How are exemplars interpreted? : -Relevance-Theory-based analysis on 'exemplification' and its philosophical implications

ミホン ワ イカニシテ カイシャク サレルカ ユウイセイ リロン ニヨル レイジ ガイネン ノ ブンセキ トソノ シャテイ

ノガワ, モトカズ

Nogawa, Motokazu

オオサカ ダイガク ニンゲン カガクブ シャカイガク ニンゲンガク ジンルイガク ケンキュウシツ

英語

例示

有意性

カテゴリー

発言解釈

exemplar

exemplification

relevance

category

utterance comprehension

How are exemplars interpreted? We cannot treat interpretation-process of an exemplar (especially of a novel one) as something self-evident. This problem is very crucial to the theory of utterance-comprehension, and more generally, to the theory of human cognition, although reference by exemplars (exemplification, as N.Goodman named) is often neglected by objectivist-realistic theorists. Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson) offers a basic framework for explaining the process of exemplar-interpretation: we can analyse exemplar-intepretaion as a pursuit of relevance by extending given, initial context. In return, the notion of exemplification, recognized as a basic kind of non-denotative reference, permits us to modify Relevance Theory and to overcome some of its defects which results from its objectivist inclinaiton (for exemple, its dubious distinction between communicating one's informative intention and providing a direct evidence for the information to be conveyed, or its notion of "interpretation" as opposed to "description"). And Relevance-Theory-based analysis on 'exemplification' may reveal an important ontological-epistemological implication of this notion: recognition and interpretation of novel exemplars are playing an central part in the creative cognitive pracitces, the re-organizing of exsiting categories, like "parole parlante" (M.Merleau-Ponty) or "world-making" (Goodman).

英語