Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money

Shinozaki, Hiroki; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money

Shinozaki, Hiroki; Serizawa, Shigehiro

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1292, 1-70

アクセス数:54件（2026-02-16 12:11 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102394

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タイトル	Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money
著者	NRID 1000000979338 1000000979338 著者名 Shinozaki, Hiroki
著者	著者名 Serizawa, Shigehiro
キーワード等	Constrained Efficiency
	Strategy-proofness
	Equal treatment of equals
	Nonquasi-linear preferences
	Bundling unit-demand minimum price Warlasian rule
	Package auctions
JEL分類コード (JEL)	D44
	D47
	D71
	D82
抄録	We consider a package assignment problem with money, in which a finite set M of objects is allocated to agents. Each agent receives a package of objects and makes a payment, and has preferences over pairs consisting of a package and a payment. These preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. The admissible set of object allocations is chosen by the planner to pursue specific objectives in conjunction with the rule. A rule satisfies constrained efficiency if no allocation―whose object allocation is admissible under the rule―Pareto dominates the allocation selected by the rule. We study the compatibility between constraints on admissible object allocations and desirable properties of rules, and characterize the rules that satisfy both. We establish that: A rule satisfies constrained efficiency, no wastage, equal treatment of equals, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy if and only if its admissible set of object allocations is bundling unit-demand for some partition of M, satisfies no wastage and anonymity, and the rule is a bundling unit-demand minimum price Walrasian rule.
出版者	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
収録物名	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)	1292
ページ	1-70
刊行年月	2025-07
言語	英語
ハンドルURL	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102394
PISSN	0473453X
eISSN	24350982
関連情報 (references)	URI https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1292.pdf
アクセス権	metadata only access
カテゴリ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
カテゴリ	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers

資源タイプ	テクニカルレポート
ローカル資源タイプ	ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー
DCMI資源タイプ	text
DCTERMS.bibliographicCitation	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 2025, 1292, p. 1-70
DC.title	Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money
DC.creator	Shinozaki, Hiroki
DC.creator	Serizawa, Shigehiro
DC.publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
DC.language' scheme='DCTERMS.RFC1766	英語
DC.type' scheme='DCTERMS.DCMIType	text
DCTERMS.issued' scheme='DCTERMS.W3CDTF	2025-07
DC.relation' scheme='DCTERMS.URI	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1292.pdf
DC.subject	Constrained Efficiency
	Strategy-proofness
	Equal treatment of equals
	Nonquasi-linear preferences
	Bundling unit-demand minimum price Warlasian rule
	Package auctions
DCTERMS.abstract	We consider a package assignment problem with money, in which a finite set M of objects is allocated to agents. Each agent receives a package of objects and makes a payment, and has preferences over pairs consisting of a package and a payment. These preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. The admissible set of object allocations is chosen by the planner to pursue specific objectives in conjunction with the rule. A rule satisfies constrained efficiency if no allocation―whose object allocation is admissible under the rule―Pareto dominates the allocation selected by the rule. We study the compatibility between constraints on admissible object allocations and desirable properties of rules, and characterize the rules that satisfy both. We establish that: A rule satisfies constrained efficiency, no wastage, equal treatment of equals, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy if and only if its admissible set of object allocations is bundling unit-demand for some partition of M, satisfies no wastage and anonymity, and the rule is a bundling unit-demand minimum price Walrasian rule.
DC.format	102394
citation_title	Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money
citation_author	Shinozaki, Hiroki
citation_author	Serizawa, Shigehiro
citation_publisher	The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
citation_language	英語
citation_date	2025-07
citation_journal_title	Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
citation_volume	1292
citation_firstpage	1
citation_lastpage	70
citation_public_url	https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102394
citation_abstract_html_url	https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1292.pdf

Constrained Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Package Assignment Problems with Money

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