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The Ismaili Imam and NGOs

— A case study of Islamic civil society —

NEJIMA Susumu*

1. Introduction

Discussions about civil society, which were initially stimulated by the dramatic events in East Europe, have recently been globalized. Although it is so far underestimated, many Islamic organizations have been working in the sphere of civil society and contributing to create it. For example, an international conference on the subject was held in Japan in 1999. Many Southeast Asian Muslims took part in and reported of their activities in civil society.¹ There were representatives of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiya from Indonesia. As members of civil society, they also appealed to the Japanese audience.

In this paper, development of the Ismaili community is examined as one of Islamic civil society. To this purpose, I shed light on the transformation of the Imam's role and image, as well as on the community's history. One may find a difficulty to associate the Ismailis with civil society. But, for those who participate in social development, the name Aga Khan must be well known through the activities of Aga Khan Education Service, Aga Khan Health Service, Aga Khan Rural Support Programme and others. These Aga Khan NGOs are members of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). At the top of AKDN, we see a single living Imam in the sense of the Shiite Islam, Aga Khan IV (Figure 1). The title is from none other than the Ismaili Imam. At the grass roots level, many Ismailis volunteer for constructing schools or managing cooperatives. It should be made clear that

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AKDN itself is non-denominational and is not an Ismaili benefit society. The NGOs are distinguished from the Ismaili religious organizations that are exclusively for jamaat - the Ismaili community. For the Ismailis, however, religious organizations and the NGOs are properly integrated into community life, since both come from the office of Imam : imamat. From the Ismaili point of view, religious organizations serve for their spiritual life, while AKDN is in charge of social services.

Through the leadership of Aga Khan IV and achievements of the AKDN, the Ismaili communities spread in Asia, Africa, North America and Europe have become more autonomous and stable. The influence is sometimes recognized at the national level, far beyond the Ismaili communities in the respective countries. Therefore, It is worth discussing the current Ismaili activities in the context of civil society. Kaiser has already done so with the AKDN activities in Tanzania.² I would like to deal with the case of Pakistan. The majority of the Ismailis actually live in Pakistan, and most AKDN activities concentrate in this country (Table 1). Furthermore, the Pakistani case has advantages to explore the relationship between State, Islam and civil society since it is one of the biggest Muslim countries in the world.

I will examine the Ismaili community in Pakistan from following perspectives.

1) Process of integration.

There are two different groups of Pakistani Ismailis : The Khojas and the mountain farmers in Karakorum.³ The Khojas' is mainly a Karachi-based business community. In the mountains of Karakorum located in the northern part of Pakistan, the mountain farmers settle in high valleys surrounded with high peaks such as Nanga Parbat (8125m) and Rakaposhi (7788m). Each group has quite a different historical background and speaks a different mother tongue.⁴ However, they have been forming an integrated jamaat. The active roles which AKDN has played in this context are examined.

2) State, society and Islam.

Gellner's discussion on civil society contrasts umma with civil society.⁵ However, isn't it possible to conceptualize Islamic civil society? When Aga Khan IV visits Pakistan, he often plays the role of 'balancer' between state and society. Although society

here primarily means jamaat in Pakistan, the influence is, as mentioned above, sometimes far beyond the Ismaili community.⁶ This somehow coincides with a model of Islamic civil society submitted by Kosugi. As a case study of the model, the Ismailis provide quite an interesting material.

The first point is historical, particularly relating to the development of the Ismaili community. The second point is an attempt to put the Ismaili case in the wider perspective of Islamic civil society.

2. Shia Imami Ismaili

Firstly, the genealogy of Ismailism is very briefly examined in order to clarify our object of discussion.⁷ The Split from the Twelver Shiism took place in the 8th century. They then established the Fatimid dynasty in Cairo in the 10th century. In the end of the 11th century, however, imamat was divided into two lines: Nizari and Mustali. The Nizaris, known with the legend of "Old Man of the Mountain", had fortified Alamut and other places. After the fall of Alamut, they had experienced another schism into Muhammad Shahis and Qasim Shahis. The former was superior in number to the latter. After the imamat of the Muhammad Shahis was extinguished in the end of the 19th century, the Qasim Shahis became predominant.

