Complete Loss of Competition : Uncontested Elections and Political Rents

Notsu, Naruki; Semma, Asahi; Harada, Shuko

OSIPP Discussion Paper, 2025, DP-2025-E-004, 1-37

アクセス数:120件（2026-02-16 23:05 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102736

論文情報

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タイトル
Complete Loss of Competition : Uncontested Elections and Political Rents
著者
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notsunaruki notsunaruki
著者名
Notsu, Naruki
著者名
Semma, Asahi
著者名
Harada, Shuko
キーワード等
Uncontested elections
Politicians’ behavior
Political rent
No competition
抄録
This study examines how the complete absence of electoral competition shapes politicians’ behavior. To explore this, we focus on mayoral elections in Japanese municipalities, a setting where uncontested elections are a common and politically important phenomenon. Using the variation in uncontested elections across municipalities at each election year, we examine subsequent changes in mayors’ salaries. We find that mayors who win office without a contest subsequently increase their salaries. The pattern also extends to pivotal stakeholders. These findings suggest that when public conflicts, such as the existence of other candidates, do not exist, politicians are more likely to seek personal gain, highlighting the fundamental role of elections in disciplining officeholders.
出版者
Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka
収録物名
OSIPP Discussion Paper
巻(号)
DP-2025-E-004
ページ
1-37
刊行年月
2025-09-17
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102736
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2025/DP2025E004.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
OSIPP Discussion Paper