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'Gentlemanly Capitalism' and the British Empire- Commonwealth in the 19th and 20th centuries*

Andrew Porter**

I

During the last decade, the term 'gentlemanly capitalism' has entered the vocabulary of modern British historians. Developed by P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins as a means of defining briefly the exceptional nature of Britain's developing capitalist system and overseas empires, it began to

attract attention and to generate controversy c.1990. The debate began, first, as a result of a series of articles which they published between 1980 and 1987¹, and was further stimulated by the appearance in 1993 of their two-volume study on *British Imperialism*.²

Cain and Hopkins set out in their work to address 'the causes of imperialism' (I, p. 4) using 'the term "imperialism" ...to refer to a species of the genus expansion' (I, p.42). They pick out as the 'distinguishing feature of imperialism...that it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state' (I, p.42-43). Imperialism is for them essentially the product of rational intention: 'imperialist impulses express a conscious act of will' (I, p.43). Moreover imperialism not only involved impositions on other peoples but also had important, in many respects conservative, domestic implications. 'Put simply', in their words, 'overseas expansion and the imperialism which accompanied it played a vital role in maintaining property and privilege at home in an age of social upheaval and revolution'. Imperialism, they argue, was part of 'a global campaign to subdue republicanism and democracy by demonstrating the superiority of the liberal idea of improvement' (I, p.45). It was 'neither an adjunct to British history nor an expression of a particular phase of its industrial development but an integral part of the configuration of British society' (I, p.46).

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That society was shaped by the political economy of 'gentlemanly capitalism', the social and political evolution of which is taken up in Volume I (chapters 2-7). 'Gentlemanly capitalism' was a system established in the course of the eighteenth century on the basis of an alliance between aristocratic, landed and financial interests ; it was shaped increasingly from the 1830s onwards by the expansion of international commerce, and the professional and service sectors of society, concentrated as they always had been in London and the south-east of England. Subordination to the goals of industry and manufactures was never a characteristic of these groups. They formed a self-contained, self-conscious elite which not only embraced both the City of London and the political world of Westminster, but, being concentrated in the south-east of England, remote from any large-scale manufacturing or extractive industries. Economic and political leadership went hand in hand : according to Cain and Hopkins, 'the gentlemanly elite had a common view of the world and how it should be ordered' (I, p.28). Expansion and imperialism were dictated and shaped by that outlook.

Having encapsulated the character of British politics, economy and society, the remainder of volume I is devoted to a series of area studies which range from Latin America and China to Britain's colonies of white settlement, notably Australia and Canada. Volume II is organised on the same dual pattern, and carries the accounts of metropolitan change and overseas activity on from 1914 to the end of the Second World War, with a final brief survey of decolonization after 1945.

There is no doubt that Cain and Hopkins have presented historians of British expansion with a distinctive and forceful challenge. They draw on the work of many other historians of Britain's industrialization who have increasingly emphasised the continuing significance in that process of pre-industrial financial and commercial capital as agents of change. Cain and Hopkins rightly remind us that the influence of financial and public service interest groups must always be considered along with industrial, manufacturing and other commercial interests in our attempts to understand the link between British economic growth and imperial expansion. However, they also push their arguments much further. Their characterisation of British society is monolithic, with all-powerful gentlemanly capitalists substituted wholesale for the bourgeois-industrial capitalists who once dominated historiographical pantheons. There is in addition no

escaping the single-mindedness of the interpretative argument spanning 250 years, or the authors' marked Anglocentricity. Cain and Hopkins largely dismiss the significance for any form of British empire-building of changes and initiatives generated independently overseas, and they have little time for suggestions that British imperialism was often reactive or defensive in inspiration. 'Aspects of causation', they argue, 'are of course to be found on the periphery ... But the generic causes, in our view, have their origins at the centre' (I, pp.50-51). Multi-causal analyses of British expansion they scornfully dismiss both as reflecting scholars' intellectual naivety or timidity, and for promoting general befuddlement and confusion (e.g. I, pp.17 and 51).

