



| | |
|--------------|---|
| Title | The Komagata Maru, Singapore and Japan : The First World War and Asia |
| Author(s) | 桑島, 昭 |
| Citation | アジア太平洋論叢. 2003, 13, p. 3-16 |
| Version Type | VoR |
| URL | https://hdl.handle.net/11094/99988 |
| rights | |
| Note | |

The University of Osaka Institutional Knowledge Archive : OUKA

<https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/>

The University of Osaka

The *Komagata Maru*, Singapore and Japan

-The First World War and Asia-

Sho Kuwajima*

The First World War was really the first worldwide war that the common people experienced. Singapore seemed far from war fronts except the news on the German cruiser, *Emden*, but the war seriously affected economic life of the people. In February 1915 the men and officers of the Fifth Light Infantry who were stationed in Singapore revolted and expressed their anti-war feelings. Most of them were Indian Muslims who found no positive reason to sacrifice themselves for the war. These feelings were decisive in leading the men to the revolt. They were influenced by the entry of Turkey, the then leader of the Muslim world, into the war on the side of Germany. They were also 'instigated' by the German prisoners of war including the *Emden* internees. But, the propaganda and call of the Ghadar Party movement, which appealed the achievement of the independence of India with arms, was also discernible. Immediately after the beginning of the war, the Ghadar Party, which had been formed in the U. S., appealed to its members to return to India for this purpose. Many of them used Japanese ships including the *Tosa Maru*. Just before the war, the Party even tried to exert their influence on the passengers of the *Komagata Maru* who were refused their entry into Canada in Vancouver despite their wish to work in the American continent.

For Japan the First World War provided 'a golden chance' to strengthen economic interests and expand political influence in Asia. It may not be accidental that many Ghadarites used Japanese ships. However, Japan occupied Tsintao of China with the

* Professor Emeritus, Osaka University of Foreign Studies

British co-operation, and participated in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny in Singapore at the request of the British.

As for the Indian Mutiny in Singapore I separately discussed it.¹ And also, how the Indian passengers of the *Komagata Maru* faced difficulties in Canada and India in 1914 due to the immigration policy of the Canadian Government is well known. Here I only want to trace the return journey of the ship from Vancouver, and examine what kind of impact the ship and her passengers exerted on Indian Nationalism and Japanese Nationalism. In a sense the experience of the journey of Japanese crew and Indian passengers in the same ship in the middle of 1914 symbolized the parting of Indian Nationalism and Japanese Nationalism in Asian History.

1

The *Komagata Maru* had a chequered career in her life of voyage. It mirrored the modern history of Japan and her expansionist phase. In that process the ship came across Indian Nationalism. She was built by C. Connell & Co., Glasgow in 1890. Her original name was *Sicilia*. According to the *Nihon Kisen Kenmeiroku* (Register of Japanese Steamers) published in December 1914, at that time the owner of the *Komagata Maru*, 3095 GT, was Shinei Kisen Gôshi Kaisha (Shinei Stm. Nav. Co.) and her port of registry was Dairen (Dalian) of China. Furuhashi Shintaro, Shinei Kisen Kaisha, recalls that the *Komagata Maru* was originally a cargo ship, but had been used to carry the immigrant Chinese to Nanyang.² After the *Komagata Maru* incident, the ownership of this ship was moved into various hands. First, the place of registry was changed from Dalian to Fusan (Pusan) of Korea. Then Karafuto (Sakhalin) Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha became her new owner, though the port of registry was Nishinomiya near Osaka. Afterwards again her ownership came into another hand, and she assumed the new name *Heian Maru* (Peace). The last year in which the *Heian Maru* appeared in the *Nihon Senmei Roku* (Register of Japanese Ships) is 1926, but the name of the ship is kept up.³ The life of the *Komagata Maru* was far from peaceful.

The *Komagata Maru*, which was chartered by Gurdit Singh, an Indian businessman of Singapore, left Hong Kong for Vancouver on 6 April 1914 soon after getting permission from the Colonial Secretary, Claude Savern though he was told that the permission to leave Hong Kong did not mean permission to land at Vancouver. When the ship sailed from Yokohama after passing through Shanghai and Moji, the total passengers reached 376 persons (24 Muslims, 12 Hindus and 340 Sikhs). Muslims were from Shahpur in West Punjab, and most of Sikhs were originally from the districts of Amritsar, Patiala, Ferozpur, Ludhiana, Jalandhar and Lahore.⁴ The majority of the passengers, originally farmers, left their military service recently. Thus they were once 'loyal subjects' of the British Raj, and the purpose of their journey was not political, but to get jobs after landing at Vancouver, though the copies of the *Ghadar*, an organ of the Ghadar Party, were distributed freely inside the ship.