The Qasim Shahis call themselves "Shia Imami Ismailis" and they are the focus of this study (hereafter simply referred as the Ismailis). The uniqueness of this sect is that they have been following a living Imam. Aga Khan IV is presently the 49th Imam of the sect, and he is believed to be a direct descendent of the first Imam, Ali.

While the imamat is located in Aiglemont near Paris, the majority of the sect lives in Pakistan. Roughly speaking, their population in the country is about half a million.⁸ The Ismailis in Pakistan consist, as already mentioned, of two different groups: the Khojas and the mountain farmers in Karakorum.

3 The Khojas

3-1. Establishment of modern jamaat

After the fall of Alamut, the Ismailis disappear from the history of Islam. The sect survived among the tribes and nomads in Persia. In 1845, Aga Khan I arrived from Persia to India. Here, there was another Ismaili community. The Khojas in Bombay welcomed the Imam. It did not take long, however, before this wealthy merchant community became divided into the followers of the Imam and his opponents. Through the court judgements, authority of Aga Khan I as the Ismaili Imam was established. At the same time, the Khojas also transformed into a group with a defined membership.⁹ Here, as Gellner points out, the Ismaili Imam was given the financial and social means for doing something quite different.¹⁰

It was Aga Khan III who started 'something quite different' on a full-scale. While cultivating a friendship with the western nobles, the Imam promoted the modernization of the Khoja community during his long reign (1885-1957). Profound changes took place in the Khoja community. Building jamaat-khana as a house of prayer and assembly, it was now featured with many kinds of organizations. A Council system was established for administration and arbitration. The Ismailia Association dealt with religious affairs, cooperative banks channeled loans to individuals, the Education Board provided schools, and so forth. While the Khojas volunteered for community services, Aga Khan III himself exercised general control over all the organizations. Thus modern jamaat was formed with religious motives, under a reconstructed imamat.¹¹

3-2 Development of the doctrine

When non-Muslim capitalists left for India at the time of partition, it was Muslim business communities which migrated from outside of Pakistan, such as Memon and Bohra, that filled the vacancy. The Khojas were also among them.¹²

During the Ayub regime (1958-68), the country's economy was monopolized in the hands of the twelve "Big Houses".¹³ From the Khoja community, Fancy group emerged as one of them. Since then, the Khojas have experienced rise and fall. While Fancy was badly damaged by the nationalization policy by Z. A. Bhutto (1971-77) and the independence of Bangladesh, Lakson and Hashwani came to the front during the Zia regime (1977-88).¹⁴ In Pakistan, the Khojas are widely recognized as a significant

business-oriented community although not all Khojas belong to rich families. It shall be added that the image of the Pakistani businessman is not graceful. Kochanek points out that the urban middle class tended to see the vast private wealth as the result of corruption, improper influence on the public treasury, and not as the result of skill, merit, patriotism, or talent.¹⁵

As the Khojas grew along with the country's economy, their doctrines have also changed along with the political process. According to the Khoja tradition, the first Nizari missionary to India appears in the name of Satgur Nur. Pir Shams and others followed. The pirs tried to reformulate the Ismaili doctrine within a Hindu framework : the Imam now appeared as the tenth incarnation of Vishnu. This reformulation reflected in ginans such as Dasa Avatar. ¹⁶ Ali S. Asani explains that the ginans are 800 hymn-like poems composed in the various languages and dialects of Gujarat, Sind, and Punjab. The Khojas recite the ginans almost daily during their prayer meetings. The singing in unison of the entire congregation can be very powerful.¹⁷

In the context of politicization of Islam in Pakistan, however, some expressions in ginans became risky for the Khojas. In the 1950s, Aga Khan III began eliminating Hindu elements from the religious practices (In 1953, the anti-Ahmadiyah disturbance occurred). In the 1970s, the ginans were further reconsidered. As a result, some terms in ginan were replaced by Islamic terms.¹⁸

When General Zia came to power, he introduced an Islamic system to the country. As Akbar S. Ahmed likens Zia to Aurangzeb, Zia 's Islam was orthodox Sunni and legalistic. ¹⁹ With the Islamization policy, Pakistan became confronted with sheer sectarianism. This took place mainly between the Twelver Shiites and Sunnis. At this time, a few ulama criticized Ismailism as heresy.²⁰ Being a minority, the Khojas faced difficulties to maintain their traditional concept of Imam. As already mentioned, the Khojas have had a century long tradition of welfare service. Aga Khan IV tapped the resources for wider society. With the advancement into the sphere of social development, the image of the Ismailis - especially that of the Imam- were positively renewed. The events in Karakorum were to be highlighted as the main stage of the renewal.

