Manufacturers’ Dilemma Falling into Exclusive-Offer Competition : A Laboratory Experiment

Kitamura, Hiroshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Misato et al.

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1281

アクセス数:12件（2025-05-05 13:38 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100860

論文情報

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タイトル
Manufacturers’ Dilemma Falling into Exclusive-Offer Competition : A Laboratory Experiment
著者
NRID
1000030582415 1000030582415
著者名
Kitamura, Hiroshi
NRID
1000080334879 1000080334879
著者名
Matsushima, Noriaki
NRID
1000070794585 1000070794585
著者名
Sato, Misato
NRID
1000060711950 1000060711950
著者名
Tamura, Wataru
キーワード等
Exclusive dealing
Exclusive-offer competition
Bargaining Power
Product differentiation
Laboratory experiment
JEL分類コード (JEL)
L12
L41
L42
抄録
We experimentally investigate exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. In theory, when upstream firms make exclusive offers to a downstream monopolist,both exclusion and non-exclusion can be equilibrium outcomes. By varying key parameters,we explore how bargaining power and product differentiation affect the likelihood of exclusion outcomes. We experimentally find that exclusion is more likely to be observed when the upstream firms have stronger bargaining power or when they produce more differentiated products; paradoxically, the higher upstream firms’ profits from cooperatively offering unattractive exclusive contracts, the more likely they are to fall into intense exclusive-offer competition.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1281
刊行年月
2025-03
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/100860
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1281.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers