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THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA: RECENT INTERPRETATIONS

P.J. MARSHALL*

This paper is concerned with a very major development in the history of Europe's dominance of the world, but one which raises difficult problems of interpretation. By the middle of the eighteenth century Europeans had been trading in maritime Asia since the early sixteenth century. Their control of the seas was undisputed, but on land, outside Indonesia, they had made little impact. The Javanese princes had become Dutch tributary states, but elsewhere only relatively small islands or coastal enclaves had passed under European rule. The British stake in India was largely confined to the trading ports of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. In the second half of the eighteenth century all this changed. The British brought a large part of eastern India under their direct rule and extended their political and military dominance over much of the south and up the Ganges valley. Further conquests on a huge scale were to follow in India in the early nineteenth century, when British power also began to menace Southeast Asia and China. Why did the break through to empire occur in India in the mid eighteenth century?

The difficulties in answering these questions are well known. Any drive to empire on the British side is particularly hard to account for.

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Little seems to have changed in the British presence in India by the mid-eighteenth century. Military strengths and weaknesses may well be an important part of any explanation, but the British were not yet deploying the technology and resources of an industrial society. The musket and the cannon were the weapons of both Europeans and Indians. Nor had British economic interests in Asia undergone any fundamental change. By almost any dating of the industrial revolution, the first wave of conquests pre-dated it. British interests in India had not changed since the founding of the East India Company in the early seventeenth century. The Company was engaged in purchasing Asian commodities for the world market. Such activities did not obviously require control of territory. Nor is there any evidence of a will to empire in the Directors of the British Company or among ministers in the British government.

1744 is the date at which the events that led to territorial empire are conventionally said to have begun. In that year fighting broke out between the British and French at sea. In 1746 hostilities commenced on land in southeastern India in the territories claimed by the Nawab of Arcot and the Nizam of Hyderabad. The British and French fought out their own rivalries, in part as allies of contestants for the succession of both states. War ebbed and flowed across southern India with very little intermission from 1746 until complete British victory brought the fighting to an end in 1761. British victory meant that the Carnatic of the British-backed Nawab of Arcot became a client state of the East India Company.

In 1756 relations between the East India Company and the Nawab of Bengal exploded into violence, when the Company rejected an ultimatum from a new Nawab, Siraj-ud-daula. The Nawab took the settlement of Calcutta. A British expedition from Madras under Robert Clive recovered it and then turned on the Nawab, defeating him at Plassey in June 1757. Thus Bengal also became effectively a client state with a new Nawab

ruling under British protection. Within a few years, however, Bengal had become a province under actual British rule. Successive Nawabs were deposed in 1760 and in 1763, when the deposed Nawab was driven to outright resistance and war. He found allies in northern India in the Mughal Emperor and the Wazir of Awadh. Both he and his allies were defeated at the battle of Buxar in 1764 and a settlement ensued at the Treaty of Allahabad of 1765 at which the Emperor gave the East India Company the *diwani*, or responsibility for the civil administration of Bengal and the provinces connected with it, while the Wazir of Awadh accepted a British alliance and a British garrison. This settlement gave the British rule over some 20 million people together with access to a revenue of about £3 million, and it took British influence nearly up to Delhi.

Only in western India was a British breakout delayed. An expedition from Bombay did, however, establish British control over the port of Surat in 1759.

I

Long established interpretations of the beginnings of empire in India, especially in western historiography, have tended to shift the focus away from the British, who were depicted as peaceful traders, minding their own business in isolation from the Indian world beyond the confines of their settlements, until developments which were not of their making forced them to take account of that world and to impose order on it. Change was attributed to the rise of a French challenge in India and above all to developments in India itself. With the collapse of the Mughal empire stability is said to have broken down in eighteenth-century India, compelling the British to take a more assertive role. The British are assumed to have done little to create the opportunities from which they were to profit so spectacularly. What earlier generations of historians felt

they had to explain was the resourcefulness and vigour with which Clive and his colleagues reacted to situations that were not of their making.

Recent scholarship has, however, questioned these accepted orthodoxies. In the first place, the British are no longer seen as purely passive in the years leading up to the wars and the conquests. They appear to have been increasingly assertive long before outright warfare began. But much more fundamental is the questioning of the proposition that British rule was filling a vacuum left by the breakdown of political stability following the disintegration of the Mughal empire. On the contrary, it is argued that the British conquest and subsequent British rule were built not on weakness and disorder but on the strength of the eighteenth-century Indian order.