4. Mountain Farmers in Karakorum

Karakorum is one of the highest mountain regions in the world. People live in separated valleys with an agro-pastoral economy. Being adjacent to Afghanistan, China and India, the region's religious setting is quite complicated. The Twelver Shiites, Ismailis, Nur Bakhshis and Sunnis coexist. Historically, there were many principalities such as Chitral, Hunza, and Ghizr. Following the annexation of the principalities in the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, Karakorum Highway opened in 1978. These events made the region accessible from the big cities in Pakistan. The road that penetrates northern Pakistan and eventually reaches to Kashgar has quickly become the vein for economic development based on tourism and international trade with China.²¹ Ever since, lowland - highland connections in terms of human, finance and information flows have grown rapidly. Islam also plays an intermediary role for tying different peoples together. Transnational Islamic groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami and Tabligh-i-Jamaat began to operate vigorously among the Sunnis. The Shiites have come under the strong influence of Iran after the Islamic Revolution.²² At the same time, Zia was promoting Islamization from the center, but his above mentioned tendency invited opposition from the Shiites. Eventually the sectarianism produced negative results in Karakorum, as elsewhere in Pakistan. In 1988, armed tribes attacked Shiite villages near Gilgit.²³ The schism became decisive.

The Ismaili population in Karakorum is bigger than that of the Khojas in Karachi. But their name seldom appears in the general account of Ismaili studies.²⁴ Facts tell that intensive integration of the Ismailis of Karakorum into the modern imamat has only recently begun. Since the cultural setting at the time of propagation was quite different from that of the Khojas, the mountain farmers had not indianized the doctrines.

In the 1920s, Aga Khan III introduced some reforms like the construction of jamaat-khana. The Imam also started a few Aga Khan Diamond Jubilee schools on his 60th anniversary (1946). But he had never visited the region. Although the reforms were following the Khoja example, the mountain farmers themselves did not have the necessary financial base or social resources. Most people were illiterate and the local rulers did not like their subjects to be educated. Then a 'revolutionary' event took place in Karakorum in

1960. The 49th Ismaili Imam, Aga Khan IV, visited the region for the first time in the Ismaili history.²⁵

Following the events in the 1970s, the Ismailis in Karakorum began to cultivate a solid relationship with the Khojas. In 1976, the Council system in Karakorum came under the Federal Council in Karachi. So did the other organizations such as Tariqah and Religious Education Board. Now, in the sphere of social development, Aga Khan University, the country's first private university founded in Karachi in 1985, began to provide the training for those local youth working in DJ schools, and the Aga Khan Health Service in Karakorum. The Khojas donated more than a hundred million dollars for the University Hospital Project.²⁶ The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), led by the renowned expert Shoaib Sultan Khan, has also made a breakthrough in the country's rural development soon after it was initiated in Karakorum in 1982.²⁷ The Khoja volunteers are in the Board of Directors and decide the NGO's strategy. Furthermore, hundreds of Ismaili students stay in Karachi to receive a higher education. Some of them will join AKDN as DJ teachers or Lady Health Visitors when they come back to Karakorum.

Take a look at an Ismaili village in Karakorum. In the center of the village, jamaat-khana is situated. Volunteers nominated by the Imam are in charge of prayer and the collection of zakat. A DJ school, Aga Khan Health Service's dispensary and the office-room of the Arbitration Panel will be around it. Weekly meetings of the Village Organization supported by AKRSP may be held in the terrace of jamaat-khana. In fact, they cover almost all the major social activities. Through religious organizations and AKDN, the Ismailis in Karakorum are integrated into the imamat. In another word, the Pakistani Ismailis now belong to a single well-coordinated jamaat in terms of institutionalization.

AKDN's penetration in Karakorum has so far been a peaceful one. They have successfully involved thousands of mountain farmers regardless of their religion. However, such rapid social change sometimes causes unspoken tension between peoples. AKDN's presence is quite visible and surpasses the administrative services. Some non-Ismailis feel threatened with the multidimensional activities of AKDN, while some Ismailis come to feel superior to others.

