



Title	The End of the Cold War and the Constructivist Ascendance
Author(s)	Shigemasa, Kimikazu
Citation	国際公共政策研究. 2000, 5(1), p. 233-256
Version Type	VoR
URL	<a href="https://hdl.handle.net/11094/9882">https://hdl.handle.net/11094/9882</a>
rights	
Note	

*The University of Osaka Institutional Knowledge Archive : OUKA*

<https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/>

The University of Osaka

# The End of the Cold War and the Constructivist Ascendance\*

by Kimikazu SHIGEMASA\*\*

## Abstract

This paper traces the theoretical challenge against the mainstream international relations theories by way of analysing the factors conducive to the demise of the Cold War. Against the backdrop of realist/neorealist accounts of the Cold War's ending, constructivists try to highlight the ideational factors which they considered had caused the cataclysmic transformation of the Cold War international system. Four issues are raised in this paper to demonstrate this "constructivist turn": changes in domestic politics in the Soviet Union; the role of nuclear weapons; the solid Western alliance system; and internal flaws in Soviet ideology.

**Keywords :** realist, liberals, constructivist, political ideas, discursive factors

---

\* The author expresses his gratitude to Mr. Virgil Hawkins for enhancing language clarity.

\*\*Ph. D. Candidate, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

"Not ideas, but material and ideal interest, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen [at railway junctions], determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interests."-Max Weber<sup>1)</sup>

## **Emergence of Constructivist Approaches to World Politics: the Ending of the Cold War as a Catalyst for Theoretical Appraisal**

The end of the Cold War has not merely generated a reassessment of foreign and security policies rooted in Cold War thinking for practitioners, but it has also posed theoretical challenges for international relations scholars and historians alike, in understanding the nature of the rapidly changing world. Regarding the task of international relations scholars, the problem is, according to Fred Halliday, not whether or not the collapse of Soviet bloc in 1989 posed theoretical questions for international relations, but, rather, what the issues of substance posed by the past really are, and which processes currently under way in the world outside merit our prospective analytic and theoretical attention<sup>2)</sup>. Neorealism and neoliberalism, which have been deemed the conventional and mainstream language of international relations theory, henceforth, have been under critical scrutiny. There have been numerous writings in defence and attempting to modify these mainstream international relations theories since the end of the Cold War<sup>3)</sup>.

- 1) Max Weber, "Social Psychology of the World Religion," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) *From Max Weber* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 280
- 2) Fred Halliday, "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 40.
- 3) Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), Michael J. Hogan (ed.) *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," and John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.) *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), William C. Wohlgforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," and Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Introduction: International Relations Theory and End of the Cold War," Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War," in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.) *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) and John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Position," Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," and Stephen Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 91, no. 4, 1997, pp. 899-912, 913-917, 931-935, respectively. These are just examples. Kaldor, in particular, argued that the Cold War

From the viewpoint of the study of diplomatic history, John Lewis Gaddis, a noted Cold War historian, has claimed that no approach to the study of international relations claiming both foresight and competence should have failed to predict the Cold War's demise<sup>4</sup>. Yet the problem is not that none of the approaches to the study of international relations have demonstrated predictive ability, but that *certain* brands of international relations theories—classical realism and neorealism in particular—may incur the criticism that was levelled by Gaddis. Having that said, it seems that Gaddis cannot vindicate his own criticism because his earlier work can encapsulate some tenets of neorealism against which his own critique can be applied. His thought-provoking “long peace” thesis reveals some Waltzian neorealist themes. Writes Gaddis:

“the passage of time and the accumulation of experience has made clear certain structural elements of stability in the bipolar system of international relations that were not present in the multipolar systems that preceded it...”<sup>5</sup>

According to him, the post-Second World War world has been characterised by the military power differentiation between victors at the end of that war; a simple bipolar structure in post-1945 world in which sophisticated leadership was not required to maintain international order, but in which structural constraint discourages irresponsibility; and alliance systems are stable in a bipolar structure<sup>6</sup>. The presence of nuclear weapons is considered to have contributed to this peace by adding behavioural restraint, preventing the occurrence of irrational acts on the part of the nuclear powers, particularly both the United States and Soviet Union, which were the poles in the bipolar system<sup>7</sup>. These assertions are clearly consistent with the logic of Waltzian neorealism, of which the central themes are the stability of a bipolar international system and the state’s pri-

---

was an imaginary war instigated by the two different systems, which reinforced each other through their shared need for it, and thus that it served to consolidate and reproduce the two social systems, pp. 5–6. This statement sounds akin to the constructivist’s account of social construct in that both systems are reflective of each other. Her prediction, however, of the events culminated in the dismantling of the Cold War was rather modest.

4) John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.) *The Cold War and After*, p. 324.

5) John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 221.

6) *Ibid.*, pp. 221–222.

7) While there is contention among scholars of international relations regarding the extent to which the presence of nuclear forces has “contributed” to the absence of wars between nuclear powers. Even so it is arguable that Gaddis may agree with Waltz’s argument that “more” nuclear weapon states might be “better” than less, in terms of the stability of the international system. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).

mary interest in physical survival in an anarchic world.

However, contrary to the lacuna of international relations theories claimed by Gaddis, some realists now emphasise that it was not realism *per se* that was put to test by the transformation of the Cold War system, but the rigid structural realism of Kenneth Waltz, which dominated at the time<sup>8)</sup>. Waltz has postulated his oft-cited three characteristic systemic principles—the ordering principle of the system (namely, anarchic nature); the differentiation of units in the system (no differentiation among the units leading states to strive for survival in the system); and the distribution of capabilities of the units in the system. A major problem with Waltz's unit-structure relationship is that it prevents us from examining the systemic change induced by the units themselves<sup>9)</sup>. Hence his inadequate attention to the unit-level analysis has exposed conceptual problems. Mainstream international relations theories including Waltz's draw on various levels of analysis, ranging from human nature, the state, the unmeasurable structural effect of international system and the omnipresent anarchy inherent in the international system, and the role of international institutions in mitigating this anarchy. Despite these insightful analytical frameworks, they have proved insufficient to provide a predictive capacity to explain change and transformation. Analytical reliance solely on systemic factors makes it difficult to look at the changes at the domestic level, hence blackboxing the interactions of domestic politics level. Naturally, one might ask: "if the structure which determines the relations between states is objectively and inescapably anarchic, then insecurity is an environmental constant and the condition of peace must be the eternal vigilance of military autarky. But then how did the Cold War end?"<sup>10)</sup> Taking into consideration the indeterminacy of purely systemic factors, Gaddis recently wrote:

"It [old Cold War history] emphasized *interest*, which it mostly defined in material terms—what people possessed or wanted to possess. It tended to overlook *ideas*—what people believed, or wanted to believe... The 'new' Cold War history will take ideas seriously: here the way that conflict ended is bound to reshape our view of how it began and evolved. For the events of 1989–91 make sense only in terms of ideas."<sup>11)</sup>

8) William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy*, p. 4.

9) Andrew Linklater, "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, pp. 251–254.

10) Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 5.

Hence a perspective is needed that views major changes not as a deterministic response to large forces operative in the international system, but rather as a decision-making process<sup>12)</sup>. This is particularly true for the so-called “Gorbachev revolution” that brought about the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, it is necessary for us to examine factors at both the international and domestic level—mobilising the logic of “two-level games”<sup>13)</sup> to better understand such a crucial turning point in history. It is within this context that constructivist thinkers have begun to assert the missing factors from the mainstream theories, i. e. the role and functioning of ideational and discursive factors, and the conceptualisation of the social construction of identities, norms, and interests which this study directly addresses. Such factors have been largely bracketed or marginalised in the realist and neoliberalist discourses.

As a consequence, it is not surprising that the end of the Cold War has generated debate on post-Cold War international relations theory. Even some realist thinkers have begun to express their appreciation of this situation. Stephen Walt conceded: “no single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom.”<sup>14)</sup> Non-realist theorists have also echoed this trend. Among them, James Rosenau has contended that a new term, ‘*postinternational politics*’ was needed to encompass the possible advent of new structures and processes while at the same time allowing for still further structural development<sup>15)</sup>. His insights called on international relations theorists to make a

11) John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now*, pp. 282–83, Emphasis in original.

12) Charles Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, 1990, p. 20.

13) Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, 1988.

14) Stephan Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, p. 30. This articulation of theoretical plurality is not common to realist thinkers. Some constructivists have also reached the same conclusion. Yet conventional constructivists, like Katzenstein, call for further analytical perspective to incorporate culture and identity as important causal factors that help define the interests and constitute the actors that national security policies. Peter Katzenstein, “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,” in Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 537.

15) James N. Rosenau, “Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Postinternational Politics for the 1990s,” in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.) *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 2. Emphasis in original. James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990). Of course, he is not the first theorists to propose such a scheme. About three decades earlier, Morton Kaplan articulated such a scheme in his *System and Process in International Relations*, but Kaplan’s analysis belongs to the mainstream realist language.

hypothesis on micro-macro links, which posits the processes by which the postulated changes in individuals are translated into consequences for collectivities and structures at the macro level. Although he did not use the term constructivism, the connotation in his postinternational politics goes beyond his previous research programme “linkage politics”<sup>16)</sup> and appears to incline toward a constructivist perspective. Along similar lines, John Ruggie stressed the need for a conception of structure that is that is more space/time-contingent to better study international transformation<sup>17)</sup>. For Ruggie, neorealist-structuralist’ atemporal and ahistorical treatment of international structure made it impossible to account for the transformation of the medieval social structure into the liberal capitalist system. Ruggie contends: “The problem is that a dimension of change is missing from Waltz’s model. It is missing because he drops the second analytical component of political structure, differentiation of units, when discussing international system. And he drops this component as a result of giving an infelicitous interpretation to the sociological term ‘differentiation,’ taking it to mean that which denotes *differences* rather than that which denotes *separateness*.<sup>18)</sup> Critics of neorealism, like Ruggie, contend that “the structure of the international system that neorealists treat as more or less universal and eternal are in fact the specific consequences of particular historical conditions.”<sup>19)</sup> Robert Cox, who also accuses neorealism of being “divorced from a standpoint in time and space,” spells out two distinctive theoretical orientations<sup>20)</sup>. Problem-solving approach treats the world represented by the existing order with the prevailing social and power relations and institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action<sup>21)</sup>. According to Cox, problem-solving theory implies neorealism’s objectivity which bases its purport to seek regularities in state behaviour. By contrast, critical theory does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted, but calls them into question by asking where they came from and whether and how they might be in the process of changing<sup>22)</sup>. It is clear that international theories

16) James Rosenau, *Linkage Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

17) John Gerard Ruggie, “International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method,” in Rosenau and Czempiel (eds.) *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, p. 22.

18) John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in Robert Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 142. Emphasis in original.

19) R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, 1987, p. 66.

20) Robert Cox, “Social Foci, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, p. 207.

21) *Ibid.*, p. 208.

which connote this critical perspective would offer a better analysis of the changing world, a case in which how we understand the causes of the end of the Cold War discussed below. Constructivism could share a view that any theory reveals its ideology and hence lends support for the need to look into “reflective-ness” to be examined later. As we see how constructivists treat the international structure, it is suffice to say here that international structure constructivism employs encapsulates *both* material and discursive nature, while neorealism’s understanding of structure is primarily concerned with materialistic power base.

