirmed, and looked at with love. Do tearing apart and extracting the micro-politics that work to establish this inviolability mean introducing an inelegant politics into literary nature? It may look like some form of violence. However, the establishment of this apparent inviolability may itself have been violence.

Nevertheless, does another possibility lie in the fact that “I” as a vessel of memories that sustains our identity is objectified and become visible through representational cultural works? This work can be a representation about representations, expressing the structure where the representation is generated. This work of representational culture may bring relativism and criticality to the phenomenological and Bergsonian concept of “I” as a vessel of memories by making it representational. The dynamics of the work, which can be divided into two different vectors—clinging to memories and accepting them and trying to neutralize them—create the representation of the work here.

2. WITHDRAWING Japan, a country of withdrawal

Sakai (2017) criticizes the psychological mechanism of ethnocentric and cultural nationalism in postwar Japan rather accelerated than the prewar, in the structure of political economy with subordination to the United States. The structure of self-recognition based on the purity, unity, and continuity of the “Japanese race” is completed in the postwar period as a collective unconscious structure unquestioned by politicians, intelligences, and the public at large. In this structure, memory and history are formed based on romantic, retrospective, and narcissistic sentimentality about the “essence” of the Japanese people, and the composition of organically closed subjectivity continues in the midst of globalization.

In the first place, subjects are impossible to be formed without “calling” by and to others. The memory and history of “the self” and the formation of “identity” are always intertwined with otherness. For postwar Japan, however, this formation took place in the closed space of “bilateral narcissism” (Harry Harootunian) with the United States. Sakai asserts the following points: by visualizing this politics, to trace back, reduce, and think about the place of memory and history formation to the place of heteronomy (middle voice), which exists before that of active/passive voice (subjectivity/objectivity); starting from the fact that we are all amid the “micro-politics of capital” (Read 2003), a heteronomous mechanism of identity formation through the construction of memory and history; the violence of the universality of modernity and its otherness encompass the world’s entire population as an effect of globalization.

The decade spanning from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake to the COVID-19 pandemic may have intensified this nationalism with a tendency to retreat. Looking at the postwar period, the realistic flow of internationalization in various aspects of society has not significantly slowed or regressed in the

last decade. As globalization continues to accelerate in the economic and social structure (the substructure), the last decade may have been characterized by a twisting structure, with a relative delay or stagnation of response in the people's awareness (the superstructure)⁴⁾. The symbolic representations in works of representational culture such as *Shin Nihon Fudoki* and *In This Corner of the World* reveal their socio-historical positions when viewed as imaginative solutions, functions, that have surfaced from desire at the level of the political unconscious (Jameson, 2010) to its structural twists.

The aforementioned "heteronomy" of memory formation is not as easy to understand as the otherness of language. How can this expression—my memory is my other, I identify my memory with myself and thereby form my identity—make sense to the subject who is always and already used to appreciating the memory of "the self" as "the self" itself? Derridean idea, looking at logic alone, may be incomprehensible as another sophism of postmodern thought. Recent findings in philosophical psychology shed light on this issue from a different angle.

In a previous article, the author interpreted Hegel's theory of memory, drawing on the findings of modern psychopathology, along with Derrida's ideas (Derrida 2007; 2008; Nojiri 2018). Notably, Hegel believed that modernity was about managing memory and that formatting the body's memory (habit) and perfecting the functioning of memory of the spirit (general intelligence) were the modern and healthy ways of human existence. Ian Hacking (1998), for example, introduced the "politics of memory" as a counterpart to Michel Foucault's "politics of the body" as one of the pairs of politics that constitute modernity. However, this insight was already part of Hegel's philosophical psychology. Herein lies the thought of Hegel, who was much more aware of the otherness of memory than we are today and who consciously recognized the need for a politics that incorporates and controls the otherness as its own. Although this may sound unexpected, in Hegel's terminology, "recollection" is the other of the self, and the recalled image itself does not belong to the self. "Memory" is established when it is made as one's own using the general intelligence generated through the experience of a relationship of desire as mutual recognition with others. Thus, Hegel distinguishes between mere "recollection" and "memory." According to Hegel, the reproduction of representations (images) is itself incoherent as a "memory" without intelligence. The "intelligence" to which Hegel refers is called the general intelligence. In modern thought, this means the function of the socialized intelligence linked to the social symbolic order.

For Hegel, regardless of what one sees or hears (the other outside of oneself) or what representations of the past attacks oneself (the other within oneself), to subordinate them to the general intelligence and always reach a state with only one's own thoughts constitutes the establishment of "the self" as "spirit." Such a spirit is the world itself and has no other. However, the establishment of this mechanism itself had to be caused by the negativity of the other. In other words, the memory of "the self" is already imbued with a desiring relationship as mutual recognition with other. The other has already entered into the private act of remembering. Notably, "the self" can be brought together as an organism only through the ability to empathize with others—the ability to overlap one's perspective on those of others, incorporate the perspectives of others into oneself, and see oneself from the perspectives of others.

Through this event, “the self” incorporates the attack of the representations as its own and stabilizes itself as the self. Paradoxically, without this relationship—without penetration of otherness—the memory of “the self” remains the other of the self. This is an elaborated and extended explanation of Sakai’s point that there is always an “otherness” in the formation of one’s being as the “I”.

Lacan attempted to explain the formation of the gaze that takes in the gaze of the other, overlaps the self with that gaze, and sees the world as self, as the formation of the modern subject. Throughout his life, he tried to explain these structures under the name “object *a*.” It is a crystal glass vessel composed by the interplay of our gazes, an empty vessel waiting to be filled with images. The composition of this vessel is the most primordial oppression, and the vessel itself is the subject. It is a place where “memory” becomes possible—a blank memory, a stance toward the future, and a memory of the future. When placed in this vessel, the mental images become “representations.” “Object *a*” sounds to be an object, but it is actually not. It is the structure that makes the object as a representation possible. Object *a* is also an “*ideational representation*” (*Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*). It is not a representation but is what makes “representation” possible; it is a picture frame or a screen. As will be described later, for subjects with typical development (TD), it is almost transparent and impossible to see. However, when the gazes on the representations intersect, the parallax sometimes makes the gaze itself visible. At that time, an object as the representation of the representation appears as the remnant of structural failure⁵).

Otherness, as a negativity built into the self, was necessary for the establishment of the organic entity of “the self” as a repository of memory. This means that today, there is a way to reinterpret it precisely from the results of post-19th century psychoanalysis and psychopathology after Hegel. Recent findings on developmental disabilities show that how empathyness and memory work in most people with typical development (TD: those who are considered “normal” and do not have developmental disabilities) is only one type of human psyche. Even in the aspect of memory, people with autism, who are socially impaired, cannot feel recollections as their own. By being confused by it, they show a way of being different from TD. Many people with autism experience events in which representations (images) of scenes they have experienced in the past come to them in a disorganized and uncontrollable manner. People with autism, unlike TD, cannot experience these representations as “past” as TD. The “past” is experienced by the “self” as the center and integration of the linear temporality that flows through past, present, and future (Heidegger)—it is a representation made as one’s own. Representations of people with autism do not undergo this process of making it as one’s own. In other words, they are attacked by the representation of the past as the other. Notably, this terminology of representing the past has already been incorporated into the memory regime of TD. When attacked by a representation, the person with autism returns to the scene of the representation itself, loses track of where they are, and panics. This is called the “time slip phenomenon” (Sugiyama 1994). Therefore, it is not a representation of the past. The term “representation of the past” is incorrect. The past itself is not the past. The past becomes the past only in the typical developmental structure of “time = self.” Those who can recall the past fondly as their “past,” even if it is something they hate, are neurotypical. Such people can even

indulge in the happiness of sharing and inheriting others' pasts as their own. This is what is called the "memory of the Japanese." Thus, by giving their own meaning to the "traces" that should be something else and projecting their emotions, the TD produces "signs" in Hegelian meaning. Hegel was referring to this life with sign-structure of TD when he spoke of people who live in "memories" as "signs" different from mere "recollections" as Spiritual being.

Some people with autism see their faces in the mirror every morning as others (Shimizu 2016). If you try to match the sensory representations with the memory representations exactly—the representation of your face you are looking at right now and the one in your memory—they will not match every day. My face is not always exactly the same because of the effects of physical condition, climate, growth, and aging. People with autism are sensitive to the difference. However, TD see the representation before them through memory, or while overwriting memory with representation, they see the face as a sign of the unity of both—the face as a metonym. TD do not see the sensory representations themselves, nor do they see the memory representations themselves. They live in such a structure where they see only "signs," which are neither of the two. Therefore, they can live with the desire to look at their face in the mirror every morning without tiring of it and accept it as their own. This is what it means to live the identity of the difference and the identity. Hegel expressed this structure in the concept of *dialectics*. TD means nothing more than living the dialectic. But that is not the only mode of the human spirit. People with autism live in a dialectic-free world. This phenomenon suggests that the social and memory skills assumed to be evident in TD are only one aspect of the human spirit.

"Developmental disorders" emerges as a minority in socio-economic politics that embrace various genetic and neuroscientific tendencies and attempt to reproduce the modern ego as a standard construct—TD. From this perspective, it is possible to perceive that autism as a developmental disorder has rapidly attracted attention in developed countries in the last two decades because the need for social, cultural and spiritual reproduction of the mental structures of TD has increased. The micro-politics of memory work in a situation where globalization affects the boundary between "I" as a vessel of memories and "the nation" as a vessel of histories. In this situation, paradoxically, *the rather autistic nature of the typical developmental imagination* that tries to indulge in "I" as a vessel of memories and the history of "a beautiful country, Japan" is highlighted⁶⁾.

3. ELEMENT A place where memories are born

What makes Hegel's theory of memory in his *Philosophy of Spirit* interesting from today's perspective is that the formation of "memory" is considered general intelligence. In today's terminology, collective consciousness and social consciousness are considered. In Hegel's concept of "memory," memory does not differentiate between individuals. Therefore, conflicts between individuals and groups, where identities formed based on individual memories collide with each other, and mutual recognition to overcome such conflicts do not appear in Hegel's chapter on "Psychology." In other words, Hegel's *psychology* is the psychology of the spirit adapted to the society of "the big Other" from

the beginning. Moments of conflict and mutual recognition are included in *The Philosophy of Spirit*. However, it is at the stage of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” *before* the chapter “Psychology.” The theory of mutual recognition of self-consciousness in Hegel’s big *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a prominent pioneer in the philosophy of mutual recognition, is thus embedded as a part in Hegel’s system, which serves as a prelude to the chapter “Psychology.” Mutual recognition of subjects is already established. Therefore, the “soul” in Hegel’s Psychology does not have a clash of images and memories between subjects.

Notably, Hegel believed that the accumulation of sense impressions (mental images) would only sink to the bottom of the dark mental “pit.” He did not consider this accumulation itself to be orderly composed, and considered the action of the imagination, which sheds light on this dark accumulation of mental images, to be collaborative. It is not explicitly stated by Hegel, but it is the logical interpretation of the structure of *The Philosophy of Spirit*. The mind is established as a “general self-consciousness” that has already completed mutual recognition with the surrounding consciousness. Therefore, consciousness can maintain its self-configuration based on stable memories without being confused by the chaotic succession of mental images or the deviant action of the imagination. Hegel believes that this is what constitutes the adult ego. The boundary/field (*element*) that makes mutual recognition of consciousness possible is, in Hegel’s terms, “negativity”. In terms of later Husserlian phenomenology, it would be called “intentional interaction” or “gaze inspiration”. It would be called “fusion of horizons” by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Mikhail Bakhtin would call the permeation of otherness that makes the “self” possible as a narrative and the field of the “dialogue” that takes place there, and “intimacy” by Anthony Giddens; in modern brain science, it would be “empathy” or “mirroring” or “theory of mind,” which makes it possible to synchronize with the emotions of others and see things from others’ perspectives. The penetration of this *element* occurs before my “soul” is established. In this *element*, my mind is established. It is because I am such a mind that I can enjoy the stable functioning of memory.

Thus, the relationship between the formation of memory and the collective field can be logically derived from the structure of Hegel’s philosophy of mind. This is consistent with Maurice Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory, which will be discussed later. Second, the relationship between memory formation and effects of empathizing may have implications even for contemporary experimental psychology and neuroscience research. In other words, it is the provision of theory as a hypothesis [Nojiri & Takase 2023]. A portion of the limbic system called the hippocampus is an organ responsible for short-term memory and spatial learning ability. The amygdala and cingulate gyrus, which are close to and function in conjunction with the hippocampus, are responsible for emotional processing and memory consolidation. Furthermore, the cingulate gyrus is responsible for empathy. In recent years, although still in the early stages, the elucidation of the functions of the limbic system has progressed rapidly along with research on developmental disorders. However, studies have suggested that psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, and PTSD, and developmental disorders, such as ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder), ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder), and LD (Learning Disorder) may be caused by impairments in the development or coordination of these

structures of the limbic system. Studies are conducted on the possibility that the social impairment seen in people with autism is due to the abnormal development and coordination of the hippocampus, amygdala, and cingulate gyrus. Links between memory and sociability function may also be revealed in the natural sciences soon.

Empathyness, which enables empathic relationships and communication, is characterized by the fact that its manifestation is limited to face-to-face situations and opportunities. Empathy is evoked through nonverbal communication, such as eye and mouth movements and other facial expressions, hand gestures, and voice tone and intonation. Thus, emotions tend to be shared according to physical proximity. The affective response of loving or hating the other person, which goes beyond the surface level of liking or disliking, is basically triggered on the basis of a face-to-face relationship. Once an empathic relationship has been established, it may be possible to continue to love the other person even when they are at a different place. However, in this case, it may be necessary to abstract and idealize “love” based on conceptual system. The less often people meet face to face, the more idealized love becomes. It would be necessary to meet the other again to recharge the feeling of love through empathy. Relationships based on empathy are only possible within a limited range of physical distance. Its fulfillment is limited to the scope of relationships in which we touch each other with physicality. As will be discussed later, Halbwachs pointed out that human memories are accumulated and ordered based on such spatial relations, which, in today’s sociology, are called the “intimate sphere”.

Notably, because of its characteristics, empathic collectivity tends to be mutually exclusive. One may think of human relations in the so-called “mura (village)” society as opposed to relations in the city, relations in the *Gemeinschaft* as opposed to the *Gesellschaft*, and so on. If empathic relationships play a role in memory formation, the collective memories formed have mutual closure and exclusivity. This leads to integration, exclusion, and withdrawing as the function of nationalism. As will be discussed later, in the “Debate on the Historical Subjects” in Japan in the 1990s, Kato (2015) published *Theories on the Post-defeat*. In response, Takahashi (2005), based on Derrida’s philosophy, advocated the idea of international generalized subject formation through the dismantling of closed identity. Tatsuru Uchida, who supports Kato, commented that that kind of thought would not give us a sense of an existential basis for facing history (Commentary by Uchida, Kato 2015). Uchida referred to the theoretically ambiguous rationale “corporeal sensation.” Nevertheless, the easiest way to understand it is to consider that it refers to the mechanism of identity formation based on empathy, as described above, and the memories consolidated by such empathy.

4. MY PRECIOUS MEMORIES Memory as the basis of the identity of “I”

The cultivation of memory, the mechanism for establishing an independent and stable self through discipline/training of imagination depicted by Hegel, has been reaffirmed independently by the contemporary scholar Ian Hacking and referred to as “politics of memory” from the perspective of history of science today. Hacking attempts to visualize the invisible obviousness of the connection

between memory and identity in modern times. In *Rewriting the Soul*, Hacking sought to uncover the background to the growing problem of trauma and multiple personality disorder in American society since the 1970s (Hacking 1998). Multiple personality disorder was originally considered a rare mental disorder, but it has become something of a social trend in the United States since the 1970s. This disorder is understood in general to be the symptom often developed by patients who have been traumatized by childhood abuse as a way of coping with PTSD. It is a form of dissociative identity disorder. The definition of a personality being multiple is that several coexisting personalities within the same person do not share memories with each other. Therefore, it is also a memory disorder.

