Contextualism and Invariantism : from a Factive Knowledge Attribution View

ブンミャク シュギ ト フヘン シュギ ジョジツテキ チシキ キゾク トイウ カンテン カラ

フクタ, ユウジ

Fukuta, Yuji

オオサカ ダイガク ダイガクイン ニンゲン カガク ケンキュウカ シャカイガク ニンゲンガク ジンルイガク ケンキュウシツ

Sociology, Anthropology and Philosophy, Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University

不変主義

知識

知識帰属

意味論

contextualism

invariantism

knowledge

knowledge attribution

semantics

Traditionally, it has been thought that knowledge is a constant property. If so, when you say that someone knows something you would attribute a constant epistemological property to him. But our actual uses of the term ‘know’ don’t reflect this traditional account. Namely, our uses of ‘know’ seem to vary relative to a situation where we use it. Contextualists try to reflect this observation in semantics, while invariantists don’t admit such semantic changes. For several years, this controversy between contextualism and invariantism has been carried out in broad range of fields involving semantics, epistemology and even pragmatics. In this study, I will focus on problems of knowledge attributions. I will argue that a serious problem would arise for contextualists, in so far as what they address is a problem of factive knowledge attributions.