The wide geographical and chronological range of their work makes it almost a comprehensive history of Britain as a global power since the late seventeenth century, and it has naturally generated plenty of interest. However, evaluations of Cain's and Hopkins's achievement, estimates of their success in developing a genuinely novel conceptual analysis, and assessments of the persuasiveness of their arguments, have all varied enormously. On the one hand *British Imperialism* has been awarded the distinguished American Forkosch prize and has recently received the accolade of translation into Japanese. On the other, it has been argued forcefully that 'it is impossible to use the concept of "gentlemanly capitalism" as an explanation of British overseas expansion that can be grasped with sufficient certainty for it to be compared with the existing accounts over which Cain and Hopkins claim superiority.... Their strategy simply sidesteps the vexed and central question of the relationships between forms of capital and territorial jurisdiction. ... In short, *British Imperialism* is flawed by its loose and profligate conceptual structure in which the lynch-pin - "gentlemanly capitalism" is never precisely or consistently defined or used.¹³ A distinguished imperial historian has acknowledged their achievement in forcing historians to reconsider old certainties, but wrote: 'My blunt conclusion must ... be that the concept ... is a very stimulating organizing principle but ... is overplayed as a generalized historical explanation. It might, in fact, be suggested that ... the argument would barely be affected if the concept was not mentioned at all. ... But, terminology apart, my fundamental objection to the underlying Cain and Hopkins argument is that it comes dangerously near to monocausality.¹⁴ In between these extremes lie those commentators who have held back from firm conclusions, preferring to summarise its arguments as

'representing the most important new thinking for a decade' and looking forward to a forthcoming debate to test their strength.⁵

One point which may be briefly made is that, despite the importance which we may attach to the debate now surrounding Cain and Hopkins' work, many other historians of imperialism and the colonial empire have paid it scant attention. Especially notable here are the historians of Britain's metropolitan - and (for them) inescapably 'imperial' - culture, many of whom have approached their subject through the medium of English literature, the arts and other forms of representation. The economic and social or political structures of empire often do not cross their horizons, and in so far as their numbers continue to grow the persuasive power of 'gentlemanly capitalist' arguments appears so far to have been limited. This is something which Hopkins himself has recently noted, with a natural and in some respects well-justified regret, in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge.⁶

II

This paper, however, is not primarily concerned with that cultural history, except in the sense that the notion of 'gentlemanly capitalism' itself naturally embodies a cultural dimension. It is written with the question in mind as to 'what progress has been made in reconciling some of these divergent views of the concept?'. Has any consensus begun to emerge as to the extent of Cain and Hopkins' success in reshaping the analytical landscape of Britain's overseas expansion and modern history? In approaching these questions I attempt to consider some of the most important and contentious issues which almost certainly will continue to pose problems for their Anglocentric hypothesis of gentlemanly capitalism.

Some of these problematical issues were clearly defined in response to the articles in which Cain and Hopkins first developed their ideas. Because the two volumes of *British Imperialism* do not add in any essential way to the substance and argument of those preliminary articles, they have retained their importance.⁷ Cain and Hopkins' arguments were seen as resting on the drawing of neat and precise distinctions between land, finance, services, and industry, when in reality these sectoral divisions were generally far from clear and frequently did not exist. They were felt to insist on the possession by gentlemanly capitalists of a distinct set of shared opinions and priorities which were strong enough to

prevent any significant conflicts of interest both within and between 'the City of London' and those involved in government or in policy-making. Again, this social and political unity was seriously questioned, and subsequent work, for example on the varied attitudes to be found within the City toward free trade, has only reinforced those doubts.⁸ In the overwhelming importance they attached to London and the south-east of England, Cain and Hopkins were felt to have seriously neglected the contributions made by other regions of the United Kingdom to Britain's expansion. Here, too, subsequent work has done much to reinforce these suggestions. It is clear that in many parts of the world Scottish migration, commerce, finance, and entrepreneurial initiative played a very important part in creating and sustaining a British presence and imperial connections, often with little or no connection to London. Work still in progress suggests that in slightly different ways the same may be said of the Welsh and still more of the Irish.⁹ Finally, the point was also made that insufficient consideration had been given to the impact on British activities both of local decisions made overseas, and of international patterns of change.

Notwithstanding the wealth of information and comment which Cain and Hopkins went on to add to the central thesis in the case-study chapters of their books, these central issues evoked no significant responses from them. Indeed, in some ways *British Imperialism* appears to heighten the problems previously discerned in the articles. Let us consider, for example, the definition of the category of 'gentlemanly capitalist'. Candidates for inclusion in this socio-economic category are multiplied until it almost seems as if no-one should be allowed to escape. Examples of this elasticity can be drawn from the chapter in *British Imperialism* on African partition (I, ch.11) which not only illustrate the particular point but, through it, the wider questions of interpretation. The prominent shipowners and investors, William Mackinnon, Donald Currie and even Alfred Lewis Jones, apparently have claims to inclusion among those 'most successful ... entrepreneurs who descended on Africa [and] carried the gentlemanly code with them' (I, p.357). Yet this often seems hard to reconcile with the detailed reality of their careers.

Alfred Jones established himself in the Liverpool palm-oil trade, made his maritime fortune long before he developed significant London connections, and, even when he did so, remained linked socially and economically to Liverpool. Currie continually wove together the contacts and resources of his provincial Scottish background with those later

developed in London, and like other shipping magnates incurred the anger of London-based officials and businessmen everywhere for his willingness to strike mutually advantageous bargains with German competitors on the routes to south and east Africa. Mackinnon's interests in Africa, like those in south-east Asia, were born of the marriage between Scottish and Indian enterprise. In terms of resources and ambitions, they owed far more to the local development of their own multifarious regional networks by the expatriate merchant companies and investment groups, of whom Stanley Chapman has written so revealingly and so well,¹⁰ than to membership of any British metropolitan financial-cum-service elite. Other figures may also suggest themselves, such as Cecil Rhodes, whose economic and political interests in so many different arenas seem so very difficult to classify in gentlemanly capitalist terms.¹¹ Such examples suggest that the gentlemanly capitalist community was not only less coherent, but its heartland in the south of England was much less self-contained and redoubtable than is necessary to support the thesis of *British Imperialism*.

Among other agents of British expansion, Cain and Hopkins also try to characterise as 'associates' of such gentlemanly-capitalist entrepreneurs 'the representatives of the Church Missionary Society ... drawn from established gentry families and from the professional classes of southern England' (I, p.358). Again, this is hardly persuasive. Recruits to the Church Missionary Society from such backgrounds were increasingly likely to reject ideas of assimilation to 'gentlemanly' norms. They often thought that religious belief and British culture should be disentangled; missionaries should increase the chance of securing conversions, and also circumvent the corrupting impact of British ways, by assimilating themselves as far as possible to local indigenous manners. Similar social types who volunteered for missionary societies of very different character - such as the China Inland Mission or the Universities Mission to Central Africa - often demonstrated the same preferences. Militancy in support of such a cause in the later nineteenth century meant not a retreat from 'spiritual egalitarianism' into an imperialist paternalism, but a reassertion of egalitarian approaches and a rejection of westernization. It would be more accurate to argue that the intention to assimilate non-European societies attributed to the gentlemanly capitalist outlook was in fact most characteristic of missionaries drawn from provincial England and non-metropolitan Britain - of, for example, the Wesleyan Methodist and Free

Church of Scotland missions, and financial supporters like Robert Arthington or Lord Overtoun.

The difficulties associated with the definition of the 'gentlemanly capitalist' are paralleled by those to be met in Cain and Hopkins' attempts to fulfil their stated 'intention to redefine the nature of 'British imperialism'. To reach this goal, they set out they say 'to consider what British interests were, how they were represented' and what were their 'results in terms of limiting the independence of other countries' both inside and outside the formal empire of British rule (I, p.8). No-one will doubt, and few will ever have denied, that the extension and protection of British financial and commercial interests has lain behind much in the history of British relations with other countries. Cain and Hopkins observe, for instance, 'that Denmark was just as much within the orbit of Britain's overseas economic influence as were the smaller, newly-settled countries' (I, p.231). However, such an example only confirms that the existence of a significant British financial and business presence abroad did not necessarily establish the existence of 'imperialism' or of British imperial domination. If this was not so, then why was Denmark never regarded as part of any British empire, while, for example, New Zealand certainly was? To ask this question is to point to the fact that other important British objectives must have been present in order to make a reality of the control and subordination so central to 'imperialism', both formal and informal, even if those objectives are discounted in Cain and Hopkins' work.

As Lance Davis has also argued, 'the United States provides an interesting counter example' to the gentlemanly capitalist argument, for although between 1865 and 1914 it met the criteria required by Cain and Hopkins' for inclusion in Britain's 'informal empire', no-one has seriously suggested that it should be regarded as a British dependency. Davis has gone on to suggest that for Canada her continued existence within the formal empire was to her own economic advantage, and gave British capitalists 'no exploitative edge over potential competitors' wherever they were from. Indeed, capital flows in the four frontier countries of Canada, Australia, Argentina and the USA were all overwhelmingly determined by local domestic demand, not gentlemanly capitalist connections, by markets and not by imperial politics or metropolitan exploitation.¹² Clearly economic interest, economic influence, and 'imperialism' frequently remained distinct from each other. Many relationships between peoples which involve elements of inequality, dependence or

'incursions upon sovereignty' are not necessarily in any sense 'imperial'; nor do all 'imperial' impulses or relationships involve exclusively or even primarily gentlemanly-capitalist connections.

Cain and Hopkins often seem to acknowledge such points. They admit, for instance, that 'to the extent that British finance and services were funding the distribution of British manufactures, the two had an important interest in common' (I, p.470). More generally, in their conclusion (II, p.315) they point to the need for further study of 'the relationship between the City and industry', and 'the link between the domestic "power elite" and imperialist expansion'. They have nevertheless been reluctant to explore them. Surely an attempt to define imperialism and its causes obliges them as well as other historians to adopt procedures allowing for an examination of the *reciprocal* nature of dependence, as well as the perceptions of the relationship and its constraints held by the different parties involved. Who was dependent on whom? How was the relationship with Britain regarded on the ground? If a people does not feel itself to be oppressed or exploited, even more if it is content with its position, is it then possible to argue that an 'imperial' relationship exists? It is important for historians to recognise that the condition of powerlessness, as well as complexities of motive and intention, often affected even the representatives of the socially and economically important interests of a supposedly 'imperial' power such as Britain.

III

This paper now turns to three further aspects of the case made by Cain and Hopkins for seeing in 'gentlemanly capitalism' the decisive dynamic of British empire-building : (1) the significance of events and interests on the periphery in shaping the pattern and timing of imperial advance or retreat ; (2) the nature of British government policy-making ; and (3) the historian's methodological problems in tackling these issues. In one way or another these have all been raised by many of those who have commented on the thesis of *British Imperialism*.