As illustrated in a later section, constructivist approach embodies various perspectives, but it shares a common concern to grapple with the explanation of change and transformation in international relations. Chris Reus-Smit has held that the end of the Cold War and the failure of the mainstream international relations theories to predict it have opened the way for recent waves of constructivist scholarship, known as the “Constructivist Turn.” According to him, “... it [the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself] undermined the explanatory hegemony of perceived failure of rationalists to predict, particularly neorealism. Empowered by the perceived failure of rationalists to predict, let alone comprehend, these revolutionary transformations, critical theorists went on the offence.”<sup>23)</sup> Thus, Reus-Smit has opened the way for theoretical links between constructivist perspectives and insights from critical theorists who are not satisfied with the rationalistic explanations the mainstream international relations theories employ. In a sense, constructivist scholarship is ‘critical’ of the mainstream theories. While these two can reinforce each other in terms of understanding and explaining the end of Cold War, one should be aware that they are not necessarily following the same research program. John Mearsheimer may be correct with regard to this point, but he fails to mention that constructivism may constitute a wide body of those critical theories. It is important to note that all critical theories do not share the former’s research agenda. For instance, Mearsheimer has grouped constructivism into the same category as postmodern critical theory and neo-Marxian oriented theory<sup>24)</sup>. Admittedly, one strand of constructivism-

22) *Ibid.*, pp. 208-10.

23) Chris Reus-Smit, *The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After the Cold War*, Working Paper No. 1996/4, Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, p. 6, Richard Price and Chris Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998, p. 265.

24) John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones

here what we could term as “postmodern constructivism”—may be constitutive of them. As critical theorists as such claimed by Mearsheimer, constructivist scholarship takes ideas seriously, and believes that discourse, or how we think and talk about the world, largely shapes practice. Nevertheless, this statement does not lead to his assumption that “international relations scholars who use critical theory to challenge and *subvert* realism certainly expect to create a more harmonious and peaceful international system.”<sup>25)</sup> “Conventional” or social constructivism aims not to subvert but to *problematisize* realism. Thus, simply treating the diverse strands of constructivist perspective as a monolithic critical theory as was done by Mearsheimer is a misnomer and would blind us to the analytical and theoretical richness of constructivist approaches to world politics. If the ending of the Cold War constitutes a “crucial test” of neorealism’s capacity to explain international change<sup>26)</sup>, then we need to examine how constructivism helps us to better understand the end of the Cold War, change and transformation of world politics, and what constructivism approaches tell us about the causes of the termination of the Cold War and why the mainstream international relations theories failed to tell us. While neorealism provides an elegant but parsimonious explanation of stability and continuity, constructivist approaches aim to capture the way to analyse the issue of change and continuity, relying on a conceptualisation that views structures and agents as linked in a dialectical synthesis<sup>27)</sup>. Contrasting constructivism approaches with those mainstream theories brings us to examine the ideational and discursive factors, namely the role and functioning of ideas generated by political leadership, intellectuals and others have had significant impact on the course of events resulting in the transformation of the Cold War international system.

---

and Steven Miller (eds.) *The Perils of Anarchy*, p. 364 footnote 128.

25) *Ibid.*, p. 365. Emphasis added.

26) Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-realism as the Science of *Realpolitik* Without Politics,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, 1993, pp. 63–64.

27) Peter Katzenstein, “International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change,” in Rosenau and Czempiel (eds.) *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, pp. 291–292, and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, p. 489.

## **Constructivist Accounts of the End of the Cold War and the Demise of the Soviet Union**

### ***Changes in Domestic Politics and Leadership***

Although realists failed to predict the phenomena that led to the conclusion of the Cold War, this does not necessarily indicate that all premises of realist arguments were doomed to fail from the beginning. With the wisdom of hindsight, some realist scholars are turning their vigour to stress the strengths of the realist position to explain why the West “won” the Cold War. Others consider the end of the Cold War as an anomaly, and hence assert that this crucial event did not set an appropriate test for theory, but was “merely a single data point.”<sup>28)</sup> However, the differences between realists and constructivists in explaining why the Cold War ended are a good point of departure, and thus they deserve scrutiny here<sup>29)</sup>. Furthermore, the divisions between these two schools of thought could pose us a set of metatheoretical questions—positivistic/objective versus non- or post-positivistic/subjective epistemology, and rationalistic and empirical versus interpretive methodology. These metatheoretical questions force us to rethink the fundamental theoretical bases upon which the discipline of international relations, and by extension, the social sciences at large rest<sup>30)</sup>.

Conventional international theories can refer to several propositions to account for the causes of the end of the Cold War. While realists might predicate their premises based upon “peace-through-strength” logic, liberals may examine cognitive and learning effect factors. Constructivism shares certain aspects of such liberal thinking in terms

---

28) William Wohforst, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” p. 4.

29) This study acknowledges that the tracing of all fundamental causes of the end of the Cold War both from realist and constructivist scholarship *per se* is a daunting task. For analytical expedience, this section attempts to draw on the extracts of major explanations derived from both approaches.

30) Similarly, Steve Smith advances the divisions of international relations theories into constitutive versus explanatory theory, as well as foundational versus anti-foundational theory. These offer an important insight into this chapter, and will be examined later. Steve Smith, “The Self-Image of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, pp. 26–31, and *idem.*, “New Approaches to International Theory,” in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 167–69. I agree with Smith that international theory should be seen as one arena in which both the clash between explanatory (based on the natural sciences’ epistemology and methodology) and constitutive (based on the social sciences’ outlook to approach the world from inside) and that between foundationalism (based on critical interpretive theory) and anti-foundationalism (based on radical interpretivism). Variants of constructivism to be examined are considered to be an outgrowth of these divisions.

of the role of ideational/discursive factors. Four interrelated propositions relevant to the realists' premises of the causes of the ending of the Cold War are set out below for consideration: the West's preparation for war; the West's nuclear weapons and their corresponding capacity to deliver assured destruction; the West's functioning alliance system, and the inherent flaw in communist ideology<sup>31)</sup>. Nonrealists, including constructivists, can refute the first proposition, because it does not explain the domestic change in the Soviet Union that propelled Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of top national leadership. The Gorbachev revolution in Soviet foreign policy was indeed the decisive factor which brought about series of initiatives known as a "peace offensive" in the field of arms control. The negotiation and successful conclusion of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty was the first case that successfully disproved the realist proposition that negotiating from a position of strength could bring an end to the Cold War in the West's favour. A close look at the change in domestic politics was missing here. In this line, Thomas Risse-Kappen and others succinctly argue that Gorbachev's "new thinkers" in foreign and security policy, such as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Gorbachev's personal foreign policy adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev played a key role in reformulating the Soviet foreign policy.<sup>32)</sup> They viewed the SS-20 intermediate nuclear missile buildup plan as "another example of ill-conceived Brezhnev-era policy following a narrow military logic without taking the political consequences into account."<sup>33)</sup> Together with Gorbachev's new thinkers, civilian experts from various institutes of the Academy of Science began to assume advisory roles and served as a counterweight to the military expertise in the policy-making process<sup>34)</sup>.

31) Charles Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 38, 1994, p. 12. John Vasquez approaches the similar topic by pointing out the inadequate realist explanatory power. Although he does not explicitly address the constructivist theme, but inclines toward World Society approach, much of his argument overlaps Kegley's. John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 13 "Challenging the relevance and explanatory power of the realist paradigm: the debate on the end of the Cold War."

32) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, Matthew Evangelista, "Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the USSR and Russia," in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Peter Shearman, "New Political Thinking Reassessed," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, 1993, pp. 139-158, and Jeffrey Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

33) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace Through Strength' End the Cold War? Lessons from INF," *International Security*, Vol. 16, no. 1, 1991, p. 184.

34) *Ibid.*, p. 182.

These new thinkers were aware of the Western concepts of common security (security can be achieved not against, but together with an adversary) and reasonable sufficiency through interactions with their Western European counterparts.

Moreover, they must have recognised that the traditional concept of “national security” and modalities for achieving it may have become obsolete by the grim fact of mutual vulnerability, thereby making it easier for these new thinkers to accept the Western security concepts and to move towards security cooperation<sup>35)</sup>. Gordon Craig and Alexander George claim that the emphasis on offense-oriented weapons systems, military postures, and doctrines had had a number of highly adverse effects. Hence these new thinkers were likely to understand “the efforts to ensure one’s own security by adopting offense-dominated military postures and doctrines exacerbate the other side’s insecurity, encourage “worst-case” fears of the adversary’s intentions and of possible threats from the other side, feed arms race, and raise the specter of crisis instability and the possibility of inadvertent war.”<sup>36)</sup> The new Soviet leader relied on these new thinkers whose foreign policy beliefs led them to advise a turnaround in Moscow’s security policy<sup>37)</sup>. This episode was but a short story in Gorbachev’s ensuing revolution, but what can be learned from it is that despite the rhetoric emphasising the West’s firm determination to fight, the Soviet Union started to transform its foreign and security policy by itself. Hence, this transformation can be better explained through reference to the changes in leadership and domestic politics as well as the role of individuals who were receptive to Western security ideas and who succeeded in disseminating them into the policy-making process.

Yet not all realist scholars have dismissed these domestic and leadership change factors. William Wohlforth examined the power/idea nexus on the end of the Cold War. He states that what was most significant about the Gorbachev’s new thinking was not its newness or the intellectual power of the ideas he sought to introduce, but the relentless way in which he went about trying to extricate his country from the dilemma he thought it was in. Here the ideas employed by Gorbachev and his reformers were analysed as the best way to counter imperialism’s aggressive force, presumably the West’s firm determination to continue the arms race<sup>38)</sup>. Thus, according to Wohlforth, these

35) Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 264.

36) *Ibid.*, p. 271.

37) Risso-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace Through Strength’ End the Cold War?” pp. 184–85.

ideas played a balancing role. New ideas such as common security and reasonable sufficiency were introduced merely to counter the old ones that exhorted the ensuing ideological rivalry and the Soviet Union's militarily superpower status<sup>39)</sup>. Accordingly, this balancing in ideas helped the new Soviet leadership save face without feeling intimidated by accepting these new ideas (at least the transition period until these new ideas were subsumed gave the Soviet leadership a breathing space for maintaining their superpower prestige.) Wohlforth's assertion that ideas may permit or facilitate actions, but actions give ideas substance resonates in constructivist argument. However, for constructivists, ideas may give meaning and substance to actions. Ideas can also be transmitted or distributed to galvanise policy change. Policy change may necessitate a political leadership that is interested, able, and willing to sponsor policy change and invest political resources in building the necessary institutional and political support<sup>40)</sup>. A sequence of events leading to the end of the Cold War explained by way of this idea discourse has the theoretical implications for constructivism and thus we will return to it in the following section.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War can be examined from the US side. The then US President George Bush announced that the United States would modify its confrontation through containment strategy—a strategy that was the backbone of the US post-World War II strategy toward the Soviet Union. Instead the United States's new strategy would be not to contain the Soviet Union, but to integrate it into the international community<sup>41)</sup>. This announcement was made in May 1989, well before the demise of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the East European authoritarian regimes. If the West, the United States in particular, had wanted to maintain its willingness to fight, then the rationale for this strategy shift would have been inconceivable. Furthermore, it is likely that the West could have taken advantage of the volatile situation in Eastern Europe

38) William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 253–259.

39) Wohlforth goes on to say: "the new thinking held that balancing, rather than bandwagoning, governed the alignment of states on the world scene. And it maintained that military power was no longer so important either for achieving security or for pursuing political goals. What the new approach did not address directly was the question of prestige. New Soviet universalism obscured the old question of decline." *Ibid.*, p. 259. Here the new thinking is taken to mean the balancing of the long-held Soviet superpower status belief with the changing perception of "militarily debunked or normal power."

40) Janice Gross Stein, "Ideas, Even Good Ideas, Are not Enough: Changing Canada's Foreign and Defence Policies," *International Journal*, Vol. 50, 1994–5, p. 48.

41) President George Bush's Address at Texas Agricultural and Mechanical University, May 12, 1989, quoted in Takehiko Kamo, *Kokusai Anzenhoshou no Kousou* [Vision for International Security] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), p. 226, footnote 7.

which was unfavourable for the Soviet Union.

### ***On the Role of Nuclear Weapons***

The second premise concerning the utility of nuclear weapons invites controversy among international relations scholars. Realists posit that the existence of nuclear forces contribute to a “nuclear peace”; liberals may argue that not the existence of nuclear weapons but “nuclear learning” and some security regimes hold the key to the stability between the two opposing camps in the post-Second World War world; constructivists might hold that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the absence of war between the superpowers, and that the transformation of how each perceived the other-in the realm of changing state identity-mattered. Here the constructivist theme that takes both materialistic and ideational factors seriously may make us reconsider the purely materialistic view of the role and presence of nuclear weapons which has dominated the language of strategy thinkers.