But, some remarkable changes had been going on in the thought of Indian soldiers and policemen who were serving in China. Shiosaki Yokichi, an owner and engineer of the *Komagata Maru*, who observed the whole course of her journey, recalls that Indian soldiers and policemen in Hong Kong came to the forefront in the movement against the delay of the Governor of Hong Kong in giving a certificate of departure to the ship. He added that their action forced the Government to permit her voyage as they feared the riot of Indian residents including the military and policemen.⁵

Gurdit Singh came to Hong Kong in connection with his suit against his partner. While he was staying at the Gurdwara in Hong Kong, he once delivered his speech, supporting Indian nationalism expressed in the *Ghadar*. He also came to know that there were fellow countrymen who were eager to look for a ship to Canada. Gurdit Singh decided to help them in response to their request to charter a ship for them. He came back to Singapore in the beginning of 1914 to find out a shipping agent, but his efforts did not bear fruits. Thus he settled his business in Singapore, and returned to Hong Kong.⁶ According to the report of the commission appointed by the Government of India to enquire into "Komagata Maru" case, "Gurdit Singh had been quite unable to charter any ship at all until he met Herr Bune, a German shipping agent at Hong Kong ; the ship (*Komagata*

Maru) herself had belonged to a German company prior to her transfer to a small Japanese company".⁷

Though his stay in Malaysia and Singapore since 1885 was not a continuous one, Gurdit Singh's sphere of influence among the Indian community, particularly among the Sikhs in these areas was considerably wide due to his work as a merchant.

The *Komagata Maru* reached Vancouver on 23 May 1914. However, the Canadian authorities refused the landing of Indian passengers on the pretext of the lack of through tickets from their home country and \$200 for each passenger. They tried to expel the *Komagata Maru* by all means including the use of the Canadian cruiser, the *Rainbow*. Finally the passengers agreed to leave Vancouver on 23 July. The difficulties that the Indian passengers faced in these two months, and their and their sympathizers' struggle are well known. Here I only want to touch the Japanese attitudes to the incident.

Japanese newspapers came to take interest in this incident in the final stage when the relations between the Canadian Government and the Indian passengers reached critical phase. One of the main reasons was the anxiety about the lives of the Japanese captain Yamamoto Tokujiro and other crew of the *Komagata Maru*. Even the rumour was informed that Yamamoto, who raised the anchor and was going to move the ship from Vancouver according to the decision of the Canadian Government, was confined in a room violently by the Indian passengers who got angry at his step.⁸ But, it seems that Japanese journalism basically tried to keep 'neutral' stance in this matter as they also understood that this was the problem between the Canadian Government and the Indian passengers, though the Japanese ship accidentally came on the scene. The *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* dated 21 July carried the appeal of one Indian student in Tokyo stating why our brethren, who were once harassed in South Africa, had to suffer from this discrimination. The *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* on the next day denied the above-mentioned rumour on the confinement of the Japanese captain, and wrote that the relations between the crew and passengers had been cordial till they got the order of departure to the ship. Also the same paper admitted the influence of Gurdit Singh among the Indian passengers, saying that, if Gurdit Singh who was a man of high repute in India once made a call, twenty or thirty thousand Indians were ready to die

for the purpose. By the way this article misunderstood Gurdit Singh as a Muslim priest. This misunderstanding partly reflects Japanese incomplete image of India and Indians in the 1910s. However, it is to be noted that at least Japanese journalism did not take hostile attitudes towards the Indian passengers in spite of the trial that the Japanese captain and crew faced.

The basic attitude of the Government and her mission in Vancouver is expressed in Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki's instruction to Hori Yoshitaka, Japanese Consul, Vancouver. This instruction stated that the Japanese Government had nothing to do with this matter as the hiring of the ship was a purely private matter.⁹ In spite of this, Yata, Japanese Consul-General, Ottawa, had to add that the safety of the lives of Japanese crew was involved in this matter.¹⁰ It was natural that the problem of the payment for chartering charge attracted the attention of the Government, but what they were seriously concerned was the fate of the Japanese ship and her crew.