5. The Imam as balancer

We have seen the historical development of the Ismaili community in Pakistan. The NGO projects in Karakorum and other places have successfully tackled the social problems that had been neglected by the Government. Within the Ismailis, it can be understood as a process of integration into imamat. Outwardly, it helped improve their image. The transformation is demonstrated in the following speeches of Aga Khan IV.

“To all my spiritual children here I give my most affectionate blessings and I remind you that whatever happens… the first thing is your Faith and this must be above everything. I am pushing you to develop your own schools, your own education, your own health boards, but I am doing this because… Islam means not only faith, but it means work, it means creating the world in which you can practice your faith to the best of your ability… I give you once again all my most affectionate and loving blessings...”

(At the Ismailia Association, Karachi, on 27 September 1960.²⁸)

“I am immensely impressed by what the poor can achieve. They have great ambitions for what they can do for themselves. As income begin to rise, the most exciting possibilities are emerging. People are taking responsibility for creating, and paying for their own social services. They are building clinics and schools. And they are insisting on quality in these services — precisely because they are paying for them. These ideas of self-help and community ownership are a new dimension of development.”

(At the ODA signing ceremony on 16 may 1991.²⁹)

The former was made in front of his spiritual children, the Ismailis. The latter is as Chairman of Aga Khan Foundation. Aga Khan IV is very well at translating jamaat's volunteerism into a wider context, the promotion of self-reliance for the poor in Asia and Africa. Combined with self-help movements among the mountain farmers, the Ismaili Imam has now become "Prince of Development Programme". The French government named him Commander of French legion d'Honneur for "eminent service to humanity".³⁰ As a distinguished guest, Aga Khan IV is given full state honors when he visits Pakistan and other countries. In November 1994, for example, President Farooq Leghari received him at Islamabad Airport and hosted a dinner. After that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Aga Khan IV signed an accord of cooperation for development between the Government and AKDN.³¹

At this point, I would like to introduce Kosugi's model on Islamic civil society (Figure 2).³² Kosugi sees the traditional Islamic community as a dynamic interaction between state and society. To this end, the whole body of ulama functions as the balancer between the two. It is the sharia that provides autonomy for ulama, especially through waqf property. Kosugi claims that such an autonomous Islamic society was deconstructed with the impacts of colonization and westernization. From this viewpoint, contemporary Islamic Revival Movements can be regarded as quest for the reconstruction of autonomous Islamic society. Revival of sharia can be seen as protest against the authoritarian state through the (re)acquisition of autonomy in the Islamic society.

It is clear that Aga Khan IV is playing the role of balancer in line with this model. In Ismailism, Imam is the sole interpreter of the inner, hidden meaning of Quran. Thus the function of ulama in this model converges in the imamat. But in a country in which the Ismailis are a minority and the question of "which Islam?" is a crucial matter, claiming a peculiar form of Islam is not beneficial. In addition to religious matters, Aga Khan IV carefully draws a line between party politics and his leadership. If we look back at Aga Khan III, we come to know that he was involved in politics. As one of the prominent Muslim leaders, he negotiated with the British Government for the sake of Indian Muslims. He was also one of the founders of the Muslim League, the party that eventually created

Pakistan. Aga Khan IV became Imam after creation of Pakistan and finds himself in quite a different milieu.

Aga Khan IV's new instrument is AKDN, which is neither religious nor political. It works in the globalizing civil society, in the discourse of social development. In this domain, Aga Khan IV has cultivated good terms with the international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank. Since Pakistan, as a country deeply in debt, is quite vulnerable to the pressures from the international organizations, such friendship counts for something. In the modernized imamat equipped with transnational NGOs, Aga Khan IV can directly talk to the Prime Minister or President, and thus plays the role of balancer between state and society.

In 1997, Aga Khan IV celebrated his 40th anniversary. The representatives of the Ismailis over the whole world praised his leadership through AKDN, and presented him a flask of the Fatimid period - the Golden Age for the Ismailis. The Imam donated ten million dollars to the Aga Khan Foundation, Aga Khan University, Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, Aga Khan Trust for Culture and the Institute of Ismaili Studies, respectively.³³ Here, a living Imam combines an Islamic belief and social development, one of the major activities in contemporary civil society.

6. Conclusion

The Ismailis have considerably changed themselves and created a new identity. That is clearly expressed in imamat. The NGO activities have taken place of indianised elements. Meanwhile the mountain farmers have become an integral part of the jamaat in Pakistan. For the Ismailis, AKDN is the shield against the misconduct and ill performance of the Government. Pakistan has been repeatedly experiencing military rule. As a result, most regimes have had authoritarian nature. Civil society has been suffocated under the circumstance. It is noteworthy that in these circumstances, century old institution like the imamat has proven effective.

In the end, it is also important to put this case study in the context of contemporary Islamic Revival Movements although Aga Khan IV's reference to Islam is

not conspicuous in front of non-Ismaili audiences. Since, as already seen, AKDN emerged in the process of reconstruction of the imamat and jamaat. It gives us an occasion to reconsider our perception of 'Islam as threat'. While NGOs based on Christian or Buddhist ideas are evaluated in their own terms, the Islamic ones are not. Understanding Islamic Revival Movements as a quest for public benefit through autonomous Islamic institutions will diversify and enrich our perception of civil society.


1. Islam and Civil Society : Messages from Southeast Asia. November 5-7, 1999 in Ito and Tokyo. The conference was organized by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. I participated in it as commentator.
2. P. J. Kaiser, 'State-Society Relations in an International Context : The Case of Aga Khan Health-Care Initiatives in Tanzania', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* XXXVI, 3-4 (1995), 184-197 and *Culture, Transnationalism, and Civil Society : Aga Khan Social Service Initiatives in Tanzania* (Westport : Praeger, 1996).
3. The Ismailis in the northern Pakistan distribute in Gilit and Ghizr Districts of Northern Areas, and Chitral District of North West Frontier Province. Karakorum in this paper is used to designate these regions. I have done fieldwork in Karakorum in 1984, 1986, from 1988 to 1989, and from 1993 to 1995.
4. Among the mountain farmers in Karakorum, actually several languages are spoken : Burushaski, Khowar and Shina to name a few.
5. E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty : Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London : Hamish Hamilton, 1994).
6. See K. Mumtza, 'NGOs in Pakistan : An Overview', in T. J. Banuri, S. R. Khan and M. Mahmood (eds.), *Just Development : Beyond Adjustment with a Human Face* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1997) 171-190. M. H. Khan, *Climbing the Development Ladder with NGO Support : Experiences of Rural People in Pakistan* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1998). J. H. Bryant, et al., 'A Developing Country's University Oriented Toward Strengthening Health Systems : Challenges and Results', *American Journal of Public Health* 83-11 (1993), 1537-1543.
7. For the history of the Ismailis, see F. Daftary, *The Ismailis : Their History and Doctrines* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990).
8. In the 1980s, it is estimated as 400,000. See H. Kreuzmann, *Hunza : Ländliche Entwicklung im Karakorum* (Berlin : Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1989), 149.
9. J. C. Masselos, 'The Khojas of Bombay : The Defining of Formal Membership Criteria during the Nineteenth Century', in I. Ahmad, (ed.), *Caste and Social Stratification among the Muslims in India* (New Delhi : Manohar, 1978), 97-116.

