Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments

Mitani, Yohei; Hanaki, Nobuyuki

Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments

Mitani, Yohei; Hanaki, Nobuyuki

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1273, 1-40

アクセス数:347件（2025-11-03 22:49 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100199

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タイトル	Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments
著者	NRID 1000070647172 1000070647172 著者名 Mitani, Yohei
著者	NRID 1000070400611 1000070400611 ORCID 0000-0003-3127-690X 0000-0003-3127-690X researchmap permalink nhanaki nhanaki Scopus Author ID 16233221700 16233221700 著者名 Hanaki, Nobuyuki
キーワード等	Between-subject random incentive
	Donation-dictator game
	Social preferences
JEL分類コード (JEL)	C91
JEL分類コード (JEL)	D90
抄録	We conduct an online donation dictator game experiment with over 1,300 participants, representative of the Japanese population, to investigate the relationship between the incentive scheme and prosocial behavior by systematically varying the stake size and probability of being paid, including those where the expected payments are controlled. We find that stake size is the main driver of donation decisions, even in the hypothetical scenario. Our result suggests that paying a large amount to a few participants incentivizes donation decisions better than paying a small amount to many in large-scale online experiments.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1273
ページ	1-40
刊行年月	2025-02
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100199
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1273.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2025, 1273, p. 1-40
DC.title	Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments
DC.creator	Mitani, Yohei
DC.creator	Hanaki, Nobuyuki
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2025-02
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1273.pdf
DC.subject	Between-subject random incentive
	Donation-dictator game
	Social preferences
DCTERMS.abstract	We conduct an online donation dictator game experiment with over 1,300 participants, representative of the Japanese population, to investigate the relationship between the incentive scheme and prosocial behavior by systematically varying the stake size and probability of being paid, including those where the expected payments are controlled. We find that stake size is the main driver of donation decisions, even in the hypothetical scenario. Our result suggests that paying a large amount to a few participants incentivizes donation decisions better than paying a small amount to many in large-scale online experiments.
DC.format	100199
citation_title	Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments
citation_author	Mitani, Yohei
citation_author	Hanaki, Nobuyuki
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2025-02
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1273
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	40
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100199
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1273.pdf

Pay a lot to a few instead of a bit to all! Evidence from online donation experiments

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