II

Judging simply by the Company's own trade, there was little that was new about the British activities in India by the mid-eighteenth century. The quantities of goods which the Company exported fluctuated around a level attained in the 1720s. Yet to deduce from this that the British role in India was a static and unchanging one in the first half of the century would be misleading. The trade of the Company was only a part of British activities; there was a private sector as well, whose role was dynamic rather than static.

The Company's servants' own trade, together with that of a limited number of British people outside the service who resided in the Company's settlements, constituted this private sector. Private British enterprise in the early eighteenth century was chiefly based on the Indian settlements and involved in trading by sea. During the first half of the eighteenth century, a large proportion of the most lucrative parts of India's seaborne carrying trade passed into private British hands. The extent to which

private individuals participated in India's internal trade is less clearly documented. In Bengal especially, where Company servants were posted at several inland trading centres as well as at Calcutta, there is clear evidence that they did so on a considerable scale. This provoked friction with the Nawab's government since private British merchants claimed exemption from his customs duties and interfered with trades over which monopolies had been granted.

Private trade extended the links that had been established with Indian commercial communities through the official trade of the Company. Private merchants brought little capital with them from Britain. Their trade therefore depended to a very large extent on loans from Indians. A complex pattern of relations developed through which British and Indian traders rendered one another services. The growth of private trade thus helped to bind Indian merchants in coastal regions to the British.

The extent of British trade in relation to the trade conducted by Asian merchants without any European participation is an uncertain and even a contentious subject.⁽¹⁾ The growth of the Company's settlements is, however, a clear indication of the importance of the British in certain regions. Bombay only emerged as the major port of western India towards the end of the eighteenth century. Although other ports along the Coromandel Coast were able to hold their own in the early eighteenth century in competition with Madras, more and more Indian merchants moved there to deal with the British and to enjoy the relative security that they offered. Calcutta, by contrast, totally eclipsed its rivals in Bengal during the first half of the eighteenth century. Its growth was meteoric as Indian merchants, artisans and labouring people moved into the area under British jurisdiction in huge numbers. Although such estimates are likely to have been grossly inflated, Europeans thought that the city contained upwards of a hundred thousand people by the middle of

the eighteenth century. Expansion of European settlements on this scale posed obvious problems for Indian rulers. The dissemination of wealth among their subjects through dealings with Europeans was of course welcome, but if that wealth lay beyond the reach of the ruler within what amounted to a foreign enclave, if that enclave was growing very rapidly, and if some of the Europeans within the enclave seemed to be extending the range of their activities, the challenge to the ruler's authority was unmistakable. Calcutta in particular constituted such a challenge to the rulers of Bengal. This was the background to the events of 1756-7, in which the Nawab took Calcutta and was eventually overthrown by the British at Plassey.⁽²⁾

III

Reassessment of the British role in the first half of the eighteenth century is being set in the context of much wider reassessments of eighteenth-century Indian history. These have begun with its economy. The accepted view that the prosperity of the seventeenth century under a benign Mughal peace gave way to poverty in the eighteenth century, as political stability broke down, has been called into question. Studies of northern India in particular have indicated that the first half of the eighteenth century was a period of continuing economic expansion, both of agricultural production and of trade.⁽³⁾ Some historians have even been prepared to argue that there is evidence for growth in certain parts of India right through the eighteenth century.

The consensus has long been that the political history of eighteenth-century India was one of a decline into fragmentation. The Maratha bid to create a new hegemony suffered a disastrous check at the battle of Panipat in 1761. Their failure enabled several successor states to emerge, but these are judged to have been internally weak as well as being locked

into a confused pattern of warfare against one another. War and disorder disrupted economic life, and left the successor states vulnerable to being picked off one by one by the British.

Economic reassessment has, however, been followed by political reassessment. States like Mysore or those founded by the Nizam, the Wazir of Awadh, the Nawab of Bengal or the Peshwa of the Marathas and individual Maratha leaders, like Sindhia or Holkar, are seen as successful and potentially stable entities. They are described as preserving the outward forms of Mughal rule, while developing administrative techniques that enabled them effectively to extract resources from agriculture and trade. The alienation of revenue in grants in return for services by a military aristocracy was replaced by revenue farming under the direct control of the state, bringing in cash yields, which could be anticipated by arrangements with bankers, such as the Jagat Seths who managed the finances of the Nawabs of Bengal. The military forces of the new states were directly employed by their rulers, and increasingly armed and trained in the European manner, rather than being the retinue of a Mughal nobleman.

The successful establishment of regional states is seen as the necessary pre-condition for the rise of British power in India. The new order created opportunities for Europeans to become participants in Indian politics in certain coastal areas and ultimately to win power there for themselves. Moreover, once they had won power, the British at first exercised it in ways that eighteenth-century rulers had developed.

IV

European involvement in local politics in southern India seems to have begun with the French. In the 1740s they became revenue farmers on a small scale for the Nawabs of Arcot on the Coromandel Coast. From 1749

they began to raise troops under French officers, first for the Nawab and then for the Nizam of Hyderabad, receiving very large revenue grants in return. The British responded by providing troops for a rival Nawab of Arcot for which they too received grants of revenue. The British-supported Nawab, Muhammad Ali, borrowed extensively from private British people, who effectively acted as his bankers and reimbursed themselves from his revenues when they could. In Bengal the British may have begun to assume a political role in encouraging opposition to Siraj-ud-daula, even before he took Calcutta in 1756. They certainly hired out their troops to Mir Jafar and the conspirators before Plassey and thereafter undertook the defence of Bengal in return for increasing allocations of revenue, which culminated in the surrender of the whole revenue of the province to them with the *diwani* grant.

From being contractors for troops and revenue collection, in a short time the British actually displaced the Nawabs of Bengal and kept the Nawab of Arcot under tight control. Yet even though the East India Company resolved 'to stand forth' as *diwan* in 1772 and act independently of the Nawab of Bengal's government, early British administration in Bengal still remained tied to the methods of the Nawabs. Revenue was collected through revenue farmers or the great *zamindars* that had emerged in the early eighteenth century. Bankers, usually based on Benares rather than in Bengal itself, advanced money on the security of the revenue and the north Indian sepoys of the Nawabs were taken into British pay and placed under British officers. It was not until the Permanent Settlement and the enacting of the Cornwallis judicial code that British ideas of governance and British personnel began to exercise a powerful influence. On the Cormomandel Coast Muhammad Ali was left to create and administer a territorial dominion with the aid of British troops, who helped him to subjugate the rich lands of Tanjore and to bring the

southern *poligars* under his jurisdiction. The lands that he had accumulated were not annexed and placed under direct British authority until the end of the century.

V

The implications underlying much recent writing about the eighteenth century is that the establishment of a British regime in certain parts of India was a gradual process that can only be understood in the context of wider changes in India as a whole. The British won power as participants in Indian political struggles. The way that they exercised this power did not initially mark any sharp break with Indian patterns of rule. As eighteenth-century rulers had done, the British preserved an outward respect for Mughal forms. Also like their Indian predecessors, the British took Indian revenue contractors and bankers into partnership. Parts of the Indian economy remained buoyant into the early phases of colonial rule and thus a high yield of taxation and the continuing ability of indigenous bankers to lend underpinned the new colonial order. Recession and contraction and the displacement of Indian merchants and bankers by British ones only came in the early nineteenth century.

This interpretation of the eighteenth century has been built up by scholars working both in India and in the west.⁽⁴⁾ It has not, however, won general acceptance, especially among Indian historians. The interpretation of the eighteenth century as a period of relative prosperity, favourable verdicts on eighteenth-century states, stress on continuity between pre-colonial and early colonial phases and the assumption that British rule was built on cooperation with Indian elites have all been rejected.

Insistence on the break in continuity brought about by the British take-over underlies all objections. The objectors' case has been most fully developed for Bengal. Arguments that the British established a commanding

role in the provincial economy early in the eighteenth century from which political mastery followed relatively easily have been countered with a version that sees the British as of limited importance in Bengal's commercial life until they brought off an armed coup in 1757. The crisis of 1756-7 was engineered by the British for their own purposes. The role of Indians in the British aggression that culminated in Plassey is said to have been less important than is usually assumed. The British then, according to this version, used the the political power won at Plassey to subordinate Bengal's economy to their own purposes. Colonial rule immediately produced serious economic dislocation in the second half of the century. The Company stopped importing bullion and began to pay for its cargoes out of Bengal's revenues. This practice, together with the remitting of large private fortunes to Britain by individuals, began the notorious drain of wealth that quickly impoverished Bengal. The situation was made very much worse by the high revenue demand which the Company exacted and by monopolies that drove merchants out of employment and forced down the rewards of weavers. Towns, except for the colonial ports, are said to have gone into decline. The famine of 1770 was a crippling blow to Bengal and famine followed in northern India in the 1780s. In short, colonial rule was an armed intrusion into India with generally adverse consequences that quickly became apparent. If they were not yet subordinating India to industrial capitalism, the British were still alien aggressors, seizing power by brute force rather than by cooperation with significant Indian interests. They used their power to stifle any economic development that may have taken place earlier in the eighteenth century.⁽⁵⁾

Eighteenth-century Indian history has thus become contested ground. Debates about economic growth or contraction, political vitality or atrophy, are at the moment somewhat indecisive, since conclusions drawn from different regions are being put against one another. More detailed

research involving a wider spread of specific instances is needed before an overall assessment of India as a whole can command much confidence.

VI

In the meanwhile, however, the role of the British themselves merits reconsideration. New versions present the British as actors in what was essentially an Indian drama. Change in India enabled the British to insinuate themselves into power and initially to exercise it in Indian ways. To the critics of the new interpretations, the British were aggressive predators who operated outside the Indian world which they despoiled.

Analysis of the British must begin in Britain itself. Had the Directors of the East India Company been able to exercise effective control over developments in India, the early eighteenth-century role of the Company would have remained substantially unchanged. The Company certainly wished to protect its trade from what it took to be threats to it by the French. In 1747 it appealed to the national government for warships to be sent to India to prevent its trade from being 'utterly destroyed'. Ministers agreed that royal troops and naval ships should be sent, while the Company increased the supply of recruits for its own troops and permitted its servants at Madras to augment their forces. The forces built up in India were, however, according to the orders of the Directors, to be used solely for defensive purposes. They constantly warned their servants against involvement in Indian politics or acquisitions of territory. The reasoning behind such injunctions is clear: the Directors could not envisage commercial advantages that would outweigh the costs and disruptions of political and military ventures. Once what was seen as unprovoked French aggression had been frustrated, the Company's view was that its interests would be best served by preserving the situation in India as it was.

Ministers in the British government were in no doubt that Asian trade

was a national interest and that the forces of the Crown must support the Company if it was likely to be worsted by the French. The national government did not, however, have any clear policy of its own towards India. Ministers did little more than respond to the Company's pleas for help and adopt the Directors' views about strategy. The admirals and colonels in command of the royal forces sent out to support the Company were told to carry out its instructions as interpreted by its servants in India.

Thus the eighteenth-century conquests were neither planned nor directed from Britain. Official policy opposed them, but never reversed them and indeed provided vital additions to the force at the disposal of men in India. By the middle of the eighteenth century the British were able to put significant military forces into the field in India. Before the 1740s garrisons of a few hundred of the Company's own soldiers were maintained at Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. During the wars with France royal regiments and increased numbers of recruits for what became the Company's own European regiments were sent out. At the same time the British began to imitate the successor states to the Mughals and to tap their sources for sepoy soldiers, mainly Telugu-speaking people for Madras and north Indian Rajputs and what were called military Brahmins for Bengal. The role of the troops changed from defending the settlements to operating far inland. Numbers remained small: Clive had about 2000 sepoys and 900 Europeans at Plassey in 1757, while in 1764, at the very hard-fought battle of Buxar in northern India, the British had 5,300 sepoys, 850 Europeans, and 20 field pieces. Forces of this size could defeat comparable numbers of the French and also win spectacular victories over very much bigger Indian armies. Here the fire-power of well-drilled infantry and field artillery together with effective logistical support proved decisive. Indian rulers were rapidly adapting their military

structures and tactics to European models, so that within a few years states like Mysore were to press the British very hard indeed, but the initial impact of the new European armies was devastating.

Ignorance about India and slowness of communications meant that no effective control could be exercised from Britain. The role of the British in India was determined by men actually in India. It is a classic case of what has been called the 'sub-imperialism' of local interests. Decisions were taken by the Governors of the Presidencies with their Councils or committees of the Council. The civilian servants of the Company maintained ultimate authority, but military officers, the commanders of the Company's own forces and royal naval and army officers, were also involved. Neither civilians nor soldiers were much inclined to follow the caution enjoined on them from home.

They became increasingly confident in the efficacy of force. As early as 1751 a free-lance soldier was trying to convince British ministers that the government of Bengal could be overthrown by an expeditionary force of 2,000 Europeans. It became conventional wisdom that 'the Moors are such a despicable cowardly set of people, that there can be no dependence on them, were they opposed by Europeans'. Once the Company had gained control over Bengal, its servants contemplated sending expeditions far into northern India, even up to Delhi.

A robust disdain for the fighting qualities of Indian armies combined with confidence in their own and in their capacity to manipulate Indian rulers encouraged the Company's servants to bold and opportunistic use of power. Their objectives were usually limited ones. Indian rulers were to be prevented from exercising any authority in future over the Company's trade or settlements and every opportunity was to be taken for extracting commercial concessions and grants of revenue. Deposing Indian rulers and assuming outright rule over whole provinces were, however, projects that

generally remained beyond their calculations. Clive raised the possibility of establishing British rule over Bengal in a famous letter to Pitt of January 1759, but only on his return to India in 1765, when he knew that the Nawab's government had been completely undermined, did he seriously plan to take 'the whole for the Company'.

Private motives were often mixed with the ostensible public purposes which had been used to justify resorting to force. War enriched individuals as well as the Company. Indians who wished to hire the Company's troops had not only to pay the Company for them but had to reward their officers very handsomely indeed. After Plassey the army and the navy each got some £275,000 to distribute, sums which did not include the huge personal payments made to individual commanders, like Clive. This is the largest and the best documented case, but every use of the army probably involved private payments. Military adventures could also be highly beneficial to the private trade of individuals. This was especially the case in Bengal. There private trade had flourished long before Plassey. With the weakening of the Nawabs after the overthrow of Siraj-ud-daula, restraints on British participation in Bengal's internal trade were broken through and a boom followed.

VII

An interpretation of British expansion that sees men in Calcutta and Madras, largely beyond control from Britain itself, opportunistically exploiting their chances for limited gains, seems at first sight to fit well with new interpretations of eighteenth-century India. In a flourishing Mughal order the British would have had few chances to exploit. In the anarchy depicted by the old historiography there would have been no effective state structures or commercial and financial networks for them to take over. Within some at least of the eighteenth-century successor

states, the British could, however, assume a political role, turn it into a dominant one and extract resources for themselves through the administrative systems that they had usurped. The case for essential continuities in the eighteenth century as the British built their power on Indian foundations at every stage therefore seems to be a strong one.

Yet there can also be no doubt that the British seizure of power in certain parts of India in the mid-eighteenth century marked a clean break with the Indian past, even if the consequences of this break would be slow to reveal themselves. The British at Calcutta and Madras might act like contenders for power in an eighteenth-century state and might use their power like contemporary Indian rulers. In the last resort, however, they were not Indian rulers. Bengal under the Company was not an Indian regional state; it had become a British possession and those who ruled it were bound to fulfil British national purposes. However tenuous control over them might be, they could not escape that control indefinitely. Steps would be taken to ensure that Britain's national interest in India would be safeguarded.

What that interest was spelt out in letters from the Directors of the Company to a government minister in 1756. The Directors pointed out that not only was the India trade 'a national trade', in which 'the public is greatly concerned', but that the duties received by the government on Asian goods were four times the shareholders' dividend. The loss of the Company's Indian settlements would mean that a great 'distress' will 'attend the nation' and that 'a general distress upon public credit will succeed'.⁽⁶⁾ Public credit was the vital issue. Britain's 'fiscal-military state' depended on an efficient tax system and on the ability of the government to borrow money at reasonable rates for long periods. The great trading companies had an important role in the management of the debt. The consequences of the failure of one of them would have been dire.⁽⁷⁾ Appeals

by the East India Company for support in India from the forces of the Crown could not therefore be ignored.