10. E. Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1981), 108.
11. H. Papanek, *Leadership and Social Change in The Khoja Ismaili Community*, (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1962). On the Tanzanian case, see S. R. Walji, *A History of the Ismaili Community in Tanzania*, (Ph.D Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974).
12. There is another Khoja business community following the Twelver Shiism. They are called Khoja Isnasheri. Here the Khojas mean only of the Ismailis.
13. H. Papanek, 'Pakistan's Big Businessmen : Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship, and Partial Modernization', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 21 (1972), 1-32.
14. I. Yamanaka, 'Business Groups and Politics in Pakistan', in I. Yamanaka (ed.) *Power Structure in Pakistan : A Study on the Political Elites* (Tokyo : Institute of Developing Economies, 1992), 295-346. (in Japanese).
15. S. A. Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development : Business and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1983), 182.
16. A. Nanji, *The Nizari Ismaili Tradition in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent* (New York : Caravan Books, 1978), ch.6. See also J. M. Hollister, *The Shia of India* (Reprint. New Delhi : Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1979).
17. A. S. Asani, 'The Ginan Literature of the Ismailis of Indo-Pakistan : Its Origins, Characteristics and Themes', in D. L. Eck and F. Mallison (eds.), *Devotion Divine : Bhakti Traditions from the Regions of India* (Paris : Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1991), 1-18 and 'The Ismaili Ginans as Devotional Literature', in R. S. McGregor (ed.), *Devotional Literature in South Asia : Current Research 1985-1988* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992), 101-112.
18. Rattansi provides a detailed account on the transformation of the Ismaili doctrines. See D. Rattansi, *Islamization and the Khojah Ismaili Community in Pakistan* (Ph. D. thesis, McGill University, 1987).
19. A. S. Ahmed, *Pakistan Society : Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in Southasia* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1986), ch.1 and *Discovering Islam - Making Sense of Muslim History and Society* (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988), ch.4.
20. Diamond, *op.cit.*, ch. VI.
21. Chitral is out of the influence of the Highway. It becomes isolated during winter even today, since the road between Chitral and Peshawar is closed with snow.
22. About 500 young Shiites from Karakorum study religion in Iran. See A. Rieck, 'From Mountain Refuge to "Model Area" : Transformation of Shi'i Communities in Northern Pakistan', in I. Stellrecht and M. Winiger (eds.), *Perspectives on History and Change in the Karakorum, Hindu Kush, and Himalaya* (Köln : Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 1997).
23. According to a Pakistani monthly journal, Herald, 14 Shiite villages were destroyed and there were 115 casualties. See Z. Khan, 'A Turbulent Legacy', Herald (November 1994), 53.
24. Daftary *op.cit.*, tells very little about Karakorum. Holzwarth's work is probably the first attempt to reconstruct the Ismaili history in Karakorum. See W. Holzwarth, *Die Ismailiten in Nordpakistan* :

Zur Entwicklung einer Religiösen Minderheit im Kontext Neuer Ausenbeziehungen (Berlin : Das Arabische Buch, 1994). See also Kreutzmann *op.cit.*, and I. Müller-Stellrecht, *Materialien zur Ethnographie von Dardistan (Pakistan) : Aus den Nachgelassenen Aufzeichnungen von D.L.R. Lorimer. Teil I Hunza* (Graz : Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1979). As the Ismaili's own account, see F. A. I. Hunzai, *Shumali Ilqa Jat men Ismaili Dawat : Ek Tarikhi Jaiza* (Karachi : Shia Imami Ismaili Tariqa and Religious Education Board barac Pakistan, 1991).

25. Hunzai *op.cit.*, 73.
26. Diamond *op.cit.*, 199.
27. For AKRSP, see the account by the first General Manager himself. M. H. Khan and S. S. Khan, *Rural Change in the Third World : Pakistan and the Aga Khan Rural Support Program* (New York : Greenwood Press, 1992).
28. Papanek *op.cit.*, 1
29. Aga Khan Foundation, *International Strategy 1991-1999* (Geneva : Aga Khan Foundation, 1992), 19.
30. W. Doukins, and E. Mortimer, 'Prince of Development Programmes', *Financial Times* (12 August 1991), 28. See also C. Knevitt, 'Prince Helps Poor to Help Themselves', *Geographical Magazine* September (1988), 20-23. S. Islam, 'Imam for All Seasons', *Far Eastern Economic Review* 14 November (1991) 64-66.
31. The News, 12 and 14 November (1994).
32. Y. Kosugi, 'Islamic Civil Society and Modern State' in M. Yamauchi (ed.) *What is 'Islamic fundamentalism'* (Tokyo : Iwanami Syoten, 1996), 37-68. (in Japanese).
33. 'The Aga Khan Marks His 40th Year as Imam of The Ismaili Muslims with Grants Totalling US \$50 Million', in *Ismaili Pakistan* Issue 2, (1997), 4-5.

Figure 1 Aga Khan Development Network



Aga Khan Foundation, *The Aga Khan Development Network* (n.p., 1995).

The figure is simplified by the author.

Table 1 Aga Khan Development Network - Social Development

Aga Khan Foundation	Switzerland (headquarters), Bangladesh, India, Canada, Kenya, Pakistan, Portugal, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, UK, USA.
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme	India, Pakistan.
Aga Khan University	Pakistan.
Aga Khan Education Services	Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda.
Aga Khan Health Services	India, Kenya, Pakistan, Syria, Tanzania.
Aga Khan Housing Boards	India, Pakistan.

Data summarized from Aga Khan Foundation, *op.cit.*, 6-9




Figure 2. Kosugi *op.cit.*, 49.