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Post-War Freedom Movement and 1946 Provincial Elections in India

Sho Kuwajima

On April 10th, 1946, the first post-war General Election was held in Japan under universal adult suffrage.

I still remember one desolate scene in connection with this election. On my way back from my school in a rural town near Tokyo, I passed through the main street where an old candidate was expressing his political view. But, the only listeners were a few of us who had not reached the age of voting. The scale of each constituency was much larger than today, and it was not strange for us to listen to the speeches of the candidates who were not known to our place. But, this candidate himself was not only uncertain about the future of Japan, but also about his own future.

In the election of 1946 in Japan, women had the first chance to vote for the destiny of Japan and their own lives. Also, it was the first time that the Communist Party of Japan could occupy seats in the National Diet. This election was held under the extreme strain of political crisis, unstable rehabilitation, food scarcity and inflation that Japan faced immediately after the war. Many of the voters preferred food to vote, and caught suburban trains early in the morning to get rice or other food stuffs in rural areas. At this time of confusion, the preparation of electoral rolls was also defective. The omission of the qualified electors reached 10.8 per cent in Kagoshima Ken (Prefecture) in the southern part of Japan. The people of Okinawa Ken were deprived of their franchise because of the reason that the administrative right over Okinawa was

not given to Japan. Parliamentary democracy in the post-war Japan started with the denial of voting right to the substantial part of the country which was victimized in the Second World War. The nature of the General Election in 1946 conditioned deeply the post-war history of Japan. What had become issues in the election campaign and what was not there exerted serious impact on the way of life and thinking of the Japanese in later years.

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From January to April 1946, the Provincial Assembly Elections were held in India. These elections as well as the elections to the Central Assembly which were held in December 1945 were crucial in deciding the political destiny of the Sub-Continent in near future.

The elections were prepared under the background of the gigantic people's upheaval of the war-time days, Quit India movement of 1942 and in the context of the growth of the Pakistan movement which had a goal of Muslim majority state(s). The Congress was expected to impress the success of the Quit India movement as its own victory through the medium of the election results. On the other hand, the Muslim League which lost the 1937 provincial elections, had to prove within the framework of the Government of India Act, 1935, that it was the only organization that represented the Indian Muslims. This claim of Jinnah, President of the League, was one of the main reasons that forced the Simla Conference of June-July 1945 to fail.

In the post-war days of India, there was the upsurge of the freedom movement which was symbolized in the movement against the trial of the men and officers of the Indian National Army, and the struggles of workers and peasants prevailed in the various parts. Food situation in the beginning of 1946 was very critical, and the memory of the Bengal

Famine of 1943 was still fresh. Popular discontent penetrated even into the naval ratings and policemen who were expected to play the role of guardians of the British rule in India.

The importance of the 1946 elections is confirmed from the fact that the Convention of the Muslim League members of the new Central and Provincial Assemblies held in Delhi on the 8th and the 9th April, 1946 adopted a resolution which defined Pakistan as ' a sovereign independent State ' under the background of the ' victory ' of the elections which showed that the League occupied most of the seats in the separate constituencies reserved for Muslims.

Also, we know from the letters of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who opened the office of the Central Election Board of the Congress in Bombay and was actually in charge of the whole process of the elections, how skillfully he managed the complexities from the nominations to the election funds. The fervent election speeches of Nehru irritated the British rulers, while Patel did not count so seriously the effect of these speeches on the votes. Patel coolly thought that the people who enthusiastically welcomed Nehru needed no special encouragement for votes.

At any rate, the new Provincial Assemblies after the elections played a decisive part in the later process of constitution-making. In fact, the members of the Constituent Assembly which framed the Constitution of India were elected by the new members of the Provincial Assemblies. The partition of India, and, the partition of Bengal and Punjab in particular, were finally decided by the will of the members of the Provincial Assemblies in these areas. Though Nehru emphatically said that, in the coming elections, the freedom of India was the main issue, and other issues were secondary, it should be noted that the Zamindari abolition bills were prepared in these newly elected Assemblies.

