Functionalism and Popper’s Interactionism : Over the Positioning of Popper’s Philosophy in Modern Philosophy of Mind

キノウ　シュギ　ト　ポパー　ノ　ソウゴ　サヨウ　シュギ　ゲンダイ　ノ　ココロ　ノ　テツガク　ニ　オケル　ポパー　テツガク　ノ　フチ　ヲ　メグッテ

Ikeda, Kento

イケダ, ケント

Sociology, Anthropology and Philosophy, Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University

心の哲学

相互作用主義

機能主義

心的力場仮説

Karl Popper

Philosophy of Mind

Interactionism

Functionalism

Mental Force Field Hypothesis

論文

Article

One of Karl Popper’s (1902–1994) primary contributions in the latter half of his career was the development of an argument for interactionism. He proposed that the mind could influence the body, a notion that finds parallels in functionalism. This article provides a comparative analysis of Popper’s interactionism and the contemporary ideas of functionalism to establish the position of his thought within the context of the modern philosophy of mind. I first outline the key features of Popper’s interactionism and late 20th-century functionalism. Next, I more specifically examine Popper’s hypothesis of the mind, highlighting its differences from functionalism. Based on these findings, I conclude that despite their parallels, Popper’s approach to the mind means his interactionism cannot be attributed to functionalism.