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Doctoral Dissertation

Daily Nationhood and Attitudes toward Immigrants: Exploring Banal Nationalism in Japan

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Abstract

In the contemporary global landscape, immigration stands out as one of the most contentious issues, with immigrants often perceived as a threat to societal well-being in numerous societies, leading to prevalent negative attitudes towards them. Existing literature on immigration predominantly attributes these negative attitudes to threat perceptions, categorizing them into economic and symbolic threats. However, this thesis posits that beneath anti-immigration sentiments lie a more fundamental driver: nationalism.

While some studies have explored nationalism as an independent variable influencing anti-immigration sentiments, they have often defined nationalism narrowly. Criticisms by Wimmer and Shiller (2002) point out that the immigration literature often takes nation-states for granted and neglects the concept of banal nationalism, introduced by Michael Billig in 1995. This research seeks to address this gap in the literature by proposing a novel explanation for anti-immigration sentiments in Japan and advocating for a broader understanding of nationalism in immigration discourse. The central hypothesis posits that anti-immigration sentiments in Japan result from symbolic threat perceptions fueled by nationalism.

Japan is chosen as the case of examination due to the significance of nationalism in discussing banal nationalism. The conventional examples illustrating daily manifestations of nationalism in established democracies are not directly applicable to Japan. However, this divergence does not imply the absence of nationalism; rather, Japan has its distinct subtle ways of expressing nationalism. This thesis aims to uncover symbols of everyday nationalism through a day survey of national newspapers. A textual analysis is conducted on 13 Japanese newspapers on a randomly selected day, mirroring Billig's day survey in 1995 on English newspapers. The findings demonstrate that Japanese newspapers actively contribute to the daily reproduction of the nation in various nuanced ways.

Furthermore, an analysis of the ISSP 2013 data is conducted to examine hypothesis using extensive Large-N survey data. Subsequently, a survey is undertaken to evaluate the extent to which nationalistic discourse propagated by the press has influenced society and to test the core hypotheses posited in this thesis. The results of these analyses present compelling evidence that underscores the causal relationship between nationalism, symbolic threat perception, and anti-immigration sentiments.

要旨

　現代の世界情勢において、移民は最も物議を醸す問題の一つとして際立っており、多くの社会において移民は社会の幸福に対する脅威として認識されることが多く、移民に対する否定的な態度が蔓延している。先行研究は、移民に対する否定的な態度は主に脅威認識によるものであり、それらを経済的脅威と象徴的脅威に分類している。しかし、この論文は、反移民感情の根底には、より根本的な推進力であるナショナリズムがあると主張している。

　一部の研究ではナショナリズムを反移民感情に影響を与える独立変数として調査しているが、多くの場合、ナショナリズムは狭く定義されている。Wimmer と Shiller (2002) による批判は、移民文学がしばしば国民国家を当然のこととみなし、1995 年に Michael Billig によって導入されたバナル「平凡的な」ナショナリズムの概念を無視していることを指摘している。この研究は、日本の反移民感情に対する斬新な説明を提案し、移民文献におけるナショナリズムのより広範な理解を提唱することによって、文献におけるこのギャップに対処しようとしている。中心的な仮説は、日本の反移民感情はナショナリズムによって煽られた象徴的な脅威認識から生じていると仮定している。

バナルナショナリズムを議論する上での日本のナショナリズムの重要性から、日本が検討事例として選ばれている。欧米の民主主義諸国におけるナショナリズムの日常的な現れを示す従来の例は、日本には直接当てはまらない。しかし、この相違はナショナリズムの不在を意味するものではない。むしろ、日本にはナショナリズムを表現する独特の微妙な方法がある。この論文は、全国紙の一日の調査を通じて日常のナショナリズムの象徴を明らかにすることを目的としている。1995 年のイギリスの新聞に対する Billig の調査を反映して、無作為に選択された日の 13 の日本の新聞で内容分析を行われた。この調査結果は、日本の新聞がさまざまな微妙な方法でナショナリズムの日々の再生産に積極的に貢献していることを示している。

さらに、広範な Large-N 調査データを使用して仮説を検討するために、ISSP 2013 データの分析が行われた。続いて、報道機関によって広められたナショナリストな言説が社会にどの程度影響を与えているかを評価し、この論文で提起された中心的な仮説を検証するためにオンラインアンケート調査が行われた。これらの分析の結果は、ナショナリズム、象徴的な脅威認識、反移民感情の間の関連性を強調する説得力のある証拠を示している。

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1. INTRODUCTION

What underlies public opposition to immigration? Who forms the opposition to immigration and who supports it? How does the host society perceive and categorize immigrants? What is the role of perceived threats from immigrants? Do economic or realistic perceptions of threat influence anti-immigrant attitudes more than symbolic perceptions of threat? What factors contribute to symbolic threat perceptions of immigrants? Why does the host society perceive immigrants as a threat to its national culture? Why does the population density of immigrants or foreigners lead to the perception of an invasion threat? Why do people think that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than citizens? Does nationalism explain symbolic threat perceptions? What are the implications of refining the definition of nationalism by using the concept of banal nationalism to explain attitudes toward immigration? Does banal nationalism exist in Japan? Can banal nationalism be ethnic or cultural? These inquiries represent the foundational questions that this dissertation endeavors to address comprehensively and analytically.

Japan has traditionally been thought of as a relatively homogeneous country with a small percentage of foreign residents. Furthermore, Japan's immigration policy is renowned for its stringent nature. However, in recent years, the number of foreign residents living in Japan has increased significantly. According to the Ministry of Justice, the number of foreign residents in Japan in 2022 will be 3,075,213, accounting for 2.5% of the total population. This represents a significant increase of approximately 902,000 people, or 42%, since 2015, with an annual growth rate of 7.51% (Immigration Service Agency of Japan 2023). The increasing influx of immigration is consequently altering Japan's image from being ethnically homogeneous to moderately diverse. Foreign laborers and households remain a source of unease within the Japanese context. Patterns indicate that, despite the stringent immigration regulations, a growing number of foreign workers and their families are likely to settle in Japan permanently, even if they are never granted Japanese citizenship (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 2-3).

The aging of the population is undeniably a paramount concern for Japan. Japan holds the distinction of having the world's fastest-aging population, with a median age of 48, which is the highest globally (European Parliament 2020, 2). In the aftermath of the Second World War, Japan embarked on a remarkable trajectory characterized by a consistent increase in its average life expectancy, ultimately propelling itself to the vanguard of nations boasting exceptional longevity rates. The issue drew national attention in 1990 during the '1.57 shock' when Japan's birth rate plummeted to its lowest recorded level in history. By 2018, Japan achieved an average life expectancy of 81.25 years for men and an astonishing 87.32 years for women, as documented by the Public Relations Office (2021). Notably, data from the World Bank projects that the proportion of Japan's population aged 65 and above will surge to an unprecedented 30% in 2021 (The World Bank 2022), a trend that shows no signs of abating. Furthermore, starting from 2011, Japan has entered a rather unique demographic phase characterized by population contraction (European Parliament 2020, 1). This distinctive situation sets Japan apart as a significant nation that, even during times of prosperity and peace, experiences an overall reduction in its population.

However, this demographic shift toward an increasingly aged population is not without its manifold challenges. While Japan has largely maintained social stability and improved living standards, analysts contend that demographic trends have posed challenges to the nation's economic growth (European Parliament 2020, 5). Japan grapples with a dwindling workforce, a consequence of its aging citizenry, coupled with the inescapable upsurge in healthcare costs that accompany an elderly population. The Japanese government, cognizant of these impending challenges, has embarked on a series of policy measures in recent years, including initiatives like raising the retirement age and actively promoting immigration as a potential solution. Nevertheless, the issue of immigration continues to remain a contentious and divisive subject among the Japanese public (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Comparative attitudes towards migrant workers[1]

When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.

In tracing the trajectory of immigration in Japan, it is essential to delve into the historical context that has shaped the country's evolving relationship with foreign residents. Historical records reveal the presence of Chinese migrants residing in Japan as early as the seventeenth century, a trend that saw a steady growth until the acquisition of Taiwan by Japan in 1895. Following the colonization of Korea in 1910, a notable influx of Korean workers occurred, both through recruitment and forced labor. After World War II, Japan had an abundant supply of returning soldiers and rural labor reserves, which contributed to the availability of inexpensive labor for the country's recovery and remarkable economic growth. Consequently, migration to Japan from various countries remained limited until the late 1970s (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 4-5).

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[1] Source: Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version: https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.js Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

In contrast to Europe's extensive recruitment of immigrant 'guest workers' during the 1960s, Japan continued to rely on rural migrants as its primary source of low-wage labor. Japan's role as a net exporter of low-wage migrants shifted during the 1970s and 1980s, with a reversal in the trends of worker emigration and immigration. During this period, more foreign labor began to enter Japan than Japanese workers leaving the country (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 5). In the 1970s, Japan witnessed the arrival of several thousand refugees escaping conflicts in Southeast Asia, as noted by Kawakami (2003). This marked the beginning of a larger influx of foreigners into Japan, with even greater numbers arriving in the 1980s. During this period, the arrivals hailed from more diverse origins, primarily other parts of Asia. Motivated by employment opportunities and the favorable value of the Japanese Yen, these migrants secured jobs across various sectors within Japan's labor market (Capobianco 2020, 3).

Two significant events in the early 1990s were anticipated to exert a substantial influence on migration patterns in Japan. The initial event was the commencement of revisions to immigration laws in 1989, followed by further refinements in subsequent years. This initiative aimed to simultaneously facilitate substantial immigration of workers of Japanese descent (*Nikkeijin*), primarily from Latin America, while tightening restrictions on other potential migrants seeking low-wage employment in Japan. The second pivotal event was the collapse of Japan's bubble economy, leading the country into a profound recession that extended well beyond earlier optimistic forecasts (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 6). As a consequence, there was a reduction in the influx of Asian foreigners, accompanied by an upswing in the number of *nikkeijin* migrants, predominantly originating from Brazil and Peru (Capobianco 2020, 3). However, overall migration to Japan continued to increase (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 7).

Although the population of Brazilians and Peruvians in Japan reached its zenith in the early 2000s, the inflow of foreigners from other nations persisted. In addition to that, Japanese government implementing policies to encourage migrants to come to Japan (Capobianco 2020, 4). Immigration to Japan and the

presence of foreign workers in the country have witnessed a consistent increase since 2013, following the government's expansion of trainee programs designed to attract hundreds of thousands of temporary migrants. As stated earlier, foreigners constitute more than 2.5% of Japanese population now.

1.1. Argument in Brief

Despite the growing number of foreign residents in Japan, research on attitudes toward migration in Japan remains limited. There is a lack of understanding of why Japanese people have negative attitudes towards migration, which hinders efforts to promote social integration and cultural diversity in Japan. This is particularly important in light of Japan's aging population and the need for a larger labor force to support the economy. Thus, there is a need for more research on attitudes towards migration in Japan in order to develop effective policies and interventions to address negative attitudes and promote a more inclusive society.

Previous studies on attitudes towards immigrants in Japan present mixed results. This paper argues that anti-immigration is caused by symbolic threat perception and symbolic threat perception is caused by nationalism. Symbolic threat can be defined as a potential threat to abstract or intangible assets of society or the state. Although there are some studies that explain anti-immigration in Japan with symbolic threat perception, there is no study that investigates the reason behind symbolic threat perception. This thesis treats symbolic threat perception as a process that nationalism causes anti-immigration.

In this study, Michael Billig's concept of Banal Nationalism is used to 'stretch' the definition of nationalism. There are some studies that tested the nationalism as an independent variable affecting anti-immigration in Japan, yet the results of these studies suggested that nationalism is not effective for explaining anti-immigration. This paper critiques the aforementioned studies on two grounds. Firstly, it advocates for a broader definition of nationalism to accurately encapsulate the intricacies of reality. In this context, the significance of banal nationalism emerges as it offers a more expansive conceptualization.

Secondly, nationalism does not cause anti-immigration, yet it provides a discursive base for anti-immigration. In this sense, nationalism causes symbolic threat perception, and symbolic threat perception causes anti-immigration.

Japan, as a non-western established democracy, is a very valuable case for the literature on banal nationalism. Billig criticizes that nationalism is perceived as belonging to peripheric movements such as separatist movements or acts of the states that threatens the status-quo by claiming to change national borders. However, nationalism is not a phenomenon which appears in crisis times or in marginal groups, and then disappears. Nations and the nation-states are reproduced in a daily basis to maintain status-quo. He uses the term *banal nationalism* to explain the nationalism of the center. In other words, banal nationalism is used in established democracies to maintain the status-quo. Reversely, in marginal movements or developing countries, it is expected that hot nationalism is more apparent than banal nationalism (Billig 2002, 5-7). Japan is one of the most politically stable countries in the World[2]. As a result, there are very few marginalized groups associated with hot nationalism. As explained earlier, hot nationalism can be observed in times of crisis or among extreme groups. On the other hand, stable countries and "normal" times are useful to see how nations and nationalism are reproduced on a daily basis. Thus, Japan is a good example to study banal nationalism.

However, the examples that were cited by Billig in order to explain how banal nationalism was flagged on a daily basis are generally irrelevant to Japan. For example, Billig uses the metaphor of an unwaving flag to explain banal nationalism by stating that it does not have any special meaning, and that the millions of flags that are raised in front of institutions throughout the US are not noticed unless they are removed

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[2] The World Bank. (2010). *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. Retrieved from https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports (Accessed November 2021).

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(Billig 2002, 37–46). However, according to Fukuoka, the Japanese flag is not an uncontested symbol. Although the *hinomaru* was established as the national flag of Japan in 1999, however, there are still some people who view it as a symbol of Japanese imperialism in the Second World War (Fukuoka 2017, 346–347). Another example is the national anthem of Japan. Although kimigayo was legislated as the national anthem of the country in 1999, however, many locals have criticized its use since it reminds them of the Second World War (Shimizu 1999, 3–4). However, this does not mean banal nationalism is not available in Japan. The second aim in this thesis is that the symbols or signifiers of banal nationalism in Japan will be explained by replicating Billig's day survey in 1995 on Japanese press.

The preference for employing content analysis on newspapers rather than social media in this thesis is rooted in two primary considerations. Firstly, existing literature indicates that, akin to survey biases, individuals on social media platforms often express opinions that elicit greater interaction rather than their authentic beliefs. Unfortunately, these more interactive ideas tend to lean towards being nationalist, aggressive, or populist in nature (Mihelj & Jimenez-Martinez 2021, 339). Furthermore, Unur's (2018) investigation on Eksi Sozluk, a forum-like social media platform in Turkey, revealed a tendency among users to favor entries (comments) expressing more negative attitudes toward refugees or displaying a more nationalist tone. Consequently, for a study aiming to identify banal symbols of nationalism in Japan, a content analysis of social media is considered unsuitable. It is essential to clarify that this choice does not imply the neglect of hot nationalism. Rather, it is deemed more valuable to analyze newspapers, given that journalists are perceived to incline towards a more liberal stance than the overall society. This approach is crucial to demonstrate how even liberal journalists routinely emphasize nationalistic sentiments in their daily coverage.

Secondly, delving into X (previously Twitter) for research purposes necessitates proficiency in utilizing computer programs tailored for extensive data analysis, a skill set for which I have not undergone formal

training. Consequently, my expertise lies primarily in researching forum-like social media platforms such as 5channel (previously 2channel). Nevertheless, an examination of posts on 5channel unveiled a prevalence of ideas largely falling under the category of 'hot nationalism.' This research aspires to elucidate how even ostensibly innocuous or inconspicuous banal nationalism can serve as a precursor to the emergence of anti-immigration sentiments. Hence, I found it more suitable to showcase how even liberal journalists, compared to the prevailing 'hot nationalism' on social media, subtly endorse the nation-state as a natural phenomenon and influence nationalism.

The reason for the irrelevance of banal nationalistic symbols to the Japanese is attributed to the likelihood that these symbols are based on civic nationalism in the US or European countries. Breton (1988) believes that ethnic or cultural nationalism is based on cultural unity, and that membership to a nation requires ethnic or cultural eligibility. However, civic nationalism is based on institutions, and membership to a nation is decided by legally established criteria (Breton 1988, 86–87). Consequently, the examples of banal nationalism that have been cited are general illustrations of civic nationalism. Moreover, since ethnic nationalists are perceived as extreme elements by many Western countries, hot nationalism may be misconstrued as ethnic nationalism at first glance. Smith (2010, 44) makes a similar point:

> While civic nationalism may, in the eyes of some political philosophers, be combined with liberalism and so achieve a measure of respectability, ethnic 'blood-and-soil' forms of nationalism remain beyond the moral pale; their unregenerate particularism debars them from any civilized intercourse with 'mainstream' political ideologies.

While civic nationalism is generally associated with established Western democracies, ethnic nationalism is associated with developing or Eastern states (Tamir 2019, 425-426). However, I argue that banal nationalism does not necessarily have to be civic, since it is hardly understood by most people as being a form of nationalism. Instead, it is a presupposition or shortcut for living in a world that is made up of nations. Hence, depending on a society, it can be either civic or ethnic. Consequently, ethnic or

cultural nationalism does not necessarily have to be hot or aggressive. This is the second reason why Japan would constitute a very valuable case study in a discussion of banal nationalism. A textual analysis of the Japanese news media not only contributes to the literature by replicating Billig's study in a new country, but it also helps in an identification of the banal symbols of cultural nationalism.

According to Doak, after the Second World War, ethnic or cultural nationalism gained prominence in Japan after the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) censored or banned the publication of political materials and contents during the occupation of Japan by the US from 1945 to 1952 (Doak 2007, 250–251). Consequently, discussions that were held on cultural issues were perceived as being free from any political leanings and motivations. Yoshino (1992) also claims that cultural nationalism is more powerful than civic nationalism in Japan. This can be the reason why the examples of banal nationalist symbols do not make sense in Japan. In this sense, Japan is an appropriate case study to revisit the definition of banal nationalism. Does banal nationalism mean civic nationalism which became natural in established democracies? Or does it simply mean everyday nationalism which can be easily neglected? The answer to these questions will be searched in this thesis.

I argue that the underlying reason behind the anti-immigration is nationalism. I will use Billig's concepts of hot and banal nationalisms to define nationalism. Nationalism causes negative attitudes through particular processes in different societies. I argue that the main process which causes negative attitudes towards immigrants in Japan is that nationalism causes symbolic threat perception, and symbolic threat perception leads to anti-immigration.

Firstly, a textual analysis will be conducted on 13 Japanese newspapers on a randomly selected day to determine banal nationalistic discourses in the Japanese press as replication of Billig's day survey on English newspapers in 1995. In the study, logos and the names of newspapers, presentation and the content of the news, columns, editorials, banal nationalistic expressions like homogenous Japan, delicious

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Japanese cuisine or unique Japanese culture, etc., number of domestic and international news, advertisements will be examined. A codebook will be prepared to analyze the content of the news, and the articles will be coded according to this codebook in a coding sheet.

Secondly, International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III (ISSP 2013) data will be analyzed to test the hypotheses on a Large-N survey data. The analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, a linear regression model is constructed to test the effect of threat perception, hero perception, and rights-based perception on anti-immigrant attitudes. In the second part, two regression models are constructed to understand what determines symbolic threat perceptions. While in the first model only hot nationalism is included in the analysis, in the second model nationalism is defined broadly to include banal nationalism.

While existing literature highlights the tendency of individuals to respond to survey questions in a socially acceptable manner (Yavcan 2011, 28), this research opts for survey data due to its ability to provide the most representative insights into public attitudes, despite inherent biases. Conducting content analysis on social media poses limitations as it cannot capture the opinions of individuals who abstain from using such platforms. There exists a possibility that non-users share common attitudes for various reasons. To mitigate the impact of representability bias, the research relies on survey data, aiming to offer a more inclusive and comprehensive perspective on public sentiment.

Lastly, an original online survey will be conducted to explore the interplay between nationalism, symbolic threat perceptions, and anti-immigrant attitudes in Japan through an empirical investigation. The original survey is administered online with the intention of minimizing social desirability bias (Weisberg, 2008, 229). The data is analyzed in four parts. To explore the influence of threat perception, hero perception, rights-based perception, and sex on anti-immigrant attitudes, a linear regression model was developed as the initial step of analysis. Second part of the analysis is divided into two. Firstly, two linear

regression models are created to understand whether the origin of the immigrant influences attitudes toward immigrants. Then, the factors that shape attitudes towards different immigrant groups were compared by using seven linear regression models. In the third part of the analysis, a linear regression model is designed to examine the relation between anti-immigration and support for equal rights for immigrants. For the last part of the analysis, three linear regression models are constructed to identify the determinants of symbolic threat perception.

1.2.Ouline of the dissertation

The dissertation comprises seven additional chapters. In this particular chapter, I introduced the research question and provided a succinct overview of my theory. Within Chapter 2, I delve into the prevailing literature surrounding immigration attitudes, the contact hypothesis and studies focused on anti-immigration and nationalism. Subsequently, I elucidate how my study both complements and extends the scope of prior research in this domain.

Chapter 3 unfolds with the presentation of my theory, elucidating the origins of negative attitudes toward immigrants and the perception of symbolic threat. In this exploration, I incorporate the concept of 'banal nationalism' to broaden the prevailing definition of nationalism. This strategic inclusion serves to complement and expand the often-overlooked aspects of nationalism within the realm of immigration attitudes studies. A critical examination of existing research on nationalism and immigration follows, culminating in an analysis that underscores the utility of banal nationalism over Social Identity Theory for elucidating the neglected dimensions of nationalism.

Chapter 4 initiates a comprehensive academic exploration into the phenomenon of banal nationalism within the Japanese context. The initial focus centers on the inquiry into the existence of banal nationalism in Japan, probing its manifestation and prevalence within the cultural and societal framework. Subsequently, a meticulous examination of examples sourced from existing literature is undertaken,

shedding light on the nuanced instances and expressions of banal nationalism. This chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the subtle yet influential role of banal nationalism within the Japanese socio-cultural landscape.

In Chapter 5, I reveal the outcomes of a day survey conducted on Japanese newspapers, aiming to comprehend the media's role in perpetuating the national identity in our daily lives. The media holds a pivotal position in contemporary society, exerting influence across diverse facets of our existence and shaping our cognitive perspectives through its persuasive impact. Consequently, an examination of how newspapers routinely highlight national identity becomes crucial in unraveling the nuances of banal nationalism in Japan. Through the utilization of both quantitative and qualitative data derived from this research, I expound on the mechanisms through which the concept of nationhood is recurrently reinforced within the Japanese press.

In Chapter 6, the outcomes of the initial set of statistical tests corresponding to the hypotheses articulated in Chapter 3 are disclosed, utilizing a comprehensive Large-N dataset. Drawing on data sourced from the International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III (ISSP 2013), a twofold analysis is undertaken. Initially, a linear regression model is formulated to scrutinize the impact of threat perception, hero perception, and rights-based perception on anti-immigrant attitudes. Subsequently, two regression models are constructed to elucidate the factors influencing symbolic threat perception.

The concluding empirical chapter unveils the findings derived from an original online survey conducted in June 2023, with the data subjected to a comprehensive four-part analysis. The initial phase involves the development of a linear regression model to assess the impact of threat perception, hero perception, rights-based perception, and sex on anti-immigrant attitudes. The second segment of the analysis is bifurcated into two components. Firstly, two linear regression models are constructed to ascertain whether the immigrant's origin influences attitudes toward immigrants. Subsequently, a comparison of the factors

shaping attitudes towards distinct immigrant groups is undertaken, employing seven linear regression models. The third facet of the analysis involves the creation of a linear regression model to explore the relationship between anti-immigration sentiments and support for equal rights for immigrants. In the concluding part of the analysis, three linear regression models are formulated to identify the determinants of symbolic threat perception.

The final chapter serves as the culmination of the dissertation, offering a recapitulation of both theoretical and empirical discoveries, accompanied by a thorough examination of their implications for academic research and policymakers alike. Additionally, a discourse on the study's limitations is presented, alongside considerations of potential future avenues for extension. This discussion aims to contribute to the continuous enrichment of our comprehension and insight into the phenomena under scrutiny.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the introductory section, I presented the enigma and the primary inquiries that this dissertation aims to tackle distinctively from the prevailing approaches. I also alluded to the potential sources and methodologies through which I anticipated unveiling these solutions. Within this chapter, I will expound upon the scholarly discourse regarding immigration attitudes, conducting a thorough assessment of its merits and limitations. Additionally, I will exemplify the manners in which my proposed research deviates from current studies and effectively addresses the deficiencies in this academic domain.

The research on anti-immigration is a huge field of research to state all the works in a thesis. It branched out exclusively and many scholars from different areas of study tried to find explanations and solutions to anti-immigration. In this chapter, main works in this area will be introduced.

First, the corner stone studies in which attitudes towards immigrants have been examined will be analyzed. This literature began with the threat theories which is thought to be leading theory for explaining anti-immigration (Igarashi 2018, 977). This theory basically argues that negative attitudes towards immigrants result from the perception of threats. In accordance with Stephan and colleagues, the repercussions of threats on intergroup relations are deemed detrimental. Consequently, the examination of threat perception becomes imperative in the study of intergroup relations (Stephan et al., 2009, 44). It is noteworthy that these theories stem from the broader field of social psychology research on intergroup relations, surpassing the scope of attitudes solely towards immigrants. Studies which are directly related with immigration studies only will be introduced in this part.

A robust discourse surrounds the nature of perceived threats that contribute to negative attitudes towards immigrants. Scholars engage in varied perspectives, with some contending that realistic threats, such as job competition or strain on public resources, are pivotal factors influencing anti-immigration sentiments (Sherif 2015; Esses et al. 1998; Heinmueller and Hiscox 2010). This viewpoint is commonly

referred to as Realistic Threat Theory within the realm of social psychology. Realistic Threat Theory is not the same with Economical Threat Theory in immigration literature theoretically, but they have many similar points. Nevertheless, numerous scholars diverge from this theory. In their perspective, negative attitudes towards immigrants are rooted in symbolic threats, such as cultural threats or the perception of invasion (Wasmer and Koch 2003; Brader et al. 2008; Luedtke 2005). This conceptualization is encapsulated by the term Symbolic Threat Theory.

The concept 'Threat Theories' is used for the works in which negative attitudes towards immigrants are explained by perceived threats. This term has been borrowed by social psychology studies on intergroup conflicts. The term was first labeled as Integrated Threat Theory in Stephan & Stephan's work in 2000. They argued that four types of threat perception cause prejudice. These four types of threats are stated as realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes. Their concept of realistic threats originated from Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Le Vine& Campbell 1972) which argues that competition on resources causes group conflict (Stephan & Stephan 2000, 25). The concept of threat in Realistic Group Conflict Theory differs with Stephan & Stephan's concept of realistic threat in the scope of threat. While Realistic Group Conflict Theory pays regard to actually available threats, Stephan & Stephan defines realistic threat broadly as including perceived threats. Before discussing this difference, a summary of Realistic Group Conflict Theory is needed.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory tries to understand the reasons behind the inter-group conflict. This area of study is wider than anti-immigration studies. According to Sherif & Sherif (1973, 2),

> *"A group may be characterized as a social unit (1) which consist of a number of individuals who, at a given time, stand in more or less definite independent status and role relationships to one another and (2) which explicitly or implicitly possesses a set of values or norms of its own regulating the behavior of individual members at least in matters of consequence to the grou"*

Intergroup relations are relations between groups (Sherif 2015, 12). Each group has their own interests or goals which may overlap or conflict with the other groups' interests or goals. If two groups whose interests are conflicting come across, a group conflict will be inevitable. In other words, the reason behind intergroup conflict is competition (Sherif 2015, 81). Sherif generally emphasizes on actual threats. However, there are many scholars who states that even perception of threat is enough for the conflict between groups even though such threat is not available (Stephan & Stephan 2000; Esses et al. 1998). In this thesis, latter will be used to identify threats.

Esses and colleagues (1998) developed an instrumental model of group conflict by using the framework of Realistic Group Conflict Theory. According to them, stress on resources and salience of other groups cause negative attitudes. There are several factors which determine the level of perceived resource stress like scarcity, unequal distribution, and desire for unequal distribution. If people perceive stress on resources, they try to decrease the competition. Accordingly, they develop negative attitudes towards the group from whom they perceive threat. So, if summarized roughly, the reason behind anti-immigration is competition on resources. This view may be called as Realistic Threat Theory or Economical Threat Theory.