Despite their importance, the Provincial Elections of 1946 have not

attracted so much attention, though there appeared so many writings on the 'Transfer of Power' in South Asia. The elections took so many months. For most of the people including the Indian political leaders, it is not clear when the elections started or when they ended. But, one of the main reasons comes from the fact that the concern over the election campaign and its results receded to the background when the British Cabinet Mission reached India in the end of March 1946 to finalize the constitutional framework for the independence of India. Another important reason was that the 'constitutional' solution of the problems of India's independence was taken for granted at this stage of history by both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. The Communist Party of India also decided to contest the elections and to support the Congress or League candidates in the constituencies where its own candidates did not stand. This implicit common understanding among the main political parties conditioned very seriously the later course of history in South Asia, though the elections of 1946 were forced to disappear from the scene by the heated discussion on the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16th, 1946.

Here it is not my purpose to trace the election campaign and the election results in detail. I only seek to present some of the features of the Provincial Elections in 1946 which were closely related to the post-independent history of South Asia.

The provincial elections of 1946 were held under the limited franchise system in which the right to vote was restricted by literacy or property. Also, the elections were characterized by the separate electorate system which started under the Indian Council Act of 1909.

Take the case of Bihar. Here only those who either pay income tax or

pay nine anna *choukidari* tax, or who are matriculated or have passed any other equivalent examination can be voters. Approximately only those peasants who had at least five bighas of land were supposed to be taxed. Out of the total population in the rural areas nearly 35% were agricultural labourers and another 25% were poor peasants who had less than five bighas of land. Thus, nearly 60% of the rural population in Bihar were disenfranchised.⁽¹⁾ According to the report of the Election Officer, Bihar, the total electorate for the Provincial Assembly represented about 7.8% of the total population of Bihar enumerated at the 1941 Census.⁽²⁾ It is to be noted that the Bihar Abolition of Zamindari Act, 1948 which finally took the form of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, was prepared by the members of the Legislative Assembly who were elected on this limited franchise.

The total number of women electors in the General and Muhammadan electoral rolls occupied only 13.1% of the total electorate in Bihar.⁽³⁾ The Election Officer, Bihar, reports that 53.9% of the registered electors recorded valid votes, while the per centage of women voters who went to the polling booths in the contested constituencies was 22.5% of the registered electors. Particularly, in the rural constituencies only about 1 woman in 9 went to the poll for the General seats, and only about 1 woman in 7 went for the Muhammadan seats. As we will see later, the provincial elections showed very clear results, but this limited participation of the people, and the women in particular in the elections reduces the value of the results. Though this aspect of the elections is rarely discussed, it is difficult to neglect it when we take into consideration the tremendous impact of the elections of 1946 on the post-independent history of South Asia. Also, this feature of the elections urges us to reconsider the meaning of the 'extra-constitutional' movement of the disenfranchised people both in the urban and rural areas which prevailed in 1945-46.

The Sixth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 provides that, no person who is or is entitled to be included in the electoral roll for an Sikh constituency, Muhammadan constituency, Anglo-Indian constituency, or Indian Christian constituency in any province shall be included in the electoral roll for a General constituency in that province. Naturally, the General voters can not vote for Muslim seats, and Muslim voters can not vote for General seats. This is a well-known fact, but this system was decisive in the Central and Provincial Elections in 1945-46. The Muslim League that claimed to represent all the Muslims in India had no need to bother about the General seats, and the Indian National Congress that claimed to represent all the Indian people had to prove that they had the support not only of the General electors but of the Muslim voters. This separate electorate system worked most effectively for the Muslim League.