According to Hacking, the date when narrative memory became an inner essence of our ‘soul’ and the basis of our identity can be identified at some point at the end of the 19th century. It is the period from 1874 to 1886. This was the time when research on multiple personality disorders became popular in France, and scientific research into memory began. It was during this period that the structures of knowledge that Hacking calls ‘the science of memory’, ‘the politics of memory’ and ‘the politics of the soul’ were established. This structure objectified the core of our personality, the place of the soul, which until then had not been subject to scientific verification, as a “memory”, and that made it possible to talk, explore, and verify the soul. The soul passed from the realm of the god into the hands of man and became an object that man could examine and question—it became political. Subsequently, man comes to have “rights” and “responsibilities” to his memory as the foundation of who he is. The problem of multiple personalities is related to memory because one of the criteria for having multiple personalities is having inconsistent (unshared) memories. In other words, one personality has memories of the abuse, and another does not. This is interpreted as an adaptive mechanism. This interpretation suggests that in modern times, memory is considered the foundation of personality integration; identity. Hacking used the history of science to reveal the social and historical nature of such a trend. He attempts to show that the new semantic label of “child abuse” that emerged in the 20th century has given a meaning and structure to what is supposed to be multiple personality disorders or dissociative symptoms. To put it plainly, it is not necessarily that genuine multiple personalities are more prevalent, but that the popularization of the concept of ‘child abuse’, and consequently of ‘multiple personalities’, which enables people to understand the dissociative symptoms of them and to name the causes, has led to more people identifying themselves under the name ‘multiple personality’.

If Hacking is right, then it is surprisingly recent that we have come to perceive ourselves as “memory vessels” (*In This Corner of the World*)—only about 150 years ago. Hacking does not explore the deeper structure of the change: how it came to be. He shows only the changes in concepts that can be traced from historical facts. However, he has unearthed some clues for us. First, Hacking follows Herman’s (1999) theory of psychological trauma, stating that psychological trauma is associated with political movements at certain times. Herman identifies three examples: hysteria in the late 19th century, shell shock in the early 20th century, and domestic sexual violence in the late 20th century. She argues that each of these issues arises against the backdrop of the republican anti-clerical political movement in 19th century in France, the political context of the collapse of the “cult” of war and the growth of the

anti-war movement, and the popularity of the feminist movement.

When a society reaches a turning point due to a historical event, and transitions occur in traditional societal moral concepts and behavioral norms, transformative pressures are exerted on people's self-understanding. Individuals are caught between competing ideologies, resulting in evolving disorders such as dissociation and flashbacks. Hacking identifies changes in religion and family status as the background for the high incidence of multiple personality disorders in American society since the 1970s. The old organizational and ideological underpinnings of the traditional American way of life have collapsed, and individualism has emerged. In this context, people experience conflicts between multiple ideologies, regardless of whether they hate the old things or cling to them. This issue is difficult to resolve through debate because it is a conflict in a modern social-historical context in which moral and personal values have already been relativized. This problem is not easily solved by individuals. A socio-historical ideological landslide drags people into a quagmire of value judgments, engulfing them in enormous, irresistible pressures. Hacking points out that the science of memory is the only vessel that can navigate this swamp or rough sea of values and emotional struggles. In other words, there is a need for an objective method that allows us to push into, analyze, and identify the causes of intractable conflicts and frictions, and the science of memory is the answer to this need. It gives people an objective and reasonable account of their families. Some blame the new family structure for the child abuse that caused their dissociation, while others blame the old family structure. What is clear is that we are caught up in significant change and need representations to explain it.

According to Hacking, what is called multiple personality in modern American society is the symptom called "dissociation" since 19th century psychoanalysis in the West and a condition called "trans" universally found in many societies and cultures throughout human history. When these symptoms or conditions were triggered by changes in religions and family patterns after the 1970s, a narrative was formed that the emergence of multiple personality disorder was caused by past child abuse. Many have adopted this type of social narrative that provides an explanation for mental problems in their reality. This model is powerful because it can provide a way of thinking that can (seemingly) pinpoint the "true cause" of our current problems, the "truth" of our souls. In modern society, individuals have liberated their souls from traditional cultural norms, social forms, and religious forms. In exchange for this freedom, individuals need the science of memory. However, Hacking does not offer a psychopathological analysis of why changes in family life cause disturbances in our memory. Here is the transfer point to Maurice Halbwachs' theory of collective memory, which we will consider next. Through Halbwachs' sociological theory of memory, we can more precisely integrate Hacking's insight into the historicity of the science of memory into social theory.

Another important contact point that can be drawn from Hacking is that to the issue of status of representation and ideology. Hacking's *Rewriting the Soul*, interestingly, ends with a conclusion about "false consciousness." Based on the evidence in this book, he cautiously suggests that deceptive memories and false consciousness themselves may not be the issues. Hacking aims to show that the belief that one can reach the past that shapes one's personality and soul by reaching one's true

memories—the idea that one’s personality and identity are shaped by the past—is a historical construct. Freud and Janet are two contrasting types that Hacking identifies for the ways of dealing with dissociative symptoms and memory. At a time when psychoanalysis was about to be born, these two men took opposite positions and clinical approaches to “false consciousness.” According to Hacking, Freud had a strong “will to truth”. He aimed to reach the hidden truths of the past that cause dissociation and hysteria, and required his patients to face this truth themselves. Freud believed that if he could reach the truth hidden deep within his patients’ false consciousness, their symptoms would disappear. This is one of the inherited ideas about child abuse today. It is an approach that deals with problems by facing and knowing the truth in the past. Conversely, Janet actively used hypnotherapy, which he inherited from his mentor Charcot. He treated his patients by implanting false consciousness. By making patients believe that the trauma did not happen or replacing their memories with better memories (substitute positive images), the approach aims to rewrite their memories and heal them. Janet’s method may be difficult to adopt openly today. In other words, we live today under the influence of such a sort of politics. Nevertheless, the question raised by Hacking are important to us. What is important—getting to the truth or restoring the life of the patient? With the ideal therapist in mind, who combines a thoughtful attitude toward the patient with a cautious skeptic’s position, Hacking asks whether the following attitude could be taken: “They accept that the patient has produced this version of herself: a narrative that includes dramatic events, a causal story of the formation of alters, and an account of the relationships between the alters. *That is a self-consciousness; that is a soul.* The doubters accept it as a reality. They are all too familiar with the fact that psychiatry is filled with pain and inability to help. They respect a clinician who can make a client feel more confident and able to get on with her life.” (Hacking 1998, 330–331 [Italic emphasis: Nojiri]). Being cautious, perhaps such therapists may be troubled that it is the therapy they give to patients that is creating false consciousness. According to Hacking, however, such guilt is merely an effect of the moral ideology contained in the contemporary politics of memory, which holds that individuals are and should be free by knowing themselves.

The *truth* that was supposedly reached in the first place may be a patient-generated falsehood. In the U.S. today, that issue forms the political opposition between the patients and support groups of multiple personality and victims of child abuse, and the organizations such as the False Memory Syndrome Foundation. We could devote time and effort to distinguishing what is truth and what is false. Meanwhile, Lacan, who began by calling himself Freud’s true successor, has since the 1960s championed the “ethics of psychoanalysis”, appears to have defected from Freud and overcome Freud’s will to truth. “Have you acted in conformity with the desire which inhabits you?” This is the question at the Last Judgment that expresses the ethics of psychoanalysis (Lacan 2002: 223). “Desire” in this case is human imagination. Lacan considered the fantasy about reality more important than reality itself. In the terminology of the Oedipus complex, the imaginary father, not the real father, is “fundamental to the structure of the subject” and “the basis of the images of divine providence”. In Lacan’s formula, man creates a symbolic order for reality. However, as the symbolic order that man creates cannot cover the complexity of reality, man encounters breakdowns, creaks, and holes. The real itself emerges from this

crack. Since the collapse of the symbolic order is the collapse of meaning, facing it means that human consciousness is blown away. Lacan refers to this effect as “death.” Simultaneously, it means experiencing reality itself. Therefore, it also has a fascination that surpasses the human order of the world, and the fascination with it is called “death drive.” Nonetheless, to live humanly, man must make it as the imagined. The cracks are filled with the imaginary. This imaginative compensation is the human desire. Whether one pursues it without giving up is the condition for being a heroic person or a human hero in the tragicomic sense. What does this mean? As the symbolic order cannot grasp reality itself, it is inevitably betrayed by reality. In other words, the more one believes in and is loyal to the order, the more one is exposed to the reality on the other side beyond the human world. Since ancient times, heroes/heroines endured this “fate” and lived through “death.”

Oedipus obeyed the law, tried to be good, and tried to catch the real murderer of the former king. However, it turned out that he had murdered his father and raped his mother. His daughter Antigone cherished the bond between her and her brother created by this incest and decided to bury her brother who had violated the laws of the nation against the law. By interpreting this tragedy, Hegel saw in this story the conflict and reconciliation between the laws of man and God. Hegel’s “Law of God” is the *element* (field) of family ties that Antigone follows to bury her brother against the nation. Hegel associates it with the *element* of “the earth” and sees it as an *element* of human imagination (concrete negativity) for receiving and soothing a physical and merciless shock of animal death (abstract negativity) (Nojiri 2010). It seems to refer to the workings of memory and imagination in the intimate and corporeal realms. Yoshimoto (2020) calls it the domain of “reciprocal illusion” (“*Tsui-gensou*”). To be loyal to it would be treason against the nation. The nation would have to incorporate it for its establishment. It is the life/death dimension between physical life (meaninglessness in human terms = death) and the symbolic order (meaning in human terms = life). Lacan called Antigone, who rebelled against the nation and pursued imaginative desires, a shining heroine (Lacan 2002 [2]: 115, 174). She is in the memory of the dead. In that sense, she is already dead. However, she lives in a different dimension from the nation. She lives with her familial *merimna* μέριμνα (fear/madness/memory/resentment), is the incarnation of the Dionysian desire for death, is an image that shines with beauty, has the power to drive Chorus (the substitute audience) into a frenzy, and makes them abandon their respect for the state’s imperial command. Lacan noted that Chorus called Antigone the one who knows herself. It means one who acts according to their desires. History is the real, the “thing (*das Ding*)” itself, the infernal machine (*La Machine Infernale*). No one can comprehend the full extent of it. Whoever pretends to know the laws of history and believes he can save the world is a pervert. Žižek applied it to the nation-state dictatorships of the 20th century (Žižek 1995). The mechanism of history is the absolutely ruthless “Other.” Those who directly identify with and take pleasure in this place of Other are called paranoiacs (The Schreber Case; Mukai 2016). That is one of defense mechanisms. The nation-state is a boat of paranoiacs who are trying to operate the machines of hell. If one can successfully get in the boat with everyone else, it will be possible to avoid falling into the individual paranoia called “perversion.”

Lacan positioned human symbolic actions and the formation of representational culture as the avoidance of “things” (*das Ding*) through signifiers. He expressed its origin with the example of the “pot” the first cultural work created by man in prehistoric times with reference to Heidegger (Lacan 2002 [I]: 181). The pot is the signifier of the signifier, the void that can be filled by any image. It is a vessel that embraces the abyss of nothingness and connects heaven and earth. According to Heidegger, such “vessels” have existed since antiquity. In modern times, however, nation-states are “vessels” invented to operate the new infernal machine of capital’s self-proliferation. When the space opened by the intersection of gazes is fixed by the formation of a political and economic symbolic order, a structure with continuous front and back surfaces is created, like a Klein bottle. Precisely speaking, a Klein bottle cannot be an object in three-dimensional space. Theoretically it is just a continuous curved surface without boundaries. In topology, the Klein bottle can only be materialized in a four-dimensional space that includes time. Therefore, it is not a real vessel. When we try to create a circular structure by receiving gaze/desire vectors of others and intersecting them with our gaze/desire vectors, temporality is necessary to make this circular connection; conversely, temporality is created by this circular connection. That is the way we can describe it for us as a human being living in a three-dimensional space. The vessel serves as a boat of time equipped with a compass that points to hope for the future. When this vessel tries to steer itself into the landslide of history, those who cannot enter it will see the abyss of hell. The surplus image, which is not collected in a vessel, returns to the subject’s body, supplies enjoyment in a form that is not unified with the subject’s own body and its parts of reality, and gives the subject the pain of division.

In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel considered the ideal design of the modern nation-state at the time of its emergence in Germany, saw “reconciliation” as aligned with the vertical axis of the family, the individual (civil society), and the state. Over the next 150 years, the imagination of the subjects was once captured by nation-state, and two world wars broke out between nations. This was followed by economic competition between nation-states without wars, and then a hyper-global economy has come (Rodrick 2014). The situation in which the nation-state framework as an imaginative aggregator is loosened, and representational culture produces imagery that circulates among different peoples, resulting in the coexistence, collision, and fusion of imagery once formed under national apparatuses, was certainly not part of Hegel’s design. Lacan says that Hegelian-Marxist premises cannot explain the problem of sacrifice to the gods of darkness, that is, the emergence of the Nazi holocaust, and that a science of “object *a*” is needed (Lacan 2020 [II]: 337–338). It is this problem that Žižek describes today as Hegel’s failure to capture “object *a*” (Žižek 2012: 600).

Whether to “act in conformity with the desire which inhabits you” is a matter of choice made by the subject of analysis (patient) as well as the psychoanalyst (doctor). This led Lacan, in his later years, to confirm enjoying the enjoyment through illusion by using the word *sinthome*, the ancient word for symptom because the patient’s desires, their self-images, are the only clues and narrow paths to the truth. The truth in this case is that the desire is the patient’s “self.” Lacan believes that truth is nowhere and that it is only the effect of the transference of desire that makes truth seem to exist. The resonance

and transference of desire in Socratic dialogue creates motives for truth and drives the interlocutors to search. However, beyond the veil woven by the exchange of desires, there is nothing. Truth is the *space* of the transference of desires itself (Lacan 2015) (Nojiri 2018).

When the core of the “self” is found to be the desire of the other, the subject must reclaim it as its own. If it can reclaim it, “the self” will gain self-identity. If this is not possible, a self that is not a self is created within the self. In dissociation, what is in the “self” is also perceived as the other. Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek continue Lacan’s thought and discuss contemporary literature, film, and other representations in culture. They follow the formulation that “symbols in representational culture are the imaginary resolution of unresolvable contradiction that we experience at the level of the real” (Jameson 2010). Human beings cannot experience reality itself. Human beings understand and manipulate reality through a system of symbols. This leaves a residue that cannot be fully symbolized. The residue is imagined and formed as an image that repairs the collapse of the symbolic system. The images provide variations (eerie, pretty, beautiful, strong, or a mixture of these) of motifs in representational culture (Žižek 1995). Is it possible to think that memory is also a representation that we create? The representation of memory is created when the image being the other can be successfully identified as the self. A traumatic flashback is an image as the other within “the self” that the self has failed to identify as the self. Next, we will see how Maurice Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory provides pioneering insights into this structure.

5. COLLECTIVE MEMORIES

Maurice Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory asserts that our memory formation always already takes place in the *element* of collectivity, the place of dialogical imagination (Halbwachs 1989). His posthumous work *The Collective Memory*, which is prominent as a sociological theory of memory, is a misleading title. In Japanese and Western languages as well, the reader who picks up the book may expect something from the sound of this title. They may expect an explanation of the process and mechanism by which the memories of individual people come together to form, for example, a collective memory on a national scale. The title is also morphologically similar to Jung’s collective unconscious; they may associate it with archetypal memory as a universal cultural inheritance of humankind. This also would lead to a major misunderstanding. Halbwachs does not consider such outcomes. Halbwachs intends to say that our memories are collective memories from the beginning. Collective in this case primarily means that the memory is formed through the permeation of intimate relationships. According to Halbwachs, it is always in the context of relationships with family, friends, and acquaintances that we remember and recall images of particular impressions and experiences. In his magnum opus, *Social Frameworks of Memory* (Halbwachs 2018), whose title is not misleading, Halbwachs attempted to combine the theories of his two teachers, Bergson and Durkheim. Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory attempts to rewrite Bergson’s argument about archival memory with Durkheim’s sociology of collective representation. For example, even when I walk alone and admire the scenery, I am not alone.

I look at the landscape and think of the friends I once shared it with, the acquaintances who told me about it, the family I would talk about it when I returned home. The landscape does not have to be something I heard about from a direct acquaintance; it can be a memory drawn in a novel I read in my childhood.

Now suppose I went walking alone. Could it be said that I preserve of that tour only individual remembrances, belonging solely to me? Only in appearance did I take a walk alone. Passing before Westminster, I thought about my historian friend's comments (or, what amounts to the same thing, what I have read in history books). Crossing a bridge, I noticed the effects of perspective that were pointed out by my painter friend (or struck me in a picture or engraving). I walk along, referring to my map in my head. Many impressions during my first visit to London—St. Paul's, Mansion House, the Strand, or the Inns of Court—reminded me of Dickens' novels read in childhood, so I took my walk with Dickens. In each of these moments I cannot say that I was alone, that I reflected alone, because I had put myself in thought into this or that group... (Halbwachs 1989: 3–4).

The day I went to school for the first time when I was little is a fact. But no matter how accurately my parents and relatives, who clearly remember such facts of my childhood, tell me about it, it is only an abstract given to me and does not lead to any living memories. It is not a memory. For a memory to be formed, I need to be in a community with whom I experience and evoke that memory together (e.g., my classmates, my teachers, and my ongoing relationships with them), whether directly or indirectly. Images that are not evoked in such a relational context of relationships and that are not imbued with relationships are mere images and do not take root as memories. According to Halbwachs, we cannot remember such images. "One remembers on the condition that one places oneself in one or more collective perspectives and replaces oneself in one or more collective streams of thought. Most of our memories are represented because other people make us remember them." (Halbwachs 1989: 19)

Halbwachs believed that for our sensory experiences to become "memories," we need relationships with others and social conceptions to provide a framework for the experiences. We can only remember them in the context of our social relationships. No one can remember and recall well unless they are in "society"—without others' help or works. This is the central claim of Halbwachs' theory of collective memory. In this sense, our memory is a collective memory from the beginning. Halbwachs offered no biological, physiological, or neuroscientific evidence for his claims. Halbwachs' method of proof is literary and philosophical, drawing on his experience and examples from literature and based on his theoretical considerations. In general, we tend to believe that "I have a memory as an accumulation of images by myself alone" and rather consider the occasions when we share it with others as accompanying events. Halbwachs tried to counter this idea by describing numerous cases.

For example, even if you are traveling with a group of friends, you may find yourself traveling with a different group in mind. Our subjectivity lies at the intersection of such collectivities. Our consciousness today is the intersection of many collectivities to which we do not fully belong. We

confuse our consciousness as independent because we can always relativize our belonging to one group by the belonging to another group. Simultaneously, this collectivity is supported by the individuals who recall memories of the group, which disappears when that all these individuals die (unless it is preserved in a literary work, etc.). Halbwachs saw this collectivity as something inherited in places like family life, aristocratic life, religious communities, traditional professional life. Even when in a context of collective memory, an individual may think that he or she is recalling another unique memory of his or her own. However, it is only recalling the memories of another group of people, placing him/herself in the current place. The modern notion of conscious freedom (autonomy from the law of causality) and our sense of fluid consciousness arise from this structure.

Without the collectivity of memory, there is no flow of consciousness. The awareness of being in a flow is possible because one can belong to a collectivity while allowing the effects of other collectivities that relativize that state to enter into that flow. This flow is not exactly a flow but a mixture of flow and standstill. When it is really pure flowing, it is not perceived as flowing. Consciousness can follow the flow and is actually independent of the flow in away when it can do so. Consciousness is independent of the flow, yet navigates through it. Halbwachs believes that collectivity is the boat that makes this navigation possible. Without the support of such a lasting and standing thing against flow, we cannot recall memories. It is collectivity that provides this standing thing. This is what Halbwachs meant when he criticized William James and Bergson by saying that consciousness does not flow, nor does time. There may be a flow of images. Nevertheless, we do not get caught up in the current and swept away; we navigate through it. It is possible because consciousness is anchored in the collective memory, supported by it and going against the flow. Properly speaking, a flow of consciousness in James and Bergson must be understood as such a hybrid structure. With this structure we are able to recall memories, project them onto the conscious screen, and enjoy the viewing experience. Without such a structure, images of the past would return to us as the past itself, and consciousness would slip back in time to the past itself. In other words, we are free from the past when we exist as an intersection of collectivity.

We conceive each influence as opposed to another, and thus believe that we act independently of each influence, since we do not act under the exclusive power of anyone. We do not perceive that our act really results from their action in concert, that our act is always governed by the law of causality. Similarly, since the remembrance reappears, owing to the interweaving of several series of collective thoughts, and since we cannot attribute it to any single one, we imagine it independent and contrast its unity to their multiplicity. We might as well assume that a heavy object, suspended in air by means of a number of very thin and interlaced wires, actually rests in the void where it holds itself up (Halbwachs 1989: 44).

There is a similarity here with Bakhtin's philosophy, which sees "I" as a polyphony of multiple consciousnesses (Bakhtin 1988). It also has something in common with Althusser's consideration on the

question of the relationship between the structural causality or overdetermination and the subject. Although Althusser's conceptual elucidation was not sufficiently achieved, it is fair to say that what he meant was that "representation" was possible in the intersectional space of gazes, in the Lacanian manner, or "representation" was possible in the intersection of collectivity, in the Halbwachsian manner (Althusser 1994). As mentioned earlier, Lacan referred to the establishment of such a structure with the term "object *a*" and also considered its establishment as the establishment of the subject. This is the "I" as a vessel of memories as mentioned earlier. Althusser believed that when the structure of the subject or "I" is established, it is also the establishment of the structure of "history." History is by nature *the real* itself, something that cannot be represented. When the subject attempts to represent the history, multiple spatialities (socialities) and multiple temporalities are imaginatively integrated into one spatiality and temporality. At this point, use values are transformed into exchange values, and concrete values into abstract values, in Marx's terms. The mutual and alternating determination of abstract and concrete values sets in motion an infinite movement of a process of valorization (creation of surplus value). This movement itself is "history" (Postone 2012). At this point, it cannot be logically determined whether the subject is the effect of the structure or the structure is the effect of the subject. This is what Althusser meant by structural causality, and overdetermination.

Halbwachs is best known for his work *The Collective Memory* from the last years of his life, but his main work should be considered *Social Frameworks of Memory*. *The Collective Memory* is a literary adaptation of the main book for a more general audience. *The Collective Memory* has more references to specific places; spatiality. This will be covered later. Meanwhile, *Social Frameworks of Memory* has a more elaborate philosophical theory of the collectivity of memory. It reveals the structure of Halbwachs' thought between Durkheim's collective representation and Bergson's pure memory. Rather than a sociology of memory, this should be considered the greatest achievement of the philosophy of memory in the 20th century. Interestingly, in this main book, Halbwachs sequentially examined dreams, early childhood memories, and the state of aphasia to argue for the collective nature of memory. All three states listed here experience a return of images. These are states in which consciousness is detached from sociality, and Halbwachs tried to show that the appearance of images in these states is never the evocation of "memory."