The question of 'the periphery' has especial significance in the light of both Hopkins' own early writing on West Africa and much of the scholarship during the last thirty years which has examined the history of Africa, Asia and the expansion of European influence or control.¹³ As a result of that work, it has been almost universally accepted that

empire-building was never a simple consequence of European intention and action, but was without exception the result of a complex process of interaction between societies in the metropole and those on the periphery. This process was one which often left local peoples with considerable power to shape the relationship which gradually emerged between metropolitan actors and their own peripheral agencies. The continuing vitality of this approach has been very persuasively demonstrated by John Darwin, using the term 'bridgeheads' to describe those sectional interests which established themselves both at home and abroad and contributed decisively to the growth overseas of British influence and control. These sectional interests were many and varied; financial and commercial or 'service' groups were only a few of them, and they were frequently not the most important in dictating the nature and occasion of British expansion or retreat. It is also possible to add to the thrust of Darwin's argument, as I and others have tried to do elsewhere, by demonstrating many of the limitations to the financial power of the City of London even at the point of its supposedly greatest strength, and by exploring the many significant divisions between its different component communities.¹⁴

The 'gentlemanly capitalist' thesis, which vigorously dismisses 'peripheral' explanations, either pays little attention to this work or pushes it to one side. This characteristic has provided a point of departure for several historians, and two particular lines of argument seem to have emerged from their comments to highlight weaknesses in the Cain/Hopkins position. With reference to the nineteenth century, and after reflecting on Britain's mounting involvement in tropical Africa, Martin Klein concluded that 'the model is of limited validity in explaining the formal empire'. Given the lack of British capital interested in tropical Africa, the theory does not explain why Britain wanted certain areas so much, for instance 'why Britain insisted on its share of East Africa or why it raced to occupy some very barren parts of West Africa'.¹⁵ Turning to other examples from the twentieth century, Shigeru Akita has detected a similar neglect of non-British and peripheral factors in Cain and Hopkins' analysis of Chinese financial policy, and Britain's diplomatic policies towards Japan, both in the 1930s.¹⁶ Roger Louis has emphasised how in both the Persian oil crisis and the Suez crisis of the early 1950s decisions taken in Egypt or the USA, and the roles of Nasser, Eisenhower and Dulles, were far greater than their parallels in London. For Louis, not only is the gentlemanly-capitalist model excessively

Anglocentric and 'anti-peripheral' in these particularly important cases ; it is also unable to account for the survival and reshaping of Britain's empire as a whole after 1945. This process, Louis has argued, depended not on British choices and resources, but above all on American resources and ambitions. Clearly he doubts the possibility of explaining decolonization in terms of what Cain and Hopkins see not as Britain's relative decline and weakness but as Britain's continued twentieth-century success as a 'gentlemanly capitalist' power. For Klein, too, a central question remaining to be answered is how the end of empire is to be related to 'the maintenance of sterling and the bolstering of the City'.¹⁷

Such a question brings us directly to consideration of the manner in which British governments at all periods made policy and took decisions about empire and their overseas presence. The gentlemanly capitalist model rests on the assumption that gentlemanly capitalists - bankers, overseas investors, merchants, members of the landed classes, politicians, and civil servants - formed a caste, one held together by a common set of values and attitudes. This outlook rendered their differences of opinion insignificant, and their tendency to agree about the actions required to promote or defend overseas interests, universal. Such a view is unsustainable, it can be argued, because it flies in the face of fact.

If we begin from a British domestic perspective, this can be seen in at least two fundamental ways. First, the social and political development of Britain since the mid-eighteenth century has involved far less the survival and imposition of 'gentlemanly' outlooks and values, than their adjustment to and incorporation alongside those of the middle and working-classes, in a national society where financial and mercantile interests were both varied and widespread throughout the country. Secondly, the model as it has been presented so far ignores the fact that the 'state does not simply reflect the demands of interest groups or classes', but, as well as representing interests of its own, develops its policies as a consequence of the political need to balance the interests of the many groups which go to make the nation's population.¹⁸ The defeat in 1906 of the tariff reformers' attack on free trade and of Chamberlain's plans for imperial preference, cannot be interpreted as a simple victory for the outlook and interests of the City of London.