Nonrealist thinkers who question this second proposition may claim that it is very difficult to set up counterfactual premises on the utility of nuclear weapons. These being: how would the world have been if there had been no nuclear weapons since the end of Second World War? In the absence of nuclear weapons, would there have been large-scale conventional war, in Europe or between the two superpowers? Would some regions in which the American extended deterrence was provided would have been involved in any sort of conflicts? We may never find adequate answers to these questions. It is difficult to isolate any independent effects produced by nuclear weapons since they were coincidental with other factors that may have contributed to the Soviet Union’s respect for the territorial status quo<sup>42)</sup>. It is true that nuclear weapons gave the superpowers the ability to destroy each other’s heartlands in a way that other rivals could not—but nuclear weapons did not provide either a motive to destroy those heartlands or a means to occupy them<sup>43)</sup>. Even so, there is no telling how many nuclear warheads were considered sufficient to deter aggressive action, or what types of weapons were necessary for deterrence. At best, we can only raise questions pertaining to the logic of deterrence and its inherent uncertainties. Nuclear deterrence involves a rather simple causation: if a state

---

42) Kegley, “How Did the Cold War Die?”, p. 16.

43) Bruce Russett, “Controlling the Soviet-US Enduring Rivalry: What was the Role of Nuclear Weapons?” in Jørn Gjelstad and Olav Njolstad (eds.) *Nuclear Rivalry and International Order* (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1996), p. 81.

A wants to prevent an attack against it, it must possess nuclear forces and demonstrate its willingness to use them in case of an emergency; an adversary state B, if it wishes to attack A with its nuclear weapons, must defend its own people and wealth against a possible second-attack from A. Conventional rationality dictates that prudent statesmen in both A and B will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Here the attacking side shows its resolve to use nuclear weapons, but at the same time it cannot actually use them, given the expected unbearable damages inflicted by a second strike from an opponent in retaliation for the first strike. Neither of the superpowers can escape from this unusability paradox. Lawrence Freedman argues, analysing the history of nuclear strategies, that in practice neither superpowers emerge with a decisive advantage: each remains capable of confounding the most ruthless and devious plans of the other, by ensuring an unavoidable risk of unendurable destruction<sup>44)</sup>. Likewise, Lebow and Stein observe the inherent uncertainties about nuclear deterrence, and point out that strategic buildups are more likely to provoke than to restrain adversaries because of their impact on the domestic balance of political power in the target state, thereby easily triggering reaction<sup>45)</sup>. Freedman concludes: "Nevertheless the experience of the past decades suggests that while the basic structure of the contemporary international system was shaped by the arrival of nuclear weapons it is now only marginally affected by variations in nuclear policies."<sup>46)</sup> Some realists, however, acknowledge the point that nuclear weapons have not changed the structure of the international system. Yet they try to modify the neorealist's rigid structural analysis which takes anarchy as a starting point, by adding a new function of nuclear weapons. Steve Weber's "joint custodianship" allows the superpowers special responsibilities that no other states are in a position to perform<sup>47)</sup>. Accordingly, this new function makes a contrast to the Waltzian account of the non-differentiation of function among units in the international system. Joint custodianship reflects both the superpowers' predominance of nuclear weapons in terms of both quantitative and qualitative advantage over other powers, and the ability to positively manage the system in a bipolar world because externalities and problem of col-

44) Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, Second Edition (London: Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 428.

45) Richard Ned Lebow and Janis Gross Stein, "Nuclear Lessons of the Cold War," in Ken Booth (ed.) *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 81.

46) Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 431.

47) Steve Weber, "Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No.1, 1990, p. 64. "Joint custodianship" means that the superpowers take on management tasks that would not be performed in a bipolar system without nuclear deterrence. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

lective action are reduced as the number of great powers decline<sup>48)</sup>. The events from the early-1980s through the 1990s, however, appeared to belie this proposition. It was not a bipolar world that both Waltz and Weber envisaged, and the number of actors enjoying great power status were not reduced. For example, West Germany opposed to the intentions of the United States when Washington was eager to introduce new Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles to Western Europe. Moreover, new societal actors gained momentum in shaping the course of states' security policy—the mass peace movement in Western Europe in particular affected the course of the superpower arms control negotiations that ensued. These facts are related to the counterargument to the third proposition and thus will be examined later.

While the underlying assumptions of nuclear deterrence and the consequences of the nuclear arms race between the superpowers, as was described earlier in the case of INF, may be subject to the interpretation of central policy-planners in the governments of both superpowers, the second proposition on nuclear weapons involves another aspect on which realists asserting the peace-through-strength thesis have not focused adequately<sup>49)</sup>. The nuclear arms race did not merely create severe competition and confrontation between its participants, but it also produced a series of security cooperation regimes. Through them, the two superpowers have learned some fundamental “rules of prudence” for managing their rivalry and for dealing with occasional confrontations without becoming embroiled in warfare<sup>50)</sup>. These security regimes were formed both bilaterally and multilaterally. According to this view, since the early 1970s when both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to limit their strategic arms and to install anti-ballistic missile defence systems (the arms control treaty materialised in the SALT 1 and ABM agreements) to the INF negotiations through the strategic arms reduction talks in the early 1990s, both sides appeared to have learned crucial norms, rules and principles to regulate their conduct. Craig and George point out: first, recognition of parity as a criterion for regulating the level of and the relationship between U. S. and Soviet strategic forces; second, recognition and acceptance of mutual vulnerability in a nuclear war; and finally, acceptance of the link between offence and defence<sup>51)</sup>. As for

48) *Ibid.*, p. 65.

49) Steve Weber's joint custodianship premise touches on the positive management side of security cooperation in both highly institutionalized bodies and less formal ones. Weber, “Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 66–77.

50) Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, p. 263.