It was Bergson's theory of memory and Freud's theory of dreams that Halbwachs sought to confront and criticize. In Bergson's theory of memory, all the images of the past are stored in the realm of the unconscious. Everything in the past accumulates and stays there as it is. This is Bergson's "pure memory." Halbwachs rejected this sort of idea. According to him, if all the images of the past are stored intact, we cannot recall them. If there is such an archive in our unconscious realm where every moment is preserved as it is, and we go there when we remember, we have to examine the entire accumulation of that moment to remember a particular scene; we have to start from the beginning to get to a particular scene and spend as much time getting there as it takes to get to that scene. In reality, our images are abstracted, structured, indexed, and stored by a social frame of reference. It is the relationships in a group that provide the frame of reference. Images are established as memories within the *element*

(ethereal medium, field) of this relationship, and evoked by this *element*. We reconstruct images of the past as memories based on our sense of reality rooted in our present personal relationships, and we appreciate them as *my* memories. Without the support of this element, we would be lost in the archive of images, plunged into the abyss of the past itself, and the “I” would dissolve and disappear into the past itself. Halbwachs emphasized that we maintain our self-identity at all times, without loss of self, through the evocation of memories. Social relationships and the conceptual framework they create provide support. Thus, Halbwachs emphasized that images of the past do not exist per se and that memories are always intellectual products always already shaped by social frameworks. He stated that even if the past itself exists, the spirit would never reach there (Halbwachs 2018). The spirit can only encounter memories reconstructed by its intellectual activity. Halbwachs’ central theme of memory is that memory is a product of the intellect, a social framework. The ideas of Halbwachs and Hegel are in complete agreement on the point that memory is intelligence.

Halbwachs’ argument is that without the support of collectivity/sociality/relationships with others, we cannot recall, nor can we sustain a recalling self. While this may be a plausible and even logical argument, since it is far from our common belief, it may be difficult to apprehend or prove it as it is. However, as we have already seen, his theory of memory suddenly returns as the most advanced when the latest pathological findings on autism are considered. As is already clear, Halbwachs’ theory of memory, which makes an imaginary relationship with others a necessary condition for the formation of memory, describes well the memory characteristics of TD. In *Social Frameworks of Memory*, Halbwachs meticulously examined conditions apart from the influence of social intelligence, such as dreams, infant memories, and cases of aphasia. He showed that in each of these cases the mental images were mere fragmentary images without meaning, and its evocation was not memory. Halbwachs’ ideas about dreams are anti-Freudian. Freud argued in *The Interpretation of Dreams* that the chain of images in dreams has the structure of wish fulfillment. Nevertheless, Halbwachs emphasized that sleep time is when our consciousness is disconnected from our relationships with others and that dreams themselves are nothing more than meaningless images. Upon awakening, we frame the collection of the dream images with the *element* of the present, and remember. It should be fair to say if dreams and memories are products of our desires, then *dreams and memories are also “representations”*. If so, it is possible to include dreams and memories in a theory of representational culture, which leads through Lacan to contemporary Jameson and Žižek. Its basic formula finished by Jameson is that “symbolic expressions in cultural works are the imaginary solutions to the unresolvable contradictions we experience at the level of the real (Jameson 1981).” According to Halbwachs, there is a line between dreams and memories, though. This is because dreams are separated from the field of social relations—a dream itself is different from the memory of a dream. What Halbwachs wanted to emphasize with this distinction was the *element* of an imaginative relationship to the other through which our memory is permeated. This bilateral dimension of desire, the dialogical dimension, remained with Lacan but disappeared from Jameson’s and Žižek’s theories of representational culture. The greatest contribution of Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory is that it shows that our memories are representations as

intellectual formations permeated by *element* of our relationships with others. The challenge is to reintegrate these two streams. Daydreams and the otherness that permeates them should be analyzed, not our dreams.

Another noteworthy point in Halbwachs' theory of collective memory is the historicity and timeliness of his awareness of the problem. What surprises readers today is that his theory of collective memory is anti-nationalist. Halbwachs noted that nations are too distant from individuals and too large as frames of memory and that they cannot function effectively as frames of collective memory. This was especially emphasized in *The Collective Memory*, which he continued to write until 1944, when he was sent to a concentration camp by the Nazi Gestapo (Halbwachs 1989). Anne Whitehead noted that Pierre Nora, who independently modified Halbwachs' theory of collective memory in the 1980s and 1990s (*The Places of Memory* project), emphasized the state as the vessel of collective memory, whereas Halbwachs believed that nations were not sites of collective memory (Whitehead 2017). In *Social Frameworks of Memory*, Halbwachs' idea of the medium of collective memory was a close social group that inherits the memory of personhood, such as a traditional family life, a lifestyle that continues in the aristocratic family line, a religious community centered on the church, and a professional life that inherits traditional styles, manners, and social status. In *The Collective Memory*, he emphasized the connection between space and memory in traditional life and occupation, including the family house, the rural countryside, the unchanging stone streets of European cities, the image of the occupational space to which a professional community belongs, and the image of the space of belief in religion. Tomoyuki Suzuki, the Japanese translator of *Social Frameworks of Memory*, commented that Halbwachs argued in another paper ("Materials and Society", 1920) that modern workers are in a work environment in which human relationships are abstracted and that they work with things rather than people. Such a working class becomes an existence without a collective memory. Halbwachs had a sense of crisis about these new forms of human existence and wrote about collective memory. The following is a summary by Suzuki. "Only the working class is cut off from such traditions.... Labor is not between man and man, but limited between man and thing, and the world of labor becomes independent in a way that cuts off the influence of 'social thoughts.' It means that their lives are not connected to the collective memory which supported other classes. A worker is something alienated from memory. (Incidentally, Namer interpreted the anecdote of a 'slave' girl who lost her childhood memory at the beginning of the book as an allegory of the worker as a class without memory)" (Halbwachs 2018: 400–401).

This could be seen as follows. The Halbwachs' awareness of the issue involved in his theory of collective memory came from a sense of crisis about the loss of collective memory. It was in the final stages of the world's transition from classical liberalism to state capitalism that Halbwachs became aware of the problem of memory theory. It was the period when the modern state started practically encompassing the entire society through a 20th century-style nation-state system, or a total war system. John Maynard Keynes published *The End of Laissez-Faire* in 1926. The industrial structure that had evolved spontaneously underwent an intense and systematic reorganization by the states and all people were reconfigured as "nations" as economic, social and cultural agents mobilized under the national

system geared to war. As the economic system is reorganized under the intensive consolidation of the state, the traditional sites of family, professional, and religious life, which Halbwachs saw as vessels of collective memory, are dismantled and dispersed.

In 1930, Ortega y Gasset wrote *The Revolt of the Masses*, in which he discussed the emergence of a mass of people called “nations” that were cut off from the past and had only the future. A nation-state is a community for future projects, an empty vessel with no memory of the past. Meanwhile, the nation’s history and traditions would be hastily remade and distributed to shape this empty vessel a space of hope for the future. Anthony D. Smith calls it “the construction of nations,” with *ethnie* as a *myth-symbolic complex* at its core. It is for the future that the past is made. It is not a fixed past but a living past constantly being reconstructed and transmitted. What was in the past is not really the issue. What is important is the opening of a continuous space of remembrance in which people from all walks of life can have equal participation. “In our descendants’ memory, lies our hope.” (Smith 1999: 243 [208]).