In this connection it is to be noted that the Consul mentioned that Gurdit Singh had expressed his deep regret to Yamamoto for the violent acts of the Indian passengers over the Japanese crew, saying that he had been always advising his men not to make trouble with the crew.¹¹ In the ship there was serious trouble between the Japanese crew and the Indian passengers. Though the Japanese could use water freely, this facility was not provided to the passengers. Sometime there was an incident when they lost control over themselves and pounced upon water which the crew had brought.¹² After the *Komagata Maru* left Vancouver, Hori reported to Kato that the captain was not worrying about his coming voyage, and added that Indian passengers had not shown any harmful feelings towards Yamamoto.¹³ It is worth mentioning that there existed practical judgment and efforts to promote mutual understanding on both sides of Yamamoto and Gurdit Singh.

Consul Hori also listened carefully to what the Indian passengers wanted to appeal, and took steps to solve water and other problems. He tried to avoid standing on the side of the Canadian authorities. Sohan Singh Josh's remark that the attitude of Yamamoto and Hori was not anti-Indian reflects half of the truth.¹⁴

However, Hori basically 'welcomed' the prohibition of entry to Gurdit Singh and

other Indian passengers 'from the Japanese standpoint' if we use his own words. In his view anti-Japanese sentiment in Canada was partly due to the shrinking of labour market accompanying with the unrestricted entry of Chinese people and their living conditions. Hori thought that, if Indians rushed in, it was sure to promote anti-Asian feelings in Canada.¹⁵ Here Japanese 'national interests' were working under the surface, and how to accommodate each other among Asian communities was not on the agenda on the side of the Japanese Government.

2

The *Komagata Maru* reached Yokohama at 7. 30 a.m. on 15 August (*Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun*, 16 August 1914). Already the Ghadar Party had rendered its help to the passengers in various ways. It is said that Sohan Singh Bhakna, Party President, who had reached Yokohama before the ship arrived, secretly met them with the object of laying the program of the Party for the *Ghadar* (Mutiny) in India, and supplied them arms and ammunitions.¹⁶ However, for example, the *Yokohama Boyeki Shimpō*, a Japanese newspaper which claims to be 'Yokohama's representative paper', did not refer to the arrival of the *Komagata Maru*, though the paper carried the article on the 'enthusiasm of citizens in Yokohama' on the occasion of Japanese participation in the war.¹⁷ This paper generally provided the news on the scheduled arrival and departure of ships at Yokohama Port in detail though not regularly. On 28 July the First World War started, and from the 1st to the 4th August Germany declared war against Russia, France and Britain. On 23 August Japan declared war against Germany. The concern of the Japanese papers and public opinion came to center around the siege of Chintao in China. These papers reported the participation of the Indian soldiers, the 36th Sikhs, in this operation. To that extent the *Komagata Maru* incident receded to the background.

The *Komagata Maru* reached Kobe at 8. 00 a.m. on 20 August. In Kobe Indian residents consisted mainly of Sindhis and Punjabis earnestly welcomed the passengers. Here Jawahar Mal, a Sindhi student who got aboard, organized processions of passengers,

and they marched 150 strong around the city, Gurdit Singh riding a rickshaw loaded with garlands, ending up at the British Consulate, besieging the Consul General R. G. E. Forster.¹⁸ However, Gurdit Singh records that the attitudes of the sailors and other Japanese crew became suddenly changed towards the passengers. The light, that was usually given, was stopped and the water supply was also cut off. They began to trouble the passengers in many other ways. The *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* dated the 4th September wrote that the Governor's House at Hong Kong did not permit the landing of the passengers in view of times, and the ship was forced to leave for Calcutta from Kobe at 4. 40 p.m. on the 3rd. This paper concluded that the *Komagata Maru* affair was settled for the time being. At this stage of history Japanese public opinion had not yet understood the *Komagata Maru* incident as their own problem, and similarly the Japanese crew of the ship wanted to get rid of the problem while they were in Japan. The involvement of the Japanese ship in this affair may be one of the reasons why Japanese papers were cautious about their report on the conditions of the Indian passengers and their response.