According to the Realistic Threat Theory, anti-immigration stems from perceptions of competition for material resources. According to Scheve and Slaughter (2001), anti-immigration is rooted in labor market competition. In other words, individuals oppose increased migration because they fear losing their jobs. As a result, blue-collar workers have negative attitudes toward blue-collar migrants, and white-collar workers oppose white-collar migrants. Nagayoshi (2009) conducted a study in Japan to examine the aforementioned hypothesis, employing data from the 2006 Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS). The results of her study revealed that the proportion of manual laborers emerged as the primary determinant in predicting negative attitudes towards immigrants. Specifically, individuals residing in economically

disadvantaged areas in Japan exhibited a higher likelihood of expressing anti-immigrant sentiments due to perceiving immigrants as a potential threat to their employment opportunities.

On the contrary, Heinmueller and Hiscox (2010) challenge this hypothesis. Their research reveals that both blue-collar and white-collar workers harbor negative attitudes towards blue-collar migrants, while concurrently holding a more positive view of white-collar migrants. The roots of anti-immigration sentiments, according to Heinmueller and Hiscox, stem from two factors: sociotropic considerations and ethnocentrism. Sociotropic considerations encompass concerns regarding the general economic situation of the country. In essence, while Scheve and Slaughter assert that anti-immigration is driven by perceptions of threats to personal interests, Heinmueller and Hiscox argue that perceptions of threats to in-group interests are more influential in elucidating anti-immigration sentiments. Kobayashi et al. (2015) tested this hypothesis in Japan through an experimental survey, discovering that high-status immigrants garnered more favorability irrespective of the respondent's income level in Japan.

The second category of threat believed to influence negative attitudes towards immigrants is symbolic threat. Some scholars argue that threats don't necessarily have to be tangible or material to evoke negative sentiments towards immigrants. In other words, symbolic threats alone are sufficient to shape a negative perception. Compelling studies support the notion that even when inter-group differences or in-group similarities are arbitrary or fabricated, discriminatory behavior can still manifest. Previous research demonstrated that discriminatory behavior towards other groups occurs when groups are defined based on visual judgments, even in the absence of personal advantages (Tajfel et al. 1971). Billig and Tajfel (1973) further explored whether this phenomenon persists when groups are randomly assigned and found that information about group membership is a significant factor in discriminatory behavior. The mere concept of 'group membership' is adequate to elicit discrimination. These findings suggest that symbolic differences hold greater significance than actual differences (Billig and Tajfel 1973). Thus, it is possible

to assume that symbolic threats are more effective on anti-immigration. This perspective is coined as Symbolic Threat Theory in the realm of research on attitudes towards immigrants.

Wasmer and Koch (2003) delved into the attitudes of Native Germans towards equal rights for immigrants, meticulously controlling for the impacts of realistic threats such as competition for scarce resources, experiences of frustration, contact with foreigners, and general systems of beliefs and values. Their findings indicate that the perception of being culturally different alone is sufficient to foster negative attitudes towards immigrants. They emphasize the significance of the immigrant's origin in predicting attitudes, highlighting that natives tend to exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigrants whose ethnic origin is proximate to their own. However, Nagayoshi (2011) presents a different perspective, asserting that cultural difference is not perceived as a threat in the Japanese context due to Japan's robust ethno-cultural identity. In Japan, cultural differences serve to reinforce the notion of Japanese 'uniqueness.'

Symbolic threats encompass more than just perceived cultural threats. Canetti-Nisim et al. (2008) argue that the primary driver of negative attitudes is the perception of security threats. Tausch and colleagues (2007) investigated the impacts of intergroup anxiety and perceived realistic and symbolic threats on intergroup attitudes, revealing that both symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety are significant predictors of anti-immigration sentiments. Brader and colleagues (2008) assert that discourses disseminated by political elites play a pivotal role in shaping native attitudes towards immigrants. They contend that the ethnicity of the immigrant predicts attitudes towards news about the costs of migration, revealing that attitudes towards immigrants with European origins tend to be more positive than those towards immigrants with Latin origins. Another influential factor in predicting reactions to the cost of migration is anxiety. When anxiety is triggered by manipulated discourses, negative attitudes become inevitable.

Ford (2011) critiques the evaluation of immigrants as a homogeneous group and advocates for a more nuanced approach. In his work investigating the reasons behind negative attitudes towards immigrants in England, he categorizes the immigrant group into seven segments and examines the impact of the origin of migrants on negative attitudes, considering other variables. The findings suggest that attitudes towards white migrants tend to be more positive than those towards non-white migrants. Additionally, factors such as education level, having a multi-ethnic background, or orientation of values significantly influence attitudes. Moreover, the study reveals that younger individuals exhibit lower levels of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism compared to older individuals, resulting in more positive attitudes towards immigrants and greater equality towards different immigrant groups with diverse ethnic origins.

Luedtke (2005), in a study conducted in Italy and Greece, identifies the number of immigrants and perceptions about the social rights that immigrants are thought to avail themselves of as factors influencing opinions about the harmonization of migration policies in the European Union (EU). According to him, negative attitudes stem from the perceived threat to occupation and sociotropic concerns.

Lahav and Courtemanche (2012) argue that negative attitudes towards immigrants are rooted in ideological threat perception rather than the ethnic or cultural origins of immigrants, unless the immigrant is framed as a national security threat. In this case, ideological differences become inconsequential. Ideological threat refers to the portrayal of immigrants as a threat to a specific ideology or political viewpoint.

Symbolic threat theories are under scrutiny in the context of Japan as well. Nakazawa (2007) conducted an examination of public opinion on immigrants, utilizing data from the JGSS 2003. The findings underscore the significance of the proportion of foreigners in an area in comprehending anti-immigration attitudes. In essence, the author argues that attitudes towards immigrants are contingent on the immigrant's

background, and an increase in the population density of immigrants elevates the likelihood that the host society perceives a symbolic threat from the immigrants.

Figure 2 Threat Theories

Existing literature on the attitudes towards Japan presents mixing findings. As stated earlier, Nagayoshi (2009) researched how the size of foreign population affects anti-immigration in Japan by using the data from JGSS 2006. The results of her study revealed that the proportion of manual laborers emerged as the primary determinant in predicting negative attitudes towards immigrants. For example, South Americans and Chinese are generally more negatively perceived, yet there is no evidence that Koreans are more negatively or positively perceived. Ultimately, she found that portion of manual workers is the most

determinant indicator which predicts anti-immigration. Japanese people living in the poorer areas are more likely to be anti-immigrant because they perceive immigrants as a threat to their jobs.

Kobayashi et al. (2015), on the other hand, studied on public opinion on citizenship eligibility through an experimental survey. They tested job competition thesis (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and found that negative attitudes are not resulted by job competition. They discovered that high-status immigrants are more favorable regardless the respondent's income level in Japan. Thus, it is possible to argue that sociotropic concerns are the most determinant factor which determines negative attitudes.

To sum up, Nagayoshi (2009)'s main argument is based on job competition hypothesis, and Kobayashi et al. (2015) found that sociotropic concerns are more predictive. In addition to these findings are mixed; these works have no response to the question why the host society perceives economic threat from migrants, yet they do not perceive economic threat from each other. It seems like that another indicator is needed to explain anti-immigration. Besides, as mentioned before, there are convincing studies that symbolic threat perception is more determinative than economic threat perception in predicting negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Green (2017) researched on the public perception in Japan by controlling threat theories, contact theory and salience of change hypothesis by using the data from JGSS-2010. Individual demographics and prefecture-level foreign population are also controlled as factors that may influence public opinion. He found that 63% of respondents were opposed to increase in immigration. Accordingly, age is found to have a negative correlation with positive perception of immigration, and education has a positive correlation. According to this research, the most predictive variable is cultural threat perception. Green's research is remarkable in that he presents strong evidence that Japanese people perceive cultural threat from immigrants, yet there is no explanation about why the host society perceives cultural threat from the immigrants in his work. Green (2017) defined cultural threat perception as being right-leaning and living

in a place where foreign population exists extensively. Thus, it is possible to argue that Green explains cultural threat perception with political ideology and perception of invasion threat. However, there is not enough data to argue that there is a positive correlation between right-wing tendencies and cultural threat perception. At the first glance, it is quite understandable that people with right wing tendencies are more anxious about protecting their culture. However, it seems odd to explain anti-immigration with right-wing tendencies because there is also not enough data to show that people with left-wing tendencies are more tolerant towards foreigners or open to cultural change. A further explanation about the origin of the cultural threat perception is needed. Accordingly, it is important to examine the works which explain anti-immigration in Japan with other indicators than threat perception.

Nagayoshi (2008) aimed to investigate the factors influencing anti-immigrant attitudes among the Japanese population, with a particular focus on perceptions of the impact of increasing immigrant numbers. Building on the "Perceived Threat Theory" from previous research, which highlighted the influence of perceived threats on xenophobia, this paper extended the analysis to include three types of perceptions: perceived positive influence, having no idea of the influence, and the perception of no influence. Utilizing data from the JGSS-2003, the study uncovered significant findings. Notably, anti-immigrant attitudes were intensified not only by the perceived threat but also by having no idea about the influence of increasing immigrants. Additionally, the effect of the rate of foreign residents on xenophobia, as identified in previous research, was mediated by the level of perceived positive influence. In essence, it was revealed that not only perceived threats but also ambiguous fears and goodwill towards foreigners contribute to the level of xenophobia. The study further identified variations in the type of perception of influence based on the nature of contacts with foreigners.

Adachi (2008) conducted a pilot study to investigate attitudes toward foreigners in Japan. The findings revealed that older individuals exhibit a higher tendency to oppose immigration compared to their younger

counterparts. Furthermore, the study identified that the origin of immigrants influences the attitudes of younger individuals, particularly if they perceive that the immigrants may not be fluent in the Japanese language.

Hamada (2008) investigated the factors contributing to anti-immigration sentiments in Japan through a meticulous analysis of two survey datasets from 1999 and 2005, both of which were administered in Gunma prefecture. The findings revealed a noteworthy increase in anti-immigration sentiments in 2005 when compared to the data from 1999. Utilizing regression analysis, Hamada discerned distinctive patterns in the relationship between demographic factors and attitudes toward immigrants. Notably, age emerged as a significant predictor, exhibiting a negative correlation with favorable attitudes towards immigrants. Conversely, interpersonal contact exerted a positive influence on attitudes, suggesting that increased interaction with immigrants correlated with more positive perceptions.

Furthermore, the study illuminated the role of education in shaping attitudes, noting that individuals with higher levels of education were less likely to perceive symbolic threats emanating from immigrant communities. This observation underscores the nuanced dynamics influencing public attitudes toward immigration and suggests a potential mitigating factor through educational interventions. The conclusive support for the group threat theory, as evidenced by the research results, adds a theoretical dimension to our understanding of anti-immigration sentiments in the Japanese context. Hamada's findings contribute valuable insights into the complex interplay of demographic factors, interpersonal dynamics, and educational backgrounds shaping attitudes towards immigration in Japan.

In the 2010 study by Hamada, attitudes towards foreign residents were investigated through an analysis of survey data collected from Gunma and Aichi prefectures. The key revelation from the study was the discernible difference in attitudes based on the occupational status of immigrant workers. Specifically, the findings indicated that attitudes towards blue-collar immigrant workers were markedly more negative

when compared to their white-collar counterparts. This nuanced distinction in attitudes sheds light on the role of occupational status in shaping public perceptions of foreign residents. The study further supported the Group Threat Theory through its analytical framework.

Kondo and Mukai (2017) delve into the factors influencing the tolerance attitudes of the Japanese population towards Muslims, contributing to the broader context of "The Research of Relations between Muslims and Non-Muslims in Contemporary Regions of Non-Muslim Majority.". This research places a specific emphasis on employing statistical methodology through a questionnaire. The questionnaire, administered to 232 college and graduate students in the Kanto area, serves as a tool to scrutinize the tolerance attitudes of the Japanese towards Muslims. To explore the determinants of tolerance attitudes, this study employed a questionnaire, investigating various variables. Prior to the primary analysis, an effort was made to intricately outline the images that the Japanese people hold toward Muslims. This involved the construction of image scales through factor analysis. The outcomes revealed the existence of three distinct factors of images, each aptly named: the "positive image factor," the "negative image factor," and the "piety image factor." Building upon the aforementioned analysis, the study explored tolerance attitudes toward Muslims using structural equation modeling. The findings indicated that the stability of identity, perceived threat, the positive image factor, and the negative image factor displayed statistically significant and direct relationships with tolerance attitudes. Furthermore, general trust, psychological essentialism, and contact experience exhibited indirect relations through the three image factors and perceived threat. Conversely, no discernible relationships were observed between the piety image factor and sex with tolerance attitudes. These results provide a nuanced understanding of the intricate interplay between various factors influencing tolerance attitudes within the Japanese context.

Igarashi (2018) claims that territory disputes trigger anti-immigration by using the data from Survey on the Image of Foreign Countries and Current Topics which is conducted between 2011 and 2013. He

argued that when the dispute on sovereignty on two islands, namely Senkaku/Diaoyu with China and Takeshima/Dokdo with South Korea, to become salient in the public space, it causes Japanese attitudes towards Chinese or Korean immigrants become more negative. The demonstrations on these islands by Chinese and Korean demonstrators in 2012, caused issue the become salient in the public discussion and, this caused attitudes to become more negative than before. I acknowledge that territory disputes trigger anti-immigration, yet it is a fact that anti-immigration exist although there is no territory dispute between the host country and the immigrants' country of origin (for example, Wasmer and Koch 2003; Ford 2011; Chandler and Tsai 2001). Thus, it is possible to claim that there is another indicator which causes an increase in anti-immigration when there is a territory dispute between host country and immigrants' country of origin.

Mukai et al. (2020) investigates tolerant attitudes toward Muslims in Japan and Korea through the lens of Integrated Threat Theory (ITT). The theoretical framework posits that realistic threat, symbolic threat, and intergroup anxiety directly influence tolerant attitudes, with assimilationism and group identification as distal variables shaping these proximal factors. A questionnaire was administered to 330 Japanese and 339 Korean individuals.

Contrary to ITT assumptions, exploratory factor analysis revealed an identical three-factor structure—general threat, entitlement, and perceived similarity—in both countries. Multigroup structural equation modeling demonstrated that assimilationism is linked to the three threat factors, which, in turn, impact tolerant attitudes. Measurement invariance was established between Japan and Korea. While the distinct separation of realistic and symbolic threat factors proposed by ITT was not supported, the study underscores the significance of three identified threat factors in influencing tolerant attitudes towards Muslims in both countries.

Davison and Peng (2021) examined how material (or economic) and symbolic perceptions of threat influence attitudes toward immigrants in Japan by conducting interviews with 28 local residents and public and political opinion leaders in Yamanashi Prefecture in 2015. The researchers discovered that the majority of participants held a negative stance towards immigrants' long-term residence, as they feared it could lead to the regeneration of Japanese culture. Interestingly, this opposition did not extend to foreign care workers, indicating a nuanced perspective among the participants. In other words, cultural threat perceptions have a negative effect on public opinion about immigration, but labor shortages can reduce cultural threat perceptions.

Laurence and colleagues (2022) explored how immigration process influences attitudes toward immigration. Using a longitudinal data, they examined the process over time. Ultimately, they found that increasing immigrant population density in an area have a negative effect on attitudes toward immigrants.

The contact hypothesis, initially developed by Allport, primarily focused on understanding the determinants of prejudice towards racial minorities in the United States. According to this hypothesis, increased interaction and contact between members of the majority and minority groups can lead to a reduction in perceptions of threat (Allport 1966). Intergroup contact refers to the interaction between members of different social or cultural groups that can lead to improved intergroup attitudes and reduced prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). In the context of immigration, increased contact between members of the host society and immigrants may play a crucial role in reducing stereotypes and negative perceptions associated with symbolic threat (McLaren 2003).

Several studies in the Japanese context have tested the contact hypothesis. Otsuki (2006) seeks to explore the impact of different types of contact with foreigners on the prevalence of prejudice and xenophobia among the Japanese population. Drawing from the "Contact Theory", previous research has identified specific types of contact, such as instrumental support, acquaintance potential, equal status, and

cooperation, as effective in reducing prejudice. In addition to these established categories, this paper examines the influence of casual contacts, like simple greetings, which are more prevalent in Japanese social interactions.

Analyzing data from the JGSS-2003, the study reveals noteworthy findings. In comparison to respondents with no contact with foreigners, those engaged in casual contacts, such as exchanging greetings, exhibit a more favorable attitude toward accepting foreign immigrants in Japan. Moreover, even indirect forms of contact, such as merely encountering foreigners in neighborhoods, demonstrate a positive effect on attitudes toward accepting foreign immigrants. This research contributes valuable insights into the nuanced dynamics of contact and its impact on shaping attitudes toward foreigners in the Japanese context.

Green (2017) examined contact defined as the ability to speak English and found a negative relationship with anti-immigration attitudes. Okubo (2021) examined what determines public preferences on immigration in Japan and found that being male, having better English skills, or having overseas experience reduces anti-immigration sentiment. Horiuchi and Ono (2023) examined the effect of contact on attitudes toward refugees in Japan and found that contact reduces threat perceptions. This thesis will also test the effect of contact on symbolic threat perceptions.

This thesis agrees with the hypothesis that anti-immigration sentiments in Japan are influenced by the perception of symbolic threats. Symbolic threats refer to potential threats to the intangible or abstract assets of a society or state such as the perception that immigrants can threaten national identity and culture (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2008, 91), or that immigrant groups can become an invasive force (Luedtke 2005). Similarly, Wasmer and Koch (2003) found that mere cultural differences are sufficient to generate negative attitudes.

Why the host society perceive immigrants as a threat to their national culture? Understanding the reasons behind perceived symbolic threat and the resulting opposition to immigration calls for a deeper examination of the concept of national culture. National culture is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon varying among individuals within a country. If we asked different people, "What is your national culture?", we would receive diverse and subjective responses. The diversity of perspectives stems from the intricate nature of national culture, which encompasses a broad spectrum of elements including language, customs, traditions, historical narratives, and shared values. Despite this rich tapestry, individuals often find themselves inclined to safeguard and preserve their cultural identity (Tsuda 2013, 48). This protective stance reflects the deeply ingrained connection individuals feel towards their cultural heritage, prompting them to navigate and negotiate the complexities of cultural diversity while striving to maintain the authenticity and continuity of their own cultural identity.

When individuals express a desire to protect their culture in the face of immigration, they are often referring to specific aspects of their national culture that they perceive as threatened. For example, some individuals may be concerned about preserving their language or traditional practices, while others may focus on maintaining their historical narratives or cultural heritage. Recognizing that these threat perceptions and the consequent opposition to immigration are not universal or homogeneous across the host society is essential.

Furthermore, exploring why there seems to be a lack of opposition to internal migration in the same country despite its potential impact on local cultures and communities is intriguing. This paradox can be attributed to the role of nationalism. Nationalism, as a collective ideology, emphasizes the unity and preservation of a nation-state's cultural identity in the face of external influences. As for internal migration, individuals may perceive a shared national culture transcending regional or local differences, mitigating the perceived threat and opposition.

Therefore, nationalism plays a significant role in shaping the perception of symbolic threat and influencing attitudes towards immigration. It provides a framework through which individuals interpret the potential impact of immigration on their national culture and guide their responses in terms of support or opposition. Put differently, it delineates the process through which nationalism gives rise to anti-immigration sentiments. Understanding this intricate relationship between nationalism, symbolic threat perception, and anti-immigration sentiments is crucial for comprehending the dynamics of immigration debates and policies in Japan.

While there is currently no study specifically testing nationalism as an independent variable affecting symbolic threat perception in Japan, there are studies that have explored nationalism as an independent variable influencing anti-immigration sentiments. Pedersen et al. (2005) conducted research in Australia, controlling for various variables such as sex, education, ideology, national identity, and lack of information. They concluded that the primary factor contributing to anti-immigration attitudes is a lack of information. In this study, national identity is defined as a distinctive social group identity and assessed within the framework of intergroup prejudices, referencing Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979). It's worth noting that Turner argues that a nation is not a distinct social group but shares a similar conceptualization with other social groups (Turner 1984, 521). National identity, in Pedersen et al.'s work, is measured "by asking respondents how much they identified with being Australian" (Pedersen et al. 2005 154). According to Social Identity Theory, individuals categorize themselves in various ways. In different contexts, different identities become evident. The stimulants that provide passing through the identities are very thin and difficult to notice. According to Turner, people do not consciously think about their identity. An Australian man may not think about his national identity for days; however, this identity becomes evident in the appropriate environment (Tuner et al 1987, 54). This shows that group identities are always present in a self-defining force. Michael Billig objects to that. Even

though the Australian man does not consciously think about that he is Australian, he continues to live unconsciously in a nation-state and in the world of nations. Nation-state is the way people live every day (Billig 2002, 69). Accordingly, being a nationalist does not necessarily require saying ''I feel strong ties with Australian people''. Billig asserts that feeling belonging to a nation is not a conscious psychological state of an individual maintaining by remembering his or her identity, national identity is daily and unconsciously lived in the world of nation-states maintaining by forgetting the identity (Billig 2002, 69).

Sides and Citrin (2007) also examined nationalism as one of the indicators influencing anti-immigration attitudes in their research on attitudes towards immigrants in the European Union (EU). They posited that material interests and cultural identities play pivotal roles in shaping attitudes towards immigration. Classifying nationalism as an individual factor, they found that nationalism does not serve as a predictive factor. The measurement of nationalism involved two questions. The first question asked respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions" (Sides and Citrin 2007, 485). The second question gauged respondents' support for policy-making at the supranational or national level (Sides and Citrin 2007, 485). I admit that these two questions can measure nationalism to some extent, especially its conscious part, yet they are not enough to measure nationalistic sentiment adequately. Because authors were used the data from European Social Survey, they did not have control on questions.

Tanabe (2011) conducted a study to examine the potential correlation between nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments. The researcher operationalized nationalism by utilizing three distinct components: patriotism, exclusive nationalism, and purification ideology. Patriotism was measured through three items, including feelings of pride in being Japanese, the belief that the national anthem should be taught in schools, and the recognition of the need for patriotism education. Exclusive nationalism was defined as xenophobia, while purification ideology referred to ethnic nationalism. Tanabe

has posited that anti-immigration sentiments are best explained by economic threat perceptions. Within this context, patriotism and purification ideology exhibit a positive correlation with economic threat perception. However, no significant correlation emerges between exclusive nationalism and economic threat perception. It is essential to emphasize that this study does not assess symbolic threat perception; hence, there is no discussion in this study comparing whether economic threat perception is a superior determinant of anti-immigrant sentiments in Japan compared to symbolic threat perception. Furthermore, the study's measurement of nationalism may not fully capture the complexity and multidimensional nature of the concept. The chosen items used to define nationalism may not adequately capture the range of nationalist sentiments, potentially limiting the comprehensiveness of the findings. This thesis argues that when nationalism is defined in a broader sense, the real origin of the symbolic threat perception and consequently the real reason for anti-immigration can be found.

What factors contribute to the perception of symbolic threat from immigrants? Why does the host society perceive immigrants as a threat to its national culture? The opposition towards immigration stems from a desire to safeguard their own culture. However, the concept of national culture itself poses challenges in terms of reaching a consensus among individuals within a country. When asked about their national culture, it is unlikely that all individuals will provide the same answer. Consequently, it raises the question of which specific culture they aim to protect. For instance, if their objective is to preserve the culture in the capital, if one exists, then why is there no opposition to internal migration? It is argued that nationalism holds the key to answering these inquiries.

Benedict Anderson (1983) posits that the concept of the nation constitutes an "imagined community," thereby extending the idea to national culture as well. According to Anderson, this imaginative construction of the nation is made feasible through a specific perception of time he terms as 'homogeneous empty time.' This notion of 'homogeneous empty time' enables individuals to comprehend the past, present,

and future as an interconnected continuum. Although not personally acquainted with all members of the nation, individuals inherently sense a connection to others residing within the homeland. As a result, this shared connection fosters the belief in a fixed cultural identity that binds them together (Anderson 1983, p 22-30). Therefore, cultural threat perceptions can also be explained by nationalism. cultural threat perception contributes to opposition against the acceptance of immigrants, as individuals fear that immigrants may jeopardize the cultural fabric of the host society. For example, Green (2017) identified cultural threat perception as a cause of anti-immigration sentiments in Japan. But why do Japanese people perceive cultural threat from immigrants? It stems from their desire to protect their own culture, leading to opposition against immigration. However, the concept of "Japanese culture" remains subjective, as obtaining a unified answer from all individuals in Japan regarding its definition is unlikely. Therefore, the question arises as to which specific culture they aim to protect. The concept of 'homogeneous empty time' is useful at this point. People are aware that fellow community members exist somewhere, even if they do not personally know them. This understanding forms the basis for imagining a fixed culture or identity. Additionally, Billig's perspective suggests that people perceive the nation as a uniform entity. Consequently, individuals tend to believe in the existence of a distinct "Japanese culture" and strive to safeguard it. While it is understandable to protect one's way of life when it is threatened, the need to protect an abstract concept like national culture arises as a result of nationalism.

Symbolic threat perception refers to the belief that immigrants pose a threat to the cultural and national identity of the host society. This perception is deeply influenced by nationalism, which plays a significant role in shaping people's attitudes and behaviors towards immigrants. Michael Billig's concept of "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995) is very useful in explaining symbolic threat perception.

3. BANAL NATIONALISM

In his book, *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig (2002) attempts to explain how nationalism is (re)produced on a daily basis and why it is easily neglected. He begins his book with a speech that was given by President George Bush at the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990. In his speech, Bush remarked that "Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation." The point that was being made by this comment was that a nation is in danger. Although despotic leaders, including Saddam Hussein, are killing, or persecuting the citizens who live in another nation-state, it is not enough reason for launching a war. Nevertheless, an attack on a nation-state was a sufficient reason for the US to initiate a war. Bush did not explain why the survival of a nation is important because there was no need to. Everyone knows the importance of the notion of a nation (Billig 2002, 1–2). Ordinary people do not ask the politicians why they must die to protect the country (Billig 2002, 6-9). In essence, the act of fighting to protect one's country is so ingrained in societal norms that it often goes unnoticed as a nationalist action. A banal nationalist anticipates that citizens of other nations similarly hold nationalist sentiments within the global community of nations. This perspective contributes to the perception of nationalism as a pervasive global ideology (Billig 2009, 349).

According to Skey (2009), the concept of "banal nationalism" that was introduced by Billig is seen as the most influential study of everyday forms of nationalism. One of his most important contributions was his critique of the apparent orthodoxy that was found in the literature, which was directed at two areas. First, previous studies on nationalism were focused on "when and what is the nationalism." In other words, they attempted to explain how nationalism became a phenomenon in world history. Billig, however, uses a functionalist point of view to explain how nation and nationalism are reproduced in everyday life. Nation-states reproduce their nations daily in the world of nations as sovereign nation-states through a "complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations, and practices" (Billig 2002, 6). This set of

ideological habits are one of the reasons of symbolic threat perception. For example, invasion threat or threat to national security is generally originated from framing of immigrants as a numerical entity, with a population growth rate higher than that of the host society. This belief that immigrants, due to their increasing population, might claim a portion of the homeland instills anxiety and leads to anti-immigration sentiments. The question arises as to why people perceive an increased immigrant population as attempting to invade their country, while not fearing a group of individuals sharing a specific political ideology or hobby doing the same. This disparity can be attributed to the context of living in a world of nations, where the "others" are imagined as opportunistic individuals coveting possessions and awaiting an opportunity to steal them. Within the realm of nations, the "worst" others are defined in terms of national identities, making foreigners worse than rock music enthusiasts. People feel the need to safeguard their perceived space from these "others," leading to opposition against immigration.

Perceiving immigrants as a threat to public order serves as another illustrative example. This perception often arises from the belief that the presence of immigrants will lead to an increase in crime rates. For instance, Stansfield and Stone (2018) discovered that perceptions of migrants as a criminal threat significantly influence attitudes toward immigration in the UK. Conversely, numerous studies indicate that immigration is associated with decreased crime rates (Zatz and Smith 2012). The question arises: why do British people or citizens of other nation-states maintain the perception that immigrants commit more crimes, despite evidence to the contrary? According to Social Identity Theory, individuals construct their identity through comparisons with an "other" or an outgroup, wherein the in-group consistently emerges as the superior entity (Tajfel and Turner 2004). Consequently, making unfounded accusations against others reinforces one's own identity. However, the choice to specifically blame immigrants by the host society, as opposed to, for example, university students or volleyball players, can be attributed to the same reasoning: living in a world defined by nations. Members of the nation tend to define their out-groups

based on national identities, and blaming immigrants serves to bolster the self-esteem of citizens by attributing the source of problems to an other who is from another nation-state. Billig posits that within the world of nations, the term 'foreigner' serves as a distinct category for referring to the 'other.' Foreigners play a significant role in the construction of the nation because the stereotypes and perceptions associated with them serve to create a clear distinction between 'us' and 'them' within the national identity (Billig 2002, 78-83).