51) *Ibid.*, p. 267.

multilateral regimes, the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime (NPT) is illustrative of this kind of learning. Even after the Second Cold War broke out following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither the United States or the Soviet Union marginalised the NPT regime, instead working to strengthen it. Summing up this nuclear learning issue, Joseph Nye portrays the four areas where such learning has reached a point of common knowledge: the destructive power of the weapons; the nuclear control problem resulting in some crisis management practices; the proliferation problem, and arms race stability involving the same three norms Craig and George maintained<sup>52)</sup>. Viewing this learning effect from a different angle, it is also noteworthy that the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster in 1985 also had an impact on the Soviet leadership and served as a lesson for political consequences should nuclear exchange take place.

Constructivists' counter-argument on this second proposition can be linked to the first one. They may posit that the *role* of nuclear weapons would not have changed, deterring the parties concerned from attacking each other; however, the *meaning* of nuclear weapons may have changed, affecting the West's determination to fight. More than three decades ago, George Kennan observed, "the image of a Stalinist Russia poised and yearning to attack the West, and deterred only by [U. S.] possession of atomic weapons, was largely a creation of the Western imagination."<sup>53)</sup> In a similar fashion, Ken Booth's "Cold War mindsets" illuminates the point. The Cold War mindsets "informed much superpower behaviour during the Cold War, and helped perpetuate and intensify the confrontation, and frequently proved counter-productive."<sup>54)</sup> Hence, throughout the Cold War era, the American construction of the Soviet Union as a threat contributed to the cold war policies of the United States<sup>55)</sup>, and maybe vice versa. The underlying assumption was that the Cold War was socially constructed—if one saw the other as an adversary in the political, economic, military, social, and ideological fields, then the same perception would be mirrored through the adversary's lens. Booth sums up the case in point as follows:

---

52) Joseph S. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U. S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, pp. 382-391.

53) George Kennan, *Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown), p. 361, quoted in Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die?", p. 16.

54) Ken Booth, "Cold Wars of the mind," in Ken Booth (ed.) *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33.

55) Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union as Other," *Alternatives*, Vol. 13. pp. 415-42 and *idem*, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* (London: Pinter, 1990), quoted in Albert Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1996, p. 101.

"What enmity promises is the clarification of one's own identity. Enemies in a Cold War are undoubtedly real—they pose a material threat and have hostile intent—but enemy images can also be an effective source in domestic and foreign policy... Psychologically, enemy imaging serves several possible functions: it may help sublimate frustration, justify improper behaviour, serve to focus aggressiveness, divert attention from other problems, and provide a contrast by which to measure or inflate one's own worth or value. Sociologically, enemy images may foster solidarity and cohesion, improve the definition of objectives and make it easier for individuals to accept training and socialisation in group norms. Politically, enemy images can assist in the identification of interests, the definition of goals, the planning of programmes, the socialisation of citizens, the maintenance of an ideology, and, by polarising good and evil, can intensify orthodoxy and dogmatism and so help create heightened nationalism and consensus. In short, enemies can be useful."<sup>56)</sup>

Thus both superpowers may have fought what Kaldor termed an imaginary war against each other. The nuclear weapons possessed by one side were hence given the meaning of evilness by the other. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union represented different worlds; in Washington's eyes, Moscow was an expansionist and exporter of international communism, while in the Kremlin, Washington was an exporter of capitalist imperialism. Jutta Weldes argues that in the process of articulation, particular phenomena, whether objects, events or social relations, are represented in specific ways and given particular meanings on which action is based<sup>57)</sup>. Thus Cold War could be taken to be no less than an aggregate of the different meanings attached to each superpower. The logic of constructivists runs: "People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not."<sup>58)</sup> Hence the meaning of Britain's nuclear forces is totally different to the United States from that of the Soviet Union. Nuclear arms races between the superpowers may have reinforced this vicious meaning and served to solidify such negative symbol construction. During the detente period in the 1970s, SALT I and ABM

56) Booth, "Cold Wars of the mind," p. 35.

57) Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, pp. 284–85.

58) Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 396–97. Similarly, Raymond Garthoff, who once headed the US delegation to SALT negotiations in the 1970s, argued that the Cold War ended when the ideological underpinnings of a world view based on an adversarial relationship were abandoned in word and deed by the protagonist and the antagonist. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Who is to Blame for the Cold War?" in Booth (ed.) *Statecraft and Security*, p. 65.

agreements laid the foundation for the spirit of arms control negotiations thereafter, but the meaning of nuclear weapons possessed by both states remained intact. *Modus operandi* of the arms control in this period was to limit the number of delivery systems, but not to reduce them. It was not until the INF negotiations that an entire category of weapons systems-warheads and delivery systems-was eliminated from both sides, together with the unprecedented intrusive verification (on-site inspection) systems. Since INF negotiations, both West and East military blocs began to conduct conventional forces reduction talks (CFE) in Europe. Moreover both the United States and the Soviet Union signed the START I treaty to reduce the total nuclear warheads down to some six thousand. These events took place after Gorbachev took power. Beginning with the INF arms controls, it is likely that the meaning of nuclear weapons has been transformed over time. They were no longer an intractable subject of reduction. Especially for the United States, Soviet counterparts proved trustworthy to negotiate with; Soviet new thinkers who became Gorbachev's aides, as was discussed already, were receptive to Western security thinking, and they may have looked *like us* to the American negotiators. As Alexander Wendt asserts, "if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." Thus constructivists takes seriously this collective meaning that constitute the structures which organize our action<sup>59)</sup>.