The nominations of the candidates for the provincial elections created serious internal bickerings inside both the Congress and the League. Vallabhbhai Patel who was in charge of the Central Election Board of the Congress, had to explode his anger, and said that it was a sad thing to see this mad competition for going into the Councils and that no selection was possible which would satisfy all.⁽⁴⁾

The Muslim League took its decision to contest the elections immediately after the breakdown of the Simla Conference in July 1945. Jinnah stated that the paramount issues before the Muslim League in the coming elections were (1) Pakistan and (2) that the Muslim League was the only authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India.⁽⁵⁾ He stressed that the League would adopt *constitutional* methods during

this period. This was the first and, most probably, the last chance to prove his claim *constitutionally*.

The Congress decided officially to participate in the elections in the meeting of the All India Congress Committee held in Bombay in September 1945. Unlike Jinnah, Nehru did not say that the coming elections were of great consequence. Instead, he praised the heroic spirit demonstrated in the Quit India struggle of 1942, and warned that, if the Congress had come into office, it would punish those officers who behaved high-handedly in the suppression of the movement. Also, Nehru threatened to start the mass movement again if the British Government would not respond to the Congress demand for freedom. These pronouncements certainly irritated the Viceroy Wavell and other British officers, and, of course, those Indian officers who were expected to serve the new Congress ministries.

But, it was also true that Nehru was seriously considering that it was the duty of the Congress leaders to direct the enthusiasm of the people into the 'right' or 'proper' channels. Patel could not do this job though he could manage skillfully other complexities. Patel bluntly wrote that the enthusiasm of the people shown in the meetings where Nehru spoke was meaningless for the votes, because they were already the supporters of the Congress.⁽⁶⁾ Actually, the speeches of Nehru were timely in directing this enthusiasm into the 'constitutional' channel though he did not use a word 'constitutional' in the public meetings.

It was probable that the Congress would lead the mass struggle again in case the British did not respond. However, the direction of strategy in the Congress leaders was already fixed. Though they praised the Patri Sarkar movement, or the people's struggle in Satara, Maharashtra, in their election meetings, the provincial leaders were persuading the underground workers in this movement which survived ever after the war to

close it for the purpose of contesting the coming elections.⁽⁷⁾

After the end of the Second World War, there were three remarkable waves of the people's struggles for freedom. They were two struggles against the trial of the officers of the Indian National Army (INA) in November 1945 and February 1946, and the Royal Indian Navy Strike in Bombay in February 1946. Some recent trends of historiography in India point out that these three upsurges were rather limited in both the width of the participants and their impact on the political process except their 'militancy,' and emphasize that the enthusiasm of the people at the grass root level shown in the Congress election meetings was much more influential.⁽⁸⁾ Here, what I want to clarify is the meaning of the fact that the Congress kept aloof from these militant upsurges. In November 1945, on the occasion of the INA struggle in Calcutta, the provincial Congress leaders refused to intervene in the movement though the Congress Working Committee later praised the spirit of non-violence in the demonstration. In February 1946, the Congress again kept aloof from the INA movement in Calcutta.

Finally, the negative response towards the strike of the Royal Indian Navy not only decided the destiny of the revolt, but also the character of the independence of India. It is another matter to discuss whether the naval strike had a detailed alternative perspective which could take place of the Congress plan, and the main theme at this critical moment was to what extent the Congress could carefully assess the strength of the will of the people which was reflected in the strike. Though the Indian Franchise Act, 1945 included in electoral rolls those persons who returned from war service and relaxed residence qualifications for those persons, the naval ratings who were in service in Bombay were not in a position to vote. In this sense, the Naval Strike represented the will of the disenfranchised.

On the 22nd of February, the Communist Party called for a general strike, and appealed to all parties and people to observe the complete hartal in all shops, schools, colleges and mills as a mark of their disapproval of the Government repression and to demand the opening of negotiations and the satisfaction of the just demands of the naval strikers. But, Patel announced that there should be no attempt to call for a hartal or stoppage of mills or closing of schools and colleges. He said that the Congress had a big party in the Central Assembly and was doing its best to help them. On the same day, the Governor of Bombay received calls from I. I. Chundrigar, President of the Bombay Provincial Muslim League, and S. K. Patil, Secretary, Bombay Provincial Congress Committee. Both leaders assured him of their anxiety to allay the disturbances, and offered the help of volunteers to assist the police.⁽⁹⁾ Meanwhile, Patel advised the naval strikers to surrender. Later, the message of Jinnah brought by a rating in the early morning of the 23rd was influential enough to close finally the naval strike. It is noteworthy that Jinnah appealed to the ratings as follows;⁽¹⁰⁾

"I offer my services unreservedly for the cause of the RIN men to see that justice is done to them. If they will adopt *constitutional, lawful and peaceful* methods and appraise me fully of what will satisfy them, I give them my assurance that I shall do my best to see that their grievances are redressed."

It was symbolic that the naval strike which shook one of the main pillars of the British rule in India ended with this assurance of Jinnah. The Muslim League was in a better position to utilize to a full extent the constitutional framework which appeared in the Modern History of India since 1909. Three weeks before the naval strike, Jinnah spoke very

modestly;⁽¹¹⁾

"The Muslim League has remained unscrupulously aloof from interfering with the Hindu (General) electorates and has, as an honourable party, decided not to interfere with the non-Muslim electorates anywhere."

The League did not need to bother about the non-Muslim electorates to prove its 'representative' character of the organization. This favourable position produced these words of self-confidence though the League was still full of internal conflicts and could not publish its election manifesto which envisaged the scheme of Pakistan in detail. The lack of the election manifesto itself came from its strategy which tried to rally the various social strata behind *the only issue, Pakistan.*

In many provinces including Bombay, the polls were scheduled to be held in March 1946. In the elections for the Bombay Legislative Assembly, S. A. Dange stood for the special Labour seat as the candidate of the Communist Party which called for a general strike of the workers in sympathy with the demands of the naval ratings. At this stage, the Communists failed to grasp the meaning of the Naval Strike in the midst of their election campaign. At least, any integrated view in this connection did not seem to have appeared in the pages of their organ.

It is well known that in the provincial elections of 1946, the Congress could win a sweeping victory in the General seats and the Muslim League could occupy most of the seats in the Muslim constituencies. The all-India or regional parties were routed except the Congress, the League, the Communist Party and the Akali Dal. The Unionists in Punjab and the

Krishak Praja Party both of which took office in 1937 were defeated by the League, though the Unionist Premier appeared later with the support of the Congress and the Akalis, and Fazul-ul-Haq who led the Krishak Praja Party still kept his personal influence.

In Bengal, a key province for Pakistan, the League could win 114 seats. It could get 6 Muhammadan Urban seats and 104 out of 111 Muhammadan Rural seats besides 4 special seats.⁽¹²⁾ Though the Congress and the Nationalist Muslims supported by the Congress nominated 6 and 5 candidates respectively, none of them could win seats. The Krishak Praja Party which was a part of the Nationalist Muslim Parliamentary Board nominated 44 candidates for the Muslim seats, and won only 4 seats. Before the polling, Sarat Chandra Bose wrote a letter to Patel in which he said; "At present there is no touch between us (the Congress) and them (Muslim masses)."⁽¹³⁾ This was tragically proved in the election results. Disunity in the Provincial Congress leadership was rampant and they were not in a position to challenge at this critical moment. The provincial League, with its internal conflicts between the Nazimuddin Group and the Suhrawardy-Hashim Group, could vitalize the organization under the 'progressive' leadership of Abul Hashim, Provincial Secretary, who succeeded in controlling the conflicts and the discussion on the detail of the Pakistan scheme.

In Punjab, another key province, the League could win a spectacular victory, securing 75 seats this time instead of 2 in the year 1937. The Unionist Party which had been in office since 1937 was reduced to a minor party. However, the new League legislators were the mixture ranging from Feroz Khan Noon who just left the Viceroy's Executive Council to Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, a 'progressive' who left the post of the President, Punjab Provincial Congress Committee. Jinnah welcomed the entry of Feroz Khan Noon into the League, saying that an earnest

change over on the part of any Muslim would be welcomed.⁽¹⁴⁾ But, this character of the League provincial organization seriously affected its activities immediately after the independence of Pakistan.

In the Muslim majority provinces, only in the North-West Frontier Province, the Congress could win a victory, getting 19 out of the 30 Muslim seats.⁽¹⁵⁾

In his letter to Krishna Menon probably written in October 1945, Nehru predicted that in the United Provinces, the Congress and the Nationalist Muslims supported by the Congress might win 25 Muslim seats at the most, over one third of the total Muslim seats.⁽¹⁶⁾ He thought that, though city Muslims were for the League, the Momins (chiefly weaver class) and the Muslim peasantry were far more for the Congress, because they considered the League as an upper class organization of feudal landlords. However, he feared that an unknown factor might creep in when God and the Koran were used for election purposes. Actually, the Congress and the Nationalist Muslims won only 3 and 7 respectively out of 66 Muslim seats including two women's seats.⁽¹⁷⁾ Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, convener of the U.P. Congress Parliamentary Board, stood for a Muslim seat in three constituencies, Rae Bareli, Gonda (South-West) and Bahrach districts and lost all contests. He was elected unopposed in the Universities constituency. This showed how the wind was blowing irrespective of the talk that the U. P. League leaders might not want Pakistan seriously.

It is needless to say that the Congress could occupy most of the General seats under the strong influence of the people's will to freedom which was shown in the Quit India struggle of 1942 and later in the struggle against the trial of the INA officers.

On the basis of the election results, the British Government and its

Mission had the 'constitutional' grounds that the Congress and the League were the main partners with which they should negotiate. However, as we saw, it was the Muslim League that utilized this constitutional framework most effectively. The League thought that their claim of the only organization representing the Indian Muslims was finally proved *constitutionally*. The Convention of the League members of the Central and Provincial Assemblies held in Delhi in April 1946 resolved that the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India would be constituted into a sovereign independent State. It was meaningful that Suhrawardy who differed with Jinnah in various matters including the status of Bengal in the Pakistan Scheme moved this resolution.

Before we proceed to the conclusion, two features of the election results should be noted. One is the meaning of the results for the Communist Party of India, and another is whether the joint electorate system which reserved the seats for the Scheduled Castes worked properly as the Poona Pact of 1932 intended to do.

As is well-known, the Communists did not participate in the Quit India movement from their standpoint of Anti-Fascist People's War, and also appreciated the Pakistan movement as the expression of the 'national self-determination' in the Muslim majority areas. As a result, the Communists were forced to withdraw their own elected office-bearers inside the Congress, and actually parted from the Congress itself in the end of 1945. In spite of this critical position, the Party considered both the Congress and the Muslim League as two main patriotic forces. Therefore, the nominations of its candidates were decided along this policy. It put up its own candidates in almost all Labour seats, and also in such rural

seats, both General and Muslim, for the areas where the organized Kisan movement existed. However, in other General seats the Communists supported the Congress candidates, and in those Muslim seats where it was not putting up its own candidates the Party supported the League unless these Congress or League candidates were notorious hoarders or 'enemies of the people.'⁽¹⁸⁾

The election results were disastrous to the Communist Party. Though the Party put up 108 candidates and hoped to secure 25 seats, it won only 8 seats. S. A. Dange in Bombay and Jyoti Basu in Bengal were elected in the Labour constituencies. But, the Communists lost their 4 seats they had kept and could not get any seat in Punjab, a key province for their theory of national self-determination. The negative results may have been partly due to the limited franchise in which the poor peasants and the majority of the labourers were deprived of their voting right. The election campaign of the Congress which criticized the Communist policy severely as anti-people was sure to contribute to their poor results too. But, the Communist appraisal of the existing political situation and their complex election strategy seems to have affected the results fatally. As the Communists came nearer to the League or the Akalis in their approach, the latter was in a better position to gain. The impact of the elections on the working class and peasant movement which they led should be examined.