Second, Billig criticizes the perception of nationalism as an extreme ideology that is held by peripheral groups—such as those who are fighting for independence from a nation-state—or extreme political groups (Skey 2009, 335–337). Instead, nationalism is (re)produced everyday throughout the world. Consequently, it is not a phenomenon that surfaces in times of crisis and then vanishes away (Billig 2002, 5–7). In addition to that, nationalism is not a tool that far-right politicians invented, it is an identification category for ordinary citizens (Phillips 2012, 510).

Billig uses the term "banal nationalism" to stretch the definition of nationalism (Billig 2002, 6). Banal nationalism is the nationalism found at the core of society. In contrast, hot nationalism, which can be easily recognized and involves or evokes emotions, prevails at the periphery, such as among separatist movements and far-right political groups at times of crisis. Banal nationalism is found in established democracies or the majority of societies.

Brekke and Staver (2018) claim that immigration policies are renationalized in the crisis times. According to them, in order to ensure collective attitude on the policies about asylum seekers, renationalization is appealed in the crisis times. They made their research in Norway and stated the needed factors which lead to renationalization. According to that:

1. The necessary political and institutional premises needs be formed,

2. A scarcity on resources is needed to be available

3. Triggers needs to be engaged

4. Zeitgeist (time spirit) needs to entail this action

5. Consensus on immigration policy cannot be achieved.

If a situation in which all the factors above is available rises, renationalization occurs. According to this approach, immigration policies are not framed with nationalism in normal times, and only in crisis times nationalization of immigration policies occurs. However, it is neglected in this study that Norway still exists as a nation-state after the crisis is over. Norway reproduce itself in a daily basis in the world of the nations as a sovereign nation-state by a 'complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices' (Billig 2002, 6). In this sense, nationalism is an ideology that becomes the common sense of the societies. These common senses are similar in that all presume the nation-state as uncontested reality, yet they can be different in the symbols that reproduce the nation. However, this does not mean that nationalism or the nation is perceived as the same by all members of the nation. There are contesting nationalisms in every society (Billig 2009). In addition to that, individuals are not empty vessels that absorb the messages in an uncritical way. Human thinking is not based on information-processing, rather it is based on rhetoric. People use rhetorical tools of 'common sense' to understand and express the happenings in their lives. This makes them ideological subjects, and this never means that they passively receive a single ideological message, rather they look the world from the window which is constructed by ideological dilemmas. Thus, there is nothing in the theoretical background of banal nationalism to deny that ordinary people will engage in sense-making (Billig 2009, 347-348).

Defining a nation is a dynamic process with different ideas about '"who we are" contesting in the national context. According to Renan, the existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite (Renan 1990, 19).

Although the concept of a nation exists in all established democracies, numerous definitions can be found for particular nations (Billig 2009, 347-348). In other words, various political parties can have different definitions for a nation-state, but with all discussions framed within the context of the world of nations. A nation-state is approved implicitly in everyday practices and national elections (Billig 2002, 100-104). In liberal democracies, the people are self-governed at regular intervals, and therefore the fate of their nation, and nationalism is routinely approved during the two elections (Billig 2002, 95). However, nationalism is approved not only in political processes, but also in everyday encounters. Institutions, symbols, flags, marches, etc. they are the means of validation, and their essential powers are stored in the customary of all these means. The naturality of the approval is the banal part of Billig's theory. People routinely approve their identity, that is, without noticing the nation. According to Billig, nationalism is not a state of mind of the modern nations which they use sometimes, but a disease specific to the people living in that country (Yumul and Özkırımlı 2000, 788).

The founding dialectic of the banal part of nationalism is the dialectic of forgetting and reminding (Billig 2002, 37). As Renan points out, forgetting is a vital element in the founding of nations (Renan 1990, 11). Communities owe their collective assets to forgetting. National identity is remembered because it is embedded in everyday habits; however, the reminders of national feelings, which are so numerous and familiar to daily life that they inculcate national identity unconsciously, are soon forgotten. This process of forgetting and remembering national identity is a constitutive part of banal nationalism (Billig 2002, 37-38). For example, a flag hanging in a classroom is a reminder of national identity that comes to mind when the flag is removed from where it was hanging. The flag is seen there every day, but it reminds us of national identity only when it is removed. (Billig 2002, 40-41). In the same way, symbols are one of the factors that make the nationalism banal. For example, maps represent the nation's space (Billig 2002, 116). Maps are never understood as a nationalist element; they are hung in all classrooms and are present

in all books. Maps symbolize that the space of the nation is fixed, and this fixed place belongs only to a particular nation. Money is also an important reminder of the nation's sovereignty (Billig 2002, 41-42).

Deixis are important banal symbols or reminders of national identity on a daily basis. They function as pronouns of places or people, depending on the context (Billig 2002, 94), providing national sentiments without being recognized. Deixis flags the nation without being recognized. Expressions that sound very natural at first glance may also be a sign of nationalism. According to Billig, deixis is generally manifest in everyday political discourses. When politicians are speaking, they appeal to a wide audience, they use deixis like 'we' or 'here' in their speeches. However, deixis is also vastly used by the media (Billig 2002, 106-109). Because of that, mass media is crucial in reproduction of nationalism and broadcasting it to large amounts of people. The media is a very important banal symbol that reinforces the national identity.

Patersoo, in his study which he examined the use of pronoun 'we' in Scottish media, found that it was used widely. However, it sometimes used for Scottish people and sometimes for whole people living in the UK. This shows that deixis can clarify the confusion because of conflicting or nested identities. Because deixis is used unconsciously as a part of banal nationalism, using the pronoun we in different contexts shows that Scottish people's identity dilemma (Patersoo 2007,419-436). Billig emphasizes that the gaps in the language are generally not innocent (Billig 2002, 6). The gaps in the language expresses the common sense that the ideology has crated.

The use of something that symbolizes the nation, such as the flag, is not perceived as routine if it is used conspicuously. The unwaved flag, rather than the waved flag, symbolizes the banality in the reproduction of nationalism. Making the nation a category of identity without being noticed is important. For example, the flag, the country's name, the maps, the founders of the countries, the monumental tombs, or the buildings of the institutions refer to us as the social, economic, ethnic and national integrity of the nation (Cotofana 2011, 520-521). Incorporating the name of the country into all institutions serves as a

constant reminder to individuals that they are the proprietors of the nation in a seamlessly routine manner. Similarly, displaying the image of the founding leader ubiquitously draws attention to places where such images are absent. Expressing disapproval or criticism toward the founding leader is often perceived as an extreme stance by society at large. Maps, despite not being commonly recognized as nationalist symbols, play a crucial role in symbolizing the spatial borders of a nation. Displayed in classrooms, books, and weather news, maps reinforce the concept of territorial ownership by the nation (Unur 2018, 26). Money, too, functions as a symbolic tool for perpetuating nationalism in everyday life, serving as a representation of the state's sovereignty.

Members of a nation-state consider themselves a community based on broad and national factors. This comprehension furnishes individuals with an identity that members of the national community can embrace. Yet, if nationalism delineates who "we" are, it necessarily defines who "they" are, as the definition of "us" relies on the distinction from the "other." Billig aptly characterized the term "foreigner" in the world of nations as a specific category for the "other." A modern foreigner is one with a nationality other than ours. This definition is modern because without nation-states, nationality would not have been so significant. Foreigners are important to a nation-state because foreigner stereotypes separate "us" from "them" (Billig 2002, 78-83).

Citizens of nation-states in the world of nations may have common sense ideas about nations, such as the idea that communities speaking the same language may wish to have their own nation-states. As scholars are also citizens of nation-states, they share ideas on nationalism. This common understanding often assumes the concept of a nation as given and may consequently impede a thorough comprehension of the phenomenon. Hence, scholars are urged to "bracket" their own common sense regarding nationalism (Billig 2002, 13-15). The literature on immigration serves as an illustrative example of the consequences when scholars fail to "bracket" their inherent common sense on nationalism. Wimmer and Shiller (2002)

criticized the immigration literature for taking the notion of nation-state for granted. They refer to this as methodological nationalism. If banal nationalism could be brought within the definition of nationalism, it would clearly show the gap in the immigration literature. This study tries to fill this gap in the immigration literature by proposing a new explanation for anti-immigration sentiments in Japan and suggesting a broader understanding of nationalism. The main hypothesis of this study is that anti-immigration sentiment is caused by symbolic threat perception, which has a discursive basis in Japanese nationalism.

Figure 3 Hypothesis

Nationalism (Hot+banal nationalism → Symbolic Threat Perception → Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants

Billig and Tajfel (1973), in their experiments investigating the role of categorization in intergroup behavior, observed that discrimination can occur even when there are no actual intergroup differences or intragroup similarities. Previous studies have shown that when groups are formed based on external appearance, even if there is no personal advantage gained, individuals tend to exhibit discriminatory attitudes toward the other grou Billig and Tajfel conducted research to determine whether this attitude persists when groups are randomly assigned, meaning other group members are completely unknown. The

results of these experiments indicated that the knowledge of belonging to a certain group, even when groups are assigned randomly, contributes to intergroup discrimination. The term "group" constitutes a sufficient behavioral code for discriminatory actions (Billig and Tajfel 1973). These explanations suggest that symbolic differences can be more influential than actual differences. Moreover, it is possible to argue that nationalism also creates randomly formed groups (Druckman 1994, 45). Billig posits that within the world of nations, the term 'foreigner' serves as a distinct category for referring to the 'other.' Foreigners play a pivotal role in shaping the construction of the nation, as the stereotypes and perceptions attributed to them contribute to establishing a distinct boundary between 'us' and 'them' within the national identity (Billig 2002, 78-83). However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the concept of the foreigner is also arbitrarily constructed by nation-states. The primary differentiator between 'us' and the 'foreigner' lies in nationality, predominantly determined by the place of birth.

According to Social Identity Theory, having a superior in-group and an inferior out-group provides a secure social identity. However, if there are doubts about the superiority of the in-group or if the previously negative characteristics of the out-group somehow become superior, an insecure social identity is formed (Tajfel 1978, 93-94). Jerkins, on the other hand, argues that rapid change and social contact create uncertainty in individuals. Confronting an otherness that cannot be precisely characterized leads to confusion within individuals regarding their own group and identity. Consequently, the future becomes uncertain as well (Jerkins 1996, 9). However, when considering Japan in this context, it becomes apparent that the country has not experienced a rapid influx of foreigners on the scale observed in many European or Middle Eastern nations. The proportion of foreigners in Japan's total population is relatively low, standing at a mere 2.5%. Furthermore, it begs the question of why immigrants are seen as sources of uncertainty while tourists or international sports players, who are also from diverse backgrounds, do not elicit a similar sense of identity-related confusion among individuals. This observation prompts us to

critically examine whether the assumptions made by Social Identity Theorists regarding the role of nation-states in shaping identity are overly simplistic and may warrant further scrutiny.

At this juncture, it is imperative to elucidate why the choice of employing the concept of banal nationalism, rather than alternative theories of nationalism or identity, is warranted. For instance, Social Identity Theory, while encompassing nationalism as a category of identity, primarily seeks to measure nationalism on a broad scale, offering explanations rooted in psychological attributes that are not bound by historical context. Indeed, throughout history, various identity groups have existed, and one might argue that group formation is a universal phenomenon. However, divorcing nationalism from its historical context and perceiving it merely as an ordinary group potentially obfuscates its banal facets (Billig 2002, 67).

Social Identity Theory posits that group members must believe in the historical and current existence of their groups. In other words, even if an individual knows only a small fraction of the group, they tend to believe they know the characteristics of the entire grou This assertion aligns with Benedict Anderson's claim that members of a nation share a sense of togetherness despite not knowing the majority of their fellow members (1983, 15). Turner argues that all groups are products of imaginative construction, implying that nationalism isn't distinct from other groups (1984, 521). Billig, however, contests this notion. He contends that what distinguishes groups from each other are the ways they are imagined. The imagination of a nation differs from that of medieval communities (Billig 2002, 68).

According to Social Identity Theory, individuals categorize themselves in various ways, and different identities become salient in different contexts. The cues that facilitate transitions between identities are subtle and often go unnoticed. Turner argues that people don't consciously reflect on their identities. An Australian may go days without pondering over their identity, but in the right context, that identity becomes prominent. This demonstrates that group identities are always present as an underlying force in

self-definition. Billig, however, objects to this notion. He asserts that even if an Australian doesn't consciously think of themselves as Australian for days, they continue to live subconsciously in the world of nation-states and nationalism. The nation-state is a form of existence that people encounter daily (Billig 2002, 69). Therefore, in this thesis, I will use the theory of banal nationalism rather than Social Identity Theory.

The hypothesis proposing that nationalism engenders symbolic threat perception may initially appear as a tautology; however, an in-depth examination of the relationship between symbolic threat perception and nationalism is imperative for several reasons. Firstly, as previously elucidated, existing literature contains studies that investigated the impact of nationalism on anti-immigration sentiments and concluded a lack of correlation between nationalism and anti-immigration. I posit that two factors contribute to these findings. Firstly, nationalism in these studies is narrowly defined. Secondly, nationalism operates through a nuanced process. For instance, Unur (forthcoming) identified two processes through which nationalism fosters negative attitudes towards refugees in Turkey. In the first process, refugees are scapegoated, and Turkish citizens (advantaged group) construct a false victimization narrative by blaming refugees (disadvantaged group). In the second process, gender categories are employed to evoke negative attitudes or assign blame to refugees. Conversely, in Japan, symbolic threat perception functions as a pivotal process through which nationalism gives rise to anti-immigration sentiments. Figure 4 illustrates the process by which nationalism triggers anti-immigration sentiments in various contexts. The first line outlines the general hypothesis, the second line depicts how nationalism leads to anti-immigration sentiments in Japan, and finally, the case of Turkey is presented as another example to elucidate the underlying process.

Figure 4 Process through which nationalism induces anti-immigration sentiments in diverse contexts.

| General Theory: | Nationalism ⟶ Process ⟶ Anti-immigration |
| Japan: | Nationalism ⟶ Symbolic Threat Perception ⟶ Anti-immigration |

Turkey: Nationalism → Scapegoating and fake victimization of self → Anti-immigration
Nationalism → Gendered framing → Anti-immigration

It is argued that nationalism contributes to the development of symbolic threat perception. Furthermore, as explicated earlier, it is crucial to emphasize that banal nationalism is not merely an attribute confined to individual disposition but rather an intrinsic feature embedded within the broader societal fabric. According to this perspective, one might expect a widespread perception of symbolic threat from immigrants in the broader society. However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not universally the case. Thus, it is imperative to explore additional factors that may intervene and moderate the association between nationalism and symbolic threat perceptions. By identifying and examining these mediating factors, we can gain deeper insights into the complex dynamics underlying the interplay between nationalism and symbolic threat perceptions of immigrants. Such an exploration holds the potential to uncover significant determinants that may break the link between nationalism and symbolic threat

perceptions, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the nuanced factors that shape attitudes toward immigration in Japan.

4. BANAL NATIONALISM IN JAPAN

Japan, as a non-western established democracy, is a very valuable case for the literature on banal nationalism. It is one of the most politically stable country in the World.[3] Billig criticizes that nationalism is perceived as belonging to peripheric movements such as separatist movements or acts of the states that threatens the status-quo by claiming to change national borders. Nationalism is not a phenomenon which appears in crisis times or in marginal groups, and then disappears. Nations and the nation-states are reproduced in a daily basis to maintain status-quo. He uses the term banal nationalism to explain the nationalism of the center. In other words, banal nationalism is used in established democracies to maintain the status-quo. Reversely, in marginal movements or developing countries, it is expected that hot nationalism is more apparent than banal nationalism (Billig 2002, 5-7). In this sense, Japan is a good example to study banal nationalism as an established democracy with very few marginal groups. However, the main example that Billig gives to explain how banal nationalism is flagged in a daily basis is very irrelevant to Japan. Billig uses the flag as a metaphor to explain that one of the ways to reproduce nationalism daily is the dialectic of remembering and forgetting. According to that, waved flags are easy to notice. Thus, they are not useful for reproducing the nation daily. However, unwaved flags are very hard to notice, and very useful for everyday reproduction of nation. Millions of flags raised in front of the institutions in the USA are not noticed unless they are removed (Billig 2002, 37-46). However, according to Lawrence, the Japanese flag is not an uncontested symbol. Although the *hinomaru* was established as the national flag of Japan in 1999, however, there are still some people who view it as a symbol of Japanese imperialism in the Second World War (Lawrence 2016, 77). The flags in the USA are perceived as not

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[3]   World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," accessed November 13th, 2021, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports.

having any special meaning and banal symbols of flagging the nation-ness daily, yet it is not the case in Japan.

National anthem is another way of flagging nationalism in a banal way. National anthem is singed before the sports games, or in the commencement ceremonies of the schools in many established democracies, yet it is not perceived as a nationalist behavior. However, in Japan, national anthem is also not an uncontested sign of Japan. Despite the legal designation of *Kimigayo* as the national anthem in 1999, there remains a considerable number of individuals critical of its use, asserting that the song evokes memories of World War II (Shimizu 1999, p 3-4). However, it is essential to recognize that the widespread skepticism surrounding the *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo* does not imply that nobody perceives them as national symbols. The crucial aspect is whether these symbols are embraced as such without scrutiny or awareness.

The reason for the irrelevance of banal nationalistic symbols, which are cited in the literature, to the Japanese is attributed to the likelihood that because the studies on banal nationalism are generally conducted in 'established' Western or quasi-Western states where civic nationalism is perceived as more 'normal' than ethnic nationalism, the symbols of banal nationalism cited in the literature are based on civic nationalism. Breton (1988) claims that ethnic or cultural nationalism is based on cultural unity, and membership to the nation requires ethnic or cultural eligibility. On the other hand, civic nationalism is based on the institutions, and membership to nation is decided by legally established criteria (p 86-87). While civic nationalism is generally associated with established Western democracies, ethnic nationalism is associated with developing or Eastern states (Tamir 2019, 425-426). Thus, the examples that is given for banal nationalism are generally examples of civic nationalism, and because ethnic nationalists are perceived as extreme in many Western countries, hot nationalism may be understood as ethnic nationalism at the first glance. However, I argue that banal nationalism does not necessarily have to be civic. Banal

nationalism is a kind of nationalism that the big majority of the society cannot realize that it is nationalism. It is a presupposition or shortcut for living in the world of nations. Thus, it can be civic or ethnic depending on the society.

According to Doak, after the Second World War, ethnic or cultural nationalism gained prominence in Japan after the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) censored or banned the publication of political materials and contents during the occupation of Japan by the US from 1945 to 1952 (Doak 2007: 250–251). Consequently, discussions that were held on cultural issues were perceived as being free from any political leanings and motivations. Yoshino (1992) also claims that cultural nationalism is more powerful than civic nationalism in Japan. The author claims that the modern cultural nationalism in Japan is theorized by the authors of Nihonjinron (discussions on Japanese-ness) and diffused to the society. Nakanishi (2012) also claims that cultural nationalism gained power after 1970s. This can be the reason why the examples of banal nationalist symbols do not make sense in Japan. In this sense, Japan is an appropriate case study to revisit the definition of banal nationalism to show that banal nationalism does not necessarily have to be civic, and ethnic nationalism does not necessarily have to be extreme.

It's crucial to highlight that Billig explicitly asserts the presence of banal nationalism in all 'established' democracies, irrespective of their geographical location in the East or West (Billig 2017, p 310-313). While Billig doesn't explicitly delve into the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism in his exploration of banal nationalism, it is notable that the examples often cited as banal nationalist symbols predominantly align with the characteristics of civic nationalism. Hence, I posit that banal nationalism doesn't inherently have to be civic; this proposition serves as a complementary addition to our comprehension of banal nationalism. Banal nationalism is a presupposition or shortcut for living in a world that is made up of nations. Hence, depending on a society, it can be either civic or ethnic. Consequently, ethnic nationalism does not necessarily have to be hot or aggressive.

Few studies have examined banal nationalism in Japan. Nuckolls (2006) analyzed banal nationalism in Japanese cinema, focusing on the film Pride: The Fateful Moment. As examples of banal nationalist symbols, this study considered certain cultural traits that the Japanese are believed to have, such as sacrifice or honor of self-abnegation. Hambleton (2011) studied cultural or banal nationalism in Japanese television programs and found that the variety programs that the foreigners show up create an image of the foreigner "other" in a banal way. Fukuoka (2017) examined the nationalism of the Japanese youth, focusing on banal nationalism. This study is valuable in that it explains the taken-for-granted youth nationalism in Japan. Ichijo (2017) studied the relationship between food and nationalism, again focusing on banal nationalism. Sasao (2020) studied sports nationalism using sports news coverage data, focusing on both cognitive nationalism and banal nationalism. Note that no study in the literature has examined the Japanese attitudes toward immigrants with a broad definition of nationalism to include banal nationalism.

Assumptions, or myths, on the society which are shared by the many members of the society can be seen as one of the banal nationalist symbols of the society. For example, the myth that Japan is a homogenous nation without a history of immigration (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 9) can be seen as one of them. The members of the nation imagine themselves as a broad community which is grounded on national factors (Billig 2002). Believing that the members of the nation are ethnically homogenous is an example of imaging the nation. In other words, Japanese people, like many other nations in the world, imagine an ethnically homogeneous nation without any immigrant or minority groups. Another example of ideological habit-like assumptions, which also supports the homogenous Japan myth, is that the assumption that the foreigners who is not from Asian countries can speak English. According to Hambleton (2011), this assumption is (re)produced and reinforced by the media, by asking foreign panelists to speak 'only' in English in the variety TV program called *Cool Japan*. This policy was probably because the producers wanted to grant the 'otherness' of the foreign panelists. Thus, I, maybe arbitrarily,

argue that this policy reinforces and reproduces the holistic manner toward foreign cultures when comparing them with Japanese culture.

Another example that flags Japanese-ness in a daily basis is 'Japanese cuisine' (Takeda 2008). The image that 'delicious food in a beautiful country' reinforces national pride of ordinary citizen. Takeda states that Japanese food is essence of Japanese-ness (2008, 6). Attributing a nation to a food would only be possible in the world of nations. There is, unfortunately, nothing which is open for common possession of humanity in the world of nations. The image of the world which is divided into nations requires that all possessions that humanity have need to be apportioned among nations, in the same way with the space and the population. Consequently, it is not surprising that nations try to possess the food, which is an essential part of everyday life. Japanese food is a symbol that reminds Japanese people that they have a unique and shared national culture.

The role of deixis in the daily reproduction of nationhood is underscored by Billig (2002 94). Tsuda (2007) illuminates this phenomenon in the Japanese language, citing examples like "watashi" (I), "ashita" (tomorrow), "wareware" (we), "konokuni" (this country), or "koko" (here). Drawing a parallel with the usage of 'the' in English (e.g., "the president" or "the economy"), Japanese employs a similar logic. In this linguistic framework, it becomes possible to reference aspects of the nation without explicit pronouns like 'we' or 'our,' simply by utilizing words that inherently encapsulate the national context—examples include "Seifu" (the government), "Keizai" (the economy), or "tenki" (the weather) (Tsuda 2007, 206). These linguistic intricacies highlight the subtle yet powerful ways in which deixis contributes to the ongoing reaffirmation of national identity within everyday discourse.

Hambleton (2011) examined how Japanese nation is flagged in the variety TV shows. In these shows, the 'otherness' of the foreigners and 'uniqueness' of the Japanese culture is reproduced instantly. For example, she claims that an Italian panelist is requested to feign ignorance about the sound of a train in

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TV show called *Cool Japan*, allowing the program to showcase a segment suggesting that Japan's highly efficient and organized train system is unique. In addition, by emphasizing the difference, and stereotyping the 'other', the shows reinforced the 'japaneseness'. In other words, the national identity is reinforced by a focus on the 'other'.

Another finding that is stated in Hambleton's study (2011) is that she found that the foreign panelists are extremely identified with their nationality. For example, they appear wearing with name tags with their name and country of origin. Iwabuchi (2005) also emphasized that panelists are called with their nationalities instead of their actual names. By emphasizing their nationalities or identifying them with their nationalities, the holistic understanding of foreign cultures and the stereotypes that shows 'our' 'uniqueness' are reproduced. In addition, Hambleton (2011) states that Japanese flag is vastly used in *Cool Japan*, in order to highlight the 'other'. In this example, the flag is waving consciously to reinforce the differences between 'us' and 'them'.

Arudou (2015) examined the racist patterns in Japan concerning the definition of 'us' and 'them,' which he refers to as Embedded Racism. He approaches racism as a social construct issue rather than one based on biological differences. Furthermore, he asserts that Japan is not an exception when it comes to racism. He elucidates racism in Japan by scrutinizing the exclusion of visible minorities in Japan who differ visually from the majority of Japanese citizens.

According to Arudou, racism in Japan fundamentally manifests itself in the definition of what it means to be Japanese. The author contends that the essence of being Japanese is defined on racist grounds. Mere proficiency in the Japanese language or assimilation into Japanese culture is insufficient; one must also resemble a typical Japanese person to be considered Japanese. Similarly, those who are not Japanese are defined based on their visual appearance. Even if a person of non-Japanese origin who is phenotypically different than majority Japanese citizens acquires Japanese citizenship, being perceived as Japanese is

exceedingly challenging. Expressions like "gaijin" or "gaikokujin" in Japanese, used to refer to foreigners, characterize not nationality but visual appearance.

At first glance, racism may appear unrelated to banal nationalism. However, Aradou's conceptualization of racism bears notable resemblances to ethnic nationalism. While Aradou predominantly illustrates instances of what he terms as embedded racism, often akin to manifestations of hot nationalism, it is essential to note that certain aspects of his portrayal, such as the strict phenotypical definition of being Japanese, possess banal characteristics. Notably, the incident where Aradou was denied entry to a public bath due to his perceived foreign appearance despite being a Japanese citizen (2015, 3) is not readily classified as banal nationalism. Nevertheless, the definition of Japanese identity based on rigid phenotypic features contains banal elements.

In alignment with this perspective, Aradou introduces the term "Embedded racism," defined as "The overt, covert, subtle, or implicit expression of a normalized, hegemonic racialized discourse that is hidden and anchored in daily interpersonal interactions, laws and law enforcement, media, and other public dialogue. It has the effect of differentiating, 'othering' and subordinating people into a predetermined group or social status within a social order" (2015, 10). This conceptualization of embedded racism exhibits certain parallels with banal nationalism, particularly in the context of a 'normalized' discourse, which constitutes the banal facet of nationalism.

In this context, I posit that the phenotypical delineation of Japanese identity and the categorization of individuals as "gaijin" or "gaikokujin" embody certain banal nationalistic characteristics. The immediate categorization of a white American, who holds Japanese citizenship, as "gaijin" or "gaikokujin" upon initial observation (prior to verifying their nationality) is rooted in pervasive assumptions within Japanese nationalism. This categorization lacks a deliberate intent, conscious thought, or emotional involvement; rather, it emanates from prevailing, widely accepted notions about the Japanese nation.

Stockwin (2019) asserts that the depiction of Japan's political landscape, particularly in Western media, often characterizes it as cryptic and notably challenging to fathom, presenting conceptual intricacies surpassing those encountered in more familiar political systems. Furthermore, there is a proclivity to explicate the presumed distinctions through an essentialist perspective or by attributing them to cultural differences (2019, 3). This approach mirrors the explanatory methods applied to Japanese nationalism or the definition of Japanese identity, akin to categorizing them as 'exotic' phenomena or framing them within the framework of racism. As previously elucidated, Japan exhibits a prevalence of ethnic or cultural nationalism over civic or political nationalism, a distinction that induces perplexity among most Westerners. This confusion arises because ethnic or cultural nationalism is predominantly perceived as hot nationalism in Western democracies, where external appearance does not readily distinguish a white American (or European) from other citizens. Conversely, in Japan, such an individual can easily be labeled as a 'foreigner.' Given the freshness of this experience for a white person, it may foster a misinterpretation that Japan is more nationalist, or perhaps even racist, compared to their home country. However, adopting a reverse perspective reveals that people of color could similarly be labeled as a 'foreigner' in Europe. In this regard, Japan does not stand apart from Europe or other Western and semi-Western nation-states; the key distinction lies in the fact that the Japanese nation is defined with more pronounced ethnic and cultural nuances than its counterparts in Western democracies.