Threats to the Company's trade had been beaten off by the defeat of the French and the overthrow of Siraj-ud-daula, but the consequences of victory, as men in India recognized much more quickly than did opinion in Britain, was that the national interest was now linked to the security of territorial empire in India as well as to the protection of the Company's trade. The profitability of the East India Company's operations now depended on its ability to maintain its control over its provinces. Taxation, collected above all from Bengal, provided the funds for a much larger volume of trade, and it also paid for the army that protected trade and that enforced the collection of revenue. Military power, revenue extraction, and trade had been fused together in a way that was to be characteristic of British India down to 1947. Much more was now at risk and the scale of the damage that failure in India could inflict on Britain had become even greater. If the East India Company went down, it would certainly pull down the credit system on which public finance and British commercial economy depended. In 1773 it was being said that the loss of India would produce 'a national bankruptcy'.

To guard against such disasters, Britain would be drawn into ever deeper involvement in India. There would be almost no limits to the resources that the British would be prepared to commit to India from now until 1947. More and more British troops would be sent to India and the Company would be permitted to increase its own forces on a colossal scale. The British would cease to be merely a regional power in eastern India, but would develop forces that could impose their will on the whole subcontinent. Much as they were disliked in Britain, repeated new conquests would be sanctioned, if the alternative seemed to be the endangering of Britain's stake in India.

The nature of British rule over its Indian provinces would also change, if slowly. The administrative practices inherited from the eighteenth-century successor states would increasingly be dismissed as corrupt and inefficient and as failing to meet British standards of good governance, which would become the criteria for reforming the Company's administration.

Thus the break in continuity seems not lie in the mid-eighteenth-century conquests or in the creation of new regimes in themselves, but in the potential for change that would follow from them. The initial conquests were limited, there was no sudden imposition of new principles of rule over them, nor was a new economic relationship between Britain and India forged at once. But for a European power, whose military and economic capacities were developing very rapidly and whose policies were coming under the influence of assertive new ideologies, to have established a bridgehead in India was no small break in continuity. Consequences would inevitably follow from that.

NOTES

- (1) Sushil Chaudhury, 'European Trading Companies and Bengal Textile Industry in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century', *Modern Asian Studies*, XXVII (1993), pp. 321-40; Om Prakash, 'On Estimating the Employment Implications of European Trade for the Eighteenth-Century Bengal Textile Industry: A Reply', *Ibid.*, pp. 341-6.
- (2) There is a very extensive literature on private British enterprise in the first half of the eighteenth century, see, for instance, H. Furber, *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600-1800* (Minneapolis, 1976); I. Bruce Watson, *Foundations for Empire: English Private Trade in India 1659-1760* (Delhi, 1980); P. J. Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1976) and 'Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800', in Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson, eds. *India and the Indian Ocean 1500 to 1800* (Calcutta, 1987), pp. 279-94.
- (3) Muzaffar Alam, 'Eastern India in the Early Eighteenth-century "crisis": some Evidence from Bihar', *The Indian Economic and Social History*

- Review*, XXVIII (1991), pp. 61-71; Dilbagh Singh, *The State, Landlords and Peasants. Rajasthan in the 18th Century* (Delhi, 1990)
- (4) See especially, Muzaffar Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-48* (Delhi, 1986); Richard Barnett, *North India between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals and the British 1720-1801* (Berkeley, 1980); C. A. Bayly, *The New Cambridge History of India*, II. 1, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 7-44; David Washbrook, 'Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History, c. 1720-1860', *Modern Asian Studies*, XXII (1988), pp.57-96.
- (5) See, for instance, a cogent general statement by M. Athar Ali, 'Recent Theories of Eighteenth-century India', *Indian Historical Review*, XIII (1987), pp 101-10. For Bengal, see numerous articles by Sushil Chaudhury and his *From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth-century Bengal* (New Delhi, 1995).
- (6) Secret Committee of the Directors to H. Fox, 18 Aug., 20 Sept 1756, British Library, Egerton Ms, 3487, ff. 134-5, 143-4.
- (7) John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London, 1989), pp. 120-2.

(付記) P.J. マーシャル氏は、1995年11月3日～11月26日に、日本大学商学部の客員教授として来日された。本稿は、11月24日(金)に、大阪・千里中央・ライフサイエンスセンターで、大阪大学文学部西洋史研究室(代表:川北稔教授)および大阪外国語大学アジア太平洋研究会(代表:赤木攻教授)の共催で実施された、特別セミナーでの報告“British Rule in India in the Late 18th Century: A New Interpretation”を、氏がオリジナル論考としてまとめ本論叢に特別寄稿されたものである。

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