The *Japan Chronicle* in Kobe, edited by Robert Young, devoted the largest space to the *Komagata Maru* affair. The paper traced in detail the negotiations between the Indian passengers, British officials and Japanese staff from Shinei Kisen Kaisha (Company) with regard to the possibility of landing at Hong Kong and the payment to the owner of the ship. The *Japan Chronicle* even carried the article on the 'pitiable' conditions of the Indian passengers ;¹⁹

"Meanwhile the position of the Indian passengers is pitiable. They are all destitute, and have not even the money to buy fruit and fresh vegetables in Kobe. On board ship they have been refused light and steam for cooking purposes, though, through the instrumentality of the Consul-General, this grievance has been somewhat remedied. The food on board is of the poorest kind, and consists almost entirely of pulses. They have not even the means to telegraph to India for help. They are beginning to despair of even getting back to their wives and children in India of whom they have heard nothing for months, and who may be as destitute as they are themselves. As for Mr. Gurdit Singh,

he is practically a ruined man, for this enterprise has made huge inroads in his wealth. It is a lamentable story, and it is to be earnestly hoped that the British Government will do something for the unhappy man.”

The recent research points out that this was the propaganda exaggerated by Jawahar Mal.²⁰ Nevertheless this paper tried to report the view of the Indian passengers too unlike the Japanese papers, though it did not conceal its sympathetic attitudes towards the British Consul-General in Kobe, saying that his position was a very difficult one, for a question of the present sort was quite unprecedented, but that the Consular officials had done their best for these Indian passengers.

According to the general Japanese understanding, the British Government and Indian passengers were interested parties, while the Japanese ship was accidentally chartered in this case. Shiosaki, an engineer of the *Komagata Maru* who spent turbulent days, felt how pitiable the conditions of ‘a weak nation’ were. A biographer of Shiosaki writes that through his experience he came to conclude that the Japanese nation must be strong.²¹ In this sense the *Komagata Maru* incident was a divergent point of Indian Nationalism and Japanese Nationalism. It was only a few months after the departure of the ship from Kobe that the Japanese navy demonstrated her ‘strength’ in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny in Singapore.

3

The *Komagata Maru* reached Singapore on 16 September 1914, and stayed up to the 19th. But, her passengers were not allowed to land. She was forced to stay three miles off the shore. Some of the passengers could not fulfill even their wish to change the ship in order to proceed to Bombay or to Shanghai from where they had started their journey. Gurdit Singh also wanted to land at Singapore, but could not do so. The British authorities in Singapore may have thought for the moment that they could isolate the Indian community and the Indian army from ‘outside influence’. Later, the Governor Sir Arthur Young had

to observe as follows ;²²

“At that time I may say, the passage of the *Komagata Maru* through Singapore was a recent event, though the ship had no communication with the land, yet it had left a bad effect.”

As we noted, the majority of the passengers of the *Komagata Maru* had left the military service recently, and the men of the Indian Army who were stationed in Singapore had shared common feelings with the passengers about the meaning of the war. Also the blunt response of the Government of Straits Settlements towards the demands of the passengers was enough to divert the ‘loyalty’ of the Indian soldiers.

The *Komagata Maru* entered the mouth of the Houghly on 26 September 1914. The Criminal Intelligence and Police searched arms and copies of the *Ghadar* inside the ship on the next two days. On the 29th, when the ship reached Budge-Budge near Calcutta, the passengers were told to board a special train to Punjab. Their stay in Calcutta was not admitted. But the passengers refused it.²³ On this day there was firing from both sides of the police and the passengers, and about 20 passengers lost their lives in this firing.²⁴ The voyage of the *Komagata Maru* came to a tragic end, though the suffering of her passengers still remained. This is a separate story to be told.

Here I want to come back to the impact of the *Komagata Maru* incident on Singapore. In December 1914 the men of the Malay States Guides refused to serve in East Africa. This refusal seriously affected the feelings of the men of the Fifth Light Infantry who were stationed in Singapore.

In this month the General Officer Commanding the Troops, Major General Reade received an anonymous letter only written as ‘Men of the Guides’. In this letter they expressed that they could not fight in any other country under any circumstances than the ones mentioned on their engagement sheet, that is, the Malay Peninsula and the Straits Settlements. This letter connected their refusal to serve in East Africa with the fresh memory of the tragedy of the *Komagata Maru* passengers at Budge-Budge ;²⁵

“As our brethren who have been shot in the *Komagata Maru* case have troubled and grieved us, some of us have lost dear brothers and other blood-relations, we can never forget the kindness of the Indian Government (British) for shooting and slaughtering the dead who lost their livings in India in the hopes of earning money and better living in America from which country they were expelled, and were not allowed to land and returned, but the Indian Government again taking the poor dead as seditious people, did not allow them to land at their own home even. When we have no right to walk freely on our own land then what do you want from us in other countries? As we are butchered in our own country we cannot expect better treatment from other countries to fight except in those mentioned in our agreement sheets.”