Turning to Britain's direct involvement overseas, the example of the South African War (1899-1902) is presented by the authors of *British Imperialism* not only as a major episode in Britain's participation in the partition of Africa, but in such a way that it appears

to provide important support for the gentlemanly capitalist interpretation.¹⁹ However, handled in this way it too raises questions about the mainsprings of government action. The argument of *British Imperialism* relies heavily on the history of South Africa as rewritten since the mid-1970s to take account of the mining revolution from c.1870 onwards. The Transvaal had emerged by the 1890s as a most important market for Britain and as the world's largest supplier of gold. Britain's interests in international trade, in the gold standard which sustained that trade, in enlarging her own gold reserves, and in cultivating collaborators among the mining magnates, dictated that everything be done to keep hold of the Transvaal. 'Had Britain's interests in southern Africa been purely strategic, she might have been able to tolerate these developments. But her commitments, like her ambitions, had spread far beyond the narrow confines of a naval base. The Transvaal could no longer be ignored: the question now was how to bring it into line with British interests.'²⁰ 'By a war of conquest' was the answer to the question, given in 1899. Britain went to war, driven by a narrowly definable range of metropolitan financial and commercial concerns.

The circumstantial logic of this argument may be compelling, but its weakness lies in its being no more than circumstantial. I have developed this dissenting view at length elsewhere, and this is not the place to repeat it.²¹ However, it is a view which hinges on two main propositions, one positive, the other negative. The first is that the British imperial government in London had other significant preoccupations which contributed decisively to the manner in which its South African policy and actions developed. These included individual and party political interests at home, and the overarching problems of imperial consolidation. The second is that the archival record, despite its enormous extent and startling comprehensiveness, simply does not bear out the primacy of gentlemanly capitalist financial and commercial views in bringing about the war. Recent work on the period preceding the war has gone some way to reinforce this position, in its analyses both of the mining interests on the Rand and the significance of events at Delagoa Bay for Britain's strategic and diplomatic misgivings about German policies.²²

Underlying these debates, both about the origins and consequences of the South African War and on the significance for British imperial development of gentlemanly capitalist concerns, is an important methodological question. Of course it is necessary for the development and health of their discipline that historians should attempt to generalize,

to advance hypotheses and provoke the rethinking of conventional wisdom. There is no doubt that reviewers have appreciated Cain and Hopkins' exposition of 'gentlemanly capitalism' for just such a contribution. However, it is equally true that the lasting value of these activities rests on the extent to which they have been already tested against primary evidence and sources, and the extent to which they continue to help historians to understand those sources. Like many a general survey, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the scale of their task, Cain and Hopkins' study of 'gentlemanly capitalism' has been overwhelmingly reliant on recent secondary writings. The explanation of British imperialism which they offer is arrived at by means of a synthesis from the selections already made by other scholars, each of whom had their own individual concerns and questions in mind. It is therefore not surprising to find that 'gentlemanly capitalism' often fits the historical detail - for example, of individual identity or imperial policy-making - very imperfectly. It is noticeable how wide the gap sometimes seems between the generalizations about Britain's capitalist political economy and the case studies of expansion. I would wish to argue that in the two important cases of Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 and her war in South Africa, it is only possible to sustain the gentlemanly capitalist analysis if one distances oneself from the archival record.

IV

It is illuminating to consider alongside *British Imperialism* a survey of a very different kind, such as Ronald Hyam's *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914*.²³ Hyam is concerned to offer an overview of the varied processes of empire building, the degrees of British influence, and the types of British expansion, which remains sensitive to the contrasting forms and dynamics of that history. He is also anxious to avoid the prevarication and banality which Cain and Hopkins regard as inseparable from such an approach.