As for the reserved seats for the Scheduled Castes, the Poona Pact provides that, in the primary election, all the members of the Scheduled Castes registered in the General electoral roll in a constituency will elect a panel of four candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes. And, in the final election, the General electorate will select one candidate from this panel.

In case of Bihar, all the elected candidates for the Scheduled Castes constituencies were Congress members. Out of the 15 elected members, 7 were returned uncontested.

In the Bombay Assembly elections, the Scheduled Castes Federation led by Ambedkar put up 14 candidates, but won no seats. In the primary elections for Bombay City North and Bombay Suburban District, Bombay City (Byculla and Parel) and East Khandesh constituencies, 3 SCF candidates topped the lists, making the Congressmen rank second. But, in the final elections, these SCF candidates were reversed by the Congressmen. This may mean that the Congress got the support of the majority of the enfranchised. But, whether this reversal lived up to the spirit of the Poona Pact should be discussed separately. Ambedkar took up this contradiction later in his book on the *States and Minorities*.

Conclusion

On February 19th, 1946, the British Government officially published the plan to send its Mission to India. This decision was taken on the premise that the Provincial Elections would soon come to end. Before the elections ended, the Viceroy Wavell and other British officers had been irritated by the threatening speeches of Nehru, Patel and other Congress leaders who stated that they would punish high-handed officers and start the mass movement in a larger scale than in the Quit India movement. But, after they observed the Calcutta upheaval and the response of the Congress leaders to it in November 1945, they came to be convinced that the Congress would not start the movement at least before the elections. And, the participation of the main political parties in the electoral process facilitated the British Government to take an initiative in the negotiations with the Indian leaders. To that extent, the elections made possible the *peaceful* 'Transfer of Power.' Also, it may

be possible to add that this experience of 1946 Provincial Elections contributed partly to the growth of the parliamentary democracy in the post-independent India.

However, there was another aspect in the Provincial Elections of 1946. The election results certainly got the constitutional recognition though they were produced on the basis of the limited franchise in which the majority of the people were deprived of their right to vote. And, this recognition, in a sense, made the Indo-British negotiations exceedingly inflexible because the opinions of the Indian people were thought to have been already confirmed.

The 'extra-constitutional' movement of the disenfranchised people could play very often the role of an indicator of the people's opinion. It is not correct to conclude that the 'constitutional' campaign is always peaceful and that the 'extra-constitutional' movement does not help the peaceful solution of the 'Transfer of Power.' The constitutional process is also seriously responsible for the tragedy of the people who faced the distress that beggared all description accompanying with the Partition in August 1947.

The Rickshaw-walas (pullers) who enthusiastically joined the Quit India movement in Patna had no right to vote, and nor had it the peasants of Isur who suffered from the most severe repression in the 'Model State' of Mysore during the same period. More than 70% of the people of 21 years and up in British India and all the people of the Indian States or the Princely States did not participate in the elections. There may be various interpretations on the 'history from below.' But, how they were observing the election scene and how they responded to the main theme of the critical period immediately after the Second World War must be an inseparable part of the history of South Asia.

(1) Government of India Act, 1935, Sixth Schedule, Part VII and *People's War*, Oct. 21, 1945.

In the case of a member of the Scheduled Castes the payment of a *choukidari* tax of an annual amount of not less than six annas is the qualification dependent on taxation.

(2) Nandalal Sinha, *Report on the Elections in Bihar, March 1946*, Patna, 1946, p. 10.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 11.

(4) Patel to Nehru, Nov. 4, 1945, Durga Das (ed.), *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50, Vol. 2*, Ahmedabad, 1971, p. 68.

(5) Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. 2*, Lahore, 1964, p. 202.

(6) Patel to Azad, Jan. 1, 1946, Das, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

(7) Gail Omvedt, The Satara Prati Sarkar, Gyanendra Pandey (ed.), *The Indian Nation in 1942*, Calcutta, 1988, pp. 251-255.

(8) Bipan Chandra *et al.*, *India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, New Delhi, 1988, pp. 481-484.

