Dynamic Pricing of Information : Belief Divergence and Surplus Extraction

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing

Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers, 2025, 1294, 1-46

アクセス数:43件（2026-02-15 23:28 集計）

固定URL: https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102983

論文情報

ファイル出力 EndNote Basic出力 Mendeley出力

タイトル
Dynamic Pricing of Information : Belief Divergence and Surplus Extraction
著者
NRID
1000020768238 1000020768238
著者名
Chen, Chia-Hui
NRID
1000040324222 1000040324222
ORCID
0000-0002-0674-0216 0000-0002-0674-0216
researchmap permalink
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Scopus Author ID
36927932200 36927932200
著者名
Ishida, Junichiro
著者名
Suen, Wing
キーワード等
monopoly screening
dynamic experiment sequence
interim individual rationality constraint
belief divergence
full surplus extraction
payment gap
JEL分類コード (JEL)
D80
D82
抄録
We consider a screening problem in which a data seller offers a dynamic payment schedule for a sequence of experiments to a privately informed buyer. Different buyer types face different expected costs for the same payment schedule. This payment gap can be optimized to reduce information rent. Dynamic mechanisms strictly increase seller revenue compared to the optimal static mechanism, and may even extract full surplus under some conditions. We obtain a full characterization of optimal dynamic mechanisms, which can take the simple form of a binary experiment at each stage. Payments are backloaded and experiments become progressively more informative over stages.
出版者
The Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka
収録物名
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers
巻(号)
1294
ページ
1-46
刊行年月
2025-10
言語
英語
ハンドルURL
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/102983
PISSN
0473453X
eISSN
24350982
関連情報 (references)
URI
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1294.pdf
アクセス権
metadata only access
カテゴリ
ディスカッション／ワーキング・ペーパー DP/WP
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers