Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies

Kitamura, Shuhei; Takahashi, Ryo; Yamada, Katsunori

Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies

Kitamura, Shuhei; Takahashi, Ryo; Yamada, Katsunori

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1289

アクセス数:179件（2026-02-16 16:45 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102138

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タイトル	Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies
著者	NRID 1000090812090 1000090812090 著者名 Kitamura, Shuhei
	NRID 1000040748349 1000040748349 著者名 Takahashi, Ryo
	NRID 1000080533603 1000080533603 著者名 Yamada, Katsunori
キーワード等	Political accountability
	misperception
	strategic voting
	corruption
	social norm
	moral
	partisan identity
	political polarization
	information campaign
抄録	Elections are a primary mechanism through which citizens can hold politicians accountable for misconduct. However, whether voters actually punish corruption at the ballot box remains an open question, as electoral decisions often involve strategic considerations, including beliefs about how others think and behave. To better understand how such strategic considerations operate in this context, we conducted a pre-registered information intervention during a major political corruption scandal in Japan. The treatment provided information about the prevailing social norm—specifically, the perceived social intolerance of the scandal. The treatment increased turnout and support for a challenger, particularly among swing voters who initially believed that others were intolerant of corruption. Among party loyalists with more lenient prior beliefs, the same information backfired, increasing support for the incumbent. The turnout effect among swing voters was sizable—approximately six percentage points—comparable in magnitude to benchmark mobilization interventions involving personalized contact or social pressure. To account for these patterns, we develop a simple model that incorporates mechanisms—notably moral reinforcement and identity reinforcement—that generate predictions consistent with the observed heterogeneity in responses. By highlighting how perceptions of prevailing norms shape voter behavior in the presence of strategic considerations, this study contributes to a broader understanding of how democratic institutions can remain resilient in the face of political misconduct.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1289
刊行年月	2025-06
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102138
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1289.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2025, 1289
DC.title	Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies
DC.creator	Kitamura, Shuhei
	Takahashi, Ryo
	Yamada, Katsunori
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2025-06
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1289.pdf
DC.subject	Political accountability
	misperception
	strategic voting
	corruption
	social norm
	moral
	partisan identity
	political polarization
	information campaign
DCTERMS.abstract	Elections are a primary mechanism through which citizens can hold politicians accountable for misconduct. However, whether voters actually punish corruption at the ballot box remains an open question, as electoral decisions often involve strategic considerations, including beliefs about how others think and behave. To better understand how such strategic considerations operate in this context, we conducted a pre-registered information intervention during a major political corruption scandal in Japan. The treatment provided information about the prevailing social norm—specifically, the perceived social intolerance of the scandal. The treatment increased turnout and support for a challenger, particularly among swing voters who initially believed that others were intolerant of corruption. Among party loyalists with more lenient prior beliefs, the same information backfired, increasing support for the incumbent. The turnout effect among swing voters was sizable—approximately six percentage points—comparable in magnitude to benchmark mobilization interventions involving personalized contact or social pressure. To account for these patterns, we develop a simple model that incorporates mechanisms—notably moral reinforcement and identity reinforcement—that generate predictions consistent with the observed heterogeneity in responses. By highlighting how perceptions of prevailing norms shape voter behavior in the presence of strategic considerations, this study contributes to a broader understanding of how democratic institutions can remain resilient in the face of political misconduct.
DC.format	102138
citation_title	Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies
citation_author	Kitamura, Shuhei
	Takahashi, Ryo
	Yamada, Katsunori
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2025-06
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1289
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102138
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1289.pdf

Misperception and Accountability in Polarized Societies

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