Hyam's success in this respect may be seen, for example, in his excellent account of Britain's role in the partition of Africa. The role of the ivory trade in drawing Africa into the world economy and as a source of ecological degradation as well as local political instability, the Anglo-French concern to contain the expansion of Islam, the importance for their own sakes of 'prestige' and of what Lord Salisbury called 'the national or acquisitional

feeling', are all highlighted by Hyam as being of critical significance at different times. Yet no-one reliant on Cain and Hopkins would think to attach much weight to such factors. Nor would they find much to recommend in Hyam's 'model of expansion',²⁴ which while it agrees with Cain and Hopkins' dismissal of any loose appeal to 'turbulent frontiers' or 'peripheral crises' as containing the keys to expansion, also rejects their emphasis on narrowly-defined metropolitan and economic causation. In establishing his place for the metropole, Hyam roundly asserts the reality of the 'official mind', primarily concerned with political and strategic calculation ; while it may have been divided within itself, it was nevertheless 'grandly independent', 'temperamentally detached from special interest groups', and was no automatic agent of, say, gentlemanly capitalist designs. Hyam insists too on the autonomy of local-level interests at the periphery, often moved chiefly by economic motives, and their interaction with the metropole mediated particularly through the imperial government's representatives on the spot. Influence and empires were won and lost as these different levels of public and private authority, ignorance and ambition interlocked with each other and exerted their variable weights.

The key to the differences between Hyam's analysis and the 'gentlemanly capitalist' overview, and one of the most impressive features of Hyam's work, is the manner in which it blends together recent secondary scholarship with the evidence culled from Hyam's own extensive reading of primary published and manuscript sources. Hyam is in consequence far less ruthless in his generalization, less convinced either that British acts of empire-building shared a lowest common denominator or that it could offer much by way of general explanation even if it was detected. Scholars have found both *British Imperialism* and *Britain's Imperial Century* stimulating or provocative according to taste, but from my own perspective it is the second of these two works which has provided illumination of the field as a whole.

Notes

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- 1 The principal articles were as follows. Written jointly were 'The political economy of British

- expansion overseas, 1750-1914', *Economic History Review* 33 (1980), 463-90 ; 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British expansion overseas. I. The old colonial system, 1688-1850' and 'II. New Imperialism, 1850-1945', *Economic History Review* 39 (1986), 501-25, and *ibid.*, 40 (1987), 1-26. See also Peter Cain, 'J.A.Hobson, Financial Capitalism and Imperialism in Late Victorian and Edwardian England', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 13, 3 (1985), 1-27 ; A.G. Hopkins, 'The Victorians and Africa : a reconsideration of the occupation of Egypt, 1882', *Journal of African History* 27 (1986), 363-91.
- 2 P.J.Cain and A.G.Hopkins, *British Imperialism : Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914*, and *British Imperialism : Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990*, 2 vols (London, 1993). Hereafter referenced in the text as I and II.
 - 3 Geoffrey Ingham, 'British capitalism : empire, merchants and decline', *Social History* 20, 3 (1995), 339-54 ; quotations from pp.344-5, 347-8.
 - 4 D. K. Fieldhouse, 'Gentlemen, capitalists, and the British Empire', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (1994), 531-41.
 - 5 For instance, Muriel Chamberlain, 'The Causes of British Imperialism : Battle Rejoined', *The Historian* 39 (1993), 10-12.
 - 6 His inaugural lecture as Smuts Professor of Commonwealth History at the University of Cambridge was published as *The Future of the Imperial Past* (Cambridge, 1997). I am very grateful to Professor Hopkins for a copy of his lecture.
 - 7 Martin Dauntton, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Industry, 1820-1914', *Past and Present* 122 (1989), 119-58 ; Andrew Porter, 'Gentlemanly capitalism and empire : the British experience since 1750?', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 18 (1990), 265-95.
 - 8 A.C.Howe, 'Free Trade and the City of London, c.1820-1870', *History* 77 (1992), 391-410. Howe has recently pursued these questions in his *Free Trade and Liberal England 1846-1946* (Oxford, 1997).
 - 9 For example, John M. MacKenzie, 'On Scotland and the Empire', *International History Review* XV, 4 (1993), 714-39 ; Gordon Stuart, *Jute and Empire* (Manchester, 1998) ; Keith Jeffrey (ed.), *An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (Manchester, 1996) ; David Fitzpatrick, 'Ireland and the Empire', in Andrew Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume 3 : The Ninetenth Century* (forthcoming, Oxford, 1999).
 - 10 Stanley Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain from the Industrial Revolution to World War I* (Cambridge, 1992). See also the comments on Chapman's book in Ingham, pp.351-53.
 - 11 Most recently on Rhodes, Robert Rotberg, *The Founder : Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power* (Oxford, 1989) ; Mordechai Tamarkin, *Cecil Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaners : The Imperial Colossus and the Colonial Parish Pump* (London, 1996).
 - 12 The hallmarks of 'informal empire' are defined as heavy capital borrowing from Britain ; the power to cut off funds in times of difficulty or default ; extensive private British investment in public utilities, banks, manufacturing and processing ; local government's fiscal and monetary