According to the letter of Lieutenant Colonel, C. H. B. Lees, commanding Malay States Guides, when the regiment came to Singapore on the outbreak of the war, the Indian officers and men were full of enthusiasm and were eager to proceed on service to Europe. But, after some weeks when he informed that they had been selected for service in East Africa, the situation had changed, and many of them, both Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs, refused to serve or were reluctant. Particularly the men of No.III (Punjabi Mohammedan) Double Company plainly refuted that it was against the agreement they signed when enlisting in the corps. As the ‘prime mover in the whole affair’, Lees was suspicious of the movement of Subadar Elim Din, a senior Indian officer who was discontented with his present post and complained of unsatisfactory treatment of the men like the pay to their wives and families, and so on.

The Commander of the Malay States Guides, however, judged that their refusal to go on service proceeded from fear, and not from any seditious wish to embarrass the Government, and also thought that the letter received did not represent the feelings of the men in the regiment, or even of any considerable portion of them. He guessed that it was written by someone outside the regiment at the request of one or two individuals in it merely to emphasize the disinclination of the corps to go service.²⁶

He tried to minimize the ‘seditious’ character of the refusal to serve in East Africa,

but the feelings of reluctance to fight in the front grew fast on the side of the Indian soldiers within a few months after the beginning of the war. When the first stage of 'enthusiasm' had passed, they felt it difficult to find the positive meaning of their participation in the war. This was nothing but the growth of anti-war feelings which took form of the 'fear' of the war. Both the military and citizens of the Indian community shared the same feelings of distance about the war. The *Tosa Maru*, *Mishima Maru* and other ships, which brought Ghadarites from America and other parts of Asia, passed through Singapore, and, while they stayed in Singapore, they appealed to the Indian soldiers to revolt. As the background which promoted the refusal of the men to serve, Lees mentioned some factors like meeting people in the bazaar or meeting and talk with German prisoners. Further he disclosed that the 'seditious' literature was being sent to soldiers through mail from America. To read 'Ghadar' literature was not so difficult at that time. If we can admit the influence of the propaganda of the Ghadar Party here, it is not unjust to hypothesize that there was at least a sign of the connection of anti-war feelings with their will to freedom, however limited their scope was at that time.

Later, Governor Sir Arthur Young came to the conclusion that the action of the Malay States Guides in December 1914 had had a 'pernicious effect' upon the morale of the Fifth Light Infantry.

Both the refusal of the Malay States Guides to serve in East Africa and the revolt of the Fifth Light Infantry in Singapore in February 1915 was not a product of the call of a few revolutionaries, but the accumulative results of the anti-war feelings of the Indian soldiers and their will to freedom which was promoted by the Ghadar Party movement. The tragic voyage of the *Komagata Maru* was one of the factors which led to the reconsideration of the meaning of the First World War and freedom.

Conclusion

The *Komagata Maru* incident has become a part of the Freedom Struggle in India, supported by the informal network of the Indian community and the Ghadar Party

movement.

However, the Japanese Government and public opinion had thought till the Budge-Budge firing in 1914 that the *Komagata Maru* incident was basically the problem between the British Government and the Indian passengers, though a Japanese ship was involved in the matter. Therefore they tried to keep their 'neutral' stance. Their main concern was the fate of the Japanese captain and crew, while they were impressed by the struggle waged by Gurdit Singh and Indian passengers. As the First World War proceeded, Japanese concern came to center around the siege of Chintao in China. Actually the *Komagata Maru* incident meant the first contact between Japanese common people and Indian Nationalism. But, due to Japanese 'neutral' attitudes this aspect was not known for a long time.

The participation of the Japanese Volunteer Corps and Japanese Navy in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny in Singapore in February 1915 provided Japanese people a chance to reconsider how to face Indian Nationalism. There appeared critical view, which thought that, just because the Mutiny was an affair between the British Government and the Indian soldiers, we should not have intervened in it. When the Japanese Government issued deportation order to two Indian revolutionaries, Rash Bihari Bose and H. L. Gupta in November 1915, Japanese public opinion moved to protect them. The reconsideration of the meaning of the Japanese participation in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny worked here.