Kawamura and Iwabuchi's (2022) research delves into the realm of online nationalism in Japan, offering valuable insights by cataloging instances of hot nationalist movements in the country. The study highlights various examples, including the "Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform," the comic book "Senso-ron" (On War), and "Zaitokudai", which are characterized as hot nationalist movements. However, it is noteworthy that the authors refrain from explicitly labeling these movements as nationalist. Their assertion is encapsulated in the statement, "Even if more Japanese come to think of the Japanese as

a homogenous race and have the anti-China and anti-Korea sentiment, such thinking and sentiments do not directly nurture nationalism" (2022, 21). Contrary to their characterization, these manifestations indeed align with the characteristics of nationalism. The perception of the Japanese nation as homogenous constitutes a quintessential symbol of banal Japanese nationalism. Furthermore, anti-China and anti-Korea sentiments serve as hot nationalist symbols, although anti-China sentiments possess the potential to become banalized. Here, banalization refers to the transformation of a fervently nationalistic trait, initially evoking strong emotions, into a commonly held belief or assumption, ultimately resulting in the recognition that it is an inherently fervent nationalistic element.

Yoshino (1992) examined the roots and the diffusion of cultural nationalism in Japan. He argues that 'cultural nationalism aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people's cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate or threatened.' (Yoshino 1992, 1). He thinks that the nihonjinron is the root of modern cultural nationalism in Japan. He states that nihonjinron explain the daily occurrences or developments with the culture that is attributed to Japan. Not only academics, but also do the journalists, critics, writers and even business elites contributed the literature on nihonjinron. According to Yoshino, nihonjinron defines the Japanese culture with a holistic comparison between us and them, yet he stresses that it is founded on the differences of Japanese nation from the rest. In other words, the West is framed as mainstream, and Japan is represented as different from the mainstream. Nihonjinron shows two theoretical pillars of Japanese uniqueness as linguistic and communicative culture and the social culture. It invents the Japanese ethnicity as uniracial and homogenous. Yoshino admits that nihonjinron is the root of modern cultural nationalism, yet he rejects that the authors of nihonjinron are nationalist (1992, 7-28).

I contend that Yoshino's cultural definition can largely be interpreted as a manifestation of banal nationalism in Japan. Hambleton (2011) also claims that cultural nationalism is very powerful in Japanese everyday life. Although there is not an overt discussion whether banal nationalism could bear cultural or ethnic nationalist character in her paper, the author also classifies Yoshino's cultural nationalism as banal nationalism. Yoshino does not think that nihonjinron theorists are nationalist because he neglects the banal nationalism inescapably, because the book *Banal Nationalism* had printed after he had written his book. It may be true that the aim of the nihonjinron theorists is not to write the theoretical basis for Japanese nationalism, yet this does not change the fact that these authors take the nation as granted in their analyses. In addition to that, the holistic understanding of the culture in the nihonjinron is very compatible with the world of nation-states. Holistic view of cultures presents shortcuts for understanding the self and the other. This kind of shortcuts makes the world predictable for the ordinary citizen.

Yoshino states that Japanese thinking elites tend to perceive the uniqueness of Japanese social culture in a holistic manner. According to the author, the explanations of the industrial society in Japan by nihonjinron theorists are reproductionist. Reproductionism is defined as the holistic view that modern industrial society is based on the solidarity which is extended from pre-industrial society to modern society. For example, according to nihonjinron theorists, the principal kinship organization of pre-industrial Japan was the stem family. Thus, in the state-building period, familism is adopted. According to that, the emperor was the head of the main family, and other families are branched out from this. The enterprises are also familistic. Company is perceived as a fictive family in which oyabun (executives and more experienced workers) and kobun (less experienced workers) have a familistic relationshi According to nihonjinron theorists, this kind of perception eased to integration of the workers into a harsh environment. This is a kind of reproductionism that nihonjinron theorists done. According to Yoshino, the function of

reproductionism is affirming the modern Japanese society by looking back to the history (Yoshino 1992, 63-75).

While I partially agree with Yoshino's perspective, asserting that individuals contribute to the reproduction of the nation when provided with a positive identity, I posit that reproductionism is not solely driven by identity affirmation. In my view, nihonjinron theorists initially endeavored to showcase and elucidate the unique characteristics of Japan before focusing on identity affirmation. Despite the pivotal role of 'Japanese uniqueness' as a significant symbol in the daily reproduction of Japanese banal nationalism by both Japanese citizens and foreigners, the affirmations propagated by reproductionist nihonjinron theorists are now subject to ongoing scrutiny and debate.

Yoshino's work holds particular significance for its critique of nihonjinron, but a crucial aspect for this thesis lies in the survey he conducted to assess the diffusion of nihonjinron into society. Through interviews with businessmen and educators in central Japan, Yoshino uncovered that nihonjinron assumptions had permeated ordinary citizens. The survey revealed that a majority of respondents believed in the intrinsic differences between Japanese people and the rest of the world. Interestingly, Yoshino observed a greater interest in nihonjinron among businessmen compared to educators. Businesspeople cited cross-cultural relations and occupational education as reasons for their engagement with nihonjinron, utilizing it in intercultural interactions and within company settings. When asked about the learning outcomes, many respondents claimed not to have acquired new knowledge but acknowledged using nihonjinron to structure their ideas about their nation and foreigners. This underscores the role of nihonjinron in the dialectic process of remembering and forgetting, subtly contributing to the unspectacular reproduction of Japanese nationalism. Readers remember their uniqueness when they read the book, yet they do not find the ideas as a something new, and do not perceive these ideas as nationalistic, extreme, or remarkable.

Yoshino's research is instrumental in deciphering the cultural indicators of nationalism in Japan, with Japanese uniqueness standing out as a crucial element in signaling Japanese nationalism. The distinctive aspect lies in the exceptionally holistic approach to comprehending foreign cultures, a trait not commonly observed in other nationalisms worldwide. While most societies exhibit shortcuts or prejudices regarding other countries, Japan's uniquely comprehensive understanding of Western cultures is noteworthy. This holistic perspective can be attributed to the influence of nihonjinron theories, which sought to elucidate Japanese distinctiveness in contrast to American culture (Yoshino 1992, 11-12). As these theories permeated intercultural relations, this holistic approach became a means of reproducing the global order of nations. However, it's essential to note that Asians, including Japanese, are often perceived as a distinct group from Westerners. Nakamatsu's discourse analysis, for instance, revealed that representations of Asian brides in the media, marriage agents, and rural policymaking are intertwined with racial and gender hegemony, framing Asian women as domestic, warm-hearted individuals who have escaped from poverty (2005, 408).

Yoshino (2007) conducted a comprehensive exploration of youth nationalism in Japan, focusing primarily on the media discourse surrounding this phenomenon and the inclination of younger individuals to support right-wing authoritarianism. The study took a methodologically nuanced approach by employing a two-layered survey methodology targeting university students. In the initial layer, students were presented with questions identical to those posed by the media surveys, offering binary response options of 'yes' or 'no.' Subsequently, participants were prompted to articulate the reasoning behind their chosen responses. For instance, the survey initially inquired about the students' stance on patriotism, followed by a request for an elaborate explanation of their answers. It is noteworthy that Yoshino refrained from drawing definitive conclusions, highlighting the complexity of student perspectives on nationalism (Yoshino 2007, 2-6).

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The survey's qualitative responses provided by students offer notable insights. One student, for instance, articulated a nuanced perspective on patriotism, advocating for its division into two categories. According to this viewpoint, patriotism can be dichotomized into two distinct forms: one that necessitates individuals to engage in warfare and another that involves supporting their national team in international sports events (Yoshino 2007, 4).

This student's elucidation communicates a crucial message—the recognition of varying manifestations of patriotism, each carrying distinct connotations. While acknowledging the inherent differences between engaging in armed conflict and supporting a national sports team, the underlying implication is that both actions can be construed as exhibiting nationalistic sentiments. This observation underscores the complexity and multifaceted nature of patriotism, prompting a critical examination of the diverse ways in which individuals express their allegiance to their nation.

The reflections provided by another student are equally compelling: "I think it's patriotism if you try to make something better even if you don't like it…" (Yoshino 2007, 5). When considered in conjunction with other students' explanations, a common theme emerges—students endeavor to rationalize their patriotism as a seemingly 'normal' sentiment. This inclination stems from the initial perception that nationalism is often associated with hot nationalism. Drawing on Billig's insights, the tendency to label figures like Saddam as nationalists while overlooking the nationalism inherent in established nation-states, such as the UK, becomes apparent (Billig 2002, 1-2).

The students' efforts to distance themselves from the label of nationalism while simultaneously expressing love for their country align with the concept of banal nationalism. In their justifications, Japanese university students inadvertently exemplify the subtler, everyday manifestations of nationalism that often go unnoticed in the context of well-established nation-states. This phenomenon underscores the need to recognize and critically examine the more subtle forms of nationalism that permeate everyday life.

Many other examples, which flags Japanessness in a habitual way can be listed, yet the point in this section is that Japan is a very significant case for discussing banal nationalism because many (not all) symbols that signs nationalism is cultural or ethnic. In other to understand how Japanese nationalism is reproduced in the newspapers a day survey will be conducted on the national newspapers. Then, the hypotheses will be tested by an analysis on a large-N survey. Lastly, a survey will be conducted to understand if this reproduction diffuses into society and to test the hypothesis that symbolic threat perception from the immigrants which causes anti-immigration can be explained by nationalism if the nationalism defined broadly as including banal nationalism.

5. DAY SURVEY

This study explores how Japaneseness is depicted within Billig's framework, encompassing both 'hot' and 'banal' nationalism. It also aims to categorize this representation as either leaning toward ethnic versus civic nationalism. This departure from prevailing discourse in nationalism studies is particularly significant as it departs from the prevailing discourse in nationalism studies, which typically assumes a civic orientation within established Western democracies. In our contemporary world, media's pervasive influence touches various facets of our lives, shaping cognitive frameworks through manipulation and efficacy (Kose and Yilmaz, 2012, 909). Acting as a mirror, the media reflects and amplifies cultural elements (Rodwell, 2015, 20). Therefore, the press serves as a crucial resource for studying the everyday (re)production of nationalism.

In his book, Banal Nationalism, Michael Billig (1995) attempts to explain how nationalism is (re)produced on a daily basis and why it is easily neglected. He begins his book with a speech that was given by President George Bush at the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990. In his speech, Bush remarked that 'Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation.' The point that was being made by this comment was that a nation is in danger. Although despotic leaders, including Saddam Hussein, are killing, or persecuting the citizens who live in another nation-state, it is not enough reason for launching a war. Nevertheless, an attack on a nation-state was a sufficient reason for the US to initiate a war. Bush did not explain why the survival of a nation is important because there was no need to. Everyone knows the importance of the notion of a nation (Billig, 2002, 1–2).

According to Skey (2009), the concept of 'banal nationalism' that was introduced by Billig is seen as the most influential study of everyday forms of nationalism. One of his most important contributions was his critique of the apparent orthodoxy that was found in the literature, which was directed at two areas. First, previous studies on nationalism were focused on 'when and what is the nationalism.' In other words,

they attempted to explain how nationalism became a phenomenon in world history. Billig, however, uses a functionalist point of view to explain how nation and nationalism are reproduced in everyday life. Second, Billig criticizes the perception of nationalism as an extreme ideology that is held by peripheral groups—such as those who are fighting for independence from a nation-state—or extreme political groups (Skey, 2009, 335–337). Instead, nationalism is (re)produced everyday throughout the world. Consequently, it is not a phenomenon that surfaces in times of crisis and then vanishes away (Billig, 2002, 5–7).

Nationalism is a dynamic process which aims to confirm a nation or its identity (Billig, 2009, 349). According to Renan, the existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite (Renan, 1990, 19). The approval of the nation is a routine work that is implicit in everyday practices. The neutrality or the implication of the approval is the banal part of nationalism. The founding dialectic of the banal part of nationalism is the dialectic of forgetting and reminding (Billig, 2002, 37). As Renan points out, forgetting is a vital element in the founding of nations (Renan, 1990, 11). Communities owe their collective assets to forgetting, and remembering the nation on an everyday basis leads to forgetting (Billig, 2002, 37). In his textual analysis of British daily newspapers which he calls as 'day survey' (Billig, 2002, 109), Billig randomly selected a day to study whether the UK was flagged by the press on a daily basis. Not surprisingly, he found that the nation was constantly flagged by the British press. For example, he found that deixis, which refers to the use of general language and expressions that refer to a particular time, place, or individual within a given context, such as 'here' or 'now,' was constantly used by the press to reproduce the homeland (Billig, 2002, 109–114).

The primary objective of this study is to illustrate how Japanese newspapers consistently emphasize national identity, either through hot or banal nationalist expressions, on a daily basis. It is important to note that the intention is not to categorize the symbols as either hot or banal nationalism. However, the study will provide definitions for both banal and hot nationalism.

Billig's explanation identifies hot nationalism as emerging during times of social upheaval, manifested in radical social movements (2002, 44). In essence, hot nationalism represents a fervent and deliberate form of nationalism that arises during extreme circumstances, by radical groups, or in an extreme manner. It is characterized by its passionate and conscious nature, often observed in extraordinary times and settings, contrasting with the established democracies' typical demeanor in ordinary circumstances.

Conversely, banal nationalism refers to a more subdued and unconscious form of nationalism prevalent in all established democracies in the routines of everyday life. It lacks the intensity associated with hot nationalism, portraying a more ordinary and ingrained expression of national identity.

5.1. Methodology

Billig conducted a content analysis on English newspapers in 1995. He randomly selected a day to study whether the UK was flagged by the press on a daily basis. Not surprisingly, he found that the nation was constantly flagged by the British press. For example, he found that deixis such as "here" or "now" was used constantly by the press to reproduce the homeland (Billig 2002, 109–114).

Although the study that was conducted by Billig was replicated in many countries[4], it has not been performed in Japan. Billig argues that not only the politicians, but also the media, in all nation-states is expected to flag the nation routinely if it is assumed to be 'banally enhabited' (Billig 2002, 109). Hence, there is a need to replicate his study in more nation-states (Billig 2002, 109). As an established non-Western democracy, Japan is a valuable case study on banal nationalism in the literature for several reasons. First, it is one of the most politically stable countries in the World.[5] Consequently, it has very few marginalized groups who are associated with "hot nationalism." Thus, the Japanese press is a valuable

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[4] For example, see Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000: 787–804), Law (2001: 299–317), and Slavtcheva-Petkova (2014: 43–61).
[5] World Bank (2010) Worldwide Governance Indicators. Available at: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports (accessed on November 13, 2021).

means of analyzing how the nation is routinely represented in a politically stable country. The second reason is that Japanese case presents the chance to identify banal symbols of cultural nationalism. The third reason for conducting a textual analysis of the Japanese press is that, according to a 2010 report – 'The Evolution of News and The Internet' - published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Japan led OECD member countries in terms of total average daily newspaper circulation, which was 51 million copies in 2008. Thus, the number of newspaper readers in Japan is not low.

However, the examples that were cited by Billig in order to explain how banal nationalism was flagged on a daily basis are generally irrelevant to Japan. For example, Billig uses the metaphor of an unwaving flag to explain banal nationalism by stating that it does not have any special meaning, and that the millions of flags that are raised in front of institutions throughout the US are not noticed unless they are removed (Billig, 2002, 37–46). However, according to Lawrence, the Japanese flag is not an uncontested symbol. Although the *hinomaru* was established as the national flag of Japan in 1999, however, there are still some people who view it as a symbol of Japanese imperialism in the Second World War (Lawrence, 2016, 77).

The reason for the irrelevance of banal nationalistic symbols, which are cited in the literature, to the Japanese is attributed to the likelihood that because the studies on banal nationalism are generally conducted in 'established' Western or quasi-Western states where civic nationalism is perceived as more 'normal' than ethnic nationalism, the symbols of banal nationalism cited in the literature are based on civic nationalism. Indeed, it's worth noting that Billig explicitly asserts the existence of banal nationalism in all 'established' democracies, regardless of their geographical location in the East or West. (Billig, 2017, 310-313). While Billig does not explicitly address the differentiation between civic and ethnic nationalism in his discourse on banal nationalism, it is noteworthy, as previously mentioned, that the examples

frequently cited as symbols of banal nationalism predominantly align with the characteristics of civic nationalism. In this sense, I argue that banal nationalism does not necessarily have to be civic; this assertion is not a critique but rather an addition to our understanding of banal nationalism. Banal nationalism is a presupposition or shortcut for living in a world that is made up of nations.

According to Doak, after the Second World War, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) censored or banned the publication of political materials and contents during the occupation of Japan by the US from 1945 to 1952. On the other hand, discussions that were held on Japanese *minzoku* was perceived as being free from any political leanings and motivations. Accordingly, ethnic nationalism gained prominence in Japan after the Second World War (Doak, 2007, 250–251).

A textual analysis will be conducted on 13 Japanese national newspapers on a randomly selected day to determine banal nationalistic discourses in the Japanese press as a replication of Billig's day survey on English newspapers in 1995 (2002, 109-125). Billig's day survey is replicated in many countries (For example, Yumul and Ozkirimli 2000; Law 2001; Slavtcheva-Petkova 2014), yet it has been not replicated in Japan yet.

During this research, I utilized content analysis to scrutinize the presentation and content of news, editorials, columns, advertisements, and their representations. The survey also incorporated quantitative indicators of banal nationalism in Japan.

For the analysis, a coding guide was prepared, and stories were coded on a sheet. Thirteen major daily newspapers were surveyed, with the top five national newspapers in circulation (*Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, and Sankei*) and the two tabloids in Japan, *Nikkan Gendai and Yuukan Fuji*. The survey also included four national sports newspapers (*Nikkan Sports, Sports Nippon, Sports Houchi, and Sankei Sports*) and the two English newspapers in Japan, *The Japan News and The Japan Times*. Numbers in parentheses correspond to the newspaper codes.

The research questions which are tried to be replied in this survey are as follows: How Japanese media flags the nationhood in a daily basis? What kind of structure is used to present news? Are there any banal nationalistic expressions in the content of the news, columns, or advertisements? Are the name or the logos of the newspapers flagging nationalism? What is the number of domestic and international news in general? What is the number of domestic and international news in the first page? Is the international news in the first page directly related with Japan?

The units of analysis are the content and the presentation of news, columns, and advertisements, and the logos and the names of the newspapers. The codebook for the survey can be found in Appendix 1.

The textual analysis of the daily newspapers was conducted on November 26, 2021. The date was a randomly selected day in a manner that did not involve an official day of observance, a formal commemoration, election campaigning, or an extraordinary national emergency, except that it occurred during the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020. Although it was nearly impossible to depict a date as ordinary (Billig 2002, 110), however, the selection of a date which did not fall on either a day of national celebration or during a period of electoral campaigning provided a better understanding of nationhood that was flagged daily by newspapers. Although COVID-19 initially created an extraordinary and disruptive situation, as time has passed, it has gradually become the new normal. Moreover, it is imperative to highlight that as of November 2021, there was a notable amelioration in the situation in Japan, characterized by a decline in cases and the successful implementation of a vaccination program. As previously mentioned, and as emphasized by Billig, there is seldom an entirely ordinary day. For instance, when Billig conducted his day survey, the United Kingdom was still in conflict with Northern Ireland (Billig 2017, 310). Therefore, November 26, 2021, can be considered an ordinary day within its own context.

5.2. Analysis of the Results

The analysis revealed that Japanese newspapers consistently flagged the nation on a daily basis. The examination encompassed coverage of domestic and international news, praising "our" homeland and shared values, expressions of "Japaneseness," the ideological affiliations of newspapers, banner headlines, the representation of news related to COVID-19, the depiction of enemies (or the 'other'), the emphasis on cultural distinctiveness, and the portrayal of foreigners/immigrants. This comprehensive exploration sheds light on the nuanced ways in which the nation is reproduced in the daily discourse of Japanese newspapers.

Politicians play a crucial role in disseminating banal nationalism to society, as their words reach mass audiences daily. The use of patriotic rhetoric, coupled with homeland deixis, enhances the impact of politicians' discourse, framing it as an expression of national identity. This is evident in the expressions of politicians scrutinized in the day survey of newspapers. However, banal nationalist elements are not exclusive to political figures within the stories. As anticipated, the news articles themselves routinely highlighted Japanese identity in various other ways.

At first glance, the most conspicuous symbols of "banal nationalism" were shown as the brand logos of the newspapers, and five of the 13 newspapers carry a reminder of Japan in their logos. For example, *The Japan Times* uses "Japan" in its title, and the tittle in the lowercase letter "j" is denoted in red as a reminder of the Japanese flag. Furthermore, its use of the slogan, "The Independent Voice in Asia," reminds its readers of the geographical location of Japan. *Sankei Sports*, which is known as *Sansupo*, uses the twin colors of red and white in its logo to recall the Japanese flag by its readers. *Yuukan Fuji* and *Sports Nippon* also use red letters to flag their "Japaneseness." *The Japan News* uses the name "Japan" in its title and the letter "N" in the word "News" is shown in red. What is surprising here is that although *Yomiuri Shimbun* does not have any reminder of "Japaneseness" in its brand logo, however, the English version of *The Japan News* flags this characteristic in a routine way. Besides the use of logos, the brand

names of several newspapers are constant reminders of Japan's nationhood and status in the world, national ideals, or shared values, including "Japan Economics Newspaper" (*Nikkei*), *The Japan News*, *The Japan Times*, "The Mount Fuji" (*Yuukan Fuji*), "Industrial and Economic News" (*Sankei*), or "Japanese Sports" (*Sports Nippon*).

These kind of reminders of nation serves to flag the nation ordinarily in an everyday basis. Repeating the name of the country reminds the nation to all the Japanese people before reading the paper. Reminding as a routine business of flagging is not a conscious act. In other words, it is different from the collectively remembering a commemoration (Billig 2002, 41).

Coverage of Domestic and Foreign News

The organization and presentation of news also reveal how nationalism is flagged by these newspapers on a daily basis. On the day of the survey, seven of the 13 newspapers demarcated the coverage of foreign news from domestic news. The foreign news, which did not pertain to "us," was presented under signposts such as "International economics," "International," "Politics and diplomacy," "Global markets," "International and Asia," "World," and "Asia." However, with the exception of *The Japan Times*, domestic news does not carry a special caption since all news, unless stated otherwise, is understood to pertain to Japan.

The weather is reported by all the newspapers, and that of Japan is given without addressing it by name. As was expected, the weather abroad was not newsworthy; only *Yomiuri* reported on it by addressing it as "the weather in the world." Domestic weather news is treated in the same way as other domestic news. It is not labeled as home weather because, as stated earlier, every story is understood to occur in Japan, unless otherwise stated.

Weather news is reported routinely as a national deixis, and is labeled as "The weather," "The weather forecast," or "Weekly weather forecast." Although many of the newspapers that were surveyed by this study used the map of Japan, however, none of them addressed it as such since it is presumed to be recognized by every resident in the country.

When foreign news is addressed and reported separately, the distinction between "us" and "them" is reinforced (Billig 2002, 117). The news stories that are reported on "them" are labeled as "international," and they are few in number. Consequently, the readers who are "we" do not waste too much time on reading foreign news, and will quickly move on to "home" news. Incidentally, foreign news comprised only 12% of all news stories that were reported as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Coverage of domestic and foreign news.

	Domestic	**%**	**Foreign**	**%**	**Total**
Total news	1439	88	196	12	1635
Columns	93	83	19	17	112
Sports news	445	91	43	9	488
Sports columns	22	96	1	4	23

Not surprisingly, the coverage of domestic news substantially exceeded that of foreign news. There was also a tendency to report domestic news on the front pages of the newspapers, and only 14% featured foreign news. Seven of the 13 newspapers did not feature any international news on their front pages. Moreover, 82% of the international stories that were reported on the front pages were either foreign news that were related to Japan directly or were presented in such a way in order to attach particular prominence

to their implications for Japan. For example, when *Asahi* and *Mainichi* reported on the new coalition government that was formed in Germany on their front pages, they devoted much coverage to the anti-nuclear policy in their stories such that nearly half of the contents were on what Japan should do if Germany joins the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. On the other hand, *Nikkei* reported the same story—which was one out of three "pure" international news—without any reference that was made to Japan. As for their banner headlines, it went without saying that the newspapers which were surveyed by this study had an overt tendency to report domestic news, except for *Mainichi* and *Yuukan Fuji* who reported international news in them.

As shown in Table 1, the coverage of domestic news by the newspapers that were included in this study was 88%. Besides domestic news, approximately 58% of international news (a total of 5.68%) were somewhat related to Japan. Hence, on the day of the survey, only 6% of all news stories were focused on international events. The same pattern was also observed in their columns, where 83% of the contents were on domestic politics. In columns that dealt with international events which were related to Japan, the percentage of "pure" international columns fell to 3%. The disproportionate coverage between domestic and international news served to reinforce banal nationalism without any realization by the public that it was being practiced. The huge coverage of domestic news by the newspapers is so widely accepted by the ordinary Japanese that they do not feel any unease over it.

Praising "our" homeland and shared values

Besides a demarcation in the reporting of foreign and domestic news, nationalism is also flagged by the newspapers through their praise of "our" homeland. For example, it was reported by *Yomiuri* that prime minister Fumio Kishida had attended a TV program to promote persimmons that were grown in the Nara Prefecture. During the show, the prime minister claimed that the consumption of persimmons from Nara could prevent one from contracting COVID-19. This is a good illustration that demonstrates how

"our homeland" is praised through the routine practice of flagging of nationhood, as it is depicted as a place where delicious and healthy fruits (or vegetables) are grown. Such accolades that are heaped on the homeland is vital to reinforce the banal nationalist sentiment of the nation. This serves as a notable example of banal nationalism as it lacks an extraordinary or passionate element. The prime minister, in making this statement, doesn't perceive it as explicitly nationalist or emotionally charged. There is no deliberate intention to stir emotions in the viewers. The expression could potentially become hot nationalist if the prime minister were to emphasize that Japan's persimmon exclusively prevents COVID infection. However, this wasn't the intended focus; rather, the purpose was to commend Nara's persimmon, inadvertently expressing praise for the homeland of the Japanese people.

Another form of commendation that is bestowed on the homeland is the reporting of "national" treasures. On the day of the survey, various national treasures were reported a total of 13 times, including Tookamachi in Niigata by *Asahi*, UNESCO heritage sites by *Nikkei*, and the beauty of nature in Japan by *Asahi*. The use of praise as a framing device has helped to reinforce in locals the view that "our" homeland is a sacred place that is endowed with distinctive and beautiful features which are distinct from other countries.

Another deictic of homeland-making is speaking to and for the nation. Advertisements have a tendency to speak on behalf of a nation or refer to "our shared values" as a marketing strategy (Billig 2002, 114–155). For example, many newspapers reported that the annual hina doll display will include the dolls of Shohei Ohtani, a famous Japanese professional baseball player who is based in the US. *The Japan News* reported the story by referring to Ohtani by his nickname, Sho-time, to emphasize that he is "our shared value," as calling someone by his nickname is an indication of intimacy. There are many advertisements that endorse "our shared values," such as those on the bath culture, hospitality, or the consumption of

cakes that are filled with strawberries in winter. The use of "our shared values" is an implicit nod to the fact that "we" are very similar individuals, which reinforces a sense of solidarity by the people as a nation.

"Japaneseness"

Another finding of this study was the overt use of headlines by all the newspapers to communicate "Japaneseness", such as "Japanese ambassador meets with Taliban leaders" by *Asahi*, "National interests: Japan has no control over gas" by *Mainichi*, and "Demands Japan to support Olympics" by *Nikkei*. A total of 191 headlines were found to contain the country's name or the name of nation. However, the references that were made to Japan or Japaneseness were not the only means which were employed to flag nationhood. In fact, there were 462 headlines that did not include the name of the country or the nation, yet readers could easily predict that the stories had occurred in Japan, such as "The Prime Minister asks for 3% wage increase" by *Mainichi*, "The economic debate" by *Nikkei*, or "100 million yen for the accommodation facility renovation subsidy" by *Sankei*. A Japanese reader would understand that "the prime minister" was a reference to the prime minister of Japan without reading the text in its entirety.