Here, Smith’s “construction of nations” can be understood as something like the process of raindrop formation and rainfall, if we replace it with a metaphor. When water vapor is present in sufficient concentration in the upper atmosphere, fine particles act as condensation nuclei and form water droplets. The myth-symbolic complex functions as a kind of condensation nucleus in this case. With this as the nucleus, an area is formed around it like raindrops in which the images of the people are refracted and intersected. These raindrops would be what Smith calls “*ethnie*.” When it grows to the point where it can rain, it falls from the sky and waters the land. When these conditions are successfully met, a space opens for the construction of nationalism out of the *ethnie*. Using Lacan’s scheme, this principle can be expressed as “ $\$ \diamond a$ ”—“*the matheme for fantasy*.” $\$$ (S barred; the barred subject) expresses that individual subjectivity is negated by the symbolic order. This is where illusions arise (some people do not have them). The system of myths and symbols provided by the state alienates individuals, but the individuals adapt to the situation by covering the myths-symbols with illusions. Although human illusiveness exists as a vapor from the beginning, for individual illusiveness to condense as a structure constituting the “I,” there must be a symbol as “the big Other” at the core of the structure. Individuals may not properly understand the “meaning” of this symbolism, nor do they necessarily have to understand it. In fact, no one understands the true *meaning* of the symbols. The *truth* of the myth does not lie in the accuracy and correctness of such *meanings*. More specifically, the *meaning* of a symbol is not in the symbol itself. The truth of myths is established on a different dimension/instance from that of correspondence with reality. A symbolic truth can be established if it has enough consistency and authority to make you believe it because everyone else seems to believe it. Subsequently, despite the emptiness/absence at the center of its meaning, people’s intersecting and overlapping fantasies congeal around its core. People may not have the same fantasies, nor do they necessarily have to have the same fantasies. Sharing the feeling that we all generally believe the same way supports each other’s feeling (“object *a*” as a structure), and the light of another’s imagination intersects with that of one’s imagination, refracting and returning to one’s mind and entering as light that illuminates one’s mind. The subject projects and sews the incoming light onto the surface of the object to which one is fixated. In this way,

an image (“object *a*” as a concrete object) that supports the individual’s unique corporeal sensation is internalized by the individual as a talisman. Here, the scheme changes from $\$ \diamond a$ [*the matheme for fantasy*] to $S(A)$ [the big Other does not exist/the anchoring or quilting point of desire]. It is a mechanism of adaptation in which individuals become aware of themselves as “nationals”⁷⁾. Once a system is established in which this mechanism is socially reproduced, a communal fantasy space called the *nation* emerges.

For example, suppose someone says, “I want a dog.” Someone replies, “A dog, that’s nice, I want one too!” They share the common feelings by saying, “Yes, dogs, aren’t they cute!” Here, a desire exchange space is formed with the symbol of “dog” as the core, and my ego stabilizes. I take home and cherish the raindrop called “dog” obtained in this manner. This waters my mind, and now and then I give it to others, gaining the common feeling to rehydrate and sustain this precious drop. It would be unnecessary to point out that the word “dog” can be associated with many different things. If there is a third party who points out the possibility that we may be thinking of different things depending on the word “dog,” that would be superfluous.—“The dog you are referring to here seems to be a Pomeranian, but the dog you are referring to there seems to be a Shiba Inu (brushwood dog). The symbolic expression is the same, dog, but the meaning is different for each, isn’t it? So, there is no communication going on between you two, right?” This is a pointless comment. For two people talking to and empathizing with each other about dogs, this does not matter. In truth, one’s desires cannot be fully expressed by the word “dog” (Lacan calls this “alienation”). Those who think they can are simply unaware of the discrepancies in expressing to others something like emotions and desires (speech act) that are different from the original meaning of the symbol itself (speech content). Or it is that you just think it is okay, even though you are aware of the discrepancies. For those who are attuned to empathic relationships, such inconsistencies are not a problem at all. The only ones who are confused are those who cannot adjust to such empathic relationships. Temple Grandin, a well-known American with autism (ASD), reports that her sense of language makes it difficult for her to use the concept “dog” (Grandin 2000). For people with ASD like Grandin, the word “dog” is a collection of many concrete images of animals called dogs that they have seen in books and on the street so far. Even each dog has different images on different occasions and from different angles. How do you put them together, Grandin asks. For people with ASD, it is the pragmatics of TD using the word “dog” regardless of the gap between the speech content and the speech act that is a miracle. Individuals with ASD are sensitive to alienation. TD, nevertheless, jumps over alienation through multi-subject work (Lacan calls this “separation”). TD overcomes alienation through separation. Using this schema, we can say that people with ASD have experienced alienation but not separation. It is a failure of formation of *object-a-structure*, i.e., the representative of representation, *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* (ideational representative) (see also note 5)). TD are also unconsciously aware that “discord = alienation.” Therefore, they try to bridge the gap by expressing it to others and gaining their agreement and empathy. In this way, the “dog,” a structure that receives, refracts, and reflects the desires of various people, is crystallized. The secret of the TD’s adaptation is that they stabilize their ego by trusting in the exchange relationships mediated by this crystal structure,

as is in the case of the dog.

When this is incorporated into the structure of the political and economic regime and a system of reproduction is created within the borders of the country, a nation-state is complete. In Japan, the parts of this system were prepared under the restoration of the emperor system after the Meiji Restoration. The collective act of remembering in the intimate sphere covered by Halbwachs is alienated by the national myth-symbol complex and mobilized into the independent formation of the national memory space. A distinction should be made between the collective action of memory in the intimate sphere, which Halbwachs deplored, and the memory space of the late nation-states, where the feudal hierarchy has been eliminated. Let's call the former *collective memory A* and the latter *collective memory B*. The collective memory B is a superordinate system of the collective memory A and includes several As. It is a hyper-collective memory. Whether this inclusion is formal or real varies with time and place. The degree of inclusion also varies between urban and rural areas. In individual subjects, the two often coexist and are intertwined and connected (see Shuji Terayama's *Death in the Countryside*, 1974). The memory spaces of the late nation-states are in fact formed with the appearance of uniformity, while incorporating such heterogeneous differences.

Such a nation-state of the twentieth century is the stage where domestic capital is highly reorganized through the use of science and technology to transform the country completely into a factory of special surplus-value production. This arose from the need for capitalism to shift completely to the production of surplus value through time difference to overcome the limit of laissez-faire economy, that is, the limit of the production of surplus value through spatial difference. This trend was particularly noticeable in underdeveloped countries then such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, which had been slow to acquire colonies. In some respects, external wars may have been even necessary for some nations to mass produce and consume the weapons in which science and technology had been invested. This regime has been pointed out as the reason why both Japan and Germany continued economically after the war: Rhine capitalism, the 1940 system, etc. This system consolidated the national imagination and reconfigured the entire nation into a linear time consciousness toward to a dream of all-Japanese-are-middle-class mentality. In Japan, toward the end of the Pacific War, as defeat intensified and the imperial space began to shrink, this temporal structure probably began on the mainland. When Japan was defeated in the war and switched to the symbolic emperor system, this space was truly *separated*. It was the birth of a "democratized Japan," a space of hope where material prosperity is a shared goal.

This fantasy space lasted for five decades. As pointed out by Yukio Noguchi and others, the state capitalist system formally perfected in the 1940s continued until the capitalist economy shifted to the neo-liberal mode that began in the 1980s. In Japan, the bubble economy delayed the start of the transition until the 1990s. It was no coincidence that this period (90s) marked the beginning of a return to Halbwachs' theory of collective memory. It also coincides with the period Dani Rodrik sees as the beginning of "hyperglobalization" (Rodrik, 2014). Pierre Nora's project stems from an awareness of restoring the nation as a place of memory that has begun to waver. During this period, Smith (1999 [1986]) tried to objectify "ethnie" as the core of nationalism in England. In Japan, which was a decade

behind due to the economic bubble, Kato (2015 [1997]) prepared the “Debate on Historical Subjects”. Notably, Kato was convinced that the question of historical perception was also a “literary” question. Literature is the point of contact between the interiority of the individual and history. In other words, through the screen of representation in postwar literature, Kato intuitively saw the collective nature of memory, its aspect as representational formation, its interaction with the structure of the 20th-century nation-state, and its decline. I shall save that discussion in Part II.

(To be continued in *Part II*)

Notes

- 1) A broader discussion based on this series, “Beyond the ‘I’ as a Vessel of Memory and the ‘Nation’ as a Vessel of History: Poetics and Micropolitics for Reconciliation Studies”, is included in *Reconciliation and Politics as an Aporia: History, Theory and Concepts*, Reconciliation Studies Series Volume 2, Akashi Shoten, 2023 [in Japanese].
- 2) In EU countries that receive numerous immigrants, some extreme right-wing forces have emerged to oppose such policies. Some of them admire Japan’s immigration policy, which accepts only a few refugees, as a model. An extreme example is the statement made by Anneas Behring Breivik (then 32 years old), the terrorist responsible for the 2011 attacks in Norway. Breivik, a far-right Christian fundamentalist who proclaimed a “revolution against multiculturalism” to “protect the West from a Muslim takeover,” carried out bombings and shootings in the city of Oslo and on the island of Utoya, killing 77 people in one day. He is said to have written online praising Japan and South Korea as ideal nations free from the influence of multiculturalism.
- 3) From 2011 to 2018, the series produced approximately 30 shows per year, for a total of 252 aired shows. In 2019, the number of shows produced decreased to seven, and from 2020, the series aired mainly selected works with good feedback and re-edited works from previous broadcasts (<https://www.nhk.or.jp/fudoki/> accessed 22 June 2020.) I pointed out a tendency of this series not to feature nations and inhabitants of non-Japanese races, with a few exceptions such as “Osaka Ikuno Korea Town” (aired February 3, 2012), “Sao Paulo” (aired December 26, 2014), “Brasil Town Oizumicho” (aired July 22, 2015), and “Hawaii (1) and (2)” (aired April 6 and 13, 2018). However, they were “Japanese nationals” with a long history since the Meiji period who had emigrated from overseas or moved overseas, such as Koreans living in Japan, Brazilians of Japanese descent, and Hawaiians of Japanese descent. They are seen in the modern Japanese nostalgia and are representations that satisfy the desire to search for the beautiful “Japan” that remains from the past.
- 4) The Shinzo Abe cabinet, the symbolic government of the past decade, became the longest-serving government since the end of World War II with its easy monetary policy and the cultural and spiritual ideal of “Beautiful Japan,” but it ended on September 16, 2020, during the preparation of this paper.
- 5) According to Jacques-Alain Miller, a prominent student of Lacan, there are two types of “object

a,” and according to Slavoj Žižek, there are three types (see web articles 4 and 6). Lacan’s concept of object *a* changed from early to late in his career. In his early work he referred to fixed objects of desire (the gaze, the breast, the voice, etc.) in the period of ego formation, in his middle period to a structure itself of intersecting gazes (the frame, the ideational representative, the screen), and in his late work to “the real”. Why they are referred to as the same object is one of the difficulties in interpreting Lacan. The object *a* of interpretation in this paper is as follows: (1) as a representative of the object of desire of the other/desire for the other; (2) as a structure of intersecting gaze/desire vectors of the other and the self; (3) as an image as the otherness that appears when the intersecting structure itself fails to form or is decentered. Here, (1)–(3) correspond to the object in the period of formation of the ego of TD, the object after formation, and the object in failure to form, respectively. While this interpretation is unique to the author, it is compatible with the modern interpretation that Lacan’s theoretical object or model shifted from the schizophrenia model to the autism model in his later years (Nojiri 2018) (Matsumoto 2015). This paper mainly uses the aspect from (2) the object *a* as the interaction of gaze/desire between others and the self, which was described in *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (Lacan 2020), and uses the terms: “the object *a* as a structure” or “the object-a-structure.” This refers to the typical developmental object *a* when comparing TD and autism. Lacan’s mechanism of “alienation” and “separation” must also be considered different between TD and autism. For those that fall under (3), Derrida refers to with the expression “mental archive,” which cannot be restored to either a vividly preserved memory or an act of recollection (Derrida 2017). It emerges in the discussion of the archive disease that afflicts all of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory: the desire for archives as lack. However, Derrida did not know the contrast between autism and TD and spoke of it only in the negative form, “unarchiving”.

- 6) The idea of “neurodiversity” is also emerging, and its political implications can be radical. For example, it is possible to relativize the problem structure of “reconciliation” between nations as neurotypical and is only a construct based on one particular value. It could be argued that the reflective relationship of reconciliation is rather problematic as a form of human relationship and should be de-emphasized. A future of coexistence without reconciliation is also a possibility. The concept of Anarcho-Autism is also emerging and is worth exploring (Web article 3).
- 7) The shift to S(*A*) [the big Other does not exist/the anchoring point of desire] does not mean that the imagination of the individual has triumphed over the state. According to Lacan, *La femme*, a woman with a slash, is related to S(*A*). “Woman...is not-whole.” (Lacan 2019). The big Other is overwritten by the subject’s imagination, but the subject’s imagination is also surrounded by the cage of economic instance that is strung around the myth-symbol complex at its core. The big Other was assumed to be non-existent, but this should not be misunderstood. The big Other was captured and overwritten by individual imaginations, but they function as convergence points for individual imaginations. Rather, the subsumption of the imagination by the big Other is completed. It serves as a frame. It is easy to understand by reflecting on the symbolic emperor system in

postwar Japan. It also applies to women. A slash is added to the definite article of woman, and the definite article is removed. This means that there is no such thing as the so-called “woman.” In postwar Japan, this refers to a structure in which all women were overwritten into the hysterical (traumatized) female subject demanded by patriarchal capitalism. There is no such thing as the so-called “woman,” but the “woman” is assumed, while individual women continue to exist. The assumption of the “woman” denies the individual woman. The fantasy of positioning women as unadaptable to the big Other, which allows the (typically male) subject to find a lack in the big Other and establish his patriarchal subjectivity. The sharing of this illusion in a transferring manner by both genders creates the national subject adapting to the big Other and connecting everything to the big Other. Consequently, the Antigone’s ethical imagination of the earth is subsumed into the system of the nation-state and rather cathects (feeds) it. In this article, I have linked the formation of the $S(A)$ mathem to the formation of the national imagination (in the sense of TD) in the construction of the nation-state. This may seem to contradict Jacques-Alain Miller’s description of $S(A)$ as “S1 without S2” (Web article 5), referring to Lacan’s “jouissance autiste.” As discussed in note 5, these surface conflicts arise mainly because my argument draws on the Lacanian account in his middle period and uses the concept of the *object-a-structure* to explain the mental structure of the TD (especially in 20th century nation-states). On the other hand, Miller emphasized Lacan in his last years and moved toward the concept of *the real* as a body (Floury, 2020). Here is my original interpretation. First, the chain of $S1=S2$ cannot exist completely and purely—in the form of only one. If there were such a thing, then such a symbolic chain would rather be equal to *the real*. “A” should be understood in this way. Simultaneously, it is also a short circuit to say “S1 without S2” when it is “A.” (It is like thinking that there are only two forms of government, imperial and republican. In reality, there is also one like the symbolic emperor system). The concepts of “S2//S1” by Lacan in his latest years or Miller included: the extraction of the enjoyment of a solitary S1, separated from its meaning as a chain of signifiers, uninterpretable even for the subject itself; to this end, it is necessary to separate the narrative from the effect of meaning and to make the enjoyment of the parole appear. Such ethics must be examined to see if they are simply the same as the culture of the May Revolution generation (Zenkyoto generation in Japan), which is linked to the changes in the political and economic system that marked the end of the Bretton Woods system = fixed currency exchange rate system, around 1970. In the first place, there is no such thing as a perfect $S1 = S2$. In fact, we should imagine that there are countless incomplete $S1=S2$ in parallel and that the *object-a-structure* supplements and completes the incompleteness. At this moment, there may be countless “S1.x” appearing. For example, imagine that the suspended state at point “S1.5” is supported by the collective memory of the *object-a-structure*, and such a mechanism maintains the national imagination of the TD. The question raised in this paper is the fate of this surplus, 0.x.

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