But, even at this stage of history Japanese public opinion including journalism did not seem to have thought the *Komagata Maru* incident as their own problem, though Consul Hori's view which we cited already disclosed it. The struggle waged by the Indian passengers in Canada and the tragedy at Budge-Budge have been long known, but there are still some aspects to be clarified with regard to this historical incident.

P. S. : This is a part of my forthcoming work, *Indian Mutiny in Singapore (1915)-First World War and Asia*, Revised Edition, rewritten for the 17th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia 18-22 December 2002, Dhaka. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. K. M. Mohsin, President for his kind arrangement.

This paper was also read at a meeting of the Centre for Contemporary Studies held at the C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar Foundation, Chennai on 11 January 2003. I would like to thank Dr. G. J. Sudhakar who kindly organized this meeting.

- 1 Sho Kuwajima, *First World War and Asia-Indian Mutiny in Singapore (1915)*, Osaka, 1988.
-----, *Indian Mutiny in Singapore (1915)*, Calcutta, 1991.
-----, "War, Regions and International Relations-Indian Mutiny in Singapore (1915)", in Sho Kuwajima (ed.), *Contemporary India-in Search of Dialogue-*, Calcutta, 2000.
-----, *Indian Mutiny in Singapore (1915)-First World War and Asia-*, Revised Edition, forthcoming.
- 2 *Osaka Asahi Shimbun*, 23 July 1914.
- 3 As for the latest life of the *Komagata Maru*, I owe my information to Capt. Kanazawa Kanji, Curator, NYK Marine Museum, Yokohama.
- 4 Hugh Johnston, *The Voyage of the Komagata Maru-The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar*, Delhi, 1979, p. 29 and P. 33.
- 5 Yoshida Sadao, *Komagata Maru Jiken* (in Japanese ; Komagata Maru Incident), Osaka, 1960, pp. 78-9.
- 6 Johnston, op. cit., p. 26.
- 7 Home Department, Political A, August 1915, No 216, in T. R. Sarren (ed.), *Select Documents on the Ghadr Party*, New Delhi, 1994, p. 64.
- 8 *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, 21 July 1914.
- 9 Kato to Hori, 16 June 1914 in *Canada ni oite Higashi Indo-jin Nyūkoku Kinshi Ikken-Komagata Maru Jiken* (Refusal of the entry of Indians to Canada-Komagata Maru Incident), Foreign Record Office, Tokyo.
- 10 Yata to Kato, 10 July 1914, *ibid*.
- 11 Hori to Kato, 10 June 1914, *ibid*.
- 12 Babu Gurdit Singh, *Voyage of Komagata Maru or India's Slavery Abroad*, Calcutta, n. d., pp. 72-4.
- 13 Hori to Kato, 24 July 1914, *Canada ni oite -----*, op. cit.
- 14 Sohan Singh Josh, *Hindustan Gadar Party-A Short History*, New Delhi, 1977, p. 143.
- 15 Hori to Kato, 9 June 1914, *Canada ni oite -----*, op. cit.
- 16 Sohan Singh Josh, *Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna-Life of the Founder of the Ghadar Party*, New Delhi, 1970, p. 40.
- 17 *Yokohama Boyeki Shimpō*, 25 August 1914.
- 18 Johnston, op. cit., p. 93.

- 19 *Japan Chronicle*, 27 August 1914.
- 20 Johnston, op. cit., p. 93.
- 21 Yoshida, op. cit., pp. 254-5.
- 22 CO 273/423, No. 169, *The Colonial Office Correspondence relating to the Straits Settlements*, Public Record Office, London (Microfilm Copy, Central Library, National University of Singapore).
- In this connection the Japaness Consul Fujii in Singapore writes to Foreign Minister Kato, stating that with regard to the embargo there are some disturbances in the Indian community against the authorities though there is no complaint against the (Japanese)crew(Fujii to Kato, 22 September 1914, *Canada ni oite* -----, op.cit.).
- 23 Johnston, op. cit., pp. 96-8.
- 24 Sumit Sarkar writes that 22 were killed (Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947*, New Delhi, 1983, p. 148), and Mridula Mukherjee says that 18 passengers were killed (Bipan Chandra *et al.*, *India's Struggle for Independence*, New Delhi, 1988, p. 153).
- 25 CO 273/433, No. 337.
- 26 Ibid., No. 339.