Since nationalism is enhabited as a consequence of the everyday routine of forgetting and reminding, readers have taken it for granted that the stories are about "here" and the citizens refer to "we." Prasenjit Duara has defined the nation as the false unity of self-same, meaning history and the historical "others" are used to create a nation which has a unique culture (Duara 1995, 4–7). According to Anderson (1983), this unity of self-same is made possible through a particular apprehension of time. The idea of "homogeneous, empty time" presents a linear passage of time that can be measured by a calendar or clock and is filled and caused by events from the past, present, and future, which contrasts with the concept of "simultaneity-along-time" that was held by medieval societies. This concept provides an understanding of the development of a nation throughout its history. Newspapers or novels provide a sense of

simultaneity in homogeneous, empty time, meaning the members of a nation feel a common bond of socialization since they are reading the same stories at the same time. More importantly, a street that is mentioned in a novel can be meaningful enough to the members of a nation without a need for further explanation (Anderson 1983, 22–26). On the other hand, every Japanese will most likely never get to meet nearly 99% of locals during their lifetime, yet they are fully confident that they are living and doing "something" at somewhere in Japan. Novels and newspapers reinforce an apprehension of time in the nation. Newspapers reinforce "homogeneous, empty time" by informing readers that other members of the nation are also moving in tandem with them (Anderson 1983, 33). Hence, newspapers enable citizens to think that they share commonalities with other members of the nation even though they will never meet each other, which is an important tool in the dialectic of forgetting and reminding. Consequently, the sense of sameness that has been forged by every member in a nation enables them to understand that unless otherwise stated, "the" prime minister refers to "our" prime minister.

Ideological Affiliations of Newspapers

A question that may be raised is whether the "amount" of nationalism that was displayed in newspapers was influenced by their ideological affiliations. The ideological affiliations of the newspapers in this study are shown in Table 2. Since tabloids and sports newspapers are not associated with any ideology, they are included in the table by genre name.

Table 2 Ideological affiliations of newspapers.

Ideological Affiliations	Newspapers
Conservative	*Yomiuri, Nikkei[6], Sankei, The Japan News*
Center-right	*The Japan times*
Center-left	*Asahi, Mainichi*
Tabloid	*Nikkan gendai, Yuukan fuji*
Sports	*Nikkan sports, Sports houchi, Sankei sports, Sports nippon*

In order to understand whether there was a correlation between ideology and the "amount" of nationalism that was displayed by the newspapers (with the exception of sports newspapers), the coverage of news that carried nationalistic headlines were analyzed. The findings of this analysis are shown in Table 3.

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[6] Iwona MERKLEJN and Jan WIŚLICKI, 2020, "Hate Speech and the Polarization of Japanese National Newspapers", *Social Science Japan Journal Vol. 23*, No. 2, pp 259–279.

Table 3 Nationalist headlines and demarcation of foreign from domestic news in newspapers (except for sports newspapers).

Newspaper	Number of news	Banal nationalist	Proportion of nationalist news	International news are separated from the domestic news
Yomiuri	146	71	46%	Yes
Asahi	166	82	49%	Yes
Mainichi	139	68	49%	Yes
Nikkei	202	110	54%	Yes
Sankei	161	89	55%	Yes
Yuukan fuji	89	32	36%	No
Nikkan gendai	76	37	49%	No
The Japan News	66	22	33%	Yes
The Japan times	42	26	62%	Yes

The ideological affiliations, number of nationalistic headlines, and demarcation of international from domestic news were coded into a table in order to establish a statistically meaningful correlation, if any, between ideology and nationalistic newswriting. Conservative and right-leaning ideologies were indicated as "0" while left-leaning ideologies were labeled as "1." *Yuukan Fuji* and *Nikkan Gendai* were coded as right-leaning and left-leaning newspapers, respectively. The newspapers that demarcated international from domestic news were coded as "0" while those that did not do so were labeled as "1." Consequently,

the results of the statistical analysis revealed that the correlation coefficient between ideological affiliation and the number of nationalistic headlines was 0.073 (p=0.85). Although a positive correlation was established between left-leaning ideology and nationalistic newswriting, however, the result was not statistically significant. The correlation between ideological affiliation and the demarcation of international from domestic news was also not statistically significant. No correlation was found between ideological affiliation and nationalistic attitudes. Although nationalist discourses are more often associated with right-wing politicians, however, their left-wing counterparts also use the nationalistic rhetoric since the basis of a nation-state is founded on the holding of national elections (Billig 2002, 100–104). Hence, it is not surprising that all newspapers, regardless of their ideological affiliations, flag the nation daily.

Banner Headlines

Generally, the newspapers examined the post-corona incentives that were distributed by the government. *Yomiuri* featured a story about "Special (system) for workers' accident insurance premiums related to corona" without acknowledging that the incentive was given by the Japanese government. The story continued as "the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare: No increase in company's burden." Although no clue was given that the story originated from Japan, however, the emphasis on government incentives was striking. The story continued as 'the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: No increase in company's burden'. Still, there is no clue that the story takes place in Japan. The emphasis on the government incentives was striking.

Nikkei also featured a story on "Hurry to improve working conditions to secure manpower" without revealing a clue on where the story had transpired. In the story, the companies and industries that were faced with a shortage of labor were discussed, such as the Toyota Motor Corporation or restaurants. The article clearly explained that as the Japanese economy recovers, it will be confronted with a shortage of

labor. It also singled out Japanese car makers for praise by highlighting the fast recovery that was made by them in automobile production.

Similarly, *Sankei*'s banner headline was "Accommodation facility renovation subsidy 100 million yen," and it did not reveal the locale of the featured story. The story continued as "The government policy: big amount of budget for renovation of touristic places," and explained that the goal of the government was to refurbish accommodation facilities in order to raise room prices. Hence, the government was using the budget to enhance the value of "our" touristic places.

It is not surprising to learn that these three right-leaning newspapers had reported on post-corona incentives since the number of new COVID-19 infections were extremely low in November 2021, and the vaccination program was also progressing at a good pace. Consequently, the news coverage on post-corona incentives can be seen as a celebration of "our" success (or prestige) in fighting COVID-19 and its harmful side effects.

On the other hand, *Asahi* featured a story that was entitled "Government's design change is not allowed in Henoko." The story had addressed the construction of a US military base in Henoko, a city in the Okinawa Islands, where the efforts that were made by the Japanese government in trying to change its design were met with resistance by the provincial government. Although *Asahi* chose to report on the discussion that was held between the national and provincial governments rather than a celebration of the post-corona incentives, however, it also did not believe that there was a need to state that "the government" was, in fact, the Japanese government.

Although *Mainichi* featured an international story as its banner headline— "Germany joins nuclear ban treaty"—however, approximately 80% of its contents were focused on Japan's reaction to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In the opening sentences, the formation of a new coalition in

Germany was reported followed by a mention of the date when the new chancellor would take office. The report continued by stating that the coalition agreement had included a provision for observer participation by Germany in the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and that Germany will become the first G7 nation to participate in this treaty. Thereafter, from the fifth sentence onwards, a discussion of Japan's response to these developments commenced and continued in the rest of the article. Consequently, news about "others" are only important when "their" actions affect "us."

The findings of this study had noted that only two pieces of international news were featured in the banner headlines. The second newspaper that shared an international story in its banner headlines was *Yuukan Fuji*. The title of the article was "Beijing Olympics 'Overall boycott' emerges: what should Japan do?" The story featured a huge photo of Fumio Kishida ("the" prime minister of Japan), a medium-sized photo of Peng Shuai (a female tennis player from China who had accused a retired Chinese Vice President of sexual harassment), and a small photo of the paramount leader of China, Xi Jinping ("their" President). In the story, China was represented in a very negative light and it was accused, along with the International Olympic Committee, of not respecting human rights. On the other hand, the US and the UK were represented as mainstream or the 'normal'.

Meanwhile, *Nikkan Gendai* had featured a story that was critical of the state of Japan-US relations in its piece which was entitled "Follow-up Pochi diplomacy with the United States beyond imagination." Pochi diplomacy is a term that was coined to criticize Japan's foreign policy which is thought to be too dependent on the US, and the Japanese government is represented as being too subservient in its compliance with the demands that were made on Japan by the US. The story featured a huge photo of Fumio Kishida wearing a face mask and was labeled as "not thinking about anything" —in an ironic use of words—. Kishida was criticized over the move that was taken by the US on oil reserves. The article

also described the call for a boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics as a strategy to contain China, and it also accused the prime minister of being a slave of the US. Consequently, by perceiving the US and the prime minister as enemies, *Nikkan Gendai* had imagined a nation that was different from that which was represented by the other newspapers. Billig states that different imaginations of the nation are held by different groups of individuals. When national elections are held, people will choose to vote for a party or individual who share their imagination of the nation (Billig 2002, 96–96).

Similar to *Yomiuri*, a story on government initiatives was carried by *The Japan News*. Titled as "Initiative eyed to foster startups, entrepreneurs," the locale where the story occurred was not stated and it mentioned that "the number of start-ups has rapidly increased in the USA, China and some European countries." As stated earlier, nationalism is an international ideology. Consequently, nations compare themselves against one another and attempt to catch up with each other. The article emphasized that Japan had an opportunity to do so, and that the US, China, and "some" (not all) European countries were her rivals. In an economic rivalry, "our" government had acted responsibly in order to protect "our" prestige.

A story on the move that was taken on oil reserves was reported by *The Japan Times* under the banner headline "Oil reserve move carries future risks," which described China, India, and South Korea as allies that can help to depress oil prices, and the US as the leader of the alliance. The release of oil reserves was also described as a decision that was taken by President Joe Biden of the US, and the other countries were expected to abide by it.

Finally, three sports newspapers—*Sports Nippon, Sports Houchi*, and *Sankei Sports*—reported on the SMCB Nippon Series of baseball tournaments in their banner headlines, and only *Sports Nikkan* featured a story on horse race in its banner headline. None of them carried an international sports story.

A significant 68% of all photos featured in the news served to reinforce national identity. An illustrative example is Makino's advertisement on the front page of *Yomiuri*, using images of diverse Japanese foods alongside the caption 'The strongest recipe to reset your belly.' This portrayal implies that only 'our' food has the power to reset 'our' belly, subtly emphasizing the connection between the nation and its culinary heritage.

As another example, a story on a food researcher on *Mainichi* (p. 18) is reported with four photos. One of them displayed the food researcher, and the other three were his cookware. The cookware shared in the paper was all Japanese style cookware, yet the food researcher is claimed to prepare various food around the world.

Lastly, Paidy's advertisement on *Nikkei* (p. 6) used a picture of daruma doll. Daruma doll is a symbol of good luck and the determination until reaching the goal. Paidy decleares that 'we' (company and the nation) will be again an 'advanced country that will be dream destination'. To express this hope, Paidy used a one eye dyed daruma with the second eye has also started to be painted slightly. In Japan, when daruma is bought, its eyes are white. The buyer makes a wish and paints one of the eyes to black. When the goal is reached, the other eye also is painted. Thus, Paidy expresses that it wishes Japan to be more developed place and the goal can be reached soon because it started working. In other words, the company speaks to 'us' as a member of 'us', and it speaks for 'us' by using 'our' shared values.

Division of the news

Out of the 86 news articles on politics, a substantial 51 of them contained explicit or implicit nationalistic elements in their headlines. This observation underscores the prevalence of nationalistic undertones within the political discourse presented in the news. In other words, 59% of the headlines of

the news about politics had a nationalistic tone. The papers generally reported political news by referring to the nation directly or the place was so accurate that there was no address to the nation or the homeland.

The number of stories on economics outnumbered the news on politics. 102 out of 167 headlines are nationalistic in tone. Namely, in 61% of the headlines of the news on economics, a nationalistic discourse is displayed. What is surprising about the stories on economics is that 89% of the nationalistic headlines were implicitly represented the nation. In other words, the tendency in stories on economics was that the nation is not addressed because it was so clear that 'the economy' is always 'our economy'.

Among the 395 stories covering society and culture, 155 featured nationalistic headlines, constituting 39% of the total. This percentage is slightly lower compared to the stories on politics and economics. It's noteworthy that 84% of these nationalistic headlines subtly flagged the nation through implicit means. This suggests a nuanced incorporation of nationalistic elements into stories on society and culture.

While the coverage of security-related news was limited, it's striking that 7 out of the 8 stories featured nationalistic headlines. Despite the low quantity, the prevalence of nationalistic framing in the security-related stories indicates a consistent tendency to flag the nation in this thematic area.

The number of stories on sports was 476. 120 of these had a nationalistic headline. The proportion of nationalistic headlines was 25%.

The number of the international stories was 163. In the international news directly relating Japan, the proportion of nationalistic headlines was 53%. On the other hand, the proportion of nationalistic headlines in the 'pure' international news was 6%. It is not possible to address the nation in the headlines in the news which is not related to Japan. In addition, because the stories are about 'the other' nations, the papers always labeled the news to express that 'this story is not about 'us''.

Advertisements

The proportion of advertisements containing nationalistic discourse was 47%. In 20% of them, the nation was addressed directly in the text. For example, the advertisement of Hanada magazine on *Yomiuri* (12) used the slogan 'Let's reform Japan!'. The ad both is speaking to 'us' and speaking for 'us'. Every member should want Japan to be better place and should buy Hanada magazine. In addition, Shohei Ohtani's MVP is celebrated. 'We' will reform Japan as a community that has shared values such as Ohtani.

In 27% of the advertisements, the nation was represented in an implicit way. The advertisement of Riken Keiki Company on the first page of *Asahi* used the slogan 'Support with technology' (技術 de 応援). The word Japan or Japanese is not written anywhere in the ad. However, it is written that the commodity follows the guidelines of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. It is not Japanese or French ministry but 'the' ministry. 'We' know that 'the' ministry is 'our' ministry.

In the 5% of the advertisements, cultural distinctiveness of the nation was emphasized. For example, the advertisement of Gijutsu-Hyohron Company frames the new year's card as a unique part of Japanese culture. Thus, the ad speaking to the nation by emphasizing cultural distinction.

In 15% of the advertisements, the nation was lauded in diverse ways. For instance, the Paidy advertisement in *Nikkei* extols Japan by characterizing it as a developed country. Furthermore, it advocates for Japan to become an even more developed place, contending that the Japanese people possess the capacity to contribute to the country's development.

In 12% of the advertisements, 'our shared values' are used to make the goods familiar with 'us'. For example, the advertisement of Nihon Sakari Company emphasizes many shared value of Japanese people such as sake and rice. 'The moistness of rice bran must have suited Japanese skin.' (米ぬかの潤いが日

本人の肌に合ったのだろう). Because rice is 'our' shared value, a crème that is produced by the rice should suit to 'our' skin.

News on COVID-19

Billig claims that weather news is a kind of national deixis that is reported on a daily basis (Billig 2002, 116). The same is true of the news coverage of COVID-19, since every newspaper surveyed by this study carried various stories on the pandemic. Like every country from around the world, after 2019, every person in Japan had read news on COVID-19, such as the number of new infections at home and abroad and the vaccination rates. In essence, the unprecedented nature of COVID-19 has evolved over time, shifting from an exceptional occurrence to a commonplace aspect of daily life, to the extent that monitoring daily infection rates has become as routine as checking the weather.

Similar to their reports on weather news, the coverage of the pandemic by the five major newspapers—*Yomiuri*, *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Nikkei*, and *Sankei*—included the use of tables that showed new infections at home and abroad. For example, *Sankei*, *Nikkei*, and *Mainichi* published a table that listed the countries with the highest number of new daily infections, as well as tables that indicated new domestic infections in every city, vaccination rollout in Japan, and a graph that depicted the number of daily infections in Tokyo. The motivation to report only the countries with the highest number of new infections was driven by a desire to demonstrate "our" prestige in preventing a rise in the number of new infections in Japan.

Asahi reported on the countries with the highest number of infections and the infection rates in neighboring countries such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Consequently, "we" can learn about the pandemic situation that was developing around "us." Domestic infections were reported in the same manner as weather news.

Finally, *Yomiuri* only reported the infections in the "main countries." Consequently, when we have an awareness of the situation in these "main countries," the information that was yielded was considered

sufficient for "us." Hence, there was not a need for us to know about the infection situation in faraway countries such as Ghana.

Stories about government action to prevent COVID-19 accounted for 25% of all stories about COVID-19. Newspapers presented the government's actions to prevent new infections to show that 'our' government is trying hard to protect 'us' from the evil pandemic, which generally 'comes from abroad'. 8% of the stories on COVID19 were about the situation of infections abroad. For example, *Yomiuri* reported a story about Germany's new coalition government, "Change of government in Germany in December", and claimed in the story that the number of people dying from COVID19 infection could be lower if the German government had taken more effective measures to prevent new infections. The emphasis that other countries are more dangerous than Japan for infection was present in many stories.

South Korea

3% of all news was about South Korea. The tone of the representation of South Korea was coded as 0 for negative; 1 for neutral; and 2 for positive tone. The average of the tone of the stories on South Korea was 0.77. In other words, the tone in representation of South Korea was generally negative. Especially, in the stories on the Korean politicians demanding an apology from Japan about World War 2nd, South Korea was represented in a very negative way.

In 58% of the stories on South Korea, headline was nationalistic. The stories about Takeshima/Dokdo islands were reported only 3 times. *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* reported South Korean ruling party candidate's election campaigning speech which he demands an apology from Japan and claiming Korean rights on Takeshima/Dokdo islands. Both framed the politician in a negative way, yet the negative tone in *Yomiuri* was more apparent.

In 18% of the news on South Korea, South Korea was framed as an enemy of Japan. *Mainichi* and *Nikkei* were framed the South Korea as an enemy in the stories on the ruling party candidate's election

campaign speech. *Mainichi* accused South Korea of threatening Japan with confiscating assets of Japanese companies operating in South Korea. On the other hand, the tone in *Nikkei* was more negative. *Nikkei* reported that the candidate claims that if Japan apologizes, he has a plan for solving compensation problem of Japanese companies. However, the word 'plan' is written in quotes to emphasize that he has no actual plan. Also, when the candidate uses the word 'victim', the paper writes in parentheses the word 'accuser' to emphasize that accusers may lying.

Foreigners/Immigrants

The assumptions or myths held by a society and shared by many of its members can be seen as banal nationalist symbols, including the myth that Japan is a homogeneous country with no history of immigration (Douglass and Roberts 2000, 9). Members of the nation imagine themselves as a broad community based on national factors (Billig 2002). Believing that the members of the nation are ethnically homogenous is an example of imaging the nation. In other words, the Japanese, like many other nations in the world, imagine an ethnically homogeneous nation with no immigrant or minority groups.

The representation of the foreigners or the immigrants was showcased in 3% of the news. The tone of the representation of foreigners was coded as 0 for negative; 1 for neutral; and 2 for positive tone. The average of the tone of the stories about foreigners was 0.86. In other words, the tone of the representation of foreigners tends to be negative in the news. Especially in the stories about crimes committed by foreigners in Japan, the tone is extremely negative. When it is thought that fewer than one in ten Japanese have the chance to engage in conversations or social interactions with foreigners (Burgess 2010), it would be obvious that the representation of foreigners in the media plays a great role in constituting foreigner images in the society.

In the 48% of the stories on foreigners, the headlines were nationalistic. For example, *Asahi* and *Sankei* reported a story about stimulant smuggling. The headline was 'Stimulant smuggling by kneading them in charcoals' in *Asahi*. There is no clue that the incident took place in Japan because the readers know that unless it is written clearly, the incident takes place in 'here'. *Sankei*, also, did not stated in the headline that the incident took place in Japan. However, the common positive side of both stories was that both papers did not express clearly that the crime is committed by the foreigners in the headlines.

The stories about foreigners living in Japan were mostly about the crimes committed by them. For example, *Asahi* and *Sankei* reported a story about the crime of stimulant smuggling committed by the foreigners. In another example, a story on a domestic court decision carried by *Mainichi*, "Uber Japan not prosecuted", emphasized that foreigners were working illegally in Japan despite not having work permits. Foreigners who challenge the imagination of a homogenous homeland are framed with crimes that unsettle the society. A similar pattern can be seen in stories about immigrants in other countries. Irregular migrants are over-represented in these stories.

China

9% of the stories were on China. The average of the overall tone of the representation of China was 0,47. In other words, the tone was extremely negative. For example, in *Yomiuri*'s story ("Asking to cabinet") on Japanese security, China was framed as a threat to the security of Japan in the same manner with other 27% of the stories on China. Especially, China's military activities around Taiwan is framed as a threat to Japanese national security.

51% of the news regarding China had nationalist headlines. For example, *Nikkei*'s story (China should take responsibility as a major power 「中国は大国の責任を」) on Japanese-Chinese relations framed China as an irresponsible big country. Especially, China is accused of military activities around Taiwan.

In all stories regarding Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, Japan is represented as completely right in claiming sovereignty over the island. For example, *Sankei*'s story (Chinese government ships around Senkaku for 2 days in a row 「尖閣周辺に中国公船 2 日連続」) on Senkaku framed the island as in Japanese sovereignty. China is accused of trespassing in the fixed space that Japanese nation owns.

Enemies

Analyzing the representation of enemies may initially appear incongruous within an article primarily centered on banal nationalism. Nevertheless, as underscored by Billig, an exploration of 'others' and the perpetuation of stereotypes about them is indispensable for the delineation of 'us' (Billig 2002, 78-83). In this context, scrutinizing the representation of 'others' in the Japanese press holds equal significance to the examination of how it constructs the image of 'us,' as it illuminates the mechanisms through which the Japanese press consistently reinforces national identity. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that Billig does not contend that established Western democracies are exclusively characterized by banal nationalism. Instead, both banal and hot nationalism coexist within these established democracies concurrently (Billig 2017, 310). Consequently, exclusively focusing on one facet of this phenomenon hinders researchers from comprehensively elucidating how the nation is perpetuated on a daily basis. In this regard, this article not only investigates the banal mechanisms that contribute to the portrayal of 'Japaneseness' but also delves into the more fervent methods employed to sustain the national identity through an 'us vs. the rest' framework.

The representation of an enemy was showcased in 3% of the news. As opposed to the use of "us," the word "them" was used to refer to the "allies" or "enemies" of Japan. In 67% of the stories where an enemy was represented, China was revealed as the top foe. For example, in the story that was carried on the state of the relations between Japan, China, and the US by *Asahi* in its report "President Xi's visit to Japan and

the response to Beijing Olympics are undecided," China was described as posing a threat to Japan's national security and the current world order. Generally, China was not considered a part of "us" because it has a history of human rights violations or infringements on the sovereignty of other countries, which were also not condoned by other nations from around the world.

76% of the stories where enemy representation was available had a nationalist headline. For example, *Mainichi*'s story (South Korean ruling party candidate mentions Japan-South Korea relations) on the speech of the South Korean candidate, flagged the country in the headline, and framed the South Korea as a threat to Japan. Especially, compensation order to Japanese companies is framed as an assault of the whole nation.

It was striking that 60% of the news stories which described an enemy were international news. What stood out even more was that 93% were viewed as external enemies, meaning they were generally not from among "us." When efforts are made to stereotype "them" in order to affirm "us," the perception of "them" as an enemy inadvertently results (Unur 2018: 27–30). For example, in the story that was carried by *Yuukan Fuji* on "US invites Taiwan on 'Democracy Summit'," China was described as a threat while both the US and Taiwan were portrayed as "our" democratic friends. Occasionally, the US and Taiwan can cooperate with "us", but not China. The fact that Japanese newspapers chose to identify Japan's enemies as hailing from beyond its shores may be attributed to the domestic stability and lack of internal strife that are enjoyed by the country.

Cultural Distinctiveness

In 3% of the stories that were carried by the newspapers, the cultural distinctiveness of Japan was emphasized as "a central element in nationalism" (Yumul and Özkırımlı 2000, 796). For example, in *Yomiuri*'s column, the "Foreign country log," after a comparison was made between the cultures in Japan

and the EU, the writer concluded that the European culture was a very complicated matter. Although a reader in Europe may be surprised to read of this generalization about the European culture, however, in Japan, foreign cultures are perceived in a very holistic manner. Yoshino claims that *nihonjinron* (theories about "Japaneseness") defines the Japanese culture by making a holistic comparison between itself and foreign cultures. However, he stresses that this definition is founded on the differences that exist between the Japanese nation and the rest of the world. Hence, the West is viewed as mainstream while Japan is represented as being different (Yoshino 1992, 8–9). However, as argued by Billig, the Japanese culture was instead viewed as mainstream by the newspaper column. Moreover, the story defined a place as a "foreign" country, which was not the US, the UK, Greece or any other country; instead, the fact that it was foreign was a sufficient reason to define it as such.

In another example, an advertisement that was placed in *Asahi*, "Big question in the Japanese language," compared the Japanese language with other languages in the same holistic manner. Another advertisement in *Mainichi* depicted the new year's card as a culturally distinct feature of Japan. In its report on international relations with China— "China should take responsibility as a major power"—that was carried by *Nikkei*, a distinctive culture of diplomacy was argued to be available to Japan. In an editorial piece that was published by *Sankei*, Japanese food culture was praised as being unique. In a story entitled "Nakajima magic connected to Kobe" which was carried by *Nikkan Sports* on baseball, Japanese culture was described as being so unique that every foreigner was surprised by it after they had relocated to Japan. An advertisement that was placed in *Sankei Sports* described the Japanese language as more silent than other languages, while in a story that was written by Imamura and Ishida for *Yuukan Fuji*, they depicted the alcoholic beverage sake as constituting a unique part of the Japanese culture. An advertisement on *Nikkan Gendai* also described the unique aspects of baseball as it is played by the Japanese. In its story entitled "Tapping reserves could fuel backlash from oil producers," *The Japan News* emphasized that

compared to the US, the increasing price of oil would not pose much of a problem to the Japanese people due to the lower rate of car ownership in Japan. In the last example, *The Japan Times* featured an invention under the title of "A cooker that makes chicken as soft as butter" and showcased the rice cooker as a distinctive feature of Japanese culture. Clearly, these examples have demonstrated that anything can constitute a unique feature of "our" culture, including loanwords, bath culture, and hospitality.

In 68% of the stories where Japanese culture is framed as unique, the headline was nationalistic. For example, 'Foreign country log' (*Yomiuri*) generates a place as 'foreign' country. It is not the US, UK or the Greece etc., it is 'foreign' country. Being foreign is a sufficient definition.

Finally, this study revealed that 86% of the stories which represented a cultural difference was carried by domestic news. Although Japanese newspapers used "them" to designate an "enemy" or a "friend" of Japan in their coverage of international news, however, in domestic news, the extent of uniqueness of our culture is explained. Hence, while the "other" is defined as "there," "we" is defined as "here."

History

In 3% of the stories, the history is referred. World War 2nd is the most used framing of history. For example, *The Japan News* featured a story on *hibakusha* (atomic bomb victim) titled as 'Puppet gives voice to A-bomb survivor'. The memories of the hibakusha are represented in a way that emphasizes 'our' shared mourning. History is framed as shared value.

Another subject that is referred most was 'Great East Japan Earthquake'. For example, *Sankei* featured a story about a voice actor titled as 'Voice actor's first challenge for the hometown' which framed the history as a shared mourning in the same way with *The Japan News*. In addition, reconstruction activities are praised to show 'our' prestige.

In the 76% of the stories that history is framed, the headline was nationalistic. For example, *Asahi*'s story on Japanese Christians in Bakufu period titled as 'A golden letter from a Christian to the Pope' (キリシタンから教皇へ金色の手紙) did not express that the 'Christian' was Japanese, because the readers know that unless stated, the story is about 'here'.

5.3.Conclusion

Eric Hobsbawm (1992) claims that a historian who is studying nationalism should distance himself or herself from nationalist beliefs (Hobsbawm 1992, 12). A social scientist should also "bracket" his or her own common sense on nationalism (Billig 2002, 14) since it can prevent a complete understanding of the phenomenon by taking the notion of nation-states for granted. This was also a criticism that was directed at the literature on immigration by Wimmer and Shiller (2002). Nationalist common sense prevents the analyst from asking why a host society would perceive immigrants as posing a cultural threat. For instance, *Asahi* reported a story on the "refugee crisis" in the EU under the titled "'Dictatorships' rocking Europe." In the report, Belarus and Russia were accused of using "refugees" to "rock" Europe, and refugees were represented as posing a huge security threat to European states. There are many reasons why refugees were perceived as dangerous, one of which was their "illegality" since they entered another country through unusual means and "trespassed" that nation's "homeland," which was perceived as "sacred" by "our" nationalist common sense.

The most distinctive contribution of this study lies in its reexamination of banal nationalism, particularly within the context of civic-ethnic nationalism, and its endeavor to identify the ethnic nationalist symbols of banal nationalism. This thesis does not argue that Japan is the sole example of an ethnic nationalist nation among established democracies. However, it highlights that the existing studies on banal nationalism in the literature predominantly emphasize civic symbols of banal nationalism. Furthermore, it entails a more comprehensive statistical examination in contrast to Billig's day survey on

the press in the UK (1995) and other studies that have reproduced Billig's research in various countries, such as Law (2001), Kose and Yilmaz (2012), and so forth. Notably, this research marks the first application of Billig's day survey methodology in Japan. These factors underscore the originality and significance of this study.