- priorities set by borrowing requirements tied to the open export economy : see Lance E. Davis, *Discussion Paper*, American Historical Association Meeting, January 1994. A collection of papers from this meeting, edited by R. E. Dumett and assessing *British Imperialism*, is forthcoming.
- 13 See in particular his outstanding book, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London, 1973).
 - 14 John Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *English Historical Review* CXII (1997), 614-42 ; A. N. Porter, 'London and the British Empire : c. 1815-1914', in H.A.Diederiks and D.Reeder (eds.), *Cities of Finance* (Amsterdam, 1996), 53-68 ; Dauntton, *Past and Present* (1989).
 - 15 Martin A. Klein, 'Which Hopkins do you Prefer : Comments of P.J.Cain and A.G.Hopkins, *British Imperialism*', unpub. paper, American Historical Association, January 1994. See also Fieldhouse, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (1994), 539-40 for a similar argument.
 - 16 Shigeru Akita, 'British Informal Empire in Asia 1880s-1930s: A Japanese Perspective', in Janet Hunter (ed.), *Japanese Perspectives on Imperialism in Asia. Discussion Paper* (London School of Economics : London, 1995), 1-29.
 - 17 Roger Louis, 'Cain and Hopkins', unpub. paper, American Historical Association, January 1994 ; Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (1994), 462-511 ; Klein, 'Which Hopkins do you Prefer'.
 - 18 Using the examples of government's changing financial policies between 1815 and 1850, and the bimetallic controversy of the 1890s, this argument is developed by Martin Dauntton in a review article, 'Home and Colonial', *Twentieth Century British History* 6 (1995), 344-58. In the latter instance, 'the gold standard was not necessarily maintained because it was pro City policy - the City was indeed divided on the issue - but because it was part of the social contract with the working-classes', p.356.
 - 19 Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, I, pp.369-81.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, p.374.
 - 21 Andrew Porter, 'The South African War (1899-1902) : Context and Motive reconsidered', *Journal of African History* 31 (1990), 31-57.
 - 22 Iain R. Smith, *The Origins of the South Africa War 1899-1902* (London, 1996). These debates have continued at two recent conferences, 'South Africa 1895-1921 : Test of Empire' (Oxford, 1996), and 'Re-thinking the South African War' (Pretoria, 1998), from both of which published collections of papers are to be expected, edited respectively by Donal Lowry and G. C. Cuthbertson. For Delagoa Bay, see Peter Henshaw, 'The "Key to South Africa" in the 1890s : Delagoa Bay and the origins of the South African War', available at the Pretoria Conference. See also Matthew Seligmann, 'The Pfeil family and the development of German colonial ambitions in Southern Africa : a study of diplomacy and colonial trends', *German History*

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- 23 2nd. edition, London, 1993.
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp.285-90.

(付記)

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