(9) Colville to Wavell, Feb. 27, 1946, N. Mansergh (ed.), *The Transfer of Power, Vol. 6*, London, 1976, p. 1081.

(10) Subrata Banerjee, *The R.I.N. Strike*, New Delhi, 1981, p. 72.

(11) Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

(12) Harun-or-Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh - Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics 1936-1947*, Dhaka, 1987, p. 231.

(13) Sarat Bose to Patel, Jan. 3, 1946, Das, *op. cit.*, pp. 385-386.

(14) Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

(15) Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement - The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47*, Karachi, 1988, p. 18.

(16) Nehru to Menon, date unknown, Nehru, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

(17) P. D. Reeves *et al.*, *A Handbook to Elections in Uttar Pradesh 1920-1951*, Delhi, 1975, pp. 342-359.

(18) T. G. Jacob (ed.), *National Question in India - CPI Documents 1942-47*, New Delhi, 1988, pp. 117.

This is a part of the work done as a Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, which will be shortly completed, and a slightly revised version of the paper read at the 12th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, 24-28, June 1991 in Hong Kong.

Table Provincial Assembly Election Results (1946)

Province	Total Seats	Muslim Seats	Congress	Nationalist Muslims	League	CPI	Others
Madras	215	29	165	—	29	2	19
Bombay	175	30	125	—	30	2	18
Bengal	250	119	86	—	114	3	47
United Provinces	228	64*	153	7	54	—	14
Punjab	175	86	51	—	75	—	49
Bihar	152	40	98	5	34	—	15
CP and Berar	112	14	92	—	13	—	7
Assam	108	34	58	3	31	—	16
NWFP	50	36	30	2	17	—	1
Orissa	60	4	47	—	4	1	4
Sind	60	34	22	3	28	—	7

Note: 1. * Women's Muslim seats excluded.

2. Others; 25 for Europeans and 4 for Krishak Praja Party in Bengal,

22 for Akalis and 20 for Unionists in Punjab, and 4 for G. M. Syed's Group in Sind. 5 Nationalist Muslims in Bihar are from Momins.

Compiled from the following sources;

Return showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46,

AICC Papers ED-1/1946 KW II, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library,

Ashok Mehta, *The Political Mind of India*, Bombay, 1952,

P. D. Reeves *et al.*, *a Handbook to Elections in Uttar Pradesh 1920-1951*,

Harun-or-Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*,

Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement*,

Kripal C. Yadav, *Elections in Panjab 1920-1947*, Tokyo, 1981.

P. S. There is little difference in the statistical analysis among these sources. The only conspicuous difference is that, while Ashok Mehta mentions 4 Nationalist Muslim winners in Bengal, the AICC papers and Harun-or-Rashid mention none. This comes from the difference of interpretation on the character of the Krishak Praja Party. Fazlul-ul-Haq, its leader, was the mover of the Pakistan Resolution at the Lahore session of the Muslim League in March 1940.

第二次世界大戦直後の インド独立運動と1946年州議会選挙

桑 島 昭

1946年の1月から4月にかけて行われたインドの州議会選挙は、その後の南アジアの歴史の方向を決めるうえで重大な意味を持っていた。しかし、1946年の3月にインドを訪れたイギリス閣僚使節団とインドの政治指導者との交渉、そして、その後の閣僚使節案をめぐる論争の蔭にかくれて、その意味が論ぜられることは少なかった。

ここでは、1945年末から翌年2月にかけてのインド独立運動の展開のなかで、英領インドの成人人口の70%以上の人から投票の権利を奪ったこの選挙が、どのような特徴を持っていたか、その後の南アジア史にどのような影響を与えたかを考えたい。インド藩王国の民衆は、この選挙の枠外にあった。1946年2月に反乱を起こしたポンペイのインド海軍の水兵も選挙権を持っていなかった。

1946年4月、インドと同様に食糧危機の下にあった日本でも、戦後最初の総選挙が行なわれた。