This study aims not to critique banal nationalism but to expand the discourse within banal nationalism in the context of civic-ethnic nationalism. Although Billig did not explicitly discuss the civic-ethnic nationalism distinction, he clearly stated that banal nationalism exists in all established democracies. Therefore, the explanations suggesting that banal nationalism exists in all established democracies, even in cases where ethnic nationalism is stronger than civic nationalism, and that the symbols of banal nationalism may tend to lean towards ethnic nationalism, neither contradict nor criticize banal nationalism. This study is original in the sense that it is among the first to openly discuss these concepts.

"Look and see the constant flaggings of nationhood." (Billig 2002, 174) "Japaneseness" is flagged by Japanese newspapers in many ways. First, they flagged the nation by means of their logos and brand names. The organization of the contents in the newspapers and the deixis of "us" or "them" have divided "our" world into nations. The weather news reminds "us" of "our" nation in a constant and implicit way, and the list goes on. In its report on the referendum that was held in Musashino city to decide on voting rights by foreign residents which was entitled "Musashino City 'foreign referendum' draft ordinance," *Yuukan Fuji* reported disapprovingly on the locals who were supportive of immigrants and labeled them as internal enemies from within the country. The right to vote was so closely associated with the nation that a proposal to grant foreigners the right to do so in the municipal elections was perceived as an act of treason.

Although the newspapers that were surveyed by this study had different ideological affiliations, however, a statistically significant correlation between "the amount of" nationalism and ideology was not

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found. While it is obvious that they had different imaginations of the nation, they occurred within the context of the nation. As Billig has argued, "there are infinite discursive possibilities for talking about 'us' and 'them.'" (Billig 2002, 87). However, ultimately, these discussions are confined to within the borders of the nation.

6.   EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN NATIONALISM, SYMBOLIC THREAT PERCEPTION, AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM ISSP 2013

6.1. Introduction

In the earlier chapters, I suggested that immigration attitudes are affected by symbolic threat perceptions, and nationalism prepares the discursive basis for symbolic threat perceptions. In the context of Japan, symbolic threat perception functions as a mechanism through which nationalism induces anti-immigration attitudes. I further argued that an expanded definition of nationalism is needed to prove the relation between symbolic threat perception and nationalism. As I mentioned earlier, the literature on attitudes towards immigrants in Japan presents mixed results, and there is no study that researched the reasons of symbolic threat perceptions.

I use Billig's concept of *Banal Nationalism* to expand the definition of nationalism. Some studies that examined nationalism as an independent variable affecting anti-immigration sentiments in Japan have shown that it does not explain anti-immigration attitudes effectively. This study criticizes the above works for two reasons. First, nationalism is not defined broadly enough to represent reality. In this sense, banal nationalism can be considered more meaningful because it has a broader definition. Second, nationalism does not directly cause, but provides a discursive base for anti-immigration sentiments. Thus, nationalism can cause symbolic threat perception, which in turn can cause anti-immigration attitudes.

I use data from the International Social Survey Program: National Identity III (ISSP 2013) and analyze it in two parts. First, a linear regression model was constructed to test the effect of threat perception, hero perception, and rights-based perception on anti-immigrant attitudes. Second, two regression models were constructed to identify the determinants of symbolic threat perception. The

first model considers only hot nationalism for analysis, while the second model broadens the

definition of nationalism to include banal nationalism.

Figure 5 Hypothesis

Nationalism
(Hot+banal
nationalism

⇒ Symbolic Threat
Perception

(Crime or cultural
threat)

⇒ Negative Attitudes
toward Immigrants

Control variables:

- Sex
- Age
- Education level
- Place of residence

Control variables:

- Perceptions of
  immigrants
- Sex
- Age
- Education level
- Place of residence

6.2. Research Design

6.2.1. Data source and sample

 I use the ISSP 2013 survey results as primary data source in this chapter. As mentioned earlier,

no study has so far used these data to examine the Japanese attitudes toward immigrants.

The ISSP is an ongoing initiative with international cooperation to conduct annual surveys on

social science topics of importance. ISSP 2013 data were obtained through self-administered

interviews with individuals throughout Japan in November 2013. The sample included individuals

living in Japan who were over 16 years of age. The sample size was 1234. The survey was administered by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute.

ISSP data help in understanding the anti-immigration attitudes of the Japanese. There are several measures for evaluating the attitudes toward immigration, perceptions of immigrants, nationalism, and control variables such as gender, age, education level, and place of residence.

6.2.2. Methodology

The analysis conducted in this study comprises two distinct parts, aiming to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration sentiments in Japan. The first part tested Hypothesis 1, which posits that anti-immigrant attitudes stem from symbolic threat perceptions. The second part tested Hypothesis 2, which posits that nationalism influences symbolic threat perceptions.

According to Hypothesis 1, anti-immigrant attitudes arise from individuals' symbolic threat perceptions. This implies that symbolic threat arises when individuals perceive immigrants as a potential threat to various aspects of society, such as national identity and culture (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2008; Luedtke 2005). The dependent variable attitudes toward immigrants. The evaluation questions corresponding to each variable are presented in the Appendix A. The responses to these questions are coded on a numerical scale, where "can't choose" and "no answers" are dropped to ensure a focused analysis of anti-immigration sentiment.

The independent variables here include different perceptions about immigrants. The first independent variable explores crime threat perception, the belief that immigrants are more likely to engage in criminal activities than Japanese nationals. The second independent variable centers on cultural threat perception, reflecting the concerns of the Japanese that immigrants may undermine

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or dilute their culture. The third independent variable examines the job threat perception, or the perception that immigrants are competitors for job opportunities. The hero perception variable evaluates the extent to which immigrants can be considered contributors to Japan's economy and cultural diversity. Finally, the variable regarding the recognition of immigrants' human rights assesses the degree to which even without citizenship, they are perceived to possess the same rights as Japanese citizens.

The conceptual constructs of "hero perception" and "rights-based perception" were introduced and coined within the framework of this study, originating from the author's novel theoretical perspective. This study marks the first instance of their incorporation into the discourse surrounding anti-immigration attitudes. Inspired by Benson's (2009) scholarly exploration, the concept of "hero perception" was conceived in light of his investigation into how immigrants are framed within the narratives of American and French national newspapers. In his seminal work, Benson discerned three fundamental frames - threat, victim, and hero frames - that delineate the portrayal of immigrants. The "threat frame" encapsulates immigrants as potential hazards to jobs, public order, the fiscal infrastructure, or the national culture (Benson 2009, 408). Contrasting this with the discourse within migration studies, where the "threat theory" primarily delves into how individuals perceive immigrants, Benson's analysis centered on the portrayal of immigrants within newspapers. the "victim frame" encapsulates immigrants as subjects affected by various layers of adversity, encompassing global economic injustices, racism, xenophobia, and humanitarian concerns. This frame accentuates the multifarious challenges immigrants encounter in their daily lives, spanning economic, social, and political hardships (Benson 2009, 408).

Conversely, the "hero frame" as identified by Benson presents immigrants in a contrasting light, highlighting their role as protagonists contributing to the enrichment of cultural diversity,

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integration into their host societies, and the undertaking of tasks that might be eschewed by others. This portrayal transforms immigrants into heroic figures whose actions and contributions amplify the fabric of society (Benson 2009, 408). Building on this parallel, the concept of "hero perception" was formulated. The term denotes an assessment of whether individuals perceive immigrants as heroic figures. This distinctive framework stems from the recognition that, analogous to how "threat frame" mirrors apprehensions of immigrants, there exists an intriguing question regarding whether immigrants are regarded as protagonists - individuals contributing to cultural diversity, integrating into their host society, or undertaking tasks others might refrain from. Thus, while the "threat perception" in migration studies typically gauges how individuals construe immigrants, the concept of "hero perception" seeks to explore whether immigrants are envisioned as commendable and heroic actors.

Similarly, the conceptualization of the "rights-based perception" emerged from the study conducted by Yavçan et al. (2017), which explored the framing of Syrian refugees in Turkish newspapers. Within their investigation, Yavçan et al. introduced the concept of "rights-based framing," emphasizing the significance of portraying refugees not as threats, victims, or heroes, but as individuals endowed with legitimate rights. This notion entails framing refugees within the context of their entitlements and legal claims, thereby reframing their narrative away from predefined stereotypes.

Building upon this premise, "rights-based perception" concept is adapted, aiming to investigate whether individuals perceive immigrants as bearers of inherent rights. Stemming from Yavçan et al.'s insights, the "rights-based perception" concept seeks to discern whether people perceive immigrants as rightful individuals, thereby shifting the discourse towards the recognition and fulfillment of their fundamental rights and dignities within the host society.

A linear regression model was created to understand the determinants of anti-immigration behavior in Japan. As mentioned previously, the dependent variable is anti-immigration attitudes, and the independent variables are crime threat, cultural threat, job threat, hero perception, and rights perception.

Hypothesis 1: The more individuals perceive a symbolic threat from immigrants, the more they oppose immigration in Japan.

The second part of the study tests Hypothesis 2, which suggests that nationalism influences individuals' perceptions of symbolic threat from immigrants. Persons with stronger nationalistic tendencies can be posited to be more likely to perceive immigrants as posing symbolic threat to the cultural and social fabric of Japan. To examine this hypothesis, the dependent variable, symbolic threat perception, is calculated as the sum of cultural threat and the crime threat variables.

In this study, the notion of crime threat is approached as a manifestation of symbolic threat. It is noteworthy that a substantial body of research underscores a consistent inverse relationship between immigration and crime rates (Zatz and Smith 2012). This perspective gains additional context from the National Police Agency's 2015 arrest rate report, which indicates that only 2.6% of all arrests in that year involved individuals categorized as foreigners. In 2015, the foreign population constituted 1.76% of the total population. While it might seem, on the surface, that foreigners commit crimes more frequently than citizens, it is crucial to note that these arrests encompassed individuals detained for infractions such as illegal entry, unlawful stay, or working without proper authorization. This nuanced understanding is essential for a comprehensive evaluation of the data. Moreover, these statistics solely reflect arrest rates and do not provide insight into the subsequent legal outcomes of these cases (National Police Agency 2016). Additionally, the categorization of "foreigners" in the report encompasses even tourists visiting the country. Consequently, the premise that foreign

individuals exhibit a heightened tendency towards criminal behavior in contrast to the Japanese population rests on fragile foundations, prompting inquiries into its veracity and potentially attributing it to ingrained biases. Thus, the apprehension about crime posed by immigrants is construed as an emblematic manifestation of symbolic threat perception.

To understand the determinants of symbolic threat perception, a multilevel linear regression analysis is employed in two models. The first model includes independent variables such as hot nationalism, sex, age, education level, and place of residence (urban or rural). Hot nationalism captures the extent to which individuals prioritize Japan's national interests over potential conflicts with other countries.

The second model considers independent variables such as nationalism, sex, age, education level, and place of residence (urban or rural). Nationalism is measured as the sum of hot nationalism and banal nationalism. By including banal nationalism, which focuses on everyday expressions of patriotism and attachment to the nation, this model provides a broader understanding of nationalism.

These models indicate that individuals with higher levels of nationalism exhibit stronger perceptions of symbolic threat from immigrants. The analysis sheds light on the complex interplay between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration sentiments in Japan, providing valuable insights into the factors shaping public attitudes toward immigration in the country.

Hypothesis 2: The more nationalistic an individual is, the more they perceive a symbolic threat from immigrants.

To ensure a robust analysis, the model excluded "can't choose" and "no response" answers from the analysis for three reasons. First, these responses (coded 8 and 9, respectively) can lead to computational issues and artificially inflate variable values. Second, public opinion refers to the

opinions of people interested in or concerned about the issue at hand (Anderson and Turgeon 2023, 29). Therefore, to capture public opinion accurately, the responses of individuals genuinely interested in or concerned about the issue at hand need more attention. The respondents who selected "can't choose" instead of "neither agree nor disagree" are often less engaged in the topic, and their responses might not reflect their true attitudes. Finally, social desirability bias can result in respondents providing answers they consider socially acceptable. Social desirability is the desire for social approval and acceptance, as well as the belief that culturally acceptable and appropriate behavior is essential for social acceptance (Marlowe and Crowne 1961, 100-115). Some respondents holding socially unacceptable anti-immigration views may choose "can't choose" (Berinsky 2008, 318).

6.3. Results

6.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Symbolic Threat Perception Causes Anti-immigration Sentiments

Data analysis revealed significant findings regarding the relationship between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration attitudes in Japan. The first part of the study explained the responses to the questions that measure the variables in Hypothesis 1 and demonstrated the regression analysis results.

Figure 6 Attitudes toward Immigrants

As can be seen in the Figure 6, 41% of the 1234 respondents preferred no change in number of immigrants in Japan. The average of the "can't choose" answers and no answers which were excluded from the analysis is 3.05. Furthermore, while 18% of the respondents are against an increase in immigration, 15% of them are approve of an increase in immigration. Thus, the Japanese public is slightly unfavorable to increase in immigration.

Figure 7 Crime Threat Perception

The study found that 39% of the respondents believed that immigrants increased their crime rate as shown in Figure 7. The mean score of the answers is 2.73. The correlation coefficient between threat of crime and anti-immigration sentiment is 0.360 (p=0). In other words, one reason for anti-immigration sentiment is the belief that immigrants commit crimes more often than Japanese citizens.

Figure 8 Cultural Threat Perception

As shown in the Figure 8, while 42% of the respondents do not agree with the statement that immigrants undermine culture, 15% believe that immigrants undermine Japanese culture. The mean of the responses is 3.50. The correlation coefficient between cultural threat perception and anti-immigration sentiment is 0.325 (p=0).

The symbolic threat variable is based on the crime and cultural threat variables. The correlation coefficient between symbolic threat perception and anti-immigration sentiment is 0.412 (p=0).

Figure 9 Job Threat Perception

As shown in Figure 9, 39% of the respondents believe that immigrants do not take jobs from Japanese citizens, 14% believe otherwise. The mean of the responses is 3.44. The correlation coefficient between job threat and anti-immigration sentiment is 0.329 (p=0).

As mentioned earlier, the hero perception variable is constructed by calculating the responses of two questions, as shown in Figures 10 and 11. The correlation coefficient between the perception of immigrants as heroes and anti-immigration sentiment is -0.456 (p=0).

Figure 10 Perception of Immigrants as Good for the Economy

Figure 11 Perception of Immigrants as Bringing New Cultures

As shown in the Figure 12, almost 50% of the respondents believe that immigrants should have the same rights as Japanese citizens. This indicates that the Japanese public perceives immigrants as individuals having the same human rights as themselves. The mean score of the responses is 4.17. The correlation coefficient between perceiving immigrants as individuals with rights and anti-immigration is -0.367 (p=0).

Figure 12 Perception of Immigrants as People with Rights

A linear regression model tests hypothesis 1 (Table 4). The dependent variable is anti-immigration behavior. After dropping "can't choose" and "no answers," the sample is reduced to 763. The coefficients are standardized as beta coefficients.

Table 4 Effect of Perception of Immigrants on Anti-immigration sentiments

Crime	0.137***
	(0.028)
Cultural	0.103**
	(0.031)
Jobs	0.103**
	(0.031)
Hero	-0.311***
	(0.018)
Rights	-0. 185***
	(0.026)
Sex (female)	0.062*
	(0.054)
Age	-0.009
	(0.001)
Education (years)	-0.0005
	(0.001)
Place of residence (rural)	0.035
	(0.022)
Adj R-squared	0.324
N	763

Note: The values in parentheses are the standard errors of the variables.

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

The explanatory power (adjusted R-squared) of the regression model is 32%. The regression analysis shows that the most important determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes is the crime threat perception. However, hero perception and perceiving immigrants as rights holders have a strong relationship with positive attitudes toward immigrants. Cultural and job threats have moderate effects on anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Furthermore, individuals

who perceive immigrants as beneficial to the economy or cultural diversity and adopt a rights-based perspective towards them have more positive attitudes toward immigration.

6.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Nationalism Causes Symbolic Threat Perception

In the second part of the analysis, two linear regression models were constructed. The dependent variable in both models is symbolic threat perception. The independent variables in the first model are hot nationalism, sex, age, educational level, and place of residence (urban or rural). The independent variables in the second model are nationalism, sex, age, educational level, and place of residence (urban or rural).

Fifty-three percent of the respondents were women. According to the World Bank (2021), 51% of the Japanese population is female. The respondents' median age was 52 years. According to the International Monetary Foundation (IMF 2020), the median age of the Japanese population is 48.4 years. The average number of years of education of the respondents is 12.59. The average years of formal education of the Japanese population in 2004 was 12.4 (Newby et al. 2009, 115). Figure 13 shows the respondents' place of residence.

Figure 13 Place of Living (Urban or Rural)

PLACE OF LIVING

	BIG CITY	TOWN OR SMALL CITY	RURAL AREAS	NO ANSWER
	381	470	365	18

Hot nationalism is measured through a question seeking to understand the respondents' attitudes toward national interests in international conflicts. As shown in Figure 14, 37% of the respondents disagreed with the idea that Japan should consider its own interests first even in conflicts with other nations. This query exhibits the lowest degree of consensus among respondents when evaluating nationalist attitudes, aligning with the observation that instances of pronounced hot nationalism are confined to a minority segment within well-established democracies. Consequently, this particular query is considered most suitable for gauging instances of hot nationalism within the framework of the ISSP dataset.

Figure 14 Hot nationalism

JAPAN SHOULD FOLLOW ITS OWN INTERESTS EVEN IF CONFLICT BETWEEN OTHER STATES OCCURS

Category	Value
AGREE STRONGLY	83
AGREE	172
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	416
DISAGREE	201
DISAGREE STRONGLY	260
CAN'T CHOOSE	96
NO ANSWER	

Banal nationalism is measured through a question on the respondents' views on patriotism. As shown in Figure 15, 55% of the respondents agree that patriotism plays a crucial role in improving Japan's place in the world. Nationalism is the sum of hot nationalism and banal nationalism. The correlation coefficient between nationalism and symbolic threat perception is 0.394 (p=0).

Figure 15 Banal nationalism

Hypothesis 2 is tested using multilevel linear regression analysis. The results are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable in both models is symbolic threat. The first model considers only hot nationalism for analysis. The second model considers both hot nationalism and banal nationalism and "stretches" the definition of nationalism.

Table 5 Effect of Nationalism on Symbolic Threat Perception

	Model 1	Model 2
Hot nationalism	0.320***	
	(0.048)	
Nationalism (hot+banal)		0.381***
		(0.032)
Sex (women)	-0.001	0.008
	(0.111)	(0.109)
Age	-0.085**	-0.041
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education (years)	0.031	0.011
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Place of residence (rural)	-0.050*	-0.049*
	(0.048)	(0.047)
Adjusted R-squared	0.119	0.156
N	985	985

Note: The values in parentheses are the standard errors of the variables.

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

In Model 1, hot nationalism is the most important variable for predicting symbolic threat perception. In other words, hot nationalists are more likely to perceive symbolic threat from immigrants than others. Age has a moderating effect on symbolic threat perception. Younger individuals are more likely to perceive symbolic threat from immigrants. Finally, place of residence has a small effect on symbolic threat perception. Individuals living in rural areas are more likely to perceive symbolic threat from immigrants compared urban residents.

In Model 2, nationalism, that is, the sum of hot nationalism and banal nationalism, is the most significant determinant variable for predicting symbolic threat perception. The correlation coefficient is higher when nationalism is defined more broadly to include banal nationalism. Living in urban areas has a small negative effect on symbolic threat perception. The explanatory power (adjusted R-squared) is higher in model 2. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is verified through multilevel linear regression analysis.

6.4. Discussion

This chapter tested two hypotheses: The first hypothesis argued that symbolic threat perceptions such as crime or cultural threat perceptions are more effective in explaining anti-immigration sentiment than economic threat perceptions. The study assessed the crime, cultural and job threat, hero perception, and rights-based perception effects on anti-immigration sentiment. The belief that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than Japanese citizens was found to be the most effective factor causing anti-immigration sentiments. Furthermore, the perception of immigrants as heroes or as people with rights was found to have a negative effect on anti-immigration sentiments. The second hypothesis argued that nationalism causes symbolic threat perceptions when it is broadly defined to include banal nationalism. Two linear regression models tested this hypothesis. The first tested the gender, age, education, place of residence, and hot nationalism effects on symbolic threat perception. This model defined nationalism in a narrow sense. The second model tested the gender, age, education, place of residence, and nationalism effects on symbolic threat perception. In this model, nationalism is defined broadly as the sum of hot and banal nationalism. Nationalism was found to be the most effective variable in explaining symbolic threat perception when nationalism is defined broadly. Both the correlation coefficient and the adjusted R-squared value are higher in the second model.

The results of testing the first hypothesis imply that Japanese citizens oppose immigrants because they fear that immigrants would increase the crime rate in the country. However, the National Police Agency's 2015 arrest rate report shows that only 2.6% of all arrests in 2015 were foreigners. These arrests included those arrested for entering the country illegally, staying illegally, or working without a permit. Furthermore, the data show only the arrest rates (National Police Agency 2016). There is no data on how many of those arrested were found guilty at the end of prosecution. Moreover, the definition of foreigners in the report included the tourists in the country. Thus, the belief that foreigners are more likely to commit crimes than the Japanese is questionable. In this sense, the perceived threat of crime by immigrants is evaluated as a symbolic threat perception.

This study shows that perceiving immigrants as heroes contributing to the overall economic situation in Japan or bringing new cultures has a negative effect on anti-immigration sentiment. Consequently, framing immigrants as heroes (Benson 2009) in the media and elite discourse can reduce anti-immigration attitudes in Japan. The study also found that individuals who believe that immigrants should have similar rights as Japanese citizens, that is, those who perceive immigrants as having rights, have more positive attitudes toward immigrants. This suggests that a rights-based approach to representing immigrants in the media or elite discourse may improve attitudes toward immigrants in Japan. However, these implications need to be evaluated through experimental research testing the effect of representation on attitudes toward immigrants in Japan.

The synthesis of prior research conducted in this study unveils valuable insights into the intricate factors that influence attitudes towards immigrants. Nagayoshi's (2009) analysis, which originally positioned job threat as a pivotal determinant of anti-immigrant sentiment, has been revisited in this study. However, the findings of this current research demonstrate that the impact of job threat is comparatively less pronounced than initially anticipated, when assessed alongside other pertinent

variables. Kobayashi et al.'s (2015) perspective, which emphasized the impact of immigrants' contribution to a nation's overall economic condition on shaping anti-immigrant sentiment, was further examined within the context of this study. The findings from this research indicate that the perception of immigrants as economic contributors holds a considerable influence over attitudes. In contrast to the perspectives put forth by Green (2017), as well as Davison and Peng (2021), which highlighted the prominence of cultural threat perceptions in influencing attitudes toward immigrants, this study presents a divergent viewpoint. The findings of this research reveal that the perception of immigrants as being more prone to criminal activities holds greater significance in shaping public sentiment. This assertion underscores the distinctive role of perceived crime threat as a determinant of attitudes toward immigrants, delineating a departure from the aforementioned emphasis on cultural threat perceptions.

The results of testing the second hypothesis indicates that nationalism is the main cause of anti-immigrant sentiments. Symbolic threat perceptions, which have a negative effect on attitudes toward immigrants, are caused by nationalism. The two regression models show the importance of "stretching" the definition of nationalism to include banal nationalism. The correlation coefficients between nationalism and symbolic threat perception as well as the explanatory power of the model (adjusted R-squared) are higher in model 2, where nationalism is defined broadly. This shows the importance of banal nationalism in measuring nationalism.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter shed light on the reasons for anti-immigration sentiments in Japan by focusing on the roles of symbolic threat perception and nationalism. The study's first hypothesis argued that the perception of symbolic threat from immigrants causes anti-immigration sentiments in Japan. The

second hypothesis argued that symbolic threat perceptions arise from nationalism. No study in the literature has so far attempted to determine the reasons for symbolic threat perception.

Given Japan's rapidly declining and aging population, immigration into the country is inevitable. Hence, it is essential to determine whether Japanese citizens support immigration, and if they oppose it, to determine the reason for it. In this regard, the results of this study indicate the need to reduce anti-immigration sentiments in Japan.

The most effective variable affecting anti-immigration behavior is symbolic threat perception. Japanese citizens oppose immigration because they believe that immigrants commit crimes more often than citizens. Furthermore, heroic and rights-based perceptions have positive effects on attitudes toward immigration. In this regard, the media and elite discourses have important roles to play because the belief that immigrants commit more crimes is not based on reality. No data categorically show that immigrants commit crimes more often than Japanese nationals.

This chapter also shows that anti-immigration has a discursive basis in nationalism. In other words, anti-immigrants use symbolic threats to show that their opposition to immigration has a rational basis, and symbolic threat perception is caused by nationalism. This study is the first one to explore the reason for symbolic threat perception and to use the concept of "banal nationalism" and stretch the definition of nationalism. Nationalism needs to be adequately understood to both explain anti-immigration sentiments and know ourselves better (Billig 2002, 175).

This study has several limitations. First, the ISSP 2013 data used were collected in 2013. The Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau (2020) estimated a 49% increase in the number of foreigners from 2013 to 2022, emphasizing the importance of utilizing new data for more accurate results in future studies. Second, the contact hypothesis and effect of concern on decline in

population cannot be tested using the ISSP 2013 data because the survey had no question to measure these variables. Third, the survey had too many "can't choose" responses. Thus, the sample considered for regression analyses was too small because such responses had to be removed. Consequently, there is a need to find out the reason for the excessive "can't choose" responses. Furthermore, the respondents tended to choose the middle answers to several questions. For example, 36% of the respondents chose "neither agree nor disagree" and 5% chose "can't choose" to the question on crime threat; 34% of the respondents answered "neither agree nor disagree" and 9% answered "can't choose" to the question on cultural threat. As these examples show, middle answers are the most popular choice for many questions. Future studies need to determine the reasons for this phenomenon. Finally, the questions used to measure banal nationalism are inadequate. Therefore, construction of a banal nationalism index is important.

Therefore, the next step for this dissertation project will be generating a novel research design to account for these limitations. Firstly, a recent survey is needed to know recent attitudes towards immigrants. Furthermore, the questions will be designed to both to test the effect of contact hypothesis and the concern for declining population and to understand banal nationalism completely.

7. UNDERSTANDING ANTI-IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN JAPAN: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF SYMBOLIC THREAT PERCEPTION AND NATIONALISM

7.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I argued that the existing survey data remains limited to understand anti-immigration attitudes in Japan. In the previous empirical chapters, a day survey was conducted on Japanese nation-wide newspapers to identify recent symbols of banal nationalism. Additionally, a statistical analysis of ISSP 2013 survey results was undertaken to assess the hypothesis that nationalism triggers anti-immigration sentiments through symbolic threat perception. In particular, I showed the relation between symbolic threat perception and anti-immigration and the importance of expanded definition of nationalism. However, a new survey design is needed to explain symbolic threat perception in Japan.

An online survey was designed and conducted in June 2023 with Japanese citizens. The aim of the survey is understanding the relation between anti-immigration, symbolic threat perception and nationalism in Japan. The questions were designed to measure nationalism in an expanded way. Questions are presented in the Appendix B.

The data is analyzed in four parts. To explore the influence of threat perception, hero perception, rights-based perception, and sex on anti-immigrant attitudes, a linear regression model was developed as the initial step of analysis. Second part of the analysis is divided into two. Firstly, two linear regression models are created to understand whether the origin of the immigrant influences attitudes toward immigrants. Then, the factors that shape attitudes towards different immigrant groups were compared by using seven linear regression models. In the third part of the analysis, a linear regression model is designed to examine the relation between anti-immigration and support for equal rights for immigrants. For the last

part of the analysis, three linear regression models are constructed to identify the determinants of symbolic threat perception.

This study holds significant value for several reasons. Firstly, it addresses an important gap in the existing literature on public opinion regarding immigration by investigating the origin and determinants of symbolic threat perception, providing new insights into this crucial aspect. Secondly, unlike previous research that narrowly defines nationalism, this study takes into account banal nationalism, offering a more comprehensive understanding of its role in shaping attitudes toward immigrants. Thirdly, the survey utilized in this study is purposefully designed to capture attitudes toward immigrants, perceptions of immigrants, and nationalism which is defined broadly, providing robust and relevant data for analysis. Lastly, the study contributes to the limited body of research on banal nationalism in Japan, thereby expanding the knowledge base in this area and enriching the scholarly discourse.

Figure 16 Hypothesis

Nationalism (Hot+banal nationalism ⟹ Symbolic Threat Perception ⟹ Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants

Control variables:

- Age
- Education level
- Place of residence
- Contact
- English speaking abilities
- Income
- Concern on declining population

Control variables:

- Perceptions of immigrants
- Sex
- Origin of immigrants

7.2. Research Design

7.2.1. Sample

This study conducted an online survey in Japan to understand the relation between anti-immigration, symbolic threat perception, and nationalism. Participants were obtained from the subject pool of Rakuten Insight, Inc., a prominent online survey company in Japan. Five hundred valid responses were obtained. The respondents had an average age of 54.4 years, and 65.2% were male. Table 6 presents detailed sample statistics.