### ***Solid Western Alliance causing the Soviet bloc to demise?***

On debate over the third proposition that the West's solid alliance system contributed to the end of the Cold War, non-realists present a different Cold War history. Probably most relevant to the third proposition is the case of the early 1980s, when deliberation was taking place on introducing Pershing II missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles to Western Europe as a countermeasure to Moscow's deployment of intermediate-range SS-20s to Eastern European states. Craig and George described the impact of this debate as follows: "American pressure for new nuclear weapons contributed to the growth of a massive anti-nuclear movement in Europe, a coalition of left-wing socialists, militant Christians, pacifists, environmental protectionists, members of alternative and extraparliamentary groups, and indiscriminate activists, which was not successful in preventing the deployment of the new missiles but certainly strengthened anti-Americanism in Western Europe and probably contributed in the long run to the emergence of

---

59) *Ibid.*, p. 397.

a growing feeling that it would be advisable not to terminate the American alliance, but to diminish reliance upon it.<sup>60)</sup> For these Europeans, the peace movement issue challenged the NATO orthodoxy, i.e. coupling the Western Europe's security with extended deterrence. Also the new missiles issue was taken to mean that "the United States was setting up Europe to suffer the consequences of its global anti-communist crusade, and the cruise and Pershing missiles were the chosen instrument of this policy."<sup>61)</sup> The timing of this mass demonstration was important because the "Second" had already set in. Despite the new phase of the Cold War, Western societies at large were not as solidly united as the realist proposition asserts. Some European states, especially West and East Germany, demonstrated their willingness to pursue detente, irrespective of even the tense years, by aiming to change the rules of the Cold War game. This was accompanied by the rise of the sensitive state, civic, and societal actors in the international arena<sup>62)</sup>. Thus the cohesion of the Western alliance was not as monolithic as the realists argued. This event indicated that social movements from below within the Western alliance defied the legitimacy of the conventional security politics. To borrow from Ann Tickner, "by rearticulating security in terms of those who are most vulnerable, security becomes a process of which begins at the bottom."<sup>63)</sup> Moreover, it would be difficult to judge a related proposition that the existence of NATO contributed to prevent war between it and the Warsaw Pact Organisation. As Kegley pointed out, there was no wars fought by the major powers between 1945 and 1949 when the international situation was more tense and volatile, and before NATO came into existence<sup>64)</sup>. Thus whether NATO helped prevent a war during the Cold War period would not be a comparable argument here. Instead other factors should be sought for better understanding.

Liberal thinkers in particular seem to have become more salient to argue against this third proposition than constructivists. In a sense, it might be contended that constructivists could capitalise on this liberal upsurge to expand their analytical scope. Indeed, some constructivists, such as Risse-Kappen, attempt to explore the alliance solidarity of

60) Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, p. 151.

61) Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 401.

62) Kamo, *Kokusai Anzenhoshō no Kousou*, pp. 246-48. During 1983, when the United States and the Soviet Union failed to reach the arms control agreement in Geneva, and both began to deploy their intermediate-range missiles, West and East Germany's political leaders exchanged mutual contact to reaffirm their intention not to terminate the detente between the Germanies. Likewise, Bulgarian and Romanian leaders also voiced their concern over the deployment of the new missiles.

63) J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in Booth and Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*, p. 190.

64) Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die?" p. 18.

NATO by linking liberal internationalism to the constructivist theme which draws on collective identity formation among members as well as prescription of norms informing appropriate behaviour for them<sup>65)</sup>. In addition, Deudney and Ikenberry explained the demise of the Cold War not merely by the Western alliance's solidarity alone but also included other factors such as the complex sociological and economic systems led by the United States. They held that capitalism, American culture and society, and the Western-dominated international organisations, as well as the Western alliance thwarted the Soviet intention to expand, while at the same time presenting an appealing alternative<sup>66)</sup>. According to them, the West maintained sufficient military strength to contain the Soviet Union defensively, while the pluralistic, pacific and open features of these Western systems, not only in the military alliance, made it difficult for the West to pursue a policy to actively and directly assail the Soviet offensively; paradoxically, as the West became more economically and militarily powerful, it presented an increasingly benign face to the Soviet Union, regardless of the rhetoric emphasised by Western leaders<sup>67)</sup>. The Soviet Communist Party's journal *Kommunist* explained in early 1988 that "there are no politically influential forces in either Western Europe or the US" that contemplate "military aggression against socialism," and "bourgeois democracy serves as a definite barrier in the path of unleashing such a war."<sup>68)</sup> Therefore, Deudney and Ikenberry conclude that the real victor of the Cold War was the Western system itself, whose vitality and accommodating attractiveness encouraged the adversary to emulate. Recent entry of the so-called Visegrad states-Hungary, Czech, and Poland-into NATO is likely to underscore this assumption.

The end of the Cold War also reinvigorated liberal thought which draws on the Kantian theme. Although Kant broadly covered many philosophical questions that go beyond the purview of this study, the Kantian theme here refers to universalist tradition. It connotes the transnational social bonds that link the individual human beings who are subjects or citizens of states, and treats international relations as taking place only apparently among states, but also envisages the possibility that the quintessential feature of international relations is really the relationship between all individuals in the commu-

65) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 357-99.

66) Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1991/92, p. 114.

67) *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.

68) Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 263.

nity of mankind<sup>69)</sup>. Michael Doyle, imbued with Kantian liberal internationalism, points out that peace could be brought about both from above and below. Commerce, economic development and other transnational ties tend to put pressure on authoritarian regimes from below. He demonstrated that tourism, educational exchanges, and scientific meetings with the liberal world may have had a liberalizing effect on the many Soviets and Eastern European elites who visited the West during the Cold War<sup>70)</sup>. And of course, the new Soviet leadership exerted influence from above, as we have discussed.

Among other liberal thinkers inspired by the wake of the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama deserves mentioning. His assertion “The End of History” deals with market capitalism and political democracy as the two main pillars of the Western liberalism, against which no rival alternatives exist in the post-Cold War world. According to him, liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.”<sup>71)</sup> Fukuyama employs what he termed “thymos” or human intrinsic desire to be recognised, to look into the events up to the demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A triad comprising a human personality-desire, reason, and recognition—is critical to political life, which, according to Hegel, drives the whole historical process<sup>72)</sup>. People in the Eastern bloc wanted to live a comparable life to the Westerners, and glimpses of show-cases in West German shops served to encourage their inherent desires. Such Western institutions as liberal democracy and market economy have underscored this desire for recognition. For Fukuyama’s liberal account, political liberal democracy and the market economy could provide an alternate vision for Eastern Europeans to emulate. He describes it this way:

“Certainly, many Eastern Europeans wanted an end to communism for less than elevated economic reasons, that is, because they thought that this would pave the way toward West German living standards. The fundamental impulse for the reforms undertaken in the Soviet Union and China was in a certain sense economic... the inability of centralized command economies to meet the requirements of the “post-industrial” society.”<sup>73)</sup>

69) Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 25.

70) Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and the End of the Cold War,” in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.) *International Relations and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 97.

71) Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, p. xi.

72) *Ibid.*, pp. xvi-vii.

### ***Internal Flaws in Soviet Ideology***

Constructivists may relate these liberal accounts to examine the fourth proposition on the inherent flaw in communism. Kratochwil claims that the change caused by Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost are better explained by reference to what he calls "the legitimization crisis of communism." Legitimation crisis is an identity crisis that occurs when "the political system fails to gain an input of mass loyalty that is as diffuse as possible; it results from the fact that fulfilment of governmental planning tasks places in question the structure of the depoliticised public realm and, thereby, the formally democratic securing of the private autonomous disposition of the means of production."<sup>74)</sup> Applied here, this legitimization crisis took place in Eastern Europe where the directives and command economy imposed by Moscow achieved little success in the form of multilateral institutional framework, while the Western institutional framework had developed considerable dynamism by the end of the 1980s<sup>75)</sup>. The communist legitimacy endowed by Moscow upon its satellite states failed to show the mass loyalty and self-confidence necessary to restore their empire by force, as events in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980-81 suggested. As a result, communist power was discredited and the Warsaw Pact's cohesion melted much more quickly than it would have been in the heart of a real war<sup>76)</sup>. For Moscow's leadership, this legitimization crisis became apparent in a secret Gorbachev note in 1986. In it Gorbachev abandoned Brezhnev's doctrine of limiting the sovereignty of East European states, where leading communist parties' relations with Moscow had been under Moscow's thumb throughout years of warning, censure, enforcement and directive practices, and the Politburo endorsed this doctrinal change<sup>77)</sup>. Thus it was not difficult to understand why Eastern Europeans staged the mass movements brought about sweeping changes through a new conception of empowerment<sup>78)</sup>. This empowerment led to the exoneration of former political prisoners, such as Vaclav Havel, and brought people's power to centre stage throughout Eastern Europe. These movements brought about a somewhat

73) *Ibid.*, p. 177. It is noted that Fukuyama's account underlies Hegelian idealism.

74) Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 46.

75) Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes," p. 73.

76) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, p. 258.

77) Alexander S. Tsipko, *Breaking with Communism*, translated by Tsuneko Mochizuki, [Komyunizumu tono Ketsubetsu] (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1993), pp. 39-40.

78) Vaclav Havel et al. (eds) *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (London: 1985), quoted in Fukuyama, *ibid.*, p. 63.

tranquil transition called the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia, but led to bloodshed in the overthrow of the regime in Romania. The events sparked by a series of legitimization crisis suggested that change in ideology initiates the systemic change, contrary to the neorealist maxim which posits that the distribution of capabilities determines a state’s position in the international system. When the cataclysmic changes began to sweep over Eastern Europe, there was no hegemonic war; indeed no tanks were deployed to subdue these movements. The Soviet Union remained a superpower in material terms when these events were unleashed under Gorbachev. Therefore, we can argue that political will and power bringing about ideological change in communism accounts better for the relatively peaceful transformation in Eastern Europe.

### **In Lieu of Conclusion**

Constructivists consider the political arena, whether domestic or international, as linked by the actors and structure of a given system. Actors can reproduce and change the system through their actions, which might lead to the alterations of the rules of the game, namely the Cold War conduct of behaviour and mindset discussed in this paper. As Koslowski and Kratochwil claim, “Fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction. Moreover, reproduction of the practice of international actors (i. e., states) depends on the reproduction of practices of domestic actors (i. e., individuals and groups). Therefore, fundamental changes in international politics occur when beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered thereby also altering the rules and norms that are constitutive of their political practices.”<sup>79</sup>

Taking into consideration these constructivist contentions, this literature review has sought alternative propositions regarding the causes of the end of the Cold War by examining the domestic politics factors caused by leadership shifts, cognitive learning factors which are likely to provide an alternative account for the nuclear peace thesis, liberal society’s attractiveness, as well as the change in identity and ideology.

However, these analyses could bring together both liberals and constructivists. They illuminate the infusion of new ideas, especially new security concepts and the role of the

<sup>79</sup>) Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Understanding Changes in International Politics: the Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, p. 216.

influential individuals who served as catalysts, and helped to trace the change in belief and identity. To put it differently, the above analyses aim to grasp the cataclysmic events from “inside-out” by allowing observers a perspective similar to that of the concerned agents, while structural account cherished by neorealism in particular aims to approach from “outside-in,” utilising hypothetical-deductive skill<sup>80</sup>. Thus far, we could argue *whether* the discourse on idea would be relevant to the above debate. However, we do not yet know *how* the ideational discourse operates. Further analysis must be needed to answer this question. It appears in this area that constructivist scholarship could articulate its research orientation by drawing on insights drawn from sociological and philosophical fields. Further inquiry into these realms from the international relations scholarship has been made in the name of the ‘third debate’ It is beyond the purview of this review to enter into this debate, but another constructivist turn could be advanced if constructivist scholarship incorporated the third debate.

---

80) Vasquez also refers to much of these nonrealist explanatory variables such as the role of domestic politics, the impact of two-level games in light of the relative influence of hard-liners and accommodationists, the importance of cognitive structures and learning, the impact of rules of the games on making peace possible, the influence of transnational actors and coalitions, and the relative importance of interactions over systemic structure. However, he cautions against liberal account for its ideological tendencies that will swallow up any scientifically neutral attempt to test its empirical components. *Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics*, pp. 324-47, and 356. Constructivism considered to be one of this nonrealist thinking also embodies this ideological/ideational component as well as materialistic one, and thus does not always necessitate such scientific neutral stance as Vasquez claims. Indeed, constructivism’s ontological “middle ground” rather seems to obfuscate Vasquez’s scientific testing criterion. The term “middle ground” comes from Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997.