Table 6 Sample descriptive statistics

Respondent attributes		%
Sex		
Male		65.2
Female		34.6
Other		0.2
Age		
20-29		2
30-49		30
50-69		56
70-80		12
Education		
Junior high school		1.8
High school		25.6
College		18.8
University		48.2
Graduate school		5.6
Variables	Min-max	Mean (SD)
Anti-immigration	1-5	2.90 (1.05)
Negative attitudes toward immigrants from the USA	1-3	1.74(0.58)
Negative attitudes toward Chinese immigrants	1-3	2.49(0.65)
Negative attitudes toward Korean immigrants	1-3	2.31(0.68)
Negative attitudes toward German immigrants	1-3	1.74(0.57)
Negative attitudes toward immigrants from Philippines	1-3	1.99(0.63)
Negative attitudes toward Japanese Brazilians	1-3	1.95(0.64)
Negative attitudes toward immigrants from Iran	1-3	2.17((0.64)
Symbolic threat perception	1-5	3.13(0.94)
Economic threat perception	1-5	2.49(1.01)
Hot nationalism	0-5	3.05(0.64)
Nationalism	0-5	3.1 (0.62)
Contact	0-5	0.95(1.18)
English speaking abilities	1-5	1.77(0.98)

Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.

7.2.2. Design and variables

This study's analysis is divided into four distinct parts, with the goal of offering a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration sentiments in Japan. The first part focused on testing Hypothesis 1, which suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes arise from symbolic threat perceptions. This examination seeks to explore the extent to which perceptions of immigrants as a symbolic threat contribute to opposition towards immigration in the Japanese context. In the second part, attitudes toward different immigrant groups are compared to understand whether origin of the immigrants plays a crucial role in understanding the factors of anti-immigration. Hypothesis 2 proposes that the origin of the immigrants do not have a significant correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes. Thus, although attitudes change depending on the immigrant groups, the factors that determines negative attitudes do not change across immigrant groups. In the third part, the relation between anti-immigration and the support for equal rights for immigrants is researched. Lastly, the fourth part concentrated on testing Hypothesis 3, which proposes that nationalism plays a significant role in shaping symbolic threat perceptions. Through this investigation, the study seeks to establish the influence of nationalism on individuals' perceptions of immigrants as a threat to their national culture, thereby enhancing the understanding of the complex relationship between nationalism and symbolic threat in the context of anti-immigration sentiments in Japan.

Hypothesis 1: Anti-immigrant attitudes are rooted in individuals' symbolic threat perceptions.

This suggests that when individuals perceive immigrants as potential threats to aspects of society, such as national identity and culture, they are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. The dependent variable in this study is "anti-immigration." The evaluation questions corresponding to each variable are included in the appendix, provided in both the original Japanese version and their English translations.

The independent variables in this study included various perceptions about immigrants, considered as factors that may influence individuals' attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants in the context of the research. The first independent variable explores symbolic threat perception, which includes threats to public order and cultural threat perception. The second independent variable examines the economic threat perception, or the perception that immigrants are competitors for job opportunities. The variable "hero perception" assesses the extent to which immigrants are perceived as contributors to Japan's economy and cultural diversity. This variable aims to gauge individuals' positive or utilitarian views or beliefs regarding the role of immigrants in enhancing the economic and cultural aspects of Japan. The variable concerning the recognition of immigrants' human rights evaluates the extent to which immigrants, despite not having citizenship, are perceived to possess the same rights as Japanese citizens. This variable aims to measure individuals' attitudes towards the equal treatment and protection of the rights of immigrants, irrespective of their citizenship status. Finally, sex is controlled as an independent variable affecting anti-immigration.

To comprehensively explore the factors influencing anti-immigration behavior in Japan, a linear regression model was constructed. This model aims to identify and analyze the determinants that contribute to individuals' attitudes towards immigration in the Japanese context. By employing a linear regression approach, we can assess the relationships and significance of various independent variables in predicting anti-immigration sentiments. As mentioned previously, the dependent variable is anti-immigration attitudes, and the independent variables are symbolic threat perception, economic threat perception, hero perception, rights-based perception, and sex.

Hypothesis 2: Origin of the immigrants do not have a significant correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes in Japan.

The second part of the analysis is also divided into two subparts. In this part, attitudes toward different immigrant groups are compared. These groups are the immigrants from the USA, Chinese migrants,

Korean immigrants, German migrants, immigrants from Philippines, Japanese Brazilians (*Nikkei*), and immigrants from Iran. The effect of the origin of the migrants on attitudes towards immigrants is tested by several scholars in Japan. Nakazawa (2007) found that the origin of the immigrant determines attitudes towards immigrants. Igarashi and Ono (2022) also tested same hypothesis and found that interaction with neoliberal ideology, immigrants' skill level as well as origin of immigrants have a statistically significant relation with anti-immigration attitude. Immigrant groups examined in this paper is the same with those in the study of Igarashi and Ono (2022), except immigrants from Iran. Immigrants from Iran is added to this study in order to see whether attitudes toward Muslim groups differ from non-Muslim groups. In this paper, although attitudes towards immigrants is expected to change depending on the origin of the immigrants, however, it is expected that the factors determine the opposition to immigrants do not change.

In the second part, a multilevel linear regression analysis was employed, including two models. The dependent variables of both models are anti-immigration. The independent variables in the first model are the immigrant groups which were previously mentioned. In the second model, in addition to the effect of origin of immigrant, symbolic threat perception, economic threat perception, hero perception, rights-based perception, and sex is controlled to show that symbolic threat perception is more effective for explaining anti-immigrant attitudes than the origin of immigrants.

Seven linear regression models were then created to understand the factors determining attitudes toward different immigrant groups. The dependent variables are negative attitudes toward seven different immigrant groups: anti-American, anti-Chinese, anti-Korean, anti-German, anti-Filipino, anti-Nikkei, and anti-Persian. Independent variables are symbolic threat perception, economic threat perception, hero perception, rights-based perception, and sex.

In the third part of the study, the relation between anti-immigration and the support for equal rights for immigrants is examined. A linear regression model is created. The dependent variable is anti-immigration.

the independent variables are support for equal social rights, support for equal political rights, and utilitarian approach.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals with stronger nationalistic inclinations are more prone to perceiving immigrants as symbolic threats.

In the fourth part of the study, Hypothesis 3 examined the influence of nationalism on individuals' perceptions of symbolic threat from immigrants. The hypothesis proposes that individuals with stronger nationalistic inclinations are more prone to perceiving immigrants as potential symbols of threat to Japan's cultural and social integrity. The dependent variable in this part of the analysis is symbolic threat perception.

To investigate the factors influencing symbolic threat perception, a multilevel linear regression analysis was employed and included three models. The use of multilevel regression allows to account for the hierarchical structure of the data, as individual responses are nested within specific groups or contexts. This approach facilitates a comprehensive examination of the determinants of symbolic threat perception while considering potential variations between different groups or settings, leading to a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. The first model includes independent variables such as contact, education level, English speaking abilities, income, place of residence, concern on declining population and age. In this model, nationalism is not included in the analysis. The second model includes independent variables such as hot nationalism, contact, education level, English speaking abilities, income, place of residence, concern on declining population and age. Hot nationalism variable captures the extent to which individuals prioritize their country in an exclusionist attitude. The third model considers independent variables such as nationalism, contact, education level, English speaking abilities, income, place of residence, concern on declining population and age. In this study, nationalism is operationalized as the sum of hot nationalism and banal nationalism, incorporating banal nationalism to capture everyday

expressions of patriotism and attachment to the nation, thereby offering a comprehensive perspective on nationalism.

7.3. Results

7.3.1. The Relation between Anti-immigration and Symbolic Threat Perception

The data analysis yielded significant findings concerning the interplay among symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration attitudes in Japan. The initial section of the study elucidated the responses to the variables pertaining to Hypothesis 1 and presented the results of the regression analysis.

Forty-two percent of the respondents preferred no change in the number of immigrants in Japan. The study found that only 36% of the respondents believed that immigrants increased their crime rate, yet 46% of them responded that they neither agree nor disagree with this belief. Similarly, 40% of the respondents expressed that immigrants break the rules in the social life, and 45% selected neither agree nor disagree. 31% of the respondents thought that immigrants harm public order, and 45% of them responded that they neither agree nor disagree with this idea. Lastly, 25% of the respondents perceived cultural threat from immigrants, and 42% selected neither agree nor disagree.

Only 12% of the respondents perceived economic threat from the immigrants. 47% of them believed that immigrants are beneficial for Japanese economy. On the other hand, 24% of the respondents expressed that immigrants contribute Japanese culture by bringing new cultures or traditions, and 59% responded that they neither agree nor disagree with this idea. Lastly, 46% of the respondents thought that immigrants should have the same rights with Japanese citizens.

A linear regression model was employed to test Hypothesis 1 (Table 7). The dependent variable in the linear regression model is anti-immigration behavior. The coefficients in the linear regression model are standardized as beta coefficients.

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Table 7 Effect of Perception of Immigrants on Anti-immigration Sentiments

Symbolic threat perception	0.378***
Economic threat perception	0.064
Hero perception	-0.239***
Rights-based perception	-0.088*
Sex (Women)	0.168***
Adj R-squared	0.389
N	500

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

The explanatory power (adjusted R-squared) of the regression model is %39. The regression analysis shows that the most important determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes is the symbolic threat perception. However, hero perception has a negative correlation with anti-immigration. Furthermore, men have slightly more positive image of foreigners than women. Lastly, rights-based approach has a small relation with positive attitudes towards immigrants. As a result, Hypothesis 1 is supported and confirmed based on the findings from the linear regression model. Furthermore, individuals who perceive immigrants as beneficial to the economy or cultural diversity have more positive attitudes toward immigration. The finding that men exhibit a more positive attitude towards immigrants compared to women is consistent with the results reported by Okubo (2021).

7.3.2. Comparison of Attitudes toward Different Immigrant Groups

Second part of the analysis is divided into two sections. Firstly, the effect of the origin of the immigrants on anti-immigration will be controlled by employing a multilevel linear regression analysis with two models (Table 8). The dependent variable in both models is anti-immigration attitudes. The independent

variables in the first model are seven different immigrant groups. The independent variables in the second model are different perceptions of immigrants, sex in addition to seven different immigrant groups.

Table 8 Factors determining anti-immigration attitude.

	Model 1	Model 2
Anti-American	0.037	0.044
Anti-Chinese	0.147**	0.131**
Anti-Korean	0.014	-0.013
Anti-German	0.234***	0.180**
Anti-Filipino	0.241***	0.153**
Anti-Nikkei	0.098	0.072
Anti-Persian	0.051	-0.004
Symbolic threat perception		0.200***
Economic threat perception		0.025
Hero perception		-0.146***
Rights-based perception		-0.075
Sex (women)		0.102**
Adj. R-squared	0.439	0.521
N	500	500

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

According to Model 1, Filipino and German origin have a strong relationship with anti-immigration attitudes. In other words, individuals with negative attitudes toward German or Filipino origin tend to oppose an increase in immigration. Chinese origin has moderate effect on anti-immigration attitudes. On the other hand, in Model 2, symbolic threat perception and hero perception are most effective factors in

determining anti-immigration. Chinese, German, and Filipino origin, and sex have moderate effects. The model's explanatory power, as indicated by the adjusted R-squared, is higher in Model 2. As a result, origin of the immigrant is less significant than perception of immigrants in determining anti-immigration. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 is supported by this analysis.

The determinants of attitudes toward different immigrant groups were also examined. Seven regression models are created. Dependent variables are attitudes towards different immigrant groups. Independent variables are different perceptions of immigrants and sex.

Table 9 Factors determining attitudes towards different immigrant groups.

	Anti-American	Anti-Chinese	Anti-Korean	Anti-German	Anti-Filipino	Anti-Nikkei	Anti-Persian
Symbolic threat perception	.209***	.378***	.346***	.236***	.357***	.369***	.424***
Economic threat perception	.093	-.015	.032	.128**	.069	.038	.023
Hero perception	-.186***	-.096	-.153**	-.203***	-.182***	-.133**	-.133**
Rights-based perception	.005	-.015	-.008	.018	-.061	-.064	-.045
Sex (women)	.114**	.036	-.009	.132**	.148***	.123**	.071
Adj. R-squared	0.154	0.170	0.194	0.204	0.300	0.250	0.272
N	500	500	500	500	500	500	500

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

As observed in Table 9, symbolic threat perception significantly influences attitudes towards all immigrant groups, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. Hero perception, on the other hand, has a strong positive relation with positive attitudes towards US citizens, Germans, and Filipinos. It also moderately

affects positive attitudes towards Koreans, Japanese Brazilians (*Nikkei*), and Persians. Reversely, hero perception does not influence attitudes toward Chinese immigrants. Although being women has a strong positive relation with negative attitudes toward Filipino immigrants, sex moderately affects attitudes toward US citizens, Germans, and Japanese Brazilians (*Nikkei*). On the other hand, sex does not have any effect on attitudes toward Chinese, Korean, and Persian immigrants. In summary, symbolic threat perception is effective in explaining negative attitudes toward all immigrant groups, yet hero perception and sex do not affect attitudes towards different immigrant groups.

7.3.3. The relation between anti-immigration and support for equal rights for immigrants

In the third part of the analysis, the relation between anti-immigration and the support for equal rights for immigrants is examined. A linear regression model is created. The dependent variable is anti-immigrant attitudes. Independent variables are support for equal social rights, support for equal political rights, and utilitarian approach.

44% of the respondents supported equal social rights such as welfare and health for immigrants. 40% of the respondents agreed with the idea that immigrants should have the right to vote in municipal elections. 46% of the respondents expressed that they think blue-collar foreign workers should be accepted in certain industries and areas where there is a shortage of labor.

Table 10 The relation between anti-immigration and support for equal rights for immigrants

Equal social rights	-0.297***
Equal political rights	-0.122*
Utilitarian	-0.247***
Adj. R-squared	0.288
N	500

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

As observed in Table 10, support for equal social rights affects anti-immigration negatively and significantly. Individuals who support equal social rights for immigrants tend to have positive attitudes towards immigrants. Utilitarian approach also has a positive correlation with positive attitudes toward immigration. In other words, support for recruiting immigrants to the sectors that there is a labor shortage have a meaningful positive relation with support for increased immigration. Lastly, support for equal political rights affects attitudes toward immigration positively but low in extent. The relation between support for equal political rights for immigrants has a weak positive relation with positive attitudes toward immigrants.

7.3.4. The Relation between Symbolic Threat Perception and Nationalism

In the last part of the analysis, three linear regression models were developed, with symbolic threat perception as the dependent variable in all three models. The independent variables in the first model were contact, education level, English speaking abilities, income level, place of residence, concern regarding declining population, and age. The independent variables in the second model are hot nationalism, contact, education level, English speaking abilities, income level, place of residence, concern on declining population, and age. The independent variables in the third model are nationalism, contact, education level, English speaking abilities, income level, place of residence, concern on declining population, and age.

Thirty-four percent of respondents said they lived in a medium or small city. Another 49% lived in large cities or suburbs of large cities, and 16% lived in rural areas. Eighty percent of respondents said they were concerned about population decline.

Hypothesis 3 was examined through multilevel linear regression analysis, and the corresponding results are displayed in Table 5. Symbolic threat was the dependent variable in all models. In the first model, nationalism was excluded from the analysis. The second model exclusively incorporated hot nationalism for analysis, while the third model incorporated both hot nationalism and banal nationalism, thus expanding the scope of the nationalism definition.

Table 11 Effect of Nationalism on Symbolic Threat Perception

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Hot nationalism		0.383***	
Nationalism			0.408***
Contact	-0.098*	-0.022	-0.023
Education	-0.045	-0.038	-0.042
English	-0.018	-0.020	-0.013
Income	0.066	0.046	0.043
Rural	-0.037	-0.038	-0.040
Population decline	0.005	0.008	0.019
Age	-0.046	-0.028	-0.041
Adj R-squared	0.004	0.145	0.165
N	500	500	500

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

In Model 1, contact had little negative effect on symbolic threat perception. In other words, contact with foreigners decreased symbolic threat perception from immigrants to some extent. Although the correlation was statistically significant, the correlation coefficient between contact and symbolic threat perception and explanatory power of the model were too low to draw predictions.

In Model 2, hot nationalism emerged as the primary variable in predicting symbolic threat perception. In other words, individuals with stronger inclinations toward hot nationalism were more prone to perceive symbolic threat from immigrants compared with those with different orientations. Other independent variables did not show a significant correlation with symbolic threat perception.

In Model 3, nationalism—represented by the summation of hot nationalism and banal nationalism—emerged as the most significant determinant in predicting symbolic threat perception. The correlation coefficient increased when nationalism was defined more expansively to encompass banal nationalism alongside hot nationalism. The model's explanatory power, as indicated by the adjusted R-squared, was higher in Model 3. Consequently, Hypothesis 3 is validated through the utilization of multilevel linear regression analysis.

7.4. Conclusion

This study examined the reason behind anti-immigration in Japan. The analysis of this study is structured into four separate sections, aiming to provide a comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration attitudes in Japan. The initial segment of the study was dedicated to examining Hypothesis 1, which posits that anti-immigrant attitudes are rooted in symbolic threat perceptions. To test this hypothesis, a linear regression model was utilized. The results of the regression analysis indicate that the most significant factor influencing anti-immigrant attitudes is the perception of symbolic threat. In addition, it is found that sex and hero perception are also effective for predicting anti-immigration. The findings of this study demonstrate that perceiving

immigrants as heroes who contribute to Japan's economy or enrich its cultural diversity has a favorable impact on reducing anti-immigration sentiments. Therefore, promoting such a portrayal of immigrants in the media and elite discourse may effectively diminish anti-immigrant attitudes in Japan (Benson 2009). The observation that men display a more positive attitude towards immigrants in comparison to women aligns with the findings reported by Okubo (2021).

The second part of the study examined attitudes toward different immigrant groups to determine whether the origin of immigrants plays a critical role in understanding the factors behind anti-immigration sentiments. Hypothesis 2 posits that the origin of immigrants does not have a significant correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes. Consequently, although attitudes may vary depending on the specific immigrant groups, the underlying factors that contribute to negative attitudes remain consistent across all immigrant groups. Immigrants from the USA and Germany were the most favorable immigrant groups for the respondents. On the other hand, Chinese immigrants are opposed most strongly among other immigrant groups. This finding aligns with the findings in day survey. It is found in the day survey that China is represented in a very negative way in the press. In this sense, media representations are important in shaping attitudes. The second part of the analysis consists of two sections. Firstly, the impact of immigrants' origin on anti-immigration attitudes will be controlled through the use of a multilevel linear regression analysis with two models. Ultimately, it is found that origin of the immigrant is less significant than perception of immigrants in determining anti-immigration. In other words, perceiving the immigrants as a symbolic threat is more effective in predicting negative attitudes towards immigrants than the origin of the immigrants. Secondly, an examination was conducted to identify the factors that determine attitudes towards different immigrant groups. It is found that symbolic threat perception significantly influences attitudes towards all immigrant groups, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. The effect of hero

perception and sex differs across immigrant groups. Finally, Hypothesis 2 is supported by empirical analysis.

The second part of this analysis demonstrated that hero perception does not affect attitudes toward less favored immigrant groups. Especially, attitudes toward Chinese immigrants remain negative though precepting immigrants as beneficial for the economy or cultural diversity. Chinese immigrants were the less favored immigrant group in the sample. This situation may be explained by territorial disputes between China and Japan. Igarashi (2018) argues that territorial disputes trigger anti-immigrant sentiment. He argued that when the sovereignty dispute over two islands, namely Senkaku/Diaoyu with China and Takeshima/Dokdo with South Korea, becomes salient in the public sphere, it causes Japanese attitudes toward Chinese or Korean immigrants to become more negative. The demonstrations on these islands by Chinese and Korean demonstrators in 2012 caused the issue to become salient in public discussion, and this caused attitudes to become more negative than before. Negative attitudes toward Chinese immigrants may be explained by Igarashi's hypotheses, yet further examination by using an experimental survey design is needed.

The relation between anti-immigration and support for equal rights for immigrants is researched in the third part of the analysis. A linear regression model is created, with anti-immigration as the dependent variable. It is found that individuals who support equal social rights for immigrants tend to have positive attitudes toward immigrants.

The fourth part of the analysis focused on testing Hypothesis 3, which posits that nationalism plays a significant role in shaping symbolic threat perceptions. Three linear regression models were constructed, with symbolic threat perception as the dependent variable in all models. It is found that nationalism, represented by the summation of hot nationalism and banal nationalism, emerges as the most significant determinant in predicting symbolic threat perception. Nationalism emerges as a significant factor leading

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to symbolic threat perceptions, which in turn negatively influence attitudes towards immigrants. The results obtained from the two regression models highlight the significance of extending the definition of nationalism to encompass banal nationalism. In Model 3, where nationalism is defined in a broader sense, the correlation coefficients between nationalism and symbolic threat perception, as well as the explanatory power of the model (adjusted R-squared), are higher. This underscores the relevance of incorporating banal nationalism in assessing nationalism's impact on symbolic threat perception. Consequently, Hypothesis 3 has also verified.

The main purpose of this study was to test the associations between anti-immigration, symbolic threat perception and nationalism. The findings of this study hold significant importance. They provide valuable insights into the interplay between symbolic threat perception, nationalism, and anti-immigration attitudes in the context of Japan. The examination of these factors sheds light on the complexities of public opinions towards immigrants and contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamics influencing attitudes in the host society. Moreover, the study lays the groundwork for future research in this field, encouraging further exploration and refinement of the relationships between these variables. The origin of the symbolic threat perception is under-studied. Thus, the findings of this study are significant for explaining the roots of symbolic threat perception. In addition, this study is original in expanding the definition of nationalism by using Billig's banal nationalism concept.

In conclusion, this study sheds light on the factors that contribute to anti-immigration sentiments in Japan, with a particular focus on the roles of symbolic threat perception and nationalism. The findings underscore the significance of understanding how perceived threats to cultural identity and national values can shape attitudes towards immigrants. Additionally, the research underscores the importance of considering banal nationalism in the measurement of nationalism, as it contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of its influence on symbolic threat perception. Indeed, understanding

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nationalism is essential not only for understanding anti-immigration sentiments but also for gaining a deeper insight into our own identities and societies (Billig 2002, 175).

8. CONCLUSIONS

8.1. Summary of Findings

The primary objective of this dissertation was to address a notable gap present in the existing literature concerning public attitudes toward immigration in Japan. This gap was successfully addressed by broadening the conceptual boundaries of nationalism. To be more specific, my aim was to delve into the underlying determinants contributing to anti-immigration sentiments and nationalism in the context of Japan. I posited and substantiated that anti-immigration sentiment stems from symbolic threat perception. Interestingly, I identified a significant gap in the existing literature—a lack of research into the reasons underpinning symbolic threat perception. Consequently, this dissertation project stands as a pioneering effort in elucidating the origins of symbolic threat perception.

Furthermore, I contended that the foundation of symbolic threat perception lies in nationalism. To substantiate this assertion, I advocated for an expanded interpretation of nationalism, drawing upon Billig's concept of banal nationalism. The examples and symbols cited in banal nationalism literature proved to be harmonious with the context of Japanese nationalism. It is important to note that studies focusing on Japanese banal nationalism remained limited in number. To provide a more comprehensive analysis, my dissertation delved into the intricate ways through which the Japanese press actively (re)produced Japanese nationalism on a daily basis. Specifically, I conducted a content analysis on a randomly selected day on the nation-wide newspapers in Japan to capture nationalist symbols.

I argued that nationalism causes symbolic threat perception which causes anti-immigration in Japan. In order to test these hypotheses, I analyzed the survey data from ISSP 2013. Furthermore, I designed an

online survey to test these hypotheses on recent data. The questions aimed to measure attitudes towards immigrants, perceptions of immigrants and nationalism.

Results of the day survey showed that "Japaneseness" is flagged by Japanese newspapers in many ways. First, they flagged the nation by means of their logos and brand names. The organization of the contents in the newspapers and the deixis of "us" or "them" have divided "our" world into nations. The weather news reminds "us" of "our" nation in a constant and implicit way, and the list goes on. Although the newspapers that were surveyed by this study had different ideological affiliations, however, a statistically significant correlation between "the amount of" nationalism and ideology was not found. While it is obvious that they had different imaginations of the nation, they occurred within the context of the nation. As Billig has argued, "there are infinite discursive possibilities for talking about 'us' and 'them.'" (Billig 2002, 87). However, ultimately, these discussions are confined to within the borders of the nation.

I provided strong evidence for my hypotheses with the data from ISSP 2013. This study shed light on the reasons for anti-immigration sentiments in Japan by focusing on the roles of symbolic threat perception and nationalism. The study's first hypothesis argued that the perception of symbolic threat from immigrants causes anti-immigration sentiments in Japan. The second hypothesis argued that symbolic threat perceptions arise from nationalism. The most effective variable affecting anti-immigration behavior is symbolic threat perception. Japanese citizens oppose immigration because they believe that immigrants commit crimes more often than citizens. Furthermore, hero and rights-based perceptions have positive effects on attitudes toward immigration. This study also shows that anti-immigration has a discursive basis in nationalism. In other words, anti-immigrants use symbolic threats to show that their opposition to immigration has a rational basis, and symbolic threat perception is caused by nationalism. This study is the first one to explore the reason for symbolic threat perception and to use the concept of "banal nationalism" and stretch the definition of nationalism.

In order to enhance the comprehensiveness of my analysis and address any potential biases inherent in the ISSP 2013 data, I formulated and executed a novel online survey in 2023. This survey not only facilitated the testing of my hypotheses using contemporary data but also provided a more refined approach to measuring nationalism.

This survey delves into the underlying factors driving anti-immigration sentiments in Japan. The analysis is structured into four distinct sections, aiming to offer a comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration attitudes within the Japanese context. The initial phase of the study focused on examining Hypothesis 1, which suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes are linked to perceptions of symbolic threat. To test this hypothesis, a linear regression model was applied. The regression analysis outcomes indicate that symbolic threat perception significantly influences anti-immigrant attitudes. Furthermore, findings reveal that sex and hero perception also contribute to predicting anti-immigration sentiments. The study's results highlight that regarding immigrants as contributors to Japan's economy or cultural diversity can mitigate anti-immigration sentiments.

The second part of the study examines attitudes towards different immigrant groups to determine whether the origin of immigrants plays a critical role in understanding the factors behind anti-immigration sentiments. Hypothesis 2 posits that the origin of immigrants does not have a significant correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes. Consequently, although attitudes may vary depending on the specific immigrant groups, the underlying factors that contribute to negative attitudes remain consistent across all immigrant groups. Immigrants from the USA and Germany were the most favorable immigrant groups for the respondents. On the other hand, Chinese immigrants are opposed most strongly among other immigrant groups. The second part of the analysis consists of two sections. Firstly, the impact of immigrants' origin on anti-immigration attitudes will be controlled through the use of a multilevel linear regression analysis

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with two models. Ultimately, it is found that origin of the immigrant is less significant than perception of immigrants in determining anti-immigration. In other words, perceiving the immigrants as a symbolic threat is more effective in predicting negative attitudes towards immigrants than the origin of the immigrants. Secondly, an examination was conducted to identify the factors that determine attitudes towards different immigrant groups. It is found that symbolic threat perception significantly influences attitudes towards all immigrant groups, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. Finally, Hypothesis 2 is supported by empirical analysis.

Second part of the analysis shows that hero perception does not affect attitudes toward less favored immigrant groups. Especially, attitudes toward Chinese immigrants remain negative though precepting immigrants as beneficial for the economy or cultural diversity. Chinese immigrants were the less favored immigrant group in the sample.

The third phase of analysis explores the connection between anti-immigration sentiments and endorsement of equal rights for immigrants. A linear regression model is formulated, with anti-immigration attitudes as the dependent variable. The findings reveal a notable pattern: individuals who advocate for equal social rights for immigrants tend to exhibit more favorable attitudes toward immigrants.

The last phase of analysis was dedicated to the examination of Hypothesis 3, which posits the substantial role of nationalism in shaping symbolic threat perceptions. To test this hypothesis, three linear regression models were constructed, each employing symbolic threat perception as the dependent variable. The findings indicate that nationalism, encompassing both hot nationalism and banal nationalism, emerges as the most influential factor in predicting symbolic threat perception. The study unveils nationalism's significant association with symbolic threat perceptions, which in turn contribute to negative attitudes towards immigrants. The outcomes from the two regression models emphasize the importance of broadening the scope of nationalism to incorporate banal nationalism. Notably, in Model 3, where

nationalism is defined more expansively, the correlation coefficients between nationalism and symbolic threat perception, as well as the model's explanatory power (adjusted R-squared), are notably higher. This underscores the relevance of incorporating banal nationalism to comprehensively assess the impact of nationalism on symbolic threat perception. As a result, Hypothesis 3 has been substantiated as well.

8.2. Theoretical and Empirical Implications

My comprehensive interdisciplinary inquiry, which delves into both theoretical and methodological aspects, highlights two significant findings. Firstly, the primary factor contributing to anti-immigration sentiments in Japan is the perception of symbolic threat posed by immigrants. This encompasses notions such as perceiving immigrants as a threat to the country's culture, believing that immigrants are more prone to committing crimes than Japanese citizens, or viewing immigrants as individuals who do not adhere to societal norms.

Moreover, my findings demonstrate the necessity of defining nationalism in a more comprehensive manner. This has implications for both the literature on anti-immigrant behavior and the literature on nationalism.

Within the realm of anti-immigration literature, my analysis brings to light a significant limitation: the prevalent tendency to unquestionably accept the nation-state framework, which impedes a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of anti-immigration. Wimmer and Shiller (2002) aptly critiqued immigration research for succumbing to methodological nationalism, which essentially means that scholars investigating immigration often take the nation-state as an assumed foundation. My findings strongly corroborate their argument. As I previously highlighted the absence of research into the reasons behind symbolic threat perception, this void might be attributed to the oversight of not critically examining common assumptions about nationalism. It is essential for scholars to consciously "bracket" their preconceived notions of nationalism (Billig 2002, 13-15) in order to fully grasp the subject under

investigation. The presumption that perceiving foreigners or migrants as threats to a nation's culture is an intrinsic or normal perspective signifies an unquestioned embrace of the nation-state. In this context, Billig's concept of banal nationalism proves invaluable for comprehending subjects in the domains of social sciences and humanities. Moreover, this concept plays a pivotal role in refining the definition of nationalism. I have demonstrated that broadening the definition of nationalism enhances our capacity to comprehend the underpinnings of symbolic threat perception more effectively.

For the literature on nationalism on the other hand, I showed that Japan is an exceptionally important case both to discuss banal nationalism and to understand ethnic or cultural nationalism is not more hot or aggressive than civic nationalism.

The scarcity of studies on banal nationalism in the context of Japan is striking. This project stands as a pioneering effort, being the first to endeavor replicating Billig's day survey methodology specifically on the Japanese press. While research on banal nationalism has predominantly centered on Western nations such as the UK, USA, European countries, or semi-Western contexts like Turkey, Serbia, and Russia, the examples cited in the literature often appear disconnected from the Japanese context. Japan, as a well-established non-Western democracy, offers an invaluable case study for banal nationalism in the scholarly arena for several compelling reasons.

Foremost, Japan holds a unique position as one of the world's most politically stable countries. Consequently, the presence of marginalized groups closely associated with "hot nationalism" remains minimal. As elucidated earlier, instances of hot nationalism are typically observed during times of crisis or among extremist factions. Conversely, politically stable countries during relatively "normal" periods provide a conducive environment to explore how nations and nationalism undergo routine perpetuation. Thus, the examination of the Japanese press stands as a significant avenue to scrutinize the everyday representation of the nation in a politically stable context.

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The lack of resonance of banal nationalistic symbols within the Japanese context can be attributed to the likelihood that these symbols are rooted in the framework of civic nationalism prevalent in the US and various European countries. Breton (1988) posits that ethnic or cultural nationalism hinges upon cultural homogeneity, necessitating ethnic or cultural compatibility for membership in a nation. Conversely, civic nationalism finds its foundation in institutional structures, and membership in a nation is determined by legally established criteria (Breton 1988, 86–87). As a consequence, the instances of banal nationalism frequently referenced serve as broad portrayals of civic nationalism.

Furthermore, the perception of ethnic nationalists as extremist elements by many Western nations could lead to a misinterpretation of hot nationalism as ethnic nationalism upon initial inspection. This potential conflation is primarily attributed to the association between these two types of nationalism within the Western discourse. In this sense, Japan is a perfect case for discussing banal nationalism or for revisiting the distinction of ethnic-civic nationalism.

Nonetheless, within the scope of this study, I contend that banal nationalism need not strictly adhere to a civic orientation, as it is not commonly perceived by the majority as a manifestation of nationalism per se. Instead, it functions as an underlying assumption or heuristic facilitating navigation in a world structured by national entities. As a result, its manifestation can take on either a civic or an ethnic character depending on the prevailing societal context. Consequently, ethnic or cultural nationalism does not inherently adopt a confrontational or aggressive demeanor. This assertion underscores the significance of Japan as a compelling case study in the discourse surrounding banal nationalism for a second crucial reason.

Therefore, my findings show that discussions on banal nationalism have not completed yet. There are many issues that remain blurred, and testing the concept in non-Western cases is important. In addition, findings of this project showed that ethnic nationalism does not necessarily have to be hot or aggressive.

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In terms of policy implications, it is found that perception of immigrants has a strong effect on attitudes toward immigrants. For example, perceiving immigrants as a symbolic threat causes negative attitudes towards immigrants. On the other hand, perceiving immigrants as contributing to the economy or cultural diversity have a positive effect on attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, promoting a positive image of immigrants in the media and elite discourse may effectively diminish anti-immigrant attitudes in Japan. It is found in the day survey that foreigners or immigrants are both underrepresented and negatively portrayed. In the newspapers, the stories on foreigners were always about negative happenings such as crime or illegal working. This mode of reporting portrays foreigners solely as individuals engaged in criminal activities in the perception of the local population. In this context, it is crucial to highlight the favorable aspects of immigration, such as addressing labor shortages and enhancing cultural diversity, through reporting by the media or elite speeches.

Moreover, the results revealed that engaging in interactions with foreigners mitigates the adverse impact of nationalism on symbolic threat perception. Such interactions prompt individuals to perceive foreigners as distinct individuals rather than mere representatives of a group defined by shared characteristics. Consequently, the stereotypes propagated by national preconceptions lose their potency when the foreign individual is recognized on a personal level. Accordingly, enhancing opportunities for interpersonal interactions with foreigners emerges as a pivotal strategy in reducing anti-immigration sentiments.

8.3. Limitations

While this study has made valuable contributions to the field, it is important to acknowledge its limitations and areas for improvement that warrant attention in future research.

The first set of limitations relate to the analysis on ISSP 2013 data. First, the ISSP 2013 data used were collected in 2013. The Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau (2020) estimated that the number of

foreigners would increase by 49% from 2013 to 2022. Hence, forthcoming research endeavors should employ updated data to yield more precise outcomes. Additionally, the ISSP 2013 data is inadequate for testing the contact hypothesis and the impact of concern on the decline in population, as the survey lacks questions to measure these variables. Third, the survey had too many "can't choose" responses. Thus, the sample considered for regression analyses was too small because such responses had to be removed. Consequently, there is a need to find out the reason for the excessive "can't choose" responses. Furthermore, the respondents tended to choose the middle answers to several questions. For example, 36% of the respondents chose "neither agree nor disagree" and 5% chose "can't choose" to the question on crime threat; 34% of the respondents answered "neither agree nor disagree" and 9% answered "can't choose" to the question on cultural threat. As these examples show, middle answers are the most popular choice for many questions. Future studies need to determine the reasons for this phenomenon. Finally, the questions used to measure banal nationalism are inadequate. Therefore, construction of a banal nationalism index is important.

The second set of limitations relate to the analysis on original online survey. First, the factor that cuts the line between symbolic threat and nationalism could not be founded in this study. This study operates under the assumption that individuals in society possess some degree of nationalism due to their existence in the world of nations. Consequently, an expectation was set for the identification of a variable that mitigates symbolic threat perception. In the final segment of the analysis, Model 1 reveals that contact exhibits a negative correlation with symbolic threat perception. While the correlation between contact and symbolic threat perception is statistically significant, the correlation coefficient and the explanatory power of the model remain low. As a result, it is not feasible to make accurate predictions solely based on these findings. Further investigation and additional variables may be necessary to better understand what decreases symbolic threat perception from the immigrants in the world of nations. Second, the sample in

this study may be considered somewhat small to be representative of Japan. The sample was 500 individuals. Margin of error in 95% confidence level is 4%.

I tried to show banal nationalistic symbols in a nation-state with strong ethnic nationalism. There is a huge literature discussing banal nationalism in the Western countries where civic nationalism is very strong. However, studies that discuss banal nationalism in the countries where ethnic nationalism is stronger are few in number. In this sense, more studies discussing ethnic banal nationalism is needed.

A significant contribution of this thesis lies in its exploration of the underlying factors driving symbolic threat perception. The inquiry into why individuals perceive immigrants as posing a symbolic threat becomes feasible when researchers consciously set aside their preconceived notions about nationalism. This thesis has demonstrated that a presumed acceptance of the nation-state as a given can hinder a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon. This study underscores the necessity of reframing established assumptions about the nation-state to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of complex phenomena.

Furthermore, the original online survey conducted for this project provides the most recent data concerning immigration attitudes and nationalism in Japan. This contemporary dataset not only enhances the accuracy and relevance of the analysis but also offers a fresh perspective on the evolving dynamics of public sentiments in a rapidly changing world. By incorporating diverse variables and expanding the scope of nationalism, this study contributes to a more nuanced comprehension of the intricate interplay between symbolic threat, nationalism, and anti-immigration attitudes. However, future research should further refine the questions to understand the factors that cut the line between symbolic threat perception and nationalism.

Finally, more research is needed to establish further linkages with specific policy realms. How can we prevent the citizens from perceiving symbolic threat from immigrants? Could positive representation of immigrants decrease anti-immigration sentiments? How do immigration attitudes relate to voting behavior? These questions open up avenues for future studies that delve deeper into the practical implications of the findings presented in this dissertation.

Another possible direction for future research is related to banal nationalism. A content analysis of television programming could provide deeper insights into how the media contributes to the (re)production of the nation on a daily basis. Moreover, conducting a content analysis on popular websites could be significant in exploring how citizens themselves participate in the (re)production of the nation in their everyday interactions.

APPENDIX A

Newspaper ID:

Enter the corresponding number for your newspaper listed below.

読売新聞 Yomiuri: 1

朝日新聞 Asahi: 2

毎日新聞 Mainichi: 3

日本経済新聞（Nikkei）: 4

産経新聞 Sankei: 5

日刊スポーツ Nikkan: 6

スポーツニッポン sports nippon: 7

スポーツ報知 Sports houchi: 8

サンケイスポーツ sankei sports: 9

夕刊フジ yuukan fuji: 10

日刊ゲンダイ nikkan gendai: 11

The Japan News: 12

The Japan Times: 13

Story ID

Consists of the newspaper ID and story number
For instance for yomiuri story #2 it would be 12.

Page

Enter on which page the news is on

Banner Headline

Enter 1 if your story is the headline story and enter 0 if it is not the headline story.

Banner Headlinetext

Enter the full text of the headline.

Tittle

Enter the full text of the tittle if it is not a banner headline story.

Flagging Japaneseness on the tittle

Enter 1 if tittle contains an emphasis on Japaneseness. For example, 'The tragedy of Japanese girl', 'The historical dresses of Japanese women', or 'Japan is being evaluated'.

Banal Japaneseness on the tittle

Enter 1 if tittle communicates the nationhood in a subtle way. For example, 'Citizens do not know…' or 'External debt is…'.

Type of the content

Enter 1 for news.

Enter 2 for columns or editorials.

Enter 3 for advertisements.

Photo

Enter 1 if there is a photo in the story.

Type of photo

Enter 1 if the photo has a nationalistic discourse.

Tittle of the International News page

Write down the tittle.

Maincateg

Enter 1 if the story concerns domestic politics and 2 if it is about international politics.

Type of News

Politics/Ideology=1

Economics =2

Society, culture=3

Security/Terror=4

Weather=5

Sports=6

International directly concerning Japan=7

Other IN=8

Other=9 (write down the category in the next column)

Subcategories

Relations with Korea (except Takeshima/Dokdo)

If Korea is presented in a positive way enter 2

If neural 1

If negative 0 in the next column

Yasukuni

Enter the tone in the next column as 0,1,2.

Emperor

Enter the tone in the next column as 0,1,2.

Senkaku/Diaoyu

Enter 0 in the next column if Japan is represented as completely right in claiming sovereignty over the island.

1, if neutrally discussed

2, if China is completely right

Takeshima/Dokdo

Enter 0 in the next column if Japan is represented as completely right in claiming sovereignty over the island.

1, if neutrally discussed

2, if Korea is completely right

Foreigners/Immigrants

Enter overall tone as 0,1,2 in the next column.

Relations with China (except Senkaku/Diaoyu)

Enter overall tone in the next column.

Constitution

Enter 0 in the next column if the story defends changing article 9.

1 if the story neither defending nor opposing a change.

2 if the story opposes changing the article 9.

Write down if the discussion is about another article.

COVID

Enter 0 if COVID is framed as a fault of 'others'.

1, if the story does not blame anyone

Write down in the next column if there is another representation.

Internal/external enemies

Shortly write down the representation in the next column

Cultural distinctiveness

Shortly write down the representation in the next column

History

Shortly write down the representation in the next column

Our prestige

Shortly write down the representation in the next column

Other: Write down

Homeland Deixis

Enter 1 if the story contains homeland deixis. Homeland deixis is the belief that 'our' homeland is not an ordinary piece of land. For example, 'the most beautiful geographic land'、'日本の美しい里と花の絶景' (A spectacular view of Japan's beautiful villages and flowers) 、'四季'(four seasons) can be evaluated as homeland deixis.

Pronouns

Enter 1 if 'we' or 'us' is used for the Japanese nation, or 'here' is used for Japan.

'Our' shared values

Enter 1 if there is an emphasis on shared values of Japanese people such as religion, daily habit, or taste.

Write down the shared value in the next column.

Other ways of flagging the nationalism

Write down shortly.

Weather News

Enter 1 if the domestic weather news and international weather news are separated.

WN Map

Enter 1 if Japanese map is used in weather news.

WN Naming of map

Enter 1 if it is stated in the story that this map is belong to Japan.

Sports News

Enter 1 for domestic sports.

2, if international

Keywords

Enter the keywords to summarize the article.

Measurement

Attitudes towards Immigrants

Q10

Do you think the number of immigrants to Japan nowadays should be ...

1 Increased a lot

2 Increased a little

3 Remain the same as it is

4 Reduced a little

5 Reduced a lot

8 Can't choose

Crime Threat

Q9

There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Japan. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in Japan).

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

(PLEASE, CHECK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE)

Q9a Immigrants increase crime rates.

1 Agree strongly

2 Agree

3 Neither agree nor disagree

4 Disagree

5 Disagree strongly

8 Can't choose

Cultural Threat

Q9e Japan's culture is generally undermined by immigrants.

1 Agree strongly

2 Agree

3 Neither agree nor disagree

4 Disagree

5 Disagree strongly

8 Can't choose

Economic Threat

Q9c Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Japan.

1 Agree strongly

2 Agree

3 Neither agree nor disagree

4 Disagree

5 Disagree strongly

8 Can't choose

Hero Perception

Definition: Perceiving immigrants as a hero who contributes to economy or cultural diversity. The value of this variable is calculated as a row total of the answers of two questions. The first question is "Q9b Immigrants generally good for Japan's economy." Second one is "Q9d Immigrants improve Japanese society by bringing new ideas and cultures."

Rights-based Perception

Q9f Legal immigrants to Japan who are not citizens should have the same rights as Japanese citizens.

1 Agree strongly

2 Agree

3 Neither agree nor disagree

4 Disagree

5 Disagree strongly

8 Can't choose

Symbolic Threat

This variable is calculated as the row sum of cultural and crime threat.

Hot Nationalism

Q5

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(PLEASE, CHECK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE)

Q5c Japan should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations.

1 Agree strongly

2 Agree

3 Neither agree nor disagree

4 Disagree

5 Disagree strongly

8 Can't choose

Q13

How much do you agree or disagree that strong patriotic feelings in Japan ...

(PLEASE, CHECK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE)

Q13a ... strengthen Japan's place in the world.

1 Agree strongly

2 Agree

3 Neither agree nor disagree

4 Disagree

5 Disagree strongly

8 Can't choose

Survey Questions

Name: Questionnaire survey on immigration policy

移民政策についてのアンケート調査

調査へのご協力のお願い

この調査は、日本社会において多様な背景を持った人々が共存し、豊かな社会を築いていくために必要な条件について調査を行うことを目的としています。回答者の皆様のご協力により、より良い社会を実現するための改善点を把握することができます。

お答えいただいた内容はすべて数字としてまとめ、一人一人の答えが知られるようなことはありません。

最後に、回答者様のご協力に心より感謝申し上げます。

- 日本に住んでいる外国人や少数民族について、おたずねします。

Q1 日本に定住しようと思って来日する外国人は、増えたほうがよいと思いますか、 それとも減ったほうがよいと思いますか。あてはまる番号に１つだけ○をつけてください。（○は１つ）

---

1 かなり増えたほうがよい

2 すこし増えたほうがよい

3 今くらいでよい

In this question, the general attitude of the participants towards the admission of new immigrants to the country is investigated. This question is used in measurement of anti-immigration.

Q2　あなたが生活している地域に、以下の（ア）～（キ）のような人々が増えることに賛成ですか、反対ですか。

	1 賛成	2 どちらともいえない	3 反対
（ア）　アメリカ人が増えること	1	2	3
（イ）　中国人が増えること	1	2	3
（ウ）韓国人が増えること	1	2	3
（エ）　ドイツ人が増えること	1	2	3
（オ）　フィリピン人が増えること	1	2	3
（カ）　日系ブラジル人が増えること	1	2	3
（キ）　イラン人が増えること	1	2	3

In this question, it is investigated whether the attitudes towards immigrants changes depending on the immigrant's origin. With the exception of the Iranian option, this question was also asked by Igarashi and Ono (2022). The Iranian option was added to explore whether Islamophobia changes attitudes towards immigrants.

Q3 次の a から c の意見について、あなたはどう思いますか。

それぞれについて１つずつ○をつけてください。（○はそれぞれ１つずつ）

	1 そう思	2 どちら	3 そうは
a) 日本に住む外国人にも同じ福祉および医療保健サービスへのアクセスを提供すべきだ。	1	2	3
b) 日本に永住する外国人に自治体の選挙での選挙権および被選挙権を与えるべきだ。	1	2	3
c) 労働力が不足している特定の産業や地域に、ブルーカラーの外国人労働者を受け入れるべきだ。	1	2	3

This question explores the basic criteria of living together in a multicultural society. Support for equal rights for immigrants and utilitarian approach are measured by using this question. This question was taken from Richey (2010) and translated into Japanese.

Q4 以下の質問に答える際には、日本に住んでいる外国人を想定してお答えください。

あなたは以下のような状況をどれくらい受け入れますか。

外国人が…	1 受け入れる	2 どちらかといえ	3 どちらともいえ	4 どちらかといえ	5 受け入れない
a) 帰化して日本国籍となること	1	2	3	4	5
b) 日本に住むこと	1	2	3	4	5
c) 自分もしくは家族の親友となること	1	2	3	4	5
d) 自分の家の隣に住むこと	1	2	3	4	5
e) 自分の兄弟姉妹と結婚すること	1	2	3	4	5

Q5 日本に定住しようと思って来日する外国人について、次の a から h のような意見があります。

それぞれについて、あなたの考えに近い番号に１つずつ〇をつけてください。（〇はそれぞれ１つずつ）

日本に定住しようと思って来日する外国人について・・・	1 そうは思わない	2 どちらかといえばそうは思わない	3 どちらともいえない	4 どちらかといえばそう思う	5 そう思う
a) そんな外国人が増えれば、犯罪発生率が高くなる	1	2	3	4	5
b) そんな外国人が増えれば、ルールが乱れる	1	2	3	4	5
c) そんな外国人が増えれば、生活環境が悪化する	1	2	3	4	5
d) 一般的に言って、日本文化は、そんな外国人によって徐々に損なわれてきている·	1	2	3	4	5
e) そんな外国人は、日本人から仕事を奪っている	1	2	3	4	5
f) そんな外国人は、全体としては日本の経済に役立っている	1	2	3	4	5
g) そんな外国人は、新しい考えや文化をもたらし、日本の社会を良くしている	1	2	3	4	5
h) そんな外国人が 日本に合法的に移住した場合は、 日本人と同じ権利を持つべきだ	1	2	3	4	5

This question is for measurement of different perceptions of immigrants.

a: crime threat

b and c: public order threat

d: cultural threat

Symbolic threat perception=a+b+c+d

e: economical threat

Hero perception=f+g

h: Rights-based perception

Q6 あなたは<u>外国人と</u>、次のような交流したことがありますか。

あてはまる番号にいくつでも○をつけてください。（○はいくつでも）

---

1 近くに住んでいる外国人とあいさつをかわす

2 一緒に働く

3 学校で一緒に勉強する

4 町内会や学校行事などに一緒に参加する

5 国際交流のグループで一緒に活動する

6 友人として付き合う

7 自分または家族や親せきが外国人と結婚している

8 交流がない

This question is asked for measuring contact.

Q7 次の a から j のようなことを、あなたはどの程度誇りに思いますか。

それぞれについて１つずつ○をつけてください。（○はそれぞれ１つずつ）

	1 まったく誇りに思わない	2 あまり誇りに思わない	3 どちらともいえない	4 やや誇りに思う	5 とても誇りに思う
a．日本における民主主義の現状	1	2	3	4	5
b．世界における日本の政治的影響力	1	2	3	4	5
c．日本の経済的成果	1	2	3	4	5
d．日本の社会保障制度	1	2	3	4	5
e．科学技術の分野で日本人が成しとげたこと	1	2	3	4	5
f．スポーツの分野で日本人が成しとげたこと	1	2	3	4	5
g．文学芸術の分野で日本人が成しとげたこと	1	2	3	4	5
h．日本の自衛隊	1	2	3	4	5
i．日本の歴史	1	2	3	4	5
j．日本社会における公正さと平等	1	2	3	4	5

This question was asked to understand in which field the participants are proud of their country's achievements. Those who are proud of items b, h and i of this question will be interpreted as hot nationalists, and those who are proud of the rest will be interpreted as banal nationalist.

- 日本と他の国との関係について、おたずねします。

Q8 次のａからｅの意見について、あなたはどう思いますか。

それぞれについて１つずつ○をつけてください。（○はそれぞれ１つずつ）

	1 そう思わない	2 どちらかといえばそうは思わ	3 どちらともいえない	4 どちらかといえばそう思う	5 そう思う
ａ．日本経済を守るために、日本は外国製品の輸入を制限すべきだ	1	2	3	4	5
ｂ．環境汚染のような問題を解決するためには、国際的な機関に強制的な権限を持たせるべきだ	1	2	3	4	5
ｃ．たとえ他の国と紛争やまさつが生じようとも、日本は自分の国の利益のために行動すべきだ	1	2	3	4	5
ｄ．外国人が日本の土地を買うことを許すべきでない	1	2	3	4	5
ｅ．日本のテレビは日本製の映画や番組をもっと放送すべきだ	1	2	3	4	5

This question (except item b) has been added to measure hot nationalism. Those who mark "I agree" in item b will be understood as non-nationalists. This question is taken from the International Social Survey Program.

Q9 次の a から c の意見について、あなたはどう思いますか。

それぞれについて１つずつ○をつけてください。（○はそれぞれ１つずつ）

	1	2	3	4	5
	そうは思わない	どちらかといえばそうは思わない	どちらともいえない	どちらかといえばそう思う	そう思う
a. 君が代が好きだ	1	2	3	4	5
b. 日の丸を見ると誇らしく思う	1	2	3	4	5
c. 国を愛する気持ちは強いほうだ	1	2	3	4	5

This question is also asked for measuring hot nationalism.

Q10 次の a から h の意見について、あなたはどう思いますか。

それぞれについて 1 つずつ○をつけてください。（○はそれぞれ 1 つずつ）

	1 そうは思わない	2 どちらかといえばそうは思わ	3 どちらともいえない	4 どちらかといえばそう思う	5 そう思う
a. 日用品を買う際、できるだけ日本製品を選ぶべきだと思う	1	2	3	4	5
b. 外食する際に、洋食レストランより和食レストランを選ぶことのほうが多い	1	2	3	4	5
c. 一般的に言って、国産品は輸入品より優れていると思う	1	2	3	4	5
d. 洋食より和食のほうが健康に良いと思う	1	2	3	4	5
e. 海外旅行先で日本食が恋しくなると思う	1	2	3	4	5
f. 日本の風呂文化は歴史に深く根ざしており、独自の習慣としきたりがあると思う	1	2	3	4	5
g. 年上の人に敬語を使うことは日本だけだと思う	1	2	3	4	5
h. 集団の和を乱さない努力は日本文化独自の習慣として大切なことだと思う	1	2	3	4	5

This question is for measuring banal nationalism.

Q11 あなたは、日本人であることをどの程度誇りに思いますか。 あてはまる番号に 1 つだ

け○をつけてください。 （○は 1 つ)

1	2	3	4	5
まったく誇りに思わない	あまり誇りに思わない	どちらともいえない	やや誇りに思う	とても誇りに思う

This question is also for measuring banal nationalism.

Q12 次の（ア）から（エ）の意見について、あなたはどう思いますか。

それぞれについて１つずつ〇をつけてください。（〇はそれぞれ１つずつ）

	1 そうは思わない	2 ばそうは思わない	3 どちらかといえ	4 どちらともいえ ょこうふうどちらともいえ	5 どちらかといえ そう思う
（ア）　日本への強い愛国心は世界における 日本の地位を高める	1	2	3	4	5
（イ）　日本への強い愛国心は日本のまとま りを維持するために必要である	1	2	3	4	5
（ウ）　日本は外国と違って単一民族なの で、独自の文化を維持できている	1	2	3	4	5
（エ）　日本文化は、日本人にしか理解でき ないと思う	1	2	3	4	5

ア: hot nationalism

イ、ウ and エ：banal nationalism

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- ここからは、あなたご自身のことについて、おたずねします。

Q13 あなたの性別をお答えください。

1 男	2 女	3 その他

Sex

Q14 あなたが最後に卒業された学校を、次の中から１つだけ選んで○をつけてください。

（○は１つ）在学中の方は、現在通っている学校をお答えください。

1 中学校
2 高等学校
3 専門学校、短期大学
4 大学
5 大学院

Education level

Q15 １から５のスケールで、英語を話すときにどの程度自信を持っていますか?

1	2	3	4	5
全く自信がない	あまり自信がない	どちらともいえない	やや自信がある	とても自信がある

English speaking abilities

Q16 あなたの現在の状況は、次のように分けると、どれにあたりますか。 最もあてはまる番号に１つだけ○をつけてください。（○は１つ） なお、病気、育児休職、休暇、ストライキなどで、一時的に仕事をしていない方は、 ふだんの状況についてお答えください。

1 仕事をしている（家族従業者を含みます）
2 仕事をしておらず、求職中である
3 生徒・学生（予備校、専修学校・各種学校の生徒を含みます）
4 研修生・見習い
5 身体上の事情で働けない
6 退職（引退）した
7 主に家事をしている
8 その他（具体的に ）:

Q17 あなたご自身の去年1年間の収入は税込みでいくらでしたか。 臨時収入、副収入を含めて、あてはまる番号に1つだけ○をつけてください。（○は1つ）

1．100万円未満	8．　700～800万円未満
2．100～200万円未満	9．　800～900万円未満
3．200～300万円未満	10．900～1000万円未満
4．300～400万円未満	11．1000～1200万円未満
5．400～500万円未満	12．1200～1500万円未満
6．500～600万円未満	13．1500万円以上
7．600～700万円未満	14．収入なし

Income level

Q18 あなたが現在お住まいになっているのはどんなところですか。 あてはまる番号に1つだけ○をつけてください。（○は1つ）

1	2	3	4	5
大都市	大都市の郊外または近郊	地方の中小都市	地方の町村	人家がまばらな農山漁村

Place of residence

Q19　　あなたは、少子化によって日本の人口が減少することに不安を感じますか。それと

も感じませんか。 あてはまる番号に１つだけ○をつけてください。（○は１つ）

---

1 とても不安を感じる

2 やや不安を感じる

3 あまり不安を感じない

Concern for declining population

長い間ご協力ありがとうございました。

Thank you